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The Other Side of Peronist Argentina: Radicals and Socialists in the Political Opposition to Pern(1946-1955)

Author(s): Marcela Garca SebastianiSource: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May, 2003), pp. 311-339Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875952Accessed: 09-04-2015 17:51 UTC

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2/30

j

Lat.

Amer.

Stud.

5,

3

11-339

?

2003

Cambridge

University

Press

311

DOI:

Io.soI7/Soo2zz26Xo3006734

Printed

n

the

United

Kingdom

The

Other

Side of

Peronist

Argentina:

Radicalsand Socialistsin the Political

Opposition

to

Per6n

(1946-195 5)

MARCELA

GARCIA

SEBASTIANI

Abstract. The

political

life of

Argentina

between

1946

and

195

5

cannot be

defined

exclusively by the emergence and consolidation of Peronism, but was also shaped by

the

actions,

ideas

and

conflicts of

opposition

to

it. The

evolution

of the

Radical and

Socialist

parties

during

those

years

was

marked both

by

their

respective

internal

discrepancies

and

by

the

dynamics

of

confrontation with

the

government.

In

the

face of

Per6n's

emergence

as a

political

figure,

Radicals

and

Socialists revitalised

inter-party

agreements

that had been

tried and

tested

in

previous

years.

The

Rad-

icals,

their

internal

disagreements

notwithstanding,

were to

become

the main

rep-

resentatives of

anti-Peronism their

oppositional

roles

changing

as the

institutional

spaces

for conflict

and

engagement

with

Peronism

developed.

Meanwhile,

the Social-

ists lost

political

and

representational

weight, despite

their

desperate attempts

to

maintain themselves as an option within the political arena. When the rules of

political

competition

changed

in

Peronism's

favour,

Radicals

and

Socialists became

convinced of the

legitimacy

of

challenging

the

constitutional

order

in

an

attempt

to

increase the

political

representation

of

anti-Peronism.

From

Per6n's

1946

election

victory

to the

present

the

hostility

between

supporters

and

opponents

of Per6n

has

been

a

recurrent

feature of

recent

Argentine

political

history.

Numerous

attempts

have

been

made to

explain

Peronism,

a

phenomenon

that

appeared

to

change

all

the

previously

estab-

lished rules of politics in the country, provoking many intellectual battles

regarding

its

origins

and the

characteristics which

facilitated its

subsequent

consolidation in

power.1

In

recent

years

new

readings

of

Peronism

have

given

rise to an

ongoing

and

lively

historiographic

debate.2

However,

the

MarcelaGarcia

Sebastianis a Research

Fellow in the

Department

of

Historiadel

Pensa-

miento

y

de

los

Movimientos

Sociales

y

Politicos

II,

Facultad

de

Ciencias Politicas

y

Sociologia,

Universidad

Complutense

de

Madrid.

1

For a

bibliography

f

Peronism,see L. Horvath ed.),A HalfCenturyfPeronism,943-1993:

An

International

ibliography

Stanford,

993).

For the

different

interpretations

f

Peronism

from

its

overthrow n

1955

until the

end of

i98os,

see

Mariano

Plotkin,

'Per6n

y

el

peronismo:

un

ensayo

bibliogrifico,'

Estudios

nterdisciplinarios

eAmrica

Latina el

Caribe,

vol.

2,

no.

I

(i99I),

pp.

I3-3

.

2

Among

the most

interesting

studies in

the last decade are:

J.

C.

Torre,

La

viejaeguardia

indical

y

Perdn: obre os

ortgenes

elperonismoBuenos

Aires,

1990);

J.

Horowitz,

Argentine

Unions,

The

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3/30

31

2

MarcelaGarcia

Sebastiani

almost ten

years

during

which

Per6n was in

power

cannot be

definedwith

reference

only

to

means

of

exercisingpower

and

new

relationships

etween

the stateand certain

ectors

of

society,

but must

also be

understood

n

terms

of the ideas, actions and conflictsof those who opposed him. Peronism

generated

political

opposition

and

redefined

he

adversary

or the

parties

hat

had

traditionally

ompeted

on the

Argentine

political

tage.

We

cannot

speak

of Peronism and

anti-Peronism s the rreconcilable

olitical

dichotomy

n

Argentina

without

knowing

how and

why

anti-Peronism

rose

or

under-

standing

he

political

strategies

nd behaviour

hat

identified t as

an

oppo-

sition.

This

article

ocuses on what

happened

o

Radicals

nd

socialists

during

he

Peronist

period,

and

presents

a

political

history

of

opposition

to the

government.

The extremistaccusations evelled

by

anti-Peronistsmmedi-

ately

after

the

civilianand

military

movement

that

overthrew

Per6n

n

1955

should

be treatedwith caution.These

accusations,

which were

designed

o

discredit

ach and

every

government

action

and

political

eader

n the Pero-

nist

decade,

became the foundation

of

many

historical

interpretations

ince

refuted.

They

also

defined

subsequent

critical

arguments

which

explained

the

polarisation

f

Argentine

political

ife

exclusively

n

terms

of Peronism

and anti-Peronism.

Following

Per6n's

downfall,

anti-Peronist ntellectuals

pointed o therestrictions eplacedon dissidence sevidence or theregime's

supposed

totalitarian

aspirations.

However,

such

an

interpretation

llows

little

space

for examination

f

the

politicalopposition

of

the

period.

In

fact,

the

successive

governments

headed

by

Per6n

attempted

to

preserve,

n

one

way

or

another,

certain

legitimising

acets

of

politicalpluralism.

The

country's epublican

nstitutions

weremaintained:

Congress

andthe

Judiciary

continued

o

function,

electionswere held at

national,

provincial

nd

(despite

an

initial

delay)

municipal

evels. Per6n

himself

won two consecutive

free

elections n whichoppositionpartiesalso participated, espiterulesof rep-

resentation

which

placed

them

at a

disadvantage.

lthough

Per6n's

margins

of

victory

in

national

elections

gradually

ncreased

following

his narrow

victory

n

1946,

the

opposition

vote never

fell below

30

per

cent

during

his

State

and

the

Rise

of

Peren,

93o-0-94y

Berkeley,

990);

D.

James,

Resistencia

integracidn.

l

peronismo

la

clase

rabajadorargentina

946-1976

(Buenos

Aires

i990);

M.

Plotkin,

Magana es

San

Perin.

Propaganda,

itzualespoliticoseducacin

n

el

regimenperonista

(1946-si9)

Buenos

Aires,

1993);

L.

Caimari,

erdn

la

Iglesia

Catdlica.

eligidn,

stado

y

sociedadn

a

Argentina

(iq43-iy9)

(Buenos Aires,

1995);

S. Bianchi,'La IglesiaCat61lican los origenesdel peronismo,'

Anuario

EHS,

No.

5

(1990),

PP.

71-89

and

'Catolicismo

peronismo:

a

educaci6n

como

campo

de

conflicto

(1946-195

5),'

Anuario

IEHS,

No.

1i

(1996),

pp.

147-78;

F.

Neiburg,

Los

ntelectuales

la

invencidn

elperonismo

BuenosAires,

1998)

R.

