thayer vietnam's relations with china, north korea and the united states
TRANSCRIPT
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Vietnams Relations with China,
North Korea and the United StatesCarlyle A. Thayer
Presentation to the Conference on Authoritarianism in East
Asia, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong, June 29July 1, 2010
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VIETNAMSRELATIONSWITHCHINAANDNORTHKOREA:THENEXTFIVEYEARSCarlyleA.Thayer
ThisreportpresentsaforwardlookinganalysisoflikelyVietnameseforeignpolicy
initiativestowardsChinaandNorthKoreaoverthenextfiveyears.Itexplorestwomajor
questions.WhatisHanoiseekingtogainfromdiplomatic,militaryandeconomic
exchangeswithBeijingandPyongyang?WhatsortofinfluencedoesChinaandNorth
KoreaassertoverVietnam?
BackgroundIn January 1950, both the Peoples Republic of China and the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea extended diplomatic recognition toVietnams fledgling communist
regime, theDemocraticRepublicofVietnam (later renamed the SocialistRepublicof
Vietnam).ChinasupportedtheVietnamesecommunistsintheirsuccessfulresistanceto
French colonialism.Relationsweredescribed as closeas lipsand teeth.BothChina
andNorthKoreaprovidedmaterialandpersonnelsupporttoNorthVietnamduringthe
VietnamWar(196573).
HanoisrelationswithBeijing,andtoalesserextentPyongyang,deterioratedduringthe
Cambodian conflict (197991).When Vietnam invaded Cambodia China retaliated by
attacking Vietnam and providingmilitary support to the Khmer Rouge. North Korea
providedasanctuarytoCambodiasPrinceNorodomSihanouk.
Vietnam and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1991 after an international
conferenceinParisreachedacomprehensivepoliticalsettlementinCambodia.InMarch
1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the
CommunistPartyofVietnam (CPV)adopteda fourteencharacterguideline calling for
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2
longterm, stable, futureorientated, goodneighborly and allround cooperative
relations. The following year at a summit meeting of state presidents, China and
VietnamcodifiedbilateralrelationsinaJointStatementforComprehensiveCooperation
intheNewCentury.Thisdocumentservedasaframeworkforlongtermstatetostate
relations.
In 2006, Vietnam and China agreed to coordinate all aspects of their bilateral
relationshipthroughaJointSteeringCommitteeonBilateralCooperationwhichmeton
anannualbasisatdeputyprimeministerlevel.InJune2008,followinganothersummit
ofpartyleadersinBeijing,bilateralrelationswereraisedtothatofstrategicpartners,
andayearlaterthiswasupgradedtoastrategiccooperativepartnership.Atthethird
meetingoftheJointSteeringCommitteeinMarch2009,VietnamandChinasetupahot
linetodealwithurgentissues(particularlyclashesintheSouthChinaSea).
In sum, SinoVietnamese relationshavebeen structured through the frameworkof a
longtermcooperationagreement,aJointSteeringCommitteeonBilateralCooperation,
and regular highlevel summit meetings between party and state leaders. This has
resulted in a dense network of agreements between party, state,military andmass
organizations at all levels. In2009,Vietnam andChina exchanged 267delegationsof
which108wereatdeputyministerlevelorhigher.
VietnamsrelationswithNorthKoreapalebycomparison.In1958,HoChiMinhandKim
IlSungpaid reciprocalvisitsmarking thehighpoint inbilateral relations. In1989, the
two countries set up an Intergovernmental Committee on Economic, Scientific and
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TechnologicalCooperation.Itmetannuallyforthefirstthreeyearsandthenwentinto
hibernationforadecadeasNorthKoreareactednegativelytothewarmingofVietnams
relationswithSouthKoreaand theestablishmentofdiplomatic relations in1992.No
highlevel delegations between Vietnam and North Koreawere exchanged for eight
years.
In2000,NorthKorearesumedhighleveldiplomaticcontactswithVietnambysending
itsforeignministertoHanoi.TheIntergovernmentalCommitteewasrevivedandheldits
fourthmeetinginOctober2001.ThefollowingyearVietnamsstatepresident,TranDuc
Luong,visitedPyongyangand signed sixcooperationagreements.The fifth,andmost
recent,meetingoftheIntergovernmentalCommitteewasheldinNovember2003.
Bilateralrelationshavecontinuedtheirslowupwardtrajectory; in2007Vietnamsparty
SecretaryGeneral,NongDucManh,andDeputyPrimeMinister/ForeignMinister,Pham
Gia Khiem, visited North Korea. North Koreas Deputy PrimeMinisterjourneyed to
Hanoi.In2008 itwasanticipatedthatKimJong IlwouldvisitVietnamtomarkthe50th
anniversaryofhisfathersfirsttriptoHanoi.Butnosuchvisiteventuated.
VietnamandChinaThe relationship between Vietnam and China is a highly asymmetric one in all
dimensionsofpower.Vietnam,with apopulationof 89million, ranks as theworlds
thirteenthmost populous country, yet it is only amiddle sized Chinese province by
comparison.ThemajorstrategicpreoccupationoftheVietnameseleadershipishowto
use the levers of diplomacy,military ties and economic relations tomaintain their
autonomyandindependenceandpreventfrombeingpulledintoChinasorbit.
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Vietnamuseshighlevelpartyandstatevisitsasadiplomatictooltocodifyitsrelations
with China. Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements, and
treaties in order tomakeChinesebehaviormorepredictable and less likely toharm
Vietnamsnationalinterests.
