the battlefield from cooperation and integration to fusion ......capabilities yoav har even1 * * *...

The Battlefield – From Cooperation and Integration to Fusion of

Capabilities

Yoav Har Even1

* * *

For many years, ground maneuvers were the main, if not the only, means of

achieving the objectives of the combat. In view of the changing battlefield,

maneuver often appears to be a burden, and decision-makers prefer to conduct wars

from the air and maneuver on land only as a last resort. According to the writer,

technological developments in the civilian and military world provide an

opportunity to change in the way of thinking and in the manner of building and

operating the force. The role of ground maneuver must be redefined, and its unique

capabilities should be used as part of a multidimensional action force (air, land, sea,

and network environment) and task oriented, capable of operating and applying all

the relevant capabilities to the task. Fusion between the fighting dimensions into a

unified fighting force, regardless of branch affiliation, will improve the IDF's

operational and lethal effectiveness.

* * *

Introduction

For many years, the battlefield was divided into physical dimensions and developments therein

were one-dimensional2. The relationship discussed over the years between maneuvering and

combat support (fire in recent centuries) has traditionally been that of complementary efforts.

These efforts usually provided cover for the other's weakness, and the manner in which they

were activated or the extent of their force were derived from the nature of the war and from the

required achievement, and from technological developments in one of the dimensions. For

example, with the entry of the tank, the element of maneuvering and of conquering territories

became dominant, and its effect was similar to that of the entry of elephants or horses for

military use as a significant part of the ability to cross great distances and take over territory. In

contrast, the entry of long-range firepower, such as artillery or aerial support, had the opposite

effect on the ground dimension in the context of maneuvering, and often created dilemmas

among decision-makers regarding the need for the maneuvering3.

1 Major General (ret.) Yoav Har Even is the President and CEO of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, and in his last position in the IDF served as Head of the Operations Directorate. 2 Until the entry of the aerial dimension into the combat dimension in the last two centuries, from the use of balloons and, of course, with the appearance of the aircraft, there was no real ability to discuss the integration of combat dimensions, as combat only took place in one dimension. 3 More on the dilemmas surrounding maneuvering in recent years can be found in Eran Ortal's article, "An End to Repression – the Sixth Era of Ground Warfare", Bein Ha-Ktavim (In between the Poles), Issue No. 6, IDF, Dado Center, January 2016.

2 The Battlefield Har Even

The well-known Roman warlord Scipio4, who

lived and fought over 2,200 years ago, is

considered to this day to be the man who

succeeded in executing daring maneuvers

worthy of study even today. It was not for

nothing that Liddell Hart, in his book "Scipio

Africanus Greater than Napoleon", defined him

as one of the greatest generals in history5.

Scipio's name preceded him and was recorded

in history books because of his operational

ability to employ the "indirect approach" and

his tactical ability to move forces of tens of

thousands ground troops and hundreds of

cavalries a distance of hundreds of kilometers

deep into enemy territory and defeat it there.

Thousands of years passed, thousands of battles

and concepts were developed, and in almost all

wars the ground battle continued to be carried

out in one dimension – the ground dimension –

with some assistance from other dimensions.

From a historical standpoint with respect to the

State of Israel, the conduct of combat in the IDF

over many years, from the War of Independence

until the Yom Kippur War, can be characterized

as conduct in separate dimensions.

In the ground dimension, maneuvering was one of

the most significant components, especially

during times when the IDF was required to maneuver and occupy territory, in light of the

existential threat on the state.

The maneuvering element was a necessity derived from the State of Israel's security outlook

and from the need to move the war as soon as possible to enemy territory. All this was due to

the fact that the real physical threat of the Arab countries was the threat of occupation and to

the lack of depth that required moving the fighting to enemy territory. The Six-Day War

represents this concept in the clearest possible way and can be seen as the maneuver's moment

of glory. In all these wars the maneuvering was based on forces operating, as a rule, on one

dimension (ground) with some sort of air support.

In the aerial dimension, too, conduct was "one-dimensional" – the Air Force fought its war and

fulfilled its tasks almost without any connection to what was happening on the ground.

Although it is possible to establish a strategic relationship (in real time or retroactively)

between the various dimensions, the tactical coordination was loose and quite rare. The Six-

Day War began with a focused airstrike – "Operation Focus" (Mivtza Moked), after which the

4 Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus – General and consul of the Roman Republic. 5 B. H. Liddell Hart, "Scipio Africanus Greater than Napoleon", Ma'arachot Publications, 1975.

