the battle for mosul - max security · the battle for mosul eﬀort to push islamic state out of...

Mounting pressure on President Zuma

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South African opposition, voices from within ruling ANC calling to hold Zuma accountable for corruption

Military conflict along India-Pakistan border

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Recent escalation likely result of domestic tensions in Pakistan, expected to decline by end of year

Trump's victory and Ukrainian anxiety

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Trump's victory, overtures towards Russia, to raise concerns in Kiev over US support for the country

The Battle for MosulEffort to push Islamic State

out of city likely to face hurdles over coming

month

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Maduro diverts attention to humanitarian issues

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Venezuela's president seeks to shift focus from political crisis to food shortages

03AFRICACARDRCSouth AfricaWestern Sahel

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Table of Contents

Cover Photo: A member of the Iraqi security forces looks at fire from oil wells set ablaze by Islamic State militants before they fled the oil-producing region of Qayyara, Iraq, November 4, 2016 / REUTERS

07AMERICASVenezuela 07

08ASIAMyanmarIndia & PakistanPhilippinesThailand

08-0910-11

1213

14EUROPEUkraine 14

15MENAAlgeriaIraqLebanonYemen

1516-17

1819-20

militia-related violence, from sectarian clashes to criminally motivated ambushes and raids, will continue to take place across the outlying areas of the country in the coming months.

Africa

CARSecurity deteriorates amid uptick in militia-related violence

CAR is currently experiencing an uptick in militia violence in outlying areas of the country, especially in Kaga-Bandoro, and with intermittent flare-ups in Bangui, namely in the PK5 Muslim enclave. This has primarily taken the form of attacks against civilians and IDP camps as well as, less frequently, clashes with UN peacekeepers and between anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka militiamen. In this context, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) is facing increasing challenges in coping with the violence and assisting the government in imposing the rule of law across the country, especially in outlying areas.

Given that most militia involvement is financially motivated, the continuous failure of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs to offer enough incentives to reduce the appeal of the war economy, creates the conditions to perpetuate the instability. Thus, militia-related violence, from sectarian clashes to criminally motivated ambushes and raids, will continue to take place across the outlying areas of the country in the coming months. Likewise, considering the volatile conditions in the

capital, additional sectarian incidents are likely to devolve into localized violence in Bangui, as such tensions often translate into unrest in the capital, mainly in the PK5 area. In this regard, the Muslim population of Bangui is mostly located in this enclave, continuing the community’s alienation from the mainly Christian population of Bangui. This alienation could subsequently represent an additional focal point for unrest in the near future.

Meanwhile, MINUSCA is facing increasing challenges in containing militia violence across the country, particularly considering animosity from large sections of the public against the UN Mission. Notwithstanding these grievances, the main driver that hinders the imposition of rule of law is the lack of effective state security infrastructure and public institutions that could align its efforts with the peacekeeping force. Furthermore, the termination of Operation Sangaris by the French government on October 31, only adds further challenges to the abovementioned goal. Taking into account the absence of progress in bolstering the state’s security infrastructure, and given the limited capabilities of the peacekeeping force,

MINUSCA is unlikely to be in a position to successfully contain a major outbreak of sectarian violence, pointing to a continued period of volatility over the coming weeks and months. In this regard, while at this moment it is too premature to conclude that the ongoing situation could devolve into large-scale sectarian unrest, as has been the case in the past, militia-related clashes are likely to continue, primarily in the restive outlying areas near Bambari and Kaga-Bandoro, as well as more localized violence in Bangui’s PK5 Muslim enclave.

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Africa

DRCKabila gains, as AU-mediated dialogue results in postponement of elections until 2018

The issue of President Joseph Kabila’s tenure in power has been the dominant feature of the Congolese political landscape since January 2015, when over 40 protesters were killed for demonstrating against efforts to extend Kabila’s rule past constitutional term limits set to expire in December. Kabila’s political capital received a boost on October 18, when the African Union (AU)-mediated dialogue accord was signed by the ruling coalition, a minority opposition faction led by former presidential candidate Vital Kamerhe, and civil society organizations.

The agreement, rejected by the main Rally opposition coalition, provides that elections will be postponed until April 2018, until which time Kabila will remain president alongside a transitional government headed by an interim prime minister from the opposition. Rally-led anti-Kabila protests on November 5, which were forcibly dispersed outside of Tshisekedi’s residence in Kinshasa on November 5, with another protest planned for November 19. The radio signal of the widely-followed Radio France Internationale and UN-run Radio Okapi have been blocked or scrambled since November 5.