Rein,Peronismo,

opulismo

politica.Argentina

5943-s9y1

Buenos

Aires,

1998);

L.

Zanatta,

Perdn el

mito

dela nacidn

atilica,

Iglesiayjircito

n os

or

genes

elperonismo,

43-1946

Buenos

Aires,

I1999).

.

C. Torre

(dir),

Los

adosperonistas

(5943-syj)

(Buenos

Aires,

2002zooz).




4/30

Radicals

nd

Socialists

n thePolitical

pposition

o

Perdn

313

period.

This

clearly

ndicates

not

only

that the

opposition

represented

real

alternative,

ut

also

that the

political

and social life

of

Argentina

between

1946

and

195

5

cannotbe reduced

imply

o the

emergence

nd consolidation

of Peronism.Moreover,Peronism did not reduce its opponents' political

space

in the

same

way

as

did

those

totalitarian

egimes

with

which it has

often been

compared.

Government

and

opposition

enjoyed

sufficient

legit-

imacy

to enable

political

competition.

Moreover,

while

political

opposition

may

be

worthy

of attention

n

itself,

examination

f the

type

of

relationship

that exists between

government

and

opposition

s central

o

analysis

of

any

politicalregime. Although

t

accounts

for

only

a

relatively

hort

period

of

Argentine

politicalhistory,

Peronismdid not remain

unchanged hroughout

the decade.The

opposition's

relationship

with the

government

and

the for-

mer's

room for manoeuvre hifted between

1946

and

1948

and

1949-1952,

and

again

between

1952

and

95

5.

It is true that

limitations

were

placed

on

dissident

opinion throughout

his

period,

but

this does not mean

they

were

always

of

the same

intensity,

or that Peronismdid

not

attempt

to observe

certain

democratic ules

which commanded ncreased nternational

support

afterthe

fall

of fascism.

The

study

of

politicaloppositionrequires

onsideration

f

several actors.

First,

the

spaces

of

confrontation

between

the

government

and

the

political

opposition.The prevailing nstitutionalstructuredetermines, n part, the

possibilities

of

different

oppositional

actors to

develop

their

strategies,

al-

though obviously

political

conflict s

not

always

carried ut

solely

within

an

institutional

ramework.4

he

opposition's

opportunities

nd

possibilities

or

action

vary

depending

on how

political

resources

are allocated

within the

division

of

powers,

on the

electoral

ules that

regulate

mechanisms

or

rep-

resentation

nd

on the

functioning

of the

party

system.

Too much

stresshas

often been

laid on

the

fact

that under he

Argentine

Constitution,

he execu-

tive can availitself of greater nstitutionalresourcesthan other branches

of

state,

tending

to weaken

the

opposition's

capacity

o

control

and

design

strategies

rom the

legislature.

n

a

system

such as

this,

parliament's

and is

weakened

while

the

presidentenjoys

exclusive

egislativepowers

of his own

through

executivedecree.

This

does

not

mean

that

congress

s not a forum

for

political

confrontation

and

negotiation,

or

that its

articulationwith

3

On

opposition

in

democratic

regimes,

see,

R.

Dahl,

(ed.),

Political

Oppositions

n

Western

Democracies(New Haven and London, 1966); Regimesnd OppositionsNew Haven and

London,

1973).

For non-democratic

regimes,

see

J.

Linz,

'An

Authoritarian

Regime:

The

Case of

Spain,'

n

R.

Dahl,

RWgimes

nd

Oppositions,p.

I71-259

and G.

Pasquino,

L'op-

posizione

difficile,'

Rivista

taliana e

Scienza

olitica,

nno

IV,

No.

2

(Aug.1974), PP.

421-39.

4

With

regard

o this

point

see,

R.

Dahl,

Lapoliarquzia.

articipacidny

posicidn

Madrid,

974)

and G.

Ionescu

e and De

Madariaga,

a

oposicidn.

asado

presente

euna

oposicidn

olitica

(Madrid,

I977).




5/30

3

4

Mlarcela

Garcia

Sebastiani

centres

of

oppositional

action

beyond

formal institutional

channels

is

impossible.5

In

the second

place,

it

is difficult o examine

he

subject

of

politicalop-

position withoutanalysing he politicalparties nvolved.In the Argentine

case a numberof factorsmake

this task

particularlyomplex:

the

instability

of

the

party

system

due to the

discontinuity

f

democratic

alternation,

he

questioning

of the

legitimacy

f

partypolitical

representation

nd the tend-

ency

to

focus

on leaders

as

opposed

to

institutions.

n the

period

under

consideration

he

Uni6n

CivicaRadical

UCR)

was

the

largest

of the

oppo-

sition

parties.

The Partido

Socialista

PS),

meanwhile,

ost

the

relative

margin

of

representation

nd decision n

public

life

which

it had

enjoyed

since the

beginning

of the

century.

n its

search or

an

ideologicalplatform

romwhich

to

compete

in the

political

arena,

he

PS became

Peronism's

harpest

ritic.

This

stance,however,

did not save it from

rapid

decline.

Clearly, ny

refer-

ence to

the

opposition

to

Per6n's

governmentsrequires

an

examination f

the

internal

dynamics

nd

power

struggles

f

these

organisations.

t is

argued

here that the

parties'organisational

apacity

and the

results

of their nternal

power

struggles

ultimately

determined heir

practise

and

strategy.

A

final

point

which merits

urther

investigation

and

which s

merely

ignalled

n

this

article)

s the

type

of

relationship

which

oppositionparties

establishedwith

other actors,suchas corporatebodies andanti-Peronistntellectual ircles.

This

is

particularly

elevant

or

understanding

he

way

in which

opposition

was

articulated

during

Per6n'ssecond termof office

and above

all

to

explain

the

participation

f the armed

forces and

the CatholicChurch

n his

over-

throw

in

September

195

5.

Radicals

nd ocialists

n theUnion

Democritica:

tradition

of

nter-party

nity

The Uni6n Democriticawas analliance, ormedbydifferentparties hathad

traditionally articipated

n the

political

arena,

which

established tself as

an

alternative

o

the

military

egime

hat

had taken

power

in

1943.

Although

t

5

See,

J.

Linz,

Democracia

presidencial

parlamentaria.

Que

diferencia

mplica?,'

n

J.

Linz

and A.

Valenzuela

comps.),

La

crisis

elpresidencialismo.

.

Perspectivasomparativas

Madrid,

1997),PP.

2

5-143;

S. M.

Shugart

nd

J. Carey,

PresidentndAssemblies:onstitutional

esign

andElectoral

ynamics

Cambridge,992);

S.

Mainwaring

nd

M.

Shugart,

Juan

Linz:

Pre-

sidencialismo democracia.Una revisi6n

critica,'

Desarrollo

conomico,

o.

13

5

(Oct.-Dec.

1994),

PP.

397-418;

S.

Mainwaring

nd M.

Shugart,

Presidentialismnd

Democrag

n

Latin

AmericaCambridge, 997).For the specificcase of the relationshipn Argentinehistory,

C.

Fenell,

'Congress

n the

Argentine

Political

System:

An

Appraisal,'

W.

H.

