the emergence of the counter terrorism command policing...

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED


The Emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing

model and its impact on intelligence sharing between the

Police and the Security Services.

By

Eric Halford

Student ID: 00221692

Dissertation thesis submitted to the faculty of English, Sociology, Politics and Contemporary

History, Salford University

In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Science

In

Terrorism and Security Studies

2008/09

Supervised by Dr Christian Kaunert


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Descriptive Abstract

The emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model is the most contemporary

change to Counter Terrorism within the United Kingdom in recent history. The creation of the CTC

and regional CTU’S has resulted in an unprecedented level of cooperation between the Police and

the intelligence agency, the Security Service. Their greatest area of cooperation is in the field of

intelligence sharing and as such this project aims to establish the impact of the creation of the CTC

Policing model on the levels of intelligence sharing between the two actors before ultimately

assessing the overall affect on the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the terrorist threat. Through

the conduct of a detailed research strategy consisting of a quantitative questionnaire and qualitative

interview process within the North West Counter Terrorism Unit this project will analyse information

and data obtained from serving Counter Terrorism staff in an effort to fill the missing dimension of

Counter Terrorism literature that is seemingly completely absent at the practitioner’s level whilst

adding to an identified general lack of empirical material surrounding Counter Terrorism study.


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Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank Dr Sarah Leonard whose support whilst completing the accredited

prior learning application was invaluable and fundamentally made my presence on the

program possible. From start to finish the support of Dr Christian Kaunert has been

exceptional, his level of knowledge and enthusiasm regarding the course content and his

continual motivational support during a number of confidence lapses has been vital in

maintaining focus throughout the project. I would also like to offer Dr Kaunert my thanks for

his support during the dissertation and apologise for the weeks of nervousness he spent

awaiting the projects final submission. This was an extremely enjoyable and interesting

project to conduct and it is only with thanks to Lancashire Constabulary and their funding

that the financial cost could be met. Finally, I reserve my greatest thanks until last and offer

them to both Chief Superintendant Tony Porter of the Greater Manchester Police and

Superintendant Edward Thistlethwaite from Lancashire Constabulary who without their

support the research that was fundamental to the project would not have even been

achievable.


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CONTENTS PAGE

Abstract 2

Acknowledgements 3

Table of Contents 4

Acronyms 6

List of Figures 7

List of Tables 7

Chapter

1. Introduction 8

2. An Introduction to Counter Terrorism

Literature

10

2.1 Counter Terrorism Literature Review

Methodology

11

2.2 Conciliation and Prevention as Tools

Against Terrorism

12

2.3 Enforcement as a Counter Terrorism

Response

13

2.4 Protection of Critical National

Infrastructure

14

2.5 Domestic Counter Terrorism, the Main

Players

15

2.6 The United States Counter Terrorism

Approach, All out War.

15

2.7 The Homeland Security Approach 16

2.8 The United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism

Approach, The Four P’s

17

2.9 Literature Review Conclusion 20

3. Practitioners Level Intelligence Sharing 22


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3.1 Introduction 22

3.2 Intelligence Sharing Solutions 24

3.3 The Importance of Enhanced cooperation 28

3.4 Conclusion 29

4. 4.1 Counter Terrorism Research Question 30

4.1 Research Methodology 31

4.2 Research Strategy 32

5. Bureaucracy, the Hidden Enemy Within

Counter Terrorism

34

5.1 Introduction to the Counter Terrorism

Command Policing Model

34

5.2 Need to Know or Need to Share 36

6. The Cooperative Approach to Counter

Terrorism

45

6.1 Introduction 45

6.2 BI-Lateral Intelligence Sharing Within the

UK’S Counter Terrorism Response

45

6.3 Conclusion 54

7. Bibliography 57

Appendices i Research Questionnaire 63

ii Sample of Interview Questions: Deputy

NCSB

81

iii Interview Matrix 82


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Acronyms

ACPO TAM Association of Chief Police Officers –

Terrorism and Allied Matters

CTC Counter Terrorism Command

CTU Counter Terrorism Unit

GPMS Government Protected Marking Scheme

MI5 Security Service

NCSB National Coordinator of Special Branches

NIM National Intelligence Model


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List of Figures

Figure 1 Comparison of intelligence sharing

blockers Pre and Post CTC Policing Model

Figure 2 Pre and Post CTC Levels of Face to Face

Liaison with the Security Service

Figure 3 The Affect on Intelligence Sharing as a

result of the CTC.

Figure 4 Level of Contribution to Increases in

Intelligence Sharing

Figure 5 Has the CTC/CTU Increased the UK’S

Counter Terrorism Ability?

Figure 6 What is the Best Way to Improve the

UK’S Counter Terrorism Ability?

List of Tables

Table 1 Structure of Counter Terrorism

Investigation with the United Kingdom

Table 2 Biggest Blocker to Intelligence Sharing

with the Security Service?

Table 3 The Biggest Blocker to Intelligence

Sharing with the Security Service Pre VS

Post CTC?

Table 4 Frequency of Face to Face Liaison with a

Member of the Security Service?

Table 5 Belief that Intelligence Sharing with the

Security Service has Increased as a Result

of the Creation of the CTC/CTU?

Table 6 What has Played the Greatest Role in

Intelligence Sharing?

Table 7 How Much do you Believe the CTC/CTU

has Increased the UK’S Counter Terrorism

Ability?

Table 8 Further Ways of Improving the UK’S

Counter Terrorism Ability.


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1. Introduction

Terrorism is undoubtedly an international threat. The attacks on the World Trade

Centre committed on September 11th 2001 resulted in victims from over 90 different

countries (Walker, 2006). Not only are the targets and victims of terrorism increasingly

international, so are their far reaching associations. Terrorist groups have been known to

utilise international support prior to the manifestation of the international Islamic

fundamentalists that we have witnessed in recent years. Terrorist groups such as the Irish

Republican Army and the Basque group, ETA, were well known to have sourced bi-lateral

cooperation and arms from international supporters (Wilkinson, 2007:158). As a result,

formulation of an international strategy and increased cooperation are widely acknowledged

as being the most effective ways of countering the terrorist threat (Wilkinson, 2007:162) and

as such this project begins with a review of literature regarding International Counter

Terrorism theories.

In an effort to gain a greater insight the review will also examine literature that has

been written regarding Counter Terrorism at a domestic level by utilising the United States

and the United Kingdom as case studies. This review will identify that the vast majority of

Counter Terrorism literature has been written from a strategic policy making level and as

such through further distilling of the material the attention will then centre on a review of

literature at a practitioners level in an effort to accurately assess the void of literature within

this missing dimension. Outlining the necessity for increased cooperation between Counter

Terrorism actors the area of intelligence sharing will be examined after being highlighted as

the fundamental process within Counter Terrorism cooperation. Subsequently combining

the missing dimension of practitioners level literature the recommendations for greater

cooperation between intelligence actors and the fundamental area of their cooperation,

intelligence sharing, an effort will be made to address the deficit in empirical evidence

within Counter Terrorism by examining if the introduction of the Counter Terrorism

Command Policing model within the UK has increased intelligence sharing between the

Police and the Security Services and ultimately, the United Kingdom’s capability to counter

the terrorist threat.

In an effort to answer this question a course of empirical research through the

circulation of a quantitative questionnaire and supporting qualitative interviews of serving

Counter Terrorism officers will be conducted within the North West Counter Terrorism Unit.


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Before analysing the data obtained an overview of the Counter Terrorism Command

structure will be provided. Through adoption of a combined data presentation and analysis

approach bureaucracy and the ‘need to know ’ principle will be examined as a barrier to the

level of intelligence sharing between the Counter Terrorism Command and the Security

Service in conjunction with the levels of face to face liaison between the two actors. This

examination will identify one major finding, that the emergence of the Counter Terrorism

Command has resulted in increased liaison between the Police and the Security Services but

that this increase has resulted in greater numbers of officers being exposed to the

bureaucratic ‘need to know’ principle thus evidencing a clear shift in the causation of

intelligence sharing blockers.

Intelligence sharing through bi-lateral, face to face contact will then be examined in

an effort to establish the factors that contribute greatest to information sharing levels within

the Counter Terrorism Command structure before analysing the overall impact of the CTC in

increasing the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability. The practitioner’s

recommendations for improving the UK’s Counter Terrorism ability offer several interesting

opportunities which will then be examined before formulating the hypothesis that joint

working and increased liaison between the two actors has a sealing point and as such a

recommendation for future progress through restructuring Counter Terrorism at a national

level will be outlined. The project will then be concluded by assessing whether the literature

reviewed provided just cause for the area of research and establish if the overall aims of the

hypothesis have been met and the weight of the evidence obtained before recommending

further areas of research to corroborate or negate the findings and recommendations

outlined.


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2. An introduction to Counter Terrorism literature

This review has identified through examination of a wide range of published academic

journals, books and policy literature that the study of Counter Terrorism has come from a

number of academic areas and from a large amount of authors and scholars. The review has

also highlighted that at present there is no international authority in existence that has

overriding control to introduce or enforce international law, policy or strategy and as such

there is no clearly defined universal approach to Counter Terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007:169).

Counter Terrorism literature, although present in many academic fields is most prevalent in

the areas of governmental policy, international relations, economics, sociology and conflict

studies. The governmental strategy and literature supporting Counter Terrorism policy is

extensive (Cressey, 2000; HMG, 2007; CO, 2008; CEU, 2005; EOTP, 2002; NSC, 2003;

Gunaratna, 2007; European Union, 2006; UN, 2009;), as is the literature in the field of

conflict studies (Malvesti, 2002; Scheurs, 2004; Hutcheson and Talev, 2006; Heyman, 2003;

Kennedy, Lum and Shirley, 2006; Hewitt, 2007; Gunaratna, 2006, 2007; Hoffman, 1998).

International relations academics have also contributed a large amount of material relating

to Counter Terrorism (Sandler, 2005; Ganor, 2005; Ek, Gallis and Miko, 2006; Deflem, 2006;

Keohane, 2005; Haine, Jaarva and Johnson, 2006; Walker, 2006; Gunaratna ans Steven,

2004; Bennis, 2003), along with academics from the field of sociology (Pressman, 2007;

Thacher, 2005; Dancs, 2008; Shapiro, 2005; Wardlaw, 1982; Crenshaw, 2007; Omand, 2005;

Wilkinson, 2007), however, although present, the literature written from an economics

perspective is much more scarce (Enders and Sandler, 2004; De Soto, 1989; Bruck, 2009).

Although the Counter Terrorism debate has provided us with an array of conflicting

theories from numerous academic fields as it has been outlined above, it is possible to

extract from the literature three commonly advocated Counter Terrorism responses. The

prevention of terrorism by tackling its fundamental causes (HMG, 2006; UN 60/288, 2006;

Omand, 2005; Gunaratna, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007; Ganor, 2006; Sederberg, 1995; CEU, 2005),

the enforcement of consequences, whether they be criminal or military (HMG, 2006;

Cressey, 2000; Shapiro, 2005; NSC, 2003; Scheur, 2004; UN 60/288, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007;

CEU, 2005; Ganor, 2005; Haine, Jaarva and Johnson et al, 2006; Keohane, 2005; Sandler,

2005; Deflem, 2006; Omand, 2005), and finally, the increase in protection from the

commission of terrorist attacks (HMG, 2006; Sandler and Walters, 2004; Thacher, 2005;


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EOTP, 2002; UN 60/288, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007; CEU, 2005; Ek, Gallis and Milko et al, 2006;

Ganor, 2005; Heymann, 2003; Dancs, 2008).

2.1 Counter Terrorism literature review methodology

The sources of material being utilised for this review encompasses only English

language Counter Terrorism publications which includes books, information sourced from

the internet and journal and articles located within scholarly website based institutions who

subscribe to the Athens system. To enable a more refined review, the literature will be

narrowed to that outlining the three previously mentioned theories which will be examined

at two levels of Counter Terrorism, international responses and the domestic approach

which will use the United States and United Kingdom as case studies. This approach assists in

bringing the wide range of literature in existence under an easily manageable umbrella. This

method also offers the advantage of enabling the review to easily identify the theoretical

base of the three most commonly advocated responses and enables a more effective review

of the depth and quality of literature in that area of Counter Terrorism strategy. This

approach will also enable commonalities and distinctions to be more accurately identified at

the international and domestic levels of Counter Terrorism, thus enabling identification of

areas that require further examination or research.

It must however be acknowledged that this approach does have downfalls and that

it is not an exhaustive review of every theory of Counter Terrorism. As the review focuses on

literature that underpins the three most commonly advocated Counter Terrorism

approaches, it is restricted by the noticeable absence of material of a more radical or under

supported theoretical response. This weakens the review as until comprehensive empirical

analysis of all available theories, radical or otherwise, has been conducted, it may overlook

the most effective method of Counter Terrorism. The review is also restrictive in the amount

of literature that has been reviewed as although extensive research has been conducted, it

should be acknowledged that due to the vast amount of literature available along with a lack

of examination of non English language literature, there is likelihood that material worthy of

inclusion may be absent.


