Taiwan's PartisanPolitics and Its Impact on the US-TaiwaneseRelationsDemocratic Accountability and Foreign Policy Commitments in AsiaApril 8-9, 2011, Henry R. Luce Hall, Yale University, 34, Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT, USA

Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ph.D.The Institute for Advanced Studies on AsiaThe University of TokyoVisiting Fellow, Todai-Yale Initiative

2

Key Questions

Why did relations between Chen Shui-bian/DPP government and GW Bush administration, once described as “best,” become “worst”?

Was the first progressive government after decades-long conservative government destined to fail in its national security policy?

If so, why and how?

3

Quick Review on Taiwan

Dual separation (1895 and 1949) from the mainland China

Multi ethnic society: Hokkiens, Hakkas, Mainlanders, and aborigines

Growing Taiwanese identity and high status-quo orientation

ROC=Taiwan/Taiwan=ROC: anyway, it’s a “sovereign state” consensus

Taiwanese people basically do not trust China, China has offered no alternative other than to pursue reunification

4

Quick Review on Taiwan continued

Traditional US policy to China and Taiwan: engagement and hedging toward China, strategic ambiguity, and dual deterrence of any attempts to change the status-quo by either one of them

Democratization during the Lee Teng-hui: “vicious cycle” of tension in the triangle relations emerges

GW Bush administration’s ABC policy: more hedging China, more supporting Taiwan (huge arms sales), no ambiguity (“Whatever it takes…”) until 9.11

US as a “guardian angel” of Taiwan: arms sales, “appropriate actions” under the Taiwan Relations Act

5

Characteristics of Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-2004)

Strong grass-rooted popularity (the son of Taiwan) Minority government plus less experienced Bad relations with government officials Strong desire for comprehensive reform Supporters: disparity between “pro-independence” elements and

the middle Divided party elites: grass-rooted local politicians and

human/social science intellectuals (lawyers) Election oriented political mobilization and populism Chen’s weak legitimacy and little prospect for reelection in 2004 Weak connections with the PRC and USA

6

Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with China(2000-2004)

Formulation of Anti-Chen coalition between the opposition KMT and PFP in the wake of the forth nuclear power plant issue

China’s intervention: China began to “take over” diplomatic relations with Taiwan’s friends

Chen administration started with the middle of the road, but began to tilt towards pro-independence for reelection

“Provocation” against China as reelection strategy: “Yibian Yiguo,” national referendum on Taiwan’s national defense and “new Taiwanese constitution”

7

Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with the US(2000-2004)

China’s successful cooptation with the USA Partisan politics: opposition parties opposed US

arms sales package US’s mixed messages to Taiwan: on one hand,

criticizing Taiwan’s “provocation” against China, on the other hand, supporting Chen’s visit to the US, and fought a war on Iraq under the name of “democratization”

Chen’s reelection at the cost of national unity, relations with China and the US

8

Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with China(2004-2008)

Chen’s challenges for his “legacy”: cease of “National Unification Platform,” “Name Rectification Campaign,” national referendum on “getting back to the UN”

Hu Jintao’s new Taiwan policy: more “status-quo oriented” stance (anti-secession law ), more engagement with the KMT (Hu-Lien summit meeting) and PFP, and military build-up

China’s growing intervention: policy with benefit for Taiwan was promoted through CPC=KMT platform

Chen’s financial scandal made him a lame duck

9

Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with the US(2004-2008)

US “humiliatingly” did not allow Chen’s transit to the mainland US (May, 2006)

Zeolick’s warning: “Independence means war” US arms sales package (PAC-3, P-3C, diesel submarine)

stagnated by opposition from KMT and PFP, then partially passed in 2007

US criticism against Taiwan: both “trouble maker” and “free rider”

US “rejected” Taiwan’s F-16 C/D request Frank Hshieh, DPP presidential candidate lost terribly in

March 2008

10

Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to reassure China and the US(2008-)

Ma’s triumph against DPP: winning 58.45% of turnout, 2/3 majority in the Legislative Yuan

Cross-strait cooperation: Cross-strait talks, Cross-strait direct flights, Taiwan welcomes Chinese tourists, and ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement)

Ma’s “diplomatic truce” address to China, low-key transit to the US

But…GW Bush administration “punished” the KMT: partial arms sales package passed on the last date of the 110th Congress in 2008

11

Conclusions

Democratized Taiwan’s partisan politics: accelerating politicization of its mainland policy and national security policy

China’s shrewd approaches toward Taiwan and US: co-opting efforts with the KMT, PFP and US government

The US dual deterrence policy will work either China or Taiwan, if either one of them tries to change the status-quo

The initial government-change in the government can worsen existed socio-political problems and relations with important foreign partners

12

Taiwan’s domestic Politics: rising

Taiwanese Identity and partisan politics

Relations with the Mainland China: confronts with

growing Chinese nationalism

Relations with the US: incompatible

with dual US deterrence

approach to China and Taiwan

Taiwan’s Chess Games during the DPP government