Agor

(ed.),

Latin

American

egislatures:

heir ole

nd

nfluence.nalyses

or

theCountries

New

York,

197

1)

and

G.

Molinelli,

Presidentes

y Congresos

n

Argentina:

itos

realidades

Buenos

Aires,

i991).

For

the

democratic

overnments

of

Rafil

Alfonsin and the first of Carlos

Menem,

A. M.

Mustapic,

Oficialistas

y

diputados:

as

relaciones

ejecutivo-legislativo

n la

Argentina,'

Desarrollo

condmico,

ol.

39,

No.

I56

(Jan.-Mar.

2000).




6/30

Radicals

nd

Socialistsn thePolitical

pposition

o

Perdn

3y

5

calledelections for

April

1946

(eventually

rought

orward

o

February)

he

militarygovernment

did not

appear,

n the

eyes

of its

contemporaries,

o

offer

any

innovative

change

n

Argentinepolitics. Opposition

to Per6n

was

not a decisive factor behindthe coalitionof traditionalpoliticalgroupings.

Therewere no indicationsbefore the electionsthat

Per6n

had

any

chance

of

success

or that he

would become a new charismatic eader

who would

change

he

relationship

etween

the

state,

political

parties

and

society.

Post-

mortem

explanations

or

Per6n's

victory

and the

changes

o

Argentinepol-

itical life

wrought by

his

movement seldom

emphasise

the

fact that the

alliancewas

the

result

of

inter-party

ntentes that had been

part

of

the

Argentinepolitical

spectrum

since the

1930s.

The

majority

of the

political

leaderswho decided

to unite as

Uni6n

Democritica

two

months before the

February

946

electionshad

priorexperience

of such

undertakings, lthough

it

is true that the influence

of

events

in

Europe

on the

national

political

debatewas a decisivefactor

n

the

timing

of the

pact.

Examples

of

coalition

building

can be

seen,

for

example,

n

the

presi-

dential

elections

held on 8

November

i931.

These

elections

were called

by

General

Uriburu

n an

attempt

o

legitimise

he institutional

risis

caused

by

the

military

oup

of

1930.

Although

the UCR decided

n

favour

of

absten-

tion,

Dem6crata

Progresistas

nd

socialists

had

decided

to form an electoral

coalition.Under the name of AlianzaCiviltheyproclaimedLisandroDe La

Torre and

Nicolais

Repetto

as their candidates or

president

and vice

presi-

dent.6The

winning

icket

n

these electionswas that of

Agustin

P.

Justo

and

Julio

A.

Roca,

also

the

result

of

an electoralcoalition

involving

various

pol-

itical

groupings, including

the Partido

Socialista

Independiente,

ed

by

Antonio De

Tomaso,

which

had

broken

away

rom the PS four

years

before;

the

conservatives

who

had

organised

hemselves

n

the PartidoDem6crata

Nacional);

some sectors

of

radicalism

opposed

to

Hip6lito Irigoyen's

ead-

ershipbut also theprocessof reorganisationet in motionbyMarceloT. de

Alvear;

and,

finally,

a collectionof

independent

associations.7

In

1936,

the

experience

of the

Popular

Fronts

in

Europe

had led

to the

formation

of an

opposition grouping.

This includedthe

UCR,

the

PS,

the

Partido

Dem6crata

Progresista

nd

the

Partido

Comunista.The

most

rep-

resentativeworkers'

and

students'

organisations,

uch as

Confederaci6n

Generalde

Trabajadores

nd the students

of

the Federaci6nUniversitaria

Argentina,

had announced heir

support

for the coalition.This new Frente

6

See

E.

Dickmann,

Recuerdos e un militante ocialista

Buenos

Aires,

1949), chap.

XI.

See

also,

R.

Larra,

Lisandro e

a

Torre.

VIda

drama el

solitario

ePinas

Buenos

Aires,

1942),p.

107

and

P.

Siegler,

Lisandro e

a

Torrey

osproblemas

e

su

e'oca

Buenos

Aires,

1984),

pp.

50-5.

7

L. De

Privitellio,

'Sociedad urbana

y

actores

politicos

en Buenos Aires: el

'partido'

independiente

en

193 i,'

Boletinde

Historia

Argentina

y

AmericanaDr. Emilio

Ravignani,

No.

9,

30

Series

(1994:

I),

PP. 75-6

and R.

Fraga,

El

GeneralJfusto (Buenos Aires,

1993),

PP.

2

2

5-42.




7/30

3

16

MarcelaGarcia

Sebastiani

Popular

had

aroused

strong

criticism rom the conservatives

n

power,

but,

despite

wild declarationsrom one side and careful

speeches

from the

other,

the

idea had not been translatednto an

alliance

candidature or

the

presi-

dential elections of

1937.

The Radicals had decided not to join the coalition

and

opted

to field their

own candidates.8

This

rejection

by

the UCR

directly

affected he

socialists'

political

nterests:after our

years'

upporting

lectoral

abstention,

n

193

5

the

Radicals

oined

the

scramble or votes.

Following

he

defeat

of

Radicalism

by

conservative candidates

in

the

1937

elections,

the

socialists ried

by

all

means

possible

to

exploit

the

possibilities

of

an

alliance

with the

UCR

in

order

to reach

an

agreement

or

the

election

of

deputies

n

March

1938.

Yet,

despite

proposals

made

by

the socialist leader Nicolas

Repetto

to the

opposition

Radical

leader,

Marcelo T.

de

Alvear,

and

the

support

for such a move at the

highest

evel

meetings

of the

PS,

the

agree-

ment

came to

nothing.9

Support

or

the different ombatants n the Second World

Warhad

split

Argentine

society

into two

political

and cultural

poles.

Those

who

had

fa-

voured the Allies

began

an

openly

anti-fascist

struggle

based

within

those

sectors

open

to

liberaland

cosmopolitan hought,

such as the

university

nd

the different ultural

nstitutions,

nd ended

up

assuming

an

overtlypolitical

character.1o

hroughout

he

opposition spectrum,

eading

party

igures

de-

cidedto jointhis waveof civilprotestagainst he conservative overnments'

dangerously

uthoritarian nd anti-democratic

practices.

n

June

1940

they

created

a civil

organisation,

Acci6n

Argentina,

nd called

on

'todos

ospartidos

politicos

la union

y

coordinacion

ara

ener

nadeterminacidnolidaria

nte

as

graves

amenazas

de la hora'.

Acci6n

Argentina

became an element of

political

8

On

this

topic,

see

A.

Rouquie,

Poder

military

sociedad

olitica

n

la

Argentina

-hasta

943

(Buenos

Aires,

i

98

1),

pp.

271-73

;

A.

Ciria,

Partidosypoder

n a

Argentina

oderna

(93o-946)

(BuenosAires, 1975), pp. 68-70;

N.

Repetto,

Mi

pasopor lapolitica.

De

Uriburu

Peron

(Buenos

Aires,

1957),

pp.

15

7

passim;

ndA.

Cataruzza,

osnombres

delpoder:

lvear

Buenos

Aires,

1997),PP.

56-7.

