the emissions gap report 2013: a unep synthesis report

8/14/2019 The Emissions Gap Report 2013: A UNEP Synthesis Report

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The Emissions Gap Report 2013A UNEP Synthesis Report


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Published by the United Naons Environment Programme (UNEP), November 2013

Copyright UNEP 2013

ISBN: 978-92-807-3353-2DEW/1742/NA

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Citaon

This document may be cited as:UNEP 2013. The Emissions Gap Report 2013. United Naons Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi

A digital copy of this report along with supporng appendices are available at hp://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2013/

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The Emissions Gap Report 2013A UNEP Synthesis Report

November 2013

UNEP


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acknowledgementsv

Chapter 4Lead authors: Henry Neufeldt (World Agroforestry Centre -

ICRAF, Kenya).

Contribung authors: Tapan K. Adhya (KIIT University,

India), Jeanne Y. Coulibaly (AfricaRice, Benin), Gabrielle

Kissinger (Lexeme Consulng, Canada), Genxing Pan (Nanjing

Agricultural University, China).

Reviewers:Anee Engelund Friis (Danish Agriculture and Food

Council, Denmark), Bert Metz (European Climate Foundaon,

Netherlands), William Moomaw (Tus University, USA), Klaus

Mschen (Federal Environment Agency, Germany), Chrisne

Negra (EcoAgriculture Partners, USA), Anne Olho (UNEP Ris

Centre, Denmark), Kaa Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,

Germany), Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland).

Chapter 5Lead authors: Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Jennifer

Morgan (World Resources Instute, USA).

Contribung authors: Yemi Katerere (Independent

Consultant, Zimbabwe), Lutz Weischer (World Resources

Instute, Germany), Durwood Zaelke (Instute for

Governance and Sustainable Development, USA).

Reviewers: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental

Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Johannes Gtschow

(Potsdam Instute for Climate Impact Research, Germany),

Ariane Labat (European Commission, Belgium), Kelly Levin

(World Resources Instute, USA), Bert Metz (European

Climate Foundaon, Netherlands), Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris

Centre, Denmark), Christopher Taylor (Department of Energy

and Climate Change, United Kingdom).

Chapter 6Lead authors: Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Anne Olho(UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark).

Contribung authors: Kornelis Blok (Ecofys, Netherlands),

Taryn Fransen (World Resources Instute, USA).

Reviewers: Joshua Busby (University of Texas at Ausn, USA),

Annie Dufey (Fundacin Chile, Chile), Asger Garnak (Ministry

of Climate, Energy and Buildings, Denmark), Bert Metz

(European Climate Foundaon, Netherlands), Klaus Mschen

(Federal Environment Agency, Germany), Daniel Puig (UNEP

Ris Centre, Denmark), Kaa Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,

Germany), Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland), Kiran

Sura (PricewaterhouseCoopers, United Kingdom), EliotWhington (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom).

Other Input: Annie Dufey (Fundacin Chile, Chile), Yemi

Katerere (Independent Consultant, Zimbabwe).

Thanks also to:Keith Alverson (UNEP, Kenya), Stuart Crane (UNEP, Kenya),

David Crossley (Regulatory Assistance Project, Australia),

Davide DAmbrosio (Internaonal Energy Agency, France),

Shyamasree Dasgupta (Jadavpur University, India), Jusne

Garre (Internaonal Energy Agency, France), Antonia

Gawel (Independent Consultant, Bhutan), Michael Grubb

(University of Cambridge, United Kingdom), James ArthurHaselip (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Michael Mendelsohn

(Naonal Renewable Energy Laboratory, USA), Pedro Filipe

Paralta Carqueija (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Daniel

Perczyk (Instuto Torcuato Di Tella, Argenna), Lynn Price

(Lawrence Berkeley Naonal Laboratory, USA), Wilson

Rickerson (Meister Consultants Group, USA), Joyashree Roy

(Jadavpur University, India), Misato Sato (London School of

Economics, United Kingdom), Janet Sawin (Sunna Research,

USA), Andrew Sco (Overseas Development Instute, United

Kingdom), Jacob Krog Sbygaard (Ministry of Climate, Energy

and Buildings, Denmark), Geng Yong (Naonal Academy ofSciences, China), Changhua Wu (The Climate Group, China).

Editorial Team:Joseph Alcamo (UNEP, Kenya), Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre,

Denmark), Anne Olho (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark),

Volodymyr Demkine (UNEP, Kenya), Bert Metz (European

Climate Foundaon, Netherlands).

Project Coordinaon:Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Anne Olho (UNEP

Ris Centre, Denmark), Tasia Spangsberg Christensen (UNEP

Ris Centre, Denmark), Volodymyr Demkine (UNEP, Kenya),

John Christensen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Mee

Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Seraphine

Haeussling (UNEP, France).

Secretariat and Media Support:Harsha Dave (UNEP, Kenya), Pia Riis Kofoed-Hansen (UNEP

Ris Centre, Denmark), Sunday A. Leonard (UNEP, Kenya),

Mee Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark),

Shereen Zorba (UNEP, Kenya), Neeya Patel (UNEP, Kenya),

Kelvin Memia (UNEP, Kenya).

Gap Model CalculaonsJrgen Fenhann (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Jacob Ipsen

Hansen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark).

Climate Model CalculaonsJoeri Rogelj (ETH Zurich, Switzerland).

EditorBart Ullstein

Design and LayoutAudrey Ringler (UNEP)

Layout and PrinngUNON, Publishing Services Secon, ISO 14001:2004 cered


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Contentsvi

Contents

Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................................ vii

Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................................... ix

Foreword ......................................................................................................................................................................... x

Execuve Summary ........................................................................................................................................................ xi

Introducon ....................................................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 2: Emissions trends as a result of pledges and their implementaon ..................................................................3

2.1 Introducon .............................................................................................................................................................3

2.2 Current global emissions .........................................................................................................................................3

2.3 Projected global emissions under business-as-usual scenarios ...............................................................................4

2.4 Projected global emissions under pledge assumpons ..........................................................................................5

2.5 Naonal progress: do policies match pledges? .......................................................................................................9

2.6 Summary ...............................................................................................................................................................12

Chapter 3 The emissions gap and its implicaons .......................................................................................................13

3.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................13

3.2 Which scenarios are analyzed? ..............................................................................................................................13

3.3 Emissions in line with least-cost 2 C pathways .....................................................................................................14

3.4. Emissions in line with least-cost 1.5 C pathways ..................................................................................................17

3.5 Later-acon scenarios in the literature ..................................................................................................................17

3.6 The emissions gap: trade-os and implicaons of todays policy choices .............................................................19

Chapter 4: Bridging the gap I: Policies for reducing emissions from agriculture ..............................................................23

4.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................23

4.2 Conversion of llage to no-llage pracces ...........................................................................................................24

4.3 Improved nutrient and water management in rice systems ..................................................................................26

4.4 Agroforestry ...........................................................................................................................................................27

4.5 Lessons learned ..................................................................................................................................................... 28

Chapter 5: Bridging the gap II: Internaonal cooperave iniaves

5.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................29

5.2 Current internaonal cooperave iniaves .........................................................................................................29

5.3 Promising areas for internaonal cooperave iniaves to close the gap ............................................................30

5.4 How to make internaonal cooperave iniaves eecve in closing the gap?...................................................31

5.5 Links with the United Naons Framework Convenon on Climate Change ..........................................................32

5.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................32

Chapter 6: Bridging the gap III: Overview of opons ......................................................................................................33

6.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................33

6.2 Emission reducon potenals in 2020 and 2030: can the gap be bridged? ..........................................................33

6.3 Opons to narrow and potenally bridge the emissions gap in 2020 ...................................................................346.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................36

References ....................................................................................................................................................................37


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Glossaryviii

Emission pathway The trajectory of annual global

greenhouse gas emissions over me.

Greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol These

include the six main greenhouse gases, as listed in

Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2); methane

(CH4); nitrous oxide (N

2O); hydrouorocarbons (HFCs);

peruorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexauoride (SF6).

