tan 28- fire safety management in heritage buildings

Preparation and Use of Lime Mortars (revised 2003)

Conservation of Plasterwork (revised 2002)

Performance Standards for Timber Sash and Case Windows (1994) (Deleted)

Thatch & Thatching Techniques (1996)

The Hebridean Blackhouse (1996)

Earth Structures and Construction in Scotland (1996)

Access to the Built Heritage (1996)

Historic Scotland Guide to International Conservation Charters (1997)

Stonecleaning of Granite Buildings (1997)

Biological Growths on Sandstone Buildings (1997)

Fire Protection Measures in Scottish Historic Buildings (1997)

Quames of Scotland (1997)

The Archaeology of Scottish Thatch (1998)

The Installation of Sprinkler Systems in Historic Buildings (1998)

External Lime Coatings on Traditional Buildings (2001)

Burrowing Animals and Archaeology (1999)

Bracken and Archaeology (1999)

The Treatment of Graffiti on Historic Surfaces (1999)

Scottish Aggregates for Building Conservation (1999)

Corrosion in Masonry Clad Early 20th Century Steel Framed Buildings (2000)

Scottish Slate Quarries (2000)

Fire Risk Management in Heritage Buildings (2001)

Non-Destructive Investigation of Standing Structures (2001)

The Environmental Control of Dry Rot (2002)

Maintenance and Repair of Cleaned Stone Buildings (2003)

Care and Conservation of 17th Century Plasterwork in Scotland (2004)

Development and Archaeology in Historic Towns and Cities (2004)

Fire Safety Management in Heritage Buildings (2005)

Corrugated Iron and other Ferrous Cladding (2005)

GUIDES FOR PRACTITIONERS

Stonecleaning -A Guide for Practitioners (1994) Timber Decay in Buildings - The Conservation Approach to Treatment (1999) 1 Rural Buildings of the Lothians: Conservation and Conversion (1999) 2 Conservation of Historic Graveyards (2001) 3 Conservation of Timber Sash and Case Windows (2002) 4 Measured Survey and Building Recording (2003)

Available from:

Publications Department Technical Conservation, Research and Education Group Historic Scotland Conservation Bureau Longmore House Salisbury Place EDINBURGH EH9 1SH Tel 0131 668 8638 Fax 0131 668 8669 email [email protected]

by Stewart Kidd

Published by Historic Scotland

ISBN: 1 904966 l1 X

Historic Scotland OCrown copyright

Edinburgh 2005

Commissioned by

TECHNICAL CONSERVATION, RESEARCH AND

EDUCATION GROUP

TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

AUTHOR Stewart Kidd

Published by Historic Scotland

ISBN: 1 904966 l l X

Historic Scotland

QCrown copyright

Edinburgh 2005

Commissioned by

Technical Conservation, Research and Education Group

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is conscious that in preparing the text for this Technical Advice Note he has relied heavily on the support, assistance and knowledge of many people and organisations. In particular, the wise council of all the members of the Scottish Historic Buildings Fire Liaison Group has been invaluable. The Group has been involved in the TAN from its earliest stages and the suggestions, comments, feedback and advice from its members has been critical to the development of the text.

Special mention must be made of those who have contributed text: Mike Coull of Grampian Fire and Rescue Service drafted much of the content of the section dealing with fire service operations; the British Fire Protection Systems Association read and developed much of the text on fire detection and alarm systems, the Industry Committee on Emergency Lighting reviewed the sections on emergency lighting; Tony Crosse of HSBC Insurance Brokers Ltd read the sections on insurance and made valuable suggestions; Nick Jordan, now of National Trust for England, Wales and Northern Ireland and Steve Emery of English Heritage also made useful suggestions and pointed out areas where the text could be improved; special thanks are also due to Graham Goodall of the Scottish Fire Services Inspectorate and Jeff Carter, Scottish Building Standards Agency for their helpful suggestions on the sections covering legislation.

The TAN contains a number of what we hope will be useful and interesting appendices and we are grateful to: David Dalziel, the Firemaster of Grampian Fire and Rescue Service for permission to reproduce parts of his research work and the Fire Protection Association for permission to reproduce the case study in Appendix B.

Thanks are also due to colleagues from the COST C17 Action Dr Wolfgang Kippes and Per Rohlen for permission to use their photographs and to the National Trust for Scotland for permission to use photographs taken by the author while working for the Trust.

Cover picture: Grampian Fire and Rescue Service visit to Castle Fraser, Aberdeenshire (picture: O Crown copyright RCAHMS)

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREWORD

Fire Safety Manual 10

Fire Safety Log Book 10

Routine Inspections, Check Lists and Hazard Spotting 11

1 INTRODUCTION Managing Fire Safety During Construction or Building Maintenance Works 12

1.1 Historic Scotland's Technical Advice Notes and Fire Protection

1.2 The Risk Posed to Heritage Buildings by Fire

3.8.1 Typical fire hazards to be considered during Construction Works 14

1.3 Addressing the Risk to Heritage Posed by Fire

3.8.2 Control of Hot Work, Permits and Procedures and Presumptions Against Hot Work 15

PRINCIPLES OF MANAGING FIRE SAFETY

Legal Compliance

Policy Statement

Fire Safety Personnel

Record Keeping

Fire Risk Assessment

Physical Fire Safety Improvements

Fire Detection and Alarm Systems

Manual Fire Fighting Equipment

3.8.3 Method Statements 16

3.8.4 Site Briefing and Induction of Contractor Personnel 16

FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT 17

Introduction to Risk Assessment & Risk Management 17

Legal Requirements 17

Carrying Out a Risk Assessment 18

Applying Risk Assessment to Inform the Management of an Historic Building 19

Automatic Fire Suppression Systems

Staff Training Insurance for Historic Buildings 20

Residential Accommodation and Staff Welfare Facilities

FIRE PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS 2 1

Fire Protection Measures 21 Control of Contractors and Maintenance Activity Installing Fire Systems in

Historic Buildings Liaison with the Fire & Rescue Service

Tailoring a fire protection project to the building 23

Business and Property Records

Co-ordination with Insurers Compartmentation 23

5.4.1 Smoke Control 24 3 FIRE SAFETY STRUCTURE 9

3.1. Fire Safety Policy 5.5

3.2. Fire Safety Manager 9

3.3. Fire Safety Officer 9

3.4. Fire Safety Structure in Smaller Premises 10

5.4.2 Doors and Door Devices 24

Fire Detection and Alarm systems 25

5.5.1 Classification and Application of Fire Alarm and Detection Systems 25


5.5.2 Sounders and Warning Devices DAMAGE LIMITATION

5.5.3 Voice Alarm Systems Introduction

Principles of Damage Limitation

The Damage Limitation Plan

5.5.4 Remote Connections and Central Alarm Stations

5.5.5 Fire Detection and Alarm System Components Developing a Damage Limitation Plan

Prioritisation of Contents Removal 5.5.6 Manual Call Points Supporting Information 5.5.7 Fire Control Panels Fire and Rescue Services Support Managing Unwanted Alarms Incidents at Night and in Remote Areas

Setting up the Damage Limitation Team

Training and Exercises

The Training Cycle

5.6.1 How to Eliminate Unwanted Alarms

Manual Fire Fighting Equipment

5.7.1 Fire classification

5.7.2 Fire Extinguishers Damage Limitation Equipment

Safety and Security

Disaster Limitation: Post-Fire Considerations

5.7.3 Hose Reels

5.7.4 Siting of Extinguishers and Hose Reels

5.7.5 Fire Blankets Business Continuity Planning

7.15.1 Introduction

7.15.2 Terminology

7.15.3 Insurance Considerations

7.15.4 The Business Continuity Plan

Managing the Media

Recovering from a Disaster

7.17.1 Dealing with the actual scenario

7.17.2 Handling the by products of the disaster

7.17.3 Recovery - getting back to normal

Wet and dry rising mains

Drencher Systems 1 Sparge Pipes

Automatic Fire Suppression and Fire Fighting Systems

5.10.1 Water-based systems

5.10.2 Water mist systems

5.10.3 Foam systems

5.10.4 Gas systems

Lighting and Signage

5.11.1 Exit and Fire signage

5.1 1.2 Emergency Escape Lighting in Historic Buildings

Failing to plan: the consequences

Installers and Standards: Third Party Certification

FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES OPERATIONS IN HISTORIC BUILDINGS 57

STAFF TRAINING

Introduction

Training for All Staff

Specialist Training for Certain Personnel

Fire Warden Training

Fire Extinguisher Training

Fire Teams

Statutory Framework 57

Fire Fighting in Historic Buildings 57

8.2.1 The building itself 58

8.2.2 The contents of the building 5 8

8.2.3 Control of volunteers and staff 58

Fire & Rescue Service Operational Considerations 5 8

8.3.1 On arrival 59

8.3.2 Initial operations 59

8.3.3 Developing situation 59


8.4 Liaison between the Emergency Services and Historic Building Owners/Managers 59

8. 5 Water supplies for fire fighting 60

8.5.1 Public water supplies 60

8.5.2 Private water supplies 61

8.5.3 Supplementary water supplies 61

8.6 Access and Signage for the Fire and Rescue services 62

8.6.1 Access Signage 62

8.6.2 Access for Fire and Rescue Service Vehicles 62

8.7 Remote Locations 62

9 FIRE SAFETY AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 63

9.1.1 Consideration of People with Disabilities 63

9.1.2 Evacuation procedures for disabled people 63

9.1.3 Staff with special needs 63

9.1.4 Organised parties with special needs

9.2 Buildings Used for Sleeping or Accommodation

9.3 Applicable Legislation

9.4 Disabled People and Sleeping risks

9.5 Buildings used occasionally for sleeping

9.6 Special Events and Functions

9.6.1 General Requirements for All Special Events

9.6.2 Small scale events

9.6.3 Larger events

9.6.4 Filming, Television and Fashion Shows

10 BUILDINGS AT SPECIAL RISK 69

10.1.1 Unoccupied Buildings 69

10.1.2 Protecting vacant buildings 70

10.2 Places of Worship 70

10.3 Remote Buildings 7 1

10.4 Buildings That Are Periodically Unoccupied 7 1

10.5 Multi occupancy buildings

10.6 Arson

10.6.1 Arson and Security

10.6.2 Preventing Arson 73

10.6.3 Arson Prevention Checklist 73

11 CONCLUSION 75

12 BIBLIOGRAPHY 76

13 USEFUL ADDRESSES 80

14 GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 82

APPENDIX A Changes in Fire Safety Legislation

APPENDIX B Case Study: Lanhydrock House

APPENDIX C Supplies for Disaster Recovery and Damage Limitation Programme in Heritage Buildings 89

APPENDIX D Safeguarding Our Built Heritage 90

APPENDIX E Draft Fire Safety Policy

APPENDIX F Sample Hot work permit

APPENDIX G Post Fire Structural Stability

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

COVER Grampian Fire and Rescue Service visit to Castle Fraser, Aberdeenshire (picture: O Crown copyright RCAHMS)

1 Morgan Academy, Dundee. Fire broke out during construction works and spread to destroy 75% of the Category A listed school building. (picture: The Courier, Dundee O DC Thomson & Co. Ltd)

2 Anna Amalia Library, Weimar, Germany. Fire devastated historic fabric and contents resulting in complete loss of part of the library's priceless collection of books. (picture: Per Rohlen)

3 The Bower Building, University of Glasgow. Severe fire damage to roof and interior of this Category A listed teaching and laboratory building. (Picture: Leigh Johnston, Historic Scotland)

4 Duff House, Banffshire. Sympathetic measures to address fire safety needs were a major component of the 1994-1995 conversion project which created a country house gallery housing artworks from the National Galleries of Scotland collection in this Category A listed building (picture: O Historic Scotland)

5 Voids within traditional construction which may aggravate fire spread should be considered when assessing risk. (picture: Per Rohlen)

6 Even in well managed buildings, vigilance is necessary to prevent development of hazardous situations. Here an escape stair has become a temporary storage area and a fire door has been propped open. (picture: Author)

7 Statistics suggest that historic buildings are at greater fire risk during construction works. Appropriate controls and procedures should be put in place to minimise risk. (picture: Author)

8 The developing stage of a fire attributed to hot works during a (nearly complete) programme of refurbishment works which led to the complete loss of this school building. (picture: O The Scotsman Publications Ltd)

9 A catered function special event in this historic house visitor attraction brings additional risks to be considered. (picture: OHistoric Scotland)

10 Decaying external chimney masonry housing flues. Is similar decay occurring behind walllinings or in roof spaces unnoticed giving rise to fire risk? (picture: O Ingval Maxwell)

l l a , b The benefits of compartmentation; complete loss on one side of the compartment wall and fire door, and on the other superficial fabric damage and only minor smoke damage to an archive of rare books. (picture: Per Rohlen)

12 Sympathetic upgrade of doors and frames - here an applied intumescent treatment to panels with a smoke seal incorporated into the stiles and head of the door to improve fire performance. (picture: Author)

13 A wall mounted beam detector used to provide smoke detection whilst avoiding disturbance to ceiling plasterwork. Note also the adjacent dichroic lamp providing emergency lighting. (picture: Author)

14 Discrete locations for call points can often be agreed. In this historic house open to the public, the hidden location on the window joinery also enables wiring to be concealed in existing voids. (picture: Author)

15 Where fire extinguishers are required to meet premises' certificate or licence requirements, subject to the agreement of the fire authority, there is no reason why they should not be allowed to be free standing at identified locations. (picture: Author)

16 Historic fabric impact minimised by locating dry riser inlet valves beneath cast iron cover in footpath. (picture: Paul Beaton, Historic Scotland

17 Concealed sprinkler head located behind circular cover coloured to match ceiling decor (bottom centre); minimising visual intrusiveness. (picture: O Ingval Maxwell)

18 Newhailes, Midlothian. A historic house open to the public whose fabric and contents are protected by a sprinkler system, sympathetically installed to minimise fabric impact. (picture: Author)

19 In this highly decorated Austrian palace interior, a contemporarily detailed floor fixed services 'pole' - housing sprinkler head, electrical services and emergency lighting - provides an innovative solution avoiding the damage to historic wall finishes which conventional installations would give rise to. (picture: Author)

20 Staff receiving fire extinguisher training. (picture: Author)


21 HM Government notice dated 1910 encouraging familiarisation with fire fighting equipment which remains pertinent today - 'extincteurs' being the former term for extinguishers. (source: Historic Scotland)

22 Morgan Academy, Dundee. Managing historic building issues, dealing with psychological loss and the physical loss of student class work as well as the logistics of providing alternative accommodation so that education can continue all have to be addressed in the aftermath of a school fire such as this. (picture: The Courier, Dundee O DC Thomson & Co. Ltd)

23 Successful damage limitation in progress - contents rescued from a country house fire. (picture: Oxfordshire Fire & Rescue Service)

24 Members of a damage limitation team in action. (picture: Author)

25 Schonbrunn Palace, Vienna. Mobile trolleys housing damage limitation equipment and supplies. (picture: Author)

26 Country house hotel gutted by fire. (picture: Historic Scotland)

27 Glass slide pictorial representation of historical fire fighting operations. (source: Author)

28 Grampian Fire and Rescue Service visit to Castle Fraser, Aberdeenshire (picture: O Crown copyright RCAHMS)

29 Fire pond at country house estate (picture: Author)

30 Emergency evacuation of elderly and young visitors and others with special needs must be considered. (picture: O Historic Scotland)

3 1 A major special event brings additional requirements and risks. (picture: O Historic Scotland)

32 Small scale events can sometimes be satisfactorily accommodated without special measures. (picture: O Historic Scotland)

33 Arson damaged main building at former Hartwood Hospital, Lanarkshire. Large complexes of redundant institutional buildings, 'mothballed' pending reuse present particular security problems. (picture: Paul Beaton, Historic Scotland)

35 Arson gutted interior of former Hartwood Hospital, Lanarkshire. Although the substantial masonry external walls remain largely undamaged, the complete loss of timber roof structure leaves fabric open to accelerated decay, seriously jeopardising future reuse potential. (picture: Paul Beaton, Historic Scotland)

36 The Gallery, Lanhydrock House; the subject of a damage limitation exercise. (picture: The National Trust 1 Andreas von Einsiedel)

37 The aftermath of the 1824 Edinburgh Old Town fire, this event led to the creation of the current modem fire service (source: Old and New Edinburgh)

38 Broadstone House, Renfrewshire. Post -fire stabilisation works undenvay. (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

39 Broadstone House. Although appearing precarious, substantially constructed traditional masonry can often be demonstrated to remain stable despite major loss of secondary structural elements. (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

40 Broadstone House, wall head dormer detail. (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

41 Bulging and cracked external masonry caused by expansion of internal metal beam. (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

42 Fire damaged safe lintols with masonry arch over (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

Figure 1: Organisation of Fire Protection

Figure 2: Fire Training Needs

Figure 3: Salvaged object flow

Figure 4: Perils of the night

Figure 5: The Training Cycle

34 A night time blaze destroys all but the steeple of a historic church. (picture: O The Scotsman Publications Ltd )

TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT I N HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Illus I Morgan Academy, Dundee. Fire broke our during consrrrrcrion works and spread to destroy 75% of the Category A listed school b~iilding. (pict~lre: The Courier, Dundee O DC Tlzomson & Co. Ltd)

viii

FOREWORD

The current high level of historic buildings loss to the effects of fire is a cause for significant concern. Over the last decade, Historic Scotland have produced a number of publications endeavouring to assist in the battle against fire loss and damage. Technical Advice Note (TAN) 11: Fire Protection Measures in Scottish Historic Buildings (1997), TAN 14: The Installation of Sprinklers in Historic Buildings (1998), TAN 22: Fire Risk Management of Heritage Bliildings (2001) and the

Historic Scotland are also currently participating in a four year pan-European Co-operation in the field of Science and Technical Research (COST) programme which is investigating the consequences of cultural heritage fire loss, drawing together experience and research developments from across Europe. The information gathered will be made available in an accessible format for end-users prior to the conclusion of the programme.

proceedings emanating from the 1998 Fire Protection This latest Technical Advice Note in Historic Scotland,s and lhe B1rilt at Duff Suite of fire related publications, TAN 28 Fire Safery House published in 1999 have been released to date.

in Blrikiings sets out the role This has been Our continuing that effective management can have in reducing fire

with expert groups and research to loss - whether this involves physical interventions abreast of developments in the field. to improve fire safety or simply the adoption of The 2002 instigation of the Scottish National Historic Buildings Fire Database Project has brought collaboration with Scotland's Fire Authorities. This (at the time of writing ongoing) project will provide property specific information usable by fire and rescue service personnel preparing for and attending incidents at Category A listed buildings where fire has broken out - and ties in with recent changes to fire services' operations placing greater emphasis on pre-planning.

procedures by building users and day to day vigilance to reduce the likelihood of fire occurring. It is hoped that the content will provide helpful guidance on fire safety management for building professionals, property owners and managers and the fire and rescue service.

Ingval Maxwell, OBE Director Technical Conservation, Research and Education Historic Scotland

March 2005


Ill.- - . . -. ,, -.-. ...-.. 1. Fir - --. --.ated ...-. oric fabric and contei.... .---.ring in complete loss of part of the library's priceless collection of books. (picture: Per Rohlen)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Historic Scotland's Technical Advice Notes and Fire Protection Recognising the fundamental threat fire poses to the built heritage and the need to provide accessible guidance for building owners and managers to enable safeguards to be implemented, Historic Scotland has to date produced a series of publications dealing with specific issues pertinent to fire and historic buildings.

TAN 11 : Fire Protectiorz Meas~lres in Scottish Historic Buildings first published in 1997 provided an overview of the whole heritage fire safety problem and focussed in detail on the vulnerability to fire of the fabric of historic buildings, specifically, the way in which traditional construction design sometimes provides an easy route for fire and smoke spread. TAN 11 also reviewed the range of fire safety measures available to counter the impact of fire and examined a number of significant case studies indicating just how vulnerable the Scottish built heritage is. TAN 14: The Installation of Sprinkler Systems in Historic Bllildings published in 1998 continued this theme and introduced the concept of automatic sprinkler systems in heritage buildings. TAN 22: Fire Risk Management in Heritage Bzlildings published in 200 1 carried the work forward by a detailed review of the use of risk assessment as a major tool in the management of fire risk. Tkvo influential case studies were included where the risk assessment process was used, not only to reduce the probability of fire loss, but also to enable the continuing use of two very important listed historic buildings and the protection of their contents.

Like all the publications in this series, this Technical Advice Note 28 is intended to provide authoritative guidance not only for building professionals but also for a wider audience including property owners and managers. As with the other fire related Technical Advice Notes, the contents are also aimed at assisting fire and rescue service officers to achieve a greater understanding of the unique problems implicit in the protection of historic buildings.

The non specialist reader may find that the overview of fire safety management in Chapter 2 of this TAN is a good place to refer in the first instance for specific information. Each of the topics covered briefly there are then expanded elsewhere in the text. A glossary of terms is included near the back of this publication for ease of reference.

1.2 The Risk Posed to Heritage Buildings by Fire Fire can cause the complete destruction of a building and its contents in only a few hours, whilst areas not directly damaged by flame or heat may be damaged by smoke, dirt and falling debris - or by the large volumes of water which may be used in fighting the fire. The loss of a building's contents can be just as devastating; obvious in the context of a museum or gallery collection, but also damaging where a building's significance is heightened by irreplaceable finishes, furnishings, and objects (not necessarily of high financial value) which are an integral part of the social history of the building, its past occupants and usage. In many cases, making good fire loss or damage is undertaken, usually involving considerable financial outlay. However even the best facsimile cannot fully compensate for the loss of authentic original fabric and contents of historic significance from which the unique cultural value and importance of the building derives.

Throughout this publication, the term 'heritage building' is used to encompass both buildings such as listed buildings, whose historic fabric itself is of value, and building such as museums, galleries, libraries and galleries where the contents may be of greater importance than the structure which houses them.

Unfortunately, the nature of the historic fabric or the way in which the building is constructed often aggravates the spread of fire within historic buildings. For example, the presence of voids and cavities inside walls or between elements of the structure can provide a ready avenue for unseen fire and smoke spread. Examination of a number of serious fires has also highlighted the particular problems posed by uncompartmented roof spaces. Older buildings were frequently constructed with little or no fire separation inside roof areas and this can allow the rapid spread of fire from one part of a building to another. Following a fire, buildings may be left structurally unstable, open to wind, weather and vandalism, and also susceptible to decay caused by the high residual moisture content in the fabric.

The 1998 Arson Prevention Bureau study Arson the Major Fire Threat to Places of Worship identified the fact that historic buildings are particular vulnerable to deliberately set fire. Given the ease with which fire can spread in old buildings special consideration should be given to enhanced security precautions. Additionally, the fact that many historic buildings are open to the public, dictates that special consideration should be

TAN 28 FIRE SAFE^ MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

given to the need for appropriate security counter measures. This topic is covered in general terms within this publication.

Records also show that historic buildings are especially vulnerable to fire risk when contractors are on site. The presence of construction personnel, their equipment and supplies appears to give rise to significantly increased risks. The management of contractors and their operations at heritage buildings therefore requires to be carefully handled and this publication offers guidance.

1.3 Addressing the Risk to Heritage Posed by Fire The United States based National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has long had an interest in the protection of historic buildings and their contents. The NFPA estimates that there are on average 89 museum and gallery fires, 198 library fires and more than 1400 church fires each year in the USA. Of these, the museum and library fires alone account for property losses in the region of $7 million. The organisation set up its first committee to draft guidance on protection in this area in 1940 and today, the W A ' s Committee on the Protection of Cultural Resources is responsible for two standards documents: NFPA 909 Code for the Protection of Cultural Resources, (2001) and NFPA

914 Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures, (2001). Both these documents have been extensively rewritten to reflect a performance-based approach to fire protection rather than the traditional, prescriptive approach normally adopted in such standards.

It is perhaps worth briefly examining the difference between the two approaches and the implications for historic buildings. Prescriptive standards are those which require the owner or occupier of a building to undertake specific work or to install particular types of equipment. For example, under the Fire Precautions Act 197 1, a fire authority could require the owner of a property which is being converted into a hotel to install specified types of exit signs at various parts of the building. A performance-based approach would set out rather more general requirements and leave it up to the building owner or their advisors to decide how this is to be implemented. Taking the same example above, the fire authority would require the property to provide adequate means of escape for guests to be able to evacuate in the event of a fire. However exit signs would have to be provided only where a risk assessment suggested that they would be necessary. Recent publications (the BS 7974:2001 series) from the British Standards Institute provide advice and information on the application of fire engineering techniques to

Illus 3 The Bower Building, Universiry of Glasgow. Severejre damage to roof and interior of this Category A listed teaching and laboratory building. (Picture: Leigh Johnston, Historic Scotland)


the design of buildings and although the documents are primarily concerned with new structures, they do contain many potentially useful techniques which can be adopted to enable historic building safety to be enhanced in sympathetic ways.

BS 7913: 1998 'Guide to the principles of conservation of historic buildings' includes a short section covering protection against fire providing a useful overview. There is however a lack of British, European or I S 0 standards specifically relating to heritage buildings of comparable scope to the NFPA publications referred to above. Organisations may therefore choose to use these NFPA documents as guidance and this approach is supported by NFPA's stance on interationationalising its output; NFPA has three European representatives on its Cultural Resources Committee and its standards are widely used in North and South America, South East Asia, the Arabian Gulf and China as well as in Spain and France.

In Europe, a four year project was established in 2002 under the Co-operation in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research (COST) programme following recognition that historic buildings are a finite resource and that the need to address their loss to fire is an issue transcending national boundaries. COST is an intergovernmental frameworkforEuropean co-operation in the field of research to facilitate the co-ordination of nationally funded research at a European level. The intention of COST Action C17: Built Heritage: Fire Loss to Historic Buildings is to investigate the consequences of the significant physical cultural loss of Europe's built heritage to the effects of fire. The project has seen multi-disciplinary, multi-national working through the collaboration and integration of a variety of related projects and partnership country interests and has benefited from Co-operation with the NFPA Cultural Resources Committee. It is also building upon

the range of current research initiatives, and recently published associated material. The outcomes will be the promotion of data and information on methodologies and management systems. This will assist a wide range of end-users to balance fire engineering needs with conservation requirements in the future preservation of European heritage.

In the immediate Scottish context, Historic Scotland has been initiating research into the protection of historic buildings from fire since 1994. The organisation's overall aim is to ensure that measures required to protect occupants, users, and the fabric of historic buildings are appropriate, consistent with conservation principles, and make the best use of the available resources. This work has been supported by an industry-wide Scottish Historic Buildings Fire Liaison Group. The Group convenes, as necessary, to discuss matters of mutual interest, and has advised on the development and drafting of pragmatic published technical guidance.

A further development in this area has been the establishment of a Scottish Historic Buildings National Fire Database. A pilot project carried out by Strathclyde Fire Brigade East Command in 1998 and the examination of Historic Scotland listed building descriptive data formed the basis of this ongoing initiative which has involved co-operation between the eight Scottish Fire & Rescue Services, Historic Scotland and the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Buildings of Scotland. It aims to present operational fire-fighters with up-to-date computerised information on what is at risk from the effects of fire in Scotland's Category A listed buildings. This will assist effectiveness both when drawing up operational plans and when tackling a fire at one of these buildings should fire strike. The database project will also be central to creating a reporting mechanism for the gathering of accurate statistics on fires in historic buildings.


Illus 4 Duff House, Banffshire. Sympathetic measures to addressjre safety needs were a major component of the 1994- 1995 conversion project which created a country house gallery housing artworks ffom the National Galleries of Scotland collection in this Category A listed building (picture: 0 Historic Scotland)

2. PRINCIPLES OF MANAGING FIRE SAFETY

All buildings should have a formal plan which sets out the way fire safety is to be managed. This fire safety plan will detail the responsibilities for fire safety management, and the accountabilities of individual staff members. The plan will also detail in general terms the steps which are to be taken to prevent fires starting, as well as the procedures for responding to outbreaks of fire.

The recently published BS 5588 (2004) Part 12: Fire Precautions in the design, cor~strcrction and crse of buildings: Managing $re safety might also be referred to as this firmly sets out the way fire safety should be managed into the whole context of fire engineering.

It is essential that fire safety in all historic buildings, regardless of size, is managed in a systematic way. This section sets out the various elements that should be incorporated into a structured fire safety plan which will then allow fire problems to be managed methodically. The order and priorities set out in this chapter are based upon the recommendations of Sir Alan Bailey's report into the fire at Windsor Castle. The contents of the information identified under each of the sub-headings below is expanded upon in later chapters as indicated.

2.1 Legal Compliance

In addition to listed building legislation applying to the external and internal fabric of most historic buildings, many heritage buildings are also likely to be subject to further legal controls on account of their use. Places of work will be subject to general fire safety legislation, whilst certain uses may also be subject to fire certification or licensing schemes.

Where legally required under the Fire Precautions Act 1971 fire certificates must be obtained and their requirements fully complied with. This includes the need to gain fire authority approval for any changes. At the time of writing (March 2005) new legislation is before the UK and Scottish Parliaments which will remove the need to obtain fire certificates for designated uses. The likely impact of these changes are summarised in Appendix A.

The Fire Certificate will also often contain requirements relating to the maximum number of persons who may be present in the building and these, as well as measures relating to fire drills and training of staff which must be observed. Other specific legislation must also be complied with including the need to acquire permits and licenses for specific activities.

Conversionor alterationofexisting buildings willusually necessitate obtaining statutory approvals under the Building Standards legislation in addition to the relevant planning permissions and listed building consents where applicable. When considering fire performance upgrading works, it should be acknowledged that Building Standards Legislation and Fire Regulations have been framed primarily to deal with proposals for new buildings. When formulating proposals for historic buildings a more flexible approach is often called for, which will include a rigorous assessment of the need for proposed works and an exploration of alternative strategies, set against their likely impact on the fabric of the building. In most cases such an approach will enable a sympathetic solution to be developed meeting the spirit, if not the full requirements of the regulations, whilst minimising impact on the historic building.

It must be noted that compliance with Building Standards legislation, fire certification and other statutory requirements provides a very basic fire safety benchmark. Building owners and managers must understand that mere legal compliance guarantees nothing more than verification that the life safety provisions of the building meet the legal minimum and that protection of fabric may be limited. Further measures are likely to be necessary to provide the best level of protection for the building itself against the effects of fire. (For more information see Chapter 5). It should also be noted that even where fire safety improvements are needed to comply with legislation, this does not absolve the owners of listed buildings from applying for and obtaining the necessary Listed Building Consent.

The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 were amended in 1999. These regulations impose a duty on every employer to provide adequate precautions in the workplace in case of fire. The regulations make explicit the risk assessment requirement mentioned above. The assessments should take account of fire- fighting equipment, any fire detection, emergency routes and exits and their maintenance. The employer should also include in their assessment employees and visitors who may have special needs or may be unfamiliar with the evacuation strategy or the escape routes. This requirement applies to any workplace and includes buildings where the general public have access.

The employer is also required to arrange any necessary contacts with external emergency services, particularly with regard to rescue work and fire-fighting. These regulations are enforced by the fire authority.


2.2 Policy Statement Each organisation should have a written fire safety policy statement. The policy should reflect their intentions to provide a safe and controlled working environment and should be signed off at the highest level. Fire safety policies should form part of the organisation's fire safety manual (see 2.4) and should be posted in prominent locations. Effective internal mechanisms should exist to ensure that the policy is subject to regular review and takes account of special or occasional events. In large organisations with devolved management or many locations there may need to be additional local policy statements. (For more information see Section 3.1)

2.3 Fire Safety Personnel Each organisation should appoint an individual at senior level as the Fire Safety Manager with specific responsibility to implement the organisation's fire safety policy. The post can often be combined with similar functions such as security or safety, while smaller organisations may expect an existing manager to undertake this duty. (For more information see Section 3.2)

Where appropriate, particularly in larger establishments or multi site operations, the Fire Safety Manager may be assisted by a full-time, specialist, fire officer. This individual can bring professional expertise in the areas of fire engineering and fire safety management skills

to bear on the problem and his role supplements the expertise and experience of the Fire Safety Manager. (For more information see Section 3.3)

2.4 Record Keeping All premises or sites should develop and maintain a Fire Safety Manual setting out the location's fire strategy and detailing plans for action in case of fire, and to act as a basis for training. Individual locations should also maintain a Fire Log Book to record all fire- related events such as training, drills, inspections by the insurance company or fire and rescue services and full details of equipment maintenance. (See Section 3.5)

In these litigious times the value of comprehensive records cannot be over-emphasised.

2.5 Fire Risk Assessment Since the introduction of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 (as amended) there has been an explicit duty on employers to cany out an assessment of the risks fire might pose to their employees or others who might use their premises. In the case of heritage buildings the risk assessment has other values and will form the basis for risk improvement and risk reduction activity. For a more in-depth explanation of the techniques, reference should be made to the Historic Scotland publication TAN22 Fire Risk Management in Heritage Buildings (Kidd, 2001).

Zllus 5 Voids within traditional construction which may aggravate jre spread should be considered when assessing risk. (picture: Per Rohlen)


2.6 Physical Fire Safety Improvements The fire risk assessment will have identified the structural features of the building that will create problems of fire or smoke spread. A plan for implementation of physical fire safety improvements should be drawn up identifying priorities for action which may include establishing or upgrading fire separation between areas, segregating areas of high fire risk and providing protected escape routes. For more information see Chapter 5.

which will include specific instruction in the correct use of fire fighting equipment.

The organisation should also appoint sufficient fire wardens or fire marshals to ensure that fire evacuations can be carried out safely and efficiently. Fire drills, involving all staff (and visitors) should take place at least every 12 months. (For more information see Chapter 6)

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d i ~ ~ on impact on historic fabric, tvorks to effect 2.11 Residential Accommodation and Staff Welfare

fire safety improvements within listed buildings are likely to require Listed Building Consent and early Where premises include any form of residential discission with the ~ o c a l ~ u t h o r i t y planning department accommodation (including private apartments, staff is recommended when formulating proposals. apartments, lettable holiday accommodation and other

living spaces) these should be included in fire audits and 2.7 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems inspections. Staff rest rooms (official and unofficial)

The installation of a modem, reliable fire detection and and smoking areas should also be subjected to audit and system should be seen as a hig-, priority. inspection. (For more information see Section 10.1)

where not specifically required by law such systems provide a significant life, property and asset protection 2.12 of Contractors and Maintenance

advantage and are always recommended by insurers. Activity Around 20% of all large fires result either directly or

In most cases (and in all cases where buildings are indirectly from construction or maintenance activity. located in rural or remote areas), the system should be In particular, inadequately controlled 'hot work' (that provided with a communications link to the fire service

is, work involving heat producing equipment such as via an approved control centre. (For more information welding, cutting, grinding, tar boiling and paint stripping) see Chapter 5.

which is responsible formillions of pounds of fire damage

2.8 Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Most buildings are supplied with fire fighting equipment such as portable fire extinguishers, fire blankets and hose reels for use by occupants. A full description of the various items of equipment and their purpose is given in Chapter 5.

2.9 Automatic Fire Suppression Systems In certain instances consideration can be given to the installation of automatic fire suppression systems. These employ water mist, sprinklers or gas flooding discharge systems which operate locally to suppress or control a fire. Their use can be advantageous in heritage buildings since they offer potential to both minimise fire loss and an alternative technological means of upgrading protection, with potential for reduced impact when compared to more conventional approaches which can be very destructive of historic fabric. (For more information see Section 5.10)

2.10 Staff Training Systematic and effective training programmes should be introduced to ensure that all staff (including part- time employees and volunteers) know how to minimise fire risks, how to raise the alarm in case of fire and to provide enough trained staff to tackle incipient fires quickly. In addition to basic training for all staff, some groups such as security personnel, maintenance staff and the catering team, may require additional training

every year. While clear fire safety requirements should be included in all contracts for building, maintenance and other work, it is suggested that in many cases there are alternative ways of working which could eliminate the use of heat. In all but the smallest organisations a formal system of 'hot work' permits should be put in place. (For more information see Section 3.8)

2.13 Liaison with the Fire & Rescue Service All planning aimed at minimising the impact of a fire should include involvement of the fire and rescue service (as most fire brigades are now styled). For example, arranging for the attendance of fire appliances at a drill or exercise will benefit all parties and will ensure that crews from the local fire station are able to familiarise themselves with the site. Meetings should be held to ensure that the fire personnel are aware of forthcoming special activities such as major exhibitions and special functions, or of temporary changes in building layouts. Where there are significant changes, such as the long- term presence of contractors on a site, the fire and rescue service should also be informed immediately.