President Kabila remains deeply unpopular due to perceived corruption, lack of economic opportunities, and his unwillingness to leave power. In a credible poll released on October 26, 74.3 percent of the 7,5454 respondents nationwide said that Kabila ought to leave power by the end of 2016, more than 80 percent opposed constitutional changes to allow for a third term, and only 8 percent would vote for Kabila. In this context, we assess that so long as Kabila remains in power, additional Rally-led protests are liable to be met with forcible dispersal tactics, causing additional flare-ups of political violence and civil unrest centered in Kinshasa. However, Congolese security forces have proven effective in either largely containing the unrest thus far or pre-emptively arresting protest leaders and deploying police and military units to prevent unauthorized rallies from materializing.

MAX Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com

No real threat to Kabila’s RuleWe assess that while intermittent bouts of violent civil unrest are likely to continue well into 2017, such incidents are unlikely to seriously threaten Kabila’s grip on power. This assessment is based on the regional support for the revised electoral calendar, Kabila’s allies within the Congolese political elite, and the aforementioned fragmentation within the opposition camp. Indeed, the endorsement of the dialogue accord by the South African Development Community (SADC) and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) regional bodies has limited the leverage of other influential international actors like the US and UN, who are consequently less likely to take a more interventionist stance in backing the opposition camp. Another potential outcome of the dialogue accord is that members of the Rally opposition coalition may eventually agree to participate in the transitional government, in exchange for Kabila not running for a third term.

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Africa

South AfricaPresident Jacob Zuma’s position further challenged following State of Capture report

President Jacob Zuma is currently facing probably the most serious challenge in his tenure with the arrival of the “State of Capture” report, published on November 2, and examining corruption in the government. The investigation focused on the improper and unethical nature of relations between President Zuma and the Gupta family, their influence on political appointments, and the sanctioning of state contracts to Gupta-owned companies.

The report led to harsh criticism throughout the political arena, while President Zuma’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) party is divided in their response. There have been calls within the party for his resignation, most notably from Chief Whip, Jackson Mthembu; however most of the party, including Secretary General Gwede Mantashe continue to back President Zuma. Contrastingly, affiliates of the party, such as its veterans and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) raised concerns regarding Zuma. On November 10, a no-confidence vote motioned by main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), failed with 214 against, and 126 for the motion. The failure is not

surprising as almost two thirds of Parliament are ANC members.

In the coming weeks the opposition parties, namely DA and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who operate as the main and most vocal opposition parties are likely to put further pressure on Zuma to resign. Firstly, they will likely target others inflicted in the reports. The first victim, CEO of Eskom already resigned, and the opposition will demand others such as the ministers of Mineral Resources and Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs to do so as well. Secondly, they will likely focus on ensuring the impartiality and seriousness of the investigation against Zuma, not allowing the topic to slip from public attention. These parties are likely to stage additional protests, which will be met with counter-protests from Zuma supporters.

At the same time, pressure within the ANC is likely to mount, with more ANC members joining Mthembu in calling for punitive measures against Zuma. This is compounded by the previous, albeit brief, anti-Zuma movements within the ANC, such as in the wake of the party’s poor performance in the

municipal elections. The fact that the majority of the party voted against the no confidence vote does not mean that he has the entire party’s support, but rather that they would rather deal with such issues internally. The ANC is likely to start taking measures to save face, with steps such as forced resignations of those suspected for corruption, or at least some reforms that will prove to the public that the ANC is taking action.


ANC’s futureThe broader implications of the State of Capture report will be seen as the ANC national conference in December 2017 elections draw nearer. There will be growing pressure from within the ANC to depose Zuma, as the ANC win is no longer certain. Even prior to the release of the report there was a sense of weakening of the ANC position in the eyes of the public as witnessed in the municipal elections where ANC lost control in Nelson Mandela Bay, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. We assess that the tense intra-party atmosphere will lead to prominent ANC members leaving the party if Zuma and other less popular party members remain in control.

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Africa

Western SahelUptick in militancy anticipated following establishment of Islamic State affiliate

Militancy remains a staple element of the western Sahel’s regional spectrum of insecurity, with various attacks, including IED and mortar fire, carried out against local and international security forces on a near-daily basis over recent months. That said, increased instability has been witnessed in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border area, which forms Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’s (ISGS) core area of operations. The group claimed three attacks over the course of October, and on October 30, was officially recognized by the Islamic State.