Integrated assessment modelsModels that seek to combineknowledge from mulple disciplines in the form of equaons

and/or algorithms in order to explore complex environmental

problems. As such, they describe the full chain of climate

change, including relevant links and feedbacks between

socio-economic and biophysical processes.

Internaonal cooperave iniaves Iniaves outside

of the United Naons Framework Convenon on Climate

Change aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases

by promong acons that are less greenhouse gas intensive,

compared to prevailing alternaves.

Kyoto Protocol The internaonal environmental treaty

intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It builds

upon the United Naons Framework Convenon on

Climate Change.

Later-acon scenariosClimate change migaon scenarios

in which emission levels in the near term, typically up to

2020 or 2030, are higher than those in the corresponding

least-cost scenarios.

Least-cost scenarios Climate change migaon scenarios

assuming that emission reducons start immediately aer

the model base year, typically 2010, and are distributed

opmally over me, such that aggregate costs of reaching

the climate target are minimized.

Lenient rulesPledge cases with maximum Annex I land use,

land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus

emissions units, and maximum impact of double counng.

Likely chance A likelihood greater than 66 percent. Used

in this report to convey the probabilies of meeng

temperature limits.

Medium chanceA likelihood of 5066 percent. Used in this

report to convey the probabilies of meeng temperature

limits.

Montreal Protocol The Montreal Protocol on Substances

that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an internaonal treaty that

was designed to reduce the producon and consumpon

of ozone-depleng substances in order to reduce their

abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the

Earths ozone layer.

Non-Annex I countries A group of developing countries

that have signed and raed the United Naons Framework

Convenon on Climate Change. They do not have binding

emission reducon targets.

No-llage agriculture Farming pracce characterized by

the eliminaon of soil ploughing by seeding a crop directly

under the mulch layer from the previous crop. It relies on

permanent soil cover by organic amendments, and the

diversicaon of crop species grown in sequences and/or

associaon. This approach avoids emissions caused by soil

disturbances related to ploughing, and from burning fossil

fuels to run farm machinery for ploughing.

Pledge For the purpose of this report, pledges include

Annex I targets and non-Annex I acons, as included in

Appendix I and Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord, and

subsequently revised and updated in some instances.

Radiave forcing Change in the net, downward minus

upward, irradiance, expressed in was per square meter

(W/m2), at the tropopause due to a change in an external

driver of climate change, such as, for example, a change

in the concentraon of carbon dioxide or the output of

the Sun. For the purposes of this report, radiave forcing

is further dened as the change relave to the year 1750

and, unless otherwise noted, refers to a global and annualaverage value.

Scenario A descripon of how the future may unfold based

on if-then proposions. Scenarios typically include an inial

socio-economic situaon and a descripon of the key driving

forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or

other climate change-related variables.

Strict rules Pledge cases in which the impact of land use,

land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus

emissions units are set to zero.

Top-down model A model that applies macroeconomictheory, econometric and opmisaon techniques to

aggregate economic variables. Using historical data on

consumpon, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-down

models assess nal demand for goods and services, and

supply from main sectors, such as energy, transportaon,

agriculture and industry.

Transient climate responseMeasure of the temperature rise

that occurs at the me of a doubling of CO2concentraon in

the atmosphere.

Transient climate response to cumulave carbon emissions

Measure of temperature rise per unit of cumulavecarbon emissions.

Uncondional pledgesPledges made by countries without

condions aached.

20th80th percenle range Results that fall within the

2080 percent range of the frequency distribuon of results

in this assessment.


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acronymsix

Acronyms

AAU Assigned Amount Unit

ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Plaorm

AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

AR5 Fih Assessment Report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

AWD Alternate Weng and Drying

BaU Business-as-Usual

BC black carbon

BioCCS Bio-energy combined with Carbon Capture and

Storage

BP Brish Petroleum

BRT Bus Rapid Transit

CCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalion to Reduce Short-

lived Climate Pollutants

CCS Carbon Capture and Storage

CDIAC Carbon Dioxide Informaon Analysis Center

CDM Clean Development Mechanism

CEM Clean Energy Ministerial

CER Cered Emission Reducon

CFC chlorouorocarbon

CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent

COP Conference of the Pares to the United Naons

Framework Convenon on Climate Change

CP1 First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol

CP2 Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto

Protocol

EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric

Research

EIA Energy Informaon Administraon

ERU Emission Reducon Unit

EU-ETS EU Emissions Trading System

GDP Gross Domesc Product

GEA Global Energy Assessment

GHG greenhouse gas

Gt gigatonne

GWP Global Warming PotenalHCFC hydrochlorouorocarbon

HFC hydrouorocarbon

IAM Integrated Assessment Model

ICAO Internaonal Civil Aviaon Organizaon

ICI Internaonal Cooperave Iniave

IEA Internaonal Energy Agency

IMO Internaonal Marime Organizaon

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry

NAMA Naonally Appropriate Migaon Acon

NGO Non-Governmental Organizaon

OC organic carbon

ODS ozone depleng substances

PAM policies and measures

PPP Purchasing Power Parity

PV photovoltaic

RD&D research, development and demonstraon

REDD+ Reduced Emissions from Deforestaon and

Forest Degradaon

RPS Renewable Porolio Standards

SO2 sulphur dioxide

SOC soil organic carbon

TCR transient climate response

TCRE transient climate response to cumulave carbon

emissions

UDP urea deep placement

UNEP United Naons Environment Programme

UNFCCC United Naons Framework Convenon on

Climate Change


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Forewordx

Achim Steiner

UN Under-Secretary-General,UNEP Execuve Director

The latest assessment by Working Group I of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released

earlier this year, concluded that climate change remainsone of the greatest challenges facing society. Warming

of the climate system is unequivocal, human-inuenced,

and many unprecedented changes have been observed

throughout the climate system since 1950. These changes

threaten life on Earth as we know it. Connued emissions of

greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes

in all components of the climate system. Liming climate

change will require substanal and sustained reducons

of greenhouse gas emissions. But how much reducon

is needed?

Further to the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancn

agreements in 2010, internaonal eorts under the UnitedNaons Framework Convenon on Climate Change are

focused on keeping the average rise in global temperature

to below 2 C, compared to pre-industrial levels. Current

commitments and pledges by developed and developing

naons can take the world part of the way towards achieving

this 2 C target, but this assessment shows that the there is

sll a signicant gap between polical ambion and praccal

reality. In short, addional emission reducons are needed.

With this fourth assessment of the gap between ambions

and needs, the United Naons Environment Programme

seeks to inform governments and the wider public on how

far the response to climate change has progressed over the

past year, and thus whether the world is on track to meet

the 2 C target. In addion to reviewing naonal pledges

and acons, this years assessment, for the rst me, also

reviews internaonal cooperave iniaves which, while

potenally overlapping, serve to complement naonal

pledges and acons.

From a technical standpoint, meeng the 2 C target

remains possible: it will take a combinaon of full

implementaon of current naonal pledges and acons, a

scaling up of the most eecve internaonal cooperave

iniaves, and addional migaon eorts at the country

level. All these eorts will require strengthened policies

aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Crucially, they

also require the promoon of development pathways that

can concomitantly reduce emissions.

As in the previous assessment, this years report provides

updated analyses of a number of tried and tested sector-

specic policy opons to achieve this goal. Specically,we show that acons taken in the agricultural sector can

lower emissions and boost the overall sustainability of

food producon. Replicang these successful policies, and

scaling them up, would provide one opon for countries

to go beyond their current pledges and help close the

emissions gap.

The challenge we face is neither a technical nor policy

one it is polical: the current pace of acon is simply

insucient. The technologies to reduce emission levels to

a level consistent with the 2 C target are available and we

know which policies we can use to deploy them. However,

the polical will to do so remains weak. This lack of policalwill has a price: we will have to undertake steeper and

more costly acons to potenally bridge the emissions gap

by 2020.

This report is a call for polical acon. I hope that,

by providing high quality evidence and analysis, it will

achieve its goal of supporng internaonal climate

change negoaons.