9

In

an interviewwith

the Radical

eader,

Repetto

commented hat '... consideraba

as

urgente

que

nunca

a

necesidade

organizar

n

gran

movimientoe

opinion

estinado darcon

el

modomas

prectico

eficaz

e

Ilegar

restablecern

elpais

el

imperio

e

a

legalidad

creara

posibilidad

euna

convivenda

ecunda

digna

de

los

partidos

..'-'Comitn

Ejecutivo

Nacional del

PS,

i945,'

El

Partido

ocialista

la

Unidn

Democritica.

esoludones

documentos

Buenos

Aires,

s/f)

and

'Programa

de

acci6n

politica

sancionado

por

el XXIV

Congreso

Ordinario

del Partido

Socialista'

(1938),

Anuario

el

Partido

ocialista

Buenos

Aires,

1946),

p.

25.

10

Concerning

Acdcin

rgentina,

ee R. Fitte

and

E.

F. Sanchez

Zinny,

Ginesis e

un

sentimiento

democraiticoBuenosAires, 1944),Tomo I, pp. 254-5. On the university ndothercultural

institutions,

ee

F.

Neiburg,

Los

ntelectualesy

a

invencion

delperonismo,hapter

4;

T.

Halperin

Donghi,

Historia e

a

Universidad

eBuenos ires

Buenos

Aires,

196

)

and

R.

Walter,

Student

Politics

n

Argentina.

he

University

eform

nd

ts

Effects,

918g-164

New

York,

1968).

n

The

leadership

of this

grouping

were

comprised

Nicolas

Repetto,

Mario Bravo and

Am&ico

Ghioldion

behalf of

the

PS,

Julio

A.

Noble on behalf

of

the PartidoDem6crata

Progresista;

M. T.

De

Alvear,

Emilio

Ravignani,

EduardoLaurencena nd ErnestoBoatti




8/30

Radicals

nd

Socialistsn thePolitical

Opposition

o Perdn

317

socialisation,

which sowed the seeds

for an

inter-party

understanding

on

liberal,

and

democratic values

and which would later lead

to the

creation

of

the

Uni6n Democratica. Towards

the end

of

1941

the

government,

under

the

control of the conservative Ram6n Castillo, took various decisions that

particularly

affected the

opposition

parties:

the

Concejo

Deliberante of

Buenos

Aires,

a

political

forum dominated

by

Radicals and

socialists,

was

closed

down and

a

state

of

emergency proclaimed.

Acci6n

Argentina

then

became the

platform

for the

re-launching

of

proposals

for a coalition

be-

tween

the

different

political

forces.12

As on

previous

occasions,

the

initiative

came from

the PS

and

had

the

support

of

trade unions and

students.

Neither

the Partido Dem6crata

Progresista

nor

the

UCR

took

part

in

these

prelimi-

nary

talks

on

'la

coalici6n

de

unidad',

which was

supported

initially

by

the PS

and

Acci6n

Argentina,

who

spread

the idea

through propaganda

in

the

Federal

Capital,

C6rdoba,

Santa

Fe

and the various towns

in

the

province

of

Buenos

Aires. l

Integration

in

the

proposed

coalition

became the

best

alternative for the

UCR,

which

was beset

by

a

leadership

crisis

following

the

death

of

Marcelo

T. de Alvear

in

January

I942.

The UCR's

difficulties had

been

clearly

reflected

in

its

poor showing

in

the March

I942

by-elections

in

Buenos

Aires.

In

January 1943

the National Convention

of the UCR

agreed

to

participate,

albeit

with internal

differences,

in

a

pro-Uni6n

Democritica

Argentina commission, in which the PS and Acci6n Argentina, and some-

what later the Partido

Dem6crata

Progresista,

were

already

involved.14

An

electoral coalition was

being

defined

to

compete

in

the

general

elections

called

for

September

1943.

When

the

military

movement,

in

which Per6n

participated

and

from

which

he

emerged

as a

political

option,

emerged

on

4

June,

the

parties

which

comprised

the then-Uni6n Democritica were at the

most delicate

stage

of the debate over the

party

or

extra-partyprofile

of the

presidential

candidates.

Following the military uprising, many of the political leaders who had

taken

part

in the debate

sought refuge

in

Montevideo for fear of

per-

secution

and

from

there continued

their contacts

in

order

to reach

some kind

of

agreement.15

Demonstrations

against

the

regime

and

in favour

of the

on

behalfof the

UCR;

and

Reynaldo

astor,

Vicente

SolanoLimaand

AntonioSanta-

marina,

ho wereconservatives

ho refused o

support

he

governments

hicharose

from the

agreement.

ee

Fitte

and

Sanchez

Zinny,

Ginesis e un

sentimiento

emocritico,

pp.

254-5

and

p.

275.

12

'Frentelasituacidnnterna.. lanzamosesdeala dea,ineludirobligacionesresponsabilidades,e

un

acercamientoe

odas

lasfuerZaspoliticas,

noproyectamos

xclusidn

lguna'.

Primera

esoluci6n

del

Consejo

Nacional

el

PS,

parte

inaldel

manifiesto

el z8

de

diciembre

e

94i,'

ElPartido

ocialistay

a

Unidn

emocrdtica

nd

La

Vanguardia,

9

Dec.

I94

13

Fitte and

Sanchez

Zinny,

Ginesis e

un

sentimiento

emocritico,

p.

397-406.

14

F.

Luna,

Alvear (Buenos

Aires,

1986), p.

331.

15 S.

Nudelman,

El

radicalismol

servicio

e

la

libertad

Buenos

Aires,

I1947).




9/30

3

18

Marcela

arcia

ebastiani

restoration

of

democratic

nstitutions,

called

by

extra-party rganisations

including

student and

professional

sectors from

mid-i945

onwards,16

ed

party

eaders o

believe that

they

did not need to redefine

significantly

he

inter-party ntente towardswhich they had been workingfor years.They

believed

that the defence of

democraticvalues

was

sufficient o

guarantee

their

electoral

victory.

Peronists

nd

Radicals

n

conflict:

hedebaten

theNational

Congress

Per6n's

victory

over

the

candidates

of

the

Uni6n Democratica

in

the

February 946

election

was not

overwhelming

n

termsof

votes,17

ut

caused

such

surprise

and

perplexityamongst

the

political

actors

who

had

defined

themselves

by

their

unity

against

he

military

egime

hat t

even

conditioned

their

analysis

of the

reasons

for

the defeat.

Once

the final

resultswere

an-

nounced,

he

electoral

oalition

collapsed

and

after

June 1946

each

party

had

to

elaborate

ts own

strategies

f

opposition

o Per6n's

government.

The

task

was

not

easy,

given

that

some

parties,

uch as

the

PS,

had

not even

gained

politicalrepresentation

n

Congress.

Othershad lost

leaders

and activists

o

the Peronist

cause,

as was the

case

of

the

conservatives

and the Radicals

as well as the

socialists.18

n

this

situation he

question

of how to

oppose

Peronism becamea matter of politicalsurvival or the partieswhich had

dominated

lectoral

politics

since

the

beginning

of

the

century,although

he

UCR

appeared

o

have

emerged

rom the

process

the

most

unscathed.

The results

of

the

1946

elections

left the

UCR as the main

opposition

force and

marked he

constitutional

battleground

or

political

confrontation.

