Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI,defendant-appellant.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.CRUZ,J.:The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.1Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.2Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated.3Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.4Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."5The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.7He was Identified by name.8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.9They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner,10who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.11He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.12He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.13He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters.14The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses.15Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling.16He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin,17to a friend whose full name he said did not even know.18The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him.19There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest,20another two weeks21and a third "weeks before June 25."22On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?A Yes, sir.Q When did you receive this intelligence report?A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?A Yes, sir.Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.COURT:Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel AminnudinA Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.Q What were those activities?A Purely marijuana trafficking.Q From whom did you get that information?A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.Q But you received it from your regular informer?A Yes, sir.ATTY. LLARIZA:Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?A Marijuana, sir.Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?A Yes, sir.Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.COURT:Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?A Yes, sir.Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?A Yes, sir.Q Are you sure of that?A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?A Only on the 23rd of June.Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?A No, more.Q Why not?A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?A Search warrant is not necessary.23That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caughtin flagrantenor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca,24for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents.25Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsAQUINO,J.,dissenting:I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caughtin flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.Separate OpinionsAQUINO,J.,dissenting:I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caughtin flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.Footnotes1 Rollo, p. 29.2 Ibid., p. 2.3 Original Records, p. 6.4 Ibid., p. 20.5 "Exh. 1," Original Records, p. 204.6 Original Records, p. 26.7 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.8 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 29.9 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, pp. 6-7.10 TSN, Sept. 5, 1984, pp. 8-10.11 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, p. 3.12 Ibid., pp. 8-9; 19-20.13 Id., pp. 10 & 13.14 Brief for the Appellant, p. 22.15 Rollo, p. 28.16 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, pp. 17-18; 22-24.17 Ibid., p. 29.18 Id., p. 4.19 Rollo, p. 28.20 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.21 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 19.22 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 12.23 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, pp. 31-33.24 65 SCRA 336.25 People v. Rubio, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123; People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252; People v. Cerelegia; 147 SCRA 538; People v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-68409, December 1, 1987.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY",accused-appellants.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.1For automatic review is the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamatalias"Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias"Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,3of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.The information against accused-appellants reads:That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited.CONTRARY TO LAW.5Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.The antecedent facts are as follows:Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning.9Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.10At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."11SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13Molina replied,"Boss, if possible we will settle this."14SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.16The demurrer was denied by the trial court.17A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,18the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.SO ORDERED.19Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:I.THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;II.THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; ANDIII.THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659(sic),IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.21Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.22Thus:Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be reversed.26As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrestin flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ).27In the case at bar, the courta quoanchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caughtin flagrante delictoin possession of prohibited drugs.28This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.InPeople v. Chua Ho San,29the Court held that in cases ofin flagrante delictoarrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed inPeople v. Doria,30probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,i.e.,supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.As applied toin flagrante delictoarrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify anin flagrante delictoarrest. Thus, inPeople v. Aminnudin,31it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of theMNWilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."Likewise, inPeople v. Mengote,32the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :.. [while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, inPeople v. Encinada,33the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding amotorelawhile holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1.ntThen, too, inMalacat v. Court of Appeals,34the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'"35In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:Here, there could have been no valid inflagrante delicto... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.36It went on to state that Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.37Clearly, to constitute a validin flagrante delictoarrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.38In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board atrisikad,accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the arrest, to wit "Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina"39The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.Compared toPeople v. Encinada,the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode themotorela.No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."40Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.WHEREFORE,the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamatalias"Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias"Boboy", areACQUITTEDand orderedRELEASEDfrom confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes:1 Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1105 [1976].2 Dated April 25, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-24.3 Sec. 8.- Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.Sec. 20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.- The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:5) 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;xxxxxxxxxOtherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the forgoing quantities the penalty shall range fromprision correccionaltoreclusion perpetuadepending upon the quantity.4 An Act Imposing the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.5 Filed on August 10, 1996; Rollo, p. 7.6 Records, p. 14.7 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 2-4.8 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 7-9.9Id.,pp. 10 and 18.10 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 4-5 (Direct examination of spa 1 Pamplona).11 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 5-6.12 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 14-15.13 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 6-8.14Id.,p. 14.15Id.,p. 9.16 Records, pp. 32-37.17 Records, pp. 39-43.19 Decision, Rollo, p. 24.20 Rollo, p. 40.21 Constitution, Article III, Section 2.22 People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999].23 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, 1090 [1961].24 People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999]; citing Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527 [1996]; People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174, 182-183 [1994]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 169 [1996]; Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp. 147-153 [1986]; Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Section 12, and Rule 113, Section 5; People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69 [1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 126-128 [1991]; Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, 348 [1975]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 871-874 [1968]; People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144, 153 [1993]; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33, 48 [1937]; and People v. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936].25 People v. Chua Ho San,supra.; citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L Ed 2d, 896 adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; and People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993].26Id.,at 449; citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997].27Id.,at 444; and the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (as amended), Rule 113, Section 5.28 Decision, Rollo, p. 22.29 People v. Chua Ho San.supra.;citing People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997]; People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998]; People v. Claudio. 160 SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1988]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]; People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]; Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].30 People v. Doria,supra.;citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917]; People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990] and People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 [1990].31 163 SCRA 402, 409-410 [1988].32 210 SCRA 174, 179-180 [1992].33 280 SCRA 72, 86-87 [1997].34 283 SCRA 159 [1997].35Id.,at 169.36Id.,at 175.37Id.,at 178.38 Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in People v, Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 [1999].39 TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.40People v. Encinada, supra.41Id.,at 91; citing Aniag v. Commission on Elections. 237 SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994].