This development presents at least two potential vectors of insecurity. Firstly, it will likely bolster ISGS’s status in the region, allowing them to draw upon a larger pool of recruits, potentially including West African members of IS returning from Libya. At the same time, we anticipate that the group will carry out further attacks over the coming months along Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s porous border regions. Furthermore, whilst the group’s current capabilities appear limited, we assess that they may seek to execute more high-profile attacks than those it has been conducting thus far, as it attempts to cement its

position within the west African jihadist landscape. Through its new affiliation, ISGS will now be able to claim attacks through official IS media, rather than a Mauritanian news source as has previously been the case, increasing their exposure and status. Secondly, ISGS’s presence may lead to the multitude of groups loyal to al Qaeda, which represent the vast majority of jihadist actors in the region, to reaffirm their dominant position through an increase in attacks of their own. Taken together, these dynamics carry the potential to fuel an overall increase in militancy in the western Sahel.

Meanwhile, the response by security forces to the militant threat has been somewhat muted and indeed is inherently limited by the deep entrenchment of jihadist elements within the very fabric of local communities. With an accompanying absence of government efforts to establish effective state institutions in the region, militant organizations have been granted the space to develop the knowledge and resources required to undertake increasingly bold and complex operations, with three such attacks witnessed in recent months. These include a complex attack on a UN

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) base in Aguelhok on October 3, an unclaimed assault on security forces guarding a refugee hosting area in Tazalit, Niger which left 22 soldiers dead on October 6, and a multifaceted raid by the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) on the town of Banamba, located just 125 km from Bamako. In the latter incident, three coordinated teams attacked the local prison, police station, and bank. Whilst we do not assess that this necessarily translates into an increased threat to Bamako, Niamey, or other large urban locales, it nevertheless points to an ongoing trend of intermittent, audacious, large-scale attacks targeting security forces or locales over the coming months.


BURKINA FASO

NIGER

ISLAMIST MILITANT ATTACKS IN BURKINA FASO AND NIGER

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Americas

VenezuelaPlausible short term humanitarian solutions, as political crisis continues

Amid an ongoing economic and political crisis, where food scarcity continues to be the main problem affecting the Venezuelan population, the second round of negotiations between the government and part of the opposition coalition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) took place on November 11-12. During the encounter, sponsored by The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and The Vatican, the parties agreed on the admittance of food and medical supplies into the country, among other minor political agreements. While the outcomes of the negotiations might have a positive impact in alleviating certain hardships for the Venezuelan people in the short term, these are unlikely to translate into significant changes that would bring about an end to the ongoing political crisis in the country.

Since the proposition of a dialogue table with the government, there have been division within MUD regarding their participation in the talks, mostly given their suspicions over a real willingness from the government to reach a satisfactory agreement. With this in mind, considering the continuous refusal of the government to release high

profile political prisoners and an equal unwillingness to renew the electoral process, the dialogue process is likely to collapse beyond these round of talks. The government is likely to divert the discussion, keeping the focus on humanitarian considerations rather than political solutions. In this way, the government can better avoid being exposed to a position where they would eventually need to appease their position, hence looking weak vis-vis their base supporters and general electorate.

Regarding the implementation of the points agreed to on November 12, and considering the important influence of the Vatican in the matter, the humanitarian accords announced in the dialogue are attainable. This includes the distribution of medicines and the possible establishment of an humanitarian corridor to mitigate the food crisis, however it is unlikely to translate in the necessary changes to end the the political and economic crisis in Venezuela. In a country where the executive branch has been repeatedly accused of controlling the judicial branch, the decision of the Constitutional Court to deny the opposition's appeal to renew

The government is likely to divert the discussion, keeping the focus on humanitarian considerations rather than political solutions.


the referendum process, supports the abovementioned argument.

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MyanmarParadigm shifts in ongoing conflicts likely to compel smaller ethnic groups to disarm

Progress on the country’s decades long ethnic conflicts remains an uncertainty as dozens of active armed groups continue to fight over a myriad of competing interests. This has much to do with a consistent and dwarfing Chinese influence brought on by half a century of exclusive rights to several major industries as well as Beijing’s seemingly indiscriminate sponsorship of ethnic armed groups operating on the countries’ shared border. China’s patronage of these groups allows them to maintain leverage in negotiating economic and diplomatic bargains at the expense of Naypyidaw. However, with the reduction of US sanctions in September 2016, a dramatic shift in power balance will likely serve to simplify and consolidate ethnic conflicts in the country by marginalizing these smaller rebel groups on the Chinese border. This will ultimately bring Myanmar closer to solving the conflicts but an all inclusive ceasefire agreement before the next scheduled peace conference in February 2017 remains unlikely.