The

opposition

had

49

of the

15

8

seats

n

the

lower

house,

but

had

no

rep-

resentation

n the

Senate.The

Chamber f

Deputies

was

therefore

o be

one

of the

centres

of

rivalry

between

the two

parties

with

most

representatives

16

For

an

account

leading

up

to the Feb.

1946

elections,

see

F. Luna.

El4y.

Crdnica

e un

ano

decisivo

Buenos

Aires,

1971).

17

Out of

a

total

of

2,839,507

registered

votes

(all male),

Per6n

gained

1,487,886 (5

2.40%)

and

the Uni6n Democraitica

,207,080 (42.5

1%),

D.

Cant6n,

Eleccionesyartidos

oliticos

n

la

Argentina.

Historia,

interpretacidny

alance

(Buenos

Aires,

1973),

p.

272.

18

On the

formation

of the Partido

Peronistaand the conflictswithin

the its

rise,

see M. M.

Mackinnon,

Sobre

los

origenes

del

Partido

Peronista.Notas

introductorias,'

W.

Ansaldi,

A.

Pucciareli

nd

J.

C.

Villarruel

eds.),

Representaciones

nconclusas.

Las

clases,

os

actores

y

los

discursos

e

a

memoria,

1

2-1946

(Buenos

Aires,

1995),

pp.

123-56.

On

the alliance

f Per6n

with the conservativeectors, ee IgnacioLlorente,Alianzaspoliticas n el surgimiento el

peronismo:

el

caso

de

la

provincia

de

Buenos Aires' and Luis

Gonzalez

Esteves,

'Las

elecciones de

1946

en

la

provincia

de

C6rdoba,'

both in M.

Mora and

Araujo

and

I.

Llorente

(comps.),

El

votoperonista.

nsayos

e

ociologia

lectoral

argentina

Buenos

Aires,

1980),

pp.

269-307

y pp.

318-364

respectively.

Also,

C.

Tcach,

Sabattinismoy eronismo.

Partidos

politicos

n

Cerdoba,

94i-syy

(Buenos

Aires,

1991),

pp.

89-90.

On

socialists onverted

o the

Peronist

cause,

see

Rein,

Peronismo,

opulismoyolitica, p. 1-8

3.




10/30

Radicalsnd

Socialists

n the

Political

pposition

o

Perdn

319

and

the main

stage

for the

political

and institutional

onfrontation

between

government

and

opposition.

The Radical

opposition

was to concentrate ts

efforts

againstgovernmentpolicy

here.The

Congress

had

not met

since

the

end of

1942

and its reopeningwas awaitedwithgreatpublicexpectation.

The

opposition

to Peronism

n

Congress

came from

the

Bloque

de los

44

-

a

group

of

Radical

deputies,

who

were

respected

even

by

deputies

within

the Peronist

group;19

anotherfive

deputies

came

from

other

oppo-

sitionforces.

However,

he Radicals

not

only

had

to

define

their

strategies

f

opposition

to the

government

n

Congress,

but

also had

to

organise

their

party

nternally.

Their defeat at the hands of

Per6n

had unleashedsuch

a

major

crisiswithin the national

eadership

of

the

UCR.

The internal

power

struggle

came to centre on the resistanceof certain eaderswho

had

sup-

ported inter-partyunity

as the best solution for Radicalism

(and

were

therefore

known

as

unionistas)

o the need to introduce

organisational

e-

forms which would democratise

he

party's

main

decisions.

The internal

divergences

between

differentstrands of Radicalismwere intrinsic to the

history

of

the

partyorganisation

nd were

not

to be absent

n

the

years

of

opposition

o

Peronism.20 hese

divergences

houldnot

be

seen

merely

as a

dispute

between

two

opposing

factions,

one more conservative

the

union-

istas)

nd the other more

popular

and

nationalist,

spousing

he

principles

of

yrigovenismo,hose memberswouldcome to be known as the intransigentes.

The UCR's

list

of candidates or the

1946

elections had

given

seats

to

several

young

leaders

with

new

ideas who had

fought

for

a share of

power

within the

party. Amongst

the most

outstanding

of these were Ricardo

Balbin and Arturo Frondizi.

The

formerwon his seat for the

province

of

Buenos Aires

and

was elected

a

leader of

the Radical

group

in

parliament;

the latter

won

a

seat

in

representation

f the Federal

Capital

and

supported

Balbin's

work in the lower

chamber.21

he

difficulties

aced

by

those who

defended their membershipof a modernisingand intransigenteaction of

Radicalism

n

consolidating

heir nitiatives

nd

political

practice

withintheir

party

structures,

ontrasted

harply

with theirwork as the

largest

opposition

19

'(Los

radicales)a

ten/an

nos

hombres

echos:

antander,

anmartino,

erio

Rojas,

Absal6n

Rojas,

Balbin,

rondii,

el coronel

omar,

raun

bloqueue

.. nosotros

que

veniamos

el

radicalismo

eniamos

un

gran

respeto,

na

gran

admiracio'n

or

ellos,

quer/amos

scucharlos

y

hasta

esperabamos

ue

los

sentimientosadicales

rzgoenistasomprendieran

a

posici'n

nuestra

y

sobreodo

a

plataforma

obrea

cual

actuariamos

..

se

llamaron

os

44

de

fierro,

era una

representacidnuy capa7 muy

luchadora'.

Interviewwith Oscar

Albrieu,

Archivo

eHistoria

Oral,

nstituto

Torcuato

Di Tella.

Colom,

forhispart,commentedon the Radicaldeputies: ... fueunaoposicidnrillanteporacalidade

sus

componentes

eran

opositores

istemiticos,

ran

superiores

n

calidad

..' Interviewwith Eduardo

Colom,

Ibid.

20

See

Tcach,Sabattinismoyeronismo.

21

On the political trajectory f Frondizi, see N. Babini,Frondiz:de la oposicidnl gobierno

(Buenos

Aires,

1984).

Also,

A.

Rouqui6,

Radicalesy

esarrollistas

Buenos

Aires,

1975)

and

C.

Szusterman,

rondif, apolitica

el

desconcierto

Buenos

Aires,

1998).




11/30

3

0

Marcela

arda ebastiani

party

n

Congress.

For

the Radicals

rom

this

group,

the

work

of

opposition

in

Congress

that

began

in

1946

meant rathermore

than-opposition

o the

initiatives

of the

Peronist

majority.

t also

gave

them the

possibility

o con-

solidatetheirpositionas those responsible or the ideologicalandstrategic

direction

of the

party.

The confrontation

between Peronists

and

Radicals

in

Congress

was

framed

withinthe constitutional

arrangements

f

the

time

and

reflected,

o a

greater

or

lesser

extent,

the

presidentialist

haracteristics

f

the

Argentine

political

system.

In

this sense conflicts between the

government

and the

opposition

were

political

and

institutional,

but

they

were

not

the

same

throughout

he lifetimeof

Per6n'ssuccessive

governments.22

ntil

mid-1948

there

was,

in

general,

reedomof

expression

or

parliamentary

ork

and the

main

discrepancies

between

government

and

opposition

were

marked

by

debate.