Foreword


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxi

Execuve summary

The emissions gap in 2020 is the dierence between

emission levels in 2020 consistent with meeng climate

targets, and levels expected in that year if country pledgesand commitments are met. As it becomes less and less

likely that the emissions gap will be closed by 2020, the

world will have to rely on more dicult, costlier and

riskier means aer 2020 of keeping the global average

temperature increase below 2C. If the emissions gap is

not closed, or signicantly narrowed, by 2020, the door to

many opons liming the temperature increase to 1.5 C at

the end of this century will be closed.

Arcle 2 of the United Naons Framework Convenon

on Climate Change (Climate Convenon) declares that

its ulmate objecve is to [stabilize] greenhouse gas

concentraons in the atmosphere at a level that wouldprevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the

climate system. The pares to the Climate Convenon have

translated this objecve into an important, concrete target

for liming the increase in global average temperature to

2 C, compared to its pre-industrial levels. With the aim

of meeng this target, many of the pares have made

emission reducon pledges, while others have commied to

reducons under the recent extension of the Kyoto Protocol.

Since 2010, the United Naons Environment Programme

has facilitated an annual independent analysis of those

pledges and commitments, to assess whether they are

consistent with a least-cost approach to keep global average

warming below 2 C 1. This report conrms and strengthens

the conclusions of the three previous analyses that current

pledges and commitments fall short of that goal. It further

says that, as emissions of greenhouse gases connue to

rise rather than decline, it becomes less and less likely that

emissions will be low enough by 2020 to be on a least-cost

pathway towards meeng the 2 C target2.

As a result, aer 2020, the world will have to rely on more

dicult, costlier and riskier means of meeng the target

the further from the least-cost level in 2020, the higher

these costs and the greater the risks will be. If the gap is not

closed or signicantly narrowed by 2020, the door to manyopons to limit temperature increase to 1.5 C at the end of

this century will be closed, further increasing the need to

rely on accelerated energy-eciency increases and biomass

with carbon capture and storage for reaching the target.

1. What are current global emissions?Current global greenhouse gas emission levels are

considerably higher than the levels in 2020 that are in

line with meeng the 1.5 C or 2 C targets, and are sll

increasing. In 2010, in absolute levels, developing countries

accounted for about 60 percent of global greenhouse gas

emissions.The most recent esmates of global greenhouse gas

emissions are for 2010 and amount to 50.1 gigatonnes of

carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) per year (range: 45.6

54.6 GtCO2e per year). This is already 14 percent higher than

the median esmate of the emission level in 2020 with a

likely chance of achieving the least cost pathway towards

meeng the 2 C target (44 GtCO2e per year)3. With regards

to emissions in 2010, the modelling groups report a median

value of 48.8 GtCO2e, which is within the uncertainty range

cited above. For consistency with emission scenarios, the

gure of 48.8 GtCO2e per year is used in the calculaon of

the pledge case scenarios.

Relave contribuons to global emissions from developing

and developed countries changed lile from 1990 to 1999.

However, the balance changed signicantly between 2000

and 2010 the developed country share decreased from

51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing country

emissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent.

Today developing and developed countries are responsible

for roughly equal shares of cumulave greenhouse gas

emissions for the period 1850-2010.

____________________1 For this report, a least-cost approach means that emissions are reduced by the

cheapest means available.2For this report, a least-cost pathway or a least-cost emissions pathway or least-cost emission scenarios mean the same thing the temporal pathway of globalemissions that meets a climate target and that also takes advantage of the lowest-cost opons available for reducing emissions.

____________________3See footnote 2.


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxii

2. What emission levels are ancipatedfor 2020?

Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are esmated

at 59 GtCO2e per year under a business-as-usual scenario.

If implemented fully, pledges and commitments would

reduce this by 37 GtCO2e per year. It is only possible

to conrm that a few pares are on track to meet theirpledges and commitments by 2020.

Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are esmated at

59 GtCO2e per year (range: 5660 GtCO

2e per year) under

a business-as-usual scenario that is, a scenario that only

considers exisng migaon eorts. This is about 1 GtCO2e

higher than the esmate in the 2012 emissions gap report.

There have been no signicant changes in the pledges and

commitments made by pares to the Climate Convenon

since the 2012 assessment. However, both rules of

accounng for land-use change and forestry, and rules for

the use of surplus allowances from the Kyoto Protocols rst

commitment period have been ghtened.Implemenng the pledges would reduce emissions by

37 GtCO2e, compared to business-as-usual emission levels.

A review of available evidence from 13 of the pares to the

Climate Convenon that have made pledges or commitments

indicates that ve Australia, China, the European Union,

India and the Russian Federaon appear to be on track to

meet their pledges. Four pares Canada, Japan, Mexico

and the U.S. may require further acon and/or purchased

osets to meet their pledges, according to government and

independent esmates of projected naonal emissions

in 2020. A h party the Republic of Korea may also

require further acon but this could not be veried based

on government esmates. However, new acons now

being taken by all ve of these pares many enable them

to meet their pledges, although the impact of these acons

have not been analyzed here. Not enough informaon is

available concerning Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa. It

is worth nong that being on track to implement pledges

does not equate to being on track to meet the 1.5 C or 2 C

temperature targets.

3. What is the latest esmate of theemissions gap in 2020?Even if pledges are fully implemented, the emissions gap

in 2020 will be 812 GtCO2e per year, assuming least-cost

emission pathways. Limited available informaon indicates

that the emissions gap in 2020 to meet a 1.5 C target in

2020 is a further 25 GtCO2e per year wider.

Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likely

chance of keeping global mean temperature increases below

2 C compared to pre-industrial levels have a median level

of 44 GtCO2e in 2020 (range: 3847 GtCO

2e)4. Assuming

full implementaon of the pledges, the emissions gap thus

amounts to between 812 GtCO2

e per year in 2020 (Table 1).

Governments have agreed to more stringent internaonal

accounng rules for land-use change and surplus allowances

for the pares to the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is highly

uncertain whether the condions currently aached to the

high end of country pledges will be met. Therefore, it is more

probable than not that the gap in 2020 will be at the high

end of the 812 GtCO2e range.

Liming increases in global average temperature further to

1.5 C compared to pre-industrial levels requires emissions in

2020 to be even lower, if a least-cost path towards achieving

this objecve is followed. Based on a limited number of new

studies, least-cost emission pathways consistent with the

1.5 C target have emission levels in 2020 of 3744 GtCO2e

per year, declining rapidly thereaer.

Note:

Following the 2012 conference of the pares to the Climate Convenon in Doha, a group of countries has adopted reducon commitments for the

second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol

Source: United Naons Framework Convenon on Climate Change

____________________4See footnote 2.

Quanfied commitments for the secondcommitment period under the Kyoto Protocoland pledges under the Cancn Agreements

Pledges formulated in terms of economy-wide emissionreducons under the Cancn Agreements

Submied migaonacons under theCancn Agreements

Countries withno pledges


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxiii

4. What emission levels in 2025, 2030 and2050 are consistent with the 2 C target?

Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likely

chance of meeng a 2 C target have global emissions

in 2050 that are 41 and 55 percent, respecvely, below

emission levels in 1990 and 2010.

Given the decision at the 17 thConference of the Pares to

the Climate Convenon in 2011 to complete negoaons on

a new binding agreement by 2015 for the period aer 2020,it has become increasingly important to esmate global

emission levels in 2025 and thereaer that are likely to

meet the 2 C target. In the scenarios assessed in this report,

global emission levels in 2025 and 2030 consistent with the

2 C target amount to approximately 40 GtCO2e (range:

3545 GtCO2e) and 35 GtCO

2e (range: 3242 GtCO

2e),

respecvely. In these scenarios, global emissions in 2050

amount to 22 GtCO2e (range: 1825 GtCO

2e). These levels

are all based on the assumpon that the 2020 least-cost

level of 44 GtCO2e per year will be achieved.

5. What are the implicaons of least-costemission pathways that meet the 1.5 Cand 2 C targets in 2020?

The longer that decisive migaon eorts are postponed,

the higher the dependence on negave emissions in the

second half of the 21stcentury to keep the global average

temperature increase below 2C. The technologies required

for achieving negave emissions may have signicant

negave environmental impacts.

