the battle to retake the iraqi city of mosul

The Battle to Retake Mosul: Political and Economic Implications — September 2016

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Table of Contents INTRODUCTION: STATUS OF MOSUL LIBERATION ........................................................................................................... 3 MILITARY OUTLOOK ................................................................................................................................................................... 4 POLITICAL MANEUVERING ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR BAGHDAD-‐ERBIL RELATIONS ........................................................................................................... 8 ABOUT WHISPERING BELL ....................................................................................................................................................... 11


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Introduction: status of Mosul liberation

The battle to retake Mosul is likely to be the next major engagement in Iraq’s war against the Islamic State (IS). Iraqi authorities have generally stated that they expect the assault to begin by the end of 2016. Some Iraqi commanders say the battle could even begin by late October. Recent events clearly show a tightening noose around the city, as Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) seek to cut off any potential IS escape routes. As is apparent in the below map, Mosul is almost completely encircled by coalition forces, with all populated areas cut off. Only open desert routes to the west of Mosul connect the city with other IS-occupied territory.

Figure 1. Map of control of territory in Iraq as of August 25, 2016.

Source: Institute for the Study of War.

The latest major events were the retaking of Qayarra air base, 40 miles south of Mosul, in July, and the capture of the city of Qayarra itself in August. The city’s condition upon its


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capture hint at what Mosul will likely look like when it is finally captured. Shops in Qayarra city were closed, food supplies low, and people were surviving on wheat from the recent harvest. The local oil wells, at Qayarra and Najma, which had produced 30,000 barrels per day (bpd) before IS took over, were set on fire, and are not expected to be back in production until well after Mosul is captured. Three of the wells are still burning as of our latest information.

Military outlook

All evidence points to the expectation that the battle for Mosul will be hard and costly. Mosul was Iraq’s second-largest city prior to IS’ capture of it, and urban warfare is notoriously more difficult for the coalition forces than open field battles, where the ISF can benefit from easily identifiable enemy, coalition air support and superior firepower. And the IS presence in Mosul is apparently still rather heavy; coalition commander Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend estimates that there are some 3,000-4,500 fighters in the city. In Mosul, the ISF will constantly have to balance the safety of civilians, and their desire to keep the city intact, against the amount of force needed to conduct effective attacks.

Nonetheless, Iraqi and western officials seem to be more optimistic about Mosul than they have been in months. Today, ISF and coalition forces have become stronger and better coordinated, while the coalition’s persistent attacks have weakened IS significantly. Recent victories against IS in major cities in Anbar – some of them surprisingly quick – have also boosted morale among Iraqi forces, and given them important experience in urban warfare. One unnamed western diplomat in the Financial Times, was recently quoted saying that the situation has gotten much better and that, “It’s still a long way

to go, and the error range is massive … but about four months ago, we sat here and thought Mosul was going to be an unmitigated disaster.” Further, there does seem to be something of a change in attitude among the ISF themselves, which in the past often seemed to see residents of recaptured parts of the country – especially Sunni Arabs – as almost as guilty as IS. The Iraqi army generally, but especially the Shi’ite-dominated militia, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) or Hashd al-Shaabi, have been accused of atrocities in the past against Sunni Arab populations in conquered cities, like Tikrit. Kurdish peshmerga militia also have been accused of similar abuses. Sensitive to this, the attack on Mosul will be led by the more ethnically balanced and disciplined regular army, with Hashd al-Shaabi and peshmerga in less central, supporting roles. Notably, the same western diplomat quoted above said, “I’ve had it described to me by senior Iraqis as, ‘We need to ensure the people of Mosul look at how were doing this campaign and feel liberated.’” It is also notable on the map in Figure 1 above that the Iraqi Shi’a militias have been mostly present in the center of Iraq (yellow in the map), whereas the latest thrust, from Baiji, north to Qayarra air base and Qayarra city, has been led by the ISF (shown in green on the map) without a large presence of the PMUs.

Iraqi and western officials seem to

be more optimistic about the attack on

Mosul than they have been in

months.


