DISPATCHES 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART

ONE. INTRODUCTION

TWO. DEFINITIONS

THREE. PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

MINE AWARENESS TRAINING (MAT)

RE-ROLING A SUB-UNIT (AN RCD EXAMPLE)

STRESS MANAGEMENT IN OPERATIONS

FOUR. DOCUMENTATION AND REFERENCES

DISPATCHES 2

PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

The time devoted to training soldiers for operations must beparamount in peacetime. Soldiers who are not physically,emotionally and professionally fit for their assigned tasks mayquickly become casualties under battlefield conditions. Leadersmust remember that in battle it is the soldier that counts, and with welltrained soldiers, almost anything is possible. Leaders must guardagainst the danger of allowing training to become a series of faithfullymemorized drills and fixed formations. Success in any operation willdepend on the flexibility, initiative and innovation of junior leaders.

All arms cooperation is also vital in war and must becontinually emphasized in training. Successful operations arealmost invariably the result of the combined effort of combat arms,combat support arms and combat service support. Theunderstanding of doctrine and tactics of all combat arms becomesincreasingly more important when considering re-roling.

To this end, the fourth issue of DISPATCHES will focus onceagain on TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS. In this issue we review theimportance of Mine Awareness Training (MAT) and stressmanagement prior to, during and after deployment. We alsointroduce some of the key factors involved with re-roling asquadron/company sized organization for operations.

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PART TWO - DEFINITIONS

One of the first requirements is to clearly identify whatconstitutes a lesson learned. The following definitions have notchanged since their approval for inclusion in DISPATCHES Vol 1:�

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OBSERVATION

ISSUE

LESSON LEARNED

. An observation is simply recorded raw datathat takes place during an operation or exercise. Observationscome from many sources such as existing Canadian and AlliedPORs, PXRs, UNMO reports and commanders and their staffs.

. An issue is a topic that develops from one or moreobservations or recurring observations. For example, when abattle group comments adversely on a piece of equipment thatwas previously reported by another unit, this becomes an issuefor the staff to resolve.

. A lesson learned is an issue that resultsin a change to Canadian doctrine, tactics, SOPs, organization,or equipment. Lessons learned are staffed through the LandForce Development process for approval.

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PART THREE-MINE AWARENESS TRAINING (MAT)

Introduction

The presence of mines, booby traps and unexplodedordnance (UXO) has become a familiar feature of day to dayoperations for many Canadian troops deployed on peace supportoperations. Recent Canadian Forces participation in United Nationsoperations in regions such as Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, and theFormer Republic of Yugoslavia, have exposed our troops to manydifferent types of mines employed by the belligerent forces in thoseregions.

To protect Canadian troops from the mine threat, we havepurchased vehicles and equipment designed to safe-gaurd againstthe blast and fragmentation effects of mines, but the best defenceremains the individual's ability to recognize situations where there isa high risk of striking a mine, and to know how to avoid the threat.This ability must be learned, and the training conducted to teachpersonnel how to recognize and avoid the threat of mines, boobytraps and UXO is grouped under the term "MineAwareness Training"(MAT).

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MAT has become an essentialcomponent of pre-deployment training.It is difficult to measure the effects thatMAT has had on preventing mineincidents, but it is known that a numberof incidents that have occurred couldhave been avoided had effective mineawareness been practiced. The hard-won lesson learned from operationalexperiences has been that mineawareness must be in the forefront ofthe minds of all involved in an operation,from the commander down to theindividual soldier.

The development and provisionof MAT is an Engineer responsibility. Aseach operation may involve a differentmine threat, the mine awarenesstraining must be theatre specific. Thecriteria for developing the mineawareness training for a specificoperation includes the types of minesemployed in theatre, the mine tacticsused by the belligerents, and the typesof tasks our troops will be performing.

Observation:

"TMRP-6 AT mines werefound with their tilt rods

wired to PROM boundingAP mines. If the AT minewas moved, the PROMs

would have been initiated,killing or injuring the

clearing party. Carefulattention must be paid to

belligerent minelayingpatterns: this may help

locate a "missing" mine. Allmanner of devious methods

were employed by bothsides, often with mines

used as elements of boobytraps. This information

must be included in all mineawareness training."