Scenarios consistent with the 1.5 C and 2 C targets

share several characteriscs: higher-than-current emission

reducon rates throughout the century; improvements

in energy eciency and the introducon of zero- and

low-carbon technologies at faster rates than have been

experienced historically over extended periods; greenhouse

gas emissions peaking around 2020; net negave carbon

dioxide emissions from the energy and industrial sectors

in the second half of the century5and an accelerated shi

toward electricaon6.

The technologies required for achieving negave emissions

in the energy and industrial sectors have not yet been

deployed on a large scale and their use may have signicant

impacts, notably on biodiversity and water supply. Because

of this, some scenarios explore the emission reducons

required to meet temperature targets without relying on

negave emissions. These scenarios require maximumemissions in 2020 of 40 GtCO

2e (range: 3644 GtCO

2e), as

compared to a median of 44 GtCO2e for the complete set of

least-cost scenarios.

6. What are the implicaons of later aconscenarios that sll meet the 1.5 C and2 C targets?

Based on a much larger number of studies than in

2012, this update concludes that so-called later-acon

scenarios have several implicaons compared to least-

cost scenarios, including: (i) much higher rates of global

emission reducons in the medium term; (ii) greater lock-in

of carbon-intensive infrastructure; (iii) greater dependence

on certain technologies in the medium-term; (iv) greater

costs of migaon in the medium- and long-term, and

greater risks of economic disrupon; and (v) greater risks

of failing to meet the 2 C target. For these reasons later-

acon scenarios may not be feasible in pracce and, as aresult, temperature targets could be missed.

The esmates of the emissions gap in this and previous

reports are based on least-cost scenarios, which characterize

trends in global emissions up to 2100 under the assumpon

that climate targets will be met by the cheapest combinaon

of policies, measures and technologies. But several new

studies using a dierent type of scenario are now available

later-acon scenarios, which assume that a least-cost

trajectory is not followed immediately, but rather forwards

from a specic future date. Like least-cost scenarios, later-

acon scenarios chart pathways that are consistent with

the 2 C target. Contrary to least-cost scenarios, later-acon

scenarios assume higher global emissions in the near term,

which are compensated by deeper reducons later, typically,

aer 2020 or 2030.

For least-cost scenarios, emission reducon rates for

20302050 consistent with a 2 C target are 24.5 percent

per year. Historically, such reducons have been achieved in

a small number of individual countries, but not globally. For

later-acon scenarios, the corresponding emission reducon

rates would have to be substanally higher, for example,

68.5 percent if emission reducons remain modest unl

2030. These emission reducon rates are without historic

precedent over extended periods of me. Furthermore,

and because of the delay between policy implementaonand actual emission reducons, achieving such high rates

of change would require migaon policies to be adopted

several years before the reducons begin.

Apart from assuming higher global emissions in the

near term, later-acon scenarios also have fewer opons

for reducing emissions when concerted acon nally

begins aer 2020 or 2030. This is because of carbon lock-

in the connued construcon of high-emission fossil-fuel

infrastructure unconstrained by climate policies. Because

technological infrastructure can have life-mes of up to

several decades, later-acon scenarios eecvely lock-in in

these high-emission alternaves for a long period of me.By denion, later-acon scenarios are more expensive

than least-cost scenarios. The actual cost penalty of later

acon depends on the future availability of technologies

when comprehensive migaon acons nally begin, as

well as on the magnitude of emission reducons up to

that point. Finally, although later-acon scenarios might

reach the same temperature targets as their least-cost

counterparts, later-acon scenarios pose greater risks of

climate impacts for four reasons. First, delaying acon allows

more greenhouse gases to build-up in the atmosphere in the

near term, thereby increasing the risk that later emission

reducons will be unable to compensate for this build up.Second, the risk of overshoong climate targets for both

atmospheric concentraons of greenhouse gases and global

temperature increase is higher with later-acon scenarios.

____________________5For most scenarios.6 Net negave carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and industrial sectorsrefers to the potenal to acvely remove more carbon dioxide from theatmosphere than is emied within a given period of me. Negave emissions canbe achieved through, among other means, bioenergy in combinaon with carboncapture and storage.


14/64xiv

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxiv

The emissions gap

40

45

55

60

Case

1

Case

2

Case

3

Case

4

50

Time (years)

AnnualGloba

lTotalGreenhouseGasEmissions(GtCOe

)

2010 2020

Median esmate of level

consistent with 2 C:

44 GtCOe (range 41 47)

Shaded area shows likely range (66%)

to limit global temperature increase

to below 2 C during the 21 century

2 C range

Remaining

gap to stay

within 2 C

limit

Business as usual


Case1

12GtCO

e

Case2

11GtCO

e

Case3

10GtCO

e

Case4

8GtCO

e

20402000 2020 2060 2080 2100

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1.5 C range

Peak before 2020

Rapid decline aerwards

2 C range


15/64xv

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxv

Median esmate of level

consistent with 2 C:


Shaded area shows likely range (66%)

to limit global temperature increase

to below 2 C during 21 century

17GtCOe(1420)

Power sector

(2.2 3.9 GtCOe)

Transport**

(1.7 2.5 GtCOe)

Buildings

(1.4 2.9 GtCOe)

Forestry(1.3 4.2 GtCOe)

Agriculture

(1.1 4.3 GtCOe)

Waste

(about 0.8 GtCOe)

*based on results from Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 2011

**including shipping and aviaon

Industry

(1.5 4.6 GtCOe)

How to bridge the gap: results from sectoral policy analysis*

40

45

55

60

50

Time (years)

AnnualGlobalTotalGreenhouseGasEmissions(GtCOe

)

2010 2020

2 C range


16/64xvi

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxvi

Third, the near-term rate of temperature increase is higher,

which implies greater near-term climate impacts. Lastly,

when acon is delayed, opons to achieve stringent levels of

climate protecon are increasingly lost.

7. Can the gap be bridged by 2020?The technical potenal for reducing emissions to levels in

2020 is sll esmated at about 17 3 GtCO2e. This is enough

to close the gap between business-as-usual emissionlevels and levels that meet the 2 C target, but me is

running out.

Sector-level studies of emission reducons reveal that,

at marginal costs below US $50100 per tonne of carbon

dioxide equivalent, emissions in 2020 could be reduced

by 17 3 GtCO2e, compared to business-as-usual levels in

that same year. While this potenal would, in principle, be

enough to reach the least-cost target of 44 GtCO2e in 2020,

there is lile me le.

There are many opportunies to narrow the emissions

gap in 2020 as noted in following paragraphs, ranging from

applying more stringent accounng pracces for emission

reducon pledges, to increasing the scope of pledges. To

bridge the emissions gap by 2020, all opons should be

brought into play.

8. What are the opons to bridge theemissions gap?

The applicaon of strict accounng rules for naonal

migaon acon could narrow the gap by 12 GtCO2e. In

addion, moving from uncondional to condional pledges

could narrow the gap by 23 GtCO2e, and increasing the

scope of current pledges could further narrow the gap by

1.8 GtCO2e. These three steps can bring us halfway to

bridging the gap. The remaining gap can be bridged

through further naonal and internaonal acon, including

internaonal cooperave iniaves. Much of this acon

will help full naonal interests outside of climate policy.

Minimizing the use of lenient land-use credits and of

surplus emission reducons, and avoiding double counng

of osets could narrow the gap by about 12 GtCO2e.

Implemenng the more ambious condional pledges

(rather than the uncondional pledges) could narrow the

gap by 23 GtCO2e. A range of acons aimed at increasing

the scope of current pledges could narrow the gap by an

addional 1.8 GtCO2e. (These include covering all emissions

in naonal pledges, having all countries pledge emissionreducons, and reducing emissions from internaonal

transport). Adding together the more stringent accounng

pracces, the more ambious pledges, and the increased

scope of current pledges, reduces the gap around 6 GtCO2e

or by about a half.

The remaining gap can be bridged through further naonal

and internaonal acon, including internaonal cooperave

iniaves (see next point). Also important is the fact that

many acons to reduce emissions can help meet other

naonal and local development objecves such as reducing

air polluon or trac congeson, or saving household

energy costs.