Vietnam has built on the normalization of political relations through a diplomatic
strategy that stresses the legacy of past close relations and mutual benefit over
contemporarydifferences.A prime examplemay be found inVietnams approach to
managing territorial disputes with China. Vietnam obtained Chinese agreement to
detach these issues from highlevel consideration and to relegate them to technical
workinggroups,andtosolvetheeasierproblemsbeforethemoredifficult.Vietnams
diplomaticstrategyemphasizedcommoninterests,suchasmakingthelandbordersafe
andsecuresothatbothsidescouldbenefitfromcrossbordertrade.Asaresultatreaty
onthelandborderandagreementdemarcatingtheGulfofTonkinwerereached.
Over the next five years Vietnam will set a priority on ensuring that its territorial
conflictswithChinaintheSouthChinaSeaarekeptpeacefulandthatamodusvivendiis
workedout tojointlyexploittheresourcesof theGulfofTonkinand theSouthChina
Sea.Vietnamwillrelyprimarilyondiplomacy,butitwillalsobackthisupwithenhanced
maritimedefensecapabilities.
Vietnamwillpursue three strategies. First, itwill continuebilateralnegotiationswith
Chinatoconcludeanagreementontheprinciplestogoverntheiractions incontested
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waters. Discussions are already in train. Once agreement is reached Vietnam will
explorewithChinathepossibilitiesofjointdevelopmentinlesssensitiveareas.
Vietnams
second
strategy
will
be
to
promote
multilateral
efforts
to
maintain
peace
and
stabilityintheSouthChinaSea.Vietnamwillseektoinvolveotherforeigncompaniesin
jointdevelopment inordertoensure that theirhomegovernmentshaveacontinuing
interest in stability in this region.Thechallenge forVietnamwillbe toworkouthow
much foreign involvement China will tolerate. Vietnam will also seek to upgrade
ASEANs 2002DeclarationonConductofParties in the SouthChina Sea into amore
bindingCodeofConduct. AsASEANChairin2010Vietnamhasawindowofopportunity
topromoteanASEANChinaCodeofConductintheSouthChinaSea.
Vietnams third strategywillbe todevelop sufficientmilitarycapacity todeterChina
fromusing force.Forexample,Vietnamwill takedeliveryof sixKiloclass submarines
fromRussiaoverasixyearperiod.Vietnamwillalsodevelopintegratedorjointairnaval
forcesandcommandheadquarters.Thisisadefensivestrategyaimedatareadenial.
VietnamsmilitaryrelationswithChinaareatanascentstage.Overthenextfiveyears
Vietnamwill seek to graduallyexpanddefense cooperation forpolitical andpractical
reasons.Vietnamwill seekenhancedmilitary tieswithChinaasa formof confidence
building,but
also
as
ameans
to
develop
influence
with
the
Peoples
Liberation
Army,
an
importantactor inChinaspoliticalsystem.Confidencebuildingmeasureswilltakethe
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formofbordersecuritycooperationinremoteareas,increasednavalportvisits,1search
andrescueexercisesandsteppedupjointnavalpatrolstoprotectfisheriesintheGulfof
TonkinandlatertheSouthChinaSea.
On the practical side, Vietnam will seek to build on recent agreements to expand
training exchanges at all levels and to promote cooperation by national defense
industries inmilitary technology, lightarmsandammunitionproduction.Vietnamwill
seekmaterial benefits from defense cooperation; butwill usemilitary relationswith
ChinaaspoliticalcoverforenhancedmilitarytieswiththeUnitedStates.Vietnamwill
alsoseektoshapeitsdefenserelationswithChinathroughmultilateralchannelssuchas
the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the ASEAN
DefenseMinistersMeetingwith dialogue partners. This process hasjust got off the
groundandVietnam,asASEANChairfor2010,isplanningtohostitsfirstmeeting.
When Vietnam normalized relationswith China smuggling became amajor issue as
ChinesegoodsfloodedintoVietnamsdomesticmarket.Theopeningofthelandfrontier
quicklyledtoincreasedcrossbordertradeandgreaterautonomyforlocalgovernment
authorities.RegularizingtradewithChinahasservedtoreinforceHanoisauthorityover
thelocalities.Since1991,tradebetweenChinaandVietnamhasgrownastronomically.
ChinaisnowVietnamslargesttradingpartner.ChinasuppliesVietnamwithmachinery,
refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies Chinawith unrefined oil, coal and
rubber.The singlemost important issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance in
1Sincenormalizationin1991,thePeoplesLiberationArmyNavyhasmadeonlythree
portcallstoVietnam,andtheVietnamesenavyhasvisitedChinaonlyonce.
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Chinas favor ($11.1billion in 2008). In 2008, China exported $15.7 billionworth of
goodstoVietnam,whileVietnammanagedtoexportonly$4.6billiontoChina.
Chinas
trade
surplus
has
figured
at
every
high
level
summit
in
recent
years.
Party
and
state leadersagree thatefforts shouldbemake tomake itmorebalanced.Buthow?
RestrictingChineseimportsisnotonthecards.ThestructureofVietnameseexportshad
changed little over the years and nomajor change is expected in the coming years.
Vietnamesedomesticmanufacturerscannotproducequalitygoodsthatarecompetitive
in the Chinesemarket place. Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese
investment;althoughChinahasrespondedthetotalamountofinvestment($3billion)is
modestwhencomparedtootherforeigninvestors.
Future tradebetweenChinaandVietnamwillbe influencedby theASEANChinaFree
Trade Agreement that took effect in January 2010. Chinese tariffs will be lowered
makingiteasierforVietnamtosellitsgoodsinChina.AndVietnamwillalsobeableto
take part in a regional division of labor by producing components for assembly
elsewherewithinthefreetradearea.ForVietnamtofullytakeadvantageofthesetrade
opportunities itwill have to get its domestic house in order andmake Vietnamese
businessesmorecompetitiveintheChinesemarket.
