t8 b3 faa indy center john a thomas fdr- entire contents- 9-24-03 mfr and 2 sets handwritten notes...

8/14/2019 T8 B3 FAA Indy Center John a Thomas Fdr- Entire Contents- 9-24-03 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 761

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIED

M E M O R A N D U M F O R THE RECORDEvent: John A. Thomas, Operations Manager of Indianapolis Air Traffic Control CenterType of event: InterviewDate: Wednesday, September 24 , 2003Special Ac cess Issues: nonePrepared by : Gate TaylorTeam Number: 8Location: Indianapolis Air Traffic Control CenterParticipants - Non-Commission: John A. Thomas, Operations Manager; EileenParticipants - Comm ission: John Farm er, Dana Hyde, Gate TaylorBackground:Thomas was hired at the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center on October 31 , 1976 an dreceived all training here. He held a full time c ontroller position from 1976 to 1985.Since then, Thomas has held the positions of Staff Spec ialist, Area Sup ervisor, First LineSupervisor, Assistant Traffic Manager, and Traffic Manager. For the past four years,Thomas has been the Operations M anager at Indy. Thomas had never been involved in ahijacking situation prior to 9/11.Current duties:As one of six Operations M anagers at the Indi center, Thom as is responsible formonitoring supervisors, ai r traffic controllers, resource managem ent, traffic volume, an dweather conditions. Thomas also monitors aircraft positions, sectors an d frequenciesperiodically throughout the work day.Thom as is the Operations M anager designated to have direct contact w ith the m ilitary ona daily basis to c oordinate with m ilitary aircraft in Indy's airspace. There w as a MilitaryOperations S pecialist (MOS) p osition at the Indi center to work d irectly with the militarybu t this position w as phased out about five years ago. The FAA decided to terminate theMOS since there was not enough work to fill a full tim e position. The responsibilities ofthe MOS have now becom e part of the Operations Manager 's job .Procedures for a hijacking before 9/11 were to follow the SOP manual for the appropriatecontacts and notific ations, supervise air traffic con trollers, and react appropriately to thephrase squawked by the pilots. All docum ents with procedures are kept on the computerat the sup ervisor desk.


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIEDIn the event of a hijack, Thomas would not have thought to call NORAD since hisimpression of NORA D was to guard US b orders. Thomas has a list of people to call inthe event of an emergency bu t does not know if NORAD is on this list.Experience on 9/11:On the morning of 9/11, at about 7:55am Central time, Thom as learned that the firstW TC tower had been hit from watching a news report on television with no volume. Herecalls telling Dave Boone that he thought it was a plane. Then, Thom as w as informedthat AA 77 had lost radar and voice comm unication and he assumed there was anemergence situation, possibly a crash or electrical failure. Thom as does no t recall who hereceived information from or who he told information to.Thomas gave the order to block airspace in front of AA 77's predicted flight path and wasnot told that AA77 had started to turn before communication was lost. He saw AA77'scoast track, hit the all primary button, and could not identify what could be AA 77. Thus,Thom as called Katherine and relayed to her that Indi had lost an aircraft. At this time , ahijack situation was not a possibility in Thomas' mind.Thomas instructed the traffic management coordinator to call Scott Air Force Base andrequest search an d rescue in the event that AA 77 had crashed. Thomas heard rumors of acrash somewhere around the West Virginia and Kentucky state line, so he also called thestate and local police for both states to ask about any accidents reported. There w as someconfusion in commun icating with the police, as rumors of a crash turned into reports of acrash.Thom as began to question the idea of a plane crash is the W est Virginia/Kentucky areawhen he learned about a plane hitting the Pentagon. About thirty minutes after thePentagon crash, John Thomas an d Dave Boone had agreed that there was no local planecrash.Thomas called the Chicago Center after seeing the World Trade Center being hit becausehe speculated that the hijackers were targeting tall buildin gs and he was co ncerned aboutthe Sears Tower.During the morning, Thomas had talked to the ROC to inform them about AA 77, butdoes not remember who he talked to or what he said. According to Thomas, the functionof the ROC is to be a commun ication center where phone n umbers and contactinformation is kept.The decision to g round all flights came from the command center. Thomas had the AirTraffic Controllers implement it by getting all air traffic grounded to the nearest airportsafely. The closest practical airport was con sidered for larger compan ies w hile smallaircraft were landed at the closest possible place. T homas had never before had to groundplanes on this scale.


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIEDThomas had witnessed the loss of transponder an d radar in the past in areas of roughterrain. He also noted that it is not too unu sual for an aircraft to loose radar and voicecom mun ication due to electrical failure. Area 3 is known to have w eak transmissions inlow altitudes. Th e loss of an aircraft in high altitude has not been a problem in Area 3.Following the morning of 9/11, Thomas remem bers FAA staff from headquarters com ingto Indi to put together statements and a time line of the incident. Dave B oone wasreferred to the commission members to answer questions about after action statementsand reports.Other talking points of interview:Thomas was aware of the potential for a hijack but had never considered a suicide aircrafthijacking situation. He had been part of SC AT AN A table top exercises w ith the m ilitary.His function in these exercises was to ma ke a phone c all; no other equipm ent was used.Since 9/11, Thomas can see that the FAA has more communication options and is betterprepared for an emergency situation. Air Traffic Controllers are now more aware ofsuspicious activity.As for the five min ute rule instituted by the FAA, Thomas believes that this willoverwhelm the DEN with situations that are not emergenc ies. How ever, Thomas does seethe plus side of the rule.


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t8 b3 faa indy center john a thomas fdr- entire contents- 9-24-03 mfr and 2 sets handwritten notes...

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