1 PPCLI Op Harmony Roto4 POR

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In order to aid units and personnel in the mounting phase ofan operation, the Engineers have begun to develop a data base ofinformation on mines employed by foreign military and para-militaryorganizations throughout the world. This data base is beingcontinuously updated and expanded to include new informationobtained through our experience on operations, and through thesharing of information with our allies. Eventually the mine data basewill be expanded to include other valuable information such as thedifferent mine warfare tactics used. The mine data base nowprovides the initial information on which MAT is based for anyparticular operation.

Typically, the MAT given to all participants in an operationconsists of a five day training package. The key objectives of thetraining are to teach all participants in an operation the following:

Recognize minefield markings employed in theatre - boththose used by the belligerents and those employed by our ownforces.

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Be aware of the mine threat and the critical importance ofmaintaining that awareness throughout the mission.

Recognize the various kinds of mines, booby traps, and UXOfound in theatre.

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Know the likely locations and the various indicators that minesand booby traps may be present.

Know the procedures for reporting a mine or

minefield, or mine incident.

Know what immediate action to take in the event of a mineincident, including individual and collective skills.

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The first training objective of MAT is to heighten theindividual's awareness of the presence of mines, booby traps andUXO. This is achieved through training all personnel to be able torecognize the shapes and sizes of various kinds of anti-personneland anti-tank mines, booby traps and ordnance, as well as theminefield marking methods (both belligerent and own forces)employed in theatre. The aim of the recognition training is not toteach personnel to identify by name all the various kinds of munitionsused in theatre, but to give them the ability to recognize theirpresence. This training is best achieved using actual inert examplesof the mines, booby traps and ordnance, in combination withphotographs and diagrams. Through a series of recognitionexercises, individuals learn to identify the presence of a mine, boobytrap or UXO that is camouflaged or partially concealed from view.

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UNPROFOR MINE INCIDENT

SUMMARY

APR 92 - FEB 95

Jun Nov May Oct Jun Oct

92 93 94

0

5

10

15

20

Series 1

Often mines are completely buried or effectively concealedfrom view. In addition, most of the minefields and mined areas thatCanadian troops have encountered on recent operations wereunmarked. In these instances, the recognition of the indicators thatmines may have been employed is key to avoiding the threat. Onceagain, effective training requires realistic training aids such as mock-ups that demonstrate the various mine indicators, and photographsof actual mined areas. Although repetitious and tedious at times,these basic mine, booby trap, and UXO recognition skills are the keyto training personnel to avoid the threat.

The last phase of the mine awareness training is designed toteach individual and section immediate action drills in the event of amine incident. In addition, mine, booby trap, and UXO reporting andexpedient marking procedures are taught. Throughout this phase ofthe training, the critical teaching point is that the immediate reactiondrill for anyone who realizes or suspects that they have entered amined or booby trapped area is to remain in place and report thesituation. This rule applies in the vast majority of cases, and anumber of mine incidents and casualties could have been avoided ifthis simple action had been taken. Units will normally have anengineer capability that can respond to such a situation and safelyextract personnel and vehicles from a mined or booby trapped area.

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It is recognized, however, thata situation may arise in which thedegree of urgency requires thatimmediate action be taken by thepersonnel involved in the incident.The decision to take action is basedon an assessment of the risksinvolved in moving in a mined areacompared to the potential or realizedrisks of remaining in place.

Classic examples of thesesituations which have occurred onrecent operations include reaching acasualty in a mined area and self-extraction from a mined area whileunder fire. To deal with a broad range of possible scenarios thefollowing three immediate action drills are taught to personnel:

It is important that the instruction in the immediate actiondrills stresses the limitations of MAT. It is not intended to makeeveryone an expert on mines. The disarming and clearing of minesis far beyond the scope of MAT. The detection, disarming, removalor destruction of mines, booby traps and UXO is the responsibility ofthe Engineers. It is a difficult and dangerous task for the Engineers.It requires extensive training, detailed planning, the employment ofspecialized equipment, and highly controlled execution.

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Individual mined area extraction drill.

Section level mined area extraction drill for personnel andvehicles.

Casualty evacuation from a mined area.

Observation:

"In response to a requestfrom UNAMIR Sector 5, the

Engineer Troop participated inthe clearance and disposal ofUXO and mines. In addition,

a UXO/mine awarenesseducation program wasdeveloped and taught at

schools and health clinicsproviding information to over

12,000 local children."