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Finally, there are also reports of grass roots resistance in Mosul. For instance, there were reports in August that a major IS recruiter of child soldiers was apparently assassinated last month, and “Down with ISIS” graffiti is apparently appearing on walls within the city. Consequently, it appears that the stage is set for support from local Mosul inhabitants, and that the local population seems ready for the IS militants to go. Of course, Mosul will be on an entirely different scale than the ISF’s recent experiences in Ramadi or Fallujah, so it is not totally clear that the experience from Anbar can be fully replicated in Mosul. For one thing, IS has had almost two years to prepare for the fight, with fortifications, tunnels and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in place waiting for the attack. IS has reportedly dug moats around the city and filled them with oil and tires to light on fire to create smoke and make air attacks more difficult and dangerous. Depending on whether IS chooses to stand and fight or try to melt away into the population, it could require massive destruction to take them out. One estimate presented to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, of the cost of reconstruction in Mosul if maximum force is required, said that it could cost $1.5 billion a year just for the humanitarian requirements of the displaced people, who will then have to live in camps outside the city. And the displaced personnel themselves will clearly be a significant concern. Over 213,000 people have fled their homes in recent months across Iraq, with 48,000 of those coming from the Mosul area and 78,000 from surrounding areas such as Sharqat and Qayarra. The battle for Mosul itself could affect up to 1.2 million people. The UN is still planning for a worst case scenario where nearly 1 million people must flee Mosul, with a direct international appeal for $284 million in aid. Only half of that amount has been funded so far. However, tactics have evolved with the ISF’s experience in Anbar. The ISF estimate that retaking Ramadi required the destruction of more than 50% of the city, whereas Fallujah required 20% of the city to be destroyed. Qayarra, the most recent battle, apparently only required 10% of the city to be destroyed. The lower level of destruction is apparently a result of the ISF shifting to an encirclement and siege approach rather than direct attacks on IS positions. This approach not only reduces direct destruction, but also allows the ISF to avoid the IEDs that IS usually leaves behind as they retreat. The only problem is that the approach also exposes the local population to the risk of starvation. However, in the long run it reduces the chance that they will have to be shifted to camps afterward, because more local housing is left intact.

Mosul will be an entirely different

scale than Ramadi or Fallujah; it is

not totally clear the experience in

Anbar can be fully replicated


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Political maneuvering

The capture of Mosul, of course, as difficult as it will be, is only the first step. Dealing with the aftermath of the battle could prove much more difficult. As noted above, for now, it does seem that the ISF, and the coalition overall, are in the dominant leadership position, with more ethnically-focused militia like the PMUs and peshmerga less central to the operation. This is incredibly important given the sensitivities of the Mosul population, which is wary of new ethnic strife. However, the current situation is highly dependent on a delicate balancing act. While the ISF currently plans to lead the attack on Mosul, it is in a tenuous position. Kurdish peshmerga forces occupy the north and east of Mosul, and the PMUs are influential to the south. It is not clear that the militias will decide to remain outside the main action in central Mosul, although for the moment, they claim to want to remain in secondary roles for fear of inflaming tensions in the Sunni Arab-dominated population. Sunni Arab militia, as well as other minority populations may also start to participate – a chance for these forces to reassert their local authority after having lost it to IS. As a consequence, this will be a very complicated situation on the ground.

And these forces will definitely have reason to be involved with the governance of the city after the reconquest, especially because Ninewa is a much more ethnically and religiously mixed area than southern Iraq. In particular, the KRG and local Sunni and minority militia will want to influence future governance of the area. The Kurds have a substantial minority population in Mosul and the surrounding Ninewa province, and has a strong affinity for the Yazidi population of western Ninewa, who are ethnic Kurds. Christians, Turkmen, and Shi’ite minorities will want their say in Mosul as well. And it is not clear how much the PMU will want to extend Shi’ite Arab – and

indirectly Iranian – influence into the area as well. At a minimum, they will want to protect the rights of the Shi’ite minority in Mosul. As a result, although the current status quo has the Iraqi government in firm control, the situation could rapidly become fluid, as rival interests start jockeying for influence after recapture. In fact, some of those moves may have begun; there have been recent reports of Kurdish peshmerga forces moving to capture villages around Mosul in an attempt to build bargaining leverage for the period after Mosul is captured. Further, lingering distrust among all parties, especially among Sunni Arabs, is fairly likely to emerge following a successful recapture of Mosul. In fact, part of the reason for the growth of IS in Iraq in the first place was the vicious sectarianism of former Shi'ite Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Some Sunnis, who felt persecuted under Maliki’s rule, welcomed IS as liberators when they routed the Iraqi army in 2014. These bitter memories are not gone, and could reemerge once the euphoria of Mosul’s liberation fades. Local Sunni Arabs, as well as other populations, are likely to be on the look out for signs that the bad old days of Shi’ite domination from Baghdad are back.