Figure 1: Publius Cornelius Scipio

Africanus. Is best known for his victory

over the Carthaginian General Hannibal

in the battle of Zama. He succeeded in

executing daring maneuvers worthy of

study even today. (Source: Wikipedia).1

3 | THE DADO CENTER JOURNAL | VOL. 16-17

IDF embarked on rapid and deep maneuvers, but each dimension of warfare was conducted

independently and could stand on its own6.

The first Lebanon War7 was in fact the first time that the IDF maneuvered, not out of necessity

arising from an outlook of a "nation under siege," an outlook that demands that the fighting be

transferred to the enemy territory. However, even in this war, the maneuver stood gloriously

alone, and the interface between it and the operation of the Air Force, which was deployed

admirably to achieve aerial superiority and to neutralize the Syrian surface-to-surface missiles

system, took place in isolated single events.

Over the years, and as a lesson from past wars, the IDF acted more intensively in order to try

and increase integration and cooperation. Such was the case in the Gaza Strip and the Second

Lebanon War8. The Yom Kippur War represents a different case of integration in which there

was an attempt to fire long-range artillery targeting surface-to-air missile bases. After crossing

the Canal, the missile bases were destroyed by the Armored Brigade 421, and this fact restored

the Air Force's freedom of operation in the Suez Canal area and the ability to assist in the

encirclement of the Third Field Army.

Operation "Protective Edge" (Tzuk Eitan) was the IDF's most recent experience in the limited

exercise of ground forces for very limited maneuvers and for achieving a defined and

delineated objective (location of tunnels and the destruction thereof). The operation is

considered by many to be revolutionary and an exemplar of the use of a multi-branch force.

However, most of the times, the battles in which multi-branch efforts were combined, were

based more on cooperation and less on the real exhaustion of multi-branch capabilities, where

the mission commander succeeds in exercising directly, in an optimal manner, all the multi-

branch efforts relevant to the mission.

6 For more on the two-stage process and the definition of the Air Force's priorities in the Six-Day War, see Alon Kaddish's article "Not on the Air Force Alone", Bein Ha-Ktavim (In between the Poles), Issue No. 12-11, IDF, Dado Center, June 2017. 7 Operation Kadesh can also be regarded as a pro-active operation not in the face of a "sense of existential threat", even though the background to the operation and the reasons for the IDF maneuver were based on logic that can still be attributed to the feeling of "no choice" of the War of Independence. 8 Operation "Days of Penitence" in the northern Gaza Strip was considered a breakthrough in the manner in which the ground and air forces were deployed, while a war room was operated jointly with the Air Force under the command of Brigadier General (later on General) Amir Eshel of the Air Force and Brigadier General Shmuel Zakai, commander of the division. All this, despite the fact that the IDF began to practice integrated firing from the division level and upward since the late 1990s, as part of the firing approach led by Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak.


Figure 2: A large-scale naval-air maneuver in cooperation with the US Navy and Air Force. The

vast majority of battles in which the IDF combined multi-branch efforts were based more on

cooperation and less on the true exploiting of multi-branch capabilities. (Source: Wikipedia).9

The New Context of Ground Maneuvering

Even before entering into a discussion on the concept of integration and the technology that

enables taking the next step, it is appropriate to discuss the role of ground maneuvers and the

ground dimension in future warfare.

For many years, the ground maneuvering was the main, if not the only, means to achieve the

war's objectives. Thousands of years of history have shown that maneuvering is almost the

only way to defeat the enemy. Maneuvering was ultimately intended to kill the enemy fighters,

and destroy their infrastructures or their rulers by "bringing the sword to the neck". In addition,

the purpose of the maneuvering was to take over physical ground assets as an expression of the

needs of the warring states or organizations.

One of the main reasons in general, and in the Israeli case in particular, for maneuvering, in the

past, was derived from the ability of the enemy who was striving to carry out physical

maneuvers; this, in the absence of the ability to attack other dimensions due to the weakness of

the air force at its disposal. Therefore, counter-maneuvering and the transfer of the fighting to

enemy territory significantly neutralized the enemy's ability to act effectively against us. This

has changed with the introduction of firepower with a variety of ranges at high rates and

increasing accuracy, without the need for achieving aerial superiority.