Larger organisations may receive a visit from a Fire Safety Officer employed by the fire authority for the region. This officer will want a more in-depth appreciation of the site and its features and may, for example, suggest that an exercise should be arranged on the premises. From time to time, an officer from the enforcement or legislative branch of the Fire Authority may also visit. This individual is primarily concerned

~ TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

to ensure that staff and visitors are able to escape from the premises in the event of a fire and that activities on the site comply with relevant legislation (For more information see Chapter 8).

2.14 Business and Property Records Even the smallest organisation depends to a greater or lesser extent on its financial and business records and archives. All vital records and data should be duplicated and one set secured in a protected, off-site location.

In the event of fire, swift access to such resources as building and engineering drawings as well as general files relating to the building and its insurance will be vital. For more information see Chapter 7).

2.15 Co-ordination with Insurers The question of the insurance valuation to be applied to a building or its contents has created many difficulties in the past - getting valuations wrong can result in, at

one extreme, paying too much for insurance, or at the other, being under-insured.

In all but the simplest cases it will probably be cost- effective to obtain professional help in valuation. There are a number of reputable companies who specialise in the valuation of historic buildings, fine art and antiques. In most cases it is likely that the cost of the valuation exercise will be greatly outweighed by either a saving in the costs of insurance or through the reassurance of better cover and the knowledge that problems arising from under-insurance should not become an issue in the event of a claim.

Insurance brokers can also be a useful source of advice - particularly those who have an expertise in heritage buildings and their contents.

Insurers are always keen to support any measures that have the effect of reducing the probability and consequences of a fire. It therefore makes good sense to discuss any proposed upgrading of fire safety provisions with insurers.

