t8 b3 boston center terry biggio fdr- 9-22-03 2 mfr and 2 sets handwritten notes 749

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center Terry Biggio Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 749

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Committee Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event:Federal Aviation Adm inistration (FAA) interview w ith Terry Biggio, Facility

DeputyManager, Boston Center.Type of even t: Recorded Interview

Date:Monday, September 22, 2003

SpecialAccess Issues: Non e

Preparedby: Geoffrey Brown

Team Num ber: 8

Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire

Participants- Non-Comm ission: Chris , FAA General Consul

Participants- Comm ission: John Azzarello, M iles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

NOT E: Un less otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Pleaserefer to the interview transcriptfor a complete account.

Background

On 9-11 Biggio was assigned as Operations M anager Areas A and D with du ty asOMIC (Operations Managerin Charge) in conjunctionwith the Traffic Management Unit

(TMU). Biggio reported to Glen M ichaels, assistant deputy for Boston Center who wasaway on 9-11, and has since retired, and HeatherAckerman,an administrative managerwho was aw ay at a joint managers m eeting on9-11. Therefore, Biggio was the managerresponsiblefor theperformanceof Boston Centeron 9-11. Prior to becoming theOMIC,Biggio worked at Boston Centeras a Quality Assuranceofficer, an instructor, an ATCsupervisor,an Op erations manager, a support manager, and as acting deputy.Biggio'sstatement signed on Sep 15,2001 indicates that he worked the OMIC position from0630-0958EOT on the morningof 9-11.

Morning of 9-11

On 9-11, after the morning rushwas over, Daniel Bueno,the Traffic Management

Supervisor,paged B iggio,who came to the TMU and wasbriefed by John Schippanian dBueno about a possible hijacking, based on threefactorsno communications,transponderturned off,an d possible unusual communicationsfrom the cockpit. TheydisplayedAA11 as a primary target [no transponder] on the 46R (Boston Sector) radardisplay, which was being worked by ATC Peter Zalewski at the time.

Zalewskihad heard something unusualbut was notsure what,so requested thatthe tape be pulled an d replayed Bob Jones, Q uality Assurancewas asked to pull the tapean d review for possible unu sual commun ications. Jones told Biggio within minu tesof the


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threateningcom mun ication, and that the speaker clearly had a Middle Eastern accent, andhad said something like"w e have someplanes" and "don't do anythingstupid". Biggiohad the Regional Operations Center and, he said, the W ashington Operations Center on aspeaker phoneand immediately relayed that information. He perceived his subsequentrole as a "conveyor of informationto the ROC."

Accordingto Biggio, prior to9-11, an airplane that had gone NO RD O (no radiocommunication)was a frequent occurrence.An airplane that lost transponderwasrelativelyinfrequent,but not unheard of. An airplane thathad seriously deviatedfrom itscourse was indicative of a serious mechanical problem, and Biggio had neverexperiencedthose three factorsin combination before. Those factors, when appliedtoAA11, were enoughfor Biggio to deem it necessary to contact ROC,but without thethreateningcommunicationfrom the cockpit,he doubts AA11 would have beenrecognized or labeled a hijack. Biggio noted that though he did not call the WashingtonOperations Cen ter (WO C) directly toinform of the hijacking, he was placed in aconference call through the ROC that was being actively monitored, as far as heknows,by the WOC.

The attack was not anticipated. He thought they would have gotten somethingfrom the aircraft, a special code Specifically, ATC sare taught thata hijack wouldinclude acovert signfrom the cockpit, eitheruse of the transponder code 7500, whichflashes "HIJACK" on the data block for the flight on theATCs TMU (traffic monitoringunit), or the pilot would have used covert language (the word"trip" to describe theairplane's course) to signal the AT C. In sim ulated hijack exercises the pilot would be incontactwith the ATC, an d they wouldbe able to verbally confirm"7500" for a hijack,"7600" for a malfunction ing transponder, and"7700" for an emergency.