Moreover, in the current period and probably in the future, most countries, including Israel, do

not see a clear need to occupy territory and hold it as an asset over time. The apparent need is

to occupy and seize ground assets in order to significantly neutralize threats and destroy, to the

9 https://tinyurl.com/y6wpsnfz

https://tinyurl.com/y6wpsnfz


extent possible, the other side's forces and its combat capabilities. The occupied land often

becomes a burden, and the fear of "sinking in quicksand" becomes a significant consideration

in deciding on the employment of maneuvering forces.

At the same time, there is a growing demand for reducing casualties among the combat forces

and it is becoming a much more significant requirement than in the past. The desire to

maneuver is perceived only as a last resort, and even then, we are required to attain a targeted

achievement (neutralizing high trajectory fire or destruction of tunnels) and we are no longer

satisfied with tasks of occupying a certain area solely for the purpose of occupying a ground

asset for its own sake.

At the same time, the enemy is also changing its nature. More and more the IDF finds itself

fighting an enemy operating in an unorganized manner – an unseen enemy that determines the

time, place and duration of its exposure and that is equipped with lethal attack capabilities

threatening the maneuvering forces. The increasing fear of losses, coupled with the increasing

difficulty in achieving the purpose of the maneuvering, brings decision-makers to prefer

conducting wars from the air ("remote wars") and maneuver only as a last resort, and this too in

order to cope with enemy capabilities that could not be destroyed from the air.

Added to all these requirements of focusing the purpose of the maneuver and clarifying it, the

required achievement and the possible cost, is a requirement of exercising proportional force

and minimizing the environmental harm to uninvolved parties amongst the enemy. This

requirement, which is not only a matter of perception or a legal problem, determines to a great

extent the manner in which the force operates from the tactical level to the strategic level, and

often affects the possible achievement at the state level, as illustrated by the events in Kafr

Kanna, both in "Operation Accountability" (Mivtza Din VeHeshbon) and in the Second

Lebanon War.

Therefore, the privilege that those managing the maneuver had for thousands of years – from

ancient times to the Yom Kippur War, of maneuvering at any cost, attaining a ground-based

accomplishment as an almost singular expression of achieving total victory and maneuvering

as the dominant and perhaps the only decisive means of achieving a resolution and political

objectives no longer exists, except in war games and exercises without strategic context.

Interim Summary and Directions for the Future

In light of all the above, and in view of the needs of the battlefield, both in Israel and abroad,

one can discern that the operational demand today, when employing military force in general

and a maneuvering force in particular, is to improve the effectiveness of military force in view

of the task, and not necessarily in view of any one physical dimension.

If, in the past, occupation of territory was the primary objective, while the destruction of the

enemy or its capabilities was a secondary objective10, in the present and future wars the goal is

to destroy the enemy or its capabilities. The ground medium is no longer an end in itself but a

platform for the enemy, which if it can be destroyed or silenced without occupation – all the

10 The urban area as an example of reference expresses the change very well. In the past, the approach was flanking and bypassing the urban area. Today, however, it is clear to all that there is no alternative but to enter the cities in order to physically harm the enemy's capabilities. See also Major General Kobi Barak's article, "Combat in Cities an Old-New Challenge", Ma'arachot, Issue No. 477, April 2018 (issue dedicated to the IDF 2048).


better. But it seems that this is not the case. In order to attain the operational achievement,

whether remotely or from within the territory itself, and with the understanding that the object

of the operation is the enemy's capabilities and not the ground, the vertical (aerial) medium that

enables locating and attacking remotely, and the horizontal (ground) medium which is critical

in order to expose and damage the enemy's hidden capabilities and forces, must be integrated

from the tactical level to the strategic level as a unified medium. It should be emphasized that

the concept of attacking targets cannot only pertain to firepower, and it should be reexamined

in a broader sense: everyone attacks targets – both the maneuvering forces and the entire range

of fire systems. Therefore, there is a requirement for precise striking of a range of targets (from

mortar and a single person to tank and house clusters), for proportionate damage in a complex

medium (urban/ wooded/ dense with uninvolved parties), while emphasizing the importance of

the time dimension (from the detection to the attack) and maximizing the attack outputs. In

other words, there is a clear operational demand for the industrialization of a multi-

dimensional assault process with time rates, precise quantities of ammunition and proportional

striking at all levels – from the soldier level to the General Staff level, with all capabilities

available at all levels.