The

rights

that Peronism

enjoyed

as

the

majority

party

during

he

first

two

years

of

government

did

not

appear

very

different rom those

en-

joyed by

other

majority

parties

during

previousperiods

of

democracy.

The

Radical

opposition

unveiled

a series of

initiatives hat

helped

to

shape

the

programme

f

the Movimientode

Intransigencia

Renovaci6n.

t was this

group

which was

finally

able to

gain

dominance

over the Radicals'

ational

decision-making

tructure n

mid-1948.23

The

proposals

made

by

Radical

deputiescoveredawiderangeof topics,but those thatreferred o therole of

the State

in

the

social

and

economic

organisation

f

the

country

deserve

particular

ttention.The

problemsposed

in this

areawere

part

of

the

ideo-

logical

climate

of

the

period

and Radicalsand

Peronistswere

committed o

similar

rather

han

opposing

proposals.

The

lack of

ideological

distance

between

Argentina's

wo main

parties

was

one of the main

characteristics

f

the

two-party

ystem

which formedthe

basis

of

Argentine

political

ife.

The

projects

presentedby

Radical

representatives

n

the National

Con-

gresscastdoubton the claim hatonlyPeronismpursuednitiatives esigned

to

improve

the

welfare

of

large

sectors

of

Argentine

ociety

and

strengthen

the state

as the

guarantor

of social and

economic

development.

Radical

deputies

promoted

the

freedom

of

professional

association,

the

right

to

strike and workers'

participation

n

the

profits

of

industry.24

he Radical

proposals

also included the extension of the

state's welfare role.

For

example,

herewere Radical

proposals

or laws to create ree summer

amps

22

Foramoredetailednalysisf the

conflict

betweenRadicals

nd

Peronistsn theNational

Congress,

ee

M.

Garcia

Sebastiani,

Peronismo

oposici6n

politica

n el

Parlamento

argentino.

La dimensi6n

del

conflicto

con la Uni6n CivicaRadical

(1946-1951),'

Revista

e

IndiasNo.

22

(Jan.-Apr.2zoo1), p.

27-66.

23

See Boletin e a

Unidn

Civica

Radical,

o.

I (14

Aug. 1948)

and

G.

Del

Mazo,

El

radicalismo.

ElMovimientoe

IntransigenciaRenovacidn

If4y-Iy7)

(Buenos

Aires,

1957),

pp.

I42-5 4.

24

Diario

eSesionese a

Caimara

e

Diputados

from

here

on,

DSCD),

1946,X,

pp.

486-9.




12/30

Radicals

ndSocialistsn

thePolitical

pposition

o

Perdn

321

for

children;

or

protection

and assistance

or

orphans,

children

and

teen-

agers;

he

drawingup

of a

Children's

Code;

the

extensionof

social

services

andthe

promotion

of

collective ife

insurance or all

workers;

annual

holidays

andpaid eavefor employeesandworkers;retirement ndcompensation or

work-related

ccidents;

free distribution

of text

books;

the

extension

of

primary

ducationfor

illiterate

adults and

support

for

the

constructionof

inexpensive

housing.25

or were the

Peronists he

only

party

upporting

he

nationalisation f

public

goods

and services.

ndeed,

discussionson

the best

means of

implementing

nationalist

policies

had formed

part

of

Argentine

political

debate

since the

1930s.

Radical

deputies

introduced

projects

to

nationalise

he oil

industry,

he

railways,

he

trams,

and the

telephone,

gas,

electricity

nd

refrigeration

ndustries,26

ut also

pressured

he

government

to commit tself to

parliamentary

ebateon

questions

of

economic

policy.27

Peronists

and

Radicals

lso

agreed

on the

widening

of the

franchise.From

the

beginning

of the

1946

parliamentary

essions both

sides

established he

need to

widen

electoral

representation y

granting

women

the

vote and to

complete

he

transformationf national

erritories

nto

provinces.28

overn-

ment and

opposition

deputiespresented

bills on the

country's

nstitutional

design

which

would have

implications

or the

distribution f

political

power

and,

n

short,

for the

partysystem.

In

truth,

both

sides

endeavoured o turn

theirparliamentaryrgumentsnto futurevotes. The opposition,however,

managed

o have

the female

suffrage

aw

passed

at a

particular

ession and

not

at

that

preferred y

the

Peronists.

This can therefore

be seen

as

a

relative

opposition

success

in

terms of

parliamentary

ontrol

over

the

Peronist

Executive.

The

systematic

ostponing

of the

debate

over the

transformation

of the

national

erritories f

El

Chaco and La

Pampa

nto

provinces

from

the

beginning

of the

1946 parliamentary

erm to

its final

approval

n

i951,

reflected

an

attemptby

the

government

o

capture

he

votes

of

the new citi-

zens in the electionsto be heldin 195

.29

Even

so,

the

natureof the

conflict

between

government

and

opposition

n

Congress

changed

after

mid-1948.

The

apparent

resolutionof

the

UCR's

process

of

reorganisation

nder he directionof

the

intransigentes

ad

allowed

25

Ibid.,

1946,

IV,

pp.

6io-iz;

V,

pp.

309,

314

and

317-18;

VI,

pp.

275-6;

XI,

pp.

599-600

and

780-781;

1947,

I, pp.

484-8;

1948,

I,

pp.

109-23,

216-17

and

367-70.

26

Ibid.,

1946,

I,

pp.

94,

123

and

684.

27

Ibid.,

1946,

I,

pp.

563-8,

743-4

and

666-98;

III,

pp.

I35, 345-6;

IV,

pp.

630-2;

V,

pp. 38-40,

62-9, o105-I

and 610-735; X, pp. 671-3; 1947, I, PP. 193-4 and 287-327; II,

pp. 229,

311 and

451;

III,

324;

1948,

I,

p.

154,

468-9;

II,

pp.

1.117-1-.118; y

II,

P.

1.793-

8

Ibid.,

1946,

I,

pp.

98-9,

105-7;

1947,

I,

pp.

77,

73-98

and

43

5-6;

III,

pp.

203-58.

29

Ibid.,

946,

I,

p.

112;

1951, II,

pp.

1.140-1.201.

Law

1.5

2 had

been

approved

n

1884

to

organise

the

national

territories.

Among

its

provisions,

attention

should

drawn to the

article

by

which

any

territory

ould

become a

province

if it had

more than

6o,ooo

in-

habitants

ccording

o the

NationalCensus.




13/30

322

MarcelaGarcia

Sebastiani

the

party

to

maintain

the

same

quotas

of institutional

representation

n

Congress

after

the elections of March

1948.

However,

the new

constitutional

arrangements

changed

the rules of

parliamentary

dynamics

after

1949.

Cer-

tain reformsintroduced n the Constitutionaccentuated he presidential

nature of the

political

system.

The division of

powers

continued

to

be

governedby

the

precepts

of the

I

853

Constitution,

but

the facultiesof the

Executive were

increased.