9. How can internaonal cooperaveiniaves contribute to narrowingthe gap?

There is an increasing number of internaonal cooperave

iniaves, through which groups of countries and/or other

enes cooperate to promote technologies and policies

that have climate benets, even though climate change

migaon may not be the primary goal of the iniave.

These eorts have the potenal to help bridge the gap byseveral GtCO2e in 2020.

Internaonal cooperave iniaves take the form of either

global dialogues (to exchange informaon and understand

naonal priories), formal mul-lateral processes

(addressing issues that are relevant to the reducon of

GHG emissions), or implementaon iniaves (oen

structured around technical dialogue fora or sector-specic

implementaon projects). Some make a direct contribuon

to climate change migaon, by eecvely helping countries

reduce emissions, while others contribute to this goal

indirectly, for example through consensus building eorts or

the sharing of good pracces among members.

The most important areas for internaonal cooperave

iniaves appear to be:

- Energy eciency (up to 2 GtCO2e by 2020): covered by

a substanal number of iniaves.

- Fossil fuel subsidy reform (0.42 GtCO2e by 2020): the

number of iniaves and clear commitments in this

area is limited.

- Methane and other short-lived climate pollutants

(0.61.1 GtCO2e by 2020); this area is covered by one

overarching and several specic iniaves. (Reducons

here may occur as a side eect of other climate

migaon.)

-Renewable energy (13 GtCO2e by 2020): severaliniaves have been started in this area.

Based on limited evidence, the following provisions

could arguably enhance the eecveness of Internaonal

Cooperave Iniaves: (i) a clearly dened vision and

mandate with clearly arculated goals; (ii) the right mix of

parcipants appropriate for that mandate, going beyond

tradional climate negoators; (iii) stronger parcipaon

from developing country actors; (iv) sucient funding and

an instuonal structure that supports implementaon and

follow-up, but maintains exibility; and (v) and incenves for

parcipants.

10. How can naonal agricultural policiespromote development while substanallyreducing emissions?

Agriculture now contributes about 11 percent to global

greenhouse gas emissions. The esmated emission

reducon potenal for the sector ranges from 1.1 GtCO2e

to 4.3 GtCO2e in 2020. Emission reducons achieved by

these iniaves may partly overlap with naonal pledges,

but in some cases may also be addional to these.

Not many countries have specied acon in the

agriculture sector as part of implemenng their pledges. Yet,

esmates of emission reducon potenals for the sectorare high, ranging from 1.1 GtCO

2e to 4.3 GtCO

2e a wide

range, reecng uncertaines in the esmate. In this years

update we describe policies that have proved to be eecve


17/64xvii

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxvii

Table 1 Emissions reducons with respect to business-as-usual and emissions gap in 2020, by pledge case

Case Pledge type Rule type Median emission levelsand range (GtCO

2e per year)

Reducons with respect tobusiness-as-usual in 2020

(GtCO2e per year)

Emissions gap in 2020(GtCO

2e per year)

Case 1 Uncondional Lenient 56 (5456) 3 12

Case 2 Uncondional Strict 55 (5355) 4 11

Case 3 Condional Lenient 54 (5254) 5 10

Case 4 Condional Strict 52 (5052) 7 8

Note:In this report, an uncondional pledge is one made without condions aached. A condional pledge might depend on the ability of a

naonal legislature to enact necessary laws, or may depend on acon from other countries, or on the provision of nance or technical support.

Strict rules means that allowances from land use, land-use change and forestry accounng and surplus emission credits will not be counted as

part of a countrys meeng their emissions reducon pledges. Under lenient rules, these elements can be counted.

in reducing emissions and increasing carbon uptake in the

agricultural sector.

In addion to contribung to climate change migaon,

these measures enhance the sectors environmental

sustainability and, depending on the measure and situaon,

may provide other benets such as higher yields, lower

ferlizer costs or extra prots from wood supply. Three

examples are:- Usage of no-llage pracces: no-llage refers to the

eliminaon of ploughing by direct seeding under the

mulch layer of the previous seasons crop. This reduces

greenhouse gas emissions from soil disturbance and

from fossil-fuel use of farm machinery.

- Improved nutrient and water management in rice

producon: this includes innovave cropping pracces

such as alternate weng and drying and urea deep

placement that reduce methane and nitrous oxide

emissions.

- Agroforestry: this consists of dierent management

pracces that all deliberately include woody perennials

on farms and the landscape, and which increasethe uptake and storage of carbon dioxide from the

atmosphere in biomass and soils.


18/64


19/6411The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Introducon 1

Introducon

Chapter 1

In December of 2009, 114 pares to the United Naons

Framework Convenon on Climate Change (the Climate

Convenon) agreed to the Copenhagen Accord1. Among the

important provisions of the accord was the call to pares to

submit voluntary emission reducon pledges for the year

2020. To date, 42 developed countries have responded

to this call and submied economy-wide greenhouse gas

emission reducon pledges, 16 developing countries have

submied mul-sector expected emission reducons, and

in addion 39 other developing countries have submied

pledges related to sectoral goals2. Another important

provision was the seng of a target to keep the increase

in global average temperature below 2C relave to pre-

industrial levels. In the wake of these two provisions, some

very crical quesons arose:- Are the pledges for 2020 enough to keep the world on

track to meet the 2 C target?

- Will there be a gap between where we need to be in

2020 versus where we expect to be?

UNEP, together with the scienc community, took on

these quesons in a report published just ahead of the

Climate Convenon meeng in Cancn in late 2010 (UNEP,

2010). This emissions gap report synthesized the latest

scienc knowledge about the possible gap between the

global emissions levels in 2020 consistent with the 2 C

target versus the expected levels if countries full their

emission reducon pledges. Many pares to the ClimateConvenon found this analysis useful as a reference point

for establishing the level of ambion that countries needed

to pursue in controlling their greenhouse gas emissions. As

a result they asked UNEP to produce annual follow-ups, with

updates of the gap and advice on how to close it.

Besides updang the esmates of the emissions gap, the

2011 report also looked at feasible ways of bridging the gap

from two perspecves (UNEP, 2011). The rst was from the

top-down viewpoint of integrated models, which showed

that feasible transformaons in the energy system and other

sectors would lower global emissions enough to meet the

2 C target. The second was a boom-up perspecve, which

examined the emissions reducon potenal in each of the

main emissions-producing sectors of the economy. These

boom-up esmates showed that enough total potenal

exists to bridge the emissions gap in 2020.

The 2012 report presented an update of the gap but

also good examples of best-pracce policy instruments

for reducing emissions. Among these were acons such

as implemenng appliance standards and vehicle fuel-

eciency guidelines, which are working successfully in many

parts of the world and are ready for applicaon elsewhere to

help reduce emissions.

The current report reviews the latest esmates of the

emissions gap in 2020 and provides plenful addional

informaon relevant to the climate negoaons. Included

are the latest esmates of:- the current level of global greenhouse gas emissions

based on authoritave sources;

- naonal emission levels, both current (2010) and

projected (2020), consistent with current pledges and

other commitments;

- global emission levels consistent with the 2 C target in

2020, 2030 and 2050;

- progress being made in dierent parts of the world to

achieve substanal emission reducons.

New to this fourth report is an assessment of the extent to

which countries are on track to meet their naonal pledges.

Also new is a descripon of the many cooperave climateiniaves being undertaken internaonally among many

dierent actors public, private, and from civil society.

Special aenon is given to analysing new scenarios

that assume later acon for migaon, compared to those

used earlier to compute the emissions gap. The report also

describes new ndings from scienc literature about the

impacts of later acon to reduce global emissions.

This year the report reviews best pracces in reducing

emissions in an oen-overlooked emissions-producing

sector agriculture. Innovave ideas are described for

transforming agriculture into a more sustainable, low-

emissions form.As in previous years, this report has been prepared by a

wide range of sciensts from around the world. This year____________________1 Since then, the number of pares agreeing to the Accord has risen to 141 (seehps://unfccc.int/meengs/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php).2With the 28 member states of the European Union counted as one party.


20/642 The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Introducon2

70 sciensts from 44 scienc groups in 17 countries have

contributed to the assessment.

