social trust and institutional confidence in spain 1980-2005 … · 2014-05-07 ·...

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Confidence in Institutions and Social Trust in Spain (1980-2005)

Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session, May 2007, Helsinki, Finland. Workshop on “Social Trust, the State and Diversity”.

Martiño Rubal Carmen Voces Mónica Ferrín

Miguel Caínzos

Contact: Martiño Rubal investigacion04.egap@xunta,es

0034 981 546 334 Escola Galega de Administración Pública

Rúa de Madrid, 2-4, 15707 Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, Spain.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Recent literature on social capital has emphasized that social capital can not be

considered apart from institutions (Levi, 1998; Hall, 1999; Stolle, 2002; Rothstein &

Stolle, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). More specifically, this so-called institutional approach

has highlighted that institutions (governments, parliaments, politicians, political parties

agencies which implement some policies, i. e. health system, education system) play

an important role in promoting social trust.

This paper deals exclusively with what is commonly regarded as one of the several

components of social capital: social trust1. Many factors have been stressed in the

literature as determinants of social trust (see Freitag, 2003, and also Welch and others,

2005). It is said that personal characteristics of individuals, either personality traits,

particular individual moral orientations acquired early in life (Uslaner, 2002), or other

beliefs as religion and stable political orientations (as political interest or ideology)

influence trust and confidence. Other determinants refer to social environment:

belonging to a certain community with certain characteristics (Paxton, 2002, Uslaner,

2002) or being part of informal social networks. Other important factors commonly

emphasized by literature are political participation and civic engagement, mainly

associational membership (Brehm y Rahn, 1997; Putnam, [2000] 2002; Stolle, 2001;

Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Herreros, 2004; but see Zmerli et al., 2007). Other

factors are related to personal resources of individuals (such as education) (Putnam,

[2000] 2002; Freitag, 2003). Finally, most recent research has put the accent on the

major role that institutions play as creators of social trust (Paxton, 1999; Hardin, 2002;

Rothstein & Stolle, 2002; Herreros, 2004; Rothstein, 2005). This presumed importance

of institutions invites us to guess that short-term political factors could have a non

negligible indirect influence in social trust through their impact on institutional

confidence2.

Recent research has identified a handful of institutions as cornerstones—together with

other factors—of the creation of social trust. Institutions held responsible for the

implementation of universal policies are said to contribute most to the feeling that “most

people can be trusted” (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). According to this view, Police, Army,

1 Anyway, as Welch and others have stated, it is difficult to distinguish those factors which contribute to the formation of social capital from those that influence the formation of social trust (Welch and others, 2005). 2 In this paper we will not intend to review in a systematic way the literature about social trust or about confidence in institutions. For this purpose, see Rubal et al. (forthcoming).

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Courts, Health care System and Educational System are part of these institutions, and

differ from partisan “political/biased” institutions (Parliament, Government, Political

Parties) or “checking/control” institutions (Newspapers, T.V., Civil Service)3. This group

of authors assumes that implementation institutions have socialization effects, as

people in contact with them internalize messages of fairness, equality etc. that increase

trust in other people (generalized trust). There is, from this point of view, a positive

relation among confidence in certain institutions and social trust.

2. OBJECTIVES, DATA AND MEASUREMENT

We think that, if we take it seriously, the argument that institutions promote social trust

must be supplemented by two additional ideas. First, whether institutions in general

have this capacity or not should depend on their own perceived trustworthiness.

Secondly and closely related to the former, if institutions do really differ in their trust-

generating power, they should also differ in their trustworthiness. With these ideas as a

starting point we will set up an analysis of the relationship between –and the

determinants of- institutional confidence and social trust that will be developed in three

steps. Firstly, we contrast the hypothesis that citizens can distinguish among different

types of institutions when expressing their confidence, for a country (Spain) and a

period of 25 years (from the beginning of the democratic period until recent time).

Secondly, we try to examine the determinants of the institutional confidence in Spain,

considering the dimensionality of the confidence (whether there is more than one group

of institutions). Finally, we extend our analysis to another data set, incorporating more

variables to our initial model, in order to explore the direction of the relationships

among variables. In addition, we test the model in other five European countries to

examine the similarities and differences with Spain. Obviously, the extent to which we

will be able fulfil these objectives will be conditioned by the availability of data. We will

attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the available data sources by using three

different data sets.

A. Do citizens distinguish among institutions when they express their confidence? Our

first objective in this paper is to answer this question, for the Spanish case.

3 Although other typologies of institutions have been proposed in the literature (see for example Denters et al., 2007), we will take this taxonomy as a point of departure, and compare it with the results from previous work on the Spanish case.

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Objective1: to contrast the hypothesis that citizens discriminate between

different types of institutions when expressing their confidence.

For this purpose, the study of the dimensionality of institutional confidence during the

last 25 years in Spain, we carry out an individual level analysis of longitudinal data,

using information from 1980 to 20054. We compare the three dimensions of institutional

confidence established by Stolle and Rothstein (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002), with a two-

dimensional distinction we have obtained in a previous work, through a Confirmatory

Factor Analysis for each year (1980, 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2005), in order to observe

which of these models fits better to data.

We think that the case of Spain is especially interesting in this regard, because, at the

beginnings of the period we study, Spain completed a successful transition to

democracy. This gives special relevance to the longitudinal perspective, as it will allow

us not only to verify the existence of a distinction between the institutions, but also to

detect changes between a time when democracy was still emerging (1980) and later

periods, in which political life took place in a fully consolidated democratic setting.

B. The second objective we come through is the study of the determinants of

institutional confidence in Spain at the individual level during the period 1996-2005.

The results of our first objective will be conditioning the number of dependent variables

which will be considered in this second stage.

