15

FIRST DIVISIONRENATO S. GATBONTON, G.R. NO. 146779Petitioner,Present:ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN,C.J.,(Chairman)YNARES-SANTIAGO,- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZCALLEJO, SR., andNAZARIO,JJ.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTEOF TECHNOLOGY and JOSECALDERON, Promulgated:Respondents. January 23, 2006x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xFACTS:Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. A civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive. The committee believed that petitioners continued stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the students learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the community.Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorneys fees.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedingswith the Regional Trial Court of Manila in a petition forcertioraribut the casewas terminated when the parties entered into a compromiseagreement wherein respondentMIT agreed to publish in theschool organ the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877(R.A. No. 7877)or the Anti-SexualHarassmentAct;disregard the previousadministrativeproceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the chargesagainst petitioner. Petitioner agreedto recognize the validity of the published rules and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the administrative case against him.[5]Labor Arbiter: Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of complainant is hereby declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during the period of his preventive suspension.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ON JULY 11, 1999 IS VALID WHEN THE MAPUA RULES AND REGULATIONS WERE ONLY PROMULGATED ON FEBRUARY 23, 1999

RULING:The petition is partly meritorious.R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to promulgate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.[12]Petitioners preventive suspension was based on respondent MITs Rules and Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations provides:Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any member of the educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency of the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February 23, 1999. InTaada vs. Tuvera,[13]it was ruled that:all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.[14]In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that [T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee. Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioners preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.In petitioners case, there is no indication that petitioners preventive suspension may be based on the foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for petitioners preventive suspension, to wit:As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not justified.[16]Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-day preventive suspension,i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.With regard to petitioners claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without basis. While petitioners preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages. This is the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show that petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.WHEREFORE, the petition isPARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are herebySET ASIDEand the Labor Arbiters Decision dated June 18, 1999 isREINSTATED.SO ORDERED.EN BANC G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA, APPELLANT.

FACTS:

Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11- year old son of appellant; Rowena Quiachon, the victim and appellant's daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus. Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however, that he no longer wanted to use his father's surname describing him as "masama" for raping his (Rowel's) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used to sleep in the same bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling. Rowel slept beside his youngest sibling while their father, appellant, and Rowena slept together in one bed. On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he, forthwith, told his mother's sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, PI00,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.[9] The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death penalty imposed on appellant.

CA AFFIRMED.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RECLUSION PERPETUA AND NOT DEATH SHOULD BE IMPOSED TO QUIACHON

RULING: YES. All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his daughter Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information and their existence duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of facts during pretrial,[26] warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on appellant. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads: SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONMICHAEL C. GUY,G.R. No. 163707Petitioner,Present:Panganiban,C.J. (Chairperson),- versus -Ynares-Santiago,Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.HON. COURT OF APPEALS,HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,Makati City and minors, KARENDANES WEI and KAMILLE DANESWEI, represented by their mother,Promulgated:REMEDIOS OANES,Respondents.September 15, 2006x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xFACTS:OnJune 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate inMakatiCity, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties.His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate.They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.In his Comment/Opposition,[7]petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition.He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration.He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss[8]on the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel.They contended that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,[9]petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters.Thus, no renunciation of right occurred.Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioners objections on the certification against forum shopping.ISSUE: whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights

RULING: NO. The petition lacks merit.As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights.To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.[14]In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights.The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution.It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kindx x x against the estate of thelate Rufino Guy Susim.[15]Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters claim.Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:ART. 1044.Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians.Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property[16]which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward.Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of aknownright.Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.[17]In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs.It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ,Petitioners,vs.SHIRLEY G. QUIONES,Respondent.FACTS:Respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worthP2,098.00.4Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt5issued by the store.6While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinsons and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor.7She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty.11Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but the latter again refused to receive it.12Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinsons was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14She thus filed the Complaint for Damages15before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybaez. In their Answer,17petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item has already been paid.18Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to respondent.19They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.21As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.22ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.RULING: YES..Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Courts pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31is noteworthy:In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x32The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.34Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.35Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1wphi1Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x xWhen I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me, "I cant remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that shes in a hurry and very busy.37Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.43We find that the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM,petitioners, vs.ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA,respondent.FACTS:Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,[5]he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.[6]Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7]Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: of course.[8]Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant.[9]At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.[10]After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.[11]In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12]Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.[13]Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.[14]Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.[15]Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.[16]Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.[17]Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.[18]One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.[19]The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.[20]The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.[21]At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.[22]Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.[23]Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24]As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.[25]Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.[26]Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.[27]When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.[28]Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto,i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.[29]Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.[30]However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.[31]When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said:alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.[32]She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.[33]Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.[34]According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.[35]When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.[36]All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.[37]Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.[38]She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39]She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.[40]ISSUE:Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil CodeRULING:NO. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,[59]is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[60]The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.[61]These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.[62]Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[63]When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law[64]which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.Article 21[65]refers to actscontra bonus moresand has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done withintentto injure.[66]A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,[67]and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.[68]As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen.[69]The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA,accused-appellant.FACTS:Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died atthe National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals inPeople v.Castillo and Ocfemia2which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.ISSUE: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?RULING: YESFrom this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability andonlythe civil liabilitydirectlyarising from and based solely on the offense committed,i.e., civil liabilityex delictoinsenso strictiore."2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.19Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:a) Law20b) Contractsc) Quasi-contractsd) . . .e) Quasi-delicts3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.22Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of,i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costsde oficio.SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005]OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO,petitioners, vs.SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA,respondents.FACTS:Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of Pasig, Metro Manila, to look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land belonging to Oscar Maccay. She was introduced by a vendor, Lydia Reyes, to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela who were engaged in lending money to market vendors on a daily basis.Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who desired to sell or mortgage any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one in Antipolo. She went to the Nobelas. She brought with her many titles. She became friendly with the spouses. Potenciano went on to brag about her connections, that she is related to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos; and that the PCGG is after her so she has to dispose of her properties.After two (2) days, she called Oscar Maccay, who came. They comported themselves as husband and wife. Maccay was in uniform. He is a police colonel who had jurisdiction over Mandaluyong, according to Potenciano. The Nobelas were impressed. They were pleased when the couple became very close to them. They confided their family problems. They even went to the office of Maccay in Fort Bonifacio.In this setting, the relationship flourished. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they should be the ones to buy the property because it will only costP300,000.00. They would be able to make a profit because the current price wasP1,500.00 per square meter.Potenciano used to call Maccay to join her in the Nobela residence. They partook of the hospitality of the accused spouses almost two to three times a week. Potenciano was treated like a queen. She was fanned and massaged. She was served her meals in the sala.After pooling together their savings, the Nobelas decided to purchase the property. They advised Maccay and Potenciano that they were ready to buy the property.Potenciano with Serlina went to Barbas lawyer, Atty. Alfonso Jimenez, at Las Pias where she had the Deed of Sale (Exh. 1) prepared and notarized. She signed it there. They were riding in the jeep of the Nobelas and passed by the office of Maccay ar (sic) Fort Bonifacio. Potenciano went alone to his office and returned with him. They then proceeded to the house of both accused at Buayang Bato, Mandaluyong. Serlina paid theP300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she was given the Deed of Sale, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other documents. When she offered to take them, they declined saying they were going home to their Magallanes house.Maccay and Potenciano continued to frequent the house of the accused spouses where they were given VIP treatment. Potenciano slept, bathed and was allowed to use the phone for her transactions and to drive the couples