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2.2 Conciliation and Prevention as Tools against Terrorism.

The United Nations resolution 60/288 emphasises a need to address the conditions

conducive to the spread of terrorism and promotes a strategy of integration and inclusion of

people, cultures and religions and promoting dialogue, mediation and conciliation (UN

60/288, 2006). The theory of tackling the underlying causes of terrorism as a Counter

Terrorism response has been championed by Martha Crenshaw since 1981 and is advocated

by both academics and politicians alike who agree policy makers should engage further with

communities to address their concerns and to avoid feeding the cycle of radicalisation

(Omand, 2005; Crenshaw, 2007). This mindset is supported by Rohan Gunaratna who

suggests enhancing the ability for moderate clerics to preach tolerism as a means of

reducing misunderstandings and conflicts between communities (2007:64). Further support

to this theory can be found in Paul Wilkinson’s book ‘Terrorism versus Democracy’ (2007) in

which he advocates such a response in his theory ‘Pathways out of terrorism’ in which he

argues that educating people that terrorism is unacceptable and counterproductive, in

conjunction with governments considering granting political concessions to terrorist groups

through peace processes to reduce their need to engage in terrorism, when appropriate,

offers the best Counter Terrorism response (2007:198).

Boaz Ganor further theorises that governments take a three strand approach to

Counter Terrorism in his publication ‘The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision

Makers’, with strand three concurring with Wilkinson that re-education, conciliation and

engagement may be the best ways of preventing the threat of terrorism from increasing

(Ganor, 2005:26). Peter Sederberg also advocates conciliation as a tool for Counter

Terrorism in his publication ‘Conciliation as a Counter Terrorist Strategy’ (1995:295). In the

theory he highlights that conciliation has been used successfully in previous Counter

Terrorism operations (1995:295) although it is argued that the differences in secular and

religious terrorism means this approach may not always work (Sederberg, 1995:307) and

that making concessions with moderate terrorist groups only increases the overall use of

terrorism by more radical elements (Ganor, 2005:146). This measure of social integration

and mediation is strongly emphasised as a Counter Terrorism response by the European

Union’s strategy to address the factors that contribute support for and recruitment into

terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007:172).


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2.3 Enforcement as a Counter Terrorism Response

The United Nations also advocate a strategy that encourages the creation of hostile

environments for terrorists and increased international cooperation in Counter Terrorism

enforcement (UN 60/288, 2006) which is where we first find the necessity for increased

levels of intelligence sharing between Counter Terrorism actors being outlined. The theory

of a pro-active Counter Terrorism response is widely supported amongst both academics

and politicians who often dismiss more conciliatory methods as being ineffective (Sederberg,

1995;298) and because of its simplicity which is identified by Todd Sandler in his publication

‘Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism’ in which he suggests that by targeting

terrorist groups, you reduce their ability to commit terrorist attacks (2005:75), the method

of targeting however is greatly debated (Crelinsten and Schmid, 1993:315).

Richard Rubenstein argues in his publication ‘Alchemist of Revolution: Terrorism in

the Modern World’ that those who view terrorism as an act of war favour military action,

those who view it as a crime favour law enforcement (1987:9). Regardless of the method the

theory has strong support and Peter Sederberg argues that failure to engage the terrorists

with enforcement would only lead to more terrorism (1995:299). Boaz Ganor suggests in

strand one, ‘eliminating terrorism’, of his three strand Counter Terrorism proposal that

complete elimination of the terrorist threat is one possible response (2005:25-26) a tactic

which Paul Wilkinson concurs within number 3 of his 6 ‘pathways out of terrorism’ plan, in

which he suggests complete eradication of the terrorist group by either law enforcement or

military intervention as one way of removing the threat by increasing the costs of their acts

(2007:197). Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter agree with the theory of repressive

enforcement but go further by warning that it should be targeted at supporters of terrorism,

their leaders and their assets (2006:64) and that care should be taken to reduce collateral

damage or you risk further adding to the threat (2006:72). The task of effective targeting is

itself a difficult task and it has been argued that regardless of the progress made post 9/11

there remains a lack of common understanding in Counter Terrorism of ‘who is doing what’

(Omand, 2005:115) and that greater steps need to be taken to improve cooperation in law

enforcement and intelligence sharing as a Counter Terrorism strategy (Omand, 2005;

Keohane, 2005), particularly between law enforcement and intelligence services at both a

domestic and international level (Keohane, 2005), again intimating at the necessity for

enhanced levels of intelligence sharing.


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2.4 Protection of Critical National Infrastructure

The United Nations encourages member states to share best practice in methods of

prevention and areas of expertise and for members to increase their protection of national

infrastructure (UN 60/288, 2006), the European Union action plan reaffirms this by outlining

the need to increase protection of international transport and border controls (Wilkinson,

2007:172) as it has been argued that open borders as present within the US and now Europe

offer increased opportunity for the planning and commission of terrorist attacks (Sederberg,

1995:298). The concept of risk management and protection from attack is known as critical

infrastructure protection and rational choice theory dictates that such target hardening is an

obvious and effective way of reducing the risk of terrorism as it increases the likely costs

(Kydd and Walter, 2006:65).

The theory is suggested by Boaz Ganor as one way of dealing with the threat of

terrorism in strand two, ‘minimising damage caused by terrorism’, of his three strand

approach (2005:26) and a theory that has widespread support amongst academics (Sandler

and Walters, 2004; Thacher, 2005; Wilkinson, 2007; Ek, Gallis and Milko et al, 2006;

Heymann, 2003; Dancs, 2008). However, the events of 9/11 served to emphasise the

necessity for protection of critical infrastructure and the result is very little detailed

literature debating the validity of this theory which is simply accepted as a must. The debate

has instead concentrated on the assessment of the risk and the methods of protection.

Many academics have added their own theoretical approaches to the risk assessment

process (Olwell, Wilson and Wilson:2006). A comprehensive assessment of this Counter

Terrorism approach was written by Theodore Lewis in his book ‘Critical Infrastructure

Protection in Homeland Security’ in which he attempts to formulate a theory of quantitative

vulnerability analysis in an effort to identify infrastructure in need of protection and how it

should be done (2006:107). Peter Orszag and Joseph Pechman further the theory by risk

assessment by arguing that simply identifying a need for infrastructure protection is not

enough and that regulatory or financial incentives are required to create compliance within

the private sector (2003:2).


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2.5 Domestic Counter Terrorism, The main Players

It can be argued that in recent years the two major domestic players in the Counter

Terrorism arena are the United States, brought about by the atrocity of the world trade

centre attacks on September 11th 2001 and the United Kingdom, who’s long Counter

Terrorism experience against Irish related terrorism and the attacks committed against the

London transport system in 2005 have given them both vast experience in domestic Counter

Terrorism. However, both these two nations adopt very different approaches to domestic

Counter Terrorism as it is argued they face very different threats and have varying levels of

resources, which has ultimately shaped their domestic policy (Shapiro, 2005). Such different

approaches are justified by Jeremy Pressman in his publication ‘Rethinking Transnational

Counter Terrorism: Beyond a National Framework’ in which he highlights the fact that

governments should acknowledge that Counter Terrorism strategies that may be successful

at an international level, may not be as useful on a domestic stage (2007:64).

2.6 The United States Counter Terrorism Approach, ‘All out war’

The literature surrounding the Counter Terrorism response by the United States is

dominated by two theories, one providing overwhelming support for military action as a tool

for defeating terrorism and the second concentrating on the protection of critical

infrastructure. The ‘all out war’ approach is strongly supported by many US academics

because they believe America is the primary global target for Islamic terrorism and their

main enemy in the holy war, ‘jihad’, and that as a result they are more likely to be subject to

nihilistic attacks such as 9/11 (Shapiro, 2005; Simon, 1987). The US national strategy is based

on a theoretical approach that advocates this response, although the provenance of this

theory is not identified. It sets out four objectives of Counter Terrorism; Defeat, Deny,

Diminish and Defend. Based on the theory that terrorist groups operate at three levels,

state, regional and global, with state level offering the lowest threat and global the highest

(NSC, 2003:1) it advocates reducing the terrorists capability at a global level through

defeating them using military action, forcing them to disperse to the regional level. At this

level, the strategy of denying them refuge through increasing weaker states capability to

fight terrorism will force organisations to disperse further, eventually operating at a state

level where they will revert to criminality to achieve their reduced aims and can be

subjected to standard law enforcement action and ultimately defeat (NSC, 2003: 11).


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Michael Scheur in his book, ‘Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on

Terror’, outlines the US theory of ‘Disengagement or War’ (2004). Although advocating all

out war against terrorism as a potential solution, Scheur suggests that disengagement from

the Middle East is attempted as the first option (2004). Scheuer furthers his argument by

suggesting that the best counter terrorist policy for the United States would be one of

reduced political intervention in the Middle East, the theorised result would be a decline in

radicalisation and terrorism targeting the United States as their motivation is slowly

diminished (2004). Jeremy Pressman offers some support for the US approach to Counter

Terrorism suggesting that the war model is the best strategic plan to reduce the terrorists

capability so they are in a constant state of catch up, always seeking to re-group and rebuild

but believes that overall, the ‘all out war’ strategy will not defeat ideological terrorism as it is

too ingrained (2007:17). James Loy and Robert Ross both suggest in their article ‘Meeting

the Homeland Security Challenge’ that the US theory of military action as a solution is based

on its historic use as one of their three transnational levers of power but that contemporary

threats such as terrorism require a more domestically orientated response (2001:2). Peter

Sederberg criticises the war response by arguing that once started, it cannot be scaled down

without appearing to be offering concessions and that it is not always proportionate as even

terrorist groups with nihilistic goals will often not have the capability (1995:300-301)

2.7 The Homeland Security Approach

The Department of Homeland Security was introduced in 2002 and they emphasise a

three strand Counter Terrorism strategy: Prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce

vulnerability to terrorism and minimise the damage caused through terrorist attack (EOTP,

2002:2). This counter terrorist strategy is based on the theory that terrorists are strategic

actors and will identify weaknesses in preparedness and defence capability to maximise

their efforts, as such, defence against a broad range of possible attacks is required (EOTP,

2002:VII). This approach is supported by game theoretic studies of Counter Terrorism

conducted by Todd Sandler and Walter Enders who adopt a cost benefit approach in their

publication ‘An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism’ (2004). They suggest a

three strand approach: Force terrorists into less harmful attacks, target their resources and

leadership and the protection of one’s self from multiple potential attacks (Enders and

Sandler, 2004:20). They theorise that if this strategy is followed, terrorists will be forced into

pursuing non-violent means to reach their goals (Enders and Sandler, 2004:20). This form of


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rational choice is also supported by Richard Lebow and Janice Gross Stein in their article

‘Rational Choice Theory: I Think Therefore I Deter’ in which they argue that terrorists are

rational actors and that a high cost benefit ratio will reduce the likelihood of them

committing attacks.

David Thacher suggests taking the theory of Homeland Security further in his

publication, ‘The local role in Homeland Security’, where he argues that Homeland Security

as a Counter Terrorism response could be increased through utilisation of the 600,000 local

Police officers within the US (2005: 635). The theory of enhancing the remit of law

enforcement is also advocated by Philip Heymann in his book, ‘Terrorism, Freedom and

Security: Winning without war’ in which he suggests that enhancing the responsibilities of

current law enforcement and intelligence gathering at a domestic level, offers a greater

capability for the United States to deal with the terrorist threat (2003:62). It has however,

been suggested that the Homeland Security approach concentrates too much on Counter

Terrorism and should be increased by broadening preparation and response to include

accidental and natural disasters which would, as a by product, increase their capability to

deal with threats from terrorism (Dancs, 2008).

2.8 The United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism Approach, The Four P’s

The strategy adopted within the United Kingdom is in line with the European ‘four P’

response; Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Prepare, also known as the Contest Strategy (HMG,

2006 and Haine, Jaarva and Johnson et al, 2006) although it was in fact the United Kingdom

who developed this theory of Counter Terrorism (Haine, Jaarva and Johnson et al, 2006). It

is highlighted within the UK Counter Terrorism strategy that it has been formulated through

drawing on decades of experience gained through domestic Counter Terrorism operations

against Irish related terrorism and more recently, Islamist terrorism (HMG, 2006:5).

Although it does not outline any specific theory of Counter Terrorism, as done in the US

Counter Terrorism strategy it is highly evident that the Counter Terrorism response adopted

by the United Kingdom encompasses all of the most commonly advocated Counter

Terrorism theories that have been identified earlier in the review. This multi lateral

approach has been adopted by the UK as they believe this offers greater flexibility in the

fight against terrorism (Ek, Gallis and Miko et al, 2006:36). This flexible approach is


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advocated by Martha Crenshaw in ‘The organisation of Terror’, an article in which she

highlights that to meet the ever changing threat of terrorism, government policy needs to

remain fluid so it can be easily adapted (2007:26). The result of the multi lateral approach by

the UK is that in contrast to US Counter Terrorism response’s, there is very limited literature

available analysing or debating the United Kingdom’s response as this has essentially been

done at the international level.