FIRE SAFETY STRUCTURE

3.1. Fire Safety Policy Service College and the Scottish Fire Services College

~~~h historic building or set of premises should have a offer suitable courses that are generally of one week's

written fire safety policy statement. duration.

The policy should reflect the organisation's intentions to provide a safe and controlled working environment and should be signed off at the highest level. Fire safety policies should form part of the fire safety manual (see section 3.5) and should be communicated to employees. This could be in the form of a notice or by inclusion in a staff or employee handbook. Once the policy has been approved and issued it should become the focus of all fire safety activity and should be referred to before any decision is taken which would involve any substantive change in the way fire safety is managed or in the way a property is protected. As already noted, regular reviews of the policy should be undertaken by a competent person and if a special event or other activity is being contemplated which might have an impact on the fire safety of the property then it may be necessary to revise the policy.

The presence of a policy not only sets out the declared intentions of the building's management or owners but is a clear statement of the importance with which the threat of fire is viewed and the seriousness with which counter measures will be applied. Policy documents such as this are likely to be of great value should an incident arise which results in litigation. It should be noted that all documentation will be disclosable to any party to litigation, as well as to organisations such as the Health and Safety Executive.

An example of a standard fire safety policy statement is set out in Appendix E.

3.2. Fire Safety Manager Larger organisations should appoint a named individual as the location's Fire Safety Manager with specific responsibility to implement the organisation's fire safety policy. Smaller properties or institutions may expect an existing manager to fulfil this role and the post can often be successfully combined with similar functions such as security or health and safety. There is no one standard solution that will meet the needs of all organisations. What is certain is that the individual appointed must be capable and competent. Should specialist training of the appointed person be required, a number of organisations, including some fire and rescue services, the Fire Protection Association, the Fire

Where the post is to be combined with another job function (for example an engineering, property or facilities management role) then the amount of time the post holder is expected to devote to fire safety matters should be made clear.

The designated fire safety manager may assume some legal responsibilities (for example, when the Fire (Scotland) Bill becomes law, the manager might well assume the specific responsibilities of the employer or the person responsible for managing premises). The appointment of the fire safety manager does not absolve directors, trustees or individual managers or other staff of their legal responsibilities for managing functions safely. However the fire safety manager should be seen as a corporate resource and auditor rather than the person to whom all fire safety tasks can be delegated and forgotten.

3.3. Fire Safety Officer Where appropriate, particularly in the very largest establishments or organisations, the Fire Safety Manager (who will invariably have other duties) may be assisted by a full-time, specialist, fire officer.

Personnel employed in these Fire Safety Officer posts are often former fire fighters (either local authority, armed forces or industrial) and their practical experience can be invaluable, particularly when complemented by specialist fire safety or fire prevention training. It is likely however that the work of the Fire Safety Officer will be focussed on inspections, training and equipment maintenance - so a lack of formal fire fighting experience should not exclude an otherwise well-qualified candidate.

Current legislation requires an employer to appoint competent persons to assist and advise them in relation to compliance with health and safety law. The appointment of a fire safety officer would help to discharge this responsibility. Some organisations may wish to contract out some of these responsibilities and consider appointing a non-employee to the role of Competent Person; this is likely to permitted under the new legislation. The role could be filled by an individual consultant or even by a company which provides such services.

3.4. Fire Safety Structure in Smaller Premises

The formalised structure for managing fire safety described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 above is clearly inappropriate in many settings - particularly those relating to private dwellings. A better and more suitable approach in these circumstances might be to relate the need for a formal fire safety management structure to the activities which take place within the property. These can be defined in the following terms:

A. Premises which are used solely or as a family residence and where staff undertake only activities related to domestic or estate management activities.

In category D properties, where more than five people (including guests and staff but not including the owner's family) sleep in the property elsewhere than on the ground floor, the property will have to comply with the Fire Precautions (Hotels and Boarding Houses) Order 1972. This legislation allows the fire authority to set out specific fire requirements. It should be noted that the 1972 Order may be repealed in 2005 and it is likely that replacement legislation will be more flexible in its approach to requirements for properties where only a few guests are accommodated.

3.5 Fire Safety Manual

B. Premises to which the public are admitted on a very All larger premises or sites should develop and maintain few days each year; a Fire Safety Manual setting out the location's fire

C. Premises where the public are admitted to the strategy and detailing plans for action in case of fire and as a basis for training. The Manual is perhaps best grounds and the property or part of the property on a

regular basis. likened to the handbook of a car - a document setting out how the property works, when to have it serviced . . .

D. Properties used to provide sleeping accommodation and the spare parts to order when replacements are for paying guests. needed.

Current UK legislation (which is due to change in the spring of 2005) does not impose any specific duties on premises which fall into category A. Even though staff are employed, none of the existing fire safety legislation is deemed to apply. The fire safety regime is therefore an informal one and should be managed in accordance with the general criteria laid down below. This mirrors much of what should be done in the regulated environment but can be done in a more informal way.

Ensure that all full and part time staff are aware who is in charge of fire safety and how the fire brigade is to be called.

Undertake regular inspections for fire hazards and correct any deviations from good practice.

Train staff and family what to do if there is a fire. Make sure everyone knows how to get out of the property and where to meet.

Provide an appropriate type and number of fire extinguishers, train staff and family how to use these and maintain the equipment. Provide a fire blanket in every kitchen.

Consider setting up regular contact with the nearest fire station.

In the case of properties in category B it may be necessary to undertake a more formal approach depending on the numbers of persons employed or at work. For example, if teas or meals are provided or if a shop is operated the property could be classed as a work place and full compliance with current and future legislation may be demanded.

Category C type locations are also places of work and must therefore comply fully with the law.

All fire safety systems and components should be detailed in the fire safety manual which should include: drawings, especially floor plans showing locations of fire extinguishers; hose reels; hydrant points; gas shut offs and the like; wiring diagrams, charts, specification sheets and replacement parts lists. The manual should also incorporate the operational, service and maintenance instructions for fire protection systems and equipment, together with details of any modifications or upgrades undertaken on the equipment. Whenever improvements are made to structural fire safety, or when new equipment is introduced, this should be recorded in the Manual which should be revised accordingly and kept up to date. A copy of the fire safety policy document and all fire risk assessments should also be incorporated into the fire safety manual.

Where construction works have been undertaken on the building since October 1994, with a few exceptions such as domestic premises, a Health and Safety File (issued under the Constrltction Design andManagement Reglllations 1994) is likely to exist for the property. Care should be taken to ensure that both this and the Fire Safety Manual are kept up to date.

3.6 Fire Safety Log Book The Fire Safety Log Book which should also be maintained for all historic buildings is a separate day to day working document, in which to make a note of all fire-related events and compliments the reference document role of the Fire Safety Manual. The Fire Safety Log Book is used to continuously record information such as:

Fire training sessions undertaken or delivered - including the duration of the event, the content and the names of those who attended.

I TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Fire drills undertaken - including the time, duration and the names of those who participated. The record should include a comments column for noting any particular problems or other observations. If a problem or difficulty has been encountered details of the remedy should also be provided.

Inspections or visits by the insurance company, fire brigade or other persons including brief details of any observations made.

Full details of all fire equipment and fire systems maintenance including emergency lighting. It is suggested that this information is recorded in the Fire Safety Log Book even when there are separate maintenance logs for equipment such as fire detection or alarm systems.

Details of any fire incidents, false alarms or other matters of interest together with the responses or remedial action taken.

In these litigious times the value of comprehensive records cannot be over-emphasised. The value of the information in the Fire Safety Log Book may be critical in, for example, convincing a court that everything reasonable has been done to manage fire - or in persuading an insurer that policy conditions have been met. This means that where locations may chose to keep the information electronically, care should be taken to ensure that adequate backup arrangements are in effect. Where only a paper record is kept, consideration should be given to storing it in a suitable fire resistant storage unit or safe.

A number of organisations including the Fire Protection Association and Croner Publishing produce a suitable 'skeleton' record-keeping book for use as a fire safety log book. Some fire and rescue services and local fire safety groups also make available printed booklets which contain space for record keeping.

3.7 Routine Inspections, Check Lists and Hazard Spotting

Checklists are a useful way of ensuring that a proper routine is followed when conducting the various checks and activities which are essential in complying with the fire safety plan

3.7.1 On a daily basis, prior to opening tlte premises or admitting the public tlie following checks should be made:

Secondary locking devices unlocked and chains removed from fire escape doors.

Fire control panel showing correct indications ('green lights')

Fire extinguishers which may have been moved are returned to the correct locations

All fire doors which should be shut or locked are in the correct position

Fire exit signs are lit and visible

Any open fire is extinguished or protected by fire guards

Ashes from open fires removed from building in steel container with lid and disposed of safely

Wastebaskets which were not emptied at the end of previous day's work and any combustible rubbish (including empty cardboard boxes) removed to a secure place

Security staff, wardens or others such as telephone operators briefed on any special events, activities

Any building work scheduled is covered by the appropriate permits (see section 3.8.2) and the necessary fire zones isolated and staff notified.

3.7.2 After closing for the day tlie following shorcld be ven3ed:

External fire exit doors secured

Fire alarm panel showing correct indications

Internal doors closed

Fire exit signs illuminated

Night telephone line checked

Open fires checked / extinguished

Wastebaskets emptied and combustible rubbish (including empty cardboard boxes) removed to a secure place

All building work has ceased, permits (see 3.7.1.) withdrawn and work sites inspected

3.7.3 On a weekly basis the following should be carried out:

Check fire exit routes are unobstructed, that door locking devices operate correctly and walk external escape routes to ensure that they are also clear

Seals on fire extinguishers checked

Fire extinguishers with pressure gauges checked for correct reading

Hose reel cupboards opened to check for leaks or signs of corrosion

Fire alarm system tested (including direct link to central station)

Visual check of emergency lighting to ensure that where appropriate the orange or red LEDs (Light Emitting Diodes) are lit or that those lights which should be permanently on are working.

Visual check for fire hazards -

electrical appliances

extension leads

overloaded sockets

unauthorised equipment

signs of illicit smoking

safe storage of flammables, gases, chemicals etc

3.7.4 On a monthly basis the following should be checked:

The posted Fire Instructions or Fire Procedures up to date

Fire wardens list up to date

Call out list up to date

Emergency lighting checked for correct operation1 charging

3.8 Managing Fire Safety During Construction or Building Maintenance Works Each year since 1998, UK fire records show that between 400 and 500 lires on construction sites were reported to the fire and rescue services. However the actual number of fires during the erection, modification or conversion of buildings is known to be much higher as there are estimated to be around 10 or 15 times as many unreported fires.

Reference to the toll of fires in historic buildings suggests that such buildings are particularly vulnerable during building works - not only as a result of fires started directly by construction processes but also as a consequence of the presence of contractors, their tools and their materials in the building.

Illus 6 Even in well managed buildings, vigilance is necessary to prevent development of hazardous situations. Here an escape stair has become a temporary storage area and afire door has been propped open. (picture: Author)


- -<-

V';" ri,, -.

G- . , t--; - - , I

rent a car L

Illus 7 Statistics suggest that historic buildings are at greater fire risk during constructioi and procedures should be put in place to minimise risk. (picture: Author)

rks. Appropriate controls

It should also be noted that fires can occur even during what may be regarded as minor maintenance activity or work being undertaken by in-house labour. It is therefore essential to ensure that all such work is implemented safely and with due regard to the risk of fire.

requirements do not take into account the dangers posed to existing buildings.

Greaterprotection against fire riskis offeredby adherence to the more onerous requirements of the Joint Code of Practice on the Protection from Fire of Construction Sites and Buildings Undergoing Renovation, first published in 1992 by the Building Employers Confederation and the Loss Prevention Council and now in its 5th edition (Fire Protection Association, 2000). When procuring larger works (say with a value of £500,000 or over) a proper contractual responsibility should be imposed which requires compliance with the Joint Code. There may be some merit in considering adopting the terms of the Joint Code for all structural work in historic buildings - including this requirement in initial enquiries or in specifications will ensure that contractors fully understand the seriousness with which the owner of the building views the need for proper management of fire safety.

A 10 year study published by the Fire Protection Association in 1999 suggests that the causes of fires on construction sites and buildings undergoing refurbishment can be broadly classified as follow

Arson

'Hot Work'- Construction methods involving heat

Misused or defective electrical equipment

Smoking materials/naked flarnes/burning rubbish

Powered equipment (ie plant, diesel generators)

Cooking/clothes drying

All current UK building and construction standards (including the CDM Regulations, the Joint Code, the Fire Precautions Crown Premises and the PACE Fire Safety Guide (see below) suggest a managed approach to the problems of fire safety on construction sites as follows:

Statistics indicate that the total cost of these fires amounts to more than £40 million worth of damage each year.

While compliance with the statutory requirements of the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996, applicable to almost all construction work, offers some protection against the risks of fire, these basic

Design Phase: the risk from fire resulting from the proposed works should be properly assessed and minimised.

Construction Phase: a plan, detailing responsibilities for:

fire safety;

site fire precautions, fire detection and alarm;

control of Hot Work;

site accommodation (including the design and location of temporary buildings);

site evacuation procedures;

liaison with the fire and rescue service;

staff training

security measures against arson

safe storage of materials (including flammables)

safe use of energy

The Joint Code also provides useful guidance on related issues including temporary methods of fire protection, temporary protection of finished surfaces and the management of waste.

In some circumstances, particularly if the works contract value exceeds £5 million, the Contractor's own insurance company may make compliance with the Joint Code a requirement for continuing insurance cover.

In the case of Crown Premises, an equivalent document to the Joint Code published by DOE in 1995 and entitled Standard Fire Preca~rtions for Contractors Engaged on Crown iYorks as well as the guidance contained in the Property Advisors to the Civil Estate (PACE) Fire Safety Guide is applicable.

3.8.1 Typical fire hazards to be considered during Construction Works

Propane and butane bottled gases are commonly used in construction and maintenance activity and they should be carefully handled. Cylinders should only be used when chained or secured upright. When not in use, cylinder valves should be shut off. Hoses and connectors should be fitted with flashback arresters and checked for wear regularly.

low flash points. Their vapours are also generally heavier than air and thus may accumulate to form an explosive concentration. All heavier than air vapours may travel considerable distances before being ignited. In one recent fire vapour travelled more than 80metres from a kitchen before being ignited by a boiler pilot light. All such substances pose serious fire hazards and where used must be stored in purpose-made metal storage cabinets

There is also a risk from certain types of temporary electrical connections and lighting units. A number of fires in historic buildings have been caused by high intensity quartz halogen lights - their use should not be permitted except under strict controls as the heat produced by these lamps can quickly ignite nearby combustible materials. Quartz halogen lights must never be left switched on in areas after work ceases or when there is no one around.

All electrical installations (including temporary arrangements) should comply with the latest edition of the BS7671: 2001 Requirements for electrical installations, 1EE winning regulations, 16th edition. and the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989. Temporary wiring installations should be of a higher standard than permanent installations due to the rough treatment they may have to withstand and should be inspected and tested at intervals - at least every three months. Where possible, contracts for construction works should specify the use of 110 volt electrical equipment using approved transformers and supply cabling. Such systems are safer for personnel and the equipment is designed to withstand rough handling so is much less likely to provide an ignition source for a fire due to damage.

The burning of rubbish in or near a historic building can be extremely hazardous and should be prohibited by contract conditions. Under no circumstances should fireplaces ever be used for rubbish burning. However on certain very large contracts where there are adequate facilities, and an exemption has been granted by the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, rubbish burning may be permitted if it can be demonstrated that this can be done in complete safety.

The possibility of false fire alarms resulting from dust and smoke generated by construction work should also be considered and care should be taken to ensure that fire detection sensors, sprinkler heads, hydrants, extinguishers, fire alarm call points and other fire equipment are both suitably protected and kept free of obstruction. If smoke detectors or sprinkler heads are to be covered for the duration of work then a procedure

Care should be taken in the use of flammable liquids must be put in place to ensure that covers are removed - especially adhesives for laying tiles or flooring at the end of each working day. (See Section 5.6 for materials and paint thinners and cleaning solvents. more information on managing unwanted fire alarm These are all likely to contain flammable liquids with actuations.)


3.8.2 Control of Hot Work, Permits and Procedures and Presumptions Against Hot Work Any construction process or activity which uses or produces heat is referred to as 'hot work' and includes the use of:

I Blowlamps (including hot air equipment) as used for plumbing, paint removal and the like.

I Welding or cutting equipment

I Grinding or cutting equipment which can create sparks or large quantities of heat

I Direct application of heat or flames as used in brazing copper piping or in lead work

LP gas when used for tar and bitumen spreading or for the installation of waterproof membranes in roofs and elsewhere.

Between 1998 and 2002 the Fire Protection Association recorded 55 serious fires attributable to hot work with a total estimated loss of more than £41 million. Wherever possible Hot Work should be designed out and banned on site, for example by specifying compression rather than soldered plumbing fittings or prefabrication of lead details to transfer welding off site. Specifications should avoid methods such as 'burning off' and contract conditions should be written to minimise fire risks. Where on site hot work is unavoidable, a formal hot work control procedure should be put in place to ensure that such works are only permitted under strictly controlled circumstances.

These permits should set out procedures to be adopted requiring (as far as possible) that any combustible materials are removed from the immediate area before work starts. The permit should also require fire extinguishers to be immediately available and the staff undertaking the work to be trained in their use. The

Illus 8 The developing stage of ajire uui-iburcd to lzor ~ ~ . o r - h ~ d~~i.iizg U (i~cu1.1~ cu~l~pletc) ~ I . O ~ I . U I I E I I E ~ oj'~~eJ'ui~bisI~rrier~t works which led to the complete loss of this scchool building. (picture: 0 The Scotsman Publications Ltd)


work area should be monitored both during the work to works being implemented, method statements afford and for at least one hour after work ceases. This will a means of ensuring that risks are identified so that ensure that there is no smouldering material or potential they can be satisfactorily addressed or eliminated. The for fire to develop. A sample hot works permit is set out final agreed statement then provides clear guidance for in Appendix F. personnel implementing the work on the methods to be

adhered to. 3.8.3 Metliod Statements As a further means of exercising strict control over works, the person responsible for administering the 3.8.4 Site Briefing and induction of contractor contract should consider requesting the submission of formal statements detailing the way in which parts of Prior to any work starting, even on small contracts, the wider project, and specific processes or operations all contractor and sub contractor personnel should be are to be managed. Statements should make it clear familiarised with the premises and the procedures to be what tools and equipment are to be used, how the work followed in the event of fire. Before commencing work is to be camed out and by whom. Details should also they should be instructed on the layout of the building, be submitted of the materials to be used including how to sound the fire alarm, and the nearest means of information on their fire properties as well as possible escape. A check should also be made to ensure that interaction with other substances. Submitted for appropriate fire extinguishing equipment is available comment, revision as necessary and final approval prior and that all are familiar with its method of operation.

FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT

4.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment & Risk Management The assessment of the possible impacts of risks to occupants' safety within virtually all buildings (other than those used for solely domestic purposes) is now a well-established legal duty. Legislation requiring fire risk assessments to be undertaken has been in place in the UK since 1997.

The objectives of a fire risk assessment are:

to review the various features that characterise a building and its occupant organisation

to establish the likely hazards that exist for the building and its users, and

to determine the probable impact of fire in the premises.

Once a fire risk assessment has been carried out,. the next step of the process is to consider how the risks identified can be addressed using the technique of risk management.

Confusion often arises between the concepts of 'risk assessment' and 'risk management'. These terms are now used in many guidance documents as well as in insurance reports. For the purposes of this Technical Advice Note, risk management is best described as: the application of standard management techniques to the identiJcation of the hazards to which buildings and their contents might be exposed, followed up by elimination, control or acceptance of those hazards.

Grading the problem areas identified by the risk assessment procedure will assist in the management of risk, allowing prioritisation of resource allocation to eliminate orreduce hazards wherepossible, and adoption of methods for dealing with those that remain.

Key terms in the principles of risk assessment are 'risk' Before beginning the risk assessment process it is

and 'hazard,. Although these words are often used sensible to review the existing measures in place to

interchangeably in everyday speech they have quite prevent and detect fires in order to determine whether

separate meanings which must be clearly distinguished there are any weaknesses. risk management

when used in the risk assessment context. A is measures to correct or lessen the likely impact of these

essentially an unsafe condition that lead to - will reduce vulnerability to both fire and the losses

for example a loose piece of carpet upon which someone from fire 'ghting activity- * -

could trip. 'Risk' is the possible impact on the person or property which might result from interaction with the hazard, taking into account the likelihood that this will happen - for example the chance of someone tripping on the loose carpet, falling and injuring themselves and damaging building fabric or furnishings on their way down. Risk is therefore more accurately defined as 'the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time'

A fire risk assessment will consider a range of factors including the layout and structure of the building, the combustibility of fabric and fittings and possible sources of ignition. The number of persons likely to be present and the activities they are undertaking will also be taken into account. In addition, in the case of historic buildings and those containing valuable or culturally- important contents, consideration should be extended to include the risks to the building fabric and contents as appropriate.

4.2 Legal Requirements Risk assessment of all hazards likely to cause injury to employees and others is a requirement of European Community legislation. These requirements, incorporated in the Framework Directive (June 1989) and Workplace Directive (November 1989), are now incorporated in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Reg~ilations 1999 (The Management Reg~llations), the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and the Fire Precal~tions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 (as amended) ' In carrying out such assessments The Management Regulations require all risks to the health and safety of employees to be considered. Consideration must also encompass any other persons whose health and safety could be affected by the employer's business activities. This would include people who might reasonably be expected to be present in the location being examined. For example residents in an hotel, the patients in a

1 These regulations are likely to be replaced throughout the UK during 2005. See Appendix A for more information.


Illus 9 A careredfunction special event in this historic house visitor attraction brings additional risks which will require to be considered. (picture: 0 Historic Scotland)

hospital, visitors to a museum or school children using Security threats will increase if scaffolding is a public library for research work. erected, as external access will be much easier

It is emphasised that the fire risk assessment required . ~h~~~ will be a measurable increase in fire risk under these pieces of legislation is concerned with the risk fire presents to people. In heritage buildings the There will be an impact on a range of health and scope of the fire risk assessment should be extended to safety risks due to the fact that the contractor's include the property's fabric and contents. personnel working in the building are unlikely

Risk assessments should be repeated regularly - at to be as well controlled as the occupying

least every 12 months. Any significant change in the organisation's own employees

way a building is arranged and or special A reappraisal will also be required where major changes circumstances which arise, should prompt a repeat of are to take place. For example the opening up of further

the assessment. Triggers for a new risk assessment areas of a building to the public or the partial conversion might include: of the building to accommodate other uses.

The assessment must necessarily involve the two Special events (including the provision of food or quite distinct factors - the hazard and the risk. fie alcohol) legislation requires that all hazards are identified, that Temporary Exhibitions the associated risks are assessed and if necessary, are

subjected to appropriate amelioration. Changes to buildingslstaff

Seasonal changes

Access in bad weather

Variations in staffing levels

4.3 Carrying Out a Risk Assessment There are five parts to the risk assessment process:

Outdoor exhibitions, festivals and concerts Identification of hazards especially where fireworks and pyrotechnics are used Identification of who or what is at risk

Use of the premises for filming Evaluation of the risk and the carrying out of improvements

Contractors commencing building work in part of the . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d i ~ ~ findings and action taken building and the resulting risk impact in the affected area provides an example: Review and revision

The outcome of the final assessment will determine likely priority for the elimination, reduction or control whether the premises, or parts of it, are to be categorised of the identified hazards, thereby eradicating or reducing as being of: the risk. A full explanation of risk scoring is given in

sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 of TAN 22. High risk - this implies that major work needs to

This reasoned approach should begin to suggest a be undertaken

programme of priorities for which suitable solutions Normal risk - this suggests that there is little that should be sought and may prove useful in supporting needs to be done a case for the allocation of the necessary funding.

Low risk - this is an unlikely outcome in a historic Other factors such as cost, the extent of invasive work

building but would indicate that the level of risk necessary and the degree of disruption resulting are also

was wholly acceptable and that no improvements likely to impact on this decision making.

were necessary. When it is decided to undertake improvements in, for example, fire compartmentation, the objectives of the works, as identified in the risk assessment, should be

The risk category allocated will determine the sort of continuously borne in mind:

precautionary measures required and will also be the starting point in the formulation of any emergency and Is the work being undertaken damage limitation plans (see Section 7). In many cases the risk rating will be a useful indicator as to priorities to prevent fire? for risk improvement and for allocation of resources. to contain fire? In carrying out a fire risk assessment, it is necessary to . to control the spread of smoke? consider the following factors:

to protect the structure of the building from The number of people present in the premises collapse?

The use to which the premises are put It is only by continuous reappraisal of the objectives that

Structural features of the buildings and site a satisfactory outcome can be achieved which addresses

The level of fire compartmentation stated aims whilst at the same time minimising impact on the historic fabric.

The exit routes for building occupants For example, a typical fire risk assessment in an historic

Furnishings and surface finishes present and their building might indicate the following unsatisfactory fire performance features or hazards:

Contents of the premises

Sources of ignition present

Storage of materials

Use of flammable materials.

1. High fire risk from defective chimney flues

2. Possibility of delayed discovery of fire outbreak

3. Probability of fire spread from kitchen via unstopped service shaft

4. Arson risk from insecure rear windows of store As previously noted to be effective the risk assessment

rooms process has to be repeated whenever circumstances change and a record should be made of the

These factors can be ranked according to their probable risk assessments carried out. This is so that if an incident consequences or according to the likely cost of their does occur, it is possible to demonstrate to the insurers

rectification and a work programme established. or the courts that appropriate steps had been taken to

Remedial action could involve the following: safeguard building users and to protect the property.

The simplest (and cheapest) way to counter (1) would be to discontinue the practice of using the fireplaces that

4.4 Applying Risk Assessment to Inform the lead to that particular chimney. If this were not possible Management of an Historic Building then the chimney flues would have to be inspected and If risk assessment principles are applied correctly then in relined. any given building, the process will have produced data identifying fire hazards and evaluating the associated In the case of (2) either a 24 hour presence would need

risks. to be assured or an automatic fire detection system installed.

The scoring or ranking of risks and their possible consequences as part of the process should determine a In the case of (3) fire resistant materials could be used

to seal the shaft


In (4) the security weakness could be eliminated by adequate physical security measures to prevent entry.

Fire risk assessment in historic buildings is covered extensively in Chapter 2 of TAN 22 Fire Risk Improvement in Historic Buildings, whilst the two major projects referred to in Chapters 5 and 6 of TAN 22 provide some excellent examples of this process in practice.

Illus 10 Decaying external chimney masonry housing flues. Is similar decay occurring behind wall linings or in roof spaces unnoticed giving rise to fire risk? (picture: O Ingval Maxwell)

4.5 Insurance for Historic Buildings Dealing with insurance is often found to be perplexing by those who manage historic buildings. This may be due in part to lack of understanding of the way in which the insurance industry is organised, and partly on account of the insurance business's recent shift towards direct provision of standardised policies, often unsuited to the peculiarities of historic buildings.

Many of the larger companies (often called composites because they sell not just property, motor and liability insurance policies but also life assurance and other financial products) have moved away from detailed examination of the risks they are asked to provide cover for in favour of formulaic standard policies. These are usually based on standard computer models with little flexibility and are frequently delivered by staff in call centres. Unfortunately, whilst offering the industry and consumers economies of scale, these products are often incapable of accommodating the unusual requirements posed by historic buildings and their contents which can rarely be said to be in any way 'standardised'. Many insurers now will simply not consider providing cover

for buildings constructed before 1900. This can lead to frustration on the part of owners or occupiers trying to purchase cover directly.

Before the rise of the direct telephone or on-line insurer most people purchased their insurance cover through an intermediary; the insurance broker. Brokers are regulated by statute and most belong to the British Insurance and Investment Brokers' Association. Brokers work on behalf of their clients (the insured party) to find the best cover for the best price - although the insurance company normally pays them commission on the cover that they actually sell. In some cases the broker may rebate the commission to the insured party and look to them for a fee for their services. Brokers have to convince the underwriters in the insurance company that the cover they are seeking is actually a good risk.

Alternatively the broker may decide to approach a Lloyd's underwriter in an attempt to get a better price or better terms. Lloyd's is not an insurance company but a marketplace where individual syndicates provide cover for risks brought to them by brokers. Very large risks may require the participation of a number of syndicates each of whom will take part of the risk. This share is often referred to as 'a line' of the risk. The principal insurer is known as the lead underwriter and he or she usually sets the terms of the policy which the other underwriters will follow.

Should an incident occur which results in a significant claim, the insurance company (or where applicable the lead underwriter) will usually appoint a loss adjuster to review the claim. Loss adjusters are independent (although paid by the insurer) chartered professionals. Their function is to verify that a claim is valid, covered by the policy wording and to agree the sum to be paid out. ~ o s s adjusters are sometimes portrayed as sdlely concerned with reducing the amount that insurers pay out but this is unfair and untrue. In fact, following a major loss where an adjusters will appear on the scene at a very early stage, they can prove a valuable resource, having the expertise to provide information and advice on a range of matters connected with repair and reinstatement.

Loss Assessors, in contrast, work for the insured party and are remunerated by taking a percentage of the amount ultimately paid out. Loss assessors are not professionally regulated and have been subject to criticism but undoubtedly many claims are settled with their intercession.

When purchasing insurance, there can be no substitute for expert assistance whether this is in agreeing a valuation for a house or major property or in finding an insurer who is prepared to provide cover for a particularly valuable painting. There are a number of insurance brokers and valuers who specialise in historic buildings and organisations such as the Historic Houses Association are a good source of advice to locate such professionals.

5. FIRE PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS

Fire protection can best be described as a systematic Extinguish or control the fire approach to the protection of people and premises, using a of smctural materials, building Assist the fire and rescue services in dealing with

components and protective systems. the fire and its consequences

5.1 Fire Protection Measures Fire protection measures in buildings are generally categorised into two main groups: active and passive (Fig 1 below)

This section describes the range of systems, measures and other facilities which can be used to:

Contain fire and its products (ie heat, smoke, hot gases)

Detect and warn of the presence of a fire

Allow occupants of a building to escape from that part of a building which is on fire

It is possible to depict the measures which can be taken in graphic form - each of the terms is explained fully later in this section.

Passive fire precautions are defined as those aspects of a building's fabric and layout which are intended to confine fires and their products in one part of a building both to minimise the damage resulting from fire and to assist in allowing the occupants time to become aware of a fire and time to escape from the building in safety. Active fire precautions are those measures which operate only after fire has already broken out, such as detection and extinction systems.

FIRE PROTECTION

I ACTIVE SYSTEMS

I I

PASSIVE SYSTEMS I

Fire Detection

I Automatic systems for Fire Fighting

Fire Suppression

Manual Equipment for Fire Fighting

Structural Means of Escape Fire Protection

Building Compartmentation

Figure I : Organisation of Fire Protection

r TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

This main division in terminology into 'passive' and 'active' measures can sometimes be confusing - For example doors may be fitted with electrically operated closing devices but are usually classified as 'passive' device due to their primary fire containment role. Similarly devices such as dampers in ductwork and shutters over openings also move or change position automatically but are still classed as being passive. The classification may be even more artificial when applied to features such as door closers which operate when a fire is detected.

5.2 Installing Fire Systems in Historic Buildings In the case of systems for historic buildings special considerations apply. Not only must the systems aim to comply with the relevant standards and provide the intended levels of protection, but additionally their impact on the building and its fabric must meet a range of tests.

It is essential that full consideration be paid to the risks of potential damage to original fabric as well as the aesthetic impact fire systems might have on historic buildings. Any changes to a listed building must not only address fire protection needs but must fully comply with the law in respect of listed building consent. Early discussion with the planning authority is recommended. All fire protection improvements should follow the Principles set out in TAN 22 (Kidd, 2001):

Mini~~tal Intervention Any changes to a listed or heritage building must cause as little impact on the building and its fabric as possible. Any work undertaken to improve compartmentation, or to provide fire detection or suppression, should not cause unnecessary disruption or damage during installation, maintenance or eventual removal.

Reversibility Any changes to a heritage or listed building should wherever possible be reversible, ie adopting a 'plug in, plug out philosophy'.

Essential Only the minimum amount of work necessary to achieve the stated objective(s) should be undertaken and all the work should be justified and informed by a detailed fire risk assessment.

Sensitive Fire protection devices, equipment and systems should be installed with due consideration to the overall appearance of the building as well as having the minimum impact on the fabric of the building which they are intended to protect. Appropriate use should be made of existing features (such as voids risers, old chimneys and ducts) to allow concealed pipe or wiring runs. Any unavoidable notching or penetration of

structural timbers should be subject to an expert review and continuously monitored.

Appropriate The fire protection measures adopted must be appropriate to the level of risk - for example there may be little point in providing a full automatic sprinkler system for a location which is sparsely furnished and where there is little or no fuel load.

Legal Contpliance The fact that certain fire protection measures are required by law does not overrule the need to comply with other legal requirements (listed building consent, planning permission, building standards, fire regulations and certification procedures). Where a building is not listed or is not in a conservation area, due consideration should still be paid to its historic fabric. The relevant authorities may need to agree a compromise in order to achieve the best means of satisfying these separate requirements.

While it is usually possible to introduce measures in an acceptable way this is likely to take a great deal of planning and careful co-ordination. The process of installation must also comply with conservation principles. Care should be taken to ensure that the selected consultants and contractors understand the constraints implicit in working with a historic building.

In determining appropriate specifications for systems or measures to improve levels of fire safety, consideration should be given to those which offer potential to minimise invasive works. For example the use of approved plastic sheathed cabling and plastic pipework in lieu of the usual metal may provide flexibility in the installation of detection systems and water based fire suppression systems respectively. Alternatively the use of radio based detection systems and equipment may provide a useful way of avoiding damaging cable runs altogether. Pipe and cable routes should be selected carefully to minimise intrusiveness. Appropriate use should be made of existing features such as voids, risers, old chimneys and ducts to allow concealed pipe or wiring runs. Where new routes have to be formed this should be subject to agreement by specialist advisors to ensure that significant fabric is not damaged. Notching or penetration of structural timbers should also be subject to such review, including the advice of a structural engineer, both to ensure that fabric damage is minimised and that structural performance is not compromised. Installation on site should be monitored to ensure compliance with agreed routes and to allow any problems which arise to be satisfactorily resolved.

While standards and codes ofpractice should be followed whenever possible due attention should also always be paid to the principles of minimum intervention and reversibility.

1 TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Details relating to the considerations specific to individual systems or measures and to the respective components are expanded upon in the sections which follow.

5.3 Tailoring a fire protection project to the building This subject is covered in more detail in Chapter 7 of TAN 22 Fire Risk Management in Historic Buildings.

When it has been decided that fire protection improvements are essential to either reduce the risk from fire or prevent it increasing where the occupancy or circumstances change, a number of factors must be carefully considered and evaluated before any work can begin. In particular the criteria noted in 5.2 must be satisfied to ensure that the proposed work will not cause unnecessary damage to historic fabric or contents.

The need to change a building or alter its structure should be last resorts rather than first thoughts. Imagination and lateral though should be employed so as to determine the most appropriate (rather than, for example, the easiest or lowest cost approach). For example, if a listed building is being converted into a hotel, it might be less intrusive (and perhaps cheaper) to install sprinklers on a bedroom floor rather than to upgrade original room doors to meet fire performance. Given the same example, where providing adequate means of escape to meet the criteria set out by the fire or building authority is problematic, it may be possible to reach a compromise solution by reducing the numbers of persons to be accommodated.

5.4 Compartmentation Compartmentation remains the simplest and most cost-effective way to restrict the spread of fire and hence risk to life and damage to buildings. While the simplest way to prevent or limit the spread of fire is to subdivide a building into the smallest practicable fire- resisting compartments, this may only be achievable at unacceptable cost to historic fabric. Before any decisions are taken in respect of such work, it is essential to ensure that all other alternative measures are properly considered.

Where improvements in compartmentation are to be made, the structural measures should be designed to contain the fire and its products for a predetermined period; at the same time, ensuring the stability of the rest of building structure under fire conditions. Existing features such as walls should be used where possible as the basis for the introduction of fire barriers - all that may be required to upgrade and existing feature is the introduction of inert material below the floor or above the ceiling.

Equally, in certain areas it may be possible to introduce modem materials into voids or between floors to form new, additional fire barriers. (For example, sheets of gypsum board only 8mm can provide more than 30 minutes of fire resistance). Modem flexible materials such as silicone foam sealant will upgrade the levels of fire resistance in a gap between two compartments and also provide a fire resistant barrier around cables, pipes or ducts.

Illus l la , l l b The benejts of compartmentation; complete loss on one side of the compartment wall andfire door, and on the other superficial fabric damage and only minor smoke damage to an archive of rare books. (picture: Per Rohlen)


A good example of this particular approach can be found in TAN 22 where there is an account of the measures adopted in the conversion of Duff House to a gallery using a sympathetic combination of modern and traditional materials to upgrade levels of protection.

The important role which air movement plays in keeping the fabric of traditionally constructed buildings healthy must not be overlooked in the pursuit of fire safety. Where spaces are being compartmented and barriers are being introduced into voids, expert advice should be sought to ensure that alterations do not compromise ventilation arrangements to such an extent that conditions which could give rise to rot or mould problems are created.

5.4.1 S~rzoke Control

Fires produce significant volumes of heat, gases and smoke - with some materials in particular, such as rubber plastics and other synthetics, producing enormous quantities of smoke; all of which can be both toxic to life and corrosive. Some historic buildings (especially in France) have long featured integrated smoke ventilation systems which automatically allow the release of smoke through roof vents. In the past twenty years a great deal of research work has been undertaken on the use of such smoke control by venting, both natural and forced using fans, to remove smoke from areas such as stainvells and other escape routes. Smoke ventilation has the benefit of reducing the fire spread and improving the chances of occupants escaping safely. A further advantage is that reduced smoke logging allows speedier access to the heart of the fire by the fire and rescue service and hence earlier fire suppression. One disadvantage is that the area below the vents often experiences a localised increased intensity of the fire and hence greater damage.

Installing a glazing material in roof lights which is designed to fail at an early stage of the fire can offer a straightforward means of providing this type of smoke ventilation in historic buildings Modification of a suitable roof light above an open well staircase along these lines should enable smoke to be vented before the fire is fully involved and this will not only help to keep the staircase clear for evacuation but also limit smoke logging elsewhere in the building and reduce the possibility of flashover.

In other buildings, positive pressure fans have been installed to create an over-pressure in corridors and stairs to prevent smoke from adjacent rooms reaching these critical areas. This has been accepted as a compensatory feature in trade-off compromises where conventional escape route compartmentation cannot be achieved.

Where it is intended to utilise a smoke control system,

a full fire engineering study should be undertaken to ensure the effectiveness of such an approach and to ensure that the smoke ventilation arrangements interact with other fire equipment (especially sprinklers) in a predictable way.

5.4.2 Doors and Door Devices Closed doors curb the spread of fire and smoke. Even very old timber doors will offer some degree of fire resistance when closed and delaying a fire for 15 or 20 minutes may make it possible to evacuate a building, summon the fire and rescue service and possibly start to remove some of the more valuable contents.

The fire performance of existing doors and their frames can often be improved, whilst maintaining their original fabric and aesthetic appearance using applied intumescent products. Where a risk assessment or exercise to improve fire compartmentation identifies the need to upgrade the fire performance of key doorways to prevent the passageof fireforlongerperiods,replacement doors and frames may need to be considered. New door sets which replicate the appearance of the original doors in the building, whilst incorporating fire resistant materials can be manufactured. However the loss of original fabric and disruption which the installation of new doors and frames will involve requires to be considered, with the necessary listed building consents obtained where applicable.

Hardware is an important contributor to a door's fire performance which demands effective latching or locking devices and hinges capable of withstanding fire for the required period of time. Original ironmongery of quality should be assessed and retained where possible, and this may involve the upgrading of certain elements.