The informaon contained in the report provides

invaluable inputs to the current debate on global climate

policy and the acons needed to meet internaonal climate

targets. Meeng these targets is instrumental for liming

the adverse impacts of climate change and associated

adaptaon gaps as illustrated in Box 1.1. UNEP hopes that

this fourth update will help catalyse acon in the forthcoming

climate negoaons.

Box 1.1 From emissions gap to adaptaon gap

This reports denion of the emissions gap is based on the internaonally agreed limit to the increase in globalaverage temperature of 2 C (or possibly 1.5C). Chapter 3 summarizes the latest scienc ndings regardingboth least-cost and later-acon scenarios for meeng that 1.5 or 2 C target. The chapter concludes that,with later-acon scenarios, the cost and risk of not meeng the target increases signicantly, compared toleast-cost scenarios.

The 2 C target has become associated with what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) termeddangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, even though the IPCC has thus far neveraached a specic temperature threshold to the concept. Nevertheless, the IPCC has characterised dangerousanthropogenic interference through ve reasons for concern, namely risk to unique and threatened systems,risk of extreme weather events, disparies of impacts and vulnerabilies, aggregate damage and risks of large-scale disconnuies.

These reasons for concern would thus gain parcular relevance in the event that the world followed a later-aconscenario emissions trajectory that in the end failed to meet the 1.5 or 2 C target. Today, when the choice betweenleast-cost and later-acon scenarios is sll available to us, later-acon scenarios highlight a growing adaptaonproblem which, by analogy with the emissions gap, could be termed an adaptaon gap.

The adaptaon gap is more of a challenge to assess than the emissions gap. Whereas carbon dioxide and itsequivalents provide a common metric for quanfying the emissions gap, we lack a comparable metric forquanfying the adaptaon gap and assessing the impacts of eorts to close it. While the emissions gap indicatesthe quanty of greenhouse gas emissions that need to be abated, the adaptaon gap could measure vulnerabilieswhich need to be reduced but are not accounted for in any funded programme for reducing adaptaon risks.Alternavely, it could esmate the gap between the level of funding needed for adaptaon and the level of fundingactually commied to the task. Developing countries needs for adaptaon are believed to cost in the range ofUS $100 billion per year (UNFCCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). By comparison the funds made available by the majormullateral funding mechanisms that generate and disperse adaptaon nance add up to a total of around US$3.9 billion to date. From a funding perspecve therefore, the adaptaon gap is signicant3.

The concept of the adaptaon gap is in line with the IPCCs Working Group IIs use of the term adaptaon decit,which is used to describe the decit between the current state of a country or management system and a statethat would minimize the adverse impacts of current climate condions.

Framing the adaptaon gap in a way useful for policy making also requires a beer understanding of how thecosts of adaptaon vary with dierent temperature projecons. Data on the costs of adaptaon under business-as-usual, and best- and worst-case emission scenarios could help policy makers beer understand the relaonshipbetween adaptaon to, and migaon of climate change. Adaptaon cost esmates also put the true costs ofclimate change, as opposed to only looking at the costs of migang it, into a broader and clearer perspecve.

There is also a knowledge gap between what we know and what we need to know to successfully adapt to climate

change. It is true that we already have enough knowledge to act on adaptaon, but not enough to act well. Forexample, we lack informaon about how much exisng and planned policies can reduce peoples vulnerability.Evaluang the eecveness of various intervenons would arguably be a very eecve way of measuring progresstowards adaptaon.

____________________3 The US $3.9 billion gure is a rough esmate based on informaon from thefollowing major mullateral funding mechanisms for adaptaon: an equivalent ofUS $399 million has been commied by the EUs Global Climate Change Alliancefrom 2008 to 2013 (GCCA, 2013). (It should be noted that part of these fundshave supported clean energy, Reducing Emissions from Deforestaon and ForestDegradaon (REDD) and Disaster Risk Reducon programme); cumulave pledgesto the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund

amounted to a total of US $863 million from their incepon to May 2013, (GEF,2013); US $2.3 billion has been pledged to the Strategic Climate Fund Trust fund asof December 31, 2012 (World Bank, 2013); and the Adaptaon Fund had receivedresources amounng to US $324 billion as of 30 November, 2012 (AdaptaonFund, 2012).


21/64

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon 3

Emission trends, pledges and theirimplementaon

Chapter 2

2.1 IntroduconThis chapter presents an update, based on the scienc

literature, of the following crical topics:

- current (2010 global) emissions of greenhouse gases;

- projected emissions (to 2020) of greenhouse gases

under a business-as-usual (BaU) scenario;

- projecons (to 2020) of greenhouse gas emissions

under four dierent sets of assumpons regarding

implementaon of naonal pledges to reduce

emissions;- the extent to which pares are posioned to implement

their pledges, in light of their current policy porolios

and plausible assumpons regarding macroeconomic

trends and osets.

The esmated emission level in 2020 under a business-as-

usual scenario is 1 gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalent

(GtCO2e) higher compared to last years emissions gap

report1. While the emission levels in 2020 for the strict-rules

cases are higher by roughly 1 GtCO2e (uncondional) and

are comparable to last years emission level (condional),

the emission levels associated with the two lenient-rules

cases are lower by roughly 1 GtCO2e, as compared to lastyears esmates. These changes are mainly due to decisions

on surpluses made by countries during the Doha climate

negoaons and downward revisions to the assumpons

on double counng of osets. They illustrate that increasing

stringency through the climate negoaons can help

reduce emission levels in 2020 under lenient-rules cases.

However, they do not reect an increase in ambion or

acon, but represent a move towards stricter accounng

rules. To illustrate, in last years emissions gap report,

emission levels associated with the strict-rules cases were

3 GtCO2e lower than those of the lenient-rules cases, whereas

this year they are lower by around 1 GtCO2e (uncondional)

and 2 GtCO2e (condional).

While previous reports assumed full pledge

implementaon, this year we also explore the extent

to which 13 pares, accounng for 72 percent of global

greenhouse gas emissions, are already on track to implementtheir pledges, and where further policy implementaon or

osets are likely to be required.

2.2 Current global emissionsLast years report esmated total global greenhouse

gas emissions in 2010 at 50.1 GtCO2e, with a 95 percent

uncertainty range of 45.654.6 GtCO2e2. This boom-up

esmate from the EDGAR database (JRC/PBL, 2012) has

not been updated since and is considered a comprehensive

assessment of global greenhouse gas emissions in 20103.

Figure 2.1 shows emission levels by major economic grouping

for the period 19702010, using this database4. These

may dier from data derived from the Naonal Inventory

Reports, which are the latest esmate of emissions for most

developed countries. The latest global esmates of energy-

related carbon dioxide emissions show a connued increase

for the years 2011 and 2012, although at a lower pace than

the average since the beginning of the 21stcentury (Olivier

et al., 2013)5.

Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Taryn Fransen (World ResourcesInstute, USA), Hans-Holger Rogner (Internaonal Instute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria)

Contribung authors: Johannes Gtschow (Potsdam Instute for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Giacomo Grassi (EuropeanCommissions Joint Research Centre, Italy), Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Kelly Levin (World Resources Instute, USA), Elizabeth

Sawin (Climate Interacve, USA), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Christopher Taylor(Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom), Zhao Xiusheng (Tshingua University, China)

____________________1 Unless otherwise stated, all emissions in this report are expressed in GtCO

2e.

This is the sum of six of the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol (thatis CO

2, CH

4, N

2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF

6), weighted by their global warming potenal

(GWP) (UNFCCC, 2002). Not included are ozone depleng substances (ODS), blackcarbon (BC), and organic carbon (OC). While nitrogen triuoride (NF

3) has recently

been added to the Kyoto Protocol, it has not been included in this analysis. Unlessotherwise stated, data include emissions from land use, land-use change andforestry (LULUCF).

____________________2This esmate included all six Kyoto gases and also takes into account emissionsfrom land use, land-use change and forestry.3 Another comprehensive assessment of global GHG emissions is WRIs CAITdatabase that esmated total global GHG emissions in 2010 at 47.2 GtCO

2e.

