t8 b2 faa ny center paul thumser- handwritten notes- alt mfr- personnel statement

8/14/2019 T8 B2 FAA NY Center Paul Thumser- Handwritten Notes- Alt MFR- Personnel Statement

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[Classification]

M E M O R A N D U M F O R THE R E C O R D

Event: Federal Aviation A dministration (FAA) New York Air Route C enter

Type of event: Interview

Date: Tuesday, September , 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Preparedby: Geoffrey Brown

Team Num ber:8

Location: FAA New York A ir Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York

Participants - Non-C om mission:Alfred , FAA G eneral ConsulParticipants - Com mission: John A zzarello, Miles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

NO TE: U nless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of

the interviewee. Pleaserefer to the interview transcriptfor a complete account.

Paul Thumser.POINT 16 on tape.Extensiveflight experience.

Became operations supervisor. Area a, area b. was supervising area b on9/11. Goesthrough operations supervisor position. Would report to the OMIC. On9/11 BruceBarrett was the OMIC. He reports to the deputyfacilitymanager, airtraffic manager,then mikeMcCormack.On 9/11 McC ormack wo uld report to acting AEA 501 RickduCharme.Now AEA500.

Based onPaul's experience as a pilot, an ELT cannot be triggered by a pilot in a 767. In767 does no t believe it could have been set off by a pilot. A testing E LT at 00-05 o f thehour. On a 767 impact would be the only way to trigger one. It could have comefromanyw here 121.5 civilian 243.0 military. A lot of times when an EL T is received o ff thetesting time a pilot will report that they set it off. RC C is the rescue co ordination center ofthe air force and they are contacted for credible ELTs. Parameters forthat type ofairplane to be set off due to a hard turn or a hard landingaren't credible. The sensitivitysetting on those ELTs are not set low. On the Egyptian air crash into the ocean there wasno ELT set off. Thumser was the midnight supervisor, which is the OM IC at night. Hevectoredan airplaneto investigate,and that planedid notpick up one. So it would haveto be a serious impact to set the ELT off.


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There is detection equipment when airplanesare within 5 miles or Ik or 2k feet of eachother. An alarm goes off and a print out com es through at the watch area. That w ent offthat morning.First theyhave to be relievedfrom that position. They request downstairsan NT ap - a com puter printout with targets, altitudes and times. M atch the time s andaltitudes to check if someone has an error. If it is concluded that there is less than a 5 mileseparation, then they c heck the voice tapes to see what the controller and the pilot said.Request airways facilitiesto check the voice tape. PutsIvonnaDowis in charge of area b.Thumser goes to begin investigation of operational error. At about 0835edt bruce Barretthad the real, and then informed Thum ser of possiblehijack and Thumser goes back toarea b.

Handoffposition sitsto right of controller.

Mark Merced on r56. Ivonnabriefs Thumser on what was happening. Thum ser takescharge of area again. Merced starts trackingAA11.Merced is having conversations withZBW. He has aheadset on so isn't hearing the ZBW side of the conversation.The lastknown altitude wasfl290. Everyone is aware ofthat. Dave finds out about it. Protectingfl290. Not allowing anyone within2k ft. aware of no radio contact withAA11 for15 or20 minutes. Primary target. Course deviation.AA11 was not supposed to come througharea, did not know destined to lax, butAA11 flight plan was not through ZN Y airspace.Last known was f!290.The people who need to know do, and aretrackingthe primary.R42 controller, Dave Bittiglia, started a track on A A1 1. In order to partially validate,Thunmserasked Merced to take an eagle936 to f!310. Vectored with a slight adjustment,the eagle went justto the left of the Am erican. Possibly10 to 15 miles northwestofLaGuardia. Eagle did not spotAA11.Major trouble that eagle did not see it. They hadhigh confidence ifAA11 was at f!290 eagle would have spotted it. Thumser becameextremely concerned because of the high volume oftraffic at all altitudes in the ZNYNew York City airspace. Sense of urgency translated to area.

When Thumserfirst got to the area had only heard of a possible hijac king, NO RD O, shutoff transponder,and offcourse.H ad received no informationof the threatening hijack.

Telling the 68 controller, who is controlling departures coming down out of LaGuardiaand Kennedy thatAA11 may enter airspace. Has told 4 out 5 sectors of his area.

Goes back to M erced, and prim ary is lost right over Ma nhattan. R adars are overlapping inZNY, so think the plane has gone very low. Tells whole area lost primary target,doesn'tknow lat/long/altor anythingelse.

At that exact point Dave BittigliainformsThumser of the lostUAL175. Data block wasthere but was no longer tracking altitude. The point went into coastafter 4 hits. The firstfour based on history are projectedby the computer. Eachhit is 12seconds. NoticesUAL175 goes to coast track. Dave calls a few seconds later and inform s he is not gettingUAL175. They notice on Bittiglia's screen the limited data log on adifferent code.Bittiglia says it isUAL175, but it's change d altitudes. M cCo rmac k and in area now.