Too often the simple precaution of closing doors is not observed. Despite the inclusion of fire-resisting doors (often upgraded at great expense), in many large fires where heavy damage has been sustained, fire has travelled unchecked from the room of origin through doors which are left open or, worse still, through self closing doors which have been wedged open. Where it is desirable to keep doors open, automatic hold-open devices which retain the door in its open position and release it when fire is detected can be considered in many locations, subject to obtaining the appropriate agreement for their use. Such doors should still be closed at night or when the building is unoccupied. Regular closure also helps prevent warping of the structure and tests the mechanism. In premises with shift security staff or watchmen it is helpful to include in standing orders a requirement that all doors should be closed during the first evening patrol and then opened in the morning prior to the premises being opened up.

TAN 28 FIRE S A ~ MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

5.5 Fire Detection and Alarm systems

1 Systems for protecting life fall into four categories:

Type M - manual system: This system relies upon a manual break glass call point being operated, which causes the alarm to sound.

1 Type L1 -Life 1: This system provides total coverage of the building, with automatic detectors installed throughout. Additionally, break glass call points are installed on all exits and between zones

Type L2 - Life 2: This system has automatic detectors installed along all escape routes as well as in areas where a fire would cause a high risk to life. Additionally, break glass call points are installed on all exits and between zones.

Type L3 - Life 3: This system has automatic detectors installed only along escape routes and in areas where free passage is essential to protect life. Additionally, break glass call points are installed on all exits and between zones.

Systems for protecting property fall into two categories:

l 5 p e P 1 - Property 1 : This system provides total coverage of the building, with automatic detectors installed throughout. Additionally, break glass call points are installed on all exits and between zones.

lllus 12 Sympathetic upgrade of doors andframes - here an applied intumescent treatment to panels with a smoke seal To all intents and purposes, a type P1 system has

incorporated into the stiles and head of the door to improve the same cover as an Type L1 system.

Jire performance. (picture: Author) Type P2 - Property 2: This system has automatic detectors installed only in high-risk areas, such as plant rooms, storage facilities or any other area where there is a high risk of fire. Additionally, break glass call points are installed on all exits and between zones.

In all but the smallest properties an automatic fire detection (AFD) system should be considered as a means of giving early warning of fire. Automatic detection systems offer invaluable warning when fires break out at night, in less frequented parts of the premises or when the property is empty.

Fire detection and alarm installations for buildings other than small dwellings should be designed and installed in conformity with BS 5839-1:2002 Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings while components should, in most cases, be manufactured in accordance with the recently introduced series of standards published as BS EN 54: Fire detection andfire alarm systems.

5.5.1 Chssifiation and Application of Fire Alarm and Detection Systems BS 5839-1 Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings classifies fire detection systems as follows:

Examples of the appropriate uses of each type of system are set out in BS 5839-1.

Property managers or owners should note that if their fire certificate requires them to install a fire alarm system, they must consult the authority having jurisdiction to determine its exact requirements before commencing any installation.

All automatic fire detection systems work by detecting the presence of heat, smoke flames or gases produced by a fire. The systems may then either sound a general signal to evacuate the premises or operate a sounder in a location such as security office. As an added safeguard it is simple, and relatively inexpensive, to also connect an automatic fire detection system directly to a central alarm station and thence to the fire and rescue service's own control room.


5.5.2 Soz~nders and Warning Devices In order to comply with statutory requirements, under the provisions of the Fire Precautions Act 1971 (as amended) and in accordance with the Fire Precalitions (Workplace) Regzrlations 1997 and 1999, provision must be made for sounding an alarm in the event of fire in any building to which the public are admitted or which is used as a place of work. The fire alarm signal should be clearly audible in all parts of the building and should be readily distinguishable from any other alarm.

Various methods of actuating alert or evacuation signals are possible

At the very smallest locations where evacuation is uncomplicated and easy or where only a very few people are likely to need to be evacuated, a bell, gong or other mechanical device operated manually when someone detects a fire may suffice to satisfy statutory requirements.

It is suggested however that there are likely to be only two choices in most historic buildings which are publicly accessible or workplaces:

A manually operated alarm system: where the sounders operate when a call point is activated by a person discovering a fire. Such systems should not be considered in circumstances where a fire could start unnoticed or where the building and its contents are of some importance. Manual system should also not be installed in buildings which are regularly left unoccupied.

In larger premises or locations where there might be large numbers of visitors the alarm system should be capable of being triggered either automatically by the fire detection system or one of the call points. In premises where there are likely to be very large numbers of people present, the system should be programmed to take account of the building's evacuation procedures, for example by phased evacuation (where occupants of only one floor are moved out of the building). Alarm delays, which give a small window of opportunity for staff to verify the presence of a fire before the warning is sounded, may also be possible. However this approach should only be adopted with the approval of the fire and rescue service and the alarm control panel should still signal a fire to the fire service as soon as it is detected.

alarm systems are considered as an appropriate alternative to electronic sounders or bells, particularly where a phased or staged evacuation is required, or to reduce panic in places of public assembly. Pre-recorded messages are stored on computer chips and can feature different texts (for example: for alarm tests, for security evacuations) or can even be provided in a number of languages if required.

The coverage and audibility of voice messages is critical and it is suggested that specialist advice must be sought before specifying or installing such a component as part of a fire detection and alarm system. Great care should also be taken to ensure that all signals from the message generation unit and its amplifier to the loudspeakers are carried in fire resistant cabling or in cables installed in steel conduit.

The fire detection part of the system should comply with BS5839-1 (2002): Fire alarm a n d j r e detection systems for buildings; Code of Practice for system design, installation, commissioning and maintenance while the voice part should comply with BS EN 60849 (1998): Sound systems for emergency purposes. It would also be advisable to ensure that the equipment also complied with BS 7827 (1996): Code of practice for designing, speczfying, maintaining and operating emergency sound systems at sports venues particularly if the local authority is to be approached for a licence for events at which large numbers of the public may be present.

5.5.4 Remote Connections and Central Alarm Stations While automatic fire detection systems are a major weapon in the fight to save life and minimise damage from fire it is essential that the warning of fire is responded to. In all but the smallest buildings and in all historic buildings which are not continuously occupied this means that an alarm signal should be communicated automatically to the fire and rescue service.

There are now very few circumstances or situations where alarms can be connected directly to a fire station. Today most systems are therefore connected to commercially-operated central stations which then pass the call on to the appropriate fire service control room. These central stations also monitor security and intruder alarms so it may be possible to achieve savings by using the same communications circuits for both types of systems.

5.5.5 Fire Detection andAlarrn Systertf Cortzponents The main components of fire alarm and detection 5.5.3 Voice Alarrrz Systems systems comprise

In very large premises, particularly those open to the public on a daily basis, public address systems linked sensors (some times called 'detectors3 or 'point to an automatic fire detection system can be used to detectors1) broadcast live or pre-recorded evacuation messages including those for fire and bomb threats. Such voice Manual call points ('break glass boxes')


The control panel and power supply including back up battery

Output devices (sounders, voice alarm systems and direct links to the fire service)

Sensors can be of various types:

Smoke detectors: either photo-optical or ionisation type which detect the actual presence of smoke in the area of the detector. Both types are effective sensors but the ionisation detector is better at spotting flaming fires which produce relatively small particles while the photo-optical sensor is much better at detecting smouldering fires.

I Heat detectors: either 'fixed' temperature or 'rate of rise' type, which monitor the temperature of the air within an area and give an alarm if this rises above a predetermined temperature or rises too quickly.

Flame sensors: designed to detect the presence of a flame, either by its infrared or ultraviolet emissions, or the unique frequency of the flame 'flicker'

Beam detectors: which transmit an infrared beam across a space at a high level to a receiver sensor

Illus 13 A wall mounted beam detector used to provide Or a reflector which bounces the beam back' If smoke detection whilst avoiding disturbance to ceiling the beam is broken by smoke the receiver plasterwork. Note also the adjacent dichroic lamp providing triggers an alarm signal. emergency lighting. (picture: Author)

Aspirating Smoke Detection (ASD) systems (sometimes known as air sampling systems) consist of a network of small diameter perforated pipes connected to a detector unit. These systems are stand-alone units but their fire warning signals can be connected to the main fire detection system control panel. The system draws air from the spaces protected through the pipes to the unit where it is analysed and its constituents examined for traces of products of combustion.

Recent technological developments include multisensor detectors which utilise different types of sensor technology and are intended not only to broaden the scope of the types of fire products detected but also to reduce unwanted alarms by cross checking. The use of a ionisation smoke sensor combined with a carbon monoxide sensor, for instance, would reduce the probability of false alarms caused by such stimuli as steam or dust. Another new development is the use of modified television camera technology to detect flames which may have uses in, for example, the protection of very long galleries or corridors.

When selecting and positioning sensor equipment in historic buildings, weight must be given to aesthetics and fabric impact as well as technical performance. Where sensors cannot be positioned in the location specified in the relevant standard, which is designed to obtain the best coverage, it might be possible to compensate for this by, for example, installing two sensors rather than one. On some ceilings it may be preferable to locate detector heads in less than optimum positions whilst still providing an acceptable level of coverage. Other alternative approaches using a flexible, considered perspective may be adopted - for example avoiding damage to a decorated ceiling by mounting a sensor on conduit that is then attached to a picture rail or cornice. While sensor bodies must never be painted, all major manufacturers can usually provide a wide range of colours to special order.

In certain circumstances, the use of smoke detectors can be avoided by using equipment such as beam detectors which cover a large area and can often be positioned in less conspicuous locations.


5.5.6 Manual Call Points Call points (sometimes known as 'break glass call points') are the primary method of sounding the alarm when someone discovers a fire. The call points normally consist of a glass cover plate which when smashed sends a signal to the fire control panel. In most fire detection systems, call points are provided by fire exits or adjacent to 'fire points' which usually contain a fire extinguisher or other equipment. These locations comply with the requirements of BS 5839 Part 1: 2002 which governs the design and installation of call points.

The location of manual call points can also sometimes cause problems. While the relevant standard specifies that these should be red, there may often be room for some compromise in the provision of call point bodies which blend with the background. This compromise might also allow flexibility in terms of concealment (providing a flush mounted call point) and location (not necessarily placing the call point directly adjacent to a door. It may also be possible to agree with the fire authority to locate the call points inside cupboards or in recesses. Careful reading of the relevant guidance documents and regulations can also be useful.

l l l u~ 14 Discrete locations for call points can C+,.. be agreed. In this historic house open to the public, the hidden location on the window joinery also enables wiring to be concealed in existing voids. (picture: Author)

5.5.7 Fire Control Panels Modern fire control panels in all but the smallest premises are likely to be of the 'analogue addressable' type. This equipment is based on a microcomputer which is programmed to monitor not only the status of each detection device (the sensors) but also the fire call points, wiring, alarm sounders and any other devices installed. When the system identifies a fire condition (ie the presence of heat, smoke or an operated call point

it will operate the sounders. The system can also be set up to close automated doors, fire shutters and so on and to call the fire and rescue service. The panel of intelligent analogue 'addressable' systems is able to give the specific 'address'; that is the actual location of the detector or other device that has activated, which is of major benefit in identifying exact position in the event of an outbreak of fire. Day to day fault finding is also simplified with addressable systems which can detect and pinpoint faults such as smoke detectors whose performance is affected by dirt or other impairments. The control panels incorporate a display window which will indicate, in clear language, the location and type of sensor and why it has activated. Printers can also be connected to provide a permanent record of activity.

The conventional non addressable 'zoned' panel by contrast is unable to distinguish between individual devices, and can only identify the wiring circuit or 'zone' to which a number are connected. When fire is detected or a fault condition occurs, the panel of these systems will therefore only give a general indication of the location by activated zone and, depending on wiring, this could be an entire floor or even an entire building.

Control panels are supplied with power via continuously charged batteries which will provide a back up supply in the event of mains failure. Panels should be located where they are visible to all who need to see their indications and operate their controls and where the fire service can easily find them in an emergency. In buildings that are unoccupied at night, they may be located where they are visible from outside the building - for example through a vision panel. or in behind a panel to which the fire brigade have access.

In larger buildings, 'repeater' panels, which give the same information as the main control panel, are often fitted near a secondary entrance or in a security control room or lodge.

Careful consideration will likely be required to identify suitable locations where panels can be installed to meet these functional requirements whilst sympathetically respecting building aesthetic and fabric considerations.

5.6 Managing Unwanted Alarms By 2002 280,000 'unwanted' fire signals were being recorded per year, a sharp rise from the 187,000 recorded in 1996. The term 'unwanted' includes not just false alarms, but any signal other than that generated by a fire. Home Office Fire Service Circular 611994 had already recognised the serious and growing problem arising from these unwanted fire signals and it should be noted that is an offence under Section 3 1 of the Fire Services Act 1947 to knowingly give or cause to be given a false alarm of a fire to a fire brigade.

Surveys show that 43% of unwanted alarms are attributable to human error or equipment malfunction.


These unwanted alarms constitute a serious problem of misuse of resources, as while the fire and rescue service is dealing with such calls they are not available to tackle real fires. False calls also erode the confidence of end-users in the value and reliability of automatic fire detection systems and can cause costly interruptions to normal activities.

Although 90% of installed AFD systems give no problems and generate few unwanted calls, it is the rising number of unwanted fire signals from the other 10% of installed systems - the 'rogue' systems which need to be addressed. Notwithstanding the continuous upgrading of standards over time, advances in technology and the improved reliability of equipment, there is little indication that the problem of unwanted alarms has been addressed by many alarm system owners.

Repeated unwanted alarm signals can result in an alarm system being classified by the fire and rescue service as 'an unsatisfactory system' - this being defined in official guidance as:

A system which produces hvo or more unwanted jre signals in any period of four weeks, or three or more unwantedjre signals in any period of twenty six weeks, and also systems where the cause of any zlnwanted jre signal has not been ident$ed and remedied within seven days.

5.6.1 How to Eliminate UnwantedAlarrns Following concerns expressed by many parties about the problem of unwanted alarms, a joint Working Group was set up consisting of representatives from the fire service, fire industry, end-users and insurers. This group recommended reinforcing the guidance already given to system users and fire and rescue services in order to reduce the number of unwanted fire signals resulting from "human factors". In support of this a free booklet entitled A guide to reducing the number of false alarms from jre-detection and jre-alarm systems has been produced by the ODPM. Other measures identified include the development of a CFOA Policy that requires fire detection systems connected via central stations to meet specified performance criteria.

Careful consideration in specifying equipment can assist in reducing unwanted alarms. For example, when selecting sensors, it makes no sense to provide smoke detection in kitchen areas, as this will result in the fire and rescue service being summoned every time the toast is burnt! Other well known stimuli for false alarms include insects, steam, dust and aerosol sprays. Detailed guidance on the design and maintenance of systems to minimise unwanted fire signals are provided within BS5839-1:2002.

It is worth noting that during the disruption to fire and rescue services' cover caused by industrial action in 2003, when the public were perhaps taking more care than usual, there was a significant drop in the number of

false alarm calls from fire detection systems -suggesting that these can indeed be managed.

Proper training of staff whose duties include setting or isolating alarm systems should be included in the fire safety management policy. The need to either isolate the alarm system when a test or drill is taking place, or advise the fire and rescue service to alert then that the system may be activated, should also be included in the policy. Good record keeping will provide assistance in determining the nature of a problem and information on all alarm actuations should be recorded in the building's fire safety log book, as should any changes to the system or its components. Where changes made to the alarm system are fundamental and permanent, details should be recorded in the Fire Safety Manual.

When building maintenance or construction work, including painting and decoration, is to take place, advice should be sought from the alarm supplier or maintenance company on what steps should be taken to ensure that construction activities do not trigger unwanted alarm calls. These could arise for instance due to cables being damaged or as a result of dust created by the works.

During works, care should be taken to protect fire system components particularly ceiling mounted smoke sensors from dust, debris or paint spray. This may require the detectors to be protected by a temporary cover. When this is done it is vital that such covers are removed at the end of the working day so that the operation of the system is not impaired for longer than is absolutely necessary. In the case of longer duration of work which produces large amounts of dust it might be worth considering whether smoke detectors could be temporarily replaced with heat sensors.

5.7 Manual Fire Fighting Equipment

5.7.1 Fire classification To ascertain what type of manual fire fighting equipment needs to be provided, the types of fires likely to be encountered in the premises have to be considered as unfortunately, there is no one single universal extinguishing medium or item of manual fire fighting equipment suited to all conditions. There are four main types of fire' determined by the fuel involved:

Class A: Fires generally involving solid organic materials, such as coal, wood, paper and natural fibres.

Class B: Fires involving: liquids: petrol, fuel oil, solvents etc) liquefiable solids

Class C : Fires involving gases: LPG, acetylene)

Class F: Fires involving cooking oils and fats

'There is a fifth category involving fires in reactive metals such as magnesium and sodium but this is not considered relevant in the context of the intended readership of this publication.


Fires involving live electrical equipment are not separately classed since although an electrical spark may be the source of the outbreak, the fuel will relate to Class A or Class B - perhaps the material from which the equipment is manufactured or flammable liquids used to lubricate the equipment.

Different types of fire are best extinguished with specific agents. For example, normal Class Acombustibles such as wood and paper are best extinguished by cooling with water, while Class B flammable liquids are best smothered by foam or dry powder. Fires involving electrical equipment should be extinguished by the use of a carbon dioxide or dry powder extinguishers. In many cases, disconnecting the equipment from its electrical supply is sufficient to extinguish the fire but in all cases, it is advisable to switch off or unplug the appliance before tackling the fire. The introduction of Class F, covering cooking oils and fats simplifies the selection of fire extinguishers for larger kitchens. Most manufacturers now offer an extinguisher which will tackle both Class Aand Class F fires. These extinguishers contain what the trade are calling a 'wet chemical' agent specifically formulated for extinguishing fires in cooking oils.

Class C Fires should not normally be tackled with portable fire extinguishers - the most effective action is to shut off the supply of gas. If this is not possible, then the fire brigade should be called while copious amounts of water are applied to the cylinder to prevent it from exploding. The area involved should be evacuated of all non essential personnel and if the hose being used to cool the cylinder can be lashed to a structure then this should be done and the area completely vacated.

Details of the various items of fire fighting equipment available, together with the fire type application to which each is suited, are set out in the following sections.

5.7.2 Fire Exting~rishers

The most common form of fire-fighting equipment in buildings is the portable fire extinguisher. These are available in a wide variety of sizes and types containing different fire fighting agents appropriate for particular types of fire.

Since 1 January 1997 all extinguishers sold in the UK should comply with BS EN 3:Portablejreextinguishers. This requires 95% of the extinguisher body to be painted red. Formerly, under BS 5423: Specijcation for portablejre exting~~ishers 1987, UK extinguishers had their full bodies colour coded to indicate their contents and as a concession to UK practice the new BS EN standard permits up to 5% of the body area to be colour coded using the standardised colours from the former standard.

Large numbers of extinguishers with full colour bodies will still be found in premises and, despite what some over-enthusiastic salesmen or service engineers

might suggest, these are still legal and may continue to be used until they are no longer serviceable. This means that some buildings will contain old and new fire extinguishers of the same type, but with different coloured bodies. To avoid confusion, it is suggested that where possible extinguishers manufactured to BS 5423 with full body colour codings, should not be installed in the same buildings, floors or areas as units manufactured to BS EN:3 where only a small proportion of the surface area of the extinguisher such as labels or neck collars are colour coded.

Fire extinguisher colour coding follows the following system:

Water (red): suitable for Class A fires involving ordinary combustible materials, such as wood and paper

Dry powder (blue): suitable for Class B fires involving flammable liquids and fires involving electrical equipment

Carbon dioxide (C02) (black): suitable for fires involving live electrical equipment

Foam (cream): suitable for small liquid spill fires (such as those involving cooking oil) where it is possible for the foam to form a blanket over the surface of the flammable liquid. Foams are sub divided according to their natures - the most common is fluoroprotein foam which will be effective on most liquid fires. Recent introductions of Foam Spray (grey) extinguishers are worth noting as these may prove to be suitable for a range of risks such as might be found in boiler rooms.

The new Class F extinguishers have no formal colour code but two or three of the larger manufacturers are using a yellow or orange label.

Halon or (BCF 1211) (green or yellow) extinguishers are now no longer permitted to be used and should be replaced - probably either by dry powder or carbon dioxide units.

Extinguishers with chromed or copper coloured bodies are also available. However as these do not comply with BS:EN 3, locations where compliance with British Standards is mandatory may decide that these should not be used, even though some consider such units to be more aesthetically acceptable in a heritage context.

5.7.3 Hose Reels Hose reels are classified as either manual or automatic. Manual units have an on/off valve which has to be opened before the hose is unwound, while automatic reels operate by means of a valve mechanism inside the spindle of the reel which operates as the hose is unwound. Both types also have an adjustable valve on the nozzle used to control and turn off water flow The hose provided comes in lengths ranging from 15 - 30 metres and in diameters of either 19 or 25 millimetres. In some larger buildings which were provided with an internal fire main, the old hydrant points have been modified and connected to a hose reel.

TAN 28 FIRE SAFE^ MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Hose reels have declined in popularity, which is surprising given their obvious advantages over portable extinguishers in terms of ease of use, low cost of use and long service life, and continuous supply of water. It is worth noting that a nine litre water extinguisher will expel approximately 4-5 litreslminute while a 19 millimetre hose reel will jet or spray around 20 lims per minute onto a fire. However hose reels do also present disadvantages including problems caused by gland leakage, maintenance costs, theft of nozzles and valve wheels, misuse and vandalism. In historic buildings their obtrusive appearance may pose aesthetic concerns which can usually be addressed by careful siting or concealment in a marked cupboard. There are also fears that once a hose reel has been deployed it will prevent fire doors in its path from closing and so permit the passage of smoke and heat. It should be noted that some fire and rescue services are actively discouraging the installation of hose reels.

extinguishers and hose reels should not be concealed in cupboards, wall recesses or inside panelling provided that appropriate signs complying with the Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996 are provided and maintained and that staff know where they are located. While on occasion, representatives of the authority having jurisdiction (including the local environment health department or building control function) may suggest or even require that signs be placed on the wall adjacent to fire extinguishers, where this would be deemed aesthetically intrusive, careful determination of the situation may make it clear that such signage is superfluous. It is also clear that some commercial organisations may be encouraging the installation of signs which may not be strictly necessary. Signs should however be provided where it is not clear that an extinguisher or hose reel is present at that location or where the type of extinguisher or its means of operation needs additional explanation.

Hose reels should be manufactured and installed in accordance with British Standard BS EN 671-Parts 1 - 4:200 1 Fixedfirefighting systems: Hose systems -Hose reels with semi-rigid hose.

5.7.4 Siting of Extinguishers and Hose Reeb For 'general' fues, which are likely to be of Class P type, extinguishers containing water or hose reels are most appropriate. A useful rule of thumb is that one standard size nine litre water extinguisher should be provided for every 200 square metres of floor space, with a minimum of one per floor.

If each floor is provided with a hose reel that is of sufficient length to reach within about 5 metres of all parts of the floor then, subject to the approval of the fire authority (or other authority having jurisdiction), portable extinguishers may be omitted altogether. Many advisors are likely to suggest however that even with this level of hose reel provision, there should still be at least one portable fire extinguisher on each floor of all buildings.

Most existing extinguishers will have been installed in compliance with BS 5306 Part 3 1985 Code ofpractice for selection, installation and maintenance of portable extinguishers. This document has been superseded by BS 5306 Part 8 2000 Selection and installation of portable jre extinguishers - Code of practice.

The 1985 British Standard (as well as its replacement) specifies that extinguishers should be wall-mounted on escape routes or assembled in 'fire points'. It is suggested in the case of historic buildings that discretion should be applied to such a placement. With the approval of the fire authority (if premises are certificated or require a licence) there is no reason why extinguishers should not be allowed to be free standing or placed in purpose built bases. Equally there is no good reason, subject to the conclusions of the fire risk assessment, why

Illus 15 Where fire extinguishers are required to meet prem'ses'cert~~cate or licence requirements, subject to the agreement of thejre authority, there is no reason why they should not be allowed to be free standing at identified locations. (picture: Author)

5.7.5 Fire Blankets Fire blankets are extremeIy useful appliances and should be provided in all kitchens including those in staff flats and holiday lets. Fire blankets are virtually maintenance-free and extremely cost-effective and can be used on all types of cooking fires, tires involving burning oil and clothing fires.

Fire blankets should comply with BS EN 1869 Fire Blankets.


5.8 Wet and dry rising mains Most buildings over six storeys and many large commercial buildings are provided with a system of internal pipework to serve as fire fighting mains providing facilities for use by the fire and rescue service.

'Wet' Systems are supplied from an internal water supply. 'Dry' systems are intended to be pressurised by the fire and rescue service when they respond and are fined with one or more fire brigade connections which are known as 'pumping-in points' These are often visible outside the building, usually labelled 'Dry Riser Inlet', and located at convenient and accessible points. In the case of historic buildings care should be taken to ensure that these pumping-in points are located so as to minimise any visual intrusion.

Riser pipework feeds a series of single outlet points within the building each with a 65 millimetre coupling compatible with fire brigade hoses, and usually located in a fire enclosure such as a stairwell. Hence they are frequently referred to as 'landing valves'. In historic buildings where such systems are installed, it is often possible to find an inconspicuous location such as a cupboard for the valve.

Illus 16 Historic fabric impact minimised by locating dry riser inlet valves beneath cast iron cover in footpath. (picture: Paul Beaton, Historic Scotland)

These mains offer significant benefits for the property as they reduce the number and length of fire brigade hoses which may have to be brought into the building and hence minimise the extent of collateral water damage which may be experienced in a fire fighting situation.

Although primarily provided for fire service use, where wet mains are installed and there is an organised fire team at the property, it is worth considering the provision of a few lengths of 65 millimetre fire hose and an appropriate nozzle near each landing valve.

The location and position of inlets and landing valves is governed by BS 5306 Part 1.

5.9 Drencher Systems / Sparge Pipes Risers (either wet or dry) may sometimes be connected to a system of pipework with open nozzles and these are referred to as Drencher Systems. Often found in bonded warehouses along the ridges of roofs or above large doorways, drenchers (sometimes known as Sparge Pipes) are controlled by a manually operated valve and have recently been installed on the exterior of a number of historic timber buildings in Norway.

5.10 Automatic Fire Suppression and Fire Fighting Systems Automatic fire suppression and fire fighting systems not only detect and notify the presence of a fire but actually start to physically fight the outbreak. A properly designed, installed and maintained system will, at the very least, contain a fire to a small area and consequently reduce the extent of damage. Indeed in most cases the system will manage to extinguish the fire before the arrival of the fire and rescue service. Clearly the damage minimisation potential of suppression systems is especially beneficial in the heritage buildings context where historic fabric or contents are irreplaceable.

There are a number of automatic fire suppression and fire fighting systems available employing different extinguishing equipment, techniques and fire fighting mediums. The suitability of each type of protection system for particular circumstances will be determined by a number of factors including the type of fire likely to be encountered in the protected space. See section 5.7.1 for details of fire type classification.

The three main types of automatic system available are as follow:

5.10.1 Water-based systems As an inert low cost extinguishing medium which is plentifully available with minimal impact on health and safety and the environment, water is probably the most readily recognised extinguishing medium suitable for the majority of fires. There are two main types of water-based system; the first is the sprinkler system and the second the water mist system. They are radically different in design, cost and application and so will be considered separately.


5.10.1.1 Sprinkler Systems

Sprinklers are one of the oldest forms of fire fighting technology; having been in use for over 140 years. The earliest recognisable installations were in British and US cotton mills between 1852 and 1860 whilst a primitive form of sprinkler system is known to have been installed in the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, London in 18 12. The first sprinkler system of modem design was installed in a piano factory in New England in 1874. The proven effectiveness and reliability of sprinkler systems since these early days and the advantages offered by water as an extinguishing agent - has led to their widespread installation to tackle many different types of risks. Reliable records maintained in the USA, UK, New Zealand and Australia indicate that around 99% of all fires in sprinklered premises are either extinguished or controlled by the sprinkler system. This figure is considered conservative since small incidents where sprinklers have extinguished a fire with no resulting property damage are not necessarily reported to the fire and rescue service, insurers or other appropriate organisations.

Operation is controlled by the glass thermal element contained in each sprinkler head which is designed to break when subjected to the heat of a fire; allowing a valve in the head to open and water to be discharged.

Often, objections are raised to the installation of sprinklers on the grounds of potential water damage. Contrary to popular perception, only the sprinkler heads in the immediate vicinity of the fire operate so the amount of water released to suppress the fire is kept to the minimum required. Water damage incurred from a sprinkler system reacting immediately to control fire growth, or in many cases to extinguish it altogether will be relatively tiny when compared to the later application of water from fire service hoses to fight a developed fire.

Concerns about water leakage from heads and distribution pipework are also frequently aired. In fact, a properly installed sprinkler system should be less likely to leak than any other water supply service within a building as the components of the system will have been subjected to a rigorous quality assurance regime and are listed by a third party certification body. The designer and installer of the system will also have been subjected to the scrutiny and approval process of the appropriate insurers' organisation. As a final safeguard, systems are provided with an automatic alarm to give warning of water leakage from the system

Care should be taken when deciding the detailed specification of sprinkler systems to ensure that the chemical content and nature of the sprinkler water supply has been taken into account. Selection of system materials, must ensure that no incompatibility of metals arises between components which for example, could cause corrosion through electrolytic reaction.

In some circumstances, the installation of sprinklers will be rewarded by more favourable insurance terms. Large discounts (such as are offered for commercial risks) are unlikely to be forthcoming but lower deductibles are likely as is extended coverage when properties are left empty for much of the year.

5.10.1.2 Quick Response Sprinklers

Quick response sprinkler heads are designed and constructed so that their response to the heat generated by a fire is much more rapid than that of 'conventional' heads. This type of sprinkler is designed to absorb heat from the surrounding atmosphere more efficiently, thereby operating more rapidly at their preset temperatures. The response time for a conventional head can be as much as three minutes while quick response heads can actuate in less than half this time, minimising fire damage.

Care has to be exercised in deciding whether to specify this type of head however, as there can be a trade off between the speed of response and the fragility of the thermal element of the head. It is suggested therefore, that in locations where even limited accidental water damage would be unacceptable, conventional heads should be specified. This is an area where specialist advice should be sought at a very early stage as the selection and specification of the sprinkler heads can have an impact on a range of other criteria including water supplies.

Zllus 17 Concealed sprinkler head located behind circular cover coloured to match ceiling decor (bottom centre); minimising visual intrusiveness. (picture: O Ingval Marwell)


5.10.1.3 Use of Sprinkler Systems

Scotland has pioneered the use of sprinklers to protect historic buildings and a significant body of experience has now been built up in relation to designing and installing these systems in a sympathetic and non- intrusive way. Buildings protected so far include Duff House, in Banff, the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh, Newhailes House in East Lothian and Broughton House in Dumfries and Galloway.

Sprinkler systems should be designed and installed in accordance with BS EN 12845 Fixedjirejgkting systems - Azrtomatic sprinkler systenu: Design, installation and maintenance. The former standard BS 5306 Part 2: Fire Extinguishing installations and equipment on premises: SpeciJication for sprinkler systems also remains valid until withdrawn, this will probably be in 2006.

Historic Scotland TAN 14, The Installation of Sprinklers Systems in Historic Buildings provides comprehensive guidance on the subject and should be referred to and used as guidance when sprinkler protection is being considered.

5.10.1.4 Water strpplies for sprinkler systems

In the past insurers, who were instrumental for requiring the installation of most sprinkler systems, used to insist on a water supply that was virtually inexhaustible. Such a definition meant water from a lake, river or canal or a large tank with independently powered pumps. Today, a less prescriptive and risk assessment driven approach is often adopted and water for sprinklers can be provided by any of the following:

Private reservoirs

Gravity or pressure tanks

Automatic pumps and a tank

Service (i.e. towns) mains

Booster pump on a service main connection (This is subject to specific approval obtained from the water undertaking).

Towns main (now generally known as service mains) supply provides the lowest cost option for sprinklers. However where adequate flow and pressure cannot be guaranteed by the water undertaker, even with the use of a booster pump if permitted, a mains connection on its own may not provide an adequate assurance of operational effectiveness. Alternatives range from private reservoirs to gravity tanks. A private reservoir, whether utilised as aprimary or secondary supply source, must be under the sole control of the property protected. A gravity tank is a purpose-built container constructed on the site at an elevation sufficient to provide the required design pressure and flow characteristics.

A further option relies on suction tanks, again consisting of purpose-built containers constructed on site with electrically driven pumps to provide the required pressure and water flow characteristics. A stand-by, diesel-driven pump may additionally be required to ensure continuously available pumping capacity. Alternatively it may be possible to utilise the output of a stand-by diesel generator.

5.10.2 Water nzist systems

Benefiting from recent research and proprietary development, water mist systems, employing heads discharging aerated water in a mist or fine sprays, superficially appear very similar to conventional sprinkler systems. Indeed, these systems offer many of the benefits of conventional sprinkler protection

Several proprietary systems are available ranging from very high pressure (up to 110 bars) systems producing a fine water particle mist, to low pressure systems providing a fine water spray extinguishing medium. The water is propelled either by pumps or by an inert gas and dispensed from nozzles that are designed to deliver water in fine droplets to the area of fire. The suppression mechanism relies on a combination of cooling by the water, the production of steam that displaces oxygen from the area of the fire to a level that cannot sustain combustion, and inhibition of the chemical processes of combustion.

In comparison with sprinklers, water mist systems use comparatively small amounts of water to fight a fire which offers installation benefits. Mist systems offer potential for installation in locations which are too small to accommodate the tanks and pumps of a conventional sprinkler system. A further benefit is the minimisation of water damage in the event of activation.

Pioneering applications of water mist protection in heritage buildings include, one gallery of the National Portrait Gallery in London and a number of very old Norwegian churches which were at particular risk from arson. The largest heritage-related mist installation to date is now operational in the National Gallery ofArt in Washington, DC.

At present, there are no British or European standards for water mist systems although a European working group is currently developing a possible standard. The US National Fire Protection Association has published NFPA750 Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems which gives useful general guidance on the application of water mist systems but does not provide a design guide for individual risk applications.

The limitations of water mist should therefore be noted. Some research has been undertaken into the appropriate use of these systems in confined spaces and large volume areas. High ceilinged rooms with large floor areas may prove a significant problem in designing nozzle layout to ensure potential fire locations fall

TAN 28 FIRE S A ~ Y MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

within the effective range of the nozzle distribution. Tests have also indicated that the design of water mist systems needs careful consideration where the protected location is prone to significant air movement as this may impact on the effectiveness of the mist Mist systems are also less effective at extinguishing slow, deep seated fires in 'normal combustibles' than traditional sprinkler systems. In one recent case, trialling water mist protection in cellular archive storage areas, for instance, results were disappointing. This and other limiting factors, such as personnel presence and detection parameters, require a careful risk assessment to be made before any conclusion is reached as to the type of protection needed. This assessment needs to take into account the fact that (unlike sprinkler systems) each mist system has to be specifically designed for the space it is to protect. In the absence of any recognised international standards for the design of water mist systems, care needs to be taken when deciding on the validity of manufacturers' claims - many of which are based on system technology and components developed for use in marine applications and so may not be directly relevant for building protection.

Although these issues will be resolved in time it is suggested that, at the time of writing, caution should be exercised in specifying water mist systems for the protection of large areas or complete buildings until design and standards issues are resolved and British or European standards are published.

BS 5306 Part 6: Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises: Foam systems.

5.10.4 Gas Systems Suppression systems are available operating by discharging fire fighting gases, which have the ability to permeate a volume, extinguish fire and to be simply ventilated out afterwards without causing damage to fabric. At face value, these would appear to offer the ideal fire protection solution for heritage buildings. Unfortunately the reality is that this is an over- optimistic view since the choice of an extinguishing gas is a complex balance of cost, levels of protection and problems of maintenance of gas concentrations which is often difficult in historic buildings.

Gas systems are unlikely to be suitable for protecting large cubic volumes due to the quantity of gas required and the difficulty of maintaining the appropriate concentrations of gas within the protected space for the duration of a fire's life. It is therefore unlikely that such systems will to be suitable for the majority of applications in protecting the interior spaces of historic buildings.

Gas systems can be ideal, however, for providing specialised protection of smaller rooms or spaces such as transformer chambers and switchrooms, or other utility spaces perceived to be of high risk, In the heritage context gas systems have been successfully employedfor the protection of archive storage areas, vaults and plant

5.10.3 Foar~z Systenzs rooms at the British Library, National Library of wales, Aberystwyth, the Library of Congress, Washington DC

Foam fire suppression systems are principally used to and at the National Archives of Scotland's General protect high fire risk locations such as warehouses and Register House in Edinburgh, processing areas where a large quantities of combustible - - - materials are present, or where flammable liquids are Factors that should be considered when assessing stored or used. In such locations where water would the suitability of a risk for gaseous protection should be ineffective as an extinguishing agent systems using include: complex synthetic foams, in concentrations of 1-6% of foam compound in solution with water, may be used. Cost of installation and future maintenance

Foam is not considered an appropriate agent for general Volume to be protected use in historic or heritage buildings however since discharged foam degrades to leave water containing Suitability of gas in relation to occu~ation by

a residue which could be harmful to building fabric persons and contents. Installing distribution pipework and accommodating foam storage demands would also be

Type of risk

likely to cause substantial disruption to historic fabric . load

Foam systems may have limited application in heritage Suitability of gas in relation to reaction potential

buildings for specialised local protection of, for with protected fabric and contents

example, larger kitchen ranges and deep fat fryers or for the protection of boiler rooms where fuel oil is burnt. Plant requirements including storage space In such locations the installation is likely to consist of required, floor loading and feasibility of achieving cylinders containing 6 - 9 litres of fire fighting solution sympathetic installation and be self contained requiring only power supply. - - - -.

Standards for foam fire fighting systems are: Likely frequency of use and access for maintenance

BS EN 1568 Fire extinglrishing media: Foam concentrates. Future availability of gaslrecharges

i TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Wider environmental considerations further complicate the issues surrounding fire fighting gas systems. In 1986 the two most effective fire fighting gases (Halon 1211 and Halon 1301) were acknowledged to be major contributors to the depletion of the Earth's ozone layer and as a result, these particular products are no longer available today.

5.10.4.1 Inert Gases Prior to the development of the Halon (chemical) gases most gas systems used carbon dioxide - CO2. This had the advantage of being inert, relatively cheap and also readily available. However, a CO2 gas concentration of at least 50% has to be maintained within the protected area to achieve extinction of fire; a concentration which would result in asphyxiation of any people present when the system discharges

Nowadays, on account of this risk, CO2 fire suppression systems are mainly restricted to unstaffed areas such as electrical switchrooms or computer rooms.

More recently, a number of proprietary inert gas mixtures have been placed on the market. These include products containing mixtures of nitrogen and argon. One particular gas also has a small amount of added carbon dioxide. The carbon dioxide in this formulation makes it possible for humans to continue to breathe in a space into which this gas mixture has been discharged as the addition of the carbon dioxide makes the lungs work harder to utilise the small amount of oxygen still present in the room. In most cases, however, it is normal not to discharge the gases until the protected area has been evacuated.

5.10.4.2 Chemical Gases

The withdrawal of the Halon gases has triggered a great deal of research into alternative chemical fire fighting agents but it is probably true to say that no gas yet marketed offers all the advantages of Halon 1301. Many of the gases developed for industrial and commercial use have properties which render them inappropriate in heritage protection applications. A number of these gases produce by-products which are corrosive and some are also toxic so can only be used in spaces which are unoccupied. It is suggested that none of these chemical gases should be specified for heritage protection use without specialist advice being sought as the characteristics of each gas need to be carefully assessed against the benefits offered in respect of the building and contents to be protected.

New standards are currently being developed for the design of gas systems and their components. The following remain applicable at present:

BS 5306 Part 4: Fire Extinguishing installations and equipment on premises: Specijcation for carbon dioxide systems.

BS EN 12094 Fire jighting systems: Components for gas extinguishing systems

BS IS0 14520 Gaseous $re-extinguishing systems: Physical properties and system design

~iius ra Newl~trrl~!~, Mzdlotlirlrn. A h~srorzc house open r o the publzc 11 hosep~rzc ana conrenrs areprorecrea oy a sprznuer system, symparhcr~ cally insrtr l1c.d to minimise fabric impac r (picture: AI rtlror)


5.11 Lighting and Signage

5.11.1 Exit and Fire Signage In all buildings not used solely as dwellings there are statutory obligations under the Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996, to provide 'distinctive and conspicuous exit signs to indicate doors and escape routes'. These signs are essential in premises that are likely to contain people who are not familiar with the layout of the buildings and need help in finding the means of escape provided.