Op Passage POR

DISPATCHES 10

Conclusion

Mine awareness is a discipline, and like all disciplines, it issubject to the degrading effects of fatigue, complacency, frustration,stress, and carelessness. During operations, it is everyone'spersonal responsibility to remain diligent in their awareness of thethreat, and it is the task of the leadership to ensure that operationsare conducted with the proper assessment of the threat imposed bymines, booby traps and UXO.

DISPATCHES 11

RE-ROLING A SUB-UNIT( AN RCD EXAMPLE )

Introduction

Training

Due to the nature of military operations, personnel must beprepared to deploy to a given theatre confident in their abilities toadapt to changing situations. Apeacekeeping operation can changerapidly for many reasons. The operational situation may dictatechanges in the organization and its composition. This article willreview some of the important aspects and considerations involved inre-roling an armoured squadron to an infantry company forpeacekeeping operations.

R e - r o l i n g f r o m a narmoured squadron to an infantrycompany requires detailedtraining. Depending on therotation number of the mission,the training requirements for a unitmay or may not be well defined bythe time the mounting phasecommences. It is very importantthat a large amount of time bespent on skills common topeacekeeping missions such asRules of Engagement (ROE), mine awareness and first aid. Ofequal, if not more importance, is the requirement to qualify soldiers ininfantry operations.

Early in the planning process it is important to separate theBattle Task Standard (BTS) training and UN specific training. Theunit must decide which aspect is more important to complete first.The RCD deemed it essential to qualify B Squadron as an infantrycompany prior to training for UN specific aspects of the mission.

"There was one occasion intheatre where the squadron wasprepared to execute a deliberate

attack as part of a hostage rescue.The BTS training was crucial.

Without it, the squadron wouldn'thave had the confidence to plan it

or for the CO to assign it."

OC B Sqn, RCD

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Two key factors in being able to accomplish the BTS weresubsequently identified. The paramount factor was the "can do"attitude of the leaders and soldiers. All personnel must be more thanwilling to just dig trenches and assault objectives, they must trulyrecognize the importance of mastering the new BTS prior todeployment as their lives may depend on it. The second factor wasthe conduct of a two week Infantry Section Commander's Course(ISCC). This permitted the leaders of the sub-unit to preparethemselves and then introduce infantry tactics and procedures totheir respective organizations with authority and confidence. As theBTS training was conducted, this confidence spread throughout theSquadron and SOPs were subsequently developed.

When selecting the type of training to be done, whether BTSor UN specific, the presence of sub-unit commanders on the missionreconnaissance is critical. The observation of the terrain and theoperational situation on the ground during the mounting phaseallows the training plan to be "fine tuned". In B Squadron's case, therecce resulted in the BTS training concentrating on dismountedoperations vice mounted. For UN specific training, a detailedknowledge of the "in-place force" SOPs permitted realistic trainingscenarios and a very smooth relief in place once deployed.

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Augmentees

B Squadron deployed with a high proportion of Reserveaugmentation. The 31 Reserve soldiers represented 26% ofSquadron strength. All Reserve contracts were at thePrivate/Corporal rank which resulted in most sections having threeor four. They had a wide variety of qualifications and experience,were well motivated towards the mission and performed well. Theinfantrymen, in particular, were very helpful during BTS training.

From the beginning, particular attention was paid to treatingaugmentees, Reservists in particular, equally with Regular membersof the sub-unit. As the Squadron was initially over strength, the bestsoldiers were selected to go, whether they were Regular or Reserve.As Regular units are deploying on operations with a high proportionof Reserve augmentation, the utilization of their wide variety ofqualifications and experience is essential in incorporatingaugmentees. Simple things such as wearing the blue beret earlyduring training may aid the effort to integrate.

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B Squadron did not employ Reservists in leadershippositions. B Squadron had several Reserve Senior NCOs whorelinquished rank for the mission. Most adjusted to the reduction inrank but there were some difficulties. Given the level of Reservepeacekeeping experience available now, Reserve NCOs should begiven the opportunity to deploy in leadership roles. Reserve SeniorNCOs must pass the selection process like everyone else, but theyshould be given the opportunity to fill command positions.

One factor that must be addressed is the effect of losingone's primary role. In B Squadron's case, the soldiers were proud tobe Armour and the loss of their primary role had to be reconciled.Most had extensive tank experience and preferred the phrase"rather ride than stride". The leader's position in this area is crucial.He must fully embrace the new role and organization anddemonstrate a high standard of enthusiasm and knowledge for hissubordinates. This, coupled with the soldier's innate desire to rise tothe challenge (particularly in support to UN operations), was clearlydemonstrated by B Squadron as they changed roles.