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UAL175 starts to descend. Needsto tell sector39 that UAL175 'slimited datalog may beentering space. Before UA L175,10 or 13miles before he turns to the southeast east.Have a goodfix on altitude, unlike AA 11. Mode c transponder still on. Atthat point thearea was informe d(after descent, before turn) that a "smallairplane"had hit the worldtrade center. Information had at that time was - had a hijacked airplane ( AA 11) that lostprimarydirectly over Manhattan, immediately equated thatit was AA11 thathit theWTC.

But now was dealing with UA L175. At this pointsafety and control in area b iscompromised,so Thumser tellsto stop al l traffic in area b. U A L175 is turning at thistime. Chaos in area relatedto attemptingto clear al l traffic in UA L175's path.20 milessoutheast of Allentown, turning southeast, descending. An extremely abnormal situation.Can put in 7600, 7700or even 7500at that point since they knewhe had theability tobroadcast. Point between j6 andJ48 20 miles northeast ofPottstownVOR.

Awareness ofhijack begins at beginning of turn, and tells Dave LaCates to scrambleMcGuire.Doesn't say I think this is a hijack. McGuiredoesn't have fighters,but wasthinking somethingwas going to happen,and was reaching fo r possibilitiesto getmilitary assistance. Lacates never acknowledged or responded. Said quietly to LaCates,so didn't say loudly, didn't wantto disturb area."If had au thority.. .knowingwhat Ikno w.. .with thebackground I have...1 would have shot that planedown" - when workingat Kennedyhad worked hijacks. Used procedureto provide fighter escorts. PaineStewarts Lea r jet ex amp le. Had been done in past. Is part of that protocol ability to shootdown aircraft? Thought it would have to be directed by white house.

If there wasn't the AA11 event, would not have thought hijack. Would havethoughtUAL175 had a serious equipment problem and would land at Kennedy. K ennedy has alarge maintenance base. In the old days would have treated like an em ergen cy and wouldhave told K ennedy, possibly Newark to get ready. Too many coincidences. M aybe threepeople with the information of area b could have put that together.

About 20 m iles northeast of Potsdam .UAL175 made turn, and Thum ser was thinkingheaded towards WTC.Not atturn towards northeast,at point of turn at southeastunderstoodU A L175 headed towards WTC.UAL175

Meanw hile, Chris Tucker pointing out3321, and speaking on r55 telling r9 a compilationof his overheard rem arks. He wasconfusing the overheard onUAL175 withAA11.Would have neve r known based on his scope. A s looking at transcript it is 0853 w hen hestates A me rican 75 hijack. So had information that a small airplane was hit. Don't have

verificationthat it wasal l that hit WTC . Buttucker's spread of information wasfromoverheard. UAL175 was in a high rate of descent, was traveling 350 or 400 knots asheaded towards into the ground.After lost target soon thereafter, nearly instantaneousheard of second W TC hit.Doesn'thave a visual on the towers, but has a mentalunderstanding of what was ongoing.

Thumser notes thatafter it was over, shut downtraffic, combined sectors, got other


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people to watch area B's scopes, m anag em ent Robert Ott, one of theoffice managers,was askedto guide areab through the process.Not abnormal procedureto givestatements. RobertO tt gave Thumserand area b directionnot to call homeor friends.Sequesteredeveryonein a conference room.

Went to old operations room and Marty Fournier recorded statements with bob Ott. MarkMerced, Dave Bittiglia, Chris tucker, Tony Palmieri, Thumser - for whatever reasonwanted these recordings. Rarely done. Gave a verbal recorded statements. Did not wantto say everything because of what was in room.

Never heardof possibilityof a terrorist usinga plane for a suicide mission.

After thum per's statement is reviewed bystaff, Thumser says he told LaCates toscramble M cGuireafter the north bound turn of UA L 175.

Mike and Dave were on phones at this point.

Whilehandlingthe descent of UA L175, said"tell 'e m he's com'n." wanted to help stopthe plane. Even had a thought of running another airplane into them at that time. It was abizarre enough to tell someone to scramble.

Assumedthe chief and the deputy on the phones w as relaying all the information.Looking atprofile and what they did it was a projection of what they did . It seemedsimple to project where they were going. Notes thoughtUA L175 was going to hit W TCabout seven min utesbefore impact. Point describing 085436 based on com missionstaffs radar.Before he made a northeast turn.

It was like driving the wrong way down the street.

"W hat I thought it was go ing to do was co njecture , not fact."

Pre 9/11 ATC would receive communicationfrom pilot of hijack. Code words,transponder. Neither of those happened on9/11. A ny other way to detect the hijack -suspect- not talking to A TC, and extremely off course. How toconfirm withoutcommunication? N o.Pre 9/11: communication - pilot reports hijack, getsinfo, reports to area supervisor, areasupervisor reports to watch desk, OM IC follows up.Doesn'tbelieve operation managerwould have been doing that. Thinks goes beyond that.Prior and or on 9/11: NO RA D and NEA DS. R easonable awareness,pre9/l1 it wou ld take5 or 6 phone ca lls to get there. W ould probab ly call local airforce base.DynSim - not familiar with. No computer or training for hijacking. Operationssupervisors do not gothrough them.A s a controller your informationfo r hijackingwas a)get informationan d pass it and b) dowhat theyask to do.Very few hijackspre-9/11 for acontrollerto respond to in the real world. W ereno exercise or drills, very little e mphasisan d drills. No knowledge of any sponsored by FA A or military. None with multiplehijackingevents.