The Prevent theory is based around the concept that tackling the radicalisation of

people, the disadvantages that create vulnerability and deterring them from terrorism

through education and integration will diminish the root causes of terrorism (HMG, 2006:1).

This theory has widespread support amongst academics at both a national and transnational

level as evidenced in the publications ‘Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward’ by

Rohan Gunaratna (2007), ‘Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy’ by David

Omand (2005), ‘Terrorism versus democracy’ by Paul Wilkinson (2007) and Boaz Ganor in

‘The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers’ (2005).

The increased protection of national infrastructure as outlined in the Protect strand

and the consequence management approach adopted through the Prepare strand of the

Contest strategy, are both extremely similar to the Homeland Security strategy adopted by

the United States (Ek, Gallis and Miko et al, 2006:37). The Homeland Security approach also

has strong support as a protective measure against terrorism and this is evidenced in the

literature produced by Todd Sandler and Walter Enders in ‘An Economic Perspective on

Transnational Terrorism’ (2004), David Thacher in ‘The Local Role in Homeland Security’

(2005) and also within the National Strategy for Homeland Security as written by the United

States (2003). This approach however is not without its criticisms as outlined in Anita Dancs

publication ‘Terrorism or All Hazards? Broadening Homeland Security’ in which Dancs

highlighted the draw backs of concentrating too heavily on Counter Terrorism (2008). Some

literature suggests that these draw backs are mitigated against in the United Kingdom’s

approach to Homeland Security through the fact that they have built on already existing

departmental and governmental infrastructure, maintaining and improving core resources

and skills creating a greater response capability to any disaster, ultimately increasing their

ability to respond to a terrorist attack (Ek, Gallis and Miko et al, 2006:37), producing exactly

the ‘All hazards’ concept advocated by Dancs (2004).


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Concentrating on the disruption of terrorists and their ability to commit attacks, the

Pursue strand is aimed at improving law enforcement, prosecutions of terrorists and

intelligence gathering capabilities (HMG, 2006:2). This direct targeting theory has huge

support both academically and amongst governments, particularly the United States (NSC,

2003:1). Literature that has been reviewed supporting this approach has been produced by

Todd Sandler in his publication ‘Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism’ (2005)

and Paul Wilkinson in number 6 of his ‘pathways out of terrorism’ in his book ‘Terrorism

Versus Democracy’ (2007) and Boaz Ganor in strand one, ‘eliminating terrorism’, of his three

strand Counter Terrorism proposal (2005, 25-26). However, it should be highlighted that the

United Kingdom’s theory of ‘Pursuing’ terrorists falls some way short of the ‘all out war’

approach advocated by some of these theories. Jeremy Shapiro suggests in his publication

‘Where You Stand Depends Where You Get Hit’, that this is due to the fact that Europe and

in this case the UK can be described as a ‘near enemy’ and although under threat from

terrorism, it is only through association with the US, the ‘far enemy’, the result being that

they could conceivable use conciliatory means to reduce their risk as the threat to them is

more politically orientated (Shapiro, 2005).

It was extremely evident through examination of UK Counter Terrorism literature

that material examining the Pursue strategy was very limited, potentially due to the fact that

the four P strategy and in particular the restructuring within Counter Terrorism Policing and

the Pursue strand is so contemporary. However, Professor Frank Gregory and Antony Field

go some way to examining the current structure in their articles ‘The Police and the

Intelligence Services-With Special Reference to the Relationship with MI5’ and ‘The

Problems of Intelligence Sharing within the UK Intelligence Community’. Gregory outlines

the creation of four Police Counter Terrorism Units and the Counter Terrorism Command

within the Metropolitan Police, created by ACPO-TAM in an effort to standardise Counter

Terrorism Policing after the failure of Police force amalgamations (Gregory; 2009:55). Field

identifies the same structural developments as Gregory but goes further by identifying the

increased presence of Security Service employees within the regional Counter Terrorism

Units and the emergence of what he describes as community Counter Terrorism Intelligence

Officers, however, Gregory’s publication is far from a critique or analysis and purely an

outline of current structures. Fields examination goes some way to assess the success of the

new Counter Terrorism structures within the United Kingdom and considering the obvious

restrictions on access to those within the arena his publication offers an insight into the level


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of success, however it is clear that his analysis is born purely from openly publicised material

and lacks the cutting edge obtained from first hand evidence.

2.9 Conclusion

This review has succeeded in identifying the main academic areas from which the

largest contributions to the theory of Counter Terrorism have been made and that the vast

amount of material offers a wealth of responses to the terrorist threat. In spite of having

ascertained that much of the available material is conflicting in its response, three

commonly advocated Counter Terrorism responses were identified. A need to prevent the

root causes of terrorism, enforce consequences on those who commit terrorist attacks and

to protect against and minimise the consequences of terrorism. These three approaches

were all theories widely acknowledged as being the most effective methods of Counter

Terrorism.

Splitting the literature into two levels, international and domestic enabled the

review to identify vast differences in response on both stages and identified the manner in

which the available literature diminished as the stage decreased. Firstly identifying that the

literature reviewed at an international level was vast and that the large majority was written

from a strategic perspective, the review also identified a clear lack of material that was

specific to domestic Counter Terrorism. The vast majority of the literature that purported to

be written in the context of domestic Counter Terrorism had in fact drawn upon the

literature and theories highlighted at the international level and were not based on any form

of empirical research, at best being underpinned through experiential learning.

The comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom proved a

useful examination as it highlighted the fact that literature that was present regarding

Counter Terrorism at a domestic level differed dramatically between the United States and

the United Kingdom. This factor is largely due to the adoption of two very clear and

controversial US approaches to Counter Terrorism, the all out military response as seen in

the invasion of Iraq and the Homeland Security approach, as evident with the creation of

The Department of Homeland Security, both of which has resulted in large debate within the

US and production of vast amounts of literature. The United Kingdom’s response to Counter

Terrorism on the contrary has been more understated. Simply reinforcing their present

structures and aligning their policy with that of the European Unions and United Nations


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Counter Terrorism strategies, both of which are in line with contemporary, post 9/11

Counter Terrorism theories. The result is a breadth of literature available analysing the

threat, legislation or government policy and its implementation but a clear absence of

literature outlining theory unique to or debating Counter Terrorism within the UK,

essentially due to the fact that this has taken place at the international level.

The review notably highlighted that Counter Terrorism literature at both

international and domestic level was directed at a policy level and as such appears to have

left a complete void of literature that is written from a ‘front line’ or ‘practitioners’

perspective and a clear absence of material and research into the implementation of

Counter Terrorism responses or their effectiveness. The literature that is available

concentrates on the tactical implementation of military or law enforcement Counter

Terrorism approaches (Bolz, Bolz jr, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002; Burke, 2000) or are written by

ex-military personnel in the form of individual anecdotal accounts of their experiences in

Counter Terrorism (Thompson, 2004). This level of material is essential as it offers us the

opportunity to assess if the Counter Terrorism theories outlined at a strategic policy making

level are in fact being implemented at a practitioner’s level and also takes us some way to

achieving a measurement of their success.

The most surprising revelation of the review is that there is an obvious lack of

empirically tested assessments of Counter Terrorism theories and those that have been

produced have simply been to provide academic justification for government policy

(Jackson, 2007). The only notable study that was identified was a systematic review

conducted by the Campbell organisation into the effectiveness of Counter Terrorism

strategies (2006). This review concurred with Jackson by identifying that Counter Terrorism

responses do not produce the results argued in the theoretically based literature that is used

to underpin them, suggesting that most Counter Terrorism literature was created to support

policy, not policy being created to implement Counter Terrorism theory (Kennedy, Lum and

Sherley, 2006:32). This revelation adds considerable weight to the necessity for research

into two areas identified in the review as potentially the most effective Counter Terrorism

responses, the need for greater community engagement, education and conciliation to deal

with the root causes of terrorism (United Nations, 20/688; Wilkinson, 2007; Ganor, 2005;

Sederberg, 1995 and Gunaratna, 2007) and the requirement for greater cooperation

between law enforcement and intelligence services at both international and domestic


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levels (Keohane, 2005; Omand, 2005; United Nations, 20/688; Kydd and Walter, 2006 and

Wilkinson, 2007).

3. Practitioners level intelligence sharing

3.1 Introduction

A review of Counter Terrorism literature at international and domestic levels was

successful in identifying the absence in literature of an empirical nature. The review also

highlighted that although present, domestic Counter Terrorism literature is to a great extent

dominated by material regarding the response of the United States and that there is a clear

deficit of literature available on the response of the United Kingdom. By reducing the stage

even further the review enabled the identification of a missing dimension by highlighting

that Counter Terrorism literature written from the perspective of the practitioner was

almost completely absent and as such there had been no clear assessment on the

implementation of the theories and policy being advocated. The review also distilled three

clear theories of Counter Terrorism but again highlighted a dramatic absence of empirical

material to underpin their theoretical basis. Conciliation, enforcement and protection were

all identified as possible Counter Terrorism responses. However, it was established that

previous terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have cemented the theory and policy of critical

infrastructure protection as a response, resulting in widespread agreement of its necessity

between both academics and policy makers. This left the protection debate concentrating

on the process of risk assessment and not the theory itself, leaving only two real areas for

contention, conciliation and enforcement.

Further review of the literature regarding the two afore mentioned theories was

successful in again identifying that both lacked empirical analysis and required further

research, in line with Counter Terrorism as a whole. However, it was within the enforcement

theory that a single consensus recommendation was stressed by both academics and policy

makers alike. The recommendation was a need for greater cooperation between law

enforcement and intelligence services. As a result the overall aim of this chapter is to

combine the missing dimension established as a practitioner’s level perspective, which

showed a clear absence of quality empirical literature and one of the predominant

recommendations within Counter Terrorism, the need for greater cooperation between law

enforcement and the intelligence services. This area of examination is necessary to


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accurately measure the standard and depth of literature at the practitioner’s level so that

the material demand gaps can be identified.

It should be highlighted that the main area of cooperation between law

enforcement and the intelligence services is in the exchange of intelligence (Wilkinson,

2007; Gregory, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2008; Aldrich, 2004 and Reveron, 2008) and as such this is

the field in which the practitioner’s level examination concentrates. The intelligence services

are traditionally viewed as the dominant actors in the world of intelligence gathering,

however, adoption by law enforcement agencies of intelligence-led policing has seen their

ability and potential in the intelligence world increase greatly (Ratcliffe, 2008). Paul

Wilkinson argues in his book ‘Terrorism Versus Democracy’ that above all else, the most

important area for cooperation in Counter Terrorism is between the Police and the

intelligence services which is also the area that has seen the most development in recent

years (2007:164). Peter Gill argues that the reason for advancements in such close

collaboration is because their networks have been brought together to fulfil a single

strategy, aligning their responsibilities in support of traditional policing objectives (2002).

This creates, as previously established, an increased need for the two actors to effectively

share the gathered intelligence in an ethos of increased cooperation. The result, in line with

the overall aim of combining both the missing dimension and recommendation is a review of

literature that concentrates on the practitioner’s level sharing of secret intelligence.

Naturally the vast bulk of material relating to the intelligence services is within the

field of intelligence studies. A review of material within this field is necessary as it will greatly

assist in the identification of the theories used to underpin their cooperation and highlight

both the benefits and problems encountered in intelligence sharing so it can be examined

from a more informed position. Publications within the field of intelligence studies adhere to

varying forms of what academics describe as the intelligence cycle (Gill and Pythian, 2006:3).

The cycle follows a structured process of planning, collection, processing, analysis and finally

dissemination (Gill and Pythian, 2006:3) and it was found that the publicised literature dealt

with all, or selected areas of the intelligence cycle. For the benefit of this review the

literature examined was concentrated solely on the area of dissemination and the methods

used to facilitate intelligence sharing amongst the intelligence services and law enforcement

to establish the depth of literature available that offers an insight into the practitioner’s level

of intelligence sharing.


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3.2 The Intelligence Sharing Solutions

The dominant theory used in intelligence sharing is known as the ‘need to know’

principle (Colby, 1976). Need to know follows the basic principle that secret intelligence

should be shared with those who require it to complete their roles but circulation beyond

those individuals is not necessary (Colby, 1976; Harfield and Kleiven, 2009; Harfield, 2006;

Harfield, 2008 and Gregory, 2009). Academics have outlined that such intelligence sharing

principles where established during the cold war at a time when secrecy of information was

essential (Wilkinson, 2007:164) but that the modern day threat of terrorism requires a

rethink of these fundamentals (Wilkinson, 2007:164). It has also been suggested that this

bureaucratic principle excludes input from potentially valuable partners by refusing access

to intelligence and information (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:242). Research conducted by

Clive Harfield and Maren Kleiven within the European Police agency Europol established that

potentially as much as fifty percent of staff believed that the ‘need to know’ principle

hindered their ability to effectively share secret intelligence (2009:200) although it should be

acknowledged that this figure is not statistically significant due to the restrictive level of the

study and that it was not based around the field of Counter Terrorism intelligence sharing

which is often complicated even further by the involvement of the Security Services.