Vietnamsmassive
trade
deficit
with
China
must
be
placed
in
the
context
of
Vietnams
current tradedeficitof $19billionwith the restof theworld (2009).Vietnamneeds
continuedaccesstomarketsintheUnitedStateswhereithasa$9billionsurplus(2009).
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In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there are also geostrategic
considerations at play. The growth of trade has been accompanied by a massive
upgrading and construction of infrastructure roads, bridges, railwaysmuch of it
fundedbytheAsianDevelopmentBankandWorldBankaspartoftheGreaterMekong
Subregion.IncreasinglymainlandSoutheastAsiaisbeinglinkedtosouthwesternChina.
Inaddition,VietnamandChinaarepromoting thedevelopmentof thetwocorridors
and one economic beltway linking southern China, Hainan island and northern
Vietnam. From Hanois point of view, this not only serves Vietnams development
needs, but also enmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives for cooperative
behavior.
Vietnam utilizes diplomatic, military and economic means to achieve the strategic
objective of obtaining Chinas acknowledgment of Vietnams independence and
autonomyinreturnforwhichVietnamrecognizesChinasregionalprimacy.
VietnamandNorthKoreaVietnams diplomacy towardsNorth Korea is guided by its foreign policy principle of
becomingafriendandcrediblepartnerofallnationsintheinternationalcommunity.
NorthKoreas failedeconomyandstatusasa roguenationpresentsopportunities for
Vietnamese diplomacy. Vietnam supportedNorth Koreasmembership in the ASEANRegional
Forum
and
later
sponsored
North
Korean
Japanese
reconciliation
talks.
Over
the next five years, when the occasion arises, Vietnam can be expected to play a
constructiverole inencouragingNorthKoreatocomeoutofitsselfimposed isolation.
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HanoiwillquietlycounselPyongyangandwillalsoconsidersympatheticallythirdparty
requeststouseitsgoodofficesasadiplomaticgobetween.
In
the
1990s
North
Koreas
famine
conditions
presented
Vietnam
with
the
opportunity
toengage inbarter trade. In 1996 this resulted in a riceforweapons swap.Vietnam
acquired Igla (SA16 Gimlet) portable air defense missiles, two Yugoclass mini
submarinesandasmallnumberofScudCballisticmissiles.Defenserelationsthenwent
intothedoldrumsforsixyearsbeforetheywererenewed.Currentlythedevelopment
of certain defense ties is restricted by UN sanctions against North Korea. Vietnam
supportedthesesanctionsandcanbeexpectedtofullyobservethem.Whilefuturerice
forweapons barter agreements cannot be ruled out, Vietnamwill be extraordinarily
circumspectandattentivetointernationalreactionsbeforeproceeding.
VietnamandNorthKoreahaveneverhada robust trade relationship.Twoway trade
hasprobablyneverexceeded$30millioninvalueinanyoneyear.Vietnamhassoldrice
in the pastbut the relationship soured in 1997 in adisputeover terms ofpayment.
North Korea even rejected emergency aid from Vietnam in response to domestic
famine. BecauseNorth Korea lacks hard currency barter agreements are likely. The
mostpromisingavenue for futurerelations lie inVietnamsstatusasa rolemodel for
economicdevelopmentunderaonepartysystem. InpastyearsNorthKoreahassent
study missions to Vietnam to see how Vietnams economic success was achieved.
Vietnamwilldefinitelybeopened to similarapproaches in the future,butprogress is
contingentonNorthKoreaswillingness.
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ChinaandVietnamChina asserts considerable direct and indirect influence on Vietnam. Probably no
major decision of any nature is made in Hanoi without taking Chinese interests and
likely responses into account. China exerts direct pressure through highlevel
meetings by national leaders. Partytoparty relations represent a special conduit
for Chinese influence. Vietnams model of economic development borrows heavily
but not exclusively from Chinese experience. Vietnamese foreign policy also infused
mimics Chinese formulations, such as the general strategic trend in Asia Pacific is
one of peace, cooperation and development. Hanoi also adapts Chinese ideology to
its own needs, such as the threat of peaceful evolution. Entire Chinese books on
the subject have been translated into Vietnamese and made compulsory reading for
Central Committee members and delegates to national party congresses. The slow
pace of U.S.Vietnam militarytomilitary relations can be attributed in part to
concerns about Chinas reaction. The 2009 Defense White paper makes no mention
of the 1979 border war with China so as not to offend Beijing. The Chinese Embassy
regularly intervenes to protest any publication or action that is seen as infringing
Chinese sovereignty, especially in the South China Sea. No other foreign state is as
assertive or influential in Hanoi than China.
NorthKoreaandVietnamIn contrast, North Korea asserts what might be termed negative influence in its
relations with Vietnam. It can oppose and block bilateral cooperation but little else.
Vietnam is privately disdainful of North Koreas cult of personality and failed model
ofjuche. North Korea must play the role of suitor for the relationship to advance.
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VIETNAMSRELATIONSWITHCHINA:DOMESTICDIMENSIONSCarlyleA.Thayer
Vietnams management of relationswith China has always been the prerogative of a small
groupwithinthepartyandstateelite.Vietnamselitehasnotalwaysbeenunifiedonhowto
manage
relations
with
its
northern
neighbor.
Historically
internal
party
contention
on
relations
with China has been insulated from the general public through party discipline and strict
controls on themedia and publishing industry. Since 2007, the emergenceof an antiChina
backlashamongawideningcircleofVietnamspoliticalelitehasbrokenthroughthisinsulation
andposedtwomajordifficultiesfortheVietnameseleadership.