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN,accused-appellant.ROMERO,J.:With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are prohibited drugs.Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.1The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the courta quofound the following:On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the prosecution rested its case.Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.2In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.These submissions are impressed with merit.InPeople v.Ramos,3this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.4Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced inStonehill v.Diokno.5This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.6Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.7The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrestrecognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court8and by prevailing jurisprudence;2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;96. Stop and Frisk;10and7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.11The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.12It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.13In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.InPeople v.Tangliben,14acting on information supplied by informers, police officersconducted a surveillanceat the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bagwho was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but herefused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's alleged activities. InTanglibenpolicemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.InPeople v.Malmstedt,15the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There wasno reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially sincethe identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. Hisactuations also aroused the suspicionof the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.Note, however, the glaring differences ofMalmstedtto the instant case. In present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.InPeople v.Bagista,16the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.InManalili v.Court of Appeals and People,17the policemen conducted asurveillancein an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, theychancedupon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.This case is similar toPeople v.Aminnudinwhere the police received information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.Another recent case isPeople v.Encinadawhere the police likewise received confidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada's constitutional right.In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which providesinter alia:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;xxx xxx xxxAccused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.18As previously discussed, the case in point isPeople v.Aminnudin19where, this Court observed that:. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view" under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.People v.Solayao,20applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted inPosadas v.Court of Appeals.21In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency circumstances, as applied inPeople v.DeGracia.22In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during acoup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection citingPeople v.Malasugui23where this Court ruled:When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:Q When this informant by the name ofaliasBenjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened after that?A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.Q What was her reaction?A She gave her bag to me.Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.24This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for theMalasuguicase is inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.25On the contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar toPeople v.Encinada,26where this Court held:[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?A: Yes, sir.Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he carried, what did you do next?A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.We are not convinced.While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant based on the transcript quoted above did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings.Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search.The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly,i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held inPeople v.Barros:27. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" . . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case ofPasion Vda.de Garcia v.Locsin(supra):xxx xxx xxx. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and thatwe do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."28(Emphasis supplied)To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated inPeople v.Omaweng,29where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?A When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?A He said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings" (sic).Q When he said that, what did you do?A We asked him if we could open and see it.Q When you said that, what did he tell you?A He said "you can see it".Q And when he said "you can see and open it," what did you do?A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag.Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellant's name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in theAminnudincase where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.This argument is untenable.Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.30Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized,wherever and whenever it is feasible.31(Emphasis supplied)While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.32The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.It isaproposto quote the case ofPeople v.Barros,33which stated:It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. Thea prioriargument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly.Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis supplied).In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.34While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, theStonehillcase observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."35Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.36Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.37WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 Decision penned by Judge Alicia L. Santos.2 Decision,Rollo,p. 49.3 222 SCRA 557 [1993].4 Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987, First ed., pp. 85-86.5 20 SCRA 383 [1967].6 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 1996 ed., pp. 147-148.7 People v. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652 [1992].8 "Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."9 Padilla v. CA and People, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997.10 People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 [1996].11 People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994].12 People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.13 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995].14 84 SCRA 220 [1990].15 198 SCRA 401 [1991].16 214 SCRA 63 [1992].17 G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997.18 People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996].19 163 SCRA 402 [1988].20 262 SCRA 255 [1996].21 188 SCRA 288 [1990].22 233 SCRA 716 [1994].23 63 Phil. 221 [1936].24 TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 6.25 Supra.26 G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.27 231 SCRA 557 [1994].28 Supra,citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.29 213 SCRA 462 [1992].30 Herrera, Oscar, A Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure and Custodial Investigation, 1994 ed., p. 60.31 People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 [1925).32 People v. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993], People v. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614 [1993], People v. De Guzman, 231 SCRA 737 [1994], People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998.33 Supra.34 Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967].35 Cruz I. A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 148.36 Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Annotated, 1995 ed., p. 526citingRodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 and Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33.37 People v. Aminnudin,supra.