procuring counter terrorism

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Buyer Beware! The Pitfalls of Procuring Counter Terrorism in Times of Uncertainty Chris Tomlinson Arup Resilience, Security and Risk

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A briefing given at CT Expo 2013

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Page 1: Procuring Counter Terrorism

Buyer Beware! The Pitfalls of Procuring Counter Terrorism in Times of Uncertainty

Chris Tomlinson – Arup Resilience, Security and Risk

Page 2: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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My Agenda

• Why worry about what the „buck‟ buys in terms of

preventing the „bang‟

• CONTEST‟s success

• The enduring adversaries

• Securing commercial developments in a recession

• Buyer‟s guide and what bad may look like

• Self-help sources

• Final thoughts on value and quality.

Page 3: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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So Why Worry?

• There has been a steady year-on-year increase in

expenditures on counter terrorism during this century –

the evidence is everywhere

• Surely we will be less of a target, as we scale back

deployments to Afghanistan over next few years?

• Most accept the „user pays‟ principle, but how much is

enough and what is defensive sufficiency?

• Raising questions about what is a fair level of

expenditure for commercial developers?

Page 4: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Especially if CONTEST is working - isn‟t it?

• PREVENT must have reached its target audiences,

changed mindsets and we are withdrawing from

Afghanistan

• PURSUE the most newsworthy of the activities appears

to have caused plenty of adversary disruption

• PROTECT may have also played a part – e.g. the 2012

Olympics‟ security overlay

• PREPARE has probably evolved as well, but it is the

least interesting of the CONTEST strands.

Page 5: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Lest We Forget – International Inspired Groups

• 11 UK nationals had planned to set off up to eight

rucksack bombs and possibly other devices in crowded

places

• Yes some have proved a bit incompetent, but we should

never bank on stupidity – these were dangerous

conspirators!

Page 6: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Lest We Forget – Dissident Irish Republicans

• We are seeing a steady drive by Dissidents to resurrect

capabilities – UVBTs, mortars and RPGs

Page 7: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Securing Commercial Spaces in a Recession

• “Can you tell me what we need to get our design past

the planning committee and can you explain that risk

appetite thing again?”

• Those that fund, design, develop, manage and occupy

are a diverse stakeholder community

• Those gifted with powers to reject poor security design

are not that empowered or inclined

• Security is always a grudge purchase and wiser heads

than I say that attitude is set to prevail

• A race to bottom in terms of the quality – perhaps!

Page 8: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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All this when:

• Building footprints are getting more „stacked and

packed‟ – economics of city space usage

• Public private property demises are harder to define –

territoriality is challenged

• The public is apt to forget that threats continue and

may evolve

• Policing is under pressure in terms of providing the

Thin Blue Line and design specialists

• The CT designer and system supplier/installer are

finding things tough commercially.

Page 9: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Key Deductions for Buyers – the Stuck Record

• Get a threat and resilience assessment done early –

ensure the DBTs are understood and agreed

• Do match the HVM to the DBTs

• Stand-off is the most acceptable of CT measures, but a

luxury in a crowded central business district

• Look for design that facilitates detection and reaction

• Think back-of-house as well as front-of-house

• Work with the police design advisor - they can help

measure local borough „pushback‟ against CT design.

Page 10: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Buyers of CT services need to look for:

• Qualified and experienced design consultants - RSES

• Approaches guided by CPNI, NACTSO and blessed by

local police specialists

• Mitigation measures that match the space usage,

threats, aesthetics and importantly risk appetite

• Mitigation measures that come with acceptable life-

span costs

• Threat response scalability

• Think about adjacent spaces and matching sufficiency.

Page 11: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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Self-help Sources

Page 12: Procuring Counter Terrorism

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“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get”

Warren Buffett