4 The reader is referred to last years report (UNEP 2012a) for a breakdownby gas.5The reader is referred to Appendix 2A for further details.


22/64

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon4

Figure 2.1: Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 19702010 by major economic groupingNote: The data ploed has been calculated using global warming potenal values as used for UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol reporng.The graph shows emissions of 50.1 GtCO

2e in 2010, as derived from boom-up emission inventories.

Source: EDGAR 4.2 FT2010 (JRC/PBL, 2012. Percentages refer to shares in global emissions in 2010.

While the last decade of the 20th century saw lile

change in the relave regional contribuons to annual

global greenhouse gas emissions, this changed drascally

during the rst decade of the 21st century. Between 2000

and 2010, the developed country share decreased from

51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing countryemissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent (JRC/

PBL, 2012). Referring to Figure 2.1, between 2000 and 2010

the share of global emissions of the non-OECD G20 countries

(i.e. Argenna, China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Russian

Federaon, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) increased by

8.7 percent, while the share of all OECD countries and other

industrialized countries declined by 9.0 percent, and the

share of the remaining developing countries changed lile.

Today developing and developed countries are responsible

for roughly equal shares of cumulave greenhouse gas

emissions for the period 1850-2010 (den Elzen et al., 2013b).

Greenhouse gas emission esmates are uncertain due todierences in denions and in the accounng of naonal

emissions. To produce a stascally signicant assessment

of the uncertainty associated with those emission esmates,

a large number of independent but consistent datasets is

required, which at present is not the case (Appendix 2.A).

It is nonetheless clear that energy-related carbon dioxide

emissions have the lowest uncertainty (UNEP, 2012a),

while land use and land-use change emissions of dierent

greenhouse gases have the highest.

2.3 Projected global emissions under

business-as-usual scenariosBusiness-as-usual scenarios of future developments aregenerally based on an extrapolaon of current economic,

social and technological trends. They usually reect policies

that have taken eect as of a recent cut-o date, for example,

20108. However, in some cases they may include policies

that, while approved, will only enter into force at a future

date (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013).

Business-as-usual scenarios of greenhouse gases are

benchmarks against which the eecveness of migaonpolicies and measures can be tested. They are also used in

this report to assess the extent to which pares pledges can

meet the 2o C or 1.5o C targets.

Business-as-usual emissions for 2020 were derived

from esmates by 12 modelling groups that analyzed the

reducon proposals of pares, as described in Secon 2.4 9.

Most of the modelling groups followed the same approach

with regards to the types of policies included in the BaU

scenario they did not include new policies with a potenal

eect on greenhouse gas emissions beyond those in eect

at the cut-o date10. Some of the modelling groups used the

BaU scenarios that the pares provided.Based on the analysis by these 12 modelling groups,

global greenhouse gas emissions for 2020 are esmated

at 59 GtCO2e (range 5660 GtCO

2e) in 2020 under BaU

assumpons, which is about 1 GtCO2e higher than the gure

in the 2012 emissions gap report11. Two key factors explain

____________________8BaU scenarios typically vary with regard to which policies they take into accountfor a variety of reasons, including: the cut-o year for their inclusion; whetherpolicies have to be planned, adopted, and/or implemented if they are to beincluded; methodologies for quanfying the eect of included policies; and thedeterminaon of whether a policy will have a signicant eect that warrants

inclusion.9See Table B.1 in Appendix 2.B for a lisng of the modelling groups.10The cut-o date for exclusion of policies varies among the modelling groups.11 Unless stated otherwise, all ranges in the report are expressed as 20 th80th

percenles.

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

GtC

Oe

Bunkers Least developed countries Other developing countries

OECD Lan America OECD Europe OECD North America

Non-OECD G20 members Other industrialized countries OECD Pacific

60

2.2%

4.7%

16.3%

42.5%

2.1%5.2%

1.5%

11.0%

14.5%

50

40

30

20

10

0

Years


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this increase: using the BaU numbers from Chinas second

naonal communicaon to UNFCCC (Government of China,

2012), and moving the base year from 2005 to 2010 in more

model studies12.

To test the robustness of the 59 GtCO2e BaU esmate, we

compare our esmates with those of several internaonal

modelling groups, including six that are parcipang in the

studies discussed in Secon 2.4 (Kriegler et al., 2013)13.

The BaU scenarios with which we compared our esmates(24 scenarios, developed by 12 dierent models) give

a median of 58 GtCO2e, with a range of 5560 GtCO

2e. In

spite of the dierent lower bound, this median, 58 GtCO2e,

is consistent with that obtained by the modelling groups

contribung to this report.

2.4 Projected global emissions under pledgeassumpons

Under the 2010 Cancn Agreements of the Climate

Convenon, 42 developed-country pares have submied

quaned economy-wide emission reducon proposals for

2020. Since November 2012, when the last emissions gap

report was released, only New Zealand has signicantly

changed its pledge14. Some countries, notably Mexico, have

changed underlying assumpons that eecvely change

their pledge15.

At the latest Conference of the Pares (COP) to the Climate

Convenon, held in in Doha in late 2012, pares agreed on

a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This

period will run from 2013 to 2020 and provides for quaned

emission reducon targets for the following Annex I pares:

Australia, Belarus, the European Union and its member

states, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland andUkraine. No binding emission reducon targets were set for

any other Climate Convenon pares, neither Annex-I nor

non-Annex I.

To date 55 developing country pares and the African

group have submied naonally appropriate migaon

acons (NAMAs) to Climate Convenon (UNFCCC, 2013). Of

these, 16 have been framed in terms of mul-sector expected

greenhouse gas emission reducons16. The remaining 39 are

expressed as sectoral goals or, in fewer instances, specic

migaon projects. In this assessment only the former 16

are considered17. Together, the 42 developed country pares

with reducon targets and the 16 developing country pares

accounted for about 75 percent of global emissions in 2010.

____________________12This resulted in higher emission levels, as economic acvity and thus emissionlevels was higher in the period 20052010, compared to the previous base year.13The esmates in this report do not include new policies aecng greenhousegas emissions aer the cut-o year.14 In August 2013, New Zealand announced a single 5 percent reducon target

with respect to its 1990 emission levels, replacing its inial 1020 percent target.15The Mexican government recently updated the countrys BaU scenario for 2020.This updated scenario leads to 960 MtCO

2e emissions, which is above the previous

BaU esmate, and also aects the 2020 emissions resulng from the pledge(see Box 2.1).

____________________16 China and India have expressed their migaon goals in terms of emissionreducons per unit of GDP; Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and theRepublic of Korea, in terms of deviaons below their respecve BaU emissionscenarios; Angua and Barbuda, Marshall Islands and Republic of Moldova, interms of absolute greenhouse gas emission reducons; and Costa Rica and theMaldives, in terms of a carbon neutrality goal. The reader is referred to Appendix2.C for addional details on these goals.17Quanfying the emission reducons resulng from these 39 acons is dicult.For this reason, this assessment assumes no reducons below BaU emissionscenarios for these countries. This might be a conservave assumpon.18 For example, in November 2012, as a part of the countrys second naonalcommunicaon to the Climate Convenon, the Chinese government releasednaonal BaU and migaon scenarios for the rst me (Government of China,2012). The BaU scenario excludes all climate-related policies implemented

since 2005, which leads to energy-related carbon dioxide emissions of14.4 GtCO

2in 2020. The migaon scenario reects both domesc policies and the

countrys internaonal emission-intensity target and results in emissions levels of4.5 GtCO

2below BaU levels. Similarly, the Mexican government recently updated

the countrys BaU scenario for 2020.

Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC pares with a pledge

Figure 2.2 shows past (1990, 2005 and 2010) as expected and future (2020) emission levels for 13 ClimateConvenon pares that have submied quantave emission reducon pledges. Four dierent projeconsto 2020 are presented: the naonal BaU scenario, the median BaU value from several internaonal modellingstudies, and the emission levels resulng from implementaon of two emission reducon pledge cases (see thenext secon for a descripon of the dierent pledge cases).

Annex I pares have dened their commitments in terms of emission reducons in 2020 relave to historical

emission levels, typically emission levels in 1990. Conversely, non-Annex I pares have dened them in terms ofemission reducons in 2020 relave to hypothecal future emission levels, typically against BaU levels in 2020, orin terms of greenhouse gas emission intensity. In this second case, the uncertainty about actual emission levels in2020 is carried over into the esmate of the emission reducons commitment.

Most naonal BaU scenarios from non-Annex I pares are relavely high compared to the range in the correspondingscenario by 12 modelling studies. The reasons for this are numerous, including dierences in denions, notablyas to which policies are considered in the baseline, as well in the nature of the assumpons made (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013). Crucially, some developing countries are increasingly clarifying those assumpons and the methodsused to calculate the baseline18.


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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon6

Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC pares with a pledge (connued)

Figure 2.2. Greenhouse gas emissions, including land-use change, for 1990, 2005, 2010 and for 2020 under a naonal BaU(if available), median of the BaU assumed by modelling groups, uncondional pledge and condional pledge for UNFCCC paresincluded in the G20 with a pledge, taking the European Union as a group.Note: For developed countries, emissions exclude emissions from land-use change.Note: European Union data include all current European Union member countries except Croaa, which joined the EuropeanUnion on 1 July, 2013.Source: EDGAR (JRC/PBL, 2012)19

____________________19 Naonal BaUs were obtained from the following sources. For developedcountries, we use the best representaon of a with-policies BaU scenario, i.e.:Australia (Department of Climate Change and Energy Eciency, 2012); Canada(Environment Canada, 2012); European Union (European Environment Agency,2012); Japan: not available; Russia (Government of the Russian Federaon, 2010);USA (EIA, 2012; Bianco etal., 2013). For developing countries without-policies BaUscenarios (den Elzen et al., 2013a), i.e.: Brazil (Brazilian Government, 2010); China(Government of China, 2012), supplemented with the average esmate non-energy CO

2emission projecon from den Elzen et al., 2013a and esmates from

Climate Acon Tracker; India (Planning Commission, 2011); Indonesia (Ministry ofEnvironment, 2010), Mexico (NCCS, 2013); South Africa (South Africa. Departmentof Environmental Aairs, 2011); Korea, Republic of (Republic of Korea, 2011). Notethat the naonal BaUs for South Africa and India were reported as a range. For thegures, the mid-point has been used.

Some pledges are uncondional, whereas others havebeen made condional on the ability of a naonal legislature

to enact necessary laws, the acon of other countries, or the

provision of nancial or technical support. We refer to these

pledges as, respecvely, uncondional and condional.

Some countries have submied one of each type, whereas

others have submied only a condional or only an

uncondional pledge. This creates a range of possible

collecve impacts from the pledges, bounded on the low

end if only uncondional pledges are implemented, and

on the high end if all condional pledges are implemented.

Emission levels in 2020 resulng from implementaon of

the pledges also depend on the rules used to account forboth land use and land-use change credits and debits, and

surplus emission units. These concepts are introduced in

the following secons, followed by a quancaon of the

emission reducons resulng from dierent combinaons ofpledge cases.

2.4.1 Use of land use, land-use change andforestry credits and debits

Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I pares may receive

credits or debits from land use, land-use change and forestry

(LULUCF) acvies dependent on a set of complex accounng

rules that contribute to the achievement of their individual

emission reducon targets. During the seventeenth

Conference of the Pares to the Climate Convenon, held

in Durban in late 2011, new LULUCF accounng rules for

countries parcipang in the second commitment period(CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol were agreed (UNFCCC, 2012a).

The potenal contribuon of LULUCF accounng under

these new rules appears to be relavely modest for Annex

I pares that joined the rst commitment period of the

Kyoto Protocol (Grassi et al., 2012): a dierence of up to

about 2 percent of 1990 emissions between strict and

lenient accounng, equal to about 0.3 GtCO2e per year. If

the USA, which did not join the rst commitment period of

the Kyoto Protocol, followed these rules, the number would

increase to 0.45 GtCO2e per year20. While these esmates

____________________20 For the USA, the esmated potenal contribuon from LULUCF credits is

about 0.15 GtCO2e per year. This is calculated as follows: for forest management,assuming 2005 as reference year and given the available projecons for 2020(United States Department of State, 2010), the credit is esmated at about0.07 GtCO

2e per year; an addional credit of about 0.08 GtCO

2e per year is

esmated from aorestaon/reforestaon and deforestaon (EPA, 2005).

1990 2010 naonal BaU 2020 BaU 2020 2020-uncondional 2020-conditonal2005

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

Emissions(MtCOe)

Australia

B

razil

Canada

C

hina

E

U27

India

Indonesia

Japan

Mexico

Russia

SouthA

frica

Korea,

Republicof

USA


25/64


____________________21For example, in the case of Russia, if the appropriate accounng of the potenalof the forestry sector (UNFCCC, 2012c) is interpreted as not applying the cap onforest management credits agreed in Durban, LULUCF credits in Russia alone mayreach 0.3 GtCO

2e per year, instead of the 0.1 GtCO

2e per year assumed in this

assessment.22This would apply if all surplus credits were purchased by pares with pledgesthat do require emission reducons, displacing migaon acon in buying pares.23 The European Union stated in Doha that their legislaon does not allow theuse of carried over surplus units (UNFCCC, 2012b). However, it is unclear if thisstatement is fully binding. Purchase of units was not excluded by the European

Union, but is highly unlikely to happen, as the European Union holds the largestshare of surplus units.24 In their respecve pledges, the governments of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarusproposed target emission levels above that 2008-2010 emissions average. Furtherdetails are available in Chen et al. (2013) and Kollmuss (2013).

____________________25Calculaons assume as a starng point the inial assigned amounts of the rstcommitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The uncertainty ranges come from the

future decisions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. If these countries stay in thesecond commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and lower their commitments totheir 2008-2010 emission levels, they can make use of surplus emissions.26 At least in theory, emission reducons could also be shared, with a certainpercentage aributed to the buyer and the seller retaining the remainder.

are generally consistent with the informaon contained in

UNFCCC (2012c), they may underesmate emissions from

those countries that may adopt dierent accounng rules

from those of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, Canada,

Japan, New Zealand and Russia21.

2.4.2 Surplus emissions unitsEsmates of emission levels in 2020 can also be inuenced

by the potenal use of surplus emission units. These surplusunits could arise either when pares actual emissions are

below their emission targets for the rst commitment period

of the Kyoto Protocol, or when their emissions in 2020 are

below their target for that year, when this does not require

signicant emission reducons. Note that surplus emission

units refers to surpluses arising from dierent types of

allowances assigned amount units, emission reducon

units and cered emission reducons all introduced in

the next paragraphs.

The 2012 emissions gap report esmated the maximum

emission reducon in 2020 due to surplus credits at

1.8 GtCO2

e22. However, as a result of the rules for using

such surplus allowances agreed to in Doha, these esmates

need to be revised (UNFCCC, 2012b; Kollmuss, 2013). The

pares agreed that allowances, referred to as assigned

amount units (AAUs), not used in the rst commitment

period can be carried over to the next period. However,

recent decisions on surplus emission units signicantly

limit the use of such surplus allowances and prevent the

build-up of new ones. Only pares parcipang in the

second commitment period can sell their surplus assigned

amount units. This will exclude Russia, which is the largest

holder of surplus assigned amount units, but which will

not parcipate in the second commitment period. Buyer

countries can only purchase surplus assigned amount unitsup to a quanty of 2 percent of their own inial assigned

amount for the rst commitment period. In addion,

Australia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and

Switzerland have said that they will not purchase units from

others, while the European Union has declared that they

will not use any surplus emissions units (UNFCCC, 2012b)23.

Finally, new surplus allowances are prevented by the fact

that allowances that exceed the pares average emission

levels in the period 20082010 will be cancelled. This rule

aects Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine24.

These decisions reduce the impact of surplus emissions

in 2020. Based on Chen et al.(2013) and Gtschow (2013),the impact of Kyoto surpluses on 2020 pledges is esmated

to be about 0.05 GtCO2e (range 0.050.15 GtCO

the emissions gap report 2013: a unep synthesis report

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