The need to know principles main role was to protect the source of secret

intelligence (Colby, 1976:9 and Aldrich, 2004:734) and it has been suggested that some

intelligence agencies place too high an emphasis on this factor (Aldrich, 2004:734). William

Colby argues that the source can be protected through a process of sanitisation, removing

any information that would enable identification of the source but leaving the core of the

secret intelligence intact, thus producing a product that is suitable for general circulation

(1976:9). It is argued that such an approach would remove dissemination constraints on

intelligence officers who often unwittingly restrict circulation of intelligence through a

misguided understanding of the need to know principle (Colby, 1976:9 and Gregory,

2009:59). Ultimately, William Colby suggested that equal importance should be placed on

the sharing of secret intelligence as it is on the gathering (1976:9) as at present there is a

clear disparity in the perception of importance between these two areas (Aldrich, 2004:734).

Clive Harfield and Maren Kleiven concur with Colby’s argument and urge the need for a

culture shift from ‘need to know’ to ‘the more we share the more we get’ (2009:203). It

should be noted that although literature was available outlining and debating the ‘need to

know’ principle there was a clear absence of material that outlined any form of research into


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its impact on intelligence sharing, further outlining necessity for greater empirical

examination in this area.

Often going hand in hand with the need to know principle are the internal systems

used within law enforcement and intelligence services that are used to grade secret

intelligence. Clive Harfield and Maren Kleivens study of Europol’s intelligence sharing

practices was particularly illustrative of this area. Utilising questionnaires circulated to

Europol staff they identified 25 different systems being used to grade intelligence

(2009:199). This created great confusion over ownership and dissemination restrictions

resulting in reduced levels of intelligence sharing (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:199). Not only

is this issue evident at an international level but also domestically, for instance the United

Kingdom Police services adhere to the national intelligence model 5x5x5 grading system

(Home Office, 2009) yet this system is not adopted by the intelligence services within the UK

creating immediate potential for bureaucracy in ownership of the intelligence and the speed

of dissemination. Such grading systems identify a dissemination level which dictates who

the information may be exchanged with without prior authority, with dissemination outside

of the authorised requiring a process of ratification from the originator (Home Office, 2009

and Aldrich, 2004). It is argued that such classification systems only serve to create overly

restrictive protocols which hinder the sharing of the intelligence between front line staff and

that such an approach is clearly outside the public interest (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:203).

Jerry Ratcliffe suggests in his book, ‘Intelligence-Led Policing’ (2008) that such blockers to

effective cooperation and communication are as a result of a system designed at a time

when secrecy was essential (2008:228).

David Pozen claimed in his analysis of the Mosaic theory, a jigsaw concept often

used to justify the restriction of information disclosure that it was illogical to grade single

pieces of secret intelligence (2005:633). Pozen argues that each piece of intelligence is part

of a larger mosaic and that it is the mosaic as a whole which should be graded and not the

single pieces of intelligence, unless it contains added factors that justify its secrecy

(2005:633). As such, intelligence exchange is vital to ensure that a concise view of the

mosaic is created as no single agency can hope to construct the wider picture by their selves

(Pozen, 2005:651). Derek Reveron suggests an overarching solution to the problems

encountered in intelligence sharing through standardised training, grading and classification

systems, security clearance and information technology (2008). As was evidenced with the

need to know principle there was again a total lack of empirical examination of the affects of


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such internal policies on the levels of intelligence sharing, reiterating the assessment that

such examination is vital to the field of Counter Terrorism.

There are two clear routes through which secret intelligence is exchanged by

practitioners, formal exchange structures (Keohane, 2005, Aldrich, 2004: Richelson, 1990;

Walsh, 2006 and Deflem, 2006) and in formal bi-lateral, trust based relationships (Aldrich,

2004; Richelson, 1990; Walsh, 2006; Harfield and Kleiven, 2009; Svendsen, 2008; Sullivan

and Wirtz, 2009; Wilkinson, 2007 and Johnson, 2000). Formal structures for intelligence

sharing cooperation increased greatly post 9/11 and Daniel Keohane highlights the

introduction of the Hague programme which is a plan solely intended to increase

cooperation in Counter Terrorism amongst European member states (2005:17) and the

Counter Terrorism Group which was set up as an effort to bring together heads of security

services to share intelligence through a memorandum of understanding (Deflem, 2006: 341).

Prior to the atrocities in America, efforts were already being made to improve the policing of

terrorism and increase the exchange of Counter Terrorism information within Europe

through adding terrorism to the remit of the European Police, Europol for who a major role

is the dissemination of information amongst intelligence services and law enforcement

(Deflem, 2006: 343). Although undoubtedly a step in the right direction and with some

history of success (Walsh, 2006:13) it has been suggested that the effectiveness of these

formal avenues of intelligence sharing as a route for practitioners are low because

intelligence services are inclined to resist widespread intelligence sharing because of a lack

of trust (Aldrich, 2004; Richelson, 1990; Walsh, 2006 and Johnson, 2000) and to protect

what they perceive as high grade, golden nugget intelligence (Aldrich, 2004; Sheptycki,

2004a and Sheptycki, 2004b). It is also argued that formal conventions hinder the day to day

exchange of more mundane intelligence because the exchange protocols are too rigid

(Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:200).

Used much more effectively are the in-formal, bi-lateral trust based relationships

between practicing intelligence officers in their respective intelligence or law enforcement

agencies. Evidence would suggest that these bi-lateral relationships are much faster at

exchanging information then the formal channels (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:200).

Highlighting successes in previous bi-lateral intelligence sharing relationships John Sullivan

and James Wirtz suggest that bi-lateral exchanges underpin formal arrangements and that

they should be positively encouraged (2009:4), a stance that has support amongst

academics and politicians (Svendsen, 2008). Paul Wilkinson offers some limited empirical


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analysis of bi-lateral relationships through the examination of previously successful

collaborations (2007:162). Through his brief examination Wilkinson concluded that Bi-lateral

cooperation can be one of the greatest ways to counter the terrorist threat (2007:162). This

argument is supported by Ludo Block who suggests that his study of bi-lateral intelligence

sharing through cross border liaison officers highlights their use in increasing cooperation

(2009:194). Block also highlighted their potential to contribute to the wider national and

international strategic aims (2009:194), however, it should be acknowledged that Block’s

study focused on the issue of organised crime though it could be argued the two are now so

closely linked that it is reasonable to assume similar potential benefits within Counter

Terrorism. It has also been suggested that this form of intelligence sharing used on a case by

case, mutually beneficial exchange creates what can effectively be described as a global

metropolitan policing network, more capable of responding to global threats such as

organised crime and terrorism (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:3).

However, front line bi-lateral relationships are not without their own complications

brought about by often opposing organisational cultures (Sheptycki, 2004a and Sheptycki,

2004b). Nina Copes research in ‘Intelligence-led policing or policing withintelligence’ (2004)

highlighted the friction present in relationships between British Police officers and civilian

analysts and identified that sworn Police officers were reluctant to accept recommendations

from civilian employees as they viewed them as lacking the required legitimacy (Cope,

2004). Frank Gregory utilised copes study to underpin an analysis of the relationship

between the Police service in the United Kingdom and the Intelligence services, MI5 (2009).

It was concluded that although the status of civilian intelligence officers as members of the

security services granted them legitimacy in the eyes of sworn Police officers, it was still

evident that confusion over organisational structures, lead agency status particularly in the

area of organised crime and the ever present ‘need to know’ policy adopted by the

intelligence services were all negative influences on the practitioners level, intelligence

sharing relationship between the Police and MI5 (Gregory, 2009:59) a stance that is firmly

supported by Antony Field in his examination of ‘The Problems of Intelligence Sharing Within

the UK Intelligence Community’ (2009: 3)


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3.3 The Importance of Enhanced Cooperation.

The importance of intelligence sharing and enhanced cooperation in the field of

Counter Terrorism are widely documented (Hutchinson and Ashcroft, 2001; Isaacson and

O’Connel, 2002; Best, 2007; Cope, 2004; Gregory, 2009; Fields, 2009; Reveron, 2008; Walsh,

2006; Richelson, 1990; Aldrich, 2004; Block, 2009; Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002). It is

accepted by academics, intelligence services, Law enforcement and politicians alike that the

failure to share intelligence and information between agencies was one of the primary

reasons for failing to identify those involved in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Best, 2007:1),

and again similarly prior to 7/7 (Field, 2009), facts that are the greatest advertisements for

the benefits of intelligence sharing. The modern day terrorist network is globalised, with

connections and associations throughout both terrorist and organised crime groups across

the world (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:1). The new global dimension to terrorism results in a

need for greater communication, cooperation and collaboration by law enforcement,

intelligence services, military and civilian agencies at both an international and domestic

level (Kilcullen, 2005:607).

However, the challenge has been identified as the development of key relationships

that encourage and nurture such information sharing across borders and jurisdictions

(Hutchinson and Ashcroft, 2001). It is widely acknowledged that this effective cooperation

between law enforcement agencies and civilian intelligence service’s is fundamental to a

successful strategy of Counter Terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007; Block, 2009; Wood and Shearing

2007; Best 2007). Jerry Ratcliffe argues that the new policing environment and in particular

Counter Terrorism now needs to place a higher value on information sharing if policy makers

hope to achieve their strategic objectives (2008:229) and Jeffrey Isaacson and Kevin

O’Connell both highlight that the need to unlock the secrecy in intelligence sharing is the

first obstacle to achieving these objectives (2002). Antony Field who has produced one of

the most in depth and up to date reviews of intelligence sharing in the UK in his publication

‘The Problems of Intelligence Sharing Within the UK Intelligence Community’ has also

identified the importance of intelligence sharing by examining the intelligence failures

present during the lead up to the London bombings on 7/7. Field stresses above all else the

need to share information to compensate for the inadequate IT capability caused through

the array of varying intelligence systems held by actors in the field (2009:5).


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3.4 Conclusion

Having established that there is a clear deficiency in Counter Terrorism literature

that is written from the practitioner’s level examining the impact and implementation of

policy and theories on Counter Terrorism strategy I combined this missing dimension with

the recommendation for greater cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence

services. This combination resulted in identification of the necessity for a deeper

examination of their intelligence sharing practices. Concentrating on literature from within

the field of intelligence studies and in particular the subject of dissemination resulted in

identification of the ‘need to know’ principle as the dominant protocol for the sharing of

intelligence (Colby, 1976). It was also established that classifications and the grading systems

used by organisations played an important role in intelligence sharing at a practitioner’s

level (Home Office, 2009 and Aldrich, 2004). Two main channels were also highlighted within

the intelligence sharing relationship between law enforcement agencies and the intelligence

services. The use of formal information sharing agreements and forums were identified as

having had some success but their use was limited on a day to day basis or when real time

intelligence sharing was required (Keohane, 2005, Aldrich, 2004: Richelson, 1990; Walsh,

2006 and Deflem, 2006). In-formal bi-lateral, practitioner level, trust based relationships

were identified as playing a much larger role than anticipated and often with great success

although it was highlighted that distinct organisational cultures can play a negative role in

such information sharing relationships (Aldrich, 2004; Richelson, 1990; Walsh, 2006; Harfield

and Kleiven, 2009; Svendsen, 2008; Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009; Field, 2009 and Johnson, 2000).

Having outlined the principles, channels and cultures that all play major roles within

the intelligence sharing arena it was overwhelmingly established that intelligence sharing

between the Civilian Security Services and Law Enforcement actors was vitally important in

Counter Terrorism (Hutchinson and Ashcroft, 2001; Isaacson and O’Connel, 2002; Best,

2007; Cope, 2004; Gregory, 2009; Fields, 2009; Reveron, 2008; Walsh, 2006; Richelson,

1990; Aldrich, 2004; Block, 2009; Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002). Playing a major role in

outlining and achieving strategic objectives (Wilkinson, 2007; Block, 2009; Wood and

Shearing 2007; Best 2007 and Ratcliffe, 2008), building relationships between partner

agencies and compensating for inadequate intelligence systems (Field, 2009 and Ashcroft,

2001), intelligence sharing was clearly established as the key tool in the prevention of

further attacks through intelligence breakdowns and the disruption of wider terrorist

networks. It was also clearly evidenced that there is a distinct lack of research examining


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many of these areas, in particularly the impact of the implementation of the ‘need to know’

principle and internal classification systems on the levels of intelligence sharing between

agencies.

4. Counter Terrorism Research Question

Literature available in the field of Counter Terrorism is extensive and a review of the

area was successful in establishing that although material written at an international level

was extensive there was a clear disparity with that written at a domestic level. Brief reviews

of domestic Counter Terrorism literature within the United States and United Kingdom

helped identify that although there have been a mass of publications on US Counter

Terrorism, the same could not be said for literature on British Counter Terrorism for which a

clear void was identified. A gradual reduction in the field of the review also enabled the

identification of a missing dimension in available literature, the practitioner’s level. By

establishing that the vast majority of Counter Terrorism literature that had been written at

both international and domestic levels was from a strategic perspective and that there was

almost a complete absence of material written from the perspective of the front line

practitioner.