In order to meet this requirement, integration of dimensions is required. The integration will

enable the improvement of the attack's effectiveness, especially that of the maneuvering

forces, while providing close assistance to a variety of forces in all terrains. It should be noted

that the emphasis on integration is naturally focused on the most complex challenge which is

the full integration of all capabilities from the air, the sea and the digital space with the ground

forces11.

In light of this, the main points of the requirement can be defined in the following manner: the

ability to gather and process intelligence for the purpose of attacking targets (direct and remote

attacks), of a range of targets at high speeds, in complex areas and with close assistance to a

variety of forces, maximizing and optimizing all the gathering and attack elements in all

dimensions (in the air, on the ground, at sea and in the digital space). All this, in a complex

combat space and independent of GPS. These capabilities, were ultimately intended to

facilitate the reduction of friction, given the need to maneuver and occupy territory.

Looking to the Future – Where to Focus

Ground warfare in the future is required to deviate from its one-dimensional nature. Looking at

the future should not be through the prism of the assets and authority of "what is on the

ground". The attempt to give a "ground" title to future capabilities is somewhat archaic. The

future holds many opportunities for real integration and the blurring of the debate over the

limits of responsibility and authority between the branches, between the corps and between the

dimensions of action.

In a long-term perspective, the various dimensions we have dealt with over the years as being

distinct and separate on the battlefield: the ground dimension, the aerial dimension, the digital

dimension, etc. – are not the correct distinctions for the future. Moreover, the traditional

11 The challenge was, and will be, the fusion of capabilities into the ground dimension, for this is the only place where fusion and integration really are needed. The other dimensions can also operate independently in accordance with their tasks.


organization around corps and branches, designed to regulate the processes of the building and

operation of the force, is in some ways a significant barrier to fusion and the exhaustion of

capabilities. The technology and possibilities available today make these distinctions irrelevant

in many ways.

The automation and mechanization revolution creates many opportunities that will enable

expressing almost anywhere and anytime the multi-branch capability while maximizing and

fusing the relevant capabilities from all dimensions to all levels of combat – from the soldier

level to the General Staff level. In many ways, the revolution that has taken place over the past

few years at the command level and above, will seep down to the individual soldier level.

The apparent ability (which is already found and is applied in existing developments) to

connect all the capabilities on the battlefield to any relevant consumer, requires adapting

combat doctrines and the principles of command and control, while disengaging from past

conventions and redefining the authority and responsibility to operate measures in various

dimensions, as well as man's place in the process12.

Therefore, it is recommended to try to make the distinction not in the contexts of physical

dimensions, but in the context of task differentiators derived from the nature of the task. In

other words, the entire operating force in the battlefield must have a multi-dimensional ability

to operate and exercise all the relevant measures in all dimensions, regardless of the color of

the uniform or the branch to which it belongs. It is clear that this statement requires a different

approach, which is not only a breaking of the entire process of building a force and their

rebuilding, but rather a different view of military doctrines and the processes for the exercising

of force.

The main reason for the high and significant potential for change to the point of reforming the

way of thinking and manner of operation, and as a result the way of building the force and this

potential, lies in the technological opportunities available today. Opportunities that will enable

those who will be wise enough to take the cognitive and conceptual leap, to reach real

integration for the first time, to the extent of fusion of all dimensions (not just physical ones)

into a uniform operating space.

The Directions of Response and the Required Capabilities

Assuming that the need is agreed upon and there is a need to redefine a different type of

integration – "fusion of capabilities", and not more specific support that is limited in time and

place, as a necessary condition, we should define the derived challenges, examine the

opportunities and attempt to also examine the barriers for realization.