1.ThefirstdifficultyisgainingconsensuswithinthepartyCentralCommitteeaboutthebest
waytorespondtoChinasincreasinglyassertiveactionsintheSouthChinaSea.
InJanuary2007,thepartyCentralCommitteesfourthplenumresolvedtodrawupanational
Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020 to integrate economic development of coastal
areas with the exploitation of marine resources in the East Sea. Vietnamese economists
estimatedthatby2020,themarineeconomywouldcontributeup to55percentofGDPand
between5560percentofexports.Vietnamsmaritimedevelopmentstrategywascompleted
during2007butwasnot releasedpublicly.According toa very seniorpartyofficial,Chinese
intelligenceacquiredacopyofthisclassifieddocumentandthenbegantoapplypressureon
foreign companies, suchasExxonMobiland IndiasONGC, thatwere likely tobe involved in
developingVietnamsmaritime sector.These companieswerewarned that their commercial
interestsinChinawouldsufferiftheydevelopedareasclaimedbyChina.
This report analyses the difficulties faced byVietnamese authorities in their efforts to
maintain control over rising domestic antiChina sentiments among Vietnamese
intellectualsandcollegestudentswhoviewChinaasVietnam'shistoricenemy.
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Chinas actions impacted negatively on Vietnamese party conservatives who had gained
influence during theglobal financialcrisisby touting theChineseeconomicmodeland the
threatofpeacefulevolution.Prior to2007,partyconservativessupportedproChinapolicies
andputabrakeon foreignpolicy initiativestowardsclosersecurityrelationswiththeUnited
States.After2007,partyconservativessupportedselfhelppoliciesindefensethroughmajor
equipmentprocurements(KiloclasssubmarinesandSu30multirolefighters)andcontinuedto
warnofthethreatofpeacefulevolutionindomesticaffairs.
ThekeydifficultyinforginginternalpartyconsensusliesintheextenttowhichVietnamshould
movebeyondselfhelptosolicitingexternalsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandothercountries
tocounterChineseassertiveness.Developingdefenseandsecurityties(asdistinctfrompolitical
anddiplomatic
relations)
with
the
U.S.
is
likely
to
be
the
most
contentious
foreign
policy
issue
tobeconsideredinadvanceoftheforthcomingeleventhnationalpartycongress.
2.TheseconddifficultyforVietnamrelatestothedomesticmanagementofrisingantiChina
sentiment. Inshort,howshouldtheregimeharnessrisingpatrioticantiChinasentimentto
buttressonepartyrulewithoutoverplayingtheirhandandprovokingsanctionsfromChina.
In 2007, student demonstrations elicited a protest from the Chinese Embassy. Vietnam
respondedby
assuring
China
(and
all
ASEAN
ambassadors)
that
the
protests
were
spontaneous
andnotofficiallysanctioned.Chinahaskeptup itsdiplomaticpressurebycontinually lodging
objectionstoanyactionthatchallengesChinesesovereignty intheSouthChinaSea,including
revisionsinprovincialhistorytextbooksandpressreporting.
TheemergenceofantiChina studentprotests in2007presentedVietnamese leaderswitha
uniquedilemma.Should theysuppress independentpoliticalactivity?Orshouldtheyharness
thestudentsnationalismtobolsterregimelegitimacy?
The Vietnamese state routinely exercises censorship over media reporting that could harm
relations with China. This policy is pragmatic but it is also shaped by repeated Chinese
diplomaticinterventionsprotestinganyslightsonChinesesovereigntyingeneralandtheSouth
ChinaSeainparticular.In2007,Vietnamesestudentswereabletodemonstratethattheycould
bypassstatecontrolsoverthemediatoobtainindependentinformationonChineseactionsin
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theSouthChinaSea.Notonlythat,butthestudentsalsodemonstratedtheywereabletouse
cellphonesand internetchatroomstocreateanetworkandorganizepublicdemonstrations
completewithcolorcodedtshirts(bearingthegoldstaronaredbackground).
Thedilemma
for
Vietnamese
authorities
was
how
to
respond
to
student
protests.
Clearly,
the
governmentcouldnotbeseenasrepressingactionsthatwerewidelyviewedaspatrioticbya
growing number of Vietnams political elite. But from the point of view of officialdom, if
studentswerepermittedtoindependentlyaccessinformation,formnetworks,andstagepublic
protestsagainstChina,wherewouldthislead? Indeed,in2006politicalactivistsformedapro
democracy network known as Bloc 8406 on the same basis. Vietnamese authorities quietly
clampeddownonstudentactivismbysendingsecurityofficialstouniversitiesandcollegesto
warnadministrators
and
the
students
involved
of
the
consequences
of
further
protests.
Propaganda sessionswereheld inparty cellsandunits to reinforce thepartys line towards
China.
ThestudentdemonstrationsspecificallyprotestedChineseactions intheSouthChinaSeaand
werenotovertlycriticalofgovernmentpolicy.Someforeignaffairsofficialsprivatelywelcomed
the student protests as strengthening their hand in negotiations with China. But security
officials showed no sympathywhen political dissidents expanded their agenda by criticizing
Chinadomestichumanrightsrecordandraisingquestionsaboutthegovernmentshandlingof
relationswithChinaonVietnamese languageblog sites.Vietnamese securityofficialsmoved
swiftly to repress such actions, especiallywhen dissidents sought to disrupt the carrying of
ChinasOlympictorchthroughHoChiMinhCity.