Ninewa is a much more ethnically and

religiously mixed area than southern Iraq – all of these

groups will have to be involved in governance


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The other major issue is the overall political context within Iraq. The government in Baghdad is anything but united, with Prime Minister Abadi barely able to make progress on appointing a new technocratic parliament since the beginning of the year. He was finally able to appoint five out of the six new Ministers he put forward in August – before ending up losing his Minister of Defense, Khalid al-Obeidi, the following week to a vote no confidence. Obviously, this could have a direct effect on the war against IS at this critical juncture before the assault on Mosul, and comes after another setback when his Minister of Interior resigned at the beginning of July following a huge bombing in Baghdad. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seems to be a villain in all of this as well, having exploited a split among the Sunni blocs in the Council of Representatives (CoR) to oust Obeidi. Obeidi’s Mutahidun Party is a Sunni rival to the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), to which the Speaker of the House, Salim al-Jubouri, belongs. Obeidi accused Jubouri, among others, of corruption when he was questioned about corruption in the military. This exposed a rift among Sunnis, which Maliki was able to exploit to get enough Sunnis to vote against Obeidi. Notably, Osama al-Nujaifi, former Speaker of the House, and Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Ninewa Province, of which Mosul is the capital, are prominent leaders in Mutahidun – and presumably hope to have a leading role in Ninewa after its liberation. Further, the vote set a dangerous precedent, with Obeidi ousted by a simple majority of 142 to 102, with 263 abstaining. This simple majority, of only those who voted, is a much lower bar, which would have required 165 votes to dismiss Obeidi. The issue now is that other Ministers become vulnerable, including Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari, who seems to be next in Maliki’s sites. The issue here is that there is also an internal split among Kurds in parliament, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran parties having just come together to counter the dominant Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This gives Maliki an opportunity to do the same against the Kurds that he did to the Sunnis, getting half of them to vote against Zebari, who is a member of the KDP. Further, the KDP is leading the peshmerga effort against Mosul, with PUK peshmerga more prominent in Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk, further west (see map in Figure 1 above). The issue with Mosul is that not all of this maneuvering comes at a time that the two major minorities in Iraq – the Kurds and the Sunnis – could end up jockeying for influence in Mosul, and potentially portends Maliki making a play to regain influence in Baghdad at Abadi’s expense. Thus, the future of Mosul, with all of its ethnic diversity, could end up being complicated not only by military jockeying on the ground, but also by conspiracies among different ethnic groups in Baghdad. The maneuvering could not only paralyze the attempts to re-integrate Mosul, with both the Ministry of Defense and Interior without their official leaders, but also could end up changing the balance of power among and within the various ethnic and religious groups that will compete in Mosul.

Maliki exploited a split among the

Sunni blocs in the Council of

Representatives (CoR) to oust

Obeidi


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Implications for Baghdad-Erbil relations

What results from these various movements is a very complex situation, to say the least. The situation on the ground in Mosul and the political situations in Baghdad and Erbil could create substantial feedback loops among them. As a result, all of the three situations will need to be monitored to understand how the Baghdad-Erbil relationship will play out. We would look to the following indicators among the three areas and how they might influence Baghdad-Erbil:

o Military and political power on the ground in Mosul and outlying areas.

• The Kurds seem to generally agree to a support role in the assault on Mosul, but there is still evidence that they intend to press for leverage. So we would watch how they move to see if they gain strength or leverage out of their troops’ positioning around Mosul. Importantly, as a sub-group, we would watch Yazidi, Christian, and other minorities in Ninewa, especially in the plains between Erbil and Mosul and between Duhok and Sinjar, as these minorities play a delicate balancing act between the more dominant Sunni Arabs in Ninewa and the Kurds. They may end up trying to use the Kurds to help secure themselves against the Sunni majority – and the Kurds will likely try to use them to secure more influence and legitimacy in Ninewa province.