Unencumbered by sanctions, the military will now be able to exercise newfound political leeway in widening conflicts against non-signatories of the

National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) under the pretext of pressuring the groups to enter into negotiations. In particular, conflicts against the Shan State Army- North (SSA-N), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army (AA) and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in Shan State will see a dramatic rise in conflict in the months ahead of the February conference. Post sanction military operations against a TNLA and AA now less supported by the international community will likely be effective in severing their operational abilities. Increasing Western investment in the country will prevent China from maintaining influence over the ethnic armies it props up, so while Beijing supports the AA and TNLA in the status quo, as the groups are increasingly cut off by the military, their diplomatic value to Beijing will also decline.

In successfully isolating these groups, the military will likely be able to compel them to lay down their arms after several more months of fighting. Disarmament has long been considered a non starter for the MNDAA, AA, and TNLA but Naypyidaw has been steadfast in demanding it as a prerequisite for peace talks. The United Nationalities Federal

Council (UNFC), the largest umbrella organization representing active combat groups including the TNLA and MNDAA as well as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and SSA-N, has long taken the position that they will only sign an agreement if all groups were included in the process. In this context, a capitulation by the TNLA, MNDAA, and AA in the form of disarming would usher in NCA’s immediate and dramatic acceptance by the UNFC.

While the conflict between ethnic armed groups and the government will de-escalate as the peace process advances, conflicts between ethnic groups will likely intensify as negotiations over intrastate borders begin. For example, while once allies, the TNLA and Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), a signatory of the NCA, have begun a dispute over territory along the northern section of the Mandalay-Muse road, likely due to increasing concerns that borders between the groups will soon be calcified. As time goes on, signatories of the NCA will increasingly come into conflict with neighboring non-signatories, in the hopes that the alignment will result in favorable gains in any final agreements.

Asia


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Asia


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India & PakistanConflict likely to gradually de-escalate, bilateral commitment to CFA to follow by end of year

Tensions between India and Pakistan remain considerably heightened due to the recent escalation of armed conflict along the Line of Control (LoC) in the disputed Kashmir region. According to Indian claims on November 9, at least 13 soldiers and 12 civilians in Indian territory have been killed as a result of heavy mortar shelling across the LoC, while Islamabad claims the death toll of Pakistan civilians in the conflict stands at 26 and seven soldiers, at the time of writing. Additionally, reports from November 8 indicate that the Indian government accused the Pakistan military of violating the 2003 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) 182 times this year, while Pakistan claims it counterparts violated the CFA on 222 occasions.

It appears that the scale-up of violence is likely reflective of recent internal conflict between the political and military establishment in Pakistan, in light of reports on October 6 that the Pakistan Muslim League -Nawaz (PML-N) government expressed criticism over the army’s alleged inaction over militancy in the border regions. However, consistent with reports of closed-door meetings indicating a reconciliation between the two factions on

October 27, the reported expansion in the range of artillery fire from Pakistan is likely due to a government-military effort to project a united front to its citizens in the ongoing armed conflict with India. As a result, in the short term, cross-border firing is liable to continue at current levels of intensity, while a further increase in the range of mortar fire and casualties cannot be ruled out.

That said, in the long term, the current trajectory of military escalation is unlikely to serve beyond its intended purpose to seemingly gain domestic capital from the ongoing conflict. Given that the term of the current Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif expires by the end of November, the potential appointment of an ostensibly more amenable candidate such as Lt. General Javed Iqbal Ramday will likely mitigate the risk of further internal tensions, due to his perceived close ties to both the PML-N government and his military peers.

Meanwhile, the reported decline in militancy-linked casualties in Kashmir since September may potentially propel the Indian government to pursue diplomatic back channels to ensure a temporary

cessation of cross-border firing. The decrease in militancy, typically during the peak of winter towards the end of the year, has likely been due to the heavy snow in the disputed region’s mountains, which renders routes inoperable. Additionally, the inclement weather has typically resulted in an annual rollback of troop operations on both sides during the winter, as evidenced by the renewed commitment by both sides to CFA in September 2015. Based on this trend, and contingent on the anticipated domestic developments in Pakistan, we assess that a gradual de-escalation of the conflict may likely set in by the turn of the calendar year.