In200809,VietnamsdomesticantiChinabacklashspreadfromthepoliticalfringetoawider
circleof thepoliticalelitewhonotonlycriticizedChineseactionsbutalsobegan toquestion
theirgovernmentshandlingofrelationswithChina.Twodevelopmentsspurredthisshift.The
first was related to the governments decision to grant a Chinese company rights to mine
bauxiteoreintheCentralHighlands.Whatbeganasaprotestaboutenvironmentalprotection
quicklybecamehighlypoliticalwhennationalsecurityconcernswereraisedbynolessafigure
thanGeneralVoNguyenGiap.GeneralGiapsintervention,intheformofthreeopenlettersto
partyandstate leaders,servedasacatalyst forother retiredhighrankingstate,militaryand
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partyofficialstovoicesimilarconcerns.TheseviewswerewidelycirculatedinVietnamoverthe
internetandinphotocopyform.
The second development to elicit an antiChina response in Vietnam arose from increased
Chineseassertiveness
in
the
South
China
Sea,
especially
the
aggressive
manner
in
which
China
enforced itsunilateral fishingban inMayAugust2009at theexpenseofVietnamsdomestic
fishing industry. AntiChina sentiment thus spread from the political elite to fishing
communitiesalongthecoast.Provincialofficialsreportedexpressedfrustrationatthecentral
governments inability to secure thequick releaseof fishermenheld indetentiononHainan
island.Fourprominentbloggersweredetainedandquestionedabouttheirinternetsiteswhen
theypostedcommentary,interalia,criticizingVietnamshandlingofrelationswithChina.
Thespreading
anti
China
backlash
resulted
in
pressures
on
the
national
leadership
to
take
action to standup toChina.ThesepressureswereamplifiedbyoverseasVietnamesewho
criticized theHanoigovernment fornotdoingenough todefendVietnamese sovereignty. In
sum, theVietnamese regime found that its appeal to nationalism asone of the basis of its
legitimacywasbeingundermined.Theregimerespondedbychangingitsmediastrategytogive
more coverage to the governmentsdiplomaticprotests toChina,bypublicizing stories that
documentedVietnams longhistoricalclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaandtheviewsof foreign
analysts sympathetic to Vietnam. The press also was permitted to report on the negative
impactofChinasunilateralfishingbanonthedomesticfleetattheheightoftheVietnamese
fishingseason.In2009,however,whentwoVietnamesepaperspublishedretrospectaccounts
ofthe2007antiChinaprotestsanddescribedthestudentsaspatriotstheyweretemporarily
shutdown.
DespiteattemptsbytheVietnameseregimetocooptantiChinapatriotismfor itsownends,
the nationalist genie may be out of the bottle. In August 2009, when Chinese netizens
published an invasion plan on the internet showing how China could attack and conquer
Vietnaminanamphibiousinvasion,Vietnamesenetizensfiredsalvosintocyberspacedefending
theircountryssovereignty.Areviewofsomeofthemoreaccessiblewebsiteindicateshitsin
the tens of thousands. Later in the year security officials blocked Facebook and imposed
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restrictionsonTwitterandYouTube inpart to restrictdiscussionofVietnams relationswith
China.
Conclusion
Itis
clear
that
aloose
network
has
emerged
in
Vietnam
among
university
students
and
the
politicalelitethatisunitedbyitsconcernsoverChinasthreattoVietnamsterritorialintegrity
and sovereignty.Thenetwork canbeexpected tobeactivated in response toanyactionby
Chinathatthreatenstheseinterests.
Vietnams oneparty state rests on multiple sources of legitimacy (rationallegal, economic
performanceandnationalism).Sincelate2007risingantiChinesepatriotismhasopenedanew
front in challenges to the legitimacy of Vietnams oneparty state. The antiChina backlash
quickly spread from the political fringe to the center of the political elite (intellectuals,
journalists,academics,retiredofficials,bloggers,unionleaders,retiredseniormilitaryandparty
officials,NationalAssemblydeputiesandpartymembers)whobegan toquestion the states
perceivedinadequateresponsetoChinesederogationofVietnamesesovereigntyandnational
security. Insum,theVietnamesepartystatesclaimtonationalismasoneofthemainstaysof
regime legitimacy has come under challenge over its handling of relationswith China (with
respecttobauxiteminingintheCentralHighlandsandChineseassertivenessintheSouthChina
Sea).TheemergenceofpopularopinionaddsanewdimensiontothefunctioningofVietnams
onepartystate.
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1
VIETNAMS DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
Carlyle A. Thayer
This reply provides a comparative assessment of Vietnams military relations with China and the
United States under six headings: highlevel exchanges, naval port visits, professional military
education and training, other defense cooperation, arms and equipment sales and strategic
cooperation.
Background
Vietnam has fought wars with both the United States (196573) and China (the FebruaryMarch
1979 border war and, by proxy, the Cambodian conflict 197989). China granted diplomatic
recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1950. Unlike the United States, Vietnam
and China maintained diplomatic relations throughout armed hostilities. Although Vietnam
withdrew all of its formed military units from Cambodia in September 1989, China refused to
normalize political relations until Vietnam agreed to a comprehensive political settlement. The
two sides explored the restoration of friendly diplomatic relations at a secret summit held in
Chengdu in southern China in September 1990. Formal restoration of political relations took
place in November 1991 at a summit meeting in Beijing.
The first defense contacts between Vietnam and China since their 1979 border war were
initiated in 1992 with the exchange of delegations from the External Relations Departments of
the Vietnamese and Chinese defense ministries in February and May, respectively. Nine years
elapsed before Vietnam and China formally agreed to multilevel military exchanges (Joint
Statementon Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century, December 2000).