Analysis of the literature reviewed was able to identify two areas that were

recommended for further research and justified a more comprehensive examination. Due to

the number and strength of the recommendations identified in the literature the area of

cooperation between law enforcement and the intelligence services was selected for further

review. An initial assessment of the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the

intelligence services established that the predominant area of cooperation was in the

sharing of intelligence and as it had already been established that there was a missing

dimension of literature at a practitioners level, this factor was combined with the

recommendation resulting in an examination of literature regarding the practitioners level of

intelligence sharing between the two actors. The increased adoption of intelligence-led

policing has resulted in a number of studies of intelligence sharing practices (Cope, 2004;

Sheptycki, 2004a; Sheptycki, 2004b; Ratcliffe, 2008 and Block, 2009) but many of these have

been limited to Intelligence sharing amongst law enforcement agencies and have

concentrated on cultural blockers leaving an absence of a comprehensive analysis of

intelligence sharing. As such this process of distiallation and combination has established


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that there is a distinct lack of research specific to intelligence sharing between British law

enforcement agencies and the intelligence services, with only three being identified

(Gregory, 2009, Field, 2009 and Harfield and Kleiven, 2009) all with great limitations. Frank

Gregory’s research was based upon a small focus group of retired Police officers with

experience of working with MI5 (2009:50), Fields examination was based purely on

assessments of limited existing data and Harfield and Kleivens interviews were limited in

number and all arranged and vetted by senior officers, as such their impartiality was

questionable (2009:198). Ultimately the review of Counter Terrorism literature and

practitioners level intelligence sharing has provided comprehensive justification for further

research into domestic Counter Terrorism responses and a need for greater empirical

analysis of intelligence sharing between law enforcement actors and the intelligence

services.

Taking into consideration the disparity of available material highlighted during the

case studies of the US and UK Counter Terrorism Response’s, I have chosen to combine the

two for mentioned areas by conducting research into the United Kingdom’s main law

enforcement Counter Terrorism response and the current state of the intelligence sharing

practices between the Police and the Security Services, MI5, through empirical research in

an effort to answer the question:

4.1 Has the introduction of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model increased

intelligence sharing between the Police and the Security Services and ultimately, the

United Kingdom’s capability to counter the terrorist threat?

4.2 Methodology

It has previously been outlined that the creation of the Counter Terrorism Command

model is the United Kingdom’s predominant response to recent terrorist attacks such as

9/11 and 7/7 and that this has resulted in increased partnership between Police services,

special branches and MI5 with the establishment of a number of regional Counter Terrorism

units (Filed and Gregory, 2009), however, to date there has been no empirical assessment of

the Counter Terrorism model as a response to the terrorist threat or its impact on

intelligence sharing. To attempt to ascertain the answers to these issues a research strategy

combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches will be utilised.


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Before embarking on any formal study within the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit

(NWCTU), authority was required at a senior level to conduct the research and as such a

formal request was submitted to both the Chief Superintendant in charge of the NWCTU and

the Superintendant in charge of the Lancashire Counter Terrorism Branch to seek

permission. This process was undoubtedly assisted by the fact that the author is a serving

Police officer within the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit and I am certain that a course of

research by anyone outside of the Counter Terrorism arena would have been unlikely to be

authorised. Taking advantage of this factor to conduct the project has added weight to its

uniqueness but it is important to acknowledge that it creates obvious questions over the

impartiality of the research and potentially the responses offered by those taking part.

However, it should be outlined that at every stage the author has maintained a stance of

critical impartiality so as to not affect the course, depth or response to any of the research

conducted. In an effort to further increase the scope, accuracy and weight of the research a

senior member of the Security Service was approached for permission to mirror the research

being done within the NWCTU in their organisation. Unfortunately due to their security

constraints it could not be authorised although assurance was given it had been considered

at the highest level by the director general of the Security Service.

4.3 Research Strategy

A questionnaire was sent via email to every member of staff both Police officer and

civilian within the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU). This approach has been

chosen as it enables the quickest, easiest and most manageable way of obtaining the

required level of data that would be needed for a meaningful analysis. The questionnaire

included a total of 43 multiple choice questions covering demographics such as length of

service, rank, role and Police force, to questions concentrating on the methods, frequency

and blockers to intelligence sharing. The multiple choice questions offered a sliding scale

response and always offered a minimum of five choices so as to offer a more balanced

response and leave room for all extremes. The questionnaire was split into two areas, pre

and post Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) Policing model with the questions in both areas

essentially remaining the same with only a change of perspective thus offering capability to

analyse the changes as a result of the Counter Terrorism Commands establishment. For

those completing the questionnaire who were not employed within Counter Terrorism prior

to the CTC’s establishment, there was only the necessity for completion of the post CTC


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questions which reduced their responses to 25. In total the questionnaire was circulated to

in the region of 500 members of staff within the NWCTU with a response rate of

approximately 10 percent, in total 52 respondents. It is estimated that the total number of

Counter Terrorism staff within the United Kingdom is in the region of 3000 (NWCTU, 2009)

although this figure is not exact and as such any calculations derived from it are only

approximate. With this factor in mind the approximate overall level of response to the

questionnaire disseminated was 1.7 percent.

To underpin the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires analysis the use

of information from key informant interviews has been utilised to offer a more in depth

practitioner’s opinion based response. Utilising a series of questions closely linked to those

in the questionnaire process the multiple choice answers were removed and the interviewee

invited to give their own perspective, free from the guidance offered by predetermined

responses, those selected to be interviewed were also removed from the questionnaire

process in an effort to avoid tainting their responses. In total ten interviews were conducted

all of which were of currently serving Police officers or civilian Police staff directly employed

by the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit or the wider Counter Terrorism field. The

interviewees were selected on the basis that they offer a distinct range of perspectives and

cover a wide demographic encompassing both sexes, varying ranks and roles and a mixture

of sworn Police officers and civilian Police staff. Due to the nature of the employment of the

interviewees and the obvious potential dangers associated with release of their personal

information, all interviewees have been given anonymity and referenced through use of a

randomly assigned alphabetical identifier. This process was chosen as although there is no

intention to publicise this project, those involved required a level of reassurance and this

method assisted in creating an interview atmosphere that was conducive to obtaining a

more open and honest response and offered the reassurance required to those involved.

The conduct of a focus group was considered as a third source of primary data and

permission was sought and granted. However it was assessed that the level of data that

would be obtained from the questionnaire and interviews was sufficient and offered both

the qualitative and quantitative levels of data being sought and as such this method of

research was not conducted.


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5. Bureaucracy, the Hidden Enemy within Counter Terrorism

5.1 Introduction to the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model

The Counter Terrorism Command Policing model is a new approach to Counter

Terrorism in the United Kingdom. Emerging in 2006 as a result of a decision made by the

Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters, better known as ACPO-

TAM. The Counter Terrorism Command was established within the Metropolitan Police

Service through an amalgamation of their two specialist operations departments known as

SO12 which was the traditional Special Branch and SO13, the Anti Terrorist Branch (MPS,

2009). The Counter Terrorism Command, also known within Counter Terrorism as the CTC is

supported by a number of regional Counter Terrorism Units, or CTU’S. The work undertaken

by the CTU’S is a mixture of intelligence gathering and law enforcement and is best

explained by the Deputy National Co-ordinator of Special Branches.

“The CTU is based at the region and has become an amalgamation of the force special

branch and the old regional intelligence cells. They are expected to chair regional meetings

and direct tasking and in the CTU case, be the function that moves from traditional

intelligence gathering to the law enforcement capability and offer the support to forces in

their region that need them” (Interviewee E)

Table 1 overleaf illustrates the current structure of Counter Terrorism within the

United Kingdom and outlines the subservient relationship adopted by the Police service,

particularly whilst the investigation is in the intelligence phase. It also illustrates the varying

levels of capabilities not only between the Police and the Security Service but within the

Counter Terrorism Units themselves.


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Table 1: Structure of Counter Terrorism Investigation within the United Kingdom (Interviewee E).

Actor Legal Powers Capability Organisational Makeup Position within CT

Security Services (MI5) Separate Legislation:

Security Services ACT

Intelligence gathering,

analysis and

dissemination

Civilian Intelligence

Agency

Lead Actor for CT

Intelligence

Investigations

Counter Terrorism

Command (CTC)

Regulation of

Investigatory Powers act,

various Terrorism ACTs

and amendments.


analysis and

dissemination. Law

Enforcement and

Investigative Capability.

Sworn Police Officers and

Police Staff .Regionally

based Security Services

Staff.

National Lead Law

Enforcement and

Secondary in

Intelligence.

South East Counter

Terrorism Unit (SECTU)

Regulation of



and amendments.


analysis and

dissemination




Staff.

Secondary Actor

Nationally Regional

Lead Law Enforcement.

Secondary Actor in

Intelligence.

West Midlands Counter

Terrorism Unit

(WMCTU)

Regulation of



and amendments.


analysis and

dissemination. Law

Enforcement and




and Locally based Security

Services Staff.

Secondary Actor

Nationally, Regional

Lead Law Enforcement

and Investigation.

Secondary Actor in

Intelligence.

North West Counter

Terrorism Unit

(NWCTU)

Regulation of



and amendments.


analysis and

dissemination. Law

Enforcement and



Police Staff. Regionally


Services Staff.

Secondary Actor



and Investigation.

Secondary Actor in

Intelligence.

North East Counter

Terrorism Unit (NECTU)

Regulation of



and amendments.


analysis and

dissemination. Law

Enforcement and





Services Staff.

Secondary Actor



and Investigation.

Secondary Actor in

Intelligence.

Wales Extremism and

Counter Terrorism Unit

(WECTU)

Regulation of



and amendments.


analysis and

dissemination




Staff.

Secondary Actor



Secondary Actor in

Intelligence.

As can be seen from the table above, the Security Service is staffed entirely by

civilian intelligence officers, operates under separate legislation to the Police service and has

no law enforcement capability, it also outlines their position as the lead agency for Counter

Terrorism investigations but only whilst they are in the investigation phase. Once a need for


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law enforcement or executive action as it is referred to within Counter Terrorism arises it is

at that stage the relationship changes and the Police become the lead agency, continuously

underpinned by the intelligence work of the Security Service.

With the emergence of the CTC and CTU’s, the ever increasing threat from

international terrorism, and the continually developing relationship an unprecedented level

of cooperation has been developed between the Security Service (MI5) and the Police.

However, it is unknown if such huge changes in the relationship between these two actors,

the pressure from which they were borne and the swiftness of the developments has been

successful in increasing the flow of intelligence or has only resulted in increased stresses in

an already precarious arena. Research conducted in the course of this project was quick to

establish the fact that an over whelming 96% of those surveyed outlined that intelligence

sharing with the Security Service was an important part of their role, with 76% describing it

as essential. However, bureaucracy was quickly established as playing an incredibly

influential role in the effectiveness of intelligence sharing, both past and present, often

hindering the exchange of potentially important information. As such this chapter aims to

outline the principles and procedures that are present within Counter Terrorism and

establish how the emergence of the CTC Policing model has influenced the levels of

bureaucracy encountered and ultimately the effect on intelligence sharing between the

organisations in question.

5.2 Need to Know or Need to Share?

Earlier in this project it was established that the secrecy surrounding intelligence

within the Counter Terrorism arena can have a hugely negative effect on the exchange of

vital information. The dominant theory behind the concept of intelligence sharing was

established as the ‘Need to Know’ principle which states that secret intelligence should be

shared with those who require it to complete their roles but circulation beyond those

individuals is not necessary (Colby, 1976; Harfield and Kleiven, 2009; Harfield, 2006; Harfield,

2008 and Gregory, 2009). The research conducted in pursuit of this thesis has clearly

reaffirmed with some empirical weight that under the CTC’s current structure the ‘need to

know’ theory greatly hinders the flow of intelligence between the Police and the Security

Service. One Counter Terrorism Financial Investigator highlighted that it can even go as far

as affecting the standard of work you can conduct stating:


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“They will only tell you what they want you to do, not why they want you to do it. You need

more information so you can make the right enquiries, it can make things difficult. By not

giving us more information I actually think our ability to complete the task is quite restricted”

(Interviewee I).

A large majority of the staff surveyed, almost half, 25 of the 52 in total sighted this

factor as the main blocker to them sharing or receiving intelligence from the Security

Service. Interestingly prior to the establishment of the CTC Policing model, although it was

identified as an issue only very few of those surveyed, just 16 percent believed that it

affected intelligence sharing with the security service, although it should be acknowledged

that the number of responses from officers with experience within Counter Terrorism prior

to the CTC’S establishment was considerably less, just 12 of the total 52. Table 2 below

clearly illustrates the weight of the responses by illustrating that the largest frequency of

post CTC respondents believed bureaucracy to be the primary factor hindering intelligence

sharing.

Table 2: What do you consider the biggest Blocker to Intelligence sharing with the Security Service?

Question: What do you consider the biggest

Blocker to Intelligence Sharing with the Security

Service?