Biggio stated that though there was no drill, simulated scenario, or previous real-life scenario that m irroredthe events of 9-11, Boston Center was able to respond

effectively through the benefit of numerousair traffic situations duringthe summer stormseason and the com bined extensive experience of the AT Cstaff. Biggio noted that partof Boston Center's subsequent ground stop success can be attributed to their authorityover air traffic. Biggio was able to stop air traffic through the Sparta/Carmel aircorridorand was able to ground stop L ogan Airport directly.

Biggion characterizedthe Traffic Management Unitfunction as the managementof informationby facilitationand as one of thebetter functioningparts of government.Informationis free-flowing because of the need to deal with severe weatheran d withother constantly changing conditions. He noted three main points of the collectiveknowledge brought to bear on9-11 by Boston Center:

1) Coordinationand communication werekey since the situationhad not beenplanned for, but the instinct an d capabilityto deal with crisis scenarioshad been firmlydeveloped;

2) qua lity personnel enabled solid comm unication in Boston Center, but B iggiohad serious concernsafter the impact at the Pentagon thathis Center's urgency andinformation was notbeing translatedto FAA operations nationally;an d


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3) the responsivenessof Boston Center allowedfor the S parta/Carmelcorridorand al l west boundtraffic to be shut down, w hich saved valuable airspacefor thecoordination of thecomplete clearingof the skies to commercialair traffic. "Airplaneson the ground can't hurt you."

Regarding Boston Center, FA A and the Military

Pre-9/11protocol fo r communicatinga hijack threatto the military had beenpracticed by as far asBiggio knew theyhad never practiced intercept procedures.In suchexercisesall comm unication was handled through the ROC.

Once the first WTC collision was reported, Biggio clearly believed it to be AA11,and comm unicated thisto the open line with ROC .It is forthis reason that Biggiowassurprised to hear that military and civiliancontrollers in the New York region were stilllooking for AA11 after impact.

Biggio noted that there is tension w ith the military at times over the use ofairspace, specifically regardinguse of theWhiskey 105 and 106 warning areasoff thecoast, but that the tension is normally negligible.

Regarding crisis management preparation and response post-9/11

Biggio noted thatATC procedurehas shifted from a service focus to a homelandsecurity focus, and that some of this change in concentration was due to the criticalincident stress debriefing for the ATCs post-9/11. Biggio believes both sides, FAA andmilitary,need education on each-others procedures and capabilities. The DynamicSimulationexercises required for AT Cspre-9-11 did not stress combinedFAA/militaryscenarios, and Biggio is concerned his ATC s wo uld not have been successful incoordinatinga m ilitary intercept with United Airlines175.

He is extreme ly concerned w ith the air vulnerability of thenation's nuclear powerplants. Since 9/11he has experienceda scenario in which a fighterscramble had notreached anuclear plantcap in time to escort an aircraft out. The incident had no adverseresult, bu t served as an exampleof the need for quicker com municationand responsetime, despite steps likethe 24 hour DEN (Defense Event Netw ork), increased attentiontoNORAC communication,and 360degree "confidenceturns" (an ATC supervisorcanrequest a pilotperform a complete 360 degree circle if there is cause for suspicion of theaircraft). Biggio believes that permanent airspace caps over these high risk sites may benecessary.

The ROC is central, he wo uldn't say"clearing house," but they have thecommunicationbridges. Training-wise they knew informationhad to gothrough theROC because of ex perience with accidents in the past.

Biggio was not aware of a "five-minute" standard concerning lostcom munications, per se. H is perception was that a controller [and others] jus t keep goingand quickly run though a mentalchecklistcheckhis owncomms,try other company (inthis case AA) planes, try AFRINC (ground-based com munications system w iththecockpit), and tryGuard (UHFand VHF frequenciesdevoted specificallyto emergencycommunications.)


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Other Information

He had communicated with his counterpart at New York Center, Bruce Barrett,and passed along what he sawanaircraft that might be descending to Kennedy,following a "tear drop" course, and in coast track with pe rhapsan ELT

On the tracking of primary-on ly targets he said that is accomplished based on theroute of flight and that is why they were able to pick up AA 11 when it ceasedtransponding. If it drops below coverage [of the en-route center] one assumption is that itbroke up in flight.Danny [Bueno]had a hard time gettinghis point-out of AA11 acrossto New York Traffic Controlcouldn'tsee it.