In contrast, the United States withheld diplomatic recognition from Vietnam for over two
decades following the end of the Vietnam War. In 1994, the U.S. lifted its trade embargo and in
July 1995 extended diplomatic recognition to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The main
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impediment to normal diplomatic relations was Vietnams satisfactory progress in providing a
full accounting of all U.S. servicemen who went missing in action or were held as prisoners of
war (MIA/POW). A further six years elapsed before the United States could negotiate its first
substantive agreement with Vietnam, the Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001. It was only in
mid2003, thirty years after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, that Vietnam decided to upgrade its
defense relations with the United States (decision of the eighth plenum of the Vietnam
Communist Party Central Committee, July 212, 2003). Vietnams Minister of National Defense
made an official visit to Washington late that year.
It is significant that Vietnam agreed to an annual defense dialogue with the United States in
2004 and bilateral defense security consultations with China in 2005. Vietnam and China
upgraded their bilateral relations to strategic partners in 2008 and comprehensive strategic
partners the following year. At the same time, in October 2008, U.S.Vietnam bilateral defense
ties took a significant step forward with the holding of the first politicalmilitary dialogue in
Washington convened by the U.S. State Department and Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1. HighLevel Visits
The United States and Vietnam have exchanged two reciprocal visits by defense
ministers/secretary of defense. These have been spaced at threeyear intervals (see table
below). In contrast, the patterns of ministerial level visits between Vietnam and China is more
erratic and heavily weighted Chinas favor. Vietnams defense minister has journeyed to China
on seven occasions since 1991. A sixyear gap occurred between the second and third visits and
a fiveyear gap took place between the fourth and fifth visits. The exchanges are not reciprocal.
Chinas defense minister has visited Vietnam only twice with a thirteen year gap between visits.
Vietnam hosted its most recent ministeriallevel visits from China in April 2006 and the United
States in July of the same year. Vietnams Defense Minister visited the United States in
November 2009 and China in April 2010.
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Table 1
Exchanges of Defense Ministers, Vietnam, China and the United States, 19912009
Visits to China by
Vietnams Defense
Minister
Visits to Vietnam by
Chinas Defense
Minister
Visits to the United
States by Vietnams
Defense Minister
Visits to Vietnam by
the U.S. Secretary of
Defense
1991 July
1992 December 1993 May
1998 January
2000 July 2000 March
2005 October 2006 April 2003 November 2006 July
2007 August
200809 no visits 200809 no visits 2009 November 200809 no visits
April 2010
A review of highlevel defense exchanges below secretary/minister level for the period 2002
mid2009 reveals that Vietnam has received roughly equal delegations from China (ten) and the
United States (eleven).*
But there is a marked imbalance in delegations from Vietnam. Eleven
highlevel Vietnamese delegations visited China, while only four visited the United States.
Highlevel exchanges between Vietnam and China may be classified into three broad
categories: general staff, general political department and regional military commands. There is
a rough balance in exchanges at general staff and general political department level. China has
dispatched three delegations of regional military commanders to Vietnam and received only
one return visit.
*Data on exchanges was taken from Vietnams 2004 and 2009 Defense White Papers. Data for
the year 2004 was omitted from these publications. See Appendices A and B.
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Because Vietnam and China are both communist states and maintain a system of political
control over their armed forces, they have an avenue of defense cooperation not available to
the United States. Also, Vietnam and China share a common border and both have put in a
major effort to demine and demarcate their common frontier.
Highlevel exchanges between Vietnam and the United States are markedly different because
the U.S. Defense Department and armed forces are not structured that same way as China.
There have been no exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Vietnamese counter
parts, for example. U.S. delegations to Vietnam may be grouped into three categories: (1) visits
by the Commander U.S. Pacific Command; (2) visits at Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
level; and (3) visits by component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command.
The United States has sent an equivalent number of highlevel delegations to Vietnam as China
has between 2002 and mid2009 (eleven as compared to Chinas ten). U.S. delegations reflect a
greater diversity of interest and potential for cooperation. By far the most frequent U.S. visitor
to Vietnam is the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command who logged four visits between
2002 and mid2009 (and a total of seven visits from 1994). In addition, Vietnam has received
visits by the commanders of the U.S. Army Pacific (May 2004), 13th
Air Force (May 2008), Pacific
Fleet (March 2009) and Pacific Air Force (June 2009).*
It is notable that visits by component
commanders are a relatively new feature of U.S.Vietnam defense relations.
U.S.Vietnam defense relations are poised to enter a new phase following the visit of Defense
Minister Phung Quang Thanh to Washington in late 2009 with agreement for Hanoi to host
direct militaryto military talks in 2010. This may prove to be the venue for advancing concrete
proposals for defense cooperation.
2. Naval Port visits
In November 1991, as Vietnam and China were normalizing their political relations, a Peoples
Liberation ArmyNavy (PLAN)JiangweiII guided missile frigate made the first visit by a Chinese
*Vietnams 2006 Defense White Paper lists a visit by the Commandant of the United States
Marine Corps in SeptemberOctober 2002 but this visit appears to have been cancelled.
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warship to a Vietnamese port since unification in 1975. The frigate visited Ho Chi Minh City. No
further port calls were made until November 2008 and August 2009.
In 2000, Vietnam and China reached agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin and on fisheries.
In April 2006, the navies of both countries commenced joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and
nine patrols have been conducted between then and the June 2010. The last joint patrol also
included the first Search and Rescue Exercise between China and Vietnam.
In June 2009, in an historic first, two Vietnamese naval ships made a visit to Zhanjiang port in
Guangdong province in Southwestern China.
VietnameseChinese naval exchanges pale in comparison to the regular annual visits by U.S.