Number/ Choice of Respondents

Nothing. It worked Perfectly. 0

National Intelligence Model Dissemination

Grading

2

Government Protected Marking i.e.

Secret/Confidential.

3

ICT 6

Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of Trust or Ability 8

Lack of Liaison. 8

Bureaucracy i.e. Need to Know Principle 25

The finding established in table 2 were also underpinned by the responses of those

interviewed who were able to offer a greater insight into the realities of dealing with the

concept of ‘Need to Know’.


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One Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer offered their opinion on why the Security Service

so strictly adhered to the principle by suggesting:

“I don’t think it is necessary but that’s how it has always been so why rock the boat, if it’s not

broken, why fix it” (Interviewee A).

However, not all officers are accepting of the justification behind the failures to share

Information with one Counter Terrorism Examinations officer stating:

“Some people are just parochial with the information, knowing they have something that

may be of use but not sharing it. Sometimes they may have had very good reasons but on

occasions it was just because they were being awkward and a bit over the top” (Interviewee

L).

An intelligence coordinator, whose role regularly involved disseminating intelligence to the

Security Service, also highlighted that it is not just the intelligence agencies that stringently

follow this principle by stating:

“It’s like this for a reason so I am not happy to send anything to them without a form of

authority from my management” (Interviewee M).

This particular statement is a good example of the hoops that are created by the “Need to

Know” principle and highlights that even if it does not stop the transition of the intelligence

at the very least, it slows the flow of the information.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter the ‘Need to Know’ principle was not always

considered the main blocker in intelligence sharing between the Police and the Security

Service. By obtaining responses from those with experience of pre CTC Counter Terrorism it

was established in the frequency distribution table overleaf that the main factors were

considered to be a lack of face to face liaison and cultural blockers such as a lack of trust or a

perception that the Police service lacked the ability to deal within intelligence effectively as

they are institutionalised to handle evidence and criminality.


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Table 3: What do you consider the biggest Blocker to Intelligence sharing with the Security Service pre and post CTC?

Question: What do

you consider the

biggest Blocker to

Intelligence Sharing

with the Security

Service?

Number/ Choice of

Respondents Pre CTC

Question: What do you consider the

biggest Blocker to Intelligence

Sharing with the Security Service?

Number/ Choice

of Respondents

Post CTC

Nothing. It worked

Perfectly.

0 Nothing. It worked Perfectly. 0

National Intelligence

Model Dissemination

Grading

0 National Intelligence Model

Dissemination Grading

2

Government Protected

Marking i.e.


0 Government Protected Marking i.e.


3

ICT 9 ICT 6

Cultural Blockers i.e.

Lack of Trust or Ability

17 Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of Trust or

Ability

8

Lack of Liaison. 17 Lack of Liaison. 8

Bureaucracy i.e. Need

to Know Principle

9 Bureaucracy i.e. Need to Know

Principle

25

As we can see in table 3 there has been a clear rise in bureaucracy as a result of the

establishment of the CTC with almost half of all post CTC respondents surveyed sighting the

‘Need to Know’ principle as the main blocker which is a rise of 33 percent. Conversely, as

figure 1 overleaf highlights, it is also apparent that there has been a considerable reduction,

some 50 percent, in the number of staff identifying the lack of face to face liaison and

cultural blockers as factors affecting the level of intelligence sharing which would indicate

that these concerns have been addressed as a direct result of the introduction of the CTC.


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Figure 1: Comparison of intelligence sharing blockers Pre and Post CTC Policing Model.

Having already established through the review of Counter Terrorism literature the

theory that bi-lateral communication channels increase intelligence sharing I was able to

construct the questionnaire to more accurately assess this factor. Table 4 confirms the

increase in bi-lateral communication by evidencing the fact that since the CTC and the CTU

Policing model has been introduced nearly half of all staff within the Policing of Counter

Terrorism now have ready access to a member of the Security Service on either a daily or

weekly basis which was previously unheard of.

Table 4: How often do you have access to Face to Face Liaison with a member of the Security Service?

Question: How often

do you have access to

Face to Face Liaison

with a member of the

Security Service?

Number/ Choice of

Respondents : Pre

CTC

Question: How often do you have access to Face

to Face Liaison with a member of the Security

Service?

Number/ Choice of

Respondents: Post CTC

Daily 0 Daily 23

Weekly 0 Weekly 12

Monthly 17 Monthly 7

Quarterly 17 Quarterly 6

Yearly 10 Yearly 3

Never 8 Never 0


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The data in table 4 is better analysed in a chart format as can be seen in Figure 2

which enables us to compare the information in both tables 3 and 4 with much greater ease

and as a result, when viewing the evidence collectively it becomes apparent that there is a

direct correlation between the increase of face to face liaison and the increase in staff

encountering bureaucratic boundaries.

Figure 2: Pre and Post CTC levels of face to face liaison with the Security Service.

It could be suggested that this increase is purely because prior to the establishment

of the CTC Police staff had little contact with the Security Service and so an increase in

liaison has now resulted in more Police staff simply encountering already existing

bureaucracy in the national security arena which they were previously not exposed to. A

more sceptical argument could be the fact that as the low levels of liaison and cultural

blockers have reduced, which previously assisted the Security Service in controlling and

managing the intelligence sharing with the Police, they have resorted to a more bureaucratic

stance to maintain this control. Analysis of these findings is clearly somewhat subjective as

without a comparative survey of Security Service members accurate interpretation of the

data is restricted. It should also be acknowledged, as identified earlier that the number of

respondents with experience of pre CTC Counter Terrorism was low in comparison to those

with current CTC experience and as such this large disparity in data range may have affected

the analysis but nevertheless it offers an interesting insight but a greater data range would

be required for the analysis to be conclusive.

Throughout the research conducted during this project the second major

bureaucratic factor that was identified was the restrictions imposed through the National

Intelligence Model and the dissemination grading of intelligence. The Deputy National Co-


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ordinator of Special Branches outlines the strategic difficulties encountered through use of

conflicting systems by stating:

“The National Intelligence model is an entirely Police mechanism so there is sometimes

tension with the Security Services in how we use this model to work out how to set objectives

and deploy resources against National Security threat and share intelligence” (Interviewee

E).

It should be immediately outlined that this factor was not identified through the

quantitative data obtained, most likely due to the self imposed restrictions on completion of

the questionnaire by limiting respondents to just one response. However, during the course

of interviewing Police officers and staff from a wide range of roles within a Counter

Terrorism Unit it became clear that second only to the ‘Need to Know’ principle the national

intelligence model was heavily sighted during the interviews as a heavy bureaucratic burden

on the sharing of intelligence. The national intelligence model is an intelligence led business

model utilised by the Police service to assist in directing the tasking of resources and assist

decision makers (Home Office, 2009). A major factor of the model is the grading of

intelligence on a three tier scale known as the 5x5x5, covering the source or the intelligence,

its reliability and dissemination instructions (Home Office, 2009).

As outlined above by the Deputy National Co-ordinator of Special Branches, the national

intelligence model is an entirely Police system but as highlighted by one intelligence co-

ordinator there is even confusion amongst Police staff regarding the dissemination

restrictions:

“I think a national problem is the 5x5x5 system, particularly the dissemination grading 5 as it

causes problems sending intelligence and confusion about what it means. Does it mean when

it says only circulate within your own force or department that this is the force you work in or

the Counter Terrorism Units?” (Interviewee M)

As outlined above, it is the dissemination grading that is the bureaucratic factor of

the national intelligence model and often over cautious grading of the intelligence causes

great difficulties in its onward dissemination and as outlined below prior consent is required

from the originator:

“Sometimes I have to go back to them (the originator) to get a form of words when they send

us intelligence that we think is suitable to send to other people” (Interviewee M).


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The mentality created by the dissemination restrictions is outlined by one Counter Terrorism

intelligence officer when describing the national intelligence model and dissemination

states:

“It is the legislation and disclosure of the secret information. The environment we work in is

very secretive the mentality makes you very wary of what you tell people” (Interviewee I).

As we have established from the findings outlined above the creation of the Counter

Terrorism Command Policing model has had varied results, increasing the level of liaison

through face to face access but conversely creating increased levels of bureaucracy. What is

unclear however is if regardless of these factors whether the creation of the CTC has in fact

increased the levels of information sharing between the Police and the Security Service. It

should first be acknowledged that without access to accurate intelligence sharing data from

within the CTC obtaining an answer to this question conclusively could not be achieved.

However, it has been possible as can be seen from the data in table overleaf, to obtain a

practitioners level opinion on the success of the CTC in increasing the flow of intelligence.

Table 5: Do you believe that the level of intelligence sharing with the Security Service has increased as a result of the creation

of the CTC/CTU?

Question: Do you believe that the level of intelligence

sharing with the Security Service has increased as a result

of the creation of the CTC/CTU?


Increased it a lot 18

In creased it a Little 16

No Change 14

Decreased it a Little 2

Decreased it a lot 2

Again, as we can see from figure 3 overleaf, the importance of these figures is plain

to see when analysed in a chart format offering a clear visual representation of the divided

opinions as to whether the CTC has been successful in increasing intelligence sharing with

the Security Services. However, what is clear is that the majority of the respondents felt that


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it had increased some 34 out of the 52 surveyed which equated to 60 percent of those

questioned.

Figure 3: The overall effect on intelligence sharing with the Security Service as a result of the creation of the CTC Policing

model.

34.00%

26.00%30.00%

5.00% 5.00%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

Increased it a

Lot

Increased it a

Little

No Change Decreased it a

Little

Decreased it a

Lot

This increase is reaffirmed by the stance of the deputy national co-ordinator of special

branches who outlines the high level of intelligence now forwarded to the regional

representatives of the Security Service by stating:

“Some units now even copy the region into every single piece of intelligence they create

which some struggle to cope with” (Interviewee E).

Although conversely the interviews conducted also highlighted the divided opinions with

one Terrorism Examinations Officer stating:

“ I think at a local level it has made things a lot easier but from a regional and national

perspective I don’t really see that it has changed much” (Interviewee L).

As we have established that the majority of staff within the CTC believe that the creation of

the CTC has increased intelligence sharing within the Counter Terrorism the most natural

question to be asked next is what have been the major contributories to the increase and

why, both questions that it is endeavoured to address in the following chapter.


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6. The co-operative approach to Counter Terrorism

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter was successful in outlining the makeup of the CTC and its

relationship with the Security Service and the levels of bureaucracy encountered during the

sharing of intelligence between the two actors. Also having outlined the majority of the key

data obtained during the research phase of this project we have gone some way to forming

conclusions from the analysis of the information. The most striking observation was the

correlation between face to face contact between the two actors and the increase in

bureaucracy encountered during the intelligence sharing process. However, it was also

established that regardless of the increased levels of bureaucracy the majority of the staff

surveyed from within the CTC felt that intelligence sharing had increased as a result of the

emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model. What is yet to be

established is what the major factors behind the increased levels of intelligence sharing have

been and as such this chapter intends to address this question. It will also make efforts to

establish if ultimately the creation of the CTC and CTU’S and the increased levels of

intelligence sharing have been successful in increasing the United Kingdom’s ability to

counter the terrorist threat before outlining the practitioners opinion on the best way

forward for Counter Terrorism in the United Kingdom.

6.2 Bi-lateral intelligence sharing within the UK’S Counter Terrorism response.

You would think that with such a close working relationship such as between the

Police and the Security Services that the need for bi-lateral communications would have all

but been replaced by streamlined and effective formal intelligence sharing agreements and

protocols. This may in fact be the case for high grade, threat to life intelligence in a real time

Counter Terrorism operation but it is the day to day relationships which are formed through

bi-lateral trust building that really makes the cogs of the Counter Terrorism machine run

smoothly. The data compiled from the projects questionnaire shown in the descending

frequency table below highlights the weight of support behind the feeling that not

surprisingly but interestingly and somewhat in contradiction, face to face contact with the

Security Service has played a significant part in increasing intelligence sharing even if it has

been responsible for the increased exposure to the bureaucratic ‘need to know’ principle.


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Table 6: What has played the greatest role in the increase of Intelligence sharing with the Security Service?

Question: What has played the greatest role in the increase of Intelligence sharing

with the Security Service?


Increased Liaison i.e. Face to Face contact. 26

Reduction of Cultural Blockers i.e. Trust / Ability. 14

Improved ICT 12

Reduced Bureaucracy i.e. Need to Know Principle 0

Effectiveness of the Government Protected Marking i.e. Secret/Confidential. 0

Effectiveness of the National Intelligence Model Dissemination Grading 0

Table 6 also highlights that the formal communications channels in place such as the

national intelligence model appear to have offered little influence in the increases discussed

earlier.

Figure 4 again offers a very visual representation of the data by clearly highlighting

that increased liaison through face to face contact with members of the Security Services is

felt to have played the biggest role in the increase of intelligence sharing, with half, some 26

of the 52 respondents all identifying it as the main influence on the increases experienced in

the flow of intelligence.

Figure 4: Level of contribution to increases in intelligence sharing with the Security Service.