Asia


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Asia


Security Force Personnel

Death toll reported due to militancy in Kashmir in 2016

Civilian Militant

25

20

30

15

10

5

0Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

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PhilippinesElection of Trump leads to fresh opportunities, new risks amid rocky US-Philippine relations

The Philippines’ relationship with the US has, over the past six months, been largely dictated by the sentiments of President Rodrigo Duterte towards President Barack Obama. In that regard, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States on November 8 has the potential to fundamentally change the dynamic between the two nations. While it is likely that president Duterte has personally favored China for a number of years, the opposition of the Obama administration to his anti-drug campaign was a catalyst to the movement away from the US towards China and Russia. Furthermore, the favoring of China is likely mostly pragmatic, given China’s policies on human rights, which president Duterte has indicated a personal admiration for. Keeping in mind the existing bilateral investments the US and Philippines enjoy, in various sectors, the possibility of maintaining relations with the US would be the least politically sensitive course of action for president Duterte, especially considering the opposition the Philippine legislature will have to a total separation. With that in mind, the possibility of a reversal or deceleration of president Duterte’s anti-US rhetoric remains, but will

depend on the future policies of President-elect Donald Trump. It further remains notable that President Duterte has briefly expressed positive attitudes towards Trump. President-elect Trump has been vague on his intended policies regarding the Philippines, making few concrete statements on his attitude towards the country, as well as how he intends to move forward, with president Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. Given his focus on domestic issues and inward facing foreign policy, it is unlikely that the Trump White House will take as much of an interest in the policies of president Duterte in comparison to its Democratic predecessor. Moreover, Trump has not shown the same concerns over human rights that were prevalent during previous administrations, which will likely be viewed as a positive sign by President Duterte, who is strongly against any perceived US interference in Philippine affairs. With that in mind, Trump’s preference towards isolationism will be well received by President Duterte. In addition, the President-elect’s comments on the possibility of scaling back US military presence abroad may indicate another issue upon which the two populist leaders agree. That said, given that both

presidents Trump and Duterte are populist and charismatic leaders who are known to make controversial and often offensive comments, there is a distinct possibility that a clash of characters could lead to increasing animosity between the executives of both governments. However, in the same vein, both have also been accused of using heavy but empty rhetoric in the past, so in the event of an inflammation of tensions between the two presidents, we assess that the actual changes of bilateral policy may be minimal. Finally, despite the recent changes in the US and potential new opportunities that it offers Philippine-US relations, President Duterte is likely to continue in his attempts to warm relations with Beijing, especially as Washington’s role in the Asia-Pacific region becomes unclear. Particularly, this may see a growth in Chinese investments in the Philippines, arms trading, and the possibility of a deal being reached over the disputed South China Sea islands over the coming months.

Asia


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ThailandJunta maintaining control over national discourse in wake of king’s death

On October 13, 2016, King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand was pronounced dead. The King was the center of a decades-long cult of personality, and as an extremely popular and unifying force in the country, many observers were worried about the possibility of coming instability following his demise. The junta government under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha has been quick to

quash any concerns, and in the process has elevated its position and further consolidated control over the country. While some see Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn’s recent return to Thailand from Germany as a changing point, his coming assumption of royal duties is most likely related to the junta’s recent amendments to the constitution that require the consent of the king in order to be enacted.

The government has also been using this period to further limit potential opposition, mostly taking the form of elaborate checks on free speech a number of laws. Les Majeste, which criminalizes criticism of the royal family, has been the most prominent, enthusiastically enforced by both police and the general public in the wake of Adulyadej’s death. Multiple reports of arrests and mob justice for perceived slights against the late king have been occurring in Thailand with some regularity.

Developments since August suggest that checks on free speech will continue, largely at the expense of foreign entities. On September 28, a foreign NGO’s press conference about a new report on widespread torture being employed by

Asia


Business opportunities under the junta ruleStability normally begets foreign interest, and the junta’s strong position over Thai politics will continue to bolster investor confidence. The government’s resilience in the face of scandals over labor regulation means that Thailand is still a source of cheap and lightly regulated labor. Moreover, as the junta further cements its position, the time may be right to realize new potential markets in Thailand. For instance, gambling and casinos are historically controversial topics, but have seen a resurgence in discussion following the king’s death.

security forces was cancelled following threats over alleged visa violations. On October 5, a pro-democracy figure from Hong Kong was denied entry into Thailand, and it was reported on November 7 that a leading British labor rights activist had left the country in the face of lawsuits following his accusations of abuse against a large Thai company. What this suggests, more than anything, is a lack of security that foreigners who are perceived to be critical of the regime may experience as a result of wide-ranging speech laws and the potential for mob justice. Going forward, foreigners with negative or contrary opinions about the government or monarchy in Thailand need to maintain awareness of their audience and minimize what could be construed as subversive activity.