Navy warships supplemented by a slowly growing number of noncombatant and humanitarian
ships (see Table 2).
Table 2
U.S. Naval Ship Visits to Vietnamese Ports, 20032010
Date of Visit Ships Involved Port Visited
2003 November USS Vandergrift Ho Chi Minh City
2004 July USS Curtis Wilbur Da Nang
2005 MarchApril USS Gary Ho Chi Minh City
2006 July USS Patriot and USS Salvor Ho Chi Minh City
2007 July USS Peleliu Da Nang2007 October USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang
2007 November USS Patriot and USS Guardian Hai Phong
2008 June USNS Mercy Nha Trang
2009 June USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang
2009 AugustSept. USNS Safeguard Ho Chi Minh City
2009 November USS Blue Ridge* and USS Lassen Da Nang
2010 Feb.March USNS Richard E. Byrd Hon Khoi Port
2010 May USNS Mercy Qui Nhon
*U.S. 7th
Fleet Flag Ship and escort.
In addition to the show the flag and protocol nature of these visits, the U.S. adds value to port
calls by providing humanitarian and medical assistance to the surrounding community. The
visits by the USNS Safeguardin 2009 and USNS Byrdin 2010 for ship repairs may be harbingers
of more permanent arrangements. Now that the Vietnamese navy has made port visits to
Thailand, Malaysia and China it is possible they may agree to visit a U.S. port such as Guam.
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Finally, the United States has added a new dimension to naval relations by flying Vietnamese
military officers out to the USS John Stennis to observe flight operations in the South China Sea
in April 2009.
3. Professional Military Education and Training
VietnameseChinese cooperation in the area of professional military education and training is at
the nascent stage. The visits by senior officials from their respective General Political
Departments invariably include discussions on exchanging experiences in armybuilding on their
agenda. In 2008, Vietnams Deputy Defense Minister held discussions in Beijing on cooperation
in personnel training. Both sides also have discussed Vietnamese participation in courses
offered by Chinas National Defense University.*
Vietnamese participation in professional military education and training with the United States
is of longer standing but involves only limited number of Vietnamese personnel. Perhaps the
first opportunity for military education was offered by the AsiaPacific Center for Security
Studies in Hawaii in the late 1990s. Incomplete data suggests that numbers have slowly risen:
1998 (2), 1999 (4), 2000 (1), 2001 (3), 200203 (no data), 2004 (13) and 2005 (9).
Since 2005, Vietnam has been eligible for Extended IMET and later IMET (English language and
medical training). Eight Vietnamese military personnel participated in FY2005.
In 2007 the United States asked Vietnam to accept U.S. officers and cadets for training in
Vietnamese universities. The status of this proposal is uncertain.*
4. Other Defense Cooperation
As noted above, defense cooperation between Vietnam and China has been mainly of a
confidence building nature involving demining and demarcating their common land border and
joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tokin.
*A major delegation from Chinas National Defense University first visited Hanoi in late 2004.
*For comparison, Australia has hosted more than 80 senior Vietnamese Defense visitors and
over 150 Vietnamese Defense students since February 1999. During the same period over 900
Australian Defence officials have visited Vietnam.
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By contrast, Vietnams other defense cooperation relations with the United States have been
and continue to be more extensive. Obviously MIAPOW full accounting has been the main
focal point for decades. But Vietnam and the United States also cooperate on other programs
designed to address the legacies of the Vietnam War such as demining and unexploded
ordnance removal and joint research into Agent Orange. Other areas of defense/security
cooperation include: military medical research (HIV/AIDS), humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (flood control), counterterrorism (including information sharing), and counter drug
trafficking.
The United States also funds Vietnamese participation at a number of defenserelated seminars
and exercises in the region such as COBRA GOLD, Western Pacific Naval Symposium and U.S.
Southeast Asia bilateral joint exercises in 200708.
In the past, Vietnam has turned down a number of requests for small joint exercises. In 1997,
for example, the U.S. unsuccessfully proposed tactical discussions and joint training exchanges
in jungle warfare. More recently (2009), the United States has invited Vietnam to participate in
search and rescue exercises.
5. Arms Sales and National Defense Industry
In 2005, Vietnam and China initiated discussions at ministerial level on cooperation between
their respective national defense industries. That year a delegation from Chinas Commission
for Science, Technology and Industry visited Vietnam. It was later reported that NORINCO, a
Chinese stateowned arms manufacturer, agreed to sell ammunition for small arms, artillery
and military vehicles to Vietnam. NORINCO was also reported to be discussing coproduction
arrangements for heavy machine guns and ammunition with a Vietnamese counterpart. In
2008, Vietnams Deputy Defense Minister held discussions with Chinas Commission for
Science, Technology and Industry in Beijing. No doubt that the prospects for Chinese defense
industry cooperation with Vietnam have been limited by recent arms and servicing agreements
between Vietnam and the Russian Federation.
Military equipment sales between the United States and Vietnam have been raised over a
number of years. In 1994, for example, the Commander in Chief Pacific Command proposed
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equipment exchanges and sales while on a visit to Vietnam. In 2005, the U.S. Ambassador to
Vietnam raised the possibility of joint cooperation in repair and maintenance and the purchase
of supplies by the U.S. Navy. The following year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while
on a visit to Vietnam, suggested that Vietnam might buy military spare parts.
All of these proposals were subject to legal restrictions. In 2006, the Secretary of State
approved the sale, lease, export and/or transfer of nonlethal defense articles and defense
services to Vietnam. This was followed by a Presidential Memorandum establishing Vietnams
eligibility under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to make certain purchases. Vietnam was
excluded, however, from lethal end items or their components including nonlethal crowd
control and night vision devices. In 2007, the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations were
amended to allow sales to Vietnam on casebycase basis.