Since 24 December 1998, all fire exit signs have had to be green and white and contain the 'running man' symbol, with appropriate directional arrows. Signs just saying 'Fire Exit' are no longer acceptable and should be supplemented with the appropriate pictogram. Exceptionally early examples of exit signage may be of historic value and specialist advice should be sought in such circumstances.

It should be accepted however that in historic buildings (especially those which are not open to the public on a continuous basis) there is a case for taking a more flexible view of the need for and positioning of exit signs. Sensitivity to historic interiors should dictate the actual placement of the signs. It may be possible, for example, to adopt an alternative approach - such as the use of free standing signs put in position only when a building is open to the public. Concessions have been made in respect of non-standardised signage in many cases and an informal approach to the fire, planning or licensing authority may be successful in gaining approval for alternative approaches.

Careful reading of the Section 5(2) of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 makes it clear that fire equipment and escape signs are only mandatory 'where necessary in order to safeguard the safety of employees and others in case of fire'. Managers of historic buildings should be prepared to challenge assumptions that fire signs are needed alongside all pieces of equipment using the risk assessment principles outlined earlier and asking common-sense questions such as 'Do the staff in this building really need a sign to tell them that this is a j r e call point ?'

The skilful use of emergency lighting units to illuminate both exit signs as well as other safety signs should be encouraged and will not only minimise the disruption caused by the introduction of additional wiring and light units but could also save money.

Photo luminescent signs are simple to install and although more expensive than conventional signs do not need supplementary lighting. However the period they require under normal lighting conditions to regain their luminescence and make them effective must be considered.

Illus 19 In this highly decorated Austrian palace interior, a contemporarily detailedfloorjked services 'pole'- housing sprinkler head, electrical services and emergency lighting -provides an innovative solution avoiding the damage to historic walljnishes which conventional installations would give rise to. (picture: Author)

5.11.2 Emergency Escape Lighting in Historic Buildings Emergency lighting (often referred to as escape lighting) is provided in most workplaces to illuminate escape routes and exits in the event of a power failure or loss of a building's main lighting. These systems ensure that there is uninterrupted illumination in areas where there are large numbers of people.

Emergency lighting units are normally located in accordance with BS 5266: Part 1. 1999 Code of practice for the emergency lighting of premises other than cinemas and certain other specijed premises used for entertainment.

Reference can also be made to the Guide to Fire Precautions in Existing Places of Work that Require a Fire Certijicate (Home OfficeIScottish office) and IS ICEL 1008: Emergency Lighting Risk Assessment Guide (200 1) .

I-- TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

5.11.2.1 Types of Emergency Lighting

The most common type of lighting unit used in historic buildings to provide escape lighting are the self- contained units which are wired into the building's lighting circuit. These provide a constant current charge to a battery which will provide power for 1 - 3 hours (or as specified). Should the mains fail, each individual lighting unit will light up automatically. These units are often supplied with appropriate fire exit signs already attached.

In very large buildings such as galleries and museums open to the public, it is normal practice to provide what are known as either combined or maintained emergency lighting units on fire escape routes and exits. Combined units are fitted with two bulbs, one of which is illuminated by the primary lighting circuit, the other being powered in a supply failure from an internal battery. Maintained luminaires use the same bulbs for both normal and emergency operation - this enables the normal luminaires to also provide emergency lighting and improve the aesthetics of the installation.

In selecting and specifying light fittings it is important to establish whether all of the control gear is contained within the fitting or whether provision has to be made to accommodate this nearby. Specification of the latter type of fitting will only be possible where a suitable void to house control gear can be identified. Care should also be taken where such units produce heat and steps taken to ensure adequate ventilation of batteries, chargers or transformers.

In the past, some large cinemas and theatres were fitted with centralised emergency power sources used to supply emergency lighting from very large batteries powering inverters. These are not common and it is unlikely that these systems will be found in operation today in historic buildings.

The presence of a stand-by generator does not obviate the need for emergency lighting unless the system has been appropriately designed to meet the full requirements of a safety system. Generators are unlikely to meet the requirements to provide escape lighting within five seconds unless a central battery is incorporated into the system to cover during the generator's start up period. With such centralised systems special fire resistant cabling must also be used to safeguard the supply from generator to the lighting units.

There are a number of ways in which the spirit of the regulations can be complied with and yet at the same time ensure that visual intrusion is minimised.

In certain cases it may be possible to refurbish existing light fittings, to incorporate emergency facilities. This can be particularly successful where historic fittings survive and are capable of conversion without compromising their integrity or appearance. However

l

where this is not deemed possible the introduction of supplementary sympathetic fittings may be appropriate

On many occasions sympathetic modem light fittings will have been introduced to a building and many ranges include fittings which incorporate emergency lighting equipment.

One approach which has been widely adopted in properties in Scotland is to install a battery and charger with mains cut-out in a floor void (for example, between two joists) and then wire this to a single lighting unit above a doorway. If the mains power fails, the charger ceases to operate and the cut-out supplies power to the light which, if located correctly will provide enough light for an escape to be made. Batteries can be installed in other locations where there is space such as between floor joists, in wainscoting and in cupboards or voids. The selection and choice of batteries, chargers and lamps should be undertaken by a competent person and the compromise between bulb life and sizellight levels needs to be carefully considered. Only sealed gel-type batteries should be used to avoid the risk of acid or electrolyte spills.

The need for lighting is usually determined by the need for people to find their way to an escape route or fire exit under circumstances where the normal illumination is extinguished. In cases where a building is only staffed or open to the public during daylight hours in the summer months, it may be possible to argue that emergency lighting is not needed - since the need for such lighting is predicated solely on the basis of escape by staff or public in darkness.

5.12 Installers and Standards: Third Party Certification Fire protection systems can only be effective if they are designed, installed and maintained according to the highest standards. In order to provide some degree of comfort to specifiers, end users and regulators a number of third party certification schemes have been set up.

Credibility is providedthrough thethird party certification schemes run by bodies listed by the Government's own supervision body, the United Kingdom Approvals Service (UKAS). UKAS approved bodies include the following commercial organisations:

LPCBIBRE Certification Ltd (the successor body to the Loss Prevention Certification Board)

British Approvals for Fire Equipment (BAFE)

Warrington Fire Research (WFR)

National Security Inspectorate (NSI)

Contractors and suppliers approved under a scheme run by one of these organisations should be utilised as a matter of preference.

6. STAFF TRAINING

6.1 Introduction In large premises, where appointed, the fire safety manager is responsible for the management of all fire safety matters. Unless already skilled, he or she should receive training for this role which should be carried out only by a competent body - either by an organisation such as the Fire Protection Association, the Fire Service College, the Scottish Fire Services College or through a local fire and rescue services training school

The fire training needs of all other staff at a heritage building is summarised in the following table. Training

Staff who have a role to play in the action to be taken in the event of fire, for example to act in support of the fire and rescue services as guides, should be trained thoroughly in all aspects of that role. These members of staff must be aware of key property information, such as the location of fire fighting water supplies, electrical and gas supply intakes, the operation of ventilation and security systems and so on.

Where a property has a well-developed damage limitation plan then all staff with a role in the plan (see section 7) should receive appropriate training.

can either be carried out 'in-house' by a suitably qualified person, by a specialist trainer, by one of the 6.2 Training for *l1 Staff

organisations mentioned above or by a commercial All staff should receive basic fire training during organisation offering this type of training: their first week of work and should attend a properly

structured fire course within three months of starting.

Figure 2: Fire Training Needs

Type of Staff

All staff

All staff

New staff, including volunteers and part time

Catering, domestic, maintenance and security personnel or outdoor staff

Supervisory staff

Relevant staff including managers

'Ikaining to be delivered When delivered

Basic Fire Course Annually

Evacuation Drill Annually

Fire Induction and Within one week of starting Awareness

Fire equipment training Annually

Evacuation Management Three yearly

Damage LimitatiodFire and Annual rescue services

Comments

Should include demonstration of use of extinguishers

Prior to start of the season

In the case of houses open to the public prior to the start of the season

Should include 'hands on' with all equipment present in

ProPeflY Should include live drill

Practical exercise not less than once every three years


This can either be an 'in-house' course or one run effective way of ensuring that all staff are properly fire by an outside organisation - some fire extinguisher trained. The fire wardens should be trained to a higher companies for instance run good training courses and level than the rest of the staff to equip them not only will undertake to provide instruction on site. for their responsibility for a designated area but also to

Training should include: enable them to provide ad hoc training for staff working in that area

l Action to take on discovering a fire

I How to raise the alarm

F ie wardens' training should reflect their important role as part of the premises' fire safety structure and should include:

I Action to take upon hearing the fire alarm Legal duties

Common causes of fire I Arrangements for calling the fire and rescue

services

I Procedures for alerting members of the public and Action in the event of a fire

visitors Use of equipment provided I Evacuation procedures and escape routes Human behaviour in fire I Location of the fire assembly point How to conduct an evacuation

Location of Evacuation Assembly points At least once each year a full evacuation drill of the premises should take place. In large or complex Fire and people with disabilities premises two such drills should take place each year. In the case of premises where the public have access this drill should, if possible, include visitors.

Where premises are open to the public for a limited season, the annual drill should take place during the first week of opening.

Part time workers, seasonal staff and volunteers should be included in this basic fire training and care should be taken to ensure that those who join mid season are properly briefed about basic fire safety duties on their first day at work.

For larger or more complex premises it is worth considering inviting the fire and rescue service to participate in an annual fire drill. Involving the fire fighters likely to have to respond to a fire on the premises will allow them to exercise their own plans and test the level of coordination needed with the management and staff of the property.

6.3 Specialist Training for Certain Personnel Illus 20 Staff receivingjre extinguisher training. (picture: Author)

Catering staff, maintenance staff and outdoor staff should be provided with training relating to the particular hazards present in their areas and the fire equipment provided, Security personnel should receive training similar to that provided for fire wardens with additional emphasis on the use of fire equipment and calling the fire and rescue services.

6.5 Fire Extinguisher Training Concerns are sometimes raised about the possible safety implications of training staff in the use of fire extinguishers, hose reels and fire blankets. These worries are rarely expressed in writing but seem to revolve around two main points:

6.4 Fi Warden Training In larger premises fire wardens or fire marshals should be appointed. The terms are normally used interchangeably but in this document, the term fire warden will be used hereafter. This can be a very cost

Staff should not try to fight fires but should be evacuating the building

If someone is injured or killed as a result of fire fighting would this render the employer legally liable ?


While it is understandable that employers should take all possible steps to protect staff or employees from injury it is clear that there are legal obligations in respect of fire training which are spelt out in a number of pieces of legislation. There is a statutory requirement for all employers to:

'Provide any information, instruction, training and supervision ... necessary to ensure the health and safety at work of ... employees' (Section 2(c) Health & Safety at Work Act 1974)

'Take measures for jrejghting in the workplace ... Nominate an adequate number of employees to implement those measures ... ensure there is adequate training and equipment ...' (Section 4(2) Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997)

While it would not be reasonable to demand that all employees be prepared to fight fires, it is suggested that it is reasonable and appropriate to provide full practical training for those who are most likely to encounter a fire in the course of their work and for any others who might volunteer for such training. It should be stressed during the training that fire equipment should only be used when it is clear that to do so will not jeopardise the safety of the employee or others. The need for such practical training for resident staff should be self- evident.

Illus 21 HM Government notice dated 191 0 encouraging familiarisation withjrejghting equipment which remains pertinent today - 'extincteurs ' being the former term for extinguishers. (source: Historic Scotland)

6.6 Fire Teams Those responsible for larger premises in rural areas should consider the need for an on-site fire team, especially given possible changes in levels of fire and rescue services cover. This on-site fire team is not to be confused with the Damage Limitation Team mentioned in Section 7

A well trained and equipped on-site fire team can provide a very effective means of fighting or containing a fire until the fire service arrives. However in order to ensure that the premises do not breach health and safety legislation it is essential that all such teams and their members are properly trained and equipped. Many fire and rescue services will be supportive of such activity provided they are convinced that the initiative will be followed through and will be taken seriously by staff. It has been suggested that some fire authorities might even be willing to loan fire equipment to formally constituted volunteer fire teams. The Fire Protection Association publishes a Code of Practice for Occupational Fire Brigades which although aimed at more formally constituted bodies on large industrial sites may be useful as a guide.

The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 require all employers to assess the risks to workers and any others who may be affected by their work or business. The objective is to identify preventative and protective measures and implement corrective action as appropriate. For example, staff may require training in moving and handling people with disabilities, including the use of specially designed evacuation chairs.

" ':I1 The @ applimoes must nat be remor&hm t : &tiom exoept in oase B 7 a : * .. . i.3 -- . G ,--4t b advisable that- -dk Oflcers .in the building should >A

I =L ,

: > "h031 &e'&aositionr of these applimoes. They &odd read all 8 ' - W> '.*~o-I - -3 . lly and ,make .themselves familiar with &a n g l n g of th& hand pumps, _-- h y h t s , &cl oJher fittings. 7

. .. - i I %me to d66onstrate the

TAN 28 FIRE S m ~~ANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Illus 22 Morgan Academy, Dundee. Managing historic building issues, dealing with psychological loss and the physical loss of student class work as well as the logistics ofproviding alternative accommodation so that education can continue all have to be addressed in the aftermath of a schooljre suclz as this. (picture: The Courier, Dundee 0 DC Thornson & Co. Ltd)

DAMAGE LIMITATION

7.1 Introduction Over the past twenty years it has become clear from the experience gained during incidents at Windsor Castle, Hampton Court and Uppark that there are major advantages in planning to deal with the impact of a fire on the fabric and contents of historic buildings.

Following the fire at Hampton Court in 1986 the UK's Fire Protection Association set up a working party to examine the issues relating to fires in historic buildings. This group's findings were contained in a report published in 1990 titled Heritage Under Fire. Among its recommendations was the proposal that managers of historic buildings should consider the formation of 'fire teams and damage control squads' who would have the responsibility for taking steps to minimise the impact of a fire on a building and its contents.

Since 1990 work to put in place mechanisms to deal with the consequences of fire has been carried out by a number of organisations - details of which are given below.

7.2 Principles of Damage Limitation Originally known as 'salvage' and owing much to the practices developed in wartime, the concept of preparing for and planning to deal with the consequences of fires or other untoward incidents is now well established in the area of heritage management

The primary purposes of damage limitation (in the context of fire) are to:

Create a wider awareness of risk among staff members and contractors.

Reduce the loss suffered by the organisation by relocating vital or significant items of the contents of a building to a safe place;

Minimise the impact of a fire by restricting the spread of smoke and heat;

Minimise the impact of fire fighting activity by reducing the collateral damage caused by water;

Recover important records or other key documents:

Protect damaged buildings against weather and intrusion to prevent further loss or damage;

The high profile fire at Windsor Castle in 1992, together with others at Hampton Court (1986), Uppark (1989) and at the Hofburg, Vienna (1992) has led to much interest in damage limitation. The Report of Sir Alan Bailey's committee on the Windsor fire included the following advice:

Each Palace should have a trained salvage team, with regular exercises in co-operation with the local fire brigade and detailed plans for the salvage of contents.

Palace managers should liaise regularly with local fire brigades on risk management, fire fighting and salvage, and arrange practice exercises.

There should be a programme to prepare and maintain architectural records of the Palaces.

In the UK the government agency responsible for managing the palace at Hampton Court has converted a long established 'private' fire brigade into an efficient and effective damage limitation team and this approach has been followed at a number of other properties. The National Trust for England, Wales and Northern Ireland (NT) also pioneered a number of useful techniques at Lanhydrock House, Cornwall. Other locations or institutions which have undertaken the development of damage limitation planning include the National Library of Scotland, the Palace of Versailles and the Schonbrunn Palace in Vienna.

Appendix B incorporates a summary of the approach adopted at Lanhydrock House which although first published in 1994 is still of value.

The National Trust for Scotland have also set up procedures in their properties to provide basic facilities for the safe evacuation of key collection items. In 2002, the European Commission approved the setting up of a Committee to look at various aspects of fire in relation to the protection of cultural heritage under its programme for Co-operation in Science and Technology (COST). COST C17, the committee number allocated to this work, includes an assessment of the current thinking on damage limitation and related activities within its remit.

One of the major benefits inherent in the Damage Limitation process is that significant improvements in risk reduction can be accomplished with comparatively


little expenditure - when set against the likely spend on fire protection or security enhancement.

7.3 The Damage Limitation Plan The Damage Limitation Plan forms the basis for all the work to be carried out after a fire (or other untoward incident) and should set out in some detail the organisation's response to the emergency. The Plan will included such information as:

A brief description of the premises and the use to which it is put;

A sketch plan showing access roads, drives, fire hydrants and such features as main gas valves, water stop valves and electrical switch rooms;

Identification of the items which are to be removed in an emergency (The 'Snatch List') together with pre-identified safe locations to which the items will be taken;

- Allocation of tasks to employees and others together with home/mobile phone numbers:

Duties of managers and supervisors;

Liaison with the fire and rescue service;

Names and addresses of resources such as contractors, conservation specialists etc.;

Skilful utilisation of even restricted resources can make

a considerable impact on the extent, cost and impact of fire damage and also ensure that an organisation can recover more quickly from the effects of the fire. In the case of a historic or heritage building being run as a business, it is even more important that attention is paid to the need to have a Damage Limitation Plan in place. In the commercial context, the idea of ensuring the survival of a business after an emergency is known as Business Continuity Planning (BCP) (See 7.15) and in the context of historic buildings this should be incorporated into the overall disaster recovery plan so that revenue streams on which the organisation or institution might depend can be safeguarded.

It is also suggested that the Damage Limitation Plan is integrated into any other plans which the organisation might have prepared in response to emergencies - for example, the fire safety plan, security or evacuation plans It is worth noting that plans and other preparatory work put in place to deal with the consequences of fire will generally be easily adaptable to counter the impact of floods, weather incidents and structural collapse - what is important is not the stimulus or incident but the process by which the building can be secured against further damage or the way in which the contents can be safely relocated.

Where business interruption insurance is sought by an organisation, prior to agreeing to provide coverage, insurers may insist on the development of suitable plans to mitigate any loss and to enable the organisation to return to normal as quickly as possible.

Illus 23 Successful damage limitation in progress - contents rescuedfrom a country house fire. (picture: Oxfordshire Fire & Rescue Service)


7.4 Developing a Damage Limitation Plan In premises which do not at present have a Damage Limitation Plan, it is likely that the existing fire plans drawn up for action in the event of a fire to satisfy statutory obligations will already require staff to undertake a number of duties. It may be relatively simple to modify the existing plans as is shown below. Basic legal requirements for all non domestic properties include the following:

Calling the fire and rescue services;

Evacuating the premises and assisting in the control of visitors;

Ensuring security of the evacuated premises and preventing re-entry;

Providing limited assistance to the local fire and rescue services for example to find utility shut-off points

The introduction of a Damage Limitation Plan requires a rethink of this approach and, in particular, will need an examination of how best to allocate the available resources - particularly manpower.

The responsibilities to be undertaken in the context of a damage limitation plan will build upon the fire plan duties placed on staff to include:

Calling the fire and rescue services;

All of these tasks will require additional levels of training and commitment and it is essential for safety, liability and legal reasons that no member of staff is asked to undertake a task for which he or she has not been properly trained.

Notwithstanding the above, it would not be unreasonable to request those members of staff not forming parts of the Damage Limitation Team to assist by working in areas not directly affected by the fire or its effects. Such tasks could include the packing and labelling of artefacts, their removal from the premises and relocation to a designated safe area.

7.5 Prioritisation of Contents Removal Perhaps the single most important task in developing a Damage Limitation Plan is to ensure that clear priorities are established for object removal. This is not a straightforward operation and the person charged with the development of the plan might well come into conflict with curatorial or conservation colleagues. Where appointed it is curatorial or conservation staff who must identify and prioritise the contents of the historic building on the basis of their importance together with the ease with which the items may be removed. Often, their view will be 'it's all important' - and while this may be true it does not help to advance the planning process.

A system of categorisation, that has been used successfully in a number of locations, divides the contents of a historic building as follows:

Evacuating nonessential personnel from the First priority: items of international cultural value building; which are intimately connected with the building

Control and evacuation of visitors; or its previous occupants.

'First-aid' fire fighting (if appropriate); Second priority: items of national value or which are important in explaining the history of the

Providing technical assistance to the fire and building or its occupants. This would also include rescue services on their arrival; items that have a high monetary value.

Taking technical steps to restrict the spread of fire Third Priority: items which may be difficult or (isolating power supplies, closing doors, windows, expensive to replace and which contribute to the operating ventilation systems etc.); history of the building or form part of a collection

that is intimately connected to the building. Removal and relocation of contents on a predetermined priority basis (The 'Snatch List'); Unclassified: items that will be left in place.

Limiting the impact of fire fighting activities (particularly the effects of water); Unclassified items will be allocated to this category, not

only for reasons of their relative lack of importance, Ventilating the building after the fire is

but also where they are too awkward or too heavy to extinguished to reduce the effects of smoke;

move. The decision to leave valuable objects is hard

Recovery of items after extinction of the fire; but must be faced as in many cases the expertise, specialist equipment and manpower needed may not be

Securing the premises; available.

Arranging measures to ensure structural stability Items of value which are not to be (or simply cannot

and temporary weather protection for fire damaged be) removed (for example because they are too heavy

areas. or large) may be afforded some degree of protection in

Illus 24 Members of a damage limitation team in action. (picture: Author)

situ. For example, bags or sheets made from appropriate lightweight protective materials will provide a degree of fire resistance, protection against smoke and water and at the same time provide protection against mechanical damage.

Suitable prefabricated covers could be manufactured and stored adjacent to the items that are to be protected. For example, close woven netting bags or even heavy duty sacks may be used to protect chandeliers from light smoke and heat and will also retain all the component parts in one place should the chandelier fall from the ceiling.

In larger properties, in place of a single Snatch List, Priority Cards should be prepared for each room, area or space summarising the priority items in the room and keying these to a photograph or plan. Information about any special security or fixing measures that may hinder removal of the items may also be included on the card. The card will also indicate the location to which the items are to be taken for safe keeping for the duration of the emergency.

Any keys or special tools required for access to individual areas or to display cases should be kept with the relevant plan and be readily available. The scope of the task should be properly assessed, in relation to the number of people likely to be available and the equipment that will be required.

packed and crated prior to transportation to a designated secure storage area. Figure 3 shows a the way in which objects can be processed as they are removed from the building. Undamaged items are labelled and passed straight to a temporary storage location while items which may have been affected by fire, smoke, heat or water may need special handling or even emergency conservation by specialists before being labelled and stored. The Damage Limitation Team, where one is established, should be involved in the establishment of prioritisation and well briefed on the intrinsic features of items which may be difficult to move - for example, the structure of a table which may be capable of being dismantled.

Salvaged object flow

D=4@ Undamaged

I Initial I n a y 1

I I-w...-.-, T

Suitable locations should be identified to which items can be initially removed and where they can be logged,

Figure 3: Salvaged objectflow.

. . . --


7.6 Supporting Information In order to minimise the impact of any fire, especially in relation to the fabric and structure of the building, a list of key contacts should be maintained. The damage limitation plan should include a readily accessible up to date list of the telephone numbers and addresses of the following:

Electricity, gas and water utilities' emergency telephone numbers

Local authority departments

Architect/surveyor/ structural and services engineers

Building contractors - plumbers, carpenters, electricians, heating engineers

Plant hire contractors (for pumps, generators, heating equipment etc.).

Experts in the care and recovery of historic items (conservation specialists)

Smoke residue removal experts

Insurance brokers/Insurers/loss adjusters

7.7 Fire and Rescue Services Support It is essential to obtain support from the local fire and rescue services before setting up the Damage Limitation Team - since it likely to be impossible to operate a successful Damage Limitation function without their active co-operation and support. Damage limitation activities must be dovetailed with the more general procedures which the fire and rescue services employ to tackle an incident. These are explained in Chapter 8.

Where the fire and rescue service concerned understand the issues relating to the protection of historic buildings it is likely that they will welcome the establishment of a Damage Limitation Team. This would have an immediate benefit for the fire service in that they would have access to additional:

Trained guides to provide information to fire fighting personnel to enable them to reach the source of the fire;

Assistance in accessing secured areas;

Specialist local knowledge of areas such as utility rooms, chemical/gas/flammables storage areas;

Technical support in operating equipment such as public address systems, CCTV, radios etc.

Many larger historic buildings have complex and tortuous floor plans and access to areas in basements and roof spaces is often difficult. Trained staff can

prove a major asset in this respect. At the Windsor Castle fire, for example, the use of castle staff as guides was invaluable and on at least one occasion prevented a fire crew from getting lost.

Consideration should be given during the development of the plan to the practicalities of tactical ventilation by the fire service during fire fighting operations. This may involve creating openings in roofs or other structures to allow smoke and heat to escape. While this activity may cause some additional local fire damage, it will also minimise the problems caused by the spread of smoke inside a building and reduce the likelihood of a flashover. Care should be taken to ensure that no deliberate damage is caused to important historic fabric.

The arrangements for co-ordinating the work of the fire and rescue services with National Trust personnel are worthy of note. Provisions at the NT's Lanhydrock property are outlined in Appendix B.

There is a particular problem in certain parts of Scotland where important historic buildings are located in areas having no full time fire and rescue personnel and where the only basic fire fighting services are provided by volunteer or part-time brigades. In these circumstances it may be necessary to consider whether the risk from fire and its consequences justify a different approach. This could be one or a combination of the following:

Fund improvements to the local part-time or volunteer brigade;

Set up and equip an 'in-house' fire brigade;

Provide the building with full fire detection and automatic suppression systems;

In fact, historically, many palaces, castles, estates and other important historic buildings had their own fire brigades and some of these continued in recognisable form until recently. It is now usually difficult to justify the financial costs of raising a full-time, private fire brigade but it may be possible to set up such a brigade from among staff in a major institution or on a large estate. Clearly, such a facility provides a very useful asset for rapid response as well as an intimate knowledge of the building and its contents. It may also be possible to 'cross train' security personnel to provide an intermediate level of fire cover as has been done at the Palace of Versailles, for example.

7.8 Incidents at Night and in Remote Areas Fire Protection Association statistics suggest that 68% of all serious fires occur during the night between 2200 hrs and 0600 hours, a period when providing emergency intervention will be more difficult. There are other fire problems at night as Figure 4 demonstrates. Even where buildings are protected by 24 hour security cover it is unlikely that the personnel on duty will be able to


undertake much in the way of limitation of damage to 7.9 Setting up the Damage Limitation Team building and contents without the necessary training npical actions to implement a full damage limitation and equipment - *though there be limits to plan, after management support has been assured and one or two guards can do. the commitment of the local fire and rescue services is

confirmed might be:

Perils of the Night

D.Y

4% Duths (Accideatal fbs) 51%

36% Death (m) 64%

44% Injuries 56%

32% No. &Large Fins 68%

27% Cost of Large F i s 73%

32% No. of- Fins 68%

S o u n r : P h e ~ ~ 1 9 8 9

Figure 4: Perils of the night.

Selection and training of Damage Limitation Team Head and Deputy

Development of Snatch Lists for contents

Production of a plan and call out lists

Selection and training of teams, each comprising four operatives and a supervisor

Acquisition of paging/communication systems to provide group alerting of all team members

Acquisition of damage limitation supplies and equipment

Nomination and training of support staff to assist in packing and removal of contents

Allocation of spaces for temporary storage of A possible approach to solving this problem is where e v a c u a t ~ items an existing security force is capable of being trained to provide an immediate intervention capability. If a ~ ~ a i n i ~ ~ and exercises with fire and rescue contracted force is employed, it should be ensured that services the contract specification includes adequate reference to the additional duties that could be imposed on security FuU sa le with all personnel fire personnel. It is likely to be easier to expand the skills rescue services base of an in-house guard force than that of contract manpower. The expansion of the security force duties to include damage limitationsu~porttaskma~ therefore Recruitment of team members should be subject to determine whether a security force could be S ~ ~ ~ e ~ S f u l l y established medical and fitness standards for similar contracted out or not. personnel in industry. Reference could be made to the UK h rural areas the response time for staff may not be a LOSS Prevention Council's Standard for Occupational problem (especially where many or all live on site or Fire Brigades. Once a damage limitation plan has been

nearby) but in the same circumstances the first response Put place and a team established, continuing regular, from the fire and rescue service may be based on part perhaps monthly, training of members will be required, time or volunteer and as such, it is likely that together with basic training of additional or replacement

in the initial stages of an incident, what fire fighters team members. there are will be fully committed to lire suppression When setting up new damage limitation teams, much

no be for removal of can be often learned from comparable premises where contents. These factors suggest that consideration of provision exists. h the case of the the of an in-h0use Damage Limitation Schanbrunn Palace in Vienna for instance, considerable Or even a ~ 0 l ~ n t e e r fire brigade is even more important benefit was obtained by sending team members to the in remote areas. UK to see how their opposite numbers at Windsor and Where staff are to be called from home then some Hampton Court operate. This approach was deemed to means of alerting them is important. Mobile phones be very cost effective and is highly recommended. using group call systems or Short Message Systems Recently consideration has been given to the setting will normally be the most useful method of doing this up of regional damage limitation teams by heritage but where a public paging system is available this can organisations working jointly with the fire service. be used. In rural areas a private paging or radio network England and Wales this has been successfully done in may be necessary. some areas by the National Trust (See Appendix B)


7.10 Training and Exercises One of the most common failings in Damage Limitation Planning is to prepare detailed plans on paper and then assume that if the unthinkable does happen everything will be all right. A paper plan on its own is worth considerably less than the effort that went into drafting it, however, and it is therefore essential to test and refine the practical implementation of the plan through training and exercises.

Training of all those having a role in the plan is vital. This should begin with formalised sessions covering the contents and purposes of the plan until all involved are familiar with the details. It is worth noting that at each stage there is an opportunity to feed back necessary changes and revisions to the plan. It is much better to find the flaws in a Damage Limitation Plan during an exercises than during the real thing!

ercise

Figure 5: The training cycle.

Following basic training of all concerned, it is then appropriate to hold small-scale exercises with individuals and groups followed by full scale exercises thereafter. Where staff are working in their 'normal' roles in an incident situation the training can be devoted solely to the practice of the sorts of activity they will be undertaking during a crisis or emergency. In the case of telephone operators, security staff and so on this should pose little problem.

A minimum of one full scale exercise should be held at least every two years, possibly involving the emergency services so that, in the event of a real disaster, they are familiar with the premises and their method of working is known to staff. It should also be noted that in the case of many historic buildings the fire and rescue services will have their own plans to deal with fires and similar emergencies in the building - it makes sense to ensure that the plans prepared by the building owner or management dovetail with those of the fire service. In the case of larger locations or properties where major public events are staged the police and ambulance service will also have pre-prepared plans to deal with emergencies so in this case, too, coordination is essential.

Issues can arise with training of management and administration staff who may not have had to undertake this sort of activity previously. Senior staff may also feel that by attending training they are somehow exposing a weakness in their skills base. All the familiarisation training and related exercise activity must therefore be organised so as to minimise the chances of any embarrassment or anxiety. The training cycle set out in Figure 5 illustrates how this might be achieved.

7.11 The Training Cycle When the Damage Limitation plan has been revised and any retraining undertaken, a slightly more ambitious exercise with a tightly focussed scenario can be considered. For example, if there is a fire in one particular area, which of the items on the floor below should be relocated, who will move them, how will they be moved and where will they be taken to? If this progresses well then the next step can be entertained with a tabletop exercise involving support staff. This should be followed by a debrief and plan revision. More training may then have to be undertaken.

Then and only then can a full-scale exercise be undertaken - which should be set very specific targets and must have full management support. Outside players (police fire etc) should only be involved when sufficient confidence in the effectiveness of the internal arrangements of the plan has been established.

At each stage the knowledge gained should be fed back into plan revisions and learning from feedback should also always follow any plan activation. The damage limitation plan should be regularly reviewed, at least annually, and in addition whenever there are any changes to the structure or layout of the premises, contents or staffing levels that will affect the implementation of the plan. This is particularly relevant to changes in how and where items are displayed or as a result of special events or temporary exhibitions. Any changes to the plans and the Damage Limitation Team's tactics should be made as soon as practicable, any plans and instructions amended as necessary and those responsible for carrying out the action duly informed and the appropriate training given.

7.12 Damage Limitation Equipment The personnel engaged in damage limitation work will need access to tools and equipment as well as some basic supplies as set out in Appendix C. These range from simple hand tools, such as screwdrivers for removing paintings from wall fixings to the more complicated equipment such as pumps for removing water from basements. Protective clothing for team members (See 7.13) will be required as well as such things as battery operated lights and supplies of cleaning materials. Consumables such as paper for wrapping relocated items will also be required, as will boxes and crates. Where special protective covers have been fabricated to

TAN 28 FIRE S m MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

Illus 25 Schonbrunn Palace, Wenna. Mobile trolleys housing damage limitation equipment and supplies. (picture: Author)

afford protection for immovable items which will be left in situ, these should be readily available. Where special security devices are in use for the protection of paintings or other objects the appropriate keys or release devices should also be provided - and may even be included with the Snatch List (see 7.5). If the evacuation plan for very large objects requires special high level access then the appropriate ladders or working platforms should be made available in convenient locations.

Major buildings should be provided with basic stockpiles of appropriate equipment in at least two locations on each floor. Each location should be provided with a range of equipment and supplies. In the case of smaller properties the provision can be adjusted to reflect the likely need. Supplies should be stowed on trolleys each of which can be pushed by one person. Selection of a suitable vehicle calls for the use of initiative; the National Library of Scotland have found large, wheeled polyethylene laundry baskets to be ideal, while the Schonbrunn Palace have utilised purpose-built trolleys of suitable design. In smaller properties a single cache of equipment may suffice if it can be located away from the main building. The National Trust for Scotland have housed supplies for some of their properties in outbuildings such as summerhouses or game larders.

Where conservation specialists are likely to be employed or called in, they should each be asked to nominate the contents of a box of emergency supplies for their own area of expertise to be kept permanently stored on site in a designated location.

Communications are of great importance in situations where a damage limitation plan is invoked and it is suggested that consideration should be given to the need for two way radios. If these are already in use at the property additional units could purchased for

emergency use if deemed necessary. At least one radio should be available to be given to the fire and rescue services incident commander.

7.13 Safety and Security The Damage Limitation Plan and its constituent documents - including the Snatch List - should be classified as confidential and kept under strict control. All copies of these documents should be numbered and no unauthorised photocopying should be permitted. Emergency packs containing keys should be secured at all times and strict accountability for their control should be exercised.

It is essential that the Employer's Liability insurers are notified of the intention to set up a damage limitation team and that staff are covered by insurance for all team activities including training.

All staff expected to work inside the building during an emergency should be supplied with appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment. This should include:

Hard hat with chin strap and attached battery- operated flashlight;

Flame retardant one piece coveralls;

Boots with internal steel sole and steel toecaps;

Leather gloves with heat resistant insert;

The management member designated to take charge of the incident should wear a fire and rescue services- approved jacket or tabard incorporating a title (such as 'Incident Manager') that has been agreed with the fire and rescue services. Supervisory personnel should also wear a coloured tabard or similar item marked to designate their role.


All staff liable for callout to emergencies should be provided with a special ID card identifying them as members of the institution's staff requiring access during emergencies and samples of the card should be provided to both the fire and rescue services and the police.

It should be acknowledged by management that the normal levels of security for the building and its contents will be seriously impaired in any emergency and it is essential that appropriate countermeasures are included in damage limitation planning. Where additional police support is a practical possibility this should be deployed to protect the site and those items which have been recovered from the affected buildings.

Where security has been contracted out it should be ensured that the security service supplier is able to provide additional manpower at short notice.

7.14 Disaster Limitation: Post-Fire Considerations

Any historic building which has been damaged by fire is inevitably going to be in a condition where specialist expertise will be required to minimise not only the effects of the fire but also the impact of fire fighting activity - especially the volumes of water which may have been applied.

From time to time fire fighters may be faced with a situation where the threat of imminent danger - for example from an unsupported gable - may necessitate immediate action which might later be regretted. It is suggested that in the circumstances where a fire is being fought in a historic structure that the fire and rescue service officer in charge or incident safety officer constantly monitor any elements of structure which might threaten the safety of personnel and at the same time ensure that no over-zealous demolition takes place.

Access to the site may be restricted by considerations of structural integrity or for the investigation of the cause of the fire. Indeed, the structural integrity of the building or its remains must be established as a first priority by specialist advisers and any stabilising measures carried out before access is allowed for any other purposes. It may be necessary to exercise control in respect of actions by local authority building control departments who may want to pursue demolition of a fire-damaged building in the interests of public safety, acting under the dangerous building provisions of Section 13 of the Building Scotland Act 1959. (This legislation will be replaced in 2005 by the B~rilding Scotland Act 2003, with Sections 29, 30 and 35 covering dangerous buildings). It should be remembered that this dangerous structures legislation suggests alternatives to demolition when appropriate and in these cases, advice or a second opinion from a structural engineer with conservation experience may be helpful in tempering such actions. Reference should also be made to Historic Scotland's

Memorandum of Guidance on Historic Buildings and Conservation Areas for further advice.

Following the extinguishment of the fire, depending on the extent of damage there are a number of things to be borne in mind.

Appropriate warning signs, barriers etc. should be erected. The Fire Protection Association publication Safety at Scenes of Fire and Related Incidents, (1994) offers helpful guidance to the criteria necessary to ensure safety in such conditions.

Debris should be carefully searched for any fragments or items of importance. These should be labelled and the position in which they were found recorded.

Damaged roofs should be covered with tarpaulins in order to minimise subsequent weather damage. Any temporary remedial work should be designed by a competent professional (surveyor, architect, structural engineer etc as appropriate) to ensure adequate fixture and structural stability is maintained. Care should be taken to ensure that scaffolding is not fixed in such a manner as to damage any elements of fabric and also that exposed wallheads are protected from damaging water ingress.

As far as possible, residual water should be removed using squeegees, cloths and suction equipment.

Drainage of firefighting water is especially important in cathedrals, churches and in buildings with masonry vaults where the weight of collected water could cause structural collapse. Consideration should be given to the benefits of providing drainage plugs in the lower parts as a precautionary measure enabling water to be drained off easily in a controlled manner. If this is not done, then it may be necessary for masonry to be damaged in the course of emergency response activities to allow water to escape.

After the fire is doused, masonry structures will have absorbed huge quantities of moisture and several damaging processes may then begin. In winter, freezing conditions can cause frost and saturated, soft masonry may crack and exfoliate. Damp conditions may also encourage the growth of moulds and fungi on timber and other organic material causing rot and decay. Drainage, protection, and ventilation are essential, particularly as winter approaches.

Plaster ceilings in rooms below the seat of the fire will almost certainly suffer from the effects of the fire fighting water and are likely to have

TAN 28 FIRE S A ~ Y MANAGEMENT IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

been brought down. Where the ceiling is intact but in need of support, props can be used. Appropriate methods are set out in Historic Scotland's Technical Advice Note 2 Conservation of Plastenvork (Simpson and Brown, 2002). Where ceilings have collapsed, the debris field should be carefully searched and any intact plaster mouldings or other features should be removed, recorded and safely stored for possible reuse or use as templates in reinstatement works.

The building should be thoroughly dried (for example, by using dehumidifiers), but special care must be taken not to over-dry the buildings fabric nor start another fire. Drying can be a very lengthy process dependant on a number of factors including thickness of walls and the season of year.

Professional advice should be sought on damaged artefact conservation from the appropriate conservation specialists. This should be done without delay as combustion products can be highly acidic and therefore very corrosive. As an emergency measure, certain items (for example books but not photographs), can be freeze-dried in commercial freezers. This will arrest further damage until assistance can be obtained.

To remove the smoke odour it may be possible to use a process in which a deodorising liquid is passed through electrically driven sprayers. However this approach should only be adopted if it can be confirmed that the deodorising liquid specification proposed for use will not harm the surfaces of the building - particularly where decorations or surface finishes are intact.

Depending on the size of the building and the extent of the damage, the building's protective systems should be reinstated where possible and levels of protection augmented as necessary. The following are examples of the areas that should be attended to:

