the expansion of the arab-israeli conflict in the 1950s great powers in the middle east galen...
TRANSCRIPT
The Expansion of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the 1950s
Great Powers in the Middle EastGalen JacksonApril 15, 2014
Agenda
• Background• Ike’s “New Look” in the Middle East• The Baghdad Pact and Tensions with the Arabs• The Road to the Suez Crisis and Its Aftermath • Eisenhower Doctrine• Israel, the Bomb, and the United States (to be
continued April 22)
The Setting
• 1949 Armistice Agreements—“no peace, no war”
• An uneasy status quo
• Instability in the Arab world
• Rise of Nasser/Pan-Arab Nationalism
Britain and France in Decline
The “New Look” and the Middle East
The Eisenhower/Dulles Strategy
• Containment—Middle East of major geopolitical significance (oil for W. Europe)
• Israel and the colonial powers: American liabilities
• Resolve conflict/move closer to Arabs to strengthen regional position
• Focus on anticommunism/USSR ignores regional forces/intra-Arab divisions
Nasser’s Egypt
U.S. Dilemmas in the Arab World
• Split in the American government—Egypt vs. Iraq
• Importance of a Middle East NATO: Baghdad Pact
• Polarization of Arab World/Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal
The Soviet Union in the Middle East
• First country to extend de jure recognition to Israel—socialist ideology attractive
• Quick policy reversal—Israel’s condemnation of North Korea, acceptance of American aid, anti-Semitism
• Opportunity to outflank NATO and the “northern tier” and undercut Baghdad Pact
A Second Try with Nasser
“A Complete Stumbling Block”
• Nasser’s refusal of the initial offer
• Johnston/Anderson Missions
• Dangerous “neutralism”—Nasser joins NAM
• American domestic politics
• Nasser’s recognition of Communist China
Nasser’s Stunning Riposte
The American Response
• Focus shifts to containment of Nasser
• But will not sanction an Anglo-French military response
• Diplomatic efforts become a charade
Anglo-French-Israeli Collusion
Tripartite War Aims
Ike’s Furious Reaction
• Resentful of timing—election and Hungary
• Blatantly imperialist/opens door to USSR
• Kept in the dark
• Potential superpower confrontation
• Totally inappropriate/UN considerations
A Case of Successful Coercion
• Economic pressure on Britain and France
• Public condemnation of the attack
• Linkage of American public/private aid to Israel
• Delay in emergency oil shipments
• Soviet threats
The American-Israeli Standoff
Significance of the Suez Crisis• Ironically, a more stable status quo (UNEF)
• 1957 American aide-mémoire (critical in 1967)
• Destruction of British and French influence in the Middle East/blow to the Western alliance
• Nasser the big winner; USSR also benefits
• Lesson for Israel: no withdrawal without concessions
• Lesson for Arabs: the U.S. will take care of it
A New Policy
The Eisenhower Doctrine
• Power vacuum created—still want to contain Nasser
• Exclusive focus on Communist/USSR threat
• Repeated errors of Baghdad Pact—again bogged down in intra-Arab squabbling/anti-Nasser result
• Lebanon Intervention and Iraq Coup (1958)
Summing Up the 1950s• Decline of European great powers
• Cold War comes to the Middle East
• Eisenhower consistent, focused, anti-communist, and impartial, but undermined by simplicity/misunderstanding of Arab world
• American impartiality on the Arab-Israeli conflict proved ineffective because the United States faced a divided Arab world and due to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism— could not be organized into an anti-Soviet bloc even with U.S. overtures to the Arabs
• Rise of Arab nationalism (e.g. UAR, 1958-1961)
A Missing Piece of the Puzzle: The Beginnings of Israel’s Nuclear Program
Israel’s Quest for the Ultimate Insurance Policy
Israel’s French Connection
• “A passionate love affair”
• Dimona
• Ike’s approach to proliferation/discovery of the site/Israel as a special case
• Ben-Gurion’s acknowledgement (Dec. 1960)
A New Administration
Kennedy’s Nuclear Policy
• Must be understood in a global context
• Initially unconcerned—Waldorf-Astoria meeting (May 30, 1961), inspections regime
• By 1963 there is a marked shift—Ben Gurion’s resignation
• Heading toward confrontation when JFK assassinated; Eshkol’s acceptance of inspections
Moving toward Acceptance (to be continued April 22)
• American conventional arms for Israel—perhaps linked to nuclear issue; non-introduction pledge
• LBJ less concerned with nonproliferation and not willing to have a confrontation; China angle
• Arabs unconcerned until 1965-1966
• Result: Israel gets the bomb/amimut
• Possible factor in May/June 1967 (operational/target)
On Thursday
• Kennedy and LBJ
• Causes and Consequences of the June 1967 Six-Day War
• United Nations Resolution 242
Questions?
Thank You!