Developments since August suggest that checks on free speech will continue, largely at the expense of foreign entities.

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UkraineElection of US president-elect Trump likely to spur move by Kiev towards Europe

Even as tensions persist in Ukraine over the country’s ongoing conflict in the Donbass region with pro-Russian separatists and Russian forces, Kiev is currently entering into a new, dangerous stage of geopolitical instability. Since 2014, warfare between Ukraine and the pro-separatists in the east has killed over 10,000 people, with one soldier killed and four wounded as recently as November 9. Yet beyond this continuation of low-level fighting, Kiev has been wracked in recent weeks by the October 30 forced disclosure of politicians’ assets and income, which revealed staggering elite wealth in the economically depressed country and ravaged the public image of President Poroshenko’s government. With public approval ratings of the government hovering in the low single-digits and high-profile resignations, including by the

governor of Odessa Oblast on November 7, the government’s ability to undertake needed economic reforms while staving off Russian and pro-Russian aggression remains severely limited.

This reality will be compounded in the weeks, ahead with the election of president-elect Donald Trump. Trump, who evinced a favorable opinion of Russian President Putin during the presidential campaign and notably avoided President Poroshenko during the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2016, is perceived to be willing to bargain with Russia over sanctions and regional tensions. Such a scenario could involve an American pull-out of the 300+ soldiers it has stationed in Ukraine in a training mission, a cessation of armament exports to Kiev, or simply a wider, more intimate consultation with Moscow on the conflict. Given his lack of stated policy objectives however, Trump may conceivably pursue an opposite, hardline position against Russia, which would be in step with traditional Republican attitudes. In any event, Ukraine’s anxiety over President-elect Trump’s plans for the region and Russia, in conjunction with Kiev’s current political instability, will

prompt the country’s elite to move even more vigorously towards Europe.

There are signs that this could bear fruit; despite efforts by some traditional Russian allies, such as Italy, to weaken or remove European sanctions on Moscow, Russia has been marginalized in Europe and the United Nations due to its ongoing involvement in the Syrian Civil War. This included a pronounced critique of Moscow at the EU leaders’ summit on October 20-21, as well as Russia being denied membership on the UN Human Rights Council on October 28, the first time a permanent Security Council member lost such a race. In this environment, Kiev will seek to move towards Europe, including by finally reaching a visa deal with the bloc, in order to forestall uncertainty from Washington and Moscow. It will likely redouble efforts to fulfill conditions set by the EU, as well as actively courting President-elect Trump in order to sway his perception of the conflict. Finally, it will oversee a continuation of the ongoing, cold status quo between Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass, where the low-intensity warfare is predominant.

Since 2014, warfare between Ukraine and the pro-separatists in the east has killed over 10,000 people


Europe

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AlgeriaMilitancy threat elevated, despite effective counter-measures

While mostly avoiding the large scale militancy that severely affected some of its neighbors, Algeria is continuously facing the same underlying threat, which has been recently exacerbated despite largely effective efforts at containment at the domestic level.

Firstly, as the Islamic State (IS) is withdrawing from its lost territories in Libya, it is possible that members of the group will seek either to pass through Algeria en route to other countries, or link-up with existing operational groups in the country and remain in it for the long-run. There are already indications of this threat, as small traveling militant groups, whose features denote that they were not involved in smuggling, were recently caught crossing the border from Libya into Algeria. Furthermore, the still small and limited existing IS group that operates in northern Algeria has recently increased its activities, reaching a peak of three attacks in October. This is either the result of manpower and material reinforcement that already reached the group or more likely an attempt by the group to attract such support by broadcasting their existence and potential.

Additionally, al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remains operational throughout the country, including in areas adjacent to those in which IS operates, while maintaining strong cross-border connections into Tunisia, Mali and Niger. Both AQIM and IS are currently competing over mostly similar resource bases both globally and regionally, as was most recently manifested by a pledge of allegiance of an al-Mourabitoun splinter group to IS on October 30, as the other part of the group joined AQIM in previous months.

Thus, the ongoing competition, base of operations, motivation to conduct attacks, and (limited) operational capabilities to do so, will likely continue to drive both groups to attempt larger, more high profile and sophisticated attacks in Algeria, in order to assert supremacy over the rivaling group. That being said, Algerian security forces have been largely successful in hindering both IS and AQIM operations in the country, potentially significantly crippling both groups, and thus at least the majority of these will likely be foiled. However, as given the aforementioned factors these groups are expected to continue investing in their operations, they will likely be forced to settle for smaller-scale

operations, mostly hit-and-run attacks targeting security forces. Moreover, this may compel the groups to upgrade the sophistication of their attacks in order to avoid detection and potential casualties in their ranks, such as by using stand-off weaponry like in the March 18 attack on the Krechba gas facility, or to attempt and embed themselves in the local populace and infiltrate major cities, such as in the October 28 assassination of a police officer in the city of Constantine.