used extinguishers should be recharged;

hose reels and hose should be wiped clean and rewound;

sprinkler and fire detection systems should be reinstated;

broken windows should be boarded up and broken doors should be repaired and made lockfast. Due consideration must be given to avoiding further damage to fabric in carrying out these works;

7.15 Business Continuity Planning

7.15.1 Introduction Where heritage buildings earn their keep as visitor attractions or historic buildings provide accommodation for commercial organisations, business continuity planning must be considered as part of the overall disaster recovery plan. The two terms 'business continuity planning' and 'disaster recovery planning' are often used interchangeably. However for clarity in this publication, 'business continuity' is used in this section to describe the commercial aspects of recovery whilst 'disaster recovery' is used as a more general term to describe the wider scenario.

Government advice suggests that 50% of all businesses experiencing a disaster and which have no effective plans for recovery fail within the following 12 months. To stay in business after disaster strikes requires careful pre-planning and it is irresponsible to believe that contingency arrangements will easily be able to sorted out on the day.

A basic business continuity plan is therefore essential and the complexity of this plan will be related to the size of the organisation. Smaller premises may be able to work with a plan that can be written on a single piece of paper, whereas major enterprises will have much more comprehensive arrangements. There can be no universal solution. However all organisations, large and small, will need to go through the same basic process to produce their plan.

7.15.2 Terminology - what is Business Continuity ?

It is important to understand the terminology and jargon used in this area as different people use the same terms to mean different things. Local authorities used to talk about 'civil defence' to describe planning to deal with war or other major disasters, but this term was replaced by 'civil protection' (the preferred EU and UN term) or 'emergency planning'. In the 1980s many local authorities began to switch from planning to deal with the effects of war to providing contingency planning for a wider range of civil incidents. This is known as the 'all-hazards' approach and is the basis for most local authority planning today.

'Crisis management' is also sometimes used to describe this type of activity but it is also used in the PR business to cover the strategy used to minimise the PR impact of an unwanted event such as product contamination. In the IT sector, 'disaster recovery' has been used to encompass planning to deal with emergencies, but they now more usually refer to 'business interruption' as this is the term most often used by consultants specialising in IT disaster management.

consideration should be given to the need for the 'Business continuity planning' currently seems to be

premises to be guarded especially if scaffolding the most fashionable term for this type of activity. It

is to be erected. refers to that part of the process dedicated to keeping an


organisation going during an emergency. For example, a business continuity plan would ensure that, in the event of a disaster, the key functions of the business continue to operate, whereas a more all-encompassing disaster recovery plan would also deal with the consequences of the disaster for example, dealing with the clean-up and ensuring that those who need to know there is a problem are told: staff, financial backers, suppliers, regulator etc.

7.15.4 The Business Continuity PIan The factors which should be considered in developing a business continuity plan include:

Relocation of key functions or facilities

Temporary power/water/gas supplies

Recovery of informationfdata and records

Communications and Information 7.15.3 Insurance Considerations - Finances Many organisations consider that provided they have purchased insurance there is no need to worry about the impact of a disaster. This is, unfortunately not true. To begin with, unless an organisation has specifically opted to buy Business Interruption or Consequential Loss cover, the insurers will not provide compensation for lost revenue while a facility is unable to trade.

Managing the Media

Consideration in developing the plan should be given to assessing the sort of scenarios which would hurt the most. For example, in the case of a historic house open for most of the year, it is likely that the loss of a catering facility and shop as a result of a fire could be a significant blow in terms of loss of revenue. In this case, the plan should provide for the facilities described above as follows:

Unless the only commercial activity undertaken in a historic building is opening a property or garden for a few days each year, it is worth taking account of how the loss of income which would follow the loss of a building might affect the owner or organisation. Business Interruption Insurance is available to cover loss of income which an organisation might suffer if severely affected by a fire, flood or other event. However this is increasingly difficult to obtain unless the insurer can be convinced that proper, tested contingency plans are in place.

Relocation of key facilities: Procure portable building for use as temporary cafelshop

Temporary power supplies: Provide generator until electricity supplier can route permanent supply. Use bottled water in cooking and LPG for heating food and water.

Illus 26 Co~rntry hoctse /lore1 girtterl byjire. (pict~rre: Historic Scotland)


Recovery of information/daWrecords: The following text is intended to provide a general While undertaking damage limitation ensure overview of the areas which require to be considered that as much paperwork as possible relating to the to assist smaller properties or organisations. In larger catering and shop are recovered from the debris; organisations it is likely that there will be an in house recreate data from other sources (eg. sales figures press or public relations specialist

for might be being reconstructed The following preparatory activity is recommended from suppliers' orders).

Communications and Information: Staff Designate a spokesperson and stand in;

need to be told whether to come to work or stay Have a press pack ready which includes at home and may need to be reassured that there photographs; will still be jobs for them; customers should be told that the facility will be closed temporarily Be aware of the background which might appear - for example via local radio or local papers; the in a film clip or interview; bank may need to be told if the business is being run on an overdraft and of course any regulators Find out what questions are likely to be asked

will need to be informed of what is going on. (care - offer alternatives which may aid your objective.

taken to do so at this stage will often engender - goodwill which can be invaluable when re-building is to be undertaken).

Finances: Steps need to be taken to cover any

During the Incident

Don't 'lie low' if there is nothing to hide;

shortfall in cash-flow; this could be done by a bank loan or extension of an overdraft; by asking If the owner or chief executive is good at

suppliers for extended terms or by a cash injection interviews they should be used rather than a

from some other source. Cash management is media professional.

essential at this time but it is likely that many suppliers will expect payment on delivery If the organisation is guilty of some

rather than the usual 28 days credit. In some misdemeanour - go public straight away,

cases, insurers may make a partial payment don't wait to be found out.

as soon as the claim is agreed. Don't fill the void with speculation.

Managing the media: In the case in point, it would be possible to put a very positive face If wrongly quoted, accused or misrepresented

on the disaster - 'yes we have had a fire but we devote all efforts to getting the facts into the

will be taking the opportunity created by the public domain.

destruction of the old tea-rooms to build a new, There are also some simple rules to remember when enlarged facility which will be able to cater giving an interview or speaking at a press conference. for larger numbers and special events'.

Tell the truth - always 7.17 below sets out the events which could be likely in managing and recovering from a disaster. ' No comment' is not an option

7.16 Managing the Media If you don't know, say so - offer to get back to them later - and always get back to them

Major fires in historic buildings will inevitably attract the attention of local and national media and it is likely ~ h , camera is always on and the microphone is that the owner or manager will be faced with requests always live and recording - be very careful what for interviews. It is essential therefore, that some you say 'afterwards'. advance consideration is given to how the situation It is quite possible to fight the fire, manage the disaster will be handled. The overriding objectives of any and save the contents but lose the media battle and so media management activity must be to ensure that the be perceived as irresponsible. A little careful planning organisation is properly represented and that the media can make the difference between being portrayed as a represent fairly and accurately the facts of the incident. hero rather than a fool. 'Public image' can be critically affected by the way a spokesperson responds to the sort of questioning that is 7.17 Recovering from a Disaster now COn~mon. Should a serious injury or fatality have The following fictional example provides an illustration occurred then it is likely that the media will arrive at the of how the disaster recovery process operates: scene in some numbers and will subject the situation and those present to close scrutiny.


7.17.1 Dealing witlz the actzlal scenario The headquarters of a major heritage organisation, itself a listed building, is seriously damaged by fire. The building contains not only the main offices, but also a shop, cafe and the computer and communications equipment which link the organisation with the buildings it owns and administers.

The prudent organisation would have had a plan to ensure that all employees, visitors and customers had been evacuated safely and then nominated staff would have been involved in implementing a damage limitation plan while the fire and rescue services deal with the fire Under certain circumstances, trained employees could have assisted in salvaging what could be saved in the way of resources, equipment, and information and preventing smoke or fire fighting water damaging areas which the fire did not reach. The plan would ensure that all relevant personnel were informed of the incident and where necessary, call-outs would be made.

disrupted the organisation's activities. Regulators, sponsoring government departments and politicians (local and national) will also want to be kept apprised of the situation.

In the context of the case described it should be clear that it would have been impossible to manage such an incident as well as its consequences without careful preplanning. The importance of drawing up plans, assigning tasks and ensuring that adequate resources are available will have ensured that not only is the incident and its impact managed but that the organisation will not have suffered irreperable damage.

7.18 Failing to plan: the consequences In dealing with heritage buildings the consequences of failing to implement a proper disaster recovery plan will give rise to issues going far beyond monetary impact:

Insurance availability: Insurance may not be available or will be extremely expensive unless the insurance carrier can be satisfied that proper plans to manage

7.17.2 Handling tlze by prod~icts of tlze disaster crises and incidents are in place.

Following the extinction of the fire, steps would be put in place to evaluate the extent of the damage. Key Staff: Should feel that an

Alternative previously earmarked premises would be organisation is in danger of going out of business opened up, standby arrangements for communications Or being may start look and data transfer would be implemented and staff would As alwaysv the most go first and

be told where to report (or perhaps to stay at home) the these tend be key staff.

following day.

Salvaged material including data would be safeguarded and if necessary passed to specialist contractors for restoration or recovery.

Contact with insurers, outside contractors, specialist consultants and the local authority building control and planning departments would be well in hand to ensure that damaged buildings are safeguarded from weather and steps taken to deal with unsafe parts of the structure or contaminated materials. Care would have been taken not to discard elements of construction, joinery and stonework etc that might be capable of reuse or could provide information or models for reinstatement works.

7.17.3 Recovery - getting back to normal Recovery in this example is particularly difficult as it requires the management of the organisation to continue at the same time as the management of the crisis - with the added impediment posed by the established resources for both likely to have been concentrated in the affected building. Such a situation will be particularly taxing for smaller, single-site operations with little spare capacity. Ensuring that reliable information is provided to those who need to know what is going on is the most important task during this phase. In the example described, activity would range from staff being reassured that they will still have a job to members, trustees, bankers and the media being told to what extent the fire has

Prosecution: There are both specific and general duties under health and safety and fire legislation that could be used to prosecute a company that has failed to plan to deal with the impact of a serious incident

Public Image: The results of a disaster may be amplified by its impact on the organisation's public image. The actual fire may have caused little damage to historic fabric but may have a disproportionate effect on the reputation of the organisation: Will future donors still regard it in the same way? Will funding bodies see it in a new light? What will members think of the organisation's efficiency after an incident? How will sponsoring government departments view suitability for future partnership work? How difficult will it be to borrow items for special exhibitions if a fire has destroyed major works of art?


ius L/ blass slzae prctorzal representanon of hlSt0rlCUl)Weflghtrng operations. (source: Author)

8. FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES OPERATIONS IN HISTORIC BUILDINGS

Section 8 is intended for use by the fire and rescue service and while it contains much that will be of interest to the general reader it does include technical terms and usages with which the layperson may not be familiar. Where not explained in the text, technical terms used are defined in the glossary at Section 14. The last two sections (Sections 8.5 on water supplies and 8.6 on access and signage) contain material of value to all readers.

8.1 Statutory Framework The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004' prescribes the core duties of Fire and Rescue Authorities in England and Wales. At the time of writing (early 2005) similar provisions are have been made for Scotland in Part 2 of the Fire (Scotland) Bill which is expected to receive Royal Assent later in 2005.

Under Section 7 a jire and rescue authority must make provision for the purposes of extinguishing jires in its area and protecting life and property in the event of jires in its area.

Subsection 7 (2) (d) of the Act imposes a duty on fire and rescue authorities to make efficient arrangements for obtaining information needed for these purposes.

This statutory obligation requires fire and rescue services in the UK to collect and maintain operational intelligence on risks within their area. The nature and extent of the intelligence held can range from basic text information and single line plan drawings held centrally, through enhanced versions of this data stored on fire appliances up to three dimensional plans on vehicle mounted electronic data systems. It is a matter for individual fire services to determine the nature and extent of information which they wish to hold and the way it is stored and managed.

Similarly, subsection 7 (2) (e) of the 2004 Act requires

The value of historic fabric and the contents of historic and heritage buildings may not always be recognisable to the non specialist and specific measures may be necessary to provide effective damage-limitation during and after a fire.

From the earliest days of fire brigades and insurance companies, the recovery of contents from properties affected by fire has always been undertaken. However the more detailed planning now being undertaken by the owners or managers of many historic buildings will inevitably demand more of fire service personnel both in the preplanning of response and in operational implementation of damage-limitation at the scene of a fire.

Since damage-limitation at operational incidents is the responsibility of the fire and rescue service, the majority of first responding fire service vehicles to incidents carry basic damage-limitation equipment. The majority of fire services in the UK also have specialist vehicles, with additional and more sophisticated equipment, which are termed either salvage tenders or damage- control vehicles.

It should be noted however that no single definitive standard in the UK exists for damage-limitation equipment. Additionally,mobilisingcriteria,operational procedures, and expertise varies from brigade to brigade even between neighbouring fire authorities.

8.2 Fire Fighting in Historic Buildings The hazards present at fires involving historic buildings generally arise from:

The building itself

The contents of the building

The nature of the fire situation every Jire and rescue az~tl~ority to make arrangements for ensuring tlzat reasonable steps are taken to prevent The nature of the task to be performed

or limit damage to property resultingfrom action taken ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l considerations for these purposes.

The first three of these topics must be taken particular This statutory duty takes on additional significance account of when considering heritage buildings and are when considering the potential financial and cultural expanded upon in the sections which follow. loss resulting from fire in historic and listed buildings.

' It is intended that this legislation will be replaced across the whole of the UK during 2005. The Fire (Scotland) Bill was introduced into the Scottish Parliament on 28 June 2004 but at the time of writing has not become law. Sections 7 and 8 of the Bill will provide similar powers to that contained in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 and it is unlikely that the duties and powers noted here will change significantly.


8.2.1 Tlte building itself

Historic building pose special problems for firefighters during a fire. These are covered in more detail elsewhere in the text (see especially Section 1.2 and Chapter 5 ) but can be summarised as

Hidden spaces where fire or smoke can travel

Lack of fire separation (particularly in roof voids)

Unusual patterns of fire spread and behaviour

Difficulty in locating the fire

Additionally, the way in which an historic building is being used may have changed significantly from its original purpose and this may have been accompanied by past alterations to fabric which have compromised fire performance. Historic buildings which have been unoccupied for lengthy periods of time can present particular additional hazards (See also Chapter 10). These include:

Difficult external and internal access

Unsafe floors and staircases

Increased risk of structural collapse

The possible presence of asbestos

The possible presence of drugs paraphernalia.

It will be necessary to assess the risk to fire-fighters against the benefits of saving the building and the incident commander at a fire will need to decide whether to adopt an offensive or defensive mode of fire fighting. In the case of a derelict property or one where fire is well established the risks are likely to outweigh the benefits and a defensive mode of fire-fighting may have to be considered. Defensive fire fighting means that fires are fought in the main without committing personnel to the interior of the building and where possible the fire is prevented from spreading to unaffected portions of the property or to nearby buildings.

8.2.2 Tlte contents of the building

Although the hazards implicit in fighting fires in historic buildings are little different from the hazards found in 'normal' fire fighting, there may be additional risks to fire crews and others resulting from the types of materials stored or used in these premises. For example, it would be likely to encounter a wide range of hazardous chemicals in buildings used for the storage, display or preparation of natural history collections.

In all historic buildings, consideration should always be given to the need to mitigate damage and the operational approach adopted by the incident commander must reflect this. Damage limitation in historic buildings falls into two broad categories:

1) Limiting damage to the structure of the building and its constituent parts - including damage by fire fighting activities, especially water

2) Limiting damage to the contents of the building - including recovery and relocation of furniture, fabric, fittings and works of art.

The hazards which may be present include:

Manual handling problems (weight and size of individual items)

Difficult access and egress

Behaviour of occupants due to a fire situation

Dangers implicit in large number of non fire service personnel assisting with damage limitation/salvage

Fire service personnel must be aware of these hazards and consequently pre-planning must incorporate liaison between the fire service and property owners to ensure awareness of all hazards likely to be present. During any pre-planning visit or inspection, consideration should be given to how damage limitation activities will impact on fire-fighting operations. When considering damage limitation of contents including, for example artworks and furniture the manual handling implications and egress route of choice should be considered.

8.2.3 Control of volunteers and staff

Additional considerations exist where there is the intention to employ volunteer members of staff (or the public) in a damage limitation role. Where such damage limitation teams exist, joint training exercises should be held in order to familiarise the teams with fire and rescue service procedures. During an incident teams must always act under the direction of the fire service incident commander who should assess what, if any, damage limitation work can be undertaken safely by them. The incident commander must maintain charge at all times over who is permitted to enter the building, areas where they can work and any control measures to be adopted. (See also 7.7,7.9 and 7.10)

8.3 Fire & Rescue Service Operational Considerations In the event of a fire, the Fire and Rescue Service's incident commander will have to decide upon the operational tactics to be employed and quickly develop a plan for dealing with the incident. The following sections identify some of the likely operational considerations. Taking these into account during the pre-planning stage, will greatly assist in the preparation of the Operational Plan which will be developed to manage the fire service's response to an incident.


8.3.1 On arrival The incident commander will

Proceed to a pre arranged rendezvous point at the site.

Make contact with responsible staff, the owner or owner's representative to obtain advice from the appropriate source

Ascertain whether occupants, staff and public are all accounted for

Ascertain the nature of the incident quickly

Obtain plans of the building if available. Property owners or managers should have these available as part of their site's own plans.

Appoint Safety Officer(s)

Cordon off area to safeguard public

Verify whether gas and electricity are isolated if this is necessary. The location of shut-off valves and isolation switches should be included in the site's plans.

Use of aerial appliances -taking account of suitability of access routes and ground stability

Decide whether adequate fire services resources Liaise with Police and other agencies on site are on site or en route

When considering whether to undertake any activity in Consider the siting of fire appliances taking respect of damagk limitation, the Incident Commander account of proximity to the building, hard standing will take the following into consideration: availability (especially for aerial appliances) and the location of water supplies. Effects of fire-fighting on the structural fabric

8.3.2 Initial operations Removal / recovery and safe storage of building's

The Incident Commander must consider the following contents

issues during the initial operations at an incident: Use of volunteers or members of the property's damage limitation team

Consider the use to which the building is being put together with its structure Liaison and control of damage limitation teams

Are there signs of a progressive or sudden increase in the size of the fire - is there a need for additional resources

Method of entry - safety of crews, consider significance of building structure

Are there signs of flashover and backdraught conditions? - if yes - withhold personnel

Empty or derelict properties - offensive or defensive fire-fighting techniques

Water Supplies - resources required to secure adequate water supplies.

Property owners or managers can assist by taking account of the above considerations, and incorporating relevant information into their own fire safety plan where possible.

8.3.3 Developing situation

In a developing situation it may not be clear what the total extent of the fire is or whether it is likely to develop rapidly. The Incident Commander will be considering both the fire-fighting element of the Operational Plan and whether it will be possible to undertake any damage limitation (whether or not this has been the subject of pre-planning), dealing with both aspects in order to manage the incident safely and effectively. In terms of firefighting, the following will be considered:

Resources required for damage limitation operations

The extent and value of the damage limitation team's training will influence the confidence which the incident commander will have in it. This will directly affect the extent to which he will allow use to be made of the team. Teams which have been properly trained and are accustomed to working alongside fire fighters and complying with their instructions will be much more effective than those which have not been so trained.

8.4 Liaison between the Emergency Services and Historic Building OwnersIManagers

It is important for owners or managers of buildings to liaise with the emergency services both as an essential element in the preparation of the property's fire plan and to ensure that the emergency services are prepared to respond effectively and swiftly in the event they are called upon to deal with a real incident on the premises. This is especially true in the case of historic buildings. In the case of larger premises, the police, fire service and ambulance/medical service will almost certainly already have prepared their own emergency plan to deal with incidents there. It makes sense to ensure that internal fire or emergency plans are fully co-ordinated with those of the three emergency services. It should be noted that new legislation likely to be introduced in 2005 specifically requires employers to liaise with all three emergency services when compiling fire plans.


In the case of the fire and rescue services, it is possible that a property may have contact with more than one part of that organisation. Personnel from the nearest fire station may pay regular visits aimed at familiarising firefighters with the layout of the property. There is considerable benefit in making sure that such groups are provided with up to date information on such things as major exhibitions, special functions, temporary changes in room or gallery layouts and most importantly, the presence of contractors undertaking building work on the site.

These familiarisation visits may include practical exercises which will enable fire fighters to become familiar with access routes, building entry points, water supplies, building layout and items and features of special importance. In the event of a fire their effectiveness will then be maximised.

Illus 28 Grampian Fire and Rescue Service visit to Castle Fraser, Aberdeenshire (picture: O Crown copyright RCAHMS)

More information on involving the fire and rescue services is set out in Appendix B, which contains a case study of Lanhydrock House where the National Trust for England and Wales (NT) involved the local retained stations from the very beginning of the project and where NT staff, volunteers and regional support personnel worked closely with Cornwall County Fire Service in the development of the house's disaster limitation plan.

8.5 Water supplies for fire fighting An analysis of some 100 fires in historic buildings prepared for a European research project shows that a shortage of water was a key factor in the amount of damage incurred in more than 35% of the incidents. It is therefore essential that due consideration is paid to the need for an adequate supply of water and this is an item which should be included on the agenda of all fire and rescue services liaison meetings.

The fire and rescue service will wish to determine not only how much water is available (both from public and private hydrants) but also the location of private water supplies in the form of ponds, lakes, lochs and streams and the effect of any likely seasonal variation on supplies.

8.5.1 Public water supplies Most water for fire fighting comes from the public water mains. There are, broadly speaking, three types of water main:

Trunk mains - up to 1.2 metres diameter

Secondary mains - up to 450 millimetres diameter

Service mains - 75, 100 and 150 millimetres diameter

Service mains are also sometimes known as towns mains and supply individual properties through a service connection. In rural areas service mains may be relatively small and sized only to provide the basic water demands of homes and farms.

Underground hydrants are provided along the length of the service mains for use by the fire and rescue service. Fire hydrant locations are marked by standardised signs to BS 3251. The upper figures on the plate indicate the diameter of the main (in millimetres) while the lower figures indicate the distance in metres between the indicator plate and the hydrant. Some older plates incorporating imperial measurements in inches and feet may also still be found. F i e hydrants are of standardised pattern and should comply with BS 750: Spec$cation for undergroundjre hydrants.

Public fire hydrants are provided as a statutory responsibility by the water supply undertaker but the cost of their maintenance falls to the fire authority.

In the case of larger buildings or estates, there is often a water meter located at or close to the property boundary between the service main and the service connection. Where the fire and rescue service might be required to draw off water from such a connection a meter by pass should be provided to allow full flows for fire fighting. The bypass valves should be clearly indicated by a sign (also complying with BS 3521) and the necessary turnkey should be readily available for fire and rescue services use.

8.5.2 Private water supplies Wherever possible, underground water supply pipework

Some properties are supplied with water through private be -ged to form a loop Or ring main

water mains fed from reservoirs, wells or even open the Property with appropriate isolation This

water. Providing the private main can meet the flow and mmgement will reduce the chance of the system being

pressure set out below, it would be sensible to provide Put Out due to localised damage Or

standard underground fire hydrants around the exterior maintenance

of the building to be protected. At least two hydrants should be installed and at larger properties consideration S u p p l e m e n ~ water should be given to fitting hydrants not more than 150 Water for fire fighting can be augmented from a variety metres apart and not less than 6 metres from a building of sources: (to permit easy access for fire appliances). While advice ponds on the installation of the hydrants should be obtained from the fire and rescue service, the responsibility for Swimming pools the maintenance of this type of system remains with the Pulpose built cisterns, ponds or canals property owner.

Natural water features including, rivers, streams The following standards should be met when water for and lakes or lochs fire fighting water is to be provided from a private water These locations should be made known to the fire supply: service and noted on the information held about the

property by the fire and rescue service. A flow of not less than 75 litres per minute from two hydrants at a pressure of 2 bars should be Adequate access (see Section 8.6.2) should be provided allowed for. Pipework should be of steel or cast for a fire service vehicle to these water sources. iron with an internal diameter determined by the Purpose-built cisterns or ponds should be marked with flow and pressure required but in any case not less an 'Emergency Water Supply' (EWS) sign together with than 65mm. the capacity in litres at these access locations. Natural

water features such as rivers, lakes, lochs and streams Where water is being stored on site, at least 60 also offer a valuable source of water for fire fighting as minutes demand (ie a minimum of 9000 litres) an adjunct to designated water supplies as does water should be provided if possible. which can be taken from ponds and canals - providing

that the fire and rescue services are able to access these. Hydrants' valves and bypasses be 'learly m e easiest route to the water should be marked using marked and a proper maintenance the EWS sign, and undergrowth etc removed as far as is regime. possible to allow fire service access.

Illus 29 Fire pond at country house estate (picture: Author)


Where possible a permanent suction connection with 8.6.2 Access for Fire and Rescue Service Vehicles strainer should be provided to enable swift access to the principal fire appliances responding to a fire water. Provision of a Sump arrangement at artificial Or will have a weight of between 13 and 17 tonnes and natural water features will also ensure easy and effective roadways with a surface appropriate for this weight access to a larger volume of water. should be provided to within 25 metres of a suitable

Property owners or managers should ensure that access point to the property. The roads should be a

identified locations are checked regularly (and dredged minimum of 3.7 metres wide unless they form part of a well-defined one way system in which case a width of 3

if necessary) and that the fire and rescue services are metres is acceptable. A minimum clearance 4.5 metres

informed of any seasonal or other impairment. Any must be maintained where overhead cables cross these work undertaken to provide Or roads. Gateways through which access for vehicles Or access these be 'lirried Out s ~ m ~ a t h e t i c a l l ~ may be needed should be not less than 3.1 metres wide and in accordance with planning and with a clear height of 4 metres. The conventional 'fire legislation. engine' (pump or water tender) needs a turning circle

of 17 metres while larger vehicles such as a turntable 8.6 Access and Signage for Fire and Rescue services ladder or hydraulic platform need a circle of 29 metres.

The fire and rescue service should be consulted where 8.6.1 Access Signage properties cannot meet these requirements. Where a Properties (especially in rural areas) should be identified gateway is too narrow or the load capacity of a bridge by appropriate signs to assist fire crews responding to a is inadequate consideration should be given to possible fire. Even if there are regular liaison visits and meetings alternatives such as providing another access route or with the local fire station, it is quite probable that fire improving the easy availability of fire fighting water crews from other stations (and even other fire and rescue supplies by installing Pumps supplying a private fire

services) may be called to attend so it is necessary to main and hydrants so that the fire and rescue service are

ensure that the name of the property is displayed where dependant On the pumps in their

any drive or private road meets a public highway. If Hard standing near water pumping points should be there is more than one entrance, then all access points commensurate with the 13 - 17 tonne weight noted should be marked unless a particular drive is unsuitable above. Where appropriate this (and indeed, access for heavy vehicles. Care should be taken to ensure that roads) may be constructed of more visually sympathetic the signs provided are no larger than is necessary for materials. this purpose and designed in appropriate manner for their context. Before installing new signs acheck should 8.7 Remote Locations be made to determine whether listed building consent 1, areas such as islands or very remote locations where or planning permission is required. Properties open to fire and rescue service response may take a significant the public will almost certainly already be adequately time it may be appropriate to consider what alternative signposted. measures should be put in place. These could include:

In the case of larger properties, especially those where Establishment of a private fire brigade staffed by large events such as pop concerts, highland games and estate workers. so on regularly take place, it may be appropriate (after consultation with the emergency services as a whole) to

' a "lunteer fire unit under the

provide point' (RVP) signs for fire, police direction and control of the fire and rescue service

and ambulance. It is likely that such signs will only be for the area.

required in properties in rural areas where there is more Installation of an automatic fire suppression than one entrance or driveway. equipment such as a sprinkler system.

FIRE SAFETY AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

9.1.1 Consideration of People with Disabilities The Disability Discriminntiorz Act (DDA) 1995 prohibits employers from treating a disabled person less favourably (because of their disability) than a person who is not disabled.

Since 2004, Part I11 of the DDA 1995 has required service providers to make reasonable adjustments to the physical features of their premises to overcome barriers of access for the disabled. Planning Permission or Listed Building Consent may be required for alteration proposals in connection with DDA compliance. When dealing with a listed building an access audit is recommended to identify how access can be addressed in a manner which is also sympathetic to the building's historic fabric. In complying with the DDA building owners or managers must at the same time ensure that statutory requirements under fire safety legislation to provide adequate means of escape in case of fire for all building occupants are also met. When planning to improve access for the disabled to buildings it is therefore also important to consider their emergency egress at an early stage, bearing in mind that whilst only one route may be required to provide for access, means of escape provision will often require two or more alternative exit routes.

9.1.2 Evacuation procedures for disabled people Aproperty's management are responsible for evacuation of all occupants including those with special needs. Ensuring adequate means of escape for the disabled in case of fire can present problems. The following are some suggestions on how the safe evacuation of people with particular disabilities could be achieved by means of fonvard planning and the provision of special equipment. In the case of staff members, an

Impaired hearing: Consideration should be given to supplementing the audible fire alarm system by, for example providing trained staff vibrating pagers or a visual fire alarm system to ensure that people with hearing difficulties are aware of a fire alarm warning.

Impaired Mobility: Wheelchair users and those with impaired mobility should normally not be allowed to use lifts in the event of a fire, unless the lifts have been designed and protected in accordance with BS 5588: Fire precautions irz the design, constr~iction and use of buildings Part 8: 1999: Code of practice for means of escape for disabled people. If staircases have to be negotiated, employees who have been suitably trained to carry those who need assistance should be made available specifically for this purpose. It should be borne in mind that some carers may themselves be elderly and relatively frail and may not be able to push wheelchairs up ramps or for long distances over uneven surfaces (such as gravel).

The safe evacuation of people with disabilities is the responsibility of the employer or other person having control of the building and not that of the fire authority. People with impaired mobility should not be directed to remain in refuges awaiting the arrival of the fire service. The employer or other responsible person should therefore make the necessary arrangements for the safe evacuation of people with disabilities from refuges.

It is important that the location of any individuals who may be in refuge points is known, and communications between them and the member of staff in control of the evacuation maintained until they have been evacuated. The use of evacuation chairs for mobility impaired staff or visitor refuge points should be considered, and staff trained in their use.

adequate risk assessment will often suggest a solution, Advice and information on training for those who may for example, a mobility-impaired employee could have have to lift or carry disabled people can be obtained from their work area relocated to a ground floor space (see the British Red Cross Society, St Andrews Ambulance 9.1.3). In the case of visitors or guests more general Association or the fire and rescue services. If it is solutions should be sought: felt that there may be specific problems in evacuating

Mental illness: Trained employees should be available disabled people that cannot be resolved locally, it is

to lead and assist people with mental impairments out good practice to consult the fire safety or community

of the building to a safe location. safety department of your local fire and rescue service or an organisation such as RADAR (Royal Association

Impaired vision: Consideration should be given to for ~ i s a b i l i t ~ and Rehabilitation). providing brightly illuminated escape routes within the building. Trained employees should be available to 9.1.3 Staff with special needs lead and assist people with impaired vision out of the staff who may need assistance in the event of an building. evacuation should be identified in the building's fire


safety plan and appropriate measures put in place to ensure that someone is detailed to provide whatever assistance may be needed. Consideration should be given to the selection of the most appropriate work location for those in this category. If special equipment is needed such as an evacuation chair this should be procured and stored near the individual with the necessary training provided for those who have been detailed to assist.

9.2 Buildings Used for Sleeping or Accommodation Many historic buildings are used as hotels, hospitals, hostels, care homes and boarding schools. In the past, measures implemented in these buildings in the interests of fire safety were sometimes crude and unsympathetic to historic fabric and aesthetic appearance. However, with care and imagination it is usually possible to meet the specific requirements of life safety legislation without major adverse impact to historic fabric.

All those who need special assistance (including those N, structural changes should be implemented in a who may be temporarily incapacitated) should be listed historic building without first having obtained listed on the evacuation roll SO the fire and rescue services building consent - this applies even where a property can be inf~rmed on their arrival. It should be noted owner has been told by a local authority department that that responsibility for making provision for the safe such physical changes are necessary to comply with the escape of these members of staff rests with property law obtain specific licences. management and their evacuation must not be expected to fall to the fire and rescue service. 9.3 Applicable Legislation

9.1.4 Organised parties with special needs Where visits by organised groups with disabilities are a regular feature at the premises then the need for additional safeguards should form a consideration in the risk assessment and the decisions taken to minimise the risk should be specified in the building's fire safety plan. For example, the number of escorts which will accompany the groups, the need for escorts to be provided with training on the building's escape routes and the way in which the fire alarm operates. One particular building always sends a radio-equipped security officer with such parties while another provides the group leader with an evacuation pager. It is essential that such groups are 'booked in and out' so that all can be accounted for in an emergency.

Where a historic building is being used other than for domestic purposes (ie as family accommodation) then a series of additional fire safety and other licensing conditions may apply. Normally there will be a minimum requirement to provide the following:

Means for giving warning of fire (ie a fire alarm system)

Means of escape in case of fire including:

Exit signage

Emergency lighting on escape routes

Fire exit doors available at all times the building is in use for the specified purpose

Means for staff to fight a fire

I Provision of facilities for the fire service

Means to ensure that all the above are available and working at all material times

Illus 30 Emergency evacuation of elderly and young visitors and others with special needs must be considered. (picture: 0 Historic Scotland)

In addition, a fire risk assessment would have to be undertaken and training provided for all staff.

If it was decided that a family home was also to offer accommodation for paying guests then additional specified measures would have to be provided in respect of means of escape. Currently, where sleeping accommodation is provided for more than 6 persons in total, or for any person above the first floor or below the ground floor then the premises have to comply with the requirements of the Fire Precautions (Hotel and Boarding Houses) (Scotland) Order 1972 and this would require compliance with the measures listed above.

A proposal to provide sleeping accommodation (in the numbers shown) will, under present legislation, require


a Fire Certificate' which will only be granted following compliance with the various fire safety features noted above. The means of warning likely to be specified will include a full automatic fire detection system to BS 5839 Part 1.

In the case of hostels, care homes and schools, similar standards can be imposed by the authority having jurisdiction.

9.4 Disabled People and Sleeping risks

In addition to the provisions set out in Section 9.3, special consideration should be given to the needs of disabled people. In hotels or hostels for instance this might include:

Allocating ground floor rooms to those with mobility problems and providing cards to be hung on room doors to indicate that the occupant may require assistance in an emergency.

If more than 50 persons are to be accommodated the doors on the escape route should, where possible, open in the direction of travel.

Particular care should be exercised if a sleeping area for large groups is to be elsewhere than on the ground floor. In general, this should not be permitted where the building is not provided with an automatic fire detection and alarm system and emergency lighting.

Fire orders or instructions (detailing how the fire and rescue services are to be called and the location of the assembly point) must be read out at the beginning of the event and then posted prominently together with a list of the names of those present.

If there is no fire alarm system then there should be a suitably loud manually-operated alarm (such as a bell or air horn)

Providing additional alarm notification (such as Exit routes and doors should be provided with

strobe lights or vibrating pillows) in rooms used temporary signs if these are not already in place.

- - by the hard of hearing. The final exit door (ie the door leading to

the outside) must not be chained or padlocked Ensuring that night staff (porters, receptionists while the premises are occupied. If, as is likely and security guards) are aware of the rooms used in most historic buildings, it is not fitted with an by those who may need additional help. approved fire exit device (a 'panic bar' or 'crash

Providing information to the fire and rescue services on their arrival as to which rooms are occupied by those who are disabled.

9.5 Buildings used occasionally for sleeping ('Sleepovers')

The following precautions should be observed whenever any historic building is used for events that involve the provision of ad lzoc sleeping accommodation. Such activities often involve providing accommodation for children in properties such as museums which are not designed for this purpose. Much of the advice here has been abstracted from guidance prepared for the various church insurers, the National Trusts and the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (formerly known as Resource).

A risk assessment should be carried out by a competent person on every occasion it is

bar') then no security fittings other than a simple night-latch should be permitted.

All internal doors and serving hatches etc must be closed at night.

proposed to use the building for sleepovers. a

There should be at least two routes leading directly from the area to be used for sleeping to the open air or a place of safety.

l Note that it is likely that the specific legislation requiring hotels and

boarding houses to obtain fire certificates is likely to be repealed in

Scotland in 2005. (See Section 2.1 and Appendix A)

Portable heaters using oil, paraffin or LPG must not be permitted inside the premises.

Portable electric heaters with an exposed radiant element should be avoided but if there is no alternative these must be switched off at night. Where possible, all heaters should be switched off at night.

Smoking must be prohibited at all times in the premises.

There must be at least two supervisory personnel in the premises at all times when children or young people are present. If there are more than 50 children sleeping there should be at least three supervisors.

All supervisory personnel should have received formal training in what do in the event of a fire and be able to utilise all the fire equipment in the premises.

There should be at least two 9 litre water extinguishers and a fire blanket present in addition to any other extinguishers provided in the premises. The premises should be equipped with emergency lighting.

TAN 28 FIRE SAFETY M A N A G E ~ N T IN HERITAOE BUILDINGS

Supervisory personnel should be aware of the correct geographical address of the location (including a Grid Reference if necessary) and the location of the nearest telephone (if the area has poor mobile phone coverage.) The fire and rescue services must be called for any fire however small and the fact that the property is being used for

I sleeping accommodation advised to the fire service control room operator.

Care should be taken that parked vehicles outside the location do no impede access for fire appliances or obstruct fire hydrants.

It is strongly advised that a practise evacuation be undertaken on the first evening of the event and this should include sounding the h alarm. I

9.6 Special Events and Functions

9.6.1 General Requirements for All Special Events Event organisers should be aware that the event may be governed by legislation that would require a license. Such events include -

A public entertainment event, as covered by the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, requiring a public entertainment license

A pyrotechnic or fireworks display, as covered by the same Act, and also requiring a license

Need for additional means of escape (eg. extra signs, lighting, staff)

Need for additional fire extinguishers

Power supplies (ie will a generator be used or a wiring extension from a property)

An event with the provision and sale of alcohol, covered by the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 as amended in 1996.

A risk assessment must be carried out by a competent person and this should include consideration of the following:

Number of persons likely to be present. In the case of very large numbers (eg more than 500), the emergency services require to be notified

Number of supervisory personnel needed to undertake safe evacuation

Activities which will take place (eg. cooking, music and dancing, service of alcohol, fireworks etc)

~l lus jl A major specral event brzngs adartzonal requirements and risks. (picture: Q Historic Scotland)

Seating: If seats are being brought in, care needs to be exercised to ensure that these will not create any additional hazard. The 'medium hazard' grading for upholstered furniture in BS 7176: SpeciJication for resistance to ignition of upholstered furniture for non domestic seating by testing composites: 1995 can be invoked as a minimum. Aisles and gangways must also be provided in the seating plan to ensure that no one is seated more than 18 metres from a fire exit. Further guidance on seating can be found in chapter 7 of A Guide to Fire Precautions in Existing Places of Public Entertainment and like Premises.

Catering: it is advisable to maintain a list of caterers whose safety standards are acceptable and impose this as a contractual requirement on the event organisers. Do not permit deep fat frying or the use of portable, free-standing gas cylinders inside buildings

Pyrotechnics should be permitted only in the open air and only when provided and organised by a competent contractor. The owner or manager of the premises should ask for sight of the contractor's liability insurance details. If the contractor is not known to the owner or manager it may be worth asking for references from other historic buildings where similar displays have been organised. All fireworks should be secured

Based on the outcome of the risk assessment, appropriate in shipping containers until the day of the event If precautions should be taken. additional security is needed to prevent access into the