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We can also see from figure 4 that the reduction of cultural blockers such as a lack of

trust or ability where also heavily sighted as an influencing factor in the increased sharing of

intelligence. These two factors may not play as surprising a role as you may first expect as it

has been widely acknowledged, as evidenced in the earlier literature review that bi-lateral

relationships play a major role in the effectiveness of intelligence sharing. Due to a historic

lack of accessibility to face to face contact with the security service it is fair to say that it has

not previously been possible to nurture these bi-lateral relationships but as more and more

members of the Security Service are stationed around the country and within the CTU’S the

level of contact has increased greatly resulting in a new era of trust and mutual respect

which has served to further oil the cogs of the intelligence sharing machine.

As outlined earlier in the examination of Counter Terrorism literature successes in

previous bi-lateral intelligence sharing relationships have long suggested that bi-lateral

intelligence exchanges offer great support to the more formal arrangements and their

growth should be positively encouraged (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:4) and it would appear

that with the ever increasing face to face liaison being experienced by Police staff from

within the CTC that senior managers within the Security Service and the Police both

recognise this fact. It has also been suggested that this form of face to face intelligence

sharing and the long term relationships that are formed effectively create what can be

described as a global metropolitan policing network, which is more capable of responding to

global threats such as organised crime and terrorism (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:3) because of

the ease and speed at which intelligence can be shared and the manner in which it is able to

initiate potentially lifesaving responses, long before the formal channels of communication

have been opened.

The consensus amongst those interviewed was also in agreement with the literature

researched and in line with the analysed data with almost every interviewee sighting

increases in face to face liaison as one of the biggest influences on the overall rise in levels of

intelligence sharing. The most obvious benefits of face to face bi-lateral relationships are

outlined by a Counter Terrorism financial investigator who states:

“I prefer having a face to face meeting as it often gives you a better return of information. I

think this is because it enables you to discuss things in a more open manner” (Interviewee I)

The more candid benefits of such mutually beneficial relationships are offered by a

Terrorism Examinations officer who stated:


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“When I worked in the operations team some of the best information I got was from a single

particular contact I knew and trusted and who was particularly helpful and I milked it, but

this happened both ways. If I hadn’t formed this relationship I would never have got as much

information as I did” (Interviewee L).

The deputy national co-ordinator of special branches re-iterates the experiences of the front

line Counter Terrorism staff by highlighting the change in the approach to bi-lateral

communication and its impact on the cultural barriers between the organisations:

“The fact that staff can build real relationships with individual people, and practitioners in

the Police are not just dealing with a faceless desk officer in Thames House has helped in the

dispersal of that servant master relationship which was previously present........so I would

agree that personal relationships have been amongst the biggest factors in increasing

intelligence sharing but not the only factor” (Interviewee E).

Having clearly identified that intelligence sharing has increased through improved

face to face liaison we have also been able to conclude that the initial assessment that this

raised the exposure to the ‘need to know’ principle has not completely stalled

improvements in intelligence sharing. However, it is still to be seen if this improvement and

the creation of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model have ultimately increased

the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the terrorist threat. Answering this question is

difficult as the data obtained clearly only gives the practitioner’s perspective and an answer

to this question in itself is almost impossible to quantify at the best of times as the deputy

national co-ordinator of special branches outlines:

“We have heard some home secretaries say that we cannot arrest our way out of this

situation so there are some that wince when we quote arrests statistics to reinforce our

success” (Interviewee I).

As such, any attempt to answer this question is extremely fraught and open to

scrutiny but nevertheless an attempt was made and as table 7 outlines it would appear that

the overwhelming opinion of the practitioners within Counter Terrorism was that the United

Kingdom’s ability to counter the terrorist threat has increased.


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Table 7: How much o you believe the emergence of the CTC/ CTU has increased the UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?

Question: How much o you believe the emergence of the CTC/ CTU has increased the

UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?

Number/ Choice of

Respondents

In creased it a Little 28

Increased it a lot 20

No Change 4

Decreased it a Little 0

Decreased it a lot 0

As we can see from the data present in table 7 above, the overwhelming majority of staff

believed the UK’S Counter Terrorism capability has increased, a fact that is greater

illustrated in figure 6 below.

Figure 5: Has the emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command increased the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the

terrorist threat?

We can clearly see from the analysis in Figure 5 that in total 48, 91 percent of the 52

members of staff questioned believed that there had been an increase in the United

Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability and not a single respondent felt it had decreased in

any way with only a negligible amount believing there had been no change. These figures

show a high degree of confidence within the CTC that they are equipped to deal with the

threat of international terrorism with their confidence boosted by the fact that there has

been no loss of life due to international terrorism within the United Kingdom since the


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creation of the CTC and the regional CTU’S. Arising from this conclusion is the question, how

has the CTC increased the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability? The evidence

would suggest that it is largely due to the increases in intelligence sharing that has arisen

through greater face to face liaison, a conclusion that was theorised in the earlier literature

review by Paul Wilkinson who suggested that Bi-lateral cooperation can be one of the

greatest ways to counter the terrorist threat (2007:162). However, as the deputy NCSB has

previously outlined, bi-lateral face to face liaison has increased intelligence sharing and has

assisted but it has not been the only factor that has played a major role in the increase in the

Counter Terrorism capability of the UK (2009).

The supporting interviews that where conducted during the research phase offered

a great insight into the effectiveness of the CTC Policing model and go some way to

identifying, although it should be acknowledged, neither extensively or conclusively, how

the CTC has increased the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability.

The deputy national co-ordinator of special branches offers the strategic perspective

regarding the CTC’S effectiveness by outlining:

“The biggest difference is the regional tasking meetings which give you the opportunity to

bring together a greater amount of resources to meet a particular threat whenever those

resources are needed or a better co-ordinated response by more than one force to issues that

affect more than one force” (Interviewee E).

The influence of the regional tasking process co-ordinated by the CTU’S is also recognised at

the practitioner’s level with one Terrorism Examinations officer highlighting the reduction of

bureaucratic blockers within Counter Terrorism as a result of the removal of jurisdictional

boundaries:

“Before when you looked at Cumbria, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Merseyside or Manchester they all

did their own surveillance and intelligence gathering, you had five different barriers, five

different forces to speak to, now it’s just one so in terms of getting things done it must be

easier” (Interviewee L).

In hand with the effective tasking process the creation of the CTC and CTU’S have also

ensured a greater preparedness for a Counter Terrorism response with a development and

tasking manager outlining:


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“We are definitely more prepared, we have resources in place, structures in place so if an

incident happens we know who will run it and where from, who will provide surveillance,

intelligence, briefings etc so it is all in place if a job broke tomorrow” (Interview H).

Regardless of the successes of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model

there is still room for great improvement with some suggesting the construction of the initial

CTC model may have been somewhat off the mark:

“It is a bit of folk lore that some elements of Policing went to the Security Service and said

where could you do with some extra support? The Security Service said investigations and of

course the Security Service meant intelligence investigations. The Police interpreted this to

mean investigations in the sense of detections, criminal investigations and

prosecutions...........so the tale is that the Police built this huge machine full of detectives

ready to do executive action........just when the government wanted to shift to PREVENT,

underpinned with better intelligence” (Interviewee E).

So in essence what is being suggested here is that although the creation of the CTC has

ensured the UK is better equipped and prepared it still falls short somewhat of the long term

strategic intelligence game that is required (Interviewee E). The deputy NCSB also argued

that the Police and the CTC’S role within intelligence, is still not clear:

“The big question is do we have the right intelligence understanding so that we know when

such terrorist plots are in the making? Personally I am not entirely convinced that there is a

completely settled view of what the Polices role in that area is” (Interviewee E).

Such a stance creates ambiguity within the Counter Terrorism Command and the

wider Counter Terrorism family and the deputy NCSB believes that it is time for both the

Police and the Security Service to acknowledge that MI5 alone cannot control all of the

intelligence workload by stating:

“We (the Police) have tended to see the long term strategic intelligence and analysis work as

a role for others to do or only to serve to assist us in fast time Stockwell type incidents or a

kidnap situation. Now there is a need for a long term strategic understanding requirement

that 3000 people in Thames House are not going to be able to do all of the work on their

own, even if they have got a few people scattered around the country”.

So in light of all these revelations we can clearly see that improvements within the

United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism are still needed and in an effort to establish the


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practitioners perspective on where they believed these improvements should take place the

final question within the survey of CTC employees aimed to answer this and can be seen in

the data presented in table 8.

Table 8: What would you suggest as a further way of improving the UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?

Question: What would you suggest as a further way of

improving the UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?


Increased Joint Working i.e. increased regional presence of the

Security Service.

21

Improved ICT capability i.e. joint access to intelligence

systems.

10

A CTC/CTU and Security Service merger. 9

A national Counter Terrorism Police force. 7

Joint ownership of intelligence investigations. 5

When the data in table 8 is again presented in chart format in figure 6, a better

understanding of the divided opinions on the way forward can be seen. However, one

feeling rises above all others and far from a dramatic restructuring of the United Kingdom’s

Counter Terrorism response or grand mergers between the Police and intelligence agencies

we can see that most practitioners feel that simply increasing the level of joint working

would be the best way forward.

Figure 6: What is the best way to further improve the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability?

There also appears to be little motivation to increase such working through the fore

mentioned mergers, restructuring or a change in the lead agency status and would appear


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from this analysis that the majority of staff are happy with the progress that has been made

within Counter Terrorism and feel that simply more of the current arrangements such as

Security Services employees based within the region is the most productive way forward.

Although as the NCSB has outlined earlier there is a clear resourcing disparity between the

3000 Security Service staff and the 150,000 Police employees in the UK and as such there

still requires an acknowledgement by the Security Service that they cannot conduct all of the

work themselves by simply underpinning it with the ill informed more mundane intelligence

gathering currently conducted by Police resources in the CTC and CTU’S. What is required by

both the Police and Security Service is a true acceptance that the level of contribution the

Police can provide is much greater than the current levels with clear room for improvement

for instance in the area of intelligence analysis. Most importantly it identifies a necessity for

an acceptance by the Security Service that there is effectively a ‘sealing point’ on the

resource capacity of their 3000 staff and overall, the UK’S Counter Terrorism capability

unless more responsibility is given to the Police.

However, to achieve this, as this research project has identified will require a

noticeable reduction in the level of bureaucracy being experienced through barriers such as

the ‘need to know’ principle. Without this the standard, depth and breadth of work that can

be conducted by the Police is severely restricted by the level of intelligence being shared,

regardless of the evidenced improvements. Even if greater numbers of Security Service

employees were stationed at a regional level as suggested as a way forward by the

practitioners questioned, the evidence obtained in this project leads me to hypothesise that

although offering some benefit would simply result in further increased levels of Police

Counter Terrorism staff experiencing the fore mentioned bureaucracy without ever reaching

the relationships true potential. As such it could be hypothesised that to further raise the

levels of intelligence sharing and ultimately the United Kingdom’s capability to counter the

terrorist threat will in fact require a substantial realignment of the influence of the actors

involved, equalising their contributions to Counter Terrorism intelligence investigations. The

concern with this is that as real progress has already been made the decision makers in a

position to continue these advances will see no real necessity and that as with 7/7 and the

subsequent creation of the CTC, it will take another major UK terrorist attack to force the

level of political shift required to fully reach the potential of the United Kingdom’s Counter

Terrorism capability.


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6.3 Conclusion

From the outset the overall aim of this project has been to assess if the introduction

of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model has increased intelligence sharing

between the Police and the Security Services and ultimately, the United Kingdom’s capability

to counter the terrorist threat. In an effort to achieve the aims and objectives of the project

a mixed strategy of qualitative and quantitative research techniques was employed. The

utilisation of a questionnaire was chosen in an effort to obtain sufficient quantitative data to

add weight to the data analysis. Without using this technique collation of sufficient data

would have been almost impossible as the void of previous research outlined during the

literature review and restrictions on publication of data surrounding national security arenas

such as Counter Terrorism meant the availability of high quality primary data was extremely

low. Although the theory of circulation of such a questionnaire is simple, the reality was very

different with a prolonged period of consultation being required at a senior management

level within the North West Counter Terrorism Unit and Lancashire Constabulary and in

hindsight this process should have been anticipated and the process instigated at a much

earlier stage as final authority was only granted very late in the project. This resulted in a

restricted amount of time for circulation of the questionnaire and a reduced period to await

responses, with no opportunity for any form of ‘second request’ process which may have

increased responses. The overall affect was a reduction in the number of responses that

where received although the level was still surprisingly high.

The interview process was also hampered somewhat because of this factor as it

resulted in a restriction on the availability of interviewees through operational and personal

commitments. Had a greater time period been available for the implementation of the

research process then there would undoubtedly have been more room for manoeuvre to

accommodate such commitments. The overall affect was that the rank or grade of those

interviewed was restricted to Constables or Sergeants and their Police staff equivalents and

did not include any interviews of middle or senior management practitioners with the

exception of the national coordinator of special branches which may have impacted on the

breadth of the data obtained, although overall all interviews where of an exceptionally high

standard.