jeep.x x xThe taxes to the purchased property had to be paid. The title had not been transferred to the names of the Nobelas. Serlina and Potenciano with the latter driving, rode the Nobela jeep to Antipolo. On the way to town, the jeep broke down. The engine fell off. Potenciano volunteered to go to Antipolo herself, pay the taxes and bring a mechanic to repair the jeep. The taxes had been paid.The good relationship continued until June 30, 1990, Prudencio Nobela suffered a stroke. He was brought to the Polymedic Hospital. That same afternoon, Potenciano called and talked to Prudencios doctor. She had Prudencio transferred to a suite and confided to Serlina that she is also known as Adelaida Potenciano; that the owners of the hospital are her mother and father. Serlina need not worry about the bill. Potenciano started sleeping in the hospital.After one week, Prudencio was to be discharged, Potenciano went to the accounting department. She tried to pay with her dollars and yens but the hospital would not accept. She asked Serlina to go with her to a money changer at Kalentong to change the money to pesos but the foreign exchange dealer refused saying the foreign currency was fake.Serlina had to go back to the house to borrow from the son of her husband by his first marriage. Maccay drove the sick man and two women home in the Nobela jeep.At this time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was beginning to slip off. The Polymedic Hospital incident was a letdown. It was then that Potenciano, who has boasted of being not only wealthy but also influential, invited Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of appliances which she claimed were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlinas dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances herself. She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. 15 to 15-C) showing her payments. The last receipt is dated July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when Potenciano saw Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the relationship began to sour.Before the last purchase of appliances, without the knowledge of the accused couple, Potenciano executed an Affidavit of Loss. She related that when she went to Antipolo on June 19, 1990 in her stainless steel jeep, the jeep broke down. She got a mechanic and when she returned the jeep was gone or carnapped.In the meantime, Serlina was beginning to doubt Potenciano. She heard that Potenciano was trying to sell their jeep. She inquired at the NBI and was told that Potenciano had a string of cases against her.In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to them because of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help them in the registration of Deed of Sale (Exh. 1, Exh. B.). They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real estate agent living in their place. When they were told that for theP300,000.00 consideration, they would need aroundP20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes, she gaveP21,000.00. The mother of de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register of Deeds. The new title (Exh. C) was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an additional 2,000.00 to de la Vega for other expenses.Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E. Cruz (Exh. 5) on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa and Theft.When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a subpoena from the Fiscals Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick.Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was astonished to discover (Exh. 6) as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the capital gains tax as onlyP1,000.00 plus. Then she realized the reason for the alleged falsification charge of Potenciano alias Angelita Barba and Oscar Maccay. The deed of sale given to them (Exh. 1) forP300,000.00 which they paid the Maccays was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending in court at Judge Alfredo Flores sala.[2] Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed the Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85961.After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse respondent spousesP300,000 and to pay damages and attorneys fees. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision. The appellate court also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.Hence, this petition.ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMPLAINANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY;RULING: No.A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainants civil liability, if any.The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse theP300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses. This Court ruled inCabaero v. Hon. Cantos[7]that a court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the accused, thus:[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.The Court recently reiterated this ruling inCasupanan v. Laroya[8]andRepublic v. Court of Appeals.[9]The appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts award of damages by justifying it as a counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent spouses filed or attempted to file a counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111 provides:SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) x x xNo counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned inCabaeroon the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.[10]A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a party to the case.[11]The records clearly show that petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant.[12]The Verification attached to the Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate petitioner Potencianos constitutional right to due process.Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent spouses. Petitioners admit the validity of the cancellation of TCT No. 473584 and the issuance of TCT No. 188289 in favor of respondent spouses. Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the lot in exchange forP300,000, there is no basis for the order requiring petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses theP300,000.[13]However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud. Petitioners must decide which version they want to advance. Petitioners cannot argue that the title of respondent spouses is valid to avoid reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time claim that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud to turn the tables on respondent spouses who might sue petitioners for swindling. Petitioners inconsistent arguments reveal their dishonesty even to the courts. Petitioners should not forget that the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners perpetrated a vicious scam on respondent spouses who are clearly the hapless victims here.Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while trying to defend their property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering from severe complications due to the strain of litigation. While this Court is constrained to grant the instant petition due to the trial courts procedural error, we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the substantive matter of the case. Petitioners unconscionably used their intelligence and position to swindle the respondent spouses of their life savings, abusing their hospitality and kindness in the process. Petitioners have the temerity to turn the tables on the poor couple by abusing the legal processes. This Court will not allow the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate this Decision without prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim for damages against petitioners.WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:1. The order to reimburse theP300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela is deleted;2. The award ofP50,000 as moral damages and the award ofP40,000 as attorneys fees are likewise deleted.SO ORDERED.

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL,G.R. No. 172060Petitioner,Present:CARPIO,J., Chairperson,- versus -PERALTA,BERSAMIN,*ABAD, andVILLARAMA, JR.,**JJ.MARIA CHRYSANTINEL. PIMENTEL and PEOPLEPromulgated:OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.September 13, 2010x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xFACTS:

Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.ISSUE:The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.RULING:NO.Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Questionin Criminal Case for ParricideFurther, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10]A prejudicial question is defined as:x x xone that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12]which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13]The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14]or homicide.[15]However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36of the Family Codeis whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim.In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.[16]At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals.The trial inCriminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue inCivil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition.WeAFFIRMthe 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961ANTONIO GELUZ,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,respondents.FACTS:Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we grantedcertiorari.Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery cannot had for the death of an unborn child.This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hoministhat was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.