restricted operations area that should be set up around the fireworks firing points then this requirement should be imposed on the event organiser. Further guidance on pyrotechnics and fireworks displays can be found in chapter 11 of A Guide to Fire Precalrtiorzs in Existing Places of P~rblic Entertainment and like Prenzises.

Fabrics, drapes and curtains: where these are being brought in by the event organiser it should be ensured that they have low combustibility characteristics. Drapes and curtains should, as a minimum meet Class B of BS 5867 Specijications for fabrics for cllrtains and drapes Part 2 Flammability requirements: 1993 while floor coverings should have a 'low radius of effect' as defined in BS 5287: Specijications for assessment and labelling o f j o o r coverings tested to BS 4790 1988. This latter term refers to the area which can be ignited by an object such as a cigarette end and which will continue to burn even when the source is removed.

Tentslmarquees and air-supported structures: ensure that these are located at least 10 metres (but preferably further) from any building and that all are provided with portable fire extinguishers. Smoking should not be permitted inside any temporary structure. The flammability requirement for tented structures is BS 5438 Part 2 and the surface spread of flame requirement is BS 476 Part 7 Class l . Further guidance on tented and air-supported structures can be found in chapter 13 of A Guide to Fire Preca~ltions in Existing Places of P ~ ~ b l i c Entertainment and like Premises.

Electricity Supplies and Lighting: great care should be exercised in the use of electricity and supplementary lighting. It is likely that in the case of all filming and fashion shows and similar events that the organiser will bring generator trucks or trailers with them. Property owners or managers should satisfy themselves that the generators and their fuel supplies are located in as safe a place as possible and certainly not less than 50 metres from the nearest building. Cable routes should be agreed in advance and under no circumstances should permission be given to fix cables or wiring to any decorated surface or masonry. Spare fuel for generators or other plant should be stored safely and securely at least 10 metres from any building and 20 metres from any tent or marquee. Refuelling must not take place while the equipment is operating. Where possible, double-skinned fuel tanks should be provided for all generators.

Smoking should be banned inside all buildings, tents and marquees and outside within 10 metres of all buildings. Large, sand-filled ashtrays or buckets should be provided at convenient points and these should be cleared regularly.

Naked flames, candles and open fires should not be permitted inside or outside within 10 metres of any buildings except as follows:

Open fires should be permitted only in fireplaces with recently swept chimneys which are provided with sturdy fireguards.

Candles should be permitted only in candlesticks in rooms occupied at all times and not be allowed to burn too far down. Candles must not be incorporated into flower arrangements or displays involving paper decorations, greenery or other combustible materials.

Naked flames should not be permitted except for filming situations where there is a trained fire watch standing by with a charged fire hose or extinguisher of appropriate type and size.

Thatched Buildings: no naked flames or fire of any sort should be permitted with 25 metres of a thatched roof.

Patrols should be made of all affected areas at the end of the event or activity or at the end of each day to ensure that no equipment has been left 'live' and that all sources of heat have been extinguished. A patrol should be commenced within 15 minutes of activity ceasing and repeated hourly for at least three hours.

Forest Areas and Grassland where dry climatic conditions have given rise to a risk of grass or forest fires all outdoor fires, pyrotechnics, naked flames and similar activities should be prohibited without exception

9.6.2 Small scale events Where a property is to be used for a relatively small scale event such as a wedding or concert it is likely that this can be managed without the need for any special measures. However, care should be taken to ensure that a revised fire risk assessment is undertaken well in advance of the date. This will require information from the event organiser in respect of the following:

Number of persons likely to be present

Securitylstewarding arrangements

Seating arrangements

Lighting, music or special effects

Electricity supply

Decorations or exhibition materials

Catering arrangements

Whether alcohol is to be served

Once this information has been gathered a plan can be put together and the owner or manager of the property can ensure that the activities intended to take place do


9.6.4 Filming, Television and Fashion Shows Film and television crews and those involved in staging fashion shows have a poor record of respecting historic fabric and the contents of buildings so need to be properly managed at all times whilst they are in or near a historic building. While the fees from such activities can be a welcome supplement to the income of an historic building, this should not blind the owner or manager to the potential risks. A useful guide, Film and Photography for Historic Houses and Gardens is available from the Historic Houses Association. This covers all aspects of the subject from promoting properties to copyright laws. The book also contains sample contracts for television and feature film work.

The following are the very minimum precautions which should be implemented before filming starts:

I Undertake a new fire risk assessment

Advise the fire and rescue services of the proposed activity or event

Ensure that the contract spells out clear assi~nment of liabilitv in case of damage or loss

Illus 32 Small scale events can sometimes be satisfactorily accommodated without special measures. Advise insurers of the proposed activity - and (picture: 0 Historic Scotland) obtain their advice

Ensure that adequate security personnel are to be engaged by the company

not create any additional level of hazard for the property and its contents. It is essential that sufficient numbers Ensure that enough additional fire equipment is

of staff are on duty to manage an evacuation if this provided by the company - this may include

should prove necessary. hiring a tire crew and fire appliance

9.6.3 Larger events An event involving more than say 100 guests should be treated as a 'larger event' and, in addition to the measures prescribed above, attention should be paid to the following:

If erection of seating, staging or the like is involved, the organiser should be asked to provide evidence of the competency of the contractor engaged. A check should also be made to ensure that the organiser and all contractors have an appropriate level of public liability and third party liability insurance.

Communicate the fire procedures for the property to all those who may be working inside buildings

If the film or tv crew wishes to disable the fire detection system, ensure that this is done by the building's usual fire system maintenance contractor and reinstated at the end of each working day

Ensure that any catering crew do not generate additional hazards

The fire risk assessment take account the Where responsibilities fall to the film or fashion event increased numbers and this may indicate additional company these should be and set out in the safety measures such as extra exit signs, more staff with them where possible. on duty and so on. In the case of very large events (involving say more than 5000 people) it will probably be necessary to consider hiring security personnel, making provision for emergency medical care and possibly having qualified fire fighters on site. Further guidance is provided in The Event Safety Guide available from HSE Books.

10. BUILDINGS AT SPECIAL RISK

10.1.1 Uaoceopied Buildings Each year there art? mund 9000 fires in empty buildings to which the fire and rescue services are called. The Fire Protection Association (FPA) estimates that fires, theft and malicious damage in empty premises (including dwellings) cause losses in excess of E120 million each year. Many of these buildings are listed or otherwise of historic interest. It has been suggested that each year, more than 20 empty or vacant Scottish buildings of historic value are lost due to fire.

Intruders into empty buildings may have a number of motives:

They may try to use the premises for commercial purposes.

To squat on a permanent or semi-permanent basis

For illegal drinking or drug taking.

To strip the premises of anything of value.

To vandalise the premises or burn them down. The attractiveness of empty buildings to younger intruders as a playground should not be ignored. The potential danger to the intruders themselves must not be overlooked. Even trespassers have certain rights and liability implications for owners and their representatives and can result in potentially significant exposure should anyone be killed or injured or if a fire should spread to nearby premises.

The safety and security of all premises, whether occupied or empty, is a management responsibility and must be subject to the same disciplines as all other aspects of management.

Empty premises in built-up areas and near to town centres create specific problems of security for owners of the premises and their insurers, tbe owners and occupiers of neighbouring premises, the local authority and the users of the town centre.

Particular consideration should be given to the impact of:

Ry posting

(sometimes known as the 'Slide to Ashes7) which, if unchecked, can drive business away from the area and trigger the beginnings of a rundown of the area to the detriment of the whole community.

Repeated vandalism to buildings such as that caused when stripping out fittings and finishes or starting small fireir may result in overall weakening of the structure of the building. Such vandalism is also likely to allow the entry of water which will inevitably give rise to timber decay with serious comeqennws for the safety of firefighters.

It is stating the obvious - but none the less valid - to say that the best way to protect a building is to keep it occupied. It is clear from examination of the case studies produced by the FPA that a subtantial proportion, probably 35%, of the historic buildings which are damaged each year can be classified as 'empty, unused or derelict' and in most cases, arson is the cause of such fires.

Vandalism Illus 33 Arson damaged main building at former Hattwmd

Graffiti Hoapiml, Lanarkshire. LQqe complexes of redundant institutioml buildings, 'nrotMed'pending reuse present

These activities and their iInpaCt on the appearance particular securitypmblems. (picture: P w l Beaton, of the building or site can begin a spiral of decline HistoricScotland)


10.1.2 Protecting vacant buildings Care should be taken to ensure that the physical security or safety precautions needed to safeguard empty buildings impact minimally on historic fabric. For example, boarding up must be done sympathetically to avoid fixings damaging original woodwork or glazing. The local planning authority should be consulted to ensure that proposed measures are acceptable and to determine whether consents are required.

Maintaining ventilation throughout the building must be taken into account when carrying out such activities since air movement helps arrest mould and fungal decay. Regular checks on roofs, gutters and drains must be undertaken to ensure that the premises are wind and water tight. Guard dogs must not be allowed to run free inside listed buildings.

Other activities which will help to minimise both the risks from intrusion and the consequences of a fire include:

The draining down of all water tanks, pipes and apparatus, except those which may be required for specific purposes such as 6re fighting.

Disconnection of all utilities at the incoming main, other than those required for fire and security protection or for other essential services such as security lighting or a controlled heating system. Disconnections should be undertaken in such a way that reconnection is not easily done.

Immediate removal of all internal and external ignitable material such as furniture, waste, litter, flammable liquids and other nonessential combustible contents abandoned by the former occupants.

Sealing up of letter flaps or, if impracticable, the rear of the letter box to be fitted with an enclosed metal box bolted in place, plus the frequent removal of any material delivered.

Immediate disposal from the site of all external sources of fuel, including removal of rubbish and other combustible materials.

The proper draining and purging of tanks and pressure vessels or pipework containing combustible or explosive liquids or gases and the implementation of approved safety measures to minimise the risk of ignition or explosion from residual vapours.

More details on the management process including check lists and a full set of recommendations can be found in the Code of Practice for the Protection of Unoccupied Buildings which is available from the FPA.

10.2 Places of Worship Places of worship have always featured disproportion- ately in the UK annual fire statistics and a significant proportion of these fires are set deliberately - perhaps 60% of fires in churches and similar properties are as a result of wilful fire raising. Ecclesiastical buildings are at greater risk of arson because of the generally poor levels of security presented by their fabric and because they are empty for much of the time.

Useful guidance on 6re safety management in places of worship can be obtained from the appropriate insurance company and also from a series of English Heritage publications developed for cathedrals. Chapter 10 of the US National Fi Protection Association's NmPA 909 Code for the Protection of Cultural Resources (2001) also provides a useful overview of the subject

There are commercial companies who will rent supplementary, high security window and door barriers for vacant buildings and while these measures can prove highly effective, care should be taken to ensure that the fixing arrangements do not harm window or door frames. The use of this type of equipment may also require listed building consent.

Illus 34 A night time blaze destroys all but the steeple ofa historic church. (picture: 6 The Scotsman Publications Ltd)


10.3 Remote Buildings

The protection of buildings or their contents of historic or cultural interest which are physically remote creates special problems. In some rural areas in the UK, fire fighting services are provided by Retained Firefighters, that is, by part time fire personnel who are summoned from their homes or other occupation by pagers or radios. In some parts of Scotland there is extreme difficulty of recruiting such people so fire cover may be provided by volunteers who, even with the best of endeavours can never be as effective as those whose full-time occupation this is. In those parts of Scotland where the fire and rescue services depend on part time or volunteer personnel it may take hours rather than minutes to mount a fire fighting operation.

While there have been recent efforts to upgrade the levels of fire cover on some of the islands off the west coast of Scotland it is clear that the fire service as a whole are under pressure from central government to allocate resources to the areas where most fire problems occur - and in Scotland these tend to be deaths in dwellings in urban areas. Under a scheme known as Integrated Risk Management Planning, all fire authorities have been tasked with producing plans for the re-deployment of resources aimed at reducing the deaths and injuries caused by fire. It is possible therefore that properties in remote rural areas will not necessarily be able to anticipate levels of fire cover which would see any improvement in response times or weight of attack.

When less than ideal levels of fire and rescue services intervention are combined with problems of weather and poor roads, owners or occupiers of remote buildings need to take a serious view of what steps should be taken to protect their buildings, occupants and contents.

The general advice contained throughout this publication will, if followed, greatly reduce the probability of fire occurring and broad compliance with a managed approach to fire safety, when coupled with sensible investment in fire protection equipment should result in major improvements in risk levels.

However, it should be accepted that where a property is more than 30 minutes away from a fire station, there is a strong possibility that extensive damage will be done to much of the building and its contents before help arrives. The risk assessment process must factor this in and in some cases the resultant conclusion may suggest that there are really only three credible alternatives if the other measures proposed in this TAN have already been implemented:

Provide an automatic fire suppression system for the building, or

Accept that there is a strong probability that the premises will be lost or seriously damaged should a fire occur.

None of these options is proposed lightly and providing the protection outlined in the first two points will not be cheap but it is difficult to see what else can be done. In the case of the fire team it is possible that some help including the loan of equipment and provision of training may be available from the relevant fire and rescue services.

10.4 Buildings That Are Periodically Unoccupied There is a clear connection between empty buildings and higher fire risks as outlined in Section 10.1.1. Where buildings are periodically unoccupied, say for more than four weeks, then as an absolute minimum the following should be done:

Inform insurers (most domestic insurance policies do not provide cover for properties which are left empty for more than 21 - 28 days).

Fit an automatic fire detection system with a central station connection

Consider either providing a zoned electrical wiring system so that all but essential electrical supplies can be isolated or fit a residual current device (RCD) which will automatically isolate mains power if a fault occurs. Advice on this sort of protection should be obtained from a suitably qualified person.

Consider providing an automatic fire suppression system

Ensure that a strict routine of 'closing the building down' is followed each time it is to be vacated - use a checklist.

Never use portable heaters in an empty building.

If a low level of heating is to be maintained to prevent frost damage, ensure that a competent person regularly inspects the system.

Consider the risks from intrusion by burglars or others - fit an intruder detection system and upgrade general security levels.

Secure all outbuildings especially garages, workshops and fuel stores.

Set up an estate fire team or local volunteer brigade, or


10.5 Multi occupancy buildings Many historic buildings house a variety of different uses under the same roof or in parts of the same complex. Additional risks arise when potentially hazardous activities are mixed with historic fabric and contents. The problem is aggravated when a building is not in the single control of one owner or occupier. For example, many buildings open to the public incorporate a range of ancillary functions which usually include catering (in the form of a tearoom or restaurant), retail (gift shop) and often accommodation for staff or even letting apartments for the public. In addition, in larger properties there may be workshops. All of these activities tend to increase the possibility of a fire if only because they introduce additional ignition sources. They may also increase the fuel load. Conservation workshops, for example, utilise a wide range of substances, many of which are highly flammable.

Clearly, all of this leads to the conclusion that the risks of and from fire in multi-tenanted and multi-occupied building are higher than they would be if the whole property was under a single management. All of this should serve to make it clear that additional care must be exercised in these sorts of circumstances and that for measures to be effective, all parts of a building must be subject to the same standards of fire audit and fire management.

While those who own and manage historic buildings will always welcome any additional income generation, the question of whether the activity to be undertaken creates additional levels of risk for the property should always be considered. Some risks can be managed, some accepted and some insured against but it seems inappropriate to introduce an activity knowing that to do so may result in generation of additional risk which might result in the loss of the building.

Illus 35 Arson gutted interior of former Hartwood Hospital, Lanarkshire. Although the substantial

I masonry external walls remain largely undamaged, the complete loss of timber

1 roof structure leaves fabric open to accelerated decay, seriously jeopardising future I reuse potential. (picture: Paul Beaton, Historic

- Scotland)


10.6 Arson Do not leave ladders, tools and flammable liquids in easily accessible locations

10.6.1 Arson and Security Arson, which is officially termed loiljill jire raising Secure bin and waste in Scotland, is now the single largest cause of fires in non-domestic buildings in Britain and there is a well- established correlation between the size of fires and the likelihood that they have been started deliberately. While arson is a crime, the causes are not one but many and this makes it very difficult to provide protection against the consequences. In 1995 the Arson Prevention Bureau undertook a study of 6800 arson fires to try to

For premises considered at high risk, fit automatic fire suppression systems.

Further advice on this subject can be obtained from the police, insurance companies and a number of other reliable sources such as the government web site run by the Home Office, details of which can be found in Chapter 13 Useful Addresses.

determine the motivation of the culprits. These were established as: 10.6.3 Arson Prevention Checklist

The Arson Prevention Bureau has developed a number

24% of guidance documents to assist those who manage

Revenge premises that may be at risk from deliberately set fires Mental illness 20% and the four checklist sections which follow set out a

Alcohol/drugs 19% simple self-assessment system which can be used to evaluate the risk of arson in any given property.

Concealment of crime 7%

Financial gain 6% 1. External Security

Excitement

Terroristlextremist

5% 1. Are there any premises (such as youth clubs, discos or football grounds) that may attract large

2% number of young people? Would-be heroism 1% 2. Are neighbouring businesseslpremises of a nature

Motive not determinedlunclear 17% that might make them a high arson risk?

The statistics set out above relate to arson committed by adults. In addition, property owners and managers should be alert to the large number of fires deliberately started each year by children and young people.

10.6.2 PreventingArson The only truly effective preventative measure is to keep the arsonists out of the building and while this can be done by judicious application of effective security measures this advice is somewhat academic where properties are open to the public.

The following list should be considered as priorities to protect against arson:

3. Does the design of the buildinglsite incorporate areas where someone could easily hide?

4. Does the buildinglsite have no perimeter protection or a poorly defined boundary?

5. Are there more entranceslexits to the building than are necessary for fire escape purposes?

6. Are any of the entrances out of sight of security or other personnel?

7. Have parking arrangements been designed with security in mind?

8. Is easy access to rooftops possible?

9. Is security lighting installed and effective?

10. Are contractors at work and is scaffolding present? - -

Ensure that the external security features are as effective as they can be 11. Do vehicles have access outside normal working

hours? Minimise the number of entry points

2. Internal Security Ensure that intruder detection systems are fully operational 1. Is there an effective access control system in

operation? Consider automatic fire detection systems

2. Is the building fitted with an intruder detection Consider the benefits of external security lighting system?

If a response by staff or others On site is available, 3. all doors, windows, etc secured outside consider closed circuit television working hours?


4. Does any letter slot give access directly to spaces within the building rather than to a solid box ?

3. Fire Hazards

1. Is access to internal ignition sources denied to intruders outside working hours?

2. Are storage areas where combustible materials might be found secured outside working hours?

3. Are flammable liquids and gases stored securely? )

4. Is combustible waste stored securely outside the premises?

5. Are all tanks and drums stored securely with padlocked taps?

6. Where services pass through compartment walls are the gaps fire stopped?

7. Have ducts passing through compartment walls been fitted with dampers?

8. Is the building fitted with an automatic fire detection system?

9. Are the detection systems connected to a central monitoring station or other location?

10. Are all staff references checked prior to employment?

l l . Is the building or others in the area prone to graffiti or vandalism?

12. Have there been unexplained small fires in the building or nearby in the past 12 months?

4. Potential Arsonists

1. Do young people habitually gather near the premises?

2. Do large numbers of the public enter the premises?

3. Are visitors permitted beyond a reception area?

4. Are contractors monitored while on the premises?

5. Have trespassers been found on the premises in the past?

6. Are staff alert and briefed on challenging strangers?

7. Do any of the activities that take place in the premises attract the attention of protest groups?

8. Are there problems in stafflmanagement relations?

9. Have there recently been redundancies or are redundancies likely?

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this publication it was stated that its objectives were to provide accessible and practical solutions to many of the fire safety problems facing those who own, manage and live in historic buildings. This Technical Advice Note has shown that many of the apparently intractable issues of providing compliance with modem standards can be resolved and at the same time, explained how compromises can often be reached.

While the text was prepared very much with the building owner or manager in mind, it is hoped that the guidance offered will also appeal to a much wider audience, including those who have to deal with consequences of failures to manage fire safety - the fire and rescue services. Those responsible for historic buildings are fortunate to be able to call on a highly professional fire service not only when the unthinkable occurs but also to rely on the community fire safety

other responsibilities (eg the Surveyor of the Fabric in the Historic Royal Palaces Agency); bllt in that case there sho~lld be a frdl-time Fire Safery oficer reporting to the Fire Safety Manager, with speciJic responsibilities delegated to him. Central management responsibilities are:

to produce a j r e safety policy for the agency;

to ensure that all major bllildings on the estate are comprehensively szlrveyed to assessjre risks and recommend appropriate precautions;

to agree with Palace managements a programme to implement those precautions, and s~lpervise implementation;

to monitor systems for maintaining equipment, controlling contractors, assessing changes of use etc @re log-book);

departments of the Scottish fire service for impartial, to check on stafftraining (properly recorded),. authoritative and sympathetic advice. The protection of our national heritage is now specifically included to ensllre liaison with local j fe brigades; in the key objectives of every fire and rescue service's . to arrangefor periodic senior management planning and fire and rescue service officers are now of implementation, andfor reglllar better informed than ever on the special problems of fire in historic buildings.

This commitment on the part of the fire and rescue services needs to be matched by equal efforts from those who own or manage properties - and, as importantly, by those who advise them. Building professionals such as architects and surveyors as well as insurance brokers and their advisors must play their part if the annual toll of destroyed and damaged historic buildings is to be stopped.

In Chapter 2 of this Technical Advice Note reference was made in summary form to some of the recommendations which followed the fire at Windsor Castle. This report, by Sir Alan Bailey has formed the focus of a great deal of attention in historic building circles and is much quoted. It is opportune in these concluding remarks to quote verbatim from the report and to then reflect on the advice and information which this Technical Advice Note contains.

The report recommended that:

Senior management must be constantly a,t9are of j re risks a n d j r e precaution priorities. Each agency must appoint a Fire Safety Manager, at senior level in central management, to take resporzsibility for jre safety thro~lghoz~t the organisation. That oficer may have

Allowing for differences of scale and organisation this advice is still valid today and can be adapted for use in any historic building. This TAN provides background information and references to support the implementation of such a series of policies and procedures and it is hoped that it will be widely used.

In conclusion, the author claims the final privilege of expressing his appreciation to Historic Scotland for allowing him to complete a promise made in 1994 when the second edition of Heritage Under Fire was published. At that time, he pledged that the information and guidance which that publication provided would be regularly updated as part of a concerted effort to widen awareness of the need for higher standards of fire safety management in historic buildings. It is hoped that this Technical Advice Note, together with those already published by Historic Scotland, will form a useful canon of work which will be of value to owner occupier, building professional, firefighter and all those concerned to ensure that our built heritage is effectively preserved against the ravages of fire.

12. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alwinkle et a1 1997 Technical Advice Note No. 11 Fire protection measures in Scottish historic buildings, Historic Scotland, Edinburgh

Arson Prevention Bureau 1998 Arson: the majorjire threat to places of worship - and how to prevent it, Arson Prevention Bureau, London.

Arson Prevention Bureau 1996 Motivation for arson APB, London.

Bailey, Sir Alan et a1 1993 Fire protection measures for the Royal Palaces, Department of National HeritageIHMSO, London.

British Automatic Sprinkler Association (2002) Sprinklers and Heritage, [online], BASA, London. Available at: http://www.basa.org.uk/pdfsl publications/00000004.pdf

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers: Recommendation No. R (93) 9 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of the Architectzrral Heritage Against Natural Disasters. (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 November 1993 at the 503rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)

Crewdson, R [no date] An insurance manual for historic houses, Historic Houses Association, London.

Croner [no date] Fire record keeping book, Croner Publishing, London [loose leaf record keeping system with CD ROM templates]

DoElstanding Committee on Fire Precautions 1995 Standardjre precautions for contractors: engaged on crown works - applicable to contractors engaged on works in crown civil and defense estates, HMSO, London.

Ecclesiastical Insurance Group 1995 Insurance valuation for church buildings, EIG, Gloucester

English HeritageRoyal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1994 Insuring your historic building: Houses and commercial buildings, English Heritage/ RICS, London.

English HeritageRoyal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1994 Insuring your historic building: Ch~lrches and chapels, English HeritageRICS, London.

English Heritage 1997 The use of intumescentproducts in historic buildings English Heritage, London

English Heritage 1997 Smoke detection systems for cathedrals, Fire safety in cathedrals; leaflet 3, English Heritage, London

English Heritage 1997 Fire safety management in cathedrals, Fire safety in cathedrals; leaflet 1, English Heritage, London

English Heritage 1997 Evaccration of visitors from cathedrals in the event offire, Fire safety in cathedrals; leaflet 4, English Heritage, London

English Heritage 1997 Prevention of loss or damage by jire in cathedrals, Fire safety in cathedrals; leaflet 2, English Heritage, London

English Heritage 1997 Timber panelled doors and jire, English Heritage, London

Fire Protection Association 2000 Fire prevention on construction sites - the Joint Code on the protection fromjire of constr~tction sites and buildings undergoing renovation, 5th edition, FPA, London

Fire Protection Association 1998 Technical Advice Note No. 14 The installation of sprinkler systems in historic buildings, Historic Scotland, Edinburgh.

Fire Protection Association, 1994 Safety at scenes of fire and related incidents, FPA, London

Fire Protection Association 1992 Fire protection in old buildings and historic town centres, FPA, London

Fire Protection Association [no date] Code of practice for the protection of ztnoccztpied buildings, FPA, London

Fire Protection Association [no date] Code of practice for occ~lpationaljre brigades, FPA, London

Fire Protection Association [no date] Workplacejre safety log book, FPA, London

Health and Safety Executive 1999 The event safety guide. HSE, London


Historic Scotland 1998 Menzorat~dlrm of gzridance National Fire Protection Association (US) 2001 NFPA on listed bzrildings and consen~ation areas, Historic 909: Code for the protection of clrltlrral resolrrces, Scotland, Edinburgh. NFPA, Massachusetts.

Historic Scotland 1999 Proceedings of the Cor$erence National Fire Protection Association (US) 2001 NFPA on Fire Protection and the Blrilt Heritage, Historic 914: Code forfire protection historic str~rctlrres, Scotland, Edinburgh. NFPA, Massachusetts

Hudson, N 1995 Film and photography for historic houses and gardens, Historic Houses Association, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005 A guide to

London reducing the lzlrmber of false alarms franl detection systems, ODPM, London. Available at: http://www.

Home OfficeIThe Scottish Office 1971 Fire bfpsa.org.uMhtml/alarms-fra.htm Precalrtions Act 1971. Guide to fire precalltions in existit7g places of ~ o r k that reqllire afire certificate, PACE Central Advice Unit 1997 Cro,vt~jre standards, HMSO, London Property Advisors to the Civil Estate, London

Home OfficeIThe Scottish Home & Health Dept PACE Central Advice Unit 1998 Fire safety guide, 1990: Guide to fire precautions in existing places of Property Advisors to the Civil Estate, London etztertainment and like prenzises, HMSO, London

Industry Committee for Emergency Lighting 2001 PACE Central Advice Unit, 1998 Bzuiness continuity

ICEL 1008: Emergency lighting - risk assessment planning guide, Property Advisors to the Civil Estate,

guide, 3rd edition, ICEL, London London

Jerome, I, 1997 Guide tofire safety signs 2nd edition, Loss Prevention Council, London.

Kidd, S 1995 Heritage underjre. A guide to the protection of historic buildings, 2nd edition, Fire Protection Association, London

Kidd, S 2001 Technical Advice Note No. 22 Fire risk rnanagemetlt in historic Bztildings, Historic Scotland, Edinburgh.

Lewis A, 1999 The prevention and control of arson, FPAILoss Prevention Council. London

Scottish Office in Conjunction with Home Office 1990 A guide t o j r e precazrtions in existing places of public entertainment and like premises, HMSO, London

Security Institute 2003 A guide to the procurement and management of manned security services, Security Institute, Stevenage

Simpson and Brown Architects, 2002 Technical Advice Note No. 2: Conservation of plasterwork, Historic Scotland, Edinburgh.

Lewis, A & Dailey, W 1999 Fire risk management in British Standards the workplace, FPA/Loss Prevention Council London.

BS 476-4: 1984 Fire tests on building materials and Loss Prevention Council 1998 Fire Protection strllchrres: Non combustibility tests for materials, BSI,

Yearbook 199819, Loss Prevention Council, Watford hndon .

Loss Prevention Council [no date] Standard for BS 476-7: 1987 Fire tests on blrilding materials and occlrpationalJire brigades, Loss Prevention Council, structures: Method for classification of the surface Watford spread ofJlame prod~lcts, BSI, London

Maxwell, I 1999 'Fire protection measures in Scottish historic buildings' -An Introduction in: Fire protection and the built heritage, Historic Scotland, Edinburgh.

Munday, J 1994 Safety at scenes o f j re and other incidents, Fire Protection Association, London.

National Fire Protection Association (US) 2003 NFPA 750: Standard on water trtistjre protection systems, NFPA, Massachusetts.

BS 750: 1984 Specification for undergrozlndjre llydrants and surface boxframes and covers, BSI, London.

BS 325 1 : 1976 Specification. Indicator plates for jre hydrants and emergency water supplies. BSI, London.

BS 5266-1: 1999 Emergency lighting. Code ofpractice for the emergency lighting of premises other than cinemas and certain other specified premises used for entertainment. BSI, London.


BS 5287: 1988 Specijication for assessment and BS 5867: 1980 Specijication for fabrics for curtains labelling of textilejoor coverings tested to BS 4790, and drapes. Flammability requirements. BSI, London. BSI, London.

BS 7176: 1995 Specijcation for resistance to ignition 1 BS 5306-1: 1976 Fire extinguishing installations and of,lpholstered furn i tu re l rn tu re fo r non-domestic seating by equipment on premises. Hydrant systems, hose reels testing composites, BSI, ~ ~ ~ d ~ ~ . and foam inlets, BSI, London

BS 767 1 :2001 Requirements for electrical BS 5306-2: 1990 Fire extinguishing installations and installarions. IEE wiring BSInnsti.ution equipment on premises. Specification for sprinkler of Electrical Engineers, London. systems, BSI, London.

BS 5306-3: 1985 Fire extinguishing installations BS 7527: 1996 Code of practice for designing,

and equipment on premises. Code of practice for specifying, maintaining and operating emergency

selection, installation and maintenance of portablejre sound 'ystems at 'ports venL1es9 London.

extinguishers, BSI, London. BS 7913:1998 Guide to the principles of the

BS 5306-4:2001 Fire extinguishing installations conservation of historic buildings, BSI, London.

I

and equipment on premises: Specijication for carbon dioxide systems, BSI, London. (Superseded by BS BS 7974:200 1 Application o f j r e safety engineering 5306-8:2000) principles to the design of bzlildings - Code of

practice, BSI, London BS 5306-6.1 -2: 1988 and 1989 Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises. Foam BS EN 3-6: 1996 Portablejre extingzrishers, BSI, systems, BSI, London. London.

BS 5306-8:2000 Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises. Selection and installation of

BS EN 54-1.1-12: 1996 Fire detection and alarm systems, BSI, London.

portablejre extinguishers. Code of practice, BSI, London.

BS EN 671 .l-4:2001 Fixedfire fighting systems. Hose

BS 5423 ~ ~ ~ ~ i f i ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ f ~ ~ portable fire extingLlishers Systems. Hose reels with semi-rigid hose, BSI, London.

(Superseded by BS EN 3) BS EN 1568- 1.1 -3:2000 Fire extinguishing media.

BS 5438 1989 Flammability of textile fabrics when Foam concentrates, BSI, London. subjected to a small ignitingfime applied to the face or bottom edge of vertically orientated specimens, BS EN 1869: 1997 Fire blankets, BSI, London. BSI, London

BS EN 12094 Firejghting systems. Components for BS 5588-8: 1999 Fire precautions in the design, gas extinguishing systems, BSI, London. constr~iction and use of buildings. Code of practice for means of escape for disabledpeople. BSI, London.

BS EN 12845:2004 Fixedjrejghting systems.

BS 5588-12:2004 Fire precautions in the design, Automatic sprinkler systems. Design, installation and

construction and use of buildings. Managingjre maintenance, BSI, London.

safety, BSI, London. BS EN 14520 Gaseousjre-extinguishing systems.

BS 5839-1:2002 Fire detection and alarm systems Physical properties and system design, BSI, p on don.

for buildings. Code of practice for system design, installation, commissioning and maintenance, BSI, BS EN 60849: 1998, IEC 60849: 1998 Sound systems London. for emergency purposes, BSI, London.


Main legislation and supporting documents

Building (Scotland) Act 2003

Civic Government Scotland) Act 1982

Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 S1 199413 140

Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 S1 199611 592

Disability Discrimination Act 1995

Directive 19991921EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres (15th individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/39 11EEC)

Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 S1 19891635

Fire Precautions Act 197 1

Fire Precautions (Hotels and Boarding Houses) Order 1972

Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 S1 199711 840

Fire Precautions (Workplace) (Amendment) Regulations 1999 S1 199911 877

Fire Services Act 1947

Health and Safety at Work Act 1974

Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996 S1 341

Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 (as amended 1996)

Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 S1 l99913242

Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas)(Scotland) Act 1997

Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Scotland) Order 1992 (as amended)

Town and Country Planning (Listed Buildings in conservation Areas) (Scotland) Regulations 1987

Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 S1 199213004

13. USEFUL ADDRESSES (AS AT MARCH 2005)

Association of British Insurers, 5 1 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7HQ. Tel020 7600 3333; Fax 020 7696 8999; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.abi.org.uk

British Approvals for Fire Equipment (BAFE), Neville House, 55 Eden Street, Kingston Upon Thames, Surrey, KT1 1BW. Tel020 8541 1950; Fax 020 8547 1564; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.bafe.org.uk

British Automatic Sprinkler Association, Richmond House, Broad Street, Ely, CB7 4AH, Tel01353 659187; Fax 01353 666619; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.basa.org.uk

British Fire Protection Systems Association, 55 Eden Street, Kingston-upon-Thames, Surrey KT1 1BW Tel 020 8549 5855; Fax 020 8547 1564; Email infoaabft.0rg.uk ; Web http://www.bfpsa.org.uk

British Red Cross, UK Office, 44 Moorfields, London EC2Y 9AL. Web http://www.redcross.org.uk

British Standards Institution, 389 Chiswick High Road, London W4 4AL Tel020 8996 9000; Fax 020 8996 7400; Web http://www.bsonline/techindex.co.uk

Building Research Establishment Ltd, Bucknalls Lane, Garston, Watford, Herts WD2 7JR Tel01923 66 4000; Fax 01923 664910; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.bre.co.uk

Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers, Scottish Region, c/o Steensen, Varming Mulcahy and Partners, The Matrix, 64 Newhaven Road, Edinburgh EH6 5QB Tel0131554 3666; Fax 0131 555 1723.

English Heritage, 23 Savile Row, London W1X 1AB Tel0207 973 3000; Fax 0207 973 3001. Web http://www.english-heritage.0rg.uk

Fire Extinguishing Trades Association, Neville House, 55 Eden street, Kingston-upon-Thames, Surrey KT1 1BW. Tel020 8549 8839; Fax 020 8547 1564; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.feta.org.uk

Fire Protection Association, London Road, Moreton- in-Marsh, Gloucestershire GL56 ORH. Tel01608 8 12500; Fax 01608 8 12501 ; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.thefpa.co.uk

Fire Services College, Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucestershire, GL56 ORH. Tel01608 65083 1; Fax 01608 651788. Web http://www.fireservicecollege.ac.uk

Glass and Glazing FederationIFire Resistant Glass and Glazed Systems Association, 44-48 Borough High Street, London SE1 IXB. Tel0870 042 4255; Fax 0870 042 4266; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.ggf.org.uk

Guild of Architectural Ironmongers, 8 Stepney Green, London E l 3JU Tel020 7790 343 1; Fax 020 7790 8517; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.gai.org.uk

Health and Safety Executive, Belford House, 59 Belford Road, Edinburgh EH4 3UE. Tel0131 247 2000; Fax 0131 247 2121

Historic Houses Association 2 Chester Street, London SWlX 7BB. Tel020 7259 5688, Fax 020 7259 5590; Email [email protected]

Historic Scotland Conservation Bureau, Historic Scotland, Longmore House, Salisbury Place, Edinburgh EH9 1 SH. Te10 13 1 668 8668; Fax 0131 668 8668; Fax 0131 668 8669; Email [email protected] Web http://www.historic-scot1and.g0v.uk

Home Office, Direct Communications Unit, 2 Marsham Street, London, SWP 4DF. Tel0870 000 1585; Fax 0207 7035 4745; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk

International Council on Monuments and Sites, 10 Barley Mow Passage, London W4 4PH Tel0208 994 6477; Fax 0208 747 8464.70 Cowcross Street, London ECIM 6EJ Tel: 020 7566 073 1; Fax: 020 7566 0045

Intumescent Fire Seals Association, 20 Park Street, Princes Risborough, Bucks. HP27 9AH Te10 1844 276928; Fax 0 1844 274002; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.ifsa.org.uk

LPCBIBRE Certification Ltd, Bucknalls Lane, Garston, Watford, Herts WD25 9XX. Tel01923 664100; Fax 01923 664603; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.brecertification.co.uk

Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (formerly Resource) 16 Queen Anne's Gate London, SWlH 9AA. Tel: 020 72 73 1444; Web http://www.mla.gov.uk


National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269-9 10 1. Web http://catalog.nfpa.org

National Library of Scotland, George IV Bridge, Edinburgh EH1 1EW Tel0131 226 453 1; Fax 0131 220 6662. Email [email protected]; Web http://www.nls.uk

National Security Inspectorate, Sentinel House, 5 Reform Road, Maidenhead, Berkshire, SL6 8BY. Tel0870 505 0000; Fax 01628 773367. Web http://www.nsi.org.uk

National Trust for Scotland, Wemyss House 28 Charlotte Square, Edinburgh EH2 4ET. Tel0131 243 9300, Fax0131 243 9301; Web http://www.nts.org.uk

RADAR, 12 City Forum, 250 City road, London EClV 8AF. Tel020 7250 3222; Fax 020 7250 0212; Email [email protected] ; Web http://www.radar.org.uk

Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, John Sinclair House, 16 Bernard Terrace, Edinburgh EH8 9NX Tel013 1 662 1456, Fax 0131 662 147711499; Email nrnrs@rcahms. gov.uk ; Web http://www.rcahms.gov.uk

Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland, 15 Rutland Square, Edinburgh EH1 2BE Tel013 1 229 7545; Fax 0131 228 2188 Email [email protected]; Web http:Nwww.rias.org.uk

Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors in Scotland, 9 Manor Place, Edinburgh EH3 7DN Tel013 1 225 7078; Fax 0131 226 3559; Email [email protected]

St Andrews Ambulance Association, National Headquarters, St. Andrew's House, 48 Milton Street, Glasgow G4 OHR. TeI 0141 332 403 1; Fax 0141 332 6582; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.firstaid.org.uk

Scottish Building Standards Agency, Denholm House, Almondvale Business park, Livingston, EH54 6GA. Tel0 1506 600 400; Fax 0 1506 600 40 1 ; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.sbsa.gov.uk

Scottish Executive, Development Department, Area 3-H, Victoria Quay, Edinburgh EH6 6QQ. Tel08457 741741; Fax 0 13 1 244 7454; Email [email protected]; Web http://~vww.scotland. gov.uWAbout/Departments/DD

Scottish Fire Services College, Main Street, Gullane, EH3 1 2HG. Tel01620 842236; Fax 01620 843045; Email [email protected] Web http://www.scottish-firesch001.g0v.uk

Scottish Society for Conservation and Restoration, The Glasite Meeting House, 33 Barony Street, Edinburgh EH3 6NX Tel0131557 0019; Fax 0131 557 0049. Chanstoun Tartaven, Bathgate Hills, West Lothian EH48 4NP TelFax 0 13 1 466 85 12

Security Industry Training Organisation, Security House, Barbourne Road, Worcester, WR1 1RS. Tel 01905 20004, Fax: 01905 734949; Web http://www.sito.co.uk

Security Institute, 26 Broadway, Wilburton, Ely CB6 3RT. Tel01353 741 099; Fax 01353 741 628; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.security-institute.org

Smoke Ventilation Association, Sterling House, 6 Furlong Road, Bourne End, Bucks. SL8 5DG Tel01628 531 186; Fax 01628 810 423; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.feta.co.uk

TRADA (Timber Research and Development Association) Technology Limited, Stocking Lane, Hughenden Valley, High Wycombe, Bucks. HP14 4ND Tel01494 569 600 Fax 01494 565 487; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.trada.co.uk

Thatching Advisory Services Ltd, The Old Stables, Redenham Park Farm, Redenham, Andover, Hampshire, SPl l 9AQ. Tel 0 1264 773820; Fax 0 1264 773836; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.thatchingadvisoryservices.co.uk

UKIC (United Kingdom Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works), 702 The Chandlery, 50 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7QY. Tel020 7721 8721; Fax 020 7721 8722; Email [email protected]; Web http://www.ukic.org.uk

Warrington Fire Research, Head Office, Holmesfield Road, Warrington, Cheshire, WA1 2DS. Tel01925 6551 16; Fax 01925 655419; Email info@ warringtonfire.net; Web http://www.warringtonfire.net

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

This section is intended only to explain terms used cpvc: chlorinated polyvinylchloride: a plastic used for in the text that are not fully defined there; it does not sprinkler pipework explain terms used in building and construction.

deductible: the amount by which a claim is discounted

aerial appliance: see high reach appliance by insurers

analogzle addressable detection system: a fire detection system where each sensor has a unique identity permitting the exact location of a fire to be indicated and signalled.

arson: the deliberate setting of any fire with intent to damage property or endanger life; in Scotland the crime is known as wilfidjre raising.

average: the process by which an insurer may reduce a claim if he feels that the value of the property insured has been wrongly stated.

BFPSA: British Fire Protection Systems Association

central(a1arm receiving) station: a specially equipped location which monitors fire and security alarms on a 24 hour basis.

BRE: Building Research Establishment - now operating as a range of companies under the control of the Centre for the Built Environment Ltd.

damage control vehicle: a fire service appliance specially equipped with equipment for undertaking damage limitation activities.

defensivejrejighting: Fighting the fire solely from outside the building so that it does not spread to neighbouring properties.

developing situation: The state of a fire when it is not clear if it is surrounded, under control or still growing.

dry riser: system of pipework in a building which delivers fire fighting water to each floor. Dry risers are pressurised via pumping-in points by the fire and rescue service.

dry riser inlet: an external box housing dry riser system couplings into which water can be pumped from a fire brigade appliance.

EWS : Emergency Water Supply (usually) open water from which the fire and rescue service can pump water for fire fighting

CACFOA: Formerly Chief & Assistant Chief Fire fabric: physical material of which a building or Officers' Association; now CFOA artefact is made.

central (alarm receiving) station: a commercially- operated location which receives signals from fire and security systems and passes these on the appropriate emergency service control room. Also know as an alarm receiving station.

CFOA: Chief Fire Officers' Association

collection: the books, artefacts, works of art or other items displayed, exhibited, archived or used for study in a museum, library, gallery or similar institution.

conservation: action to secure the survival or preservation of buildings, cultural artefacts, or other thing of acknowledged value for the future.

conservation area: area of special architectural or historic interest, formally designated and afforded statutory protection under Planning Legislation

$ashover: stage in the development of a fire (especially one contained in a room or compartment) where fire spreads rapidly involving all of the combustible material.

jire action notice: See fire instructions

fire appliance: general term for a fire and rescue services vehicle. Appliances consist of 'Water Tenders' or 'Pumps' which transport 5 - 7 fire fighters together with a high capacity pump and hose as well as a small supply of water. Specialist appliances include turntable ladders, hydraulic platforms and salvage vehicles

jire authority: The legal entity established under the Fire Services Act 1947 which employs a fire and rescue service or brigade and which is charged with specific duties in respect of the enforcement of the law relating to fire safety.


fire conzpartinent: room or other part of a building separated from adjoining spaces by fire rated construction

fire damper: device for blocking an air duct in event of fire, usually operated by activation of a fusible link or electrically by smoke detection.

fire detection system: equipment intended to detect and report the presence of a fire through sensors which respond to smoke, flame and other products of combustion

jirejighting plan: That portion of the operational plan which deals with fire fighting.

jire instr~~ctions: A printed list of actions, usually in the form or a blue and white notice, to be taken in the event of fire. The notice will specify what staff members are required to do when discovering a fire or on hearing the fire alarm. The method to call the fire and rescue services will also be covered as will any procedures relating to the safety of guests, visitors and others in the premises. Also known as fire action notice or fire procedures

jire procedures: see fire instructions

jre protection: theory and practice of applying technology and management to reducing the probability of loss of life and property in fire.

jire rated: description of a product or element of construction designed to withstand the effects of fire for a predetermined period.

jre retardant: substance or treatment applied to a material to increase its resistance to fire or its products.

fire (ring) main: An arrangement of underground pipework, valves and fire hydrants designed to provide a supply of fire fighting water for a property or site. Such systems are usually arranged in the form of a RING around the property to provide continuity of supply even when part of the pipework may be out service.

jire warden: employee designated and trained to undertake specified tasks (particularly evacuation of people) should a fire take place (also sometimes known as a fire marshal)

hard standing: a piece of solid ground, sometimes prepared on which a fire appliance can sit while pumping or carrying out other operations. Essential for high reach appliances.