Taken as a whole, the underlying threat of militancy stemming from operations by IS and AQIM in Algeria and the related efforts to contain and remove this threat are expected to grow in significance over the coming months.

MENA


Militant Attacks in Algeria

3 Islamic State

claimed/linked attacks

1 AQIM claimed

attacks

2Unclaimed

attacks

5Foiled

imminent attacks

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MENA


In the coming month, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will likely face major obstacles in their efforts to recapture the northern city of Mosul from Islamic State (IS), thus likely leading to a prolonged operation that will last for a longer period than anticipated.

While Iraqi troops have had relative success against the Sunni jihadist militant group in their ongoing offensive, which began on October 17, namely their ability to retake villages in the city’s eastern outskirts, ISF forces have faced great resistance. Even as the Iraqi army, along with the assistance of Kurdish Peshmerga forces, have made gains towards the city and have approached Mosul from three different directions, the vast obstacles that have arisen have prevented major progress.

In general, three dilemmas have been presented to Iraqi forces during the course of this operation that have stalled progress. For one, the symbolic significance and dire importance of Mosul to IS has caused the militant group to employ defensive strategies in order to protect the city. This has involved repeated suicide bombings against approaching forces in the vicinity of the city,

but also attacks against Iraqi forces on other fronts throughout the country, including highly-sophisticated assaults at the government’s hinterland. This also includes

the brief capture of major urban areas such Anbar Province’s al-Rutba and some neighborhoods within the city of Kirkuk.

Islamic State infographic tallying attacks in Iraq

IraqMosul operation likely to face challenges, prolonging offensive for longer than anticipated

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Another obstacle is Iraqi forces’ lack of fully committed allies in the ensuing operation. While Peshmerga troops have been instrumental in retaking IS territories in areas surrounding Mosul, the Kurdish fighters have showed reluctance in actually entering Mosul itself in order to retake the city. In addition, tensions regarding territorial control in the region following the elimination of IS has left Kurdish troops less willing to fully cooperate with the Iraqi army. Also, while the Turkish government has offered its own support in aiding Iraqi troops with retaking the IS stronghold, the Baghdad-based government has been largely resistant in accepting such support. Thus, the Iraqi army has been forced into a situation where it will likely have to enter Mosul alone, and unlike previously taken cities such as Ramadi and Fallujah, such limited assistance is liable to constitute further challenges to the ISF.

Finally, while the Iraqi army has been able to make gains north, south, and east of Mosul, ISF has faced serious issues with approaching from the west. An essential part of the Iraqi army’s strategy in retaking cities from IS has been its ability to fully surround the targeted cities. This tactic has allowed them to cut off supply lines, thereby weakening militants within the city before launching a full-scale assault from multiple directions. In the case of Mosul, while Iraqi troops have been relatively

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successful in approaching from the south, and Peshmerga troops have been helpful in providing support north and east, the west is entirely IS-controlled territory.Strongholds such as Tal Afar have allowed the militant group to continue to resupply its comrades in Mosul, thus providing major difficulties for the Iraqi army in its strategy going forward.

Ultimately, while we forecast the Iraqi Army eventually recapturing Mosul from IS, the operation will likely be prolonged and face larger difficulties than anticipated. Moreover, in order to overcome such obstacles, the Iraqi government will likely need to acquire further assistance from outside sources, whether it be the Peshmerga or the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Finally, as Iraqi forces come closer to capturing Mosul, IS militants will likely retaliate with larger, more large-scale attacks, in government-held areas throughout the country, including Baghdad.

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LebanonRecent election of president likely to increase political stability

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Threat of militancy?Despite likely renewed political stability, the potential for a successful militant attack remains, although there has been a reduction in the number of such incidents over the past two years. This threat largely emanates from Sunni jihadist militant groups, like the Islamic State (IS) and Fath al-Sham front, formerly known as the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front. Highlighting this, on October 20, Lebanese security forces arrested eight Syrian nationals for planning suicide bombing attacks across Lebanon, including the targeting of cafes, restaurants, tourist destinations, as well as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrols at unspecified locations. Overall, this threat is particularly relevant with regard to IS, in light of the jihadist group’s persistent setbacks, which increases its motivation to attack in order to project resilience. Given such increased threat levels, if an attack were carried out, it would likely target tourist and government interests, as well as predominantly Shiite-populated areas.