The U.S. would like to see Vietnam take part in the Foreign Military Sales process. U.S. officials
have already explained the process involved and how to submit a Letter of Request for Price
and Availability. Vietnam could seek approval to acquire spare parts for its stock of captured
U.S. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and UH1 (Huey) helicopters which are presently
inoperable. In 2009, the head of the Pentagons Defense Cooperation Agency singled out
maritime patrol craft and coastal radar as possible items for sale. But U.S. officials have made
clear that nonlethal arms sales are contingent upon Vietnam engaging more fully with the
United Sates.
As early 2003, U.S. private sector defense industry sources began to identify Vietnam as a
potentially attractive arms market. In 2007, the U.S.ASEAN Business Council opened an office
in Hanoi and hosted a visit by a U.S. Defense and Security Corporate Executive Delegation
representing ITT, Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Oracle.
6. Strategic Cooperation
The United States has engaged with Vietnam more fully to promote strategic cooperation than
China. Vietnam conducts strategic cooperation with its northern neighbor mainly through
multilateral channels such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN
Regional Forum. Vietnam is keen to promote what is known as the ASEAN Defense Ministers
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Meeting (ADMM) Plus process involving ASEAN Defense Ministers and their dialogue partners
(Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States).
Vietnam will host the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi in 2010.
Vietnams strategic cooperation with the United States includes more channels for cooperation
than the ASEAN process. In 2004, Vietnam attended the AsiaPacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD)
meeting held in Tokyo for the first time. A Vietnamese observer reportedly attended a meeting
of the Proliferation Security Initiative held in New Zealand. Vietnam has also discussed, but
remained noncommittal on, its participation in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
Vietnam continues to send defense officials to the ShangriLa Dialogue in Singapore. In 2008,
the Chairman of the JCS met with Vietnamese representatives for the first time.
Conclusion
Bilateral defense cooperation between Vietnam and China and Vietnam and the United States
are heavily tinged by political considerations. No doubt defense officials in both Beijing and
Washington would like to see an increase in bilateral militarytomilitary cooperation with
Vietnam. Vietnam moves slowly and deliberately and generally sets the pace. When Vietnam
decides to move forward, its policies towards China and the United States appear to move in
tandem. The initiation of defense dialogues with the U.S. and China is 200405 is an example.
Vietnam also maintains a rough equivalency in the number of highlevel exchanges it receives
from both countries.
China is relatively new to the defense cooperation game. The scope of what China can offer is
limited in comparison to longestablished programs in the U.S. China and Vietnam share a
special politicalideological conduit for relations between their armed forces that is closed to
the United States. This conduit provides China a means to influence Vietnam but the extent of
Chinas ability to do so in practice appears quite limited. Vietnam and China have made
concrete progress in addressing land and maritime (Gulf of Tonkin) border issues.
The United States engages in defense cooperation on a global scale. It can offer an
extraordinarily wide scope of programs that are of longstanding. The unique role of Combatant
Commanders in the U.S. system gives the U.S. Pacific Command a special edge in offering
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opportunities for cooperation with Vietnam. Although Vietnam has sent nearly three times as
many highlevel defense delegations to China (eleven) as the United States (four) from 2002 to
mid2009, that has not resulted in greater Chinese influence or defense cooperation.
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Appendix A
HighLevel Defense Delegations from Vietnam to China and the United States, 2002mid2009
Date From Vietnam to China From Vietnam to USA
1991 July
1992 December
1998 January
2000 July
Defence Minister
Defence Minister
Defence Minister
Defence Minister
2002 July Chief of the General Political
Department
2002 October Chief of the General Political
Department
2003 OctoberNovember Chief of the General Staff
2003 November Defence Minister
2004 No delegation recorded No delegation recorded
2005 April Deputy Chief of the General
Staff
2005 June Deputy Minister of Defence
2005 October Defence Minister
2005 November Chief of the General Political
Department
2006 SeptemberOctober Vice Chairman National
Committee of Search and
Rescue
2006 October Chief of the General Political
Department
2007 April Commanders Military
Regions 1, 2, 3, 7 and
Capital Military Region
2007 August Defence Minister
2007 OctoberNovember Deputy Chief of the General
Staff
2008 January Deputy Minister of National
Defence
2008 April Navy Commander
2008 September Deputy Chief of the General
Staff
2008 NovemberDecember Chief of the General Staff
2009 May Standing Deputy Chairman
of the National Committee
on Search and Rescue
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Appendix B
HighLevel Defense Delegations from China and the United States to Vietnam, 2002mid2009
Date From China to Vietnam From US to Vietnam
1993 May Defence Minister
2000 March Secretary of Defense
2002 January Commander Pacific
Command
2002 April Commander of Border
Military Area Command
2004 February Commander Pacific
Command
2004 March Deputy chief of the PLA
General Staff
2004 May Commander US Army in the
Pacific
2004 June Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Defense POW/MIA
2004 December Deputy Director PLAs
General Political Department
2005 June Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defence ISA
2005 July Central Military Commission
2006 April Defence Minister
2006 June Secretary of Defense
2006 July Commander Pacific
Command
2006 December Cheng Du Military Command
2007 April Commander, Guangxi
Military Region
2006 MayJune Chief of the General Staff
2007 November Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense
2007 November Chief of the General Political
Department
2007 December Commander Pacific
Command
2008 May Commander 13th
USAF
2008 November Deputy Chief of the General
Political Department
2009 March Chief of the General Staff Commander US Pacific Fleet
2009 June Commander Pacific Air Force