The most

important change

was

the

possibility

of

presidential

re-election;

other articles widened

the

president's

powers

of

interference

n

parliamentary

ffairs.30

Thereafter,

Congress

ceased to be

the

UCR's

preferred

orum. In the

parliamentaryeriod

that

opened

with

the constitutional

eform,

Congress

was

slowly

transformed

nto a rubber

tamp

for the

government's

egislative

proposals;

the mechanismsof

parliamentary

ontrol were more

rigid

and

certainhierarchical

endencieswere

heightened.3'

The Chamber

f

Deputies

ceased

to

be

a national

orum for

political

debate and

became

the

stage

on

which the

opposition

made its accusations

against

he abuses

of the execu-

tive,

contained

within the new constitutional

arrangements.32

Parliamentary

debate was

peppered

with

protests

by

the

opposition

over

procedures.33

From

1949

onwards,

however,

the accusations were

heightened

in

an

attempt

to conserve

parliament

s an

organ

of institutional

ontrol

over the Peronist

executive. The Radicals launched a campaign to discredit the government

30

By

means

of

a

partial

veto,

the

president

could

reject

any

legislative

proposal

and return

only

a

revised

version

to

Congress.

A

new institutional

igure

was

introduced:

el

estado e

prevenciony

larma'.

n this

way,

the Executivecould

dispense

with

Congress

o

call

a

state

of

emergency.

The

sittingperiods

of the

legislators

were altered:

deputies

and senatorswould

sit for six

years

with

half the

Chamber

being

elected

every

three

years.

In

this

way

their

mandateswould coincide

with

the

presidency.

Other reforms altered

he

links between

ministers

nd

Congress

andwith the

president.

Ministerial

arrangements

ould

be

notified

to the Presidentbefore

the

Chambers,

untying

he institutional

elationship

hat the

min-

isters had maintained

with

Congress

and

reducingparliamentary

ontrol

over the Execu-

tive.

M.

Serrafero,

El

presidencialismo

n

el

sistema

politico

argentino,'

PhD.

diss.,

I.

U.

Ortega

y

Gasset-Universidad

omplutense

de

Madrid,

1992, pp.

8

5-115

and

J. Slodky,

ElEstadojusticialista

Buenos

Aires,

1988),Chapter

II.

31

A.

Ciria,

Politica

cultura

popular:

a

Argentina

eronista

46-i9;,r

(Buenos

Aires,

1986),

pp.

Iz7-9;

P.

Waldman,

Elperonismo

I94}-i95r

(Buenos

Aires,

1981),pp.

63-4

andF.

Luna,

Peron

y

su

tiempo.

La

Argentina

era una

fiesta

(Buenos

Aires,

1984),

I, p.

3

I

2.

32

The Radical

representatives

xpressed

their

disagreement

with

the

new

Constitution

by

renouncing

he seats

of

those

deputies

who would have

sought

re-election

n

I95o,

ac-

cording

o the established

ulewhen

they

were

elected

n

1946.

After

1950,

herefore,

hey

were reduced

n number

by

21

deputies

due to this decision.

33

The Radicaldeputiescalledfor reportsfrom the governmentover the attackson oppo-

sition

newspapers

hat occurred

hroughout1947

and on the attitude

f

the FederalPolice

in

these events.

They

also

denounced various violations of the

freedom

of

speech,

of

reunionand

of

the

press

and the

obstacles

that the

opposition

faced

n

gaining

access to

radio stationsthat

steadily

came to

belong

to

people

connected

to the

Peronist

govern-

ment.

See,

for

example,

DSCD,

1946,

IX,

pp.

833-4; 1947,

I,

p.

141;

II,

PP.

312-14,

892-904;

III,

pp.

128-30, 568-9

and

p.

765;

IV,

p.

58;

and

1948,

IV,

p.

3.212.




14/30

RadicalsndSocialists

n the

Political

pposition

oPern

32

3

and call into

question

he

way

the

Peronist

party

usedthe state to favour

ts

own

interests,

obstructing

ts

opponents'

freedom

of

speech

in the

process.

They

calledfor a

parliamentary

ommittee o

investigate

he

private

inances

of Peronistdeputiesand of the most importantpartymemberswho held

governmentposts.

They

also

demanded

reports

on the

way

public

funds

were

granted

to

political

organisations;

he

premises

used

by

committees,

centres

and

grassroots

organisations

f the

Peronist

party

and

the use

of

materialsand

public

service

personnel

for

party

activities.The

opposition

also

presented

several

proposals

to ban the use

of

political

badges

by

civil

servants

or

state

employees

and

the

display

of

party

symbols

in

meeting

rooms

and other

public

buildings.34

The

most

heated

political

conflict between

government

and

opposition

during

he final

years

of

Per6n's

first

government

was,

however,

of an in-

stitutional

ature

andwas

prompted

by

the

suspension, xpulsion

or removal

of

parliamentaryights

from Radical

deputies

in

Congress

accused

of

in-

sulting

government

igures.

The

impassioned

speeches

that

resultedreveal

two different

visions

-

Peronist

and Radical

of the

constitutionality

f

political

action.35

For the Peronists

the measures

adopted

n

the

Chamber

against

a few Radical

deputies

Ernesto

Sanmartino,

Agustin

Rodriguez

Araya,

Ricardo

Balbin,

Atilio

Cattineo

and MauricioYadarola were

justi-

fiedbyaparticulareading f the Constitution.For theRadicals, n the other

hand,

he

opposition

n

Congress hroughout

he

period

under

consideration

was based

on the

defence

of constitutional alues

and the

reprisals

against

the

minority

deputies

served

to

prove

to their

supporters

hat Peronismdid

not

respect

ts

political

opponents.

The

Radicals

of

theProvince

f

Buenos ires

cast

hemselves

s the

alternative

to Peronism

The

steady

erosion of the National

Congress

as a

political

venue

for the

conflict between Peronism

and its

opponents

also

signalled

a

worsening

context

more

generally

or the

opposition.

In

its

attempt

to attract

all civil

society

to the

Peronistcause after

the

passing

of the

new Constitution

he

government mplemented

a series

of authoritarianmechanismswhich

lim-

ited the areas

of

expression

available

o its

opponents. 6

While

ensuring

ure

that

the

opposition parties'position

as

legal politicalcompetitors

was

not

34

Ibid., 949,

III,

p. 1954,

2.oz2

and

2.029-31; IV,p.

3.201,

pp.

3o61-2

and

3.624;V,

p.

3.830;

1950,

I,

pp.

227-8,

p.

342

and

pp.

678-681,

II,

p.

982; 1951,

I,

pp. 298-9.

35

Formore

details,

ee

M. Garcia

ebastiani,

Peronismo

oposici6n olitica,'

p.

57-64.

36

On the

increasing

authoritarianism

of the Peronist

government,

see

Waldman,

Elperonismo,

p.

227

and

passim;

and W.

Little,

'Party

and State

in

Peronist

Argentina,

1945-1955,

HAHR,

3,

No.

4

(Nov.

1973),

PP.

645-62.




15/30

3

24

MarcelaGarcia

Sebastiani

diminished,

Peronismmade

great

effortsto reducetheir

possibilities

of

be-

coming

a

viable

political

alternative.

n

official

campaign

f

intimidation nd

attacks

began,

which

swiftly

ed to the

closureof

all

sections

of

the media

not

openlyidentifiedwith Peronistpolicies.37Even so, the Radicals elt more

committed han

any

other

party

o the

political

work of

opposition.