Over the coming months, the political situation in Lebanon is liable to stabilize. This is largely due to recent notable political developments, namely the election of Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun by the Lebanese Parliament as president on October 31, following two-and-a-half years of political deadlock and absence of a president. Days later, on November 3, the newly elected president tasked Mustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri with the formation of a new government, after Hariri was elected by the Parliament as the new Prime Minister, receiving 110 votes out of 127.

The developments are particularly notable given that Lebanon’s political system has been characterized by a tense rivalry between Aoun and Hariri, mainly regarding the FPM leader’s alliance with Hezbollah, as well as his support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In

this context, it is likely that the political progress was mediated by regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, enabling the two adversaries to bridge some of their differences to form this unity government. This is further likely in light of these countries’ ministries of foreign affairs’ statements, expressing their support for Aoun’s appointment.

Overall, these concessions will likely lead to a significant quieting of civil society activity, as well as strikes by Lebanon’s unions. Such protest activity in recent months was largely attributed to the persistent refusal of lawmakers to resolve socioeconomic issues, given the lack of a president. With the election of a president and formation of a government, these issues are liable to be finally addressed and possibly resolved by the parliament, likely leading to a resulting decline in related protest movements over the coming weeks and months.

Iranian Minister of Foreign A�airs congratulates Aoun

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YemenGradual territorial advances by anti-Houthi forces likely to lead Houthis to escalate hostilities on other fronts

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Viable peace plan unlikelyIn terms of a political solution to the conflict, a viable peace plan is unlikely to be witnessed over the coming months. The issues that continue to hinder the ongoing talks include widespread opposition to the current proposed peace plan put forward by UN envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, which was ultimately rejected by anti-Houthis who perceived it as rewarding pro-Houthi forces. Moreover, while mediated temporary ceasefires may materialize over the coming months, both sides are unlikely to fully halt hostilities, further decreasing the confidence in a possible political solution. Nonetheless, additional attempts by mediators to bring such a political solution to the conflict will likely be witnessed over the coming months despite these difficulties, although they are unlikely to register any significant breakthroughs.

Over the coming months, we assess that the relative stalemate witnessed in Yemen over the past period is likely to continue. In this context, despite

the military operations the Saudi-led Coalition will continue to carry out, anti-Houthi forces are not likely to experience any major breakthroughs over the coming month, but instead, will see gradual territorial advances. In this context, the focal points of such clashes will be focused on the area in and around Sanaa Governorate’s Nihm District, in particular along the vital N5 Highway, which connects Sanaa to the anti-Houthi-controlled Marib, and thus serves as a critical supply route for anti-Houthis in a future ground assault on the pro-Houthi capital. An additional focal point east of Sanaa will likely be the Sirwah District. Clashes here are likely to be witnessed in the vicinity of Route 515, which runs from Marib to Sanaa, and would provide anti-Houthi forces with a second major supply route, in addition to the abovementioned N5 Highway. Besides Sanaa, we assess that similar gradual territorial advances remain likely to be recorded near the besieged city of Taiz, including to the south of the city near the N1 road, which connects Taiz to the anti-Houthi-controlled city of Aden. Recent advances by anti-Houthi forces in the region, including near al-Shaqab, are likely to further facilitate such additional gains.

The anticipated steady territorial advances by anti-Houthi forces are likely to place significant pressure on pro-Houthi forces. As a result, in order to alleviate the pressure on their forces near Taiz and Sanaa, pro-Houthi fighters are liable to continue escalating hostilities in other fronts, in order to force redeployments of anti-Houthi forces towards fronts considered less vital, and away from fronts perceived as critical, in particular near the abovementioned N5 and N1 roads, in Sanaa and Taiz respectively. In this context, such an escalation remains likely to be witnessed in two fronts. Firstly, we assess that over the coming months the Saudi-Yemeni border will remain highly active, as pro-Houthi forces are likely to continue launching of missiles from northern Yemen targeting Saudi border regions, as well as areas deep into Saudi territory. Secondly, pro-Houthi attacks targeting vessels, including foreign vessels allied or perceived to have sided with anti-Houthi forces, near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait may also be witnessed over the coming months, as pro-Houthi forces attempt to disrupt traffic through the straits while hindering ships from resupplying anti-Houthi forces.


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