heritage building: a building of historic value or a building (not necessarily historic), such as a museum, library or gallery, housing cultural artefacts.

high reach appliance: a fire and rescue services vehicle, such as a turntable ladder or hydraulic platform, used to gain access to upper floors of buildings or to project water on to their roofs.

HMFSI: Her Majesty's Fire Service Inspectorate.

hot work: any activity employing the use of heat or a naked flame or producing heat or sparks undertaken during construction or maintenance work. The term also covers tar boiling, lead work and paint stripping as well as welding, brazing and soldering

hot workpermit: a document issued by a responsible person to a tradesman or contractor judged to be competent to permit the performance of a task deemed to be hazardous indicating the conditions under which the work is to be undertaken.

Incident Commander: fire and rescue service officer in charge of the attendance at an incident.

Intumescent paintlpaper: specially treated materials which have the property of expanding or swelling when heated. These materials usually also form a crisp, charred outer coating which helps to prevent fire spread and provides additional resistance to fire .

LPC: Loss Prevention Council (no longer in existence, its roles having been shared between the FPA and the BRE).

LPCB: Loss Prevention Certification Board (now part of BRE as LPCBIBRE Certification Ltd.

New Dimensions: relates to provisions made with the fire and rescue services nationally to deal with the effects of major disasters and incidents involving terrorism.

FDRl Form and FDR3 Form: Fire data report forms non-combustible: not capable of sustaining used by the fire and rescue services to record fires combustion attended by them.

ODPM: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister FPA: Fire Protection Association. (Government department with responsibility for

FSC Fire Service College, Moreton in Marsh, Gloucestershire. See also SFSC.

fire safety and building regulations in England and Wales)


operational plan: organisational approach adopted by the fire and rescue service at the scene of a fire. The Operation Plan will cover all aspects of fire fighting and rescue activities.

offensivejrejghting: Fighting fire by entering the building involved and fighting the fire at its seat.

passivejre protection: any fire protection measure depending on the resistance of materials to fire or products of combustion

prod~rcts of combustion: flames, heat, gases and solid matter (including residues) emitted by a fire or combustion process

protective systems: any equipment or systems intended to protect a building or its contents from threats such as fire, intrusion, theft and flood.

pumping-in point: fitting used to permit the fire and rescue service to deliver water to an internal pipework system such as a dry riser or sprinkler system.

restoration: alteration of a building, part of a building or artefact which has decayed, been lost or damaged or is thought to have been inappropriately repaired or altered in the past, the objective of which is to make it conform again to its design or appearance at a previous date.

retainedjrejghter: member of a local authority fire and rescue services who (normally) follows another full- time occupation and responds to fires only when called by radio or pager.

reversibility: concept of work to a building, part of a building or artefact being carried out in such a way that it can be reversed at some future time, without any significant damage having been done.

salvage tender: see damage control vehicle

SFSC: Scottish Fire Services College, Gullane, East Lothian

smoke aspiration system: fire detection technique which utilises narrow bore pipes to draw air continuously from protected areas for analysis. The air sample is monitored to detect any particulate matter which would indicate a fire or incipient fire.

sprinkler head: mechanical device fitted to a water supply network which opens at a pre-determined temperature and showers water in a predetermined pattern into a protected area.

suppression system: any equipment or mechanism designed to (usually) automatically discharge a fire fighting agent (such as water or an inert gas) with the intention of controlling or extinguishing a fire.

vehicle rnolinted data system: electronic equipment in the cab of a fire appliance which provides the crew with information on the properties in their operational area.

volztnteerjrejghrer: a fire fighter usually attached to a small, geographically-remote fire station such as those found in North West Scotland. Called to fires in the same sort of way as retained fire fighters, volunteers are not necessarily trained to the same standards and receive no remuneration.

wilfiljre raising: the act of deliberately setting fire to the property of another

APPENDIX A

CHANGES IN FIRE SAFETY LEGISLATION

At the time of writing (March 2005) the existing Fire Services Acts are currently under review in both the UK and Scottish Parliaments. New legislation has been drafted and subject to parliamentary scrutiny is expected to come into force during 2005. This is likely to confirm the various duties placed on fire and rescue authorities, to emphasise the importance of fire prevention, and to include a new statutory obligation to carry out community fire safety work. Fire authorities are also likely to be given new powers to investigate fires and to charge for certain non-emergency services.

As part of the same process existing fire safety legislation will also be replaced. This will be achieved in Scotland through Part 3 of the Fire (Scotland) Bill and in England and Wales through the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2004 made under the Regulatory Reform Act 1997. Amongst other matters it is proposed to remove the existing requirement for fire certificates under the Fire Precautions Act 1971 and to replace the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997.

Based on the latest drafts, it is likely that the new legislation will apply to virtually all places of work and also to most non-domestic premises. The main objective will be to ensure, in the event of fire, the safety of employees and other persons in and around buildings.

Whilst the main obligations in places of work will be imposed principally on the employer, owners and other persons having control of premises may also be subject to duties under the new law. It is envisaged that there will be a very broad general duty to take appropriate fire safety measures in premises. More specific provisions, largely similar to those currently included in the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997, may include duties to:

Undertake fire risk assessments and to review and revise these as necessary

Undertake specific assessments of the risk to employees aged under eighteen

Assess and control the risks of fire and explosion from dangerous substances

Provide and maintain fire exits and routes to fire exits

Ensure emergency routes are kept clear, illuminated and signed

Provide and maintain adequate equipment for fighting fires

Provide and maintain adequate equipment for detecting and warning of fire

Adequately maintain all other fire equipment and systems

Establish appropriate emergency fire and evacuation procedures

Appoint a competent person or persons to assist in complying with the relevant duties

Provide specified safety information to employees and others

Ensure employees are adequately trained

Co-operate and co-ordinate fire safety measures with others who share the premises

Employees will be under a duty to co-operate with employers and ensure they do nothing to affect the safety of themselves or other persons. They also have a duty to notify employers if they become aware of any serious hazards or defects.

APPENDIX B

CASE STUDY LANHYDROCK HOUSE

This text is based on an article by Mr Ken Golding in the November 1992 issue of Fire Prevention reprinted in Heritage Under Fire, 2nd edition, published in London in 1994 by the Fire Protection Association and is inclzided here with the kind permission of the copyright owners. The author of this Technical Advice Note expresses his appreciation for this consent.

An outstanding example of management and employees working to put the principles of preplanning for damage limitation into practice is demonstrated at Lanhydrock House. Lanhydrock is one of the premier tourist attractions in Cornwall, with 150,000 visitors every year. The building was completed in 1642 by the Robartes family, who lived there continuously until the death of the Honourable Everild Agar Robartes in 1969. In 1881, a devastating fire destroyed the kitchen area and south and east wings of the house. The north wing was only saved by the drastic action of dynamiting a fire break. The family resolved to rebuild the house and wisely incorporated features to reduce the risk of a recurrence of such magnitude.

The new construction was of concrete and steel, with as much fire proofing as was known to Victorian engineering. A 70,000 gallon reservoir was built in the hillside above the house, which gravity-fed 12 hydrants placed strategically around the exterior of the house and at all stair heads. Viscount Robartes brought a "Manor" fire engine from Merryweather and started his own volunteer fire and rescue services for the estate and surrounding area. He was also instrumental in setting up a fully manned fire station at Bodmin and the link between Lanhydrock and Bodmin fire station has survived to the present day.

Lanhydrock is now owned and managed by the National Trust and is considered to be the flagship of the Trust in Cornwall.

Following the Hampton Court fire, the National Trust set up a working party to review its risk management procedures. In July 1989, it issued two documents - Fire Precautions at Historic Buildings and Emergency Procedures in Historic Buildings and circulated them to all regions and house administrators. When considering how best to implement those directives, the Cornwall Region decided to concentrate resources at Lanhydrock

The fire brigade was asked to expand their annual inspection into a full house fire prevention survey, so that any recommendations could be included in a schedule of work. The survey was extensive and the recommendations far-reaching. They included a complete upgrading of the fire detection system, the compartmentation of the house and roof spaces and the introduction of a new fire main and hydrant outlets. To introduce fire doors into an historic building requires sensitivity of design, constant consultations, skilled craftsmen and considerable funding. To date, five new fire doors have been completed and installed and other doors upgraded; the entire fire detection system has been replaced and a new fire main and hydrant system installed.

During that same period of time, the Trust have worked very closely with the fire fighters of Bodmin Fire Station to set up and train their salvage support team. Members of Cornwall County Brigade were understandably wary about National Trust support teams being let loose anywhere near an emergency scene without clear working boundaries and responsibilities having first been established, but they were very interested in the positive advantages that could be gained from such a group. The support teams were selected from the fittest people on Lanhydrock estate, the builders, gardeners and wardens, each group working with their department head as team leader and one other as a nominated deputy.

Lanhydrock is a large house with 32 rooms open to the public and a further 50 used as private accommodation, restaurant, shop and storage. To ask anybody to familiarise themselves with such a vast area on a part- time basis is not practical and so each team familiarised themselves with one wing of showrooms each. They have prime responsibility for their wing and then act as support in any other area of the house.

~ o u s e , initially training up the first house team in the The time scale for this was from November 1989 to region and then to expand their role to respond as the April 1990, during which time it was established which Cornwall Region Team on account of their central items of the thousands in the house were a priority, their position in the county. location, fixing and security, both during and after a


- - Illus 36 The Gallery, Lanhydrock House; the subject of a damage limitation exercise. (picture: O The National Trust Photographic Library l Andreas von Einsiedel)

salvage operation. Storage and conservation areas were designated for both short and long term situations. Site management areas, police interview and press briefing rooms were designated and first aid positions established and equipped. Dormant contracts were negotiated with specialist hire companies, removals firms and a freezer company for the conservation of the books. Finally, a training area was set up in a disused section of the building's Harness Block.

The building's gallery houses a unique collection of books, so 2,000 books scheduled for disposal were obtained from a local library to test various evacuation and conservation techniques. Staff trained on average one hour per week from April to November 1990. A fourth support team was introduced to prepare all the equipment required as the incident unfolded and then to assist with conservation of the salvaged objects. This group was made up from the conservation cleaners and restaurant staff as they have the greatest knowledge of handling and wrapping precious artefacts.

By November 1990, the Trust were confident enough in their progress to hold a large-scale exercise at the house, involving the Fire Brigade. Conservation advisers from London were also invited, to advise both the support team and fire brigade on the handling and conservation requirements for paintings, ceramics, books, furniture and metals. Personnel from the region attended as observers to assist the Trust in setting up their own house teams. The exercise took place in three areas of

the house simultaneously to stretch the support teams to the limit, working with the fire brigade, who were using key boards provided by the house to gain access to locked compartments. The contents of a mock up of the dining room were evacuated under the supervision of a fire officer, then roles changed as the fire brigade, under the instruction of the support leader, sheeted up and protected those large items that could not be moved, such as built-in dressers and plaster overmantels. The system to evacuate books from the gallery was also tested, using chutes constructed from sailcloth. This proved very worthwhile, as it poured with rain on the day and the chutes became sodden causing the books to get stuck, so the system had to be rethought.

Training continued throughout the winter and a tighter risk management policy was implemented, by introducing a six-monthly house inspection carried out by house and regional management staff. Electrical and electronic maintenance contracts, and those for fire detection and extinguisher systems were all negotiated on a six-monthly basis. Chimney sweeping was increased to quarterly. All hot work and smoking was banned and the first fire check door was completed and installed.

In April, a repeat exercise was held, as part of Bodmin Fire Station's inspection by the Home Office Fire Inspectorate. The purpose was to involve the part-time fire crews from Liskeard and Lostwithiel and also to test the National Trust response outside of office hours. The opportunity was also taken to test the newly installed fire


main. Chutes were used again to evacuate books but this time book slings on ropes were used to transport plastic inner liners down the chute. This method cut down the handling both in the building and in the salvage areas and more than 2000 books were evacuated in under 25 minutes. The inner liners were colour-coded, so that conservators could quickly recognise which books needed most urgent attention and what damage they had suffered: blue - water damage; green - smoke damage; red - good condition. This addition to the original concept was the result of one of the earlier debriefing sessions.

Whilst the practical exercise was in progress at the house, National Trust Regional Office staff were implementing the designated telephone call out lists to contact management, conservators, utility companies, hire companies and stewards and to check if they would have been available to respond, had there been an emergency. The response rate was just under 25%, which was more than the figure originally conceived in the contingency planning.

Fire precautions and emergency procedures have always formed a part of the National Trust management training courses and housekeeping study days. In 1990, the first specific Emergency Procedures study day was held at Kingston Lacey. In the following year, the venue was Erddig, near Wrexham and in 1992, Lanhydrock House. The training days are used to pool information from the regions and avoid re-inventing the wheel. The course was expanded to three days, to give enough time to assimilate the information and incorporate a practical element into the training.

Prior to the exercise phase, there were three days of intensive training in the following subjects:

Handling and packing ceramics

Glass and miscellaneous objects

Inventories and the role of the Conservation Department

Handling and storage of sculpture, protection of stonework and plastenvork

Handling and storage of furniture

Handling and packing of books

Handling and storage of textiles

Handling and storage of paintings

Handling and storage of metalwork

Emergency support team, equipment and procedures

Fire precautions and fire fighting

Post trauma stress

There were also talks relating to planning for emergencies, dealing with the press, alternative types of fixtures and fittings, the importance of risk management, the importance of working closely with the fire brigade and security measures in an emergency.

The developments that have evolved at Lanhydrock through a process of assessment planning, implementation and ongoing evaluation have been possible, due to the commitment and co-operation of all involved and provide an excellent example of what can be achieved. Liaison with the fire brigade has ensured a professional approach by the National Trust and kept training on a practical level that will be of benefit to all concerned in the event of an emergency.

APPENDIX C

SUPPLIES FOR DISASTER RECOVERY AND DAMAGE LIMITATION PROGRAMME IN HERITAGE BUILDINGS

This is a general list of items that have been proven to have value in bothjre andjood and similar emergencies. Quantities can be adjcrsted as appropriate for the property and local conditions.

In Larger Properties and Museums and Galleries For Smaller Properties

electric submersible pump and hose (for pumping out 2 lightweight ladders (3-4m in height extended as lift pits, basement areas etc.; appropriate)

200 sandbags; 1 toolbox complete with appropriate tools (including 2 each carpet knives, wire cutters and small crowbars); 4 X plastic flat scoops; 2 large battery-powered hand lamps and spare batteries roll hazard warning tape; 4 plastic buckets, scoops, sponges and mops;

10 rolls paper towels; 10 flat-pack plastic crates; 2 water misting sprays;

5 X 2 litre bottles distilled water 1 large roll bubble wrap;

1 large roll wrapping paper; conservation equipment for paintings;

first aid kit (large) 50 large self sealing plastic bags;

2 eye wash bottles 50 medium self sealing plastic bags;

200 large self sealing plastic bags picture and furniture slings;

100 small self sealing plastic bags protective blankets for fine surfaces;

1 roll acid free tissue paper low level dollies/trolleys or wheels for moving heavy items;

stationery box (pens, pencils, markers, rubber bands, adhesive tape, labels, string, indelible markers and paper clips, scissors, labels tags and chalk) scissors;

50 polythene aprons protective clothing including dust masks, rubber gloves

5 boxes lightweight disposable polythene gloves and overshoes.

2 wetldry vacuum cleaners;

6 large capacity electric fans;

large tool box with appropriate tools;

8 furniturelpainting slings

50m coil of lOmm rope

50m coil of 5mm rope

2 X 7m extending ladders;

additional slings for pictures andlor furniture;

additional low level trolleys (for moving heavy objects);

additional blankets or protective coverings;

4 tarpaulinslcovers at least 20m X 10m;

APPENDIX D

SAFEGUARDING OUR BUILT HERITAGE

Until the 1990s there was little specijc research work done by the jre and rescue services in respect of the protection of historic buildings and their contents. The publication of Heritage Under Fire in 1994 and a series of conferences run by the Fire Protection Association and other organisations was largely welcomed by thejre service and some zisefifl work was undertaken by individual jre and rescue services especially in liaison and coordination with the owners and managers of historic properties. Grampian Fire and Rescue Service became an acknowledged leader in this area following a series of majorjres in the region including Aberdeen Grammar School (1986), Cullen House (1989) and Mar Lodge (1991). Today they maintain a lead position in thisjeld as coordinator for the jre service contributions to the Scottish Historic Buildings National Fire Database project begun in 2002 and ongoing at the rime of writing (March 2005).

As his international research project for the 2002 Fire Service College Brigade Command Course the current Firemaster, David Dalziel selected the subject of thejre services' awareness of the problems of jres in historic buildings; in particular the operational preparedness ofjrejighters in their response to stlch jres. It is believed that this is jrst time a senior jre and rescue service oficer has undertaken a project on a heritage topic and Historic Scotland are pleased to have received the author> consent to reproduce an abstract of Firemaster Dalziel 'S dissertation here.

Safeguarding Our Built Heritage Recommendations from Research Project

David Dalziel QFSM MA, Firemaster, Grampian Fire and Rescue Service

1. Pending the full introduction of the English Heritage and Historic Scotland databases, fire services should, as a matter of priority, provide operational intelligence to crews attending fires in heritage buildings. Recognising the total numbers of listed buildings involved, precedence should be given to Grade 1 1 Category A properties. The enhanced information should include detailed damage-limitation planning measures and the potential impact on the structure and contents from firefighting actions, in addition to the routine operational information, recognising the high potential for rapid, and undetected, fire spread.

Implementation will significantly enhance the operational response capability of crews, contribute to the mitigation of damage, and conform to statutory duty. The operational intelligence provided is a low cost, rapid method of improving the protection to the built heritage and complies with the guidance issued to all UK fire and rescue services from central government, in 2003, on integrated risk management planning.

Any failure to implement will continue to expose the built heritage to its particular vulnerability to fire and subsequent irreplaceable loss. Inaction exposes individual fire services to criticism, potential litigation and loss of public confidence.

2. Fire and rescue service managers, in utilising the risk equation in the fire cover review, should consider the consequence of fires in heritage buildings to be extreme and, by applying worst-case scenario planning principles, all Grade 1 1 Category A listed buildings in the UK should have an enhanced pre-determined first attendance, including a damage-limitation vehicle with specifically trained personnel.

Implementation will incur additional costs, particularly where retained personnel are utilised, but should provide sufficient resources on initial attendances to make an effective attack on incidents simultaneously with a damage limitation strategy. Cognisance of heritage loss should be reflected in the appropriate speed and weight of attack to mitigate loss and should be provided for in integrated risk management planning scenarios.

Failure to implement may result in the potential of crews, particularly in rural areas, dependant upon retained fire cover, having to conduct dynamic risk assessments in relation to their capability with limited resources and consequent restriction on their actions. Unrestricted fire spread and ineffective damage limitation measures will result in exaggerated loss and subsequent cost to our cultural heritage, insurance losses and impact on tourism as only some of the ancillary outcomes. Service


managers may have to justify their strategic decisions in litigation and 1 or subsequent inquiries.

3. More emphasis should be given, by fire services in the UK, to developing the skill-base and general awareness of the particular operational considerations and impact of firefighting measures in heritage buildings. The broad, generic provisions of the Fire Services Acts do not take account of a risk-based approach specific to heritage buildings nor the recommendations contained in the Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers: Recommendation No. R (93) 9 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of the Architectlira1 Heritage Against Natural Disasters.

Implementation costs are minimal and are specific to inclusion of heritage risk in general training and assessment of competence. The National Occupational Standards for Fire Service Operations in the Community should include specific reference to heritage risk. There will be associated administrative costs, far outweighed by the benefit.

Failure to implement will result in the existing low awareness being perpetuated and maintain the generic areas of competence as being appropriate to all structural fire service operations. The outcome will be a lack of capability to resolve heritage incidents in a sympathetic and informed way.

Recommendations, contained in the European Council of Ministers recommendation No. R (93) 9 of 1993 can be complied with and a national standard promulgated, that gives definitive guidance, for compliance with a statutory duty.

There will be a financial cost for research and publication that would have to be borne by central government.

Failure to implement will leave individual fire brigades to develop differing levels of expertise and competence and an inability to assess that competence against any national occupational standard. Developing training for damage limitation is as integral to operational response measures as firefighting and intervention skills are. The financial and cultural loss due to fire will be exacerbated through any lack of competence in damage limitation.

6. The Technical Advice Notes, published by Historic Scotland, are comprehensive, informative reference documents not replicated elsewhere in Europe. Consideration should be given by the ODPM to developing UK performance based guidance document(s), based on that format, to expand on the recommendations of BS7913:Guide to the principles of the conservation of historic buildings and Recommendation R (93) 9 of European Ministers.

Implementation will involve research and development costs, potentially involving the use of external consultants and existing agencies, including heritage 4. Individual fire and rescue services should review organisations and CACFOA. All existing European and

their training programmes to determine if sufficient international guidance should be incorporated into the emphasis has been placed on the specific operational guidance. There will be research and publication costs considerations applicable to incidents in heritage

buildings. This should include the impact firefighting that may be grant funded from Europe. - -

operations has on the structure and fabric. A failure to implement will result in no definitive standard being readily available to inform practitioners, Implementation costs will be absorbed through the architects, conservation agencies or fire services ongoing integrated risk management strategy, cross without extensive,potentiallyreplicated,uncoordinated referenced with the existing published lists from

English Heritage and Historic Scotland, to determine and costly research.

the extent of resource implication. Development of specific operational intelligence and training packages 7. The Fire Service College (FSC) should be the catalyst to address those outcomes will be minimal. for change, in raising the fire services awareness of

Failure to implement will result in a response option protecting the built heritage, by the inclusion of specific

that does not possess the competence to effectively deal inputs on the subject on all core progression courses.

with heritage risk. Higher priority should be given to developing damage- limitation skills on all practical courses.

5. HMFSI should update the 1983 guidance to fire The FSC should arrange strategic seminars on the services in the UK on damage-limitation. Definitive operational issues relevant to protecting the built operational guidance should be issued in respect of the heritage. specific operational considerations applicable to fires in Earlierrecommendations, arising from this research, will heritage buildings. provide the basis for training delivery and require only Existing national guidance on damage limitation minimal alteration to existing core progression courses is outdated, generic and of low prominence within at the FSC. Collaboration between service stakeholders, national training strategies. Implementation of this industry, insurance companies, government and recommendation will bring renewed focus to the issue conservation agencies would enhance the process and and take account of modem equipment and techniques. minimise cost.


Any failure to progress this recommendation participation at regional and national level, for example, will compound the potential impact referred to in by the inclusion of heritage issues on CFOA operational recommendations [2] to [5] above. committees.

Implementation can be immediate with significant improvements to broader service awareness. There

8. Within 5 years, individual fire brigades in the UK are virtually no financial implications and, the current

should provide an integrated system, with a record of review of its business strategy to form 'business streams'

all listed buildings in their area, utilising a database by CFOA should readily incorporate this recommended

similar to that being developed in Scotland. The approach through the 'Intervention' policy portfolio. relevant local information should be made available

to operational personnel on the incident ground either by vehicle mounted data systems (VMDS) or some similar method.

Implementation has significant capital costs associated withit.Thecurrentnationa1communicationsprocurement strategy, 'Firelink', will still leave individual brigades with expenditure for VMDS terminals. This cost has to be balanced against the wider operational risk to crews with no immediate access to operational intelligence on the incident ground. Overlaying heritage information would be an insignificant addition to the overall strategy

Failure consequence is referred to in [l] above.

9. The absence of any systematic co-operation and liaison between the specialist interest groups, and agencies involved in protecting and conserving the built heritage, and the fire service, results in information being restricted. CFOA should liaise with both English Heritage and Historic Scotland to formalise reporting arrangements.

Implementation only requires existing ad-hoc arrangements to be formalised and has minimal logistical and financial impact. An integrated strategy, supported by all of the recommendations contained in this research, would provide a cohesive and widely

The existing bias away from the operational elements of the service will perpetuate the current lack of ownership on, what is widely perceived, as a specialist area of risk.

11. Forms FDRl and FDR3 should be amended to clearly indicate incidents in the built heritage. In the short term (within 12 months) the special study boxes should be utilised. Guidance for completion of the FDRl form should be amended to encourage the recording of all damage in listed buildings and historical property.

HMFSI should consult with ODPM on the necessary amendments and, in the interim, suitably amend the provisions for notification of fires of special interest in respect of heritage fires.

Implementation will provide definitive data on the extent and nature of risk to the built heritage. The international lack of data masks the threat of continued loss and any concerted action to reverse the trends. Cost effects are minimal and ODPM is, in any event, in the process of revising the format of the FDR1, and associated, forms. The author has discussed the issue with ODPM and HM Chief Inspector of Fire Services [Scotland] in relation to notification procedures in the interim. The author has also made a submission to the FDRl review consultation process.

understood heritage protection policy in the UK. That 'vOuld have greater jnfluence On Ministers 12. Within 12 months, the published lists of all Grade 1

and funding streams' with the drive policy Category Abuildings should be made available by fire initiatives in a co-ordinated way. brigades to personnel responsible for the completion Not implementing this recommendaiion will perpetuate of FDRl forms so that crews can accurately record the disjointed strategic approach to the fire services incidences of fires in heritage buildings. contribution to safeguarding the heritage. At an published lists are readily available throughout the UK, operational and tactical level, response options and broken down by specific address and local parishes. service delivery will continue to be compromised. Printed versions, freely available from individual local

authorities could be readily provided to all fire stations

10. The current link between the agencies responsible for protecting the built heritage, and fire services in the UK, has been, predominately, the fire safety side of the service, with the emphasis on prevention, conservation and statistical data. In order to raise a broader awareness of heritage issues within the service, consideration should be given, by individual chief fire officers and firemasters, to more formal operational liaison and

at no cost.

Failure consequence is referred to in [l l ] above. Further, failure to implement will ignore stakeholder lobbying and the recommendations of European Ministers. It will compound the lack of statistical data on heritage loss and contradict the emphasis given to heritage risk in the governmental advice to brigades on integrated risk management planning.


13. Within 2 years, the information, in (12) above should be made available automatically, as part of the turnout instructions, to the pre-determined attendance through mobilising systems. All other categories of listed buildings should be provided by other means to those responsible for the collation of fire statistics in individual brigades.

Implementation only requires a data input to existing mobilising systems by adding an additional field to turnout instructions. This is a basic administrative task that can be readily achieved, at no cost, by fire control staff.

Failure consequence is referred to in [l l] above

from the national resilience funding that supported mass decontamination and regional rescue capability. Collaborative, regional bids, on a 'Spend to Save' basis, may be more successful. An alternative strategy, given the ongoing integrated risk management planning process, would be for a nominated fire and rescue service in a region to carry out this specialist function on behalf of adjoining services.

Passing the risk to occupiers/owners would be consistent with regulatory reform and the risk assessment process introduced by government. That moved the prescriptive application emphasis of fire safety legislation by fire authorities to, self-assessment by owners / occupiers. It would however require a change to principal legislation and may be vigorously opposed by industry and the

14. The regional approach to UK resilience, from the insurance lobbies. Failure to implement would leave

New Dimensions work, should be considered as a responsibility with individual fire authorities.

model to form regional specialist damage limitation teams, with the competence and specialist equipment necessary, to supplement individual fire brigades response.

CFOA should liaise with HMFSI on this concept.

Thegovernment white paper and the ScottishExecutive's consultation on the future of the fire service, including structure, governance, collaboration and wider role, serve to potentially support this recommendation.* The white paper was published after the author's research had concluded but appears to support the concept advocated by the recommendation. Implementation will provide best value, significantly reduce loss, and provide regional expertise in damage limitation for major or complex incidents.

"Postscript: The Fire Bills in the UK have been enacted for England and Wales and the Scottish legislation is due to receive Royal Assent in May 2005.

Failure to implement will contradict central governments stated intent, defy the principles of best value, dilute the potential for regional expertise and expose individual brigades to being unable to mount effective damage limitation measures at significant incidents, particularly at heritage fires.

15. Funding for regional specialist damage-limitation measures should be provided centrally if the provision is to be from local authority fire and rescue services.

Consideration should also be given to passing the risk to occupiers and owners, as is the case in Sweden, through a change to legislation and encouraging the private sector to provide a damage-limitation service. These measures would require the support of central government and promotion by those who advise Ministers in the respective Parliaments.

Implementation would require ministerial support and central funding. That would be unlikely to come

16. Alternative funding may be available, through the heritage lottery fund. Consideration should be given by fire and rescue services, on a regional basis, to developing a funding bid through Europe.

The inextricable link to the potential detrimental effect to the UK tourist economy, permanent loss of our historic and cultural heritage, together with the United Nations' declaration and European council of minister's recommendations on protecting the built heritage, supports a powerful argument.

There are a few insurers who specialise in heritage risk and there may be some benefit in discussing potential partnership or sponsorship arrangements with those companies.

This alternate strategy may be pursued in parallel with regional 'Spend to Save' bids and capital funding applications. The recent [June 20031 statement of intent from central government, by way of the published White Paper, on regionalisation may make this alternate strategy unnecessary.

17. The terminology used to describe the mitigation of fire damage should be altered from the word 'salvage' to 'damage-limitation' to standardise it with Europe. This may be achieved through the issue of a 'Dear Chief Fire Officer / Firemaster' letter by HMFSI.

Implementation costs are minimal and should be incorporated within a number of the previously referred to recommendations. All that is required is a commitment, from those who have governance over the fire service, to recognise the need for uniformity and a common understanding.

Maintaining the term 'salvage' does not convey the positive and proactive approach necessary from damage limitation strategies.' Salvage', by implication suggests

APPENDIX E

DRAFT FIRE SAFETY POLICY

As has already been made clear, all historic bziildings should have a j r e safety policy which should, at the very least set out the intentions of the owner or occupier in respect of the importance of managingjre safety effectively.

Two model safety policy statements are attached. The jrst is a comprehensive statement which encompasses much more technical detail and is almost a minijre safety manual. The second is a short and simple example of the sort which might be appropriate for a smaller historic building.

FIRE POLICY STATEMENT (LONG VERSION)

1. Employer's Duties

We are a responsible employer and take our fire safety obligations seriously. For this reason, we have formulated this policy to help us comply with all our legal obligations to staff, visitors and other relevant persons as required by the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 (as amended), the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 and other relevant legislation.

4. Procedures

We have introduced the following procedures in order to maintain high standards of fire safety:

A full fire risk assessment has been undertaken which will be reviewed annually. However, more frequent reviews will occur if there are changes that will impact on its effectiveness. These may include alterations to the premises or new work processes.

These obligations and duties include the provision of The fire evacuation procedures will be exercised at a safe place of work where risks of and from fire are least annually minimised and where reasonable steps have been taken to eliminate or reduce fire safety hazards. Due to its Training will be provided as necessary to any staff importance, this fire safety policy also forms part of our given extra fire safety responsibilities, such as overall health and safety policy. those who are appointed as fire marshals

2. Employees' duties All employees have a duty to ensure that they do not place themselves or others at risk of harm. They are also required to co-operate fully with us and those nominated by us to manage fire safety matters in complying with any procedures that we may introduce to protect the safety and well-being of our staff and visitors.

All employees have an obligation to ensure that they work safely and use the equipment provided as

It is our policy that all staff will be trained in the use of fire extinguishers

All new members of staff and temporary employees will be provided with induction training which will include instructions on how to raise the alarm and use the available escape routes

All escape routes will be clearly signed and kept free from obstructions at all times

instructed. All fire-related equipment will be regularly

serviced and maintained. 3. Communications

We will keep staff informed of any changes that are made ' If aware defective Or

to our fire safety procedures and fire risk assessments. missing equipment, they must report it to a fire marshall, manager or other designated person

We will also ensure that all visitors to our premises are briefed in the evacuation procedures and not left alone Alarm systems will be tested regularly. Staff will unless they are aware of, and familiar with, all available be told when a test is scheduled escape routes.

Any other safety systems will be checked Equally, employees must also bring to the attention regularly to ensure correct operation of their supervisor or other nominated person any equipment, condition or situation which they consider This policy forms part of all employees' to pose a hazard. conditions of employment. Failure to comply may

be treated as a disciplinary matter.

5. Procedures in the event of a fire

a. On discovering afire

If you discover a fire raise the alarm immediately

If you have been trained and feel that it is safe to do so, attempt to fight the fire using the equipment provided

If this fails, evacuate immediately. Ensure that no- one is left in the room and close the door behind you.

Ensure that you or the designated person has called the fire brigade.

Play your part in the roll call so you are safely accounted for.

b. If you hear thefke alarm

Operate any essential shutdown devices, e.g. machinery . immediately leave using the nearest available fire exit

Report to the assembly point for a roll call

If you are with a visitor or there are contractors or temporary staff working nearby, ensure they accompany you.

3. Fire marshals

Encourage staff around you to evacuate and to proceed to the assembly point

Report to the person in charge, noting any absentees.

4. Person in charge

Gather all information regarding the evacuation

Establish if it is a genuine fire or false alarm

Ensure that the fire brigade has been called

FIRE POLICY STATEMENT (SHORT VERSION)

The (Trustees) have resolved that at in relation to the protection of (ABC House) the first priority should be the protection of life safety in the event of fire. The second priority is the protection of the buildings and its contents. All efforts to achieve these measures taken are consistent with the overall objectives of the protection of the house's heritage value to ensure the protection of Scotland's national heritage for the enjoyment and instruction of future generations.

The (Trustees) require all staff, contractors, visitors and other persons visiting the premises to comply at all times with relevant legislation, statutory guidance and codes of practice as they relate to the building and its contents and to any and all (ABC House) fire safety rules and procedures which may be promulgated from time to time.

The (House Manager) is nominated as the person responsible for all fire safety matters within the site. In the event of his or her absence from site, this responsibility is delegated to the (Deputy House Manager)

Liaise with the fire brigade on its arrival.

APPENDIX F

SAMPLE HOT WORK PERMIT

a a-= 4 0 8 r : zt; i

b s 3 : L X G W i 2- i Q : : h : :

G : : x i : : C . . S . ' 5 : $ : i < . . . . : : E i ; ? . . . . - m S . . . . . . . . . . . . . S . . . . a - . . . . S . . - . . - - . S . . . . . . . . . . . - S . . . . . - S . . . . . I . . . - . . - . . . . . - . . . . . - ' 3 : Pia - - 8s i

APPENDIX G

POST FIRE STRUCTURAL STABILITY

The following is based on text prepared by Historic Scotland's in-house structural engineer.

When a building is considered dangerous The Building (Scotland) Act 2003 defines the local authority's responsibilities. During a fire the authority's opinion on whether walls or gables are unsafe and need to come down could inform the fire brigades approach. Immediately after a fire the local authority will assess the building and where it appears that a building constitutes a danger to persons in or about it, or to the public generally, or to adjacent buildings or spaces, the local authority must carry out such work (including, if necessary, demolition) as it considers necessary to protect the public and adjacent property and persons. Subsequently a dangerous building notice may be served on the owner requiring works to be carried out within a set period.

However, when considering listed buildings and scheduled monuments a local authority must, if reasonably practicable, consult with the Scottish Ministers and the planning authority. It is important in such cases to have a structural engineer or conservation specialist on hand, with experience in the form and structure of historic buildings and the approach to securing and conserving historic fabric, who can inform the approach to stabilising the building. There are now Structural Engineers formally accredited in building conservation.

Where the structural damage is significant, clearly in addition to historic value the location of buildings and external pressures can influence the extent of making safe and the approach. A city centre building adjacent

Illus 38 Broadstone House, Renfrewshire. Post -jre stabilisation works underway. (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

~ioieh1asu03 ls!ppads e Lq uo!padsu! alojaq %u!lCIp M O I ~ 01 aAoqe JOOIJ ay1 dn SuFuado pue %u!ddo~d Lq pa~aiuno:, aq 01 spaau ,,sasde~lo:, aJojaq u ~ o p ayei,, jo uopsea~ aie!paww! aqi ' y i ! ~ pap oi qn3yj!p Lpejn3!md aq w3

s%u![!a3 laiseld 3!.1ols!q 01 a%awap JaleM '%u!pea~ds aJy aqi iua~aid oi slroga oi anp paie3!1dw! rCp3a.11~ iou %u!p~!nq ayljo smd 04 a8emp U! iInsa1 ue3 saly JaI[ewg

-9oiu!1 ajes uol! i s m 10 laais L I I ~ U O ! S ~ ~ ~ O pm qoiu!~ ajes laqurg q i ! ~ uo!i3unruo:, U! s%u!uado MOPU!M pua loop JaAo saq3n! hoseur ~ I ! M uayo - sIIaM auols pgos y3!q1 w o ~ j Buy~yauaq pua pmpue~s q%!q e 03

q!nq SaJnpms im3y!u%!s uqjo a n Lay3 leq~ U! aJy e %U!A!A.T~S U! a%e~ue~pe UI? aAeq Leur s%u!pl!nq ~! . IOJS!H

.pa%pnr aq 1.1723 uo!ieJap!suos lay30 q q ~ wog wniep e sa palroda~ aq isnw ~as!'?.~dde is03 paielal e pue Li!l!q!seaj la3!ug3ai 'raAaMoH .iua!p pw Luedwos a ~ m ~ t ~ s u ! aqi jo sMay a q pm sqeda~ jo Q!~!qe!la~ ay1 'asua~eadda s!iaqlsaa

ay) S E gsns suo!ieJap!suo3 JapeoJq qsnw uo paseq aq )snw inq '/C1!1!q!seaj le3!uq3ai ay1 jo iuawssasse a q uo paseq Lldw!s aq ~ouue3 a y e laye ,,Ai!g!qemda~,, aqi i e v saiou q .Lipopd e sa uopeh1asuo3 slap!suo3 ieqi uoges!~qnd e iou S! q ' J a , i a ~ o ~ .aJy e Jaije iuawssasse IeJnpruis E ino 8u~L.1.1123 uagM a3ueprnS Injasn sa~!8 ,,saJnl3nriS %u!is!x~ jo ~ e s ! e ~ d d ~ , , uo!ie3!1qnd s,laau!%ug IeJnpruis 30 uopnqisu1 aqL JO 9 x!puaddv


A major fire can lead to significant structural risk from collapsing roofs or floors causing progressive collapse. The resulting loss of ties to walls or outward force on a wall could result in failure and collapse of parts of the outer envelope. A safe inspection of a precarious structure can be difficult. For taller buildings a hanging basket from a crane with suitable reach should be utilised to enable close up inspection. Smaller units such a "cheny pickers" can be used for smaller structures.

Health and Safety issues are of major importance when dealing with a structure subjected to fire. Hazards and risks must be thoroughly considered to inform the approach to inspection and making safe and secure. Method statements defining the approach to work should be produced before carrying out stabilisation, conservation or repair work. Access to carry out archaeological assessment and recording can also prove difficult when making safe and clearing a site as soon as practicable is required.

After a fire where roof collapse has occurred, gables and pediments over wall head dormers can be left standing exposed with no rear support. While the initial instinct may be to carefully dismantle stone by stone utilising hanging baskets or temporary scaffold and storing the stone for subsequent re-construction, the necessity of such intervention should be carefully considered. It should be taken into account that the triangular form is well suited to resisting wind load, with a low centre of gravity providing stability and a reducing area to catch the wind minimising the overturning moment. Each situation should be considered on its merits with consideration being given to the height and location of the building, the size of the stone blocks, the tightness of the joints and the effectiveness of inter-bedding. Where feasible tying gables and pediments back by the erection of temporary support systems to enable their safe retention in-situ is preferable, as it reduces

the risk of stone damage and loss, compared with dismantling and reconstruction. Chimney stacks and corner turrets can also appear precarious when in fact they are perfectly stable. Consideration has to be given to the greater exposed areas to wind load and loss of counterweight of roof structure.

The extent of heat damage to stone and mortar needs to be assessed case by case. Sandstone can resist heat better than some other stones, whilst brick, having been formed by firing, is more resistant. The thickness of the stone wall and form of construction (rubble, regularly coursed etc) subjected to the heat of the fire will be a factor in the degree of damage. Damage may take the form of spalling, de layering or the formation of micro cracks making the stone and mortar more prone to deterioration if exposed to weather.

Roof loss may lead to wall heads and stone faces meant only for internal exposure being exposed to weathering. Protective measures to conserve will need to be considered if early remedial work is not likely. The most severe stone damage is likely to be on the thinner isolated elements such as lintols, mullions and transoms. Propping or framing out to provide support should be carried out as quickly as possible.

Metal elements of a structure provided with sufficient fire protection or built into stonework may survive a fire without severe deflection or loss of strength. However, if exposed to a substantial level of heat, expansion, deflection and loss of strength will occur. In steel for example, the yield strength at room temperature will be reduced to about half at 500°C and to 10% or less at 1000°C. Strength recovery post fire is usually dependent on the temperature reached but a reduction of around 5% is allowed for hot rolled steel cooling from 800°C. Expansion of built in metal beams during a fire - especially elongation - can also cause damage to stonework resulting in bulging and cracking in walls.

Illus 41 Bulging and cracked external masonry caused by expansion of internal metal beam. (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)


Illus 42 Fire damaged timber safe lintols with masonry arch over (picture: Lothian Webster, Historic Scotland)

For wrought iron a high temperature can be beneficial to strength on re-cooling. As for cast iron a permanent loss of strength would occur if subjected to temperatures greater than 750 "C although working stresses are usually lower. Generally cast iron is considered to perform well in fires and is less prone to collapse in the early stages of a fire than steel. However, sudden cooling as a result of direct exposure to fire hose water can cause severe cracking and failure. Cast iron beams are more prone to collapse and sudden failure than columns. Where cast iron elements have survived a fire a detailed study of the components is advisable to check for surface crack development and to ensure their long term reliability.

Concrete has an inherently good resistance to the effects of fire. This is not to say that it is not susceptible to deterioration when exposed to extreme heat, spalling

may occur and steel reinforcement may expand and lose strength. Older concretes require careful consideration as they may contain combustible materials. Filler joist slabs combine concrete and metal, the metal joists being provided with a degree of fire protection by the concrete.

Timber of standard small cross sectional area will normally only survive localised fires or fires where rapid intervention by the fire service has been successful. In such instances, larger sections may suffer only surface charring. Inspection of timber elements will reveal the extent of section reduction due to charring and if not extensive their structural integrity may not be compromised. In some cases sufficient section may survive to enable retention with the addition of strengthening.

tan 28- fire safety management in heritage buildings

Documents

scottish historic buildings

historic scotland guide

historic scotland isbn

building conservation

conservation of plasterwork

traditional buildings

sandstone buildings

rural buildings