• The ISF are leading the way into Mosul, and the stronger they are, the better and more comfortable it will be for the Sunni Arabs in Mosul. The ISF are also more likely to be a predictable ally for the coalition and to impose a more consistent rule of law in Mosul. If the ISF start to lose influence, that may not be good for the stability of Mosul after it is recaptured.

• The PMUs are generally far in the background and the least influential, at least on the surface, in the plans to take Mosul. It is in Abadi’s interest, and in the interest of Sunnis in Mosul, that they stay that way. If they start to try to push into Mosul and gain influence, it could create problems in the city.

• Expect the two Nujaifi brothers to push for power and influence in Mosul and Ninewa once Mosul is reclaimed. They will try to claim legitimacy as one of the previous leading families within Ninewa (as well as Anbar). However, it remains to be seen how well the Sunni population will support them, as some may see them as not having done much to help them when Anbar and Ninewa were occupied by IS. There will also be a synergistic relationship between the local support they are able to gain and their power and support they are able to gain in Baghdad. If they are able to gain support in Baghdad, it will help them bring aid to Ninewa, and gain support there, and vice versa.

The Kurds seem to generally agree to a support role in

Mosul, but there is still evidence that

they intend to press for leverage


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o Baghdad politics.

• The first influence of Mosul on Baghdad is that it could help spur the splits in political blocs in Baghdad. As Mutahidun and the IIP, and to a lesser extent, the PUK and KDP, fight over influence in Mosul, this will influence politics in Baghdad. This fight will determine who is driving the relationship that Ninewa and the Kurdistan Region have with the federal government, and how much money and other support flows between the federal budget and those regions. In the case of Ninewa, it is aid money for reconstruction; in the case of Erbil it is the Kurdistan Region’s budgetary allocation and the all-important division of oil revenues. The fate of Mosul could influence both questions.

• The other piece is how Mosul politics could affect the balance of power between the current Prime Minister, Abadi, and his rival, Maliki, who appears to be attempting a comeback at Abadi’s expense. If Maliki can exploit the divisions among the Kurds to get Finance Minister Zebari dismissed, the same way he used the Sunni divisions to get Defense Minister Obeidi dismissed, he will start to gain traction as a power broker in Parliament, at Abadi’s expense. However, the Kurds may see Maliki’s plan and try to block it by remaining united at the national level, even as they continue to compete within Kurdistan.

• Lastly, the appearance of a success or failure in the battle of Mosul could weaken or strengthen Prime Minister Abadi. Maliki would likely benefit if Abadi is weakened, as he tries to make his comeback. The loss of the Defense Minister helps Maliki’s cause; however, it does appear that the ISF have gained valuable experience and has other strong leadership that can step into Obeidi’s shoes.

o Erbil politics.

• The politics in Erbil are likely to influence and be influenced by the battle for Mosul. Mainly, the Mosul battle would seem to increase the influence of the KDP, as their peshmerga are at the forefront of that battle, and presumably any influence over local minority Yazidi, Christian, and other populations would be a benefit to the KDP. To the extent that the PUK peshmerga can participate, they may gain some influence, but geographically, the KDP has a greater advantage. If this helps the KDP influence these minority parties in Baghdad, it could help the KDP maintain its influence there – and counteract the PUK and Gorran there. And of course, the continued strength of the KDP with these minority groups, and to the extent that the KDP can position themselves as a strong advocate for them, the more leverage the KDP can have in both Kurdistan and national politics.

Mosul could help drive splits in the political blocs in

parliament in Baghdad


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• And extremely important for Erbil is the strength of Maliki in Baghdad. Maliki has

historically been a fierce opponent of Kurdish moves towards autonomy, especially over oil. As a result, the Kurds should be fiercely opposed to any return of Maliki’s influence. This works both ways. The Kurds have every interest in presenting a united front against Maliki in Baghdad (for instance, in keeping Zebari as Finance Minister). And conversely, if Maliki gains more influence in Baghdad, it could be bad for Erbil-Baghdad relations, as one would expect a return to the historically contentious and argumentative relationship between the two.


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the battle to retake the iraqi city of mosul

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