The derived challenges:

a. The challenge of command and control – freeing man from processes and actions in

which the "machine" has an advantage, and having him focus on defining the tasks, the

12 Eran Ortal put it well in his article, "An End to Repression – the Sixth Era of Ground Warfare", which argued that one should strive for a transition from integration to fusion and to the elimination of the commanders' dependence on the management of interfaces and interconnections between those providing support and those receiving support. Along with the integration of air forces, intelligence and ground forces (the fifth stage approach), the need for ground force is growing, that has fused within it the capabilities and advantages of the vertical dimension. See E. Ortal, Bein Ha-Ktavim (In between the Poles), Issue No. 6, IDF, Dado Center, January 2016.


constraints and conditions for exercising force at all levels, based on automation

processes and quick interfaces.

b. Distributing capabilities to all levels so that each commander can manage his own

mission.

c. The ability to support decision-making processes in a reality of information overload,

based on the ability to autonomously make an integrated decision with a person within

the circle.

d. A high-speed, robust, multi-branch broadband communications network that operates at

large ranges without the need for a fixed infrastructure.

e. High collection capacity in a variety of areas from a variety of sensors.

f. The ability to process information at high capacities and its distribution to all the

elements during operational times.

g. The ability to attack accurately from the air, from the sea and from the ground, a variety

of targets during operational times with close support, while simultaneously

distinguishing between our forces and the enemy.

h. Customized BDA capability.

The Opportunities

The fourth technological revolution, which began in the civilian world and is led by it, allows

the military world, on rare occasion it must be said, to study and observe existing concepts and

abilities, in a unique manner.

The IOT revolution, implemented in a variety of areas such as smart cities, smart homes, etc.,

enables study and implementation for military needs. The transition from a collection of

sensors for civilian use, which worked independently, to connectivity and integration in an

open architecture, enabling maximizing capabilities, is a good example of implementation and

realization on the battlefield. The ability to connect and disconnect, to extract information

quickly and to apply it to a variety of uses, is employed daily in the civilian world, and the

challenge is to learn concepts and uses and import them into the military world.

It is therefore correct to say that we are at the beginning of a revolution on the battlefield. A

revolution that will enable us to reach fusion for the first time, as a new step in integration.

This can be defined as a CTC revolution (Connecting the Capabilities) in the battlefield.

Turning the battlefield into an effective, lethal and multi-branch system, based on the

combination of all the gathering and attack capabilities to improve operational effectiveness

and precise lethality. Solutions that enable smart, flexible, fast and adaptable connection of the

collection of products and capabilities to systemic, combat-based solutions, on the network,

while synergistically exhausting a variety of sensors, processing and distribution systems and

closing circuits. This is done while exploiting existing and developing capabilities that enable

warfare in a variety of open and closed areas, in a GPS free environment.

The Areas Required for the Development of the Conceptual and Weapons Response

a. Decision-making processes and support thereof – the main challenge in complex

systems is the ability to make decisions in a complex reality of uncertainty on the one

hand, and information overload on the other. It is therefore necessary to develop every


system, that is essentially SOS (System of Systems) so that it support the commander's

or operator's decision-making system – each at its level. Such a system must handle the

information overload, the rapid processing capability required, with the ability to

prioritize and with the ability to define operating policies ("laws") that create degrees of

freedom for the "automation" processes.

b. Urban space as the common scenario13 – urban space should be regarded as the reference

point for the development of all responses. The challenge of locating targets within the

urban space, a robust ability to picture the situation of our forces and the distinction

between enemy forces and our forces (3D) is the scenario for which the response should

be formulated.

c. The digital space as a shared space – digital space should be considered a unified space,

that allows anyone connected to the mission to have access, with the ability to process

and analyze information, the ability to make it accessible during operational and

relevant times.

d. Network as a basic condition – as the entire concept is based on a rapid and multi-branch

attack network, it is necessary to ensure that the network solutions include full end-to-

end hardware solutions up to ADD-ON solutions that connect to an existing interface.

e. The concept of employing a variety of tools that operate in a decentralized and

autonomous manner – one of the building blocks required for development and

construction (internal and external) is the small platforms that will enable the work of the

flocks and the swarms. The emerging need is providing a response based on a variety of

small, unmanned platforms on the ground, through the airspace immediately above the

ground to the intermediate layers. All of these platforms should operate autonomously

with minimal human involvement in their operation. The person in the circle should

focus on processes in which he has unique added value, from defining the task, through

the defining of the required operational achievement and to defining the operating

policy. The system will recommend how best to employ the force.

f. The ability to protect the network and maintain continuity of its functioning – the

communications medium not only enables, it is also a weakness, and therefore, it must

be ensured that at any given time, the network is protected and operates continuously.

g. Fast and protected maneuverability – maneuverability is required to all areas of the

battlefield, to depth and in depth, that is quick, protected and lethal. This capability

should be based on protected, rapid and lethal movement capabilities, which are able to

express not only the dimension of physical movement, but also the ability to operate in a

targeted and efficient manner all of the aforementioned capabilities while moving and

deep in the field.

