Taiwan's PartisanPolitics and Its Impact on the US-TaiwaneseRelationsDemocratic Accountability and Foreign Policy Commitments in AsiaApril 8-9, 2011, Henry R. Luce Hall, Yale University, 34, Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT, USA
Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ph.D.The Institute for Advanced Studies on AsiaThe University of TokyoVisiting Fellow, Todai-Yale Initiative
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Key Questions
Why did relations between Chen Shui-bian/DPP government and GW Bush administration, once described as “best,” become “worst”?
Was the first progressive government after decades-long conservative government destined to fail in its national security policy?
If so, why and how?
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Quick Review on Taiwan
Dual separation (1895 and 1949) from the mainland China
Multi ethnic society: Hokkiens, Hakkas, Mainlanders, and aborigines
Growing Taiwanese identity and high status-quo orientation
ROC=Taiwan/Taiwan=ROC: anyway, it’s a “sovereign state” consensus
Taiwanese people basically do not trust China, China has offered no alternative other than to pursue reunification
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Quick Review on Taiwan continued
Traditional US policy to China and Taiwan: engagement and hedging toward China, strategic ambiguity, and dual deterrence of any attempts to change the status-quo by either one of them
Democratization during the Lee Teng-hui: “vicious cycle” of tension in the triangle relations emerges
GW Bush administration’s ABC policy: more hedging China, more supporting Taiwan (huge arms sales), no ambiguity (“Whatever it takes…”) until 9.11
US as a “guardian angel” of Taiwan: arms sales, “appropriate actions” under the Taiwan Relations Act
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Characteristics of Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-2004)
Strong grass-rooted popularity (the son of Taiwan) Minority government plus less experienced Bad relations with government officials Strong desire for comprehensive reform Supporters: disparity between “pro-independence” elements and
the middle Divided party elites: grass-rooted local politicians and
human/social science intellectuals (lawyers) Election oriented political mobilization and populism Chen’s weak legitimacy and little prospect for reelection in 2004 Weak connections with the PRC and USA
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Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with China(2000-2004)
Formulation of Anti-Chen coalition between the opposition KMT and PFP in the wake of the forth nuclear power plant issue
China’s intervention: China began to “take over” diplomatic relations with Taiwan’s friends
Chen administration started with the middle of the road, but began to tilt towards pro-independence for reelection
“Provocation” against China as reelection strategy: “Yibian Yiguo,” national referendum on Taiwan’s national defense and “new Taiwanese constitution”
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Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with the US(2000-2004)
China’s successful cooptation with the USA Partisan politics: opposition parties opposed US
arms sales package US’s mixed messages to Taiwan: on one hand,
criticizing Taiwan’s “provocation” against China, on the other hand, supporting Chen’s visit to the US, and fought a war on Iraq under the name of “democratization”
Chen’s reelection at the cost of national unity, relations with China and the US
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Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with China(2004-2008)
Chen’s challenges for his “legacy”: cease of “National Unification Platform,” “Name Rectification Campaign,” national referendum on “getting back to the UN”
Hu Jintao’s new Taiwan policy: more “status-quo oriented” stance (anti-secession law ), more engagement with the KMT (Hu-Lien summit meeting) and PFP, and military build-up
China’s growing intervention: policy with benefit for Taiwan was promoted through CPC=KMT platform
Chen’s financial scandal made him a lame duck
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Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with the US(2004-2008)
US “humiliatingly” did not allow Chen’s transit to the mainland US (May, 2006)
Zeolick’s warning: “Independence means war” US arms sales package (PAC-3, P-3C, diesel submarine)
stagnated by opposition from KMT and PFP, then partially passed in 2007
US criticism against Taiwan: both “trouble maker” and “free rider”
US “rejected” Taiwan’s F-16 C/D request Frank Hshieh, DPP presidential candidate lost terribly in
March 2008
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Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to reassure China and the US(2008-)
Ma’s triumph against DPP: winning 58.45% of turnout, 2/3 majority in the Legislative Yuan
Cross-strait cooperation: Cross-strait talks, Cross-strait direct flights, Taiwan welcomes Chinese tourists, and ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement)
Ma’s “diplomatic truce” address to China, low-key transit to the US
But…GW Bush administration “punished” the KMT: partial arms sales package passed on the last date of the 110th Congress in 2008
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Conclusions
Democratized Taiwan’s partisan politics: accelerating politicization of its mainland policy and national security policy
China’s shrewd approaches toward Taiwan and US: co-opting efforts with the KMT, PFP and US government
The US dual deterrence policy will work either China or Taiwan, if either one of them tries to change the status-quo
The initial government-change in the government can worsen existed socio-political problems and relations with important foreign partners
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Taiwan’s domestic Politics: rising
Taiwanese Identity and partisan politics
Relations with the Mainland China: confronts with
growing Chinese nationalism
Relations with the US: incompatible
with dual US deterrence
approach to China and Taiwan
Taiwan’s Chess Games during the DPP government