In

this

unfavourable

ituation,

designing

an

opposition

strategy

o con-

front

Peronism

required

dditional

ctionsto

those carried ut

in

Congress.

The

unification f all

the internal

orceswithin

the UCR

would facilitate his

decision-making rocess.

The

intransigentes

ad

gained

control

of the

National

Committee

the

party's

maximum

decision-making

body

in

February

1948.

However,

he

differences etween

Radicals ook on

new characteristics

and could no

longer

be

reduced to

discrepancies

between unionistasnd

intransigentes.

his internal

struggle

was transformed

nto

a

dispute

between

leadersof

the

key

electoral

regions

over the

style

of

the

party's

eadership.

he

fiercest

onfrontation

was over controlof the

organisational

tructures f the

UCR and established

he

provincial

epresentatives

f C6rdoba

and Buenos

Aires as the main

competing

protagonists.

Caught

betweenthe

two,

the sec-

tors

previously

dentified

as unionistas

for

their

support

or electoral

lliances

with

other

parties)

had,

from

1950

onwards,

reunitedtheir

forces around

UnidadRadical

and,

from

their control

over the

committeeof the

Federal

Capital,endeavoured o find a spacein which to act and avoid beingrel-

egated

o the

sidelines

of

the internal

power

struggle.38

General

electionswere

held

in

195

and Per6n

stood

for

re-election or

another

six-year

erm. The

UCR had to

convince the

electorate,

by

all the

meansat its

disposal,

hat t

represented

distinct

political

option

and could

establish tself as the

reference

point

for

anti-Peronism.Not all

the intra-

nsigente

roups

were

represented

n

the

National

Committee;

hose

in

control

were

basically

Cordoban

intransigentes

ed

by

AmadeoSabattini.

As

they

were

especiallynterested n maintaininghis position of internaldominance,n

the

face of the

increasingprominence

which

other

intransigente

eaders,

uch

as

Balbin,

were

gaining

n

national

politics, they

were unableto

co-ordinate

oppositional

policies

that

would

bring

together

all

sectors

of

anti-Peronism.

Instead

t

was

the

intransigente

ectorsof

Radicalism

n

the

province

of Buenos

7

To this

end,

Parliament ad

formalised he

Comisidn

Tisca-Decker

o

legitimise

he

closure

of

oppositionnewspapers.According o TheEconomist27May

195

o),p. 895,thiscommission

had closed more than

15

o

newspapers

by

the

end

of

April 1950. Cf

M.

Plotkin,

Maadana

s

San

Perdn,

.

126. On

government

control

over the mass

media, see,

P.

Sirvmn,

erodny

os

medios

de

comunicacidn

Ip43-I9y)

(Buenos

Aires,

1984);

E. F.

Sinchez

Zinny,

El

culto

de

la

infamia.

istoria

ocumentadae a

Segunda

irania

rgentina,

(Buenos

Aires,

I

8),

Chapter

I,

and

O.

Confalonieri,

erdn

ontra

eron

Buenos

Aires,

I956),

pp.

I81-95.

38

On

the

reunification

f

the

unionistas,

ee C.

Tcach,

Sabattinismoyperonismo,

p.

147-5

3.




16/30

RadicalsndSocialists

n

thePolitical

Opposition

o Peron

325

Aires that

sought

to transform themselves

into the most

credible

political

reference

point

within the

opposition

to Per6n between

1949

and

195

I.39

The

intransigentes

f Buenos Aires

were not

immune to

internal

differences,

centring on the differingvisions of their principal leaders, Balbin y Moises

Lebensohn,

as

to

what

should be

the

political

orientation of a

party

with

deep

roots

in

national

history.

The

former,

with

a more

pragmatic

approach

to

politics

and

impressive public speaking

abilities,

moved within those

spaces

of

political

confrontation

which

made

him

the

opposition

leader

with the

greatest

chance of

challenging

Per6n

for the

presidency.

As

deputy

for Buenos Aires

province

and

president

of the

opposition

group

his main

platform

was

the

National

Congress.

However,

he

neglected

his work as

president

of

the

Buenos

Aires committee

of the

UCR,

which

he had won

in

internal elections at the end

of

I947.40

Towards

the

end

of

1949

he was

accused of

contempt

by

the

government

and lost his

parliamentary

mmun-

ity,

following

his

public

declarations

in the

city

of

Rosario.41

These events

consolidated his

position

as leader

of the

opposition

and affected the

political

opportunities

that

the Buenos

Aires

intransigentes

ried to

take

advantage

of

in

order to

gain

control over

the

party's

national

decision-making

structures.

In

order to lead

the

party,

it was

necessary

to obtain

the

presidency

of the

UCR's

National

Committee.

This

was

the

key

position

because it selected

the

Radicalcandidates for the next presidentialelections. Two intransigenteeaders

contested the

position:

Balbin and

Santiago

Del

Castillo,

the latter allied with

the followers

of

Sabattini.

In

February

195o

Del Castillo

was

finally

elected

president

of the

National

Committee with

the

support

of

the

unionista end-

encies.42

The

tensions between

the

intransigentes

f Buenos Aires and

C6rdoba

were resolved

in

favour

of the

latter,

paradoxically

as

the

result of a

pact

with

the sector which

had been its

most tenacious

internal

enemy.

This

election

anticipated

a

new correlation

of forces at the

heart of

Radicalism.

Barely

a month later, in March 195o, Balbin suffered another political defeat

when

he

lost

the elections

for the

governorship

of

Buenos Aires

province

to the Peronist

candidates.43

It

was,

however,

his

imprisonment

after

the

39

For more

details,

see M. Garcia

Sebastiani,

'Radicales vs.

peronistas

en las

elecciones

presidenciales

de

1951

:

Balbin,

Lebensohn

y

el comit&

de la UCR

de la

provincia

de Buenos

Aires,'

Ciclos en

la

Economia,

Estado

y

Sociedad,

X,

vol.

IX,

No.

18 (2nd

semester

i999),

pp.

91-142.

40

On

the

internal Radical elections

in Buenos

Aires,

Provincias

Unidas,

No.

48

(19

Aug.

1947); on the reorganisation of the Buenos Aires committee, G. Del Mazo, El radicalismo,

pp. 76-92.

41

M.

Monteverde,

'Balbin

preso,'

Todoes

Historia,

No.

74

(1981),

pp. 8-29.

42

On the

development

of the

party meeting,

see

ElDia,

6 and

9

Feb.

195o0.

43

The Peronist ticket

headed

by Domingo

Mercante obtained

486,549

votes and

the

UCR

283,454.

According

to the authorities of the Buenos Aires

provincial

committee of

the

UCR the results had been

encouraging

because

they implied

a

32%

rise

for the Radicals




17/30

3

26

Marcela

Garcia

Sebastiani

Buenos

Aires

elections that

endowed

him

with a

symbolic

value

that his

intransigente

omrades

n

the

province

were able to

capitalise

n

to createan

image

of Radicalismas

the

defender of

civil

liberties

n its

political

fight

with Peronism.The campaignhat theBuenosAiresintransigentesounted n

favourof Balbin's reedombecamea

catalysing

lement

n

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