Objective2: to study some of the determinants of confidence in institutions

for the Spanish case, taking into account its dimensionality.

In this second step of our work, we were forced to restrict the data set previously used,

because the surveys of 1980 and 1990 did not contain enough information about the

alleged determinants of institutional confidence. Therefore, we use three

Latinobarometer surveys (1996, 2001 and 2005) from the Centro de Investigaciones

Sociológicas. In this second step, we run multivariate regression analyses addressed

to identify the determinants of confidence in institutions.

4 We use data from the World Values Survey (1981 and 1990) and from Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Barometer May 1990, code number 1871; Latinobarometer July 1996, code number 2218; Latinobarometer May 2001, code number 2417 and Latinobarometer October 2005, code number 2620).

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C. There has been much quarrel about the existence of a relation between social trust

and institutional confidence in the literature. Some authors detect a relation at the

aggregate level (Newton, 2001) or both at the aggregate and individual levels of

analysis (Hall 1999; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Others notice a reciprocal relation

among these two types of trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997) or even do not find any

relation at all. Our hypothesis establishes a relation among confidence and trust,

although the direction is not clear. One of the main purposes at this stage of our work is

to elucidate the direction of this relationship. Besides, we will investigate the relation of

institutional confidence with other determinants stressed in the literature.

At the same time, in this phase, we try to broaden the scope of the analysis by

increasing the number of independent variables formerly employed in the regression

model. Thus, we will compare our model for Spain with other countries, in order to

discover similarities and differences between them, being Spain the reference5.

Objective3: to examine the relation among institutional confidence and other

variables (including social trust) and the direction of the relation between

confidence in institutions and social trust for the Spanish case, proposing a

model which we replicate for other European countries.

For this purpose, we will use data from the first wave of the European Social Survey

(2002/3). The methodology is based on the Structural Equation Model, and we make

an analysis of invariance of the model, comparing Spain with five countries: France,

Germany, Italy, Great Britain and Sweden.

In steps two and three of our work we have included five different types of variables.

The first one encompasses variables with a political component. Within this block we

can distinguish four subgroups. The first one concerns evaluation of -and satisfaction

with- the political and economic context (satisfaction with the government, satisfaction

with the present state of the economy and evaluation of current working of some

welfare policies). A second subgroup is formed by variables linked with orientations

which are usually assumed to be relatively stable, either value orientations (i. e.

political ideology) or motivational orientations (i. e. interest in politics). The third

subgroup refers to exposure to information about politics and links the two previous

groups of variables. Finally, there is a set of political variables associated with political

5 There are contextual factors that influence both social trust and institutional confidence. Our intention is not to create a model for each country, but just to find differences with the Spanish model.

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behaviour (voting and political participation). The second block of variables that we

have taken into account measures different socio-demographic features of individuals

(age, sex, education). The third block includes a single variable: satisfaction with life.

Beyond its undeniable dependence on the external context, we assume that this

variable has a stable component related to optimism and a feeling of control over one’s

own life; hence, we understand that it measures not only a transient state of mind or

mood but also a steady personality trait. The fourth block is one particularly relevant

according to the main thrust of the literature about social capital and social trust, and

has to do with sociability, both of a formal (participation in associations) and an informal

kind (relations with friends, relatives and workmates). The last block of variables is

related to religion6.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

3.1 Study of the dimensionality of confidence in institutions

Recent literature has stressed the necessity of further elaboration of the concept of

institutional confidence. One of the most influential formulations distinguishes among

representative, implementation and control institutions. According to this view,

institutions with implementation functions are the most important in promoting social

trust, due to some of the characteristics they share (transparency, fairness,

universalism, impartiality) and their ability to exert a socialisation role.

We assume as a working hypothesis the possibility of the existence of different kinds of

institutions. But, instead of taking for granted any typology, our first goal in this paper is

to empirically adjudicate between two different classifications built upon the same set of

institutions (Political parties, Parliament, Government, Civil Service, Courts,

Newspapers, TV, Church, Army and Police). On the one hand, the typology suggested

by Rothstein and Stolle differentiates three sets of institutions (Model A, Figure 1). On

the other hand, an alternative distinction, based on our previous work, separates two

groups of institutions (Model B, Figure 1). For this purpose, we have compared the

whole fit of both models to survey data in Spain through confirmatory factor analysis.

6 For more details, see Appendix 1.

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Political/Biased

Institutions

Parties e11

1

Parliament e21

Government e31

Neutral/Order

Institutions

Courts e6

Army e7

Police e8

1

1

1

1

ControlInstitutions

Newspapers e11

T. V. e12

1

1

Church e91

Civil Service1

e10

PolíticalInstitutions

Parties e1

1

1

Parliament e21

Government e31

Social OrderInstitutions

Army e9

Police e10

Church e11

11

1

1

Civil Service e51

Courts e61

Newspapers e71

T. V. e81

Figure 1. Two models of the dimensionality of confidence in public institutions. The model proposed by Rothstein and Stolle7 differentiates three dimensions. The first

one is formed by political/biased institutions, that is, representative institutions with

elected officials: Political Parties, the Parliament and the Government. The second

group is formed by “neutral/order” institutions (the Courts, the Army, the Police; we

have added a fourth institution to this group – the Church – because, at least in the

Spanish case, it appears to be similar to the institutions belonging to this dimension).

And the last dimension, made up by actors with a control power, is formed by Civil

Service, Newspapers and Television.

Instead, our model distinguishes two different dimensions of the confidence in

institutions8. On the one side are those institutions which play an important role in

democratic political life, either as representatives of citizens (political parties, the

7 This model dropped out of two different analyses: one at the macro level with 50 countries, and the other at the micro level for Sweden. In both cases, the method used was Principal Component Analysis and results were quite similar (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). 8