Concerning ELTs(Emergency Locator Transmissions) Biggio said that a hardlanding could cause such a transmission. An EL T is not a signal sent by pilot operators.It is clearly indicativeof a crash.

It was his "gut fe eling" that it wasAA11 that hit thefirst towerthecoast track,

the ELT, and the fact it was descending. He told that to his TMU , to the ROC and to theATM at Herndon.

Final Comment

Biggio believes that communication and information is key. He also believes thatgiven a urgent situation, it is vitally necessary to be co nfidant that Boston Center know itis speaking with the right person to have the correct inf orm ation, or request forinformation, imm ediately addressed.He believes thatATC supervisors now willrecognize the unusual signs in their airspace that w ill indicate a possible terrorist eventusing aircraft, and that those supervisors will communicate immediately with TMU andBoston Center managementofficers of the suspicious activity. Biggiois extremelyconcerned though that this process, as well as it may w ork within Bo ston C enter, will nottranslate into the rapid andeffective national response ne eded to deal with a crisis akin tothe 9-11 attacks.

He would not, with confidence, have declaredAA11 a hijack if ithadn't been forthe cockpit communications.


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[Classification]

M E M O R A N D U M FOR THE R E C O R D

Event: Federal Aviation Adm inistration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview1 with

Terry Biggio, Deputyof Facility, Boston Center.

Type of event: Interview

Date: Monday, September22 , 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Preparedby: Geoffrey Brown

Team Num ber: 8

Location:FAA Boston Center, Nashua,New Hampshire

Participants- Non-Com mission: Chris , FAA G eneral Consul

Participants- Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted,the following paraphrasesthe response and opinionof

the interviewee. Pleaserefer to the interview transcriptfor a complete account.

Background:CurrentlyTerry Bigg io is Deputy of Facility for Boston C enter.

On 9/11 Biggio was O perations Manager A reas A and D for one and half years with

duties as OM IC (Op erations M anager in Charge) in conjunction with theTraffic

Management Unit (TMU). Biggio reportedto G len M ichaels, assistant deputyfo r Boston

Centerwho wasaway on 9/11, and hassince retired,and Heather Ackerman, an

administrativemanagerwho wasaway at a joint managers meetingon 9/11. Biggiowas

the manager overall responsible for Boston Center on9/11. Prior to being OMIC, Biggio

worked withBoston Center as a Quality Assuranceofficer, an ATC teacher, an ATC

supervisor,an Operations manager,a support manager,and as acting de puty.

On 9/11, Daniel Bueno paged Biggio, who came to the TMU and wasbriefed by John

Schippaniand Bueno.They showedTerry AA11 on the 46R radar display,which was


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being worked by Peter Zilowski at the time. B ob Jones w as asked to pull the tape

recordingfo r AA11 to review fo r possible un usual comm unications. Jone s told Biggio

immediatelyof the threatening communication, and that it the speaker clearly had a

middle eastern accent, and had said something like "we have someplanes" and "don't do

anything stupid". Biggio immediately relayed this information to the Regional Operations

Command(ROC).

Accordingto Bigg io, prior to9/11, an airplane that had gone NORA C (no radio

communication)was frequent.An airplanethat lost transponder was relatively infrequent,

but notunheard of. An airplane thatha d seriously deviatedfrom its course was indicative

of a serious mechanical problem,and Biggio and never experienced sucha serious

deviation before. These three factors, when applied to AA11, were enough for Biggio todeem it necessary to contact ROC, but without the threatening communicationfrom the

cockpit, he doubts AA 11 would have b een recognized or labeled a hijack. Specifically,

ATC s are taught that ahijack would include a covert signfrom the cockpit, either use of

the transponder code 7500, wh ich flashes"HIJACK"on the data blockfor the flight on

the ATCs TMU (traffic monitoring unit), or the pilot would have used covert language

(the w ord"trip" to describethe airplane's course)to signal the ATC. In simulated hijack

exercises the pilot would be in contact with the ATC, and they would be able to verbally

confirm "7500" for a hijack, "7600" for a malfunc tioning transponder, and"7700" for an

emergency.

