caricom counter terrorism strategy final...caricom counter-terrorism strategy the caricom...

CARICOMCOUNTER-TERRORISMSTRATEGY

The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy (“the CT Strategy”)wasadoptedattheTwenty-NinthInter-SessionalMeetingoftheConferenceofHeadsofGovernmentoftheCaribbeanCommunity(CARICOM)atPort-au-Prince,Haiti,on26-27February2018.

PREVENTINGVIOLENT

EXTREMISM

DENYINGTERRORISTSTHEMEANS

ANDOPPORTUNITYTOCARRYOUT

THEIRACTIVITIES

DISRUPTINGEXTREMIST

ANDTERRORIST

ACTIVITIESANDMOVEMENTSIN

CARICOM

IMPROVINGPREPAREDNESSANDDEFENCES

AGAINSTTERRORISTATTACKS

RESPONDINGEFFECTIVELYTOTERRORISTATTACKSANDPROMOTINGACULTUREOFRESILIENCE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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CHAPTER 1 - THE THREAT TO CARICOM

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CHAPTER 2 - CARICOM COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

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1. PreventingViolentExtremism

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2. DenyingTerroriststheMeansandOpportunitytoCarryOutTheirActivities

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3. Disrupting Extremist and Terrorist Activities andMovementsinCARICOM

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4. Improving Preparedness and Defences AgainstTerroristAttacks

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5. Responding Effectively to Terrorist Attacks andPromotingaCulureofResilience

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ANNEX: PLAN OF ACTION

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

1. Terrorism and associated violent extremism pose direct threats to

CARICOM’s vision of integrated, inclusive, secure, and prosperouseconomies reflecting sustainable growth. Today’s terrorist and violentextremistorganisationsutilisemoderninformationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs)aswellasglobalisedtradeandtraveltoextendtheirreachfarbeyondtheirpointsoforigin.Asaresult,nopartoftheworldisimmune from this scourge. Even if not an actual target for terroristattacks, a country may be the source of terrorists and or terroristsympathiserswhopreparefor,provideassistanceto,ortraveltoanothercountryforthepurposeofcommittingaterroristact.Individualsinonecountry may raise funds for or recruitindividualstocommitaterroristattackinthe home country or in a third state. Acountrymayalsobeatransitorrestspotfor a terrorist using broken traveltechniques to evade detection by lawenforcementandsecurityservices.Itisbysuchmeansthatsome30,000individualsfrommorethan100countrieshavebeenlured to fight for the Islamic State (IS)from2012-2016.1

2. CARICOM States are not immune from

violent extremism, the foreign terroristfighter (FTF) phenomenon or the globalthreatofterrorism.ConcernsincludeFTFsreturneesandrelocatorstravellingtoandfrom the Region, radicalised terroristsympathisers inCARICOMStates, violentextremists who could be inspired ordirected to carry out an attack, theincreasinginfluenceofextremistreligiousleaders, and the growing volume andaccessibility of terrorist propaganda on-

1SeeSecondreportoftheSecretary-GeneralonthethreatposedbyISIL(Da’esh)tointernationalpeace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States incounteringthethreat.

The purpose of this Strategy is to reduce therisk of terrorism and associated violentextremism, as well as building resilience toextremist ideology, with a view to ensuring asafe and free CARICOM.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a grouping of 20 countries: 15 Member States and five Associate Members. It is home to approximately 16 million citizens, 60% of whom are under the age of 30, and from the main ethnic groups of Indigenous Peoples, Africans, Indians, Europeans, Chinese, Portuguese and Javanese. The Community is multi-lingual; with English being the main language of the community complemented by French and Dutch including variations of these, as well as African and Asian expressions. Stretching from The Bahamas in the north to Suriname and Guyana in South America, CARICOM comprises States that are considered developing countries, with the exception of Belize in Central America, Guyana and Suriname in South America, all Members and Associate Members are island states. While these States are all relatively small, both in terms of population and size, there is also great diversity with regards to geography and population as well as the levels of economic and social development.

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line and via peer-to-peer networks. The CARICOM Region faces theadditional challenge posed by the evolving relationship betweenorganisedcrimegroupsandviolentgangsontheonehand,andterroristgroupsandradicalisedindividualsontheother.

3. By the startof2018,more than 200 individuals fromCARICOMStates

havetraveledtoconflictzonesinSyriaandIraq.2ItisenvisagedthatFTFsreturneesandrelocatorswillposeaparticularthreattotheRegion.Theincreasedfrequencyofterroristattacksonsofttargets,includingpublicspaces associatedwith tourism,major events and recreation facilities,globally,areworrisome.

4. Terrorismunderminesthefundamentalvaluesandprinciplesthatunite

theRegionandisoneofthemostseriousattacksondemocracy,humanrights, the rule of law, good governance and the tolerance of differentfaiths and beliefs. Terrorism poses a serious threat to peace, security,stabilityandendangersthesocialfabricandeconomicdevelopmentoftheregion.

5. TheStrategyisbasedonthefollowingprinciples:

I. RespectForDemocraticValues.II. ProtectingHumanRightsAndRespectingTheRuleOfLaw.III. FosteringGoodGovernance. IV. FosteringMutualRespectAndToleranceOfDifferentFaiths

AndBeliefs.

COREPRINCIPLES

RespectForDemocraticValues

ProtectingHumanRightsAnd

RespectingTheRuleOfLaw

FosteringGoodGovernance

FosteringMutualRespectAndToleranceOf

DifferentFaithsAndBeliefs

Democracyisaplatformforinclusive

participation,empowermentandaccountability.

Counter-terrorismmeasuresoughtnottoserveaspretextsto

underminedemocracy.

Thepromotionofhumanrightsandeffectivecounter-terrorismpoliciesasnon-conflicting

goals,butcomplementaryandmutuallyreinforcing.

Goodgovernancebasedonintegrity,

openness,transparency,

accountabilityandtheruleoflaw,atalllevelsconstitutesanimportantelementforpreventing

violentextremismandterrorism.

Terrorismoughtnottobe

associatedwithanyreligion,nationality,civilisationorethnicgroup.

2Between2013and2017morethat200CARICOMcitizenstraveledtotheconflictzone.

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6. The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy confronts terrorism andassociatedviolentextremismthroughthefollowingfive(5)corepillars:

I. PreventingViolentExtremism.

II. DenyingTerroriststheMeansandOpportunitytoCarryOutTheirActivities.

III. Disrupting Extremist and Terrorist Activities and

MovementsinCARICOM.

IV. Improving Preparedness and Defences Against TerroristAttacks

V. RespondingEffectivelytoTerroristAttacksandPromoting

aCultureofResilience. 7. As terrorist activities are rarely limited by territorial boundaries, the

natureofthemultifacetedthreatofterrorismnecessitatesaharmonisedregionalresponse.Therefore,acoherentregionalapproachiscriticaltosuccessfully complementing current national and global counter-terrorismefforts.

ADVANTAGESOFTH

ECARICOM

COUNTER-TERRORISM

STRATEGY

Strengthensnationalandregionalcapabilitiestopreventandcombatviolentextremismandterrorism

Addressesviolentextremismandterrorismthroughatailored,harmonisedregionalapproach

FacilitatescooperationandcoordinationbetweenMemberStatesandInstitutions

Prioritisesnationalandregionalinterests

EnhancespartnershipsandthebuildingofstrategicallianceswithPartnerNationsandAgencies

Ensuresanintegratedandcoordinatedresponse

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CHAPTER 1 - THE THREAT TO CARICOM 8. The overall terrorist threat to the security of CARICOM States has

increased considerably since 2013.3 While CARICOM States may haveuniquevariationsinthemanifestationofexistingterroristthreats,thesethreatshavethepotentialtoadverselyimpactallCARICOMStates.Theseterroristthreatsareessentiallyborder-lessandmaytakeplacethroughlegalandillegalmovements.

9. ThemainregionalconcernsrelatetothephenomenaofFTFs,includingtheir return and relocation to the Region, the increasing influence ofextremist religious leaders and radicalised terrorist sympathisers inCARICOMStates, violentextremistswhocouldbeinspiredordirectedtocarry out an attack, the growing volume and accessibility of terroristsgroup propaganda on-line and via peer-to-peer networks, and thepotential exploitation of the banking system to fund terror networks.Intelligence and other information sources have confirmed that IS, Al-Qaeda, its affiliated organisations, and other terrorist organisationscontinue to plan terrorist attacks againstWestern interests. CARICOMStates receive a substantial amount of foreign direct investment (FDI)fromtheUnitedStatesofAmericaandEurope,whichplayacriticalroleinrelationtoeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.

10. CARICOMStatescouldbetargetedasanintermediateobjectivetoaffect

thestrategiceconomicinterestsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,CanadaandEuropeancountries.Thesignificantpresenceofwesterninterestsonourshores,coupledwiththeRegion’sporousbordersmayalsoincreasethe risk of a potential terrorist attack in the Caribbean. Furthermore,thereremainsacontinuedconcernthattheCaribbeancouldbeutilisedasatransitpointforpotentialterroristsorterroristorganisations.

ForeignTerroristFightersReturneesandRelocators 11. The fact that by the start of 2018 more than 200 individuals from

CARICOM States have traveled to conflict zones in Syria and Iraqdemonstrates how theRegion has been caught up in global terrorism.While the activities of FTFs abroad contribute to instability abroad,attacksinEurope,Africa,andAsiademonstratethepotentialthreatthattheyposewhentheyreturn4totheirhomeorthirdcountriesasbattle-

3The Threat level of terrorism has increased since the adoption of the CARICOM Crime andSecurity Strategy (CCSS) by CARICOM Heads of Government in February 2013. Terrorism isreflectedasaTierThree(3)ThreatoutofaFour(4)TierThreatSystemintheCCSS.TheissuesofFTFs in particular returning FTFs, the influence of extremist religious leaders, aswell as theradicalisationofCARICOMnationalswerenotperceivedasaregionalthreatin2013.4Somereturneeswilltraveltotheircountriesoforiginorresidence.Othersmaychoosetotraveltoconflictzonesintheregionandbeyond.TheflowofreturningFTFsentailstheriskofspreadingthethreatposedbyindividualsloyaltoIStonewregions,includingCARICOM.

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hardenedandtrainedFTFs.The involvementofFTFs in thoseattacks-whether inplotting,recruiting, facilitatingorcarryingout theattacks-illustratestheabilityofterroristorganisationstomobilisereturnedFTFs.Returning FTFs’ ability to leverage violent extremist networks both athome and abroadmake them especially dangerous. Additionally, FTFsrelocating fromconflictzonestoCARICOMnowpresentaconsiderablethreat.

12. The motivations of FTFs returnees and relocators are diverse. Whilesomearedisillusionedwithterroristpracticesandlifeinconflictzones,othersmayreturntotheirhomestateorrelocatewiththeaimofcarryingout terrorist attacks, assist in transnational recruitment, as well as,facilitatingthetravelofnewFTFs.TherelocationofFTFsfromtheconflictzonestootherregionsnowpresentsaconsiderablethreat.

13. Addingtotheseconcernsaretheterroristnetworksandcellsalreadyin

or transiting through the CARICOM Region and others within closeproximitytotheCaribbean,orthosebeingtrainedinconflictzoneswithclosetiestoCARICOM.Whiletherearecurrentlynospecificindicationsthat terrorist networks are preparing attacks in the Region, CARICOMnoteswithconcernthat IShasshifted itsmessageandnowcallson itssympathisers to “stay at home and carry out attacks”, as well as theincreasingglobalgeographicaldispersalofFTFs.TheRegioncanbeusedasameetinggroundortrainingcamporasasafehavenforsleepercellsorterroristgroups.

EvolvingRelationshipBetweenOrganisedCrimeGroups,ViolentGangsandTerrorism

CARICOMexpressesstrongconcernabouttheincreasinglinksbetweenorganisedcrimegroups,violentgangsandterrorism,ashighlightedbythefinancingoftheillegalactivitiesofglobalterroristgroupsviatheproceedsofillicittrafficking.Theunfortunateprevalenceof illicit trafficking routes throughout the Caribbean Basin raises the probability thatorganised crimegroups andviolent gangsmaybe enlisted to facilitate theundetecteddeparture and return of foreign terrorist fighters. It also creates the opportunity forcollaborationamongmembers,groupsandotheraffiliatesintheregion.

Globally, it has been recognised that a significantnumber of foreign terrorist fightersalreadyhadcriminalbackgroundsbeforeturningtoterrorism.Sixoutofthetenattackersinthe2015Parisattackshadacriminalbackground,andallsixknownattackersinthe2016Brusselsbombingshadcriminalbackgrounds.Manyof theFTFsfromtheRegionwho joined IS, also have a criminal background. The CARICOM Region’s highunemployment andunderemployment rates, especially amongyouth, growingpovertywithpocketsofhighlyconcentratedurbanpoverty,increasedcriminalityofyouthgangs,andfeelingsofalienationandmarginalisationprovideapermissiveandfertilegroundforterroristsandothercriminalstoexploit.

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The Influence of Extremist Religious Leaders, as well as Radicalised Terrorist Sympathisers in CARICOM 14. There are nationals within a few CARICOM States who are known to

promoteaviolentjihadistmessage.5Theinfluenceofextremistreligiousleaderswhopromotetoxicvalues,indoctrinatehatredandintoleranceorincite support for terrorist groups, is destroying tolerant religioustraditions and threatening our democratic order. Their teachings arefuelingviolentextremism,whichsignificantlycontributetotheexodusofforeignterroristfightersfromtheRegion.Thepresenceoftheseextremistreligious leaders in the Region has harmful and far-reachingconsequencesforourschools,religiousinstitutionsandprisons.

Radicalisation of Homegrown Extremists

15. TheRegion is increasingly vulnerable to the virulent spread of violentextremistgroups,aswellasattacksbyviolentextremistswhocouldbedirected,encouragedormerelyinspiredbytheISandAl-Qaedaideologyandrhetoric.Theregionexhibitsseveraloftheconditionsconducivetothespreadofviolentextremismideologyandtheterroristgroupsfuelledby them. Institutional weakness, high levels of unemployment andunderemployment, as well as inequality, significant poverty rates andhigh levels of criminality and low detection rates make the Regionsusceptibletotheinfiltrationofextremistideology.

16. Onlineradicalisationpresentsaprimaryconcernasterroristgroupsfarfromourshoresareexploitingreligiousbeliefsinordertoincitehatredand violence and to cause division and polarisation in our society.Radicalisation, if not deterred, could result in individuals, or groupscommittingreligiouslymotivatedactsintheRegion.

5 In August 2017, Jamaica-based Islamic clericSheikh Abdullah Al-Faisal was arrested on aprovisional warrant under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty after he was accused by USAuthoritiesofengaginginterrorism-relatedactivities,includingencouragingindividualstocarryoutactsofterrorisminthenameoftheIslamicStateandconnectingthemwithotherradicalisedsupporterswhowerewilling-oralreadyintheprocess-ofdoingthesameincountriesaroundtheworld.HehasbeenplacedonaUSblacklistforassistingin,sponsoring,orprovidingfinancial,material,ortechnologicalsupportforthemilitantgroup,ISIS.

RadicalisationinPrisons

Prisoncanactasanincubatorforviolentextremistideology,butmoreimportantly,itcanactasapositiveinstitutiontopreventthespreadofextremistviewsandforthereformand rehabilitation of prisoners, with the aim to reintegrating them successfully intosociety and reducing the risk of recidivism. Rehabilitation programs within regionalprisonsmustbestrengthenedandfurthersupportedbytherespectivelocalcommunities.Thiswillfacilitatereducedratesofrecidivism,whileincreasingthechancesofsuccessfulreintegration.

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The Growing Volume and Accessibility of Terrorist Group Propaganda On-Line 17. Informationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs)suchastheinternet

and social media platforms, are key elements of our society. Theypromote and facilitate democratic values, commerce, communications,humanrights,andvigorouspoliticaldebate.Unfortunately,terroristsandother criminalshavebeenable toabuse these technologies toadvancetheir agenda, using them for propaganda, incitement to violence,recruitment,financing,andoperationalplanning,unfetteredbynationalborders or other physical boundaries. The CARICOM Region is notimmune from this phenomenon. There have been reports of hackingagainstseveralgovernmentagencies’websites/e-mails,aswellasattacksagainstsystemsusedbyprivatecitizensinBarbados,Guyana,Jamaica,St.VincentandtheGrenadines,andTrinidadandTobagobypersons/groupsaffiliatedwithterroristorganisations.6

18. Thedisseminationofterror-attackmethodologiesandguidance,aswellas designs for the building of improvised explosive devices over theInternetandsocialmediaisakeyconcern.

The Financing of Terrorism 19. NationalsoftheRegionhavebeencitedinrespectivenationalFinancial

Intelligence Unit [FIU] Reports as suspects involved in terrorismfinancing.Avarietyofbothlegalandillicitactivitiesareutilisedtofinanceterrorist acts. A growing trend has been the increased use of wiretransfers.Thepotentialexploitationofthebankingsystemtofundterrornetworksandtheabuseofnon-governmental,non-profitandcharitableorganisationsbyandforterroristpurposesarekeythreatstotheRegion.

20. An increasing source of funding is the exploitation of the internet andsocialmediatoattractdonationsfromindividualsandlegalentities,bymisleadingusersaboutthetruerecipientsofthefunds.

21. As counter-financing measures worldwide disrupt already identified

flowsoffinancialsupport,themethodsoffinancingandmovingfundswillevolve. It isexpectedthat transactionsthroughtheregulated financialinstitutionswillbereducedandtheuseofalternativechannelsforfundmovement will increase such as bulk cash transportation, unlicensedexchange operators (e.g. the hawala system), and cryptographiccurrencies(e.g.Bitcoinhouses).Public-privatepartnershipandresearchwillbecomemorecriticalasthemechanismsemployedbyterroristsandtheirsupportersbecomemoresophisticated.

6Occurredbetween2014and2016.

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Access to Illicit Firearms 22. Recent global terrorist attacks have shown recurrent patterns. Small

ArmsandLightWeapons(SALW)haveincreasinglybecomeaweaponofchoice for carrying out terrorist attacks. This is an alarming andworrisome trend given the availability and proliferation of illegalfirearms intheRegion. Onaverage,morethan70percentofhomicidevictimsinCARICOMStatesarekilledbyfirearms.

23. Giventheprevailingconsiderationswhichhavebeenpresentedabove,an

effective counter-terrorism strategy must address limiting access byterroristsandviolentextremiststofirearms,ammunition,explosives,andrelatedprecursors, aswell as toprecautionarymeasures todetect andprevent the use by terrorists of chemical, biological, radiological andnuclear(CBRN)material,asrequiredbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution1540(2004).

CARICOMVitalIndustriesandtheImplicationofaTerroristAttack Tourism

24. TourismplaysanimportantroleinCARICOMStatesandisakeydriverof

regional sustainable economic growth and a vital contributor to jobcreation and poverty alleviation. According to the World Travel &TourismCouncil (WTTC) in2016, travelandtourismcontributed 14.9percentoftotalGDPintheCaribbean,13.4percentoftotalemploymentand 12.5 percent of total capital investment. Terrorists have beentargeting tourist resorts and destination cities globally. In addition totragedyorthelossoflife,eventsinBelgium,Coted’Ivoire,Egypt,France,Tunisia, and Turkey demonstrate the economic consequences for thetravel and tourism industry as these states have all seen a drastic

VehiclesAsWeaponsofTerrorInCrowdedSpacesTerroristtacticsarecontinuallybeingadapted.TheISandAlQaedahavecalledonfollowerstousevehiclesasweapons.Attacksoncrowdedplacesoverseas,includingNewYork(October,2017)Barcelona(August,2017),London(June,2017),Stockholm(April,2017),London(March,2017),Berlin(December,2016)andNice(July,2016)demonstratehowvehiclescanbeusedbyterroriststohorrifyingeffect.Vehicle attacks require little organisation, manpower, training, expertise ortechnologicalknow-how,butcanhavedevastatingconsequences.WhilesuchattackshavenotbeingcarriedoutintheRegion,CARICOMMemberStatesshould not believe that they are immune. We need to strengthen our nationalarrangementsinordertohelpownersandoperatorsbetterprotectcrowdedplacesfromterrorism.

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decrease invisitors followingterrorattacks,someofwhichspecificallytargetedtourists.FollowingtheterroristattacksontheBardoMuseuminTunisiainMarch2015,theTourismMinistryreportedthattherewereover3,000holidaycancellations,whilereservationsdeclined60percent.TheconsequencesofaterroristattackontheRegion’stourismindustrywill disproportionately and profoundly impact the economies of theregion,andaterroristattackinanyCARICOMStatewillnegativelyimpactthetourismindustryofallCARICOMStates.7

Oil and Gas Industry 25. InTrinidadandTobago,oilandgasproductsplayanintegralroleinthe

country’seconomyandisavaluablenationalasset,accountingfor34.9percentofthecountry’sGDP.8Guyanaisalsopoisedtobecomeamajoroil producer in theWestern Hemisphere. Respected industry analystsWoodMackenzieprojectupto450,000barrelsadaybythemid-2020s.Additionally, 12 of the 17members of the PetroCaribe oil alliance arefrom CARICOM (excluding, Barbados, Montserrat, and Trinidad andTobago),andallhavesignificantfuelfarms/storagedepots.Adisablingattack on the oil and gas infrastructure or reserves in Trinidad andTobago and other states could cripple individual states and affect theentireRegion.

Critical Infrastructure

26. Critical infrastructure, including communication platforms, air and sea

portsandpublicplacesareattractivetargetsforphysicalorcyberattacksby terrorist groups. Attacks on critical infrastructure which provideessential goods and services aswell as revenue, have the potential tocausewidespreadeconomicandenvironmentaldamage.

27. Essential components such as pipelines and power grids are routinelytargeted given their economic value. Terrorist attacks on criticalinfrastructure could significantly disrupt the functioning of thegovernmentandprivatesectoralikeandcauseknock-oneffectsbeyondtheinfrastructuresectoraswellaspost-disruptioneconomicdownturns.

Major Sporting, Cultural and Entertainment Events 28. The Region is host to a number of high profile sporting, cultural and

entertainment events such as international cricket competitions,carnivalsandmusicfestivals.Theseeventsfulfillanumberofthecriteriathatterroristswouldliketohitandasaresult,theyarehighlyattractive

7TheCaribbeanisalsomarketedbytheCaribbeanTourismOrganization(CTO)andtheCaribbeanHotelandTourismAssociation(CHTA)asasingledestinationentity:“OneSea,OneVoice,OneDestination”.8 The country is attracting the attention and investment dollars of some of the biggest oilcompaniesintheworld.

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targetsforterrorists.Attacksagainstthesecanresultinmassiveciviliancasualties. The attacks in Paris in November 2015 that included anattempttotargettheStadedeFranceandtheattackattheManchesterArenainMay2017duringamusicconcert,illustratetheincreasingthreatfromterrorism.Thethreatposedbyterroristgroupsandtheirintenttotarget Western interests, suggest the risk to sporting, cultural andentertainmenteventsisnowmoresignificantthaninpreviousdecades.

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CHAPTER 2 - CARICOM COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

29. The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy is an opportunity for the

Region to enhance existing counter-terrorismsystems and todomoretogetherinordertopreventviolentextremismandtocombatterrorism.TheStrategyrepresentsanimportantmilestoneinthecollectivepursuitof CARICOM States toward strengthening the regional response toterrorism in all its forms and manifestations, based on a commonstrategicandoperationalframework,butalsorecognizingthatCARICOMStates have different capabilities to prevent and combat terrorism.Further,itensuresthatcounter-terrorismmeasuresinonecountrydonotsimply displace terrorists to less secure,more hospitable areas in theRegion.

30. We acknowledge that while improving security, intelligence andinformation sharing among relevant stakeholders are essential, thestructural factors that can lead to violent extremism must also beaddressed, including intolerance and political, economic, and socialmarginalisation, as outlined in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the associated UN Secretary-General’s Plan ofActionforPreventingViolentExtremism.

31. The Strategy addresses the critical need to implement systematic,preventive measures which directly impact the drivers of violentextremismaswellastheunderlyingconditionsconducivetothespreadofterrorismthatterroristrecruitersexploittopersuadeotherstosupporttheir cause. The Strategy pays particular attention to preventingradicalisation, addressing the phenomenon of returning FTFs andworking toward their reintegration. Preventing radicalisation includesbuildingaresilientRegioninwhichindividualsandcommunitiesareableto withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those whoespousethem.

32. CARICOM States are convinced that countering terrorism and violent

extremism requires a cooperative approach at all levels. This Strategyrecognises theneed forCARICOMStates to coordinateamongnationalauthorities, among States and to cooperatewith relevant internationalandregionalorganisations,aswellaswiththeprivatesector,civilsociety,andthemedia,asappropriate.

33. TheStrategyfurtherrecognisestheimportanceofCARICOMStatesbeing

in compliance with all relevant United Nations Counter-TerrorismSecurityCouncilResolutions (UNSCRs), inparticular UNSCResolutions1347, 1540, 2178 9 , 2309; and all relevant recommendations of the

9Resolution2178(2014)isfocusedonthetravelofForeignTerroristFightersfromtheirhomecountriestoconflictzones.

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FinancialActionTaskForce(FATF),in-particularFATFrecommendations5and6,ascriticalfoundationsforsuccess.Inthisvein,theStrategywillalsobecompatiblewiththeUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategy, theInter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS/CICTE) Declaration of Renewed HemisphericCommitmenttoEnhanceCooperationtoPrevent,Combat,andEliminateTerrorismandallotherrelevantandapplicableinstruments.

34. The Strategy is informed by a number of core principles: promoting

democraticvalues;protectinghumanrights,respectingtheruleof law;fostering good governance; and fostering mutual respect for andtoleranceofdifferentfaithsandbeliefs.

35. The Strategy consists of five pillars of action: (1) preventing violent

extremism; (2) denying terrorists the means and opportunity tocarry out their activities; (3) disrupting extremist and terroristactivitiesandmovementsinCARICOM;(4)improvingpreparednessanddefencesagainstterroristattacksand(5)respondingeffectivelytoterroristattacksandpromotingacultureofresilience.

36. TheStrategybuildsonCARICOM’sestablishedtools,includingCARICOMIMPACSAdvancePassenger InformationSystem(APIS)10andCARICOMcounter-terrorism networks which have already played an importantpartinCARICOM’sresponsetoterroristthreats.

10TheCARICOMAPIS is theworld’s onlymultilateral system.APIS allowsStates to effectivelyverifythepossiblepresenceofaforeignterroristfighteronboardanaircraft.On23October2017,the sharing of advance passenger information became mandatory under Annex 9 to theConventiononInternationalCivilAviationoftheInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO).

PREVENTINGVIOLENT

EXTREMISM

DENYINGTERRORISTTHEMEANSAND

OPPORTUNITYTOCARRYOUT

THEIRACTIVITIES

DISRUPTINGEXTREMISTANDTERRORIST

ACTIVITIESANDMOVEMENTSIN

CARICOM



RESPONDINGEFFECTIVELYTOTERRORISTATTACKSANDPROMOTINGACULTUREOFRESILIENCE

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37. The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy that follows provides theframework for CARICOM counter-terrorism actions, and ensures thatcounter-terrorism measures in one country do not simply displaceterrorists to less secure, more vulnerable areas in the Region. TheStrategy will also seek to promote greater regional harmonisation ofapproaches and build networks between national agencies andwhereappropriate, develop common approaches to spot and tackle theconditionsconducivetothespreadofviolentextremismandterrorism.

PILLAR1:PREVENTINGVIOLENTEXTREMISM 38. Theemphasisinthisareaisonaddressingthevarioussocial,economic,

political and other factors, including exclusion and extremism, whichengender conditions for the spreadof violentextremism and inwhichterrorist organisations are able to recruit and win support. CARICOMStateswillstrivetopreventanddiminishthesefactorsbyengagingwitha range of actors including individuals, communities, schools, prisons,plus internationalpartners,andthroughresearchtobetterunderstandthe complexity of the phenomenon, the nature of the terroristorganisationsandhowtocounterthem.Wenotethatviolentextremismis a multi-faceted problem that requires a comprehensive and inter-institutional approach that is endorsed at all levels including at thecommunity level.Keyactivitieswill focusonresearch toensurebetterunderstanding, address the drivers of radicalisation and needs arisingfrom the threats of violent extremism, prioritise prevention of violentextremismbyfocusingonrootcausesandtargetingyouth.Attentionwillalsobepaidtopreventingradicalisationinprisons,aswellasdevelopingeffectivedisengagement/de-radicalisationprogrammes.

39. Thisapproachincludesprogrammesandactivitiesto:

o Implement the UN Plan of Action for Preventing ViolentExtremismwhichrecommendsaregionalandnationalPlanofActionthataddressesthesevenfocusareas–

ü dialogueandconflictprevention;ü goodgovernance,humanrightsandtheruleoflaw;ü communities;andempoweringyoungpeople;ü genderequalityandempoweringwomen;ü education,skillsdevelopmentandemploymentfacilitation;ü strategic communications, including through the Internet

andsocialmedia;andü supportingandempoweringcivilsocietytochallengeviolent

extremismideology.

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PILLAR 2: DENYING TERRORISTS THE MEANS ANDOPPORTUNITYTOCARRYOUTTHEIRACTIVITIES

40. Theemphasisinthisareaisondeprivingextremistsandterroristsaccess

to the material, expertise, finance, and other enabling capabilitiesrequiredtocommitterroristacts.ThispillaralsoincludesactivitiesatandwithinCARICOMborderstodenyterroriststhemeansandopportunitiestoactwithintheRegion.


o Counter the financing of terrorism, reduce access to illegal

firearms, strengthen borders and improve the securityof ourportsofentry.

o Enact legislation to criminalise terrorismand the financingofterrorism,toprovideforthedetection,prevention,prosecution,conviction and punishment of terrorist activities and theconfiscation, forfeitureandseizureof terrorists’ assetsandofthe facilitators of the financing of terrorism and for relatedmatters.

PILLAR 3: DISRUPTING EXTREMIST AND TERRORISTACTIVITIESANDMOVEMENTSINCARICOM

42. Theemphasis inthisarea isonenhancing informationand intelligence

capabilities, strengthening aerial, land, maritime and cyber domainawareness,stoppingviolentextremistpropagandaaswellasadvancingcoordinated and cooperative relationships between our intelligence,security and law enforcement agencies nationally, regionally andinternationally. Information and intelligence sharing concerning theidentityofFTFs, returnees, relocatorsandknown terrorist supporters,willremainfundamental.


o MaximisetheuseoftheCARICOMregionalsecurityframework

including IMPACS and its Centres: the Joint RegionalCommunications Centre(JRCC) and the Regional IntelligenceFusion Centre (RIFC) aswell as theRegional Security System(RSS) to facilitate information and intelligence sharing withMemberStatesandourinternationalpartners.

o Strengthen national information and intelligence sharingnetworks.

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PILLAR 4: IMPROVING PREPAREDNESS AND DEFENCESAGAINSTTERRORISTATTACKS

44. Theemphasisinthisareaistheneedtoprotectcriticalinfrastructureand

tostrengtheneffortstoimprovethesecurityandprotectionofvulnerabletargets, such as public places, tourism infrastructure, transportationnetworks, information systems and sporting and cultural events fromterrorist attacks; involving public-private partnership whereappropriate.


o Protect citizens and critical infrastructure and reduce ourvulnerabilitytoattack,includingthroughtheimprovedsecurityofpublicspaces,transportandcriticalinfrastructure.

o Develop a culture of cybersecurity in CARICOM through theimplementationoftheCARICOMCyberSecurityandCybercrimeActionPlan.

PILLAR 5: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO TERRORISTATTACKSANDPROMOTINGACULTUREOFRESILIENCE 46. The emphasis in this area is to prepare our responders and the

community to manage and minimise the consequences of a terroristattack, by improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath, thecoordinationoftheresponse,andtheneedsofvictimsifeveraterroristattackoccurs.


o Establish mechanisms for national integration and rapidresponsebyallrelevantresponderstoaterroristincident.

o Ensure that systems and structures for cooperation between

relevantagencieswithinCARICOMStatesandintheRegion,areestablishedorstrengthened.

ACCOUNTABILITY,REVIEWANDIMPLEMENTATION

48. CARICOMStateswillreviewtheStrategyeverytwoyearstoreflectnewand emerging threats and evolving trends of violent extremism andterrorism. An Implementation Review Group shall be established todevelopanoverviewofthereviewprocess.

17

49. TheStrategywillalsobecomplementedbyamoredetailedplanofaction,whichwillallowfordetailedprogresstobemonitored.Thiswillinclude:

I. Thedevelopmentofsuccessindicatorslinkedtothe[measures/

actions]intheactionplan(seeannex1);and

II. Thedevelopmentoftimeframeslinkedtotheactionplan. 50. CARICOMinvitesindividualStatestodevelopnationalcounter-terrorism

PlansofActionand/orStrategiesreflectingthegoalsandobjectivesoftheCARICOMStrategy.

18

ANNEX 1: PLAN OF ACTION PILLAR MEASURE/ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE

AUTHORITY TIME

FRAME 1

PREVENTINGVIOLENT

EXTREMISM

i Promote dialogue, tolerance and respect, throughcross-culturalandinterfaithdialoguesplusstrengthenregionalandnationalcapacitiesforconflictprevention.

CARICOMandMemberStates

Ongoing

ii Enhance dialogue and understanding towardpreventing violent extremism at the political andofficiallevel,aswellaspursuingpoliticalandtechnicaldialoguewithThirdStates,inordertopreventviolentextremismandenhancecounter-terrorism.


Ongoing

iii Promote and implement national specific strategiccommunication programs, including UN SecurityCouncilResolution2354(2017)whichemphasisedtheneedtocounterterroristnarratives.


Ongoing

iv Conductdetailedresearchofrecruitmenttoterrorismin specific contexts such as in prisons, in places ofworship;onmisuseof the internetandmedia/socialmediabyviolentextremists,aswellasthefactorsthatdrive individuals towards violent extremismand thelinkbetweencriminalityandviolentextremismintheCaribbeanandothermatters,tobetterunderstandthephenomenonintheregion.


Ongoing

v Promote and implement measures for preventingviolentextremism,andencouragingreintegrationandrehabilitation that complies with internationalstandards.


Ongoing

vi Strengthenthecapacityofpolice,prosecutors,judges,prisonofficialsandotherjusticeactorstoaddressthelife cycle of radicalisation to violent extremism inconformitywithhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw.


Ongoing

vii Facilitate intergovernmental communications andcooperation and establishing early warning capacityfor theexchange of information on violentextremistactivities, including the utilisation of virtual crisisrooms,tosupportprevention.


Ongoing

viii ActiveparticipationbyMemberStatesandCARICOMininternational fora relating to violent extremism andterrorism.


Ongoing

ix Promotesocialinclusionagendastoreducethesenseof marginalisation and victimisation and encourageMemberStatestoimplementappropriatepoliciessuchasthosetowardaddressingunemployment.


Ongoing

x Facilitateandsupportcivilsociety,youth,andwomentoengageinpreventionandresponseeffortsrelatedtoviolentextremism.


Ongoing

xi Effectivelyaddressthewholelife-cycleofterroristradicalisation,frompreventiontoreintegration.

MemberStates

Ongoing

19

PILLAR MEASURE/ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE

AUTHORITY TIME

FRAME

2

DENYINGTERRORISTSTHEMEANSAND

OPPORTUNITIESTOCARRYOUT

THEIRACTIVITIES

i AdopttheCARICOMArrestWarrantTreaty. MemberStates

2018

ii Extend access to, and where appropriate,integrate into national systems the CARICOMAdvancePassengerInformationSystem(APIS).


2019

iii Adopt and implement theCARICOMmodelAPISBill.

MemberStates

2018

iv Establish a CARICOM Passenger Name Record(PNR) system in support of the APIS to collectpassenger and crew data to support theprevention, detection, investigation andprosecution of terrorist offences and seriouscrime.


2020

v Support and implement, in collaboration withtheInternational Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), the Traveller IdentificationProgramme(TRIP)Strategy

MemberStates

Ongoing

vi Consider participating in the ICAO Public KeyDirectory(PKD).

MemberStates

2020

vii Establish the CARICOM Advance CargoInformationSystem(ACIS)


2018

viii AdoptandimplementACISlegislation.


2019

ix Strengthen cooperation among border agenciesand support greater use of CARICOM andINTERPOL Tools to prevent and combatterrorism.


Ongoing

x Improve integration and utilisation of financialintelligence with other types of informationavailable, such as that provided by the privatesector to national governments, to moreeffectively disrupt terrorist financing, includingthrough actions related to investigativetechniques,evidencegatheringandprosecution.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xi Consider strengthening the powers of theFinancial Intelligence Units and facilitate theirenhancedcooperationthroughtheCFATF.

MemberStates

Ongoing

20

PILLAR MEASURE/ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY

TIME FRAME

xii Develop model anti-terrorism legislation tocriminalise terrorism and the financing ofterrorism, to provide for the detection,prevention, prosecution, conviction andpunishment of terrorist activities and theconfiscation, forfeiture and seizure of terrorists’assets and of the facilitators of the financing ofterrorismandforrelatedmatters.

CARICOM 2019

xiii Enact, and where appropriate, review counter-terrorismlegislationinviewoftheevolvingthreatposedbyterroristgroupsandindividuals.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xiv Criminalise the funding, organisation andfacilitationofforeignterroristfighters,notlimitedto material support, such as the provision offirearms and explosives, shelter, means oftransportation,services,assetsandgoods.

MemberStates

2019

xv Consider improvements to the regulation andtransparencyof legalentities, includingcharitiesandalternativeremittancesystems,whichmaybeused by terrorists to acquire funding for theiractivities.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xvi EnactthefullimplementationofUNSCResolution2178,andotherUNSCResolutionson terrorism,as well as other relevant internationalconventions.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xvii Increase national, regional and internationalcooperation to reduce illegal firearms, includingtheenactmentoftherelevantlegislation.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xviii Takeallnecessarystepstoenhanceforensicand ballistic capabilities, in particularstrengthening the Regional Integrated BallisticInformationNetwork (RIBIN), in order to tackleterroristaccesstoillegalfirearms.


Ongoing

xix Consider strengthening national legislation andcontrols on the possession, use and transfer ofillicit firearms, as well as, the investigation ofarms-traffickingnetworks.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xx Continue to implement obligations under UNSecurity Council Resolutions 2370 (2017) and1540(2004)andtakeeffectiveactionstopreventtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD)andtheirmeansofdeliverytoterrorists.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xxi Develop and enforce appropriate legal andregulatory measures for the protection andcontrolofsensitivematerials.

MemberStates

Ongoing

21

PILLAR MEASURE/ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE

AUTHORITY TIME

FRAME

3

DISRUPTINGEXTREMISTANDTERRORISTMOVEMENTS

ANDACTIVITIESINCARICOMMEMBERSTATES

i EstablishNationalPointsofContactsforcounter-terrorisminordertofacilitateinformationsharing

MemberStates

2018

ii Consider increasing the capacity of INTERPOLNationalCentralBureausaswellasdesignatea24hour/sevendaysaweekpointofcontact.

MemberStates

2018

iii MakefulluseoftheINTERPOLFTFsdatabaseandotherrelateddatabases.

MemberStates

Ongoing

iv Establish an INTERPOL Regional Bureau inCARICOMIMPACStoformalinkbetweennationalpolice and the INTERPOL global network whichwillserveasaliaisonoffice.


2019

v Establish a mobile CARICOM Information andIntelligenceSharingNetwork(CISNET)tofacilitaterealtimeactionableintelligence.


2019

vi Consider advancing programs and projects inbiometrics system-based tools for identifyingknownandsuspectedterrorists.


Ongoing

vii Share, where appropriate, information aboutforeign terrorist fighters and other individualterrorists and terrorist organisations, includingbiometric and biographic information, incompliancewithnationalandinternationallawtomultilateral screening databases, includingIMPACSandINTERPOL.

MemberStates

Ongoing

xxii Strengthen and/or establish a National JointCoordination Centre to manage informationsharingandintelligenceinMemberStates.

MemberStates

2019

xxiii StrengthenthevettingofvisaapplicationstoCARICOMbyestablishingadedicatedVisaVettingUnit at IMPACS to process visa requests toCARICOMStates.


2019

22

PILLAR MEASURE/ACTIONS RESPONSIBLEAUTHORITY

TIMEFRAME

4



i Promote awareness and understanding of thenecessarybalancebetweeneconomicandsecurityissues.


Ongoing

ii Continuously review and, where necessary,improvethesecurityandprotectionofparticularlyvulnerable targets, such as critical infrastructureandpublicplaces.

Member States

Ongoing

iii Increase the development of public and privatepartnerships on protection of criticalinfrastructure, including Internet, cyber andtourismsecurity,inordertopreventandreactinanefficientmanner to potential risks and threats torelatedfacilities.

CARICOM and Member States

Ongoing

iv Develop national plans for protecting criticalinfrastructure,identifyingpotentialsofttargets.

Member States

Ongoing

v Establish a CARICOM Critical InfrastructureNetworktofacilitatethedevelopmentandsharingof best practices on the protection of vulnerablesites, public spaces or critical infrastructure thatcarryimportancefortheirrespectiveStates.


2019

vi DesignandconductregularpreparednessexercisesamongCARICOMMemberStates,whichtakesintoconsiderationvaryingterroristscenarios.


Ongoing

vii FosteracommonCARICOMsecurityapproachandguidelines for security planning at majoreventsfocusing on evaluation, coordination,prevention and risk analysis of major eventplanning.


2019

viii Encourageprivatesectoroperativestostrengthentheirsecurity.


Ongoing

ix Strengthen private security operators throughenhancedlegalorregulatorystructures,aswellaspromotetraining.


Ongoing

x Prepareandregularlyupdatecontingencyplanstodealwithterroristattacksthatmaybecarriedoutin CARICOMMember States or against CARICOMrepresentationsabroad.

Member States

Ongoing

xi Promote continuous training in incidentmanagement (at all levels, across all levels,preparing individual modules or completeexercises).


Ongoing

23

PILLAR MEASURE/ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY

TIME FRAME

5

RESPONDINGEFFECTIVELY

TOTERRORISTATTACKSANDPROMOTINGACULTUREOFRESILIENCE

i Improve responsiveness and resilience bypromoting methods of planning, prevention, crisismanagementandrecovery.


Ongoing

ii Engenderacultureofcontinuousplanning,includingdoingregularcontingencyplanningthroughtrainingandeducation.

MemberStates

Ongoing

iii Strengthenthecriminaljusticecapacity,cooperationandresponsetoterrorism.

MemberStates

Ongoing

iv Takeappropriatetreatyactions:a. Amend the Mutual Security Assistance

Treaty, to include terrorism as a specificoffense.

b. Consider an enhanced request procedurefor terrorism offenses under CARICOMMutualLegalAssistanceAgreement.


2019

v Revise and simplify the present CARICOM JusticeProtection Agreement so as to enhance itspracticalityandeffectiveness.


2019

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