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Post 9/11: hasn't personally gone through any, and does not believe controllers have gonethrough any either. Only review they 've gotten is what to do in case of known hijacking.Were only told a "suspected hijacking".

Pilots reported comm unications to ATC, A TC com municated that to Thumser. "evenunited said everybo dy stayin seats blah blahblah" - Thumser.

Area b w as treating U AL 175 andAA11 as hijacking. Thought not confirmed hijacking.Would have said absolutely a hijac k, but was not a confirm ed hijacking. No on e said toThumser don't sa y it's a hijack untilit is confirmeda hijack.

AA11 rebirth: never heard any rum ors of that sort. But did here within ZNY that it mightnot have beenAA11 that hit WTC. Made the logical assumption that it wasAA11.W ouldn't see afire from the world trade center if a sma llaircraft hit it. W ould be a smallfire. But didn't hear anyone say anything about at not being AA11 hitting the center.Doesn'trecall anythingfrom outside the center ofAA11 still being airborne. Nothingheard about a plane lost in pequebsi.

Error thatr39 had in themorning did not have anythingto do with the events of 9/11.

When each sector was clear ofaircraft Thumser combined the sector.

R5002based out of Bradley in H artford ct. they do routinely train with live am mu nition,to his knowledge.

Does not believe wrote anAA11 statement. Usuallyfacility that has control of theairspace or the airplane that is involved in the accident does the incident. So mu ch ofAA11 happen ed in Boston a little surprised that theydidn't ask for a statementfromThumser.

Last knownalt at f!290. Transponderon at that point.In hindsight,after accidents occur,an y way can you getfrom Boston center to hit WTC without hitting ZNY airspace? Yes.Without hittingNew York Tracon space? No.

Told by FAA if anyone wants a statement onAA11, Sam Shelton told him the FAAwould ask for it. Shelton administrator in charge of area b. Following protocol if FAAwanteda statement wouldgo through Shelton.

Verbal statementgiven to bob O tt PaulThumser wouldnot have aproblem withcommissionstaff reviewing it.

Recom mendations: securityat gates, securityat airports (ramps, cleaners, maintenance,fuelers) - that's where access to planes is. Clamp down on security in ramp area. ATCperspectivevery little that can be done except cooperate with the hijac ker. If the situationwas similar, minutes to New York, would be verydifficult without already airbornecombat ready pilots with authority to shoot down. Better military cooperation right now,


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with NEADS/NORADdirect line. Cou ld be hotlines distributed throu ghout, but notconfident that every operational su pervisor shouldbe given that responsibility.

Pre911 military com munications verydifficult. Relationship only dealt withaircraft inand out of practice bo mb ing range. Involved in desert storm. Developed goodrelationship duringthat. Limited direct communication. Manufacturersof transponders.

BelievesU AL175 might have had an updated transpon der that can not be turned off . Onethat will always give you a transponder code and itcan't get turned off. Original code1470, then 3020, then a minute later 3021 changed it. W hy turn 4 knobs w hen you couldturn it off with one switch? - does that seem an attempt by United A irlines pilot to signal,hijackersto shut off,or c hijackers change codefo r confusion?If flying would have goneto the first digit,right to the side of the pilot. Probablynot an office switch,and thenscrambledit up. Even sw itching one digit would have com e up a limited data block. Inflight school taught earlyon the codes, etc?fo r that levelto fly manuallya 767 wouldhave definitelyknown.


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(incident #)

(call sign)PERSONNEL STATEMENT -

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONNEW YORK AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER

ACTION: Complete in accordance with FAA Order 8020. 1IB , Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, investigation, andReporting, paragraph 75, Personnel Statements.

BACKGROUND: Much of the information concerning the circumstances surrounding this accident/incident can be retrieved viasome type of recorded data source. However,, some of the facts concerning what you saw and what you did may not have beencompletely captured. The purpose of this statement is to provide any Era within your peoooal knowledge ttatyprovide a more complete understanding of the circumstances sunouixling this acddentfmcioent. Therefore, speculations, hearsayopinions, conclusions, and/or other extraneous data arc not to be irxdudcd m thb statement Additkmalry, thb statement ma^released to the public through FOIA or litigation activities including retrial discovery, deooshions, and artualcoimtestimooy.

mSTOUCtlONS: This statement is to be PRINTED and signed by you. Statement times and dates shall correspond with SISO.Your signature below certifies the accuracy of mis statement It willneithcr be edited nor typed, and, once signed, will constituteyour original statement .

This statement concerns the acddcnt/iroadcnt C7


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t8 b2 faa ny center paul thumser- handwritten notes- alt mfr- personnel statement

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