Re-roling an armoured squadron to an infantry companyrequires personnel to qualify on a multitude of weapons, in somecases, to a higher qualification level. Personnel must be comfortableand effective with their individual weapon and the various weaponsused in theatre such as grenades, C-6, C-9, Carl Gustav, M-72, .50calibre HMG and foreign weapons.

Morale

Weapons Training

DISPATCHES 15

Organization

Conclusion

As the sub-unit adjusts from one ORBAT to another, it isimportant that variances in establishments be accepted andSOPs/mindsets be adapted to deal with the new reality. The loss ofthe Squadron LO and Operations WO/Sgt represented a loss incapability/flexibility. Notwithstanding, the infantry company did nothave these positions, and the sub-unit SOPs had to reflect that.

B Squadron successfully operated as a re-roled infantrycompany during The Royal Canadian Dragoons Battle Groupmission on Op Cavalier 4. The battle group training in itself wasdemanding and complete, but B Squadron also had to incorporatethe BTS training required of an infantry company. By separating theUN specific and BTS training early in the planning process, BSquadron qualified personnel in infantry related skills and thenconcentrated on UN specific details. This approach increasedconfidence, had a positive effect on morale and provided a solidplatform from which to tackle the demanding duties of a UNoperation.

DISPATCHES 16

STRESS MANAGEMENT IN OPERATIONS

Introduction

By the nature of their work, soldiers are at considerable risk ofencountering tragic events or CRITICAL INCIDENTS: events orcircumstances outside the range of normal experience that disruptone's sense of control and involves the perception of life threat.Deaths or injuries related to training, flying, search and rescueactivities, medical emergencies, policing and fire-fighting activitiesare examples of such. More specifically related to operations,experience has shown that soldiers on peacekeeping missions arelikely to be exposed to multiple events which can be classified ascritical incidents or potentially traumatic events. These mightinclude: sniper fire while on patrol; artillery fire; firefights in front ofand behind patrol vehicles; witnessing the deaths of civilians;searching for, finding and handling dead bodies or parts of bodies;smelling dead bodies; caring for wounded and starving children,women or elderly civilians; protecting civilians at great risk to theirown lives; being helpless to intervene in civilians' deaths;confrontations at numerous road blocks including threats of beingshot; and ongoing threat of exposure to booby traps and mines, toname just a few.

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Combat Stress

In the face of such events, soldiers may display varying levelsof stress. Some can suffer immediate reactions that have thecapability of either reducing or paralyzing performance. Othersmight be unaffected immediately only to experience symptoms ofdistress minutes, hours, days or even years later. Stress is a relativeconcept, so that a given event may not exert the same effect on eachindividual. The extent and the duration of the distress is alsodependent on the suddenness, intensity and length of the eventitself, as well as the human support available during and after theevent.

S u c h r e a c t i o n s t osituations in combat or nearcombat are called COMBATSTRESS REACTIONS. NO ONEis exempt from the possibility ofexperiencing these reactionswhich are in fact normal emotionaland physical responses exhibitedby normal people faced with tragicor critical events. History clearlyshows that combat st resscasualties have been a relativelylarge portion of an army'swounded-in-action in past wars. During WW II the Canadian Armyhad in excess of 10,000 personnel, some of whom were experiencedleaders, treated for Combat Stress Reactions.

The distress experienced in the face of a tragic event canhave serious negative personal and operational consequences ifappropriate intervention does not take place. Specific personalproblems may include: depression, withdrawal from relationships,substance abuse, inability to concentrate, constant anxiety, sleepdifficulties, flashbacks and excessive fear of taking risks. If thesepersist and remain unresolved or untreated, long-term physicaland/or emotional disability such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disordercan occur.

Observation:

"Of critical importance is thetraining of a unit team which canthen, in turn, train the remainder

of the unit and conduct/coordinate debriefings. Soldiers

at all ranks are extremelyunreceptive to outside

agencies/non combat arms CICdebriefers and trainers."

Op Harmony Roto 5 POR

DISPATCHES 18

At the unit level, these personal dysfunctions can result inpoor morale, lowered productivity and effectiveness and weakenedgroup cohesion, thus threatening mission completion.

In the last decade or so, there has been growing evidencethat appropriate pre-incident education and timely critical incidentstress interventions (such as critical incident stress debriefings) anddefusings can significantly help reduce the degree of psychologicaldisability experienced by personnel. By the same token, these willalso minimize the impact on operational effectiveness. Although noscientific research has yet been completed in this regard,observations suggest these interventions are successful. Forexample, feedback following debriefings is virtually all positive andmany who expressed some initial hesitancy to participate laterdescribed the debriefings as beneficial. In addition to the above,there are two types of specialized training for people who willintervene in the occurrence of tragic events:

Combat Stress Education And Intervention

DISPATCHES 19

� Peer Support Training is intended for unit leaders beginning atthe junior leader level who are considered by their fellow soldiersas being "natural helpers" and thus trusted and respected. Oncetrained, they act as facilitators to the debriefing process and areresponsible for conducting another type of intervention calleddefusings. Defusings are brief group discussions conductedimmediately or as soon as possible after the occurrence of aCritical Incident. They are designed to keep personnel in serviceand promote speedy stress recovery. They are often conductedin close proximity to the scene. Defusings will either eliminatethe need to provide formal debriefings or will enhance thedebriefing process.

The Critical Incident Stress Management Course is aimed atteaching knowledge and skills necessary to conduct CriticalIncident Stress Debriefings

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Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Process (CISD).

A C I S D i s a s t r u c t u r e dpsychological and educational processdesigned to mitigate the impact of aCritical Incident and to accelerate normalrecovery, thus greatly reducing thepossibility of long term distress throughventilation and discussion of thoughts,feelings and reactions related to theCritical Incident. Ideally, CISDs areconducted 24 to 72 hours after theoccurrence of an incident, away from thescene and separate from any operationaldebriefing. The debriefing typically lastsfrom 2 to 3 hours. The CISD is normallyconducted by a team composed of specially trained members of thehelping professions (ie: social work officers, medical personnel,personnel selection officers and chaplains) and peer supportersbelonging to the unit being debriefed.

Observation:

"CISD briefingsconducted both beforeand after deployment

were very valuable andwill be included in thetraining guidance to

deploying units in thefuture."

Op Passage POR

DISPATCHES 20

The debrief begins with stating ground rules such asinforming participants that everything said in the room is consideredconfidential. Each participant is then asked to share his/herpersonal experiences during the incident. More specifically,participants are asked about the 'facts' (What happened to you), the'thoughts' (What do you remember thinking) and the 'feelings' (Whatdo you remember feeling). Similar information is requested aboutparticipants' experiences since the incident. The second half isdevoted to educating participants on normal stress responses andidentifying helpful stress management techniques as well as helpresources.

Shortly before returning to Canada a pre-deploymentbriefing should be given to all military personnel. The intent is toprovide information on possible post-operation reactions, ways toalleviate them and to facilitate transition to a non-combat setting aswell as to family life. Briefings aimed at enhancing family reunionsshould also be made available to spouses and/or significant others.These briefings should address key issues such as the possibleimpact of combat/operational stress on personality or behaviour, andthe adjustment process of family reintegration.

Post-Deployment Stress

DISPATCHES 21

Observation:

"Stress debriefings became routine after critical incidentsinvolving deaths (military or civilian), mine strikes, intensiveshelling or small arms firefights. Even so, the unit's overall

stress level rose significantly after the 4-5 days of the MedakPocket Operation. The unit asked for and received additionalstress counsellors from LFWA HQ to assist the in-place teamsfor the period 26 Sep-4 Oct 93. This was very successful andwhen integrated with the 2 PPCLI counsellors already in place,also served to prepare the soldiers to re-integrate back to their

family lives on arrival in Canada."

Op Harmony Roto 2 POR.

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Nausea, upset stomach, sweating and profuse tremors.

Disorientation and loss of coordination.

Heart rate and blood pressure increase.

Hyperventilation, chest pains, headaches.

Muscle soreness and fatigue.

Finally, as part of the medical examination required on returnfrom a UN mission or operation, medical officers will specificallyinquire about stress reactions and initiate appropriate follow-upmeasures based on the answers provided.

The signs and symptoms of acute stress reactions are asfollows:

Stress Reactions

PHYSICAL:

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COGNITIVE:�

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Impaired thinking anddecision making.

Poor concentration andconfusion.

Difficulty performingcalculations.

Memory and concentrationproblems.

Flashback (image keepsreturning).

Poor attention span.

Time distortion andperception alteration.

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DO

Do expect the incident to botheryou.

Do maintain a good diet and cutdown on caffeine and sugars.

Do exercise.

Do take time for leisureactivities.

Do remind yourself the post-trauma consequences arenormal.

Do learn as much as possibleabout Critical Incident Stress.

Do get extra help, if necessary.

Do spend time with family,friends and co-workers.

DISPATCHES 23

EMOTIONAL:�

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Anxiety, guilt and fear.

Grief and depression.

Emotional numbing.

Feeling lost, abandoned andhelpless.

Withdrawal from others.

Anger, resentment and scapegoating.

Feeling numb, shoc

Trauma CAN cause post-incident symptoms in anyone.

Intrusive imagery, numbing, rage, grief, etc is NORMAL. It isabnormal not to have such a response post-trauma.

Some trauma survivors experience symptoms years or evendecades post-incident.ked and overwhelmed.

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Stress Recovery Process

Some guidelines pertinent to the stress recovery process areas follows:

Observation:

"Defusing and debriefingusing unit resources dealtwith most critical incident

problems."

Op Passage POR

DISPATCHES 24

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It is normal to fear losing control.

Symptoms usually get worse before they get better. Don't blockthe emotions. They must get worked through.

Post-incident distress is responsive to counselling.

Get talking!

Some symptoms never go away. They are events both positiveand negative that we never completely forget.

Sudden recall of past traumas (feelings, images, dreams) areusually triggered by something in your current life that needsattention (stress, loss, fear, anger). GET TALKING!

Some good can come from any trauma...ie: hope, goals,strength, growth. Finding the good heals.

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DISPATCHES 25

Don't�

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Where To Go For Help

Help is available allaround. It can be provided byinformal sources such asspouses, f r iends, fami lym e m b e r s , c o - w o r k e r s ,s u p e r v i s o r s a n d e v e nacquaintances. Or it can beobtained from more formalsources such as physicians,s o c i a l w o r k e r s a n dpsychiatr ists. Remember,combat stress reactions arenormal emotional and physicalresponses exhibited by normalpeople faced with tragic orcritical events.

Don't drink alcohol excessively.

Don't use legal or illegal substances tonumb post-trauma consequences.

Don't withdraw from family, friends andco-workers.

Don't automatically stay away from work.

Don't look for easy answers to explainthe reasons for the incident.

Don't think you are "crazy".

Don't think you are the only one who hasbeen affected.

Don't have unrealistic expectations forrecovery.

DISPATCHES 26

ALLC PUBLICATIONS LIST

DISPATCHES

TRAINING POSTERS

THE BULLETIN

SOFTWARE

Vol 1 - Convoy OperationsVol 2 - Mine Warfare During Peace Support

OperationsVol 3 No 1 - Training for OperationsVol 3 No 2 - Training for Operations

001 - Mine Incidents002 - Negotiator's Checklist003 - Section Trauma Kits

Vol 1 - Introduction to the ALLC and the LessonsLearned Process

Vol 2 No 1 - Cold Weather OperationsVol 2 No 2 - Zero Template House Clearing Range

Prototype - Lessons Learned InformationWarehouse (LLIW)

Vol 3 No 2 Contributors

MAT - Capt P. Renshaw, LFC HQ

Re-roling - Maj R. Puddister, RCD

Stress - LCdr L. deMontigny, LFC HQ

PART FOUR -DOCUMENTATION AND REFERENCES

CANADIAN

Op Harmony Roto 2 POROp Harmony Roto 4 POROp Harmony Roto 5 POROp Cavalier Roto 4 POROp Passage POR

DISPATCHES 27

PART FOURDOCUMENTATION AND REFERENCES

ALLC CONTACT NUMBERS

CFB KINGSTON (613) 541-5010AUTOVON/CSN/DSN 270-5010Fax - Direct Dial (613) 541-5983

Director - LCol PA Cunningham:5986

SO Operations - Maj FM Aubin:5985

SO Training - Maj RE Hook:5867

SO Production - Capt DG Morison:5918

SO Administration - Capt F Schutt:5981

Clerk - MCpl AP Crawley:5984

Any comments or suggestions maybe forwarded to Editor Dispatches,

Capt DG Morison.