The result of this research conducted provided a number of extremely interesting

conclusions, firstly that the emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model


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has increased the level of face to face liaison but has conversely resulted in an increased

exposure to bureaucracy in the form of the ‘need to know’ principle. It was also identified

that the levels of intelligence sharing had increased as a result of the emergence of the CTC

and that face to face, bi-lateral relationships where believed to be the greatest factor in this

perceived increase in intelligence sharing and ultimately, the overall assessment was that

the CTC had been successful in increasing the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the

terrorist threat. Having established these conclusions it is clear that the objectives of the

project have remained in sight throughout and the continual focus ensured that the

research was successful in supplying the sufficient amount and quality of data to ensure an

informed analysis was possible, ultimately ensuring that all of the overall aims and

objectives of the project where successfully met.

It is somewhat disappointing that none of the identified conclusions provided what

could be described as controversial or revealing insights and as a rule simply reaffirmed the

theories that had been identified earlier in the literature review stage. This assessment

however may be too self critical as it was overwhelmingly established at the beginning of the

project that there was a distinct lack of empirical research that had been conducted to

either confirm or refute any of the theories outlined and as such any research that adds

evidence that can be utilised to underpin the theories within Counter Terrorism should be

viewed as a positive contribution.

Although this project was successful in identifying a number of conclusions there

was only one that could be translated from the data into a clear recommendation to achieve

further progress which was the requirement for increased joint working, which in this case is

manifested through the presence of regionally stationed Security Service employees.

However, as the data also evidenced, increased joint working and face to face liaison only

served to increase the exposure to bureaucracy in the ‘need to know’ principle and as such

the radical hypothesis was reached that only a realignment of influence, equalising both

actors contributions would be sufficient to encourage further developments and increases in

intelligence sharing. However, such realignment would require substantial political backing

and as such is unlikely to be progressed purely through an increase in academic theories

underpinning the hypothesis. Regardless of this fact efforts will be made to influence change

by supplying senior managers within the Counter Terrorism Command with copies of the

project and consideration will also be given to publication in an effort to gather further

support and development.


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To aid in the development of the work conducted within this project there are a

number of areas that would benefit both the development of the hypothesis reached and

the overall contribution to empirical research surrounding Counter Terrorism. To accurately

assess the conclusion that the Security Services restrictively adhere to the ‘need to know’

principle to maintain control on the management of intelligence a study of the culture,

practices and policy with the Security Service would be required. This would provide

opportunity to conduct comparison between the two actors and as such create a more

accurate assessment of the hypothesis. An examination of the potential options of

realignment would also be required in an effort to establish the feasibility of the hypothesis

and finally and most importantly an examination of the internal policies which dictate the

levels of intelligence sharing such as the national intelligence model, in particular the

dissemination category along with a review of the equivalent Security Service policies,

however, with the heavy restrictions, barriers and strict adherence to secrecy within the

Security Service unfortunately means that conduct of any of these further research projects

would be extremely difficult. However, with the threat of terrorism still ever present, the

continued presence of allied forces in Islamic Republic’s and convictions of UK based

terrorists seemingly continuous, there appears no end in sight for the ‘war on terror’. As

such the necessity to keep one step ahead is more important than ever and the price of

‘resting on our laurels’ in the fight against terror could be high, higher than any cost of

political or organisational Counter Terrorism realignment and the powers that be should ask

themselves, is the cost of change, higher than the human cost of another 7/7.


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Appendices

i. Research Questionnaire

Thesis

The formulation of the Police Counter Terrorist Command (CTC) and emergence of Counter

Terrorist Units (CTU) across the United Kingdom has increased the level of national

cooperation in relation to counter terrorist information and intelligence sharing. As a result

the CTC/CTU model has ultimately increased the effectiveness of the United Kingdoms

ability to counter the threat of international terrorism.

Completion:

Please simply complete the questionnaire by placing an X in your chosen field or type your

written response in the areas provided. Once completed simply save to your document file

and then return as an attachment to: [email protected]

1. How long have you served within the North West Counter Terrorist Unit?

<1 Year

1 Year

2 Years

3 Years

4> Years

2. Which Police Service are you employed by?

Cheshire

Cumbria

Greater

Manchester

Lancashire

mailto:[email protected]


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Merseyside

3. What is your current role within the North West Counter Terrorist Unit?

Researcher

Analyst

Operations Officer

Financial Investigator

Intelligence Officer

Source Handler

Security Advisor

Senior Management

4. Which strand of the Contest Strategy does your role fall under?

Prevent

Pursue

Protect

Prepare

5.

Police Officer

Police Staff

6. What is your rank or Police staff grade?..................................................


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7. How integral is it to your role to share intelligence/information with the Security Service?

Essential

Quite Important

Moderately Important

Not Important

Completely Irrelevant

8. Do you have experience of working within the Special Branch prior to the formation of theCounter Terrorism Command model? If your answer is NO, please go direct to question29.

Yes

No

Pre Counter Terrorist Command Model

For those who have experience of working within the Counter Terrorism Arena Pre and Post

CTC/CTU please answer all questions.

9. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC who did you consider as your main partner forissues of Counter Terrorism?

Metropolitan Police

Other Police Services

Security Services

Europol

Interpol

Do Not Know

Other (Please specify

below)


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10. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how often would you shareintelligence/information with the Security Service?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly

11. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how often would you shareintelligence/information with other special branches/Police Services?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly

12. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how would you rate the ease ofintelligence/information sharing with other Special Branches and Police Services?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor


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13. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how would you rate the ease ofintelligence/information sharing with the Security Service?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor

14. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how often would you have face to face contactwith a member of the Security Service?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly

Never

15. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how easy was it to access a member of theSecurity Service?

Very Easy

Easy

Moderately accessible

Difficult

Impossible


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16. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how do you feel the Security Service rated theability of the Police to gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor

17. Do you believe negative perceptions of the Police as intelligence actors and culturaldifferences affect the level of information/intelligence sharing?

Yes

No

18. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what did you consider as the biggest blocker toinformation/Intelligence sharing with the Security Services?

ICT

Lack of Liaison

GPMS Marking

NIM dissemination grading

Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of

trust/ability.

Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to

know” principles.

Other (Please specify below)

Nothing, it worked perfectly


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19. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what did you consider as the biggest blocker toinformation/Intelligence sharing with other Special Branches and Police Services?

ICT

Lack of Liaison

GPMS Marking



trust/ability.

Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to

know” principles.



20. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what options where available as a method ofcontact with the Security Service?

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary

Internal ICT systems



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21. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what options where available to you as a methodof contact with other Special Branches and Police Services? Select more than one option ifappropriate.

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary



22. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what method of communication did you use mostoften when contacting other Special Branches or Police Services?

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary




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23. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what did you consider as the biggest blocker toinformation/Intelligence sharing with Police Special Branches and other Police Services?

ICT

Lack of Liaison

GPMS Marking


Cultural Blockers i.e. lack of trust.

Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to know”

principles.



24. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how did you feel the Security Service rated theability of the Police to gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor


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25. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what options were available as a method ofcontact with the Security Service? Select more than one option if appropriate.

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary



26. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what method of communication did you use mostoften with the Security Service?

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary




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27. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what would you of suggested as a way ofimproving intelligence/information sharing with the Security Service?

Improved ICT

Increased Liaison

Joint Working

Reduced Bureaucracy


28. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how would you have rated the United Kingdomsability to counter the terrorist threat?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor

Post Counter Terrorist Command

29. Who do you consider as your main partner agency for Counter Terrorism?

Metropolitan Police

Other Police Services

Security Service

Europol

Interpol

Do Not Know

Other (Please specify

below)


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30. How often do you share intelligence/information with the Security Service?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly

31. How often do you share information/intelligence with other Counter Terrorist Units?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly

32. How often do you share information/intelligence with Police Special Branches notencompassed by a Counter Terrorist Unit?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly


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75

33. How do you rate the intelligence/information sharing process with the Security Service?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor

34. How do you rate the intelligence/information sharing process with other Counter TerroristUnits?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor

35. How do you rate the intelligence/information sharing process with Police Special Branchesnot encompassed by a Counter Terrorist Unit?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor


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36. How often do you have face to face contact with a member of the Security Service?

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Quarterly

Yearly

37. How easy would you rate access to such face to face contact with a member of theSecurity Service?

Very Easy

Easy

Moderately accessible

Difficult

Impossible

38. What options are available to you as a method of contact with other Counter TerroristUnits? Select more than one option if appropriate.

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary




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77

39. What method of communication do you use most often with other Counter TerroristUnits?

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary



40. What do you consider as the biggest blocker to information/Intelligence sharing with otherCounter Terrorist Units?

ICT

Lack of Liaison

GPMS Marking


Cultural Blockers i.e. lack of

trust/ability.


principles.


None, it works perfectly


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78

41. How do you feel the Security Service rate the ability of the Police to gather, analyze anddisseminate intelligence?

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Extremely Poor

42. What options are available as a method of contact with the Security Service? Select morethan one option if appropriate.

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary



43. What method of communication you use most often with the Security Service?

Telephone

Email

Postal

Face to Face

Intermediary



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79


44. What do you consider as the biggest blocker to information/Intelligence sharing with theSecurity Services?

ICT

Lack of Liaison

GPMS Marking



trust/ability.


principles.


45. How much do you believe the emergence of the Counter Terrorist Command model hasincreased or decreased information/ intelligence sharing with the Security Service?

Increased a lot

Increased a little

No change

Decreased a little

Decreased a lot


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80

46. What do you believe has assisted most in the increase of intelligence/information sharing?

Improved ICT

Increased Liaison

GPMS Marking


Reduction of Cultural Blockers


47. How much do you believe the emergence of the Counter Terrorist Command model hasincreased the United Kingdoms ability to counter the terrorist threat?

Increased a lot

Increased a little

No change

Decreased a little

Decreased a lot

48. What would you suggest as a further way of improving the United Kingdoms ability tocounter the terrorist threat?

Increased Joint Working

Increased ICT capability

Joint ownership of intelligence

investigations

A national CT Police service (FBI

model)

A CTC/CTU and SyS merger

Other (please specify below)

49. Any comments/suggestions you wish to add?


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ii. Sample of Interview Questions: Deputy NCSB

1. Introduction of interviewee.2. What is the role of the Special Branch?3. What is the Counter Terrorist Unit?4. What is the structure of the CTU? i.e CTC/Regional CTU5. What is the CTU’S role?6. Why was it created?7. How are the objectives of the CTU identified?8. How does the CTU differ from the traditional “Special Branch”?9. Are the CTU’S intended to replace the Special Branch?10. Do you for see any further CTU’S being created in the near future?11. What does the CTU model offer that the traditional Special Branch does not?12. Who controls intelligence investigations within the CTU? i.e SyS led.13. How is CT information/intelligence shared between CTU’S, Police, Security Services? i.e SPOE14. Is this different from previous methods used by the Special Branch, if so, how/why?15. Which method do you believe is most productive? i.e speed, standard etc16. Has information/intelligence sharing increased/decreased between Police services because

of CTU’S, if so, how/why?17. Has such increase/decrease had any affect on Police service capability to counter the

terrorist threat, if so how/why?18. How would you describe pre CTU relationships with the Security Services (SyS/SIS/GCHQ)?19. Has the creation of the CTU increased/decreased working relationships with Security

Services in comparison to that of a traditional Special Branch? If so, how/why?20. Has such increase/decrease had any affect on Police service capability to counter the

terrorist threat, if so how/why?21. Has emergence of the CTU created any cultural/relationship change with Security Services, if

so, how? i.e perception of Police ability to gather intelligence/use covert intel gatheringtechniques such as HUMINT/CHIS.

22. Do you believe the Polices ability to gather, manage, analyse and disseminateinformation/intelligence has increased/decreased since 9/11? Please explain your answer.

23. Has the emergence of the CTU played a role in the increase/decrease in expertise withinintelligence gathering, management, analysis and dissemination in Police services, if so,how/why?

24. Do you for see any further advancement’s in information/intelligence sharing within theCTU, if so, how/why?

25. What would you suggest to improve intelligence/information sharing betweenPolice/Security services?

26. Closing thoughts of interviewee.


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A. iii. Interview Matrix

Interviewee Randomly Assigned

Reference Indicator

Detective Superintendant DavidShaylor: Deputy National Co-ordinator of Special Branches.

E

Detective Constable David

Macauley: Ports Examination Officer

L

Police Staff Susan Saddoo: CounterTerrorism Financial Investigator

I

Detective Sergeant Musserat Khan:Counter Terrorism Direction,analysis and Targeting Manager.

H

Police Staff Pamela Waring:Intelligence Co-ordinator.

M

Detective Constable Robert Mowat:

Counter Terrorism Intelligence

Officer

A

Detective Constable Peter Denson:

Counter Terrorism Intelligence

Officer

F

Detective Constable Gregory

Anderton: Counter Terrorism


O

Detective John Tomlinson: Counter

Terrorism Intelligence Officer

R

Detective Constable Simon

Davidson: Counter Terrorism


D

the emergence of the counter terrorism command policing...

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