Biggio notedthat though he did notcall the WOCdirectly to inform of the hijacking,he

was placed in a conference call through the RO C that w as being actively monitored, as

far as he knows, by the WO C.

Biggio noted that though there was no drilled simulated scenario, or previousreal-lifescenariothat mirrored the events of 9/11, Boston Center was able to respondeffectively

through the benefit of numerousair traffic threats duringthe summ er storm seasonan d

the comb ined extensive experience of the ATCstaff.

Biggio noted that part of Boston Center's success can be attributed to their authority over


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air traffic. Biggio was able tostop air traffic through the Sparta/Carmelpassage and was

able to ground stop Logan Airport directly.

Biggio noted three main points of the collective knowledge brought to bear on9/11 by

Boston Center 1) Coordination and comm unication were key since9/11 s situation itself

had not been planned fo r, but the instinct and capability to deal with crisis scenarios had

been firmly developed; 2) quality personnel enabled solid communicationin Boston

Center, but Biggio had serious concernsafter the impact at the Pentagon that his Center's

urgency and information was not being translated to FA A operations nationally; and 3)

the responsivenessof Boston Center allowed for the Sparta/Carmelcorridor and all west

bound traffic to be shut down, which saved valuable airspace for the coordination of the

complete clearing of the skies to commercial airtraffic.

Regarding Boston Center, FA A and the M ilitary:

Pre-9/11 protocol for communicatinga hijack threat to the military had been practicedby

as far as Biggio knew they had never practiced intercept procedures. In such exercises all

communication was handled through the ROC.

Once the first WTC collision was reported, Biggio clearly believed it to be AA11, and

communicated this to the open line with RO C. It is for this reasonthat Biggio was

surprised to hear controllerfor the New York region were still lookingfor AA11 after

impact.

Biggio noted that there is tension with the military at times over the use of airspace,

specifically regarding use of the W hiskey105 and 106 space off thecoast, but that this

tension is normally negligible.

Regarding crisis man agement preparation and responsepost-9/11:

Biggio noted that ATC procedure hasshifted from a service focus to a homeland security

focus, and that some of this change in concentration is due to the critical incident stressdebriefing for the AT Cs post-9/11 . Biggio believes both sides,FAA and military, need

educationon each-others proceduresand capabilities.The Dynamic Simulation exercises

required for ATCs pre-9/11 did not stress com bined FAA /military scenarios, and Biggio

is concerned his ATCs would not have been successful in coordinating an intercept with


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United Airlines175. He is extremely concerned withthe airvulnerabilityof the nation's

nuclear power plants. Since9/11 he has experienced a scenario in which a fighter

scramblehad not reached a nuclear plant cap in time to escort anaircraft out. This

incidenthad no adverse result, but served as an example to Biggio of the need for quicker

communication and response time despite steps like the 24 hour DEN (Defense Event

Network), increased attention to NO RA C comm unication, and 360 degree "confidence

turns" (an AT C sup ervisor can request a pilot perform a complete 360 degree circle if

there is cause for suspicion of theaircraft). Biggio believesthat permanent airspace caps

over these high risk sites may benecessary.

Recommendations:

Biggio believes that communication and information is key. He also believes that given aurgent situation, it is vitally necessary to be confidan t that Boston Center know it is

speaking with the right person to have the correct information, or request for information,

immediatelyaddressed. He believes that ATC supervisors now will recognize the unusual

signs in their airspace that w ill indicate a possible terrorist event usingaircraft,and that

those supervisors w ill comm unicate immediately withTMU andBoston Center

managementofficers of the suspicious activity. Biggio is extremely concerned though

that this process, as well as it may wo rk within Boston Center, will not translate into the

rapid andeffective national response needed to deal with a crisis akin to the 9/11 attacks.

[Classification]


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t8 b3 boston center terry biggio fdr- 9-22-03 2 mfr and 2 sets handwritten notes 749

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