Given the development of concepts and capabilities, we will be able to employ other forces in

the future. The future multi-dimensional fighting can and should be from the level of the

battlegroup and above. Combat that is based on integrated manned and unmanned capabilities,

with each commander in accordance with his mission, whether at the frontlines or in depth,

13 It is worth emphasizing that the urban scenario is taking on an increasing volume not only in the IDF. In the US Army, which is currently updating its demands for modernization processes, the ARMY commander speaks about fighting in "Mega Cities" as a leading scenario in building the force.


whether by maneuvering or by remote action, has all of the relevant capabilities regardless of

the corps and branch affiliation.

A force that needs, for the purpose of its task, to carry out a maneuver so as to attain a certain

achievement on the ground, derived from the character of the task, will continue to be based on

a variety of movement capabilities (from walking, through an armored combat vehicle up to

entrance with a vertical or maritime flank), however the platform that will enable it will be only

one component in the overall capability. The ability of this maneuvering force to receive

during operational time all the relevant information in its area, processed and analyzed for its

task, its ability to connect all the relevant capabilities (most of which are probably not organic

and directly subordinate to it), and to employ a variety of measures (even if not necessarily

organically subordinate to it) on time and with the required force – all of these will enable

improvement for maximum efficiency at any point in time. Moreover, it is possible that in

another mission, the force operator will be wearing a uniform that is not green, but here too the

ability to employ the variety of measures and capabilities (including "classic ground") will be

natural.

It can be said that the real challenge is the conceptual-theoretical challenge – rather than the

technological challenge.

Figure 3: The US Army is also advancing an operational concept that relies on a range of diffuse,

autonomous platforms. Pictured here is an example in the electromagnetic realm. (U.S. Air

Force14)

14 https://defensesystems.com/articles/2016/01/29/strategic-command-joint-electronic-warfare.aspx


The Barriers to Realization

The barriers to realization are almost entirely in the world of our concepts and learning

abilities. Technology is not a barrier, it is a challenge. But to the best of my understanding,

most of it can be realized at a rate much faster than many people think.

Release from traditional force-building processes on the branch level, and processes directed at

the building of a branch force that only at the second stage will be interfaced with the rest of

the capabilities, are the main barrier not only in the IDF but also worldwide. The need to

examine current processes from the outset is a necessary condition for the release of the other

barriers.

Summary

A special issue of the "Ma'arachot" journal15 was recently published under the headline "IDF

2048" – how will the IDF look in its 100th year. In the collection of articles written in this issue

by the Chief of Staff and a number of major generals, the need, the potential and the direction

were identified16. However, a further leap is still needed. A leap of transition to integration as a

component assisting in the maximum fusion of and capabilities assimilated at all levels.

As stated, this process is necessary and vital and not desirable. The gospel today is that the

abilities exist and the potential is not unattainable, but different thinking is required. Assuming

that the leap is indeed carried out, it is possible that in the future we will not be required to hold

separate discussions of the capabilities required according to a cross-section of the efforts of

the branches operating with partial integration, but rather a discourse and building of a force

that enables the task commander to employ all measures and capabilities during operational

time, regardless of the color of the beret or uniform.

15 IDF, Ma'arachot, Issue No. 477, April 2018. 16 These directions have also been identified in recent years by ground major generals as part of the formulation of "land on the horizon" processes – Major Generals Guy Tzur, Kobi Barak and Aharon Haliva, in articles published in the journal Bein Ha-Ktavim (In between the Poles), Issue No. 6 (January 2016) and Issue No. 9 (December 2016), IDF Dado Center.


Bibliography

• Ortal, Eran. "An End to Repression". Bein Ha-Ktavim (In between the Poles), Issue No.

6 (IDF, Dado Center, January 2016).

• Barak, Kobi. "Combat in Cities an Old-New Challenge", Ma'arachot, Issue No. 477,

(April 2018). The issue dedicated to the IDF 2048.

• Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. "Scipio Africanus Greater than Napoleon". (Tel Aviv:

Ma'arachot Publications, 1975).

Kaddish, Alon. "Not on the Air Force Alone", Bein Ha-Ktavim (In between the Poles),

Issue No. 12-11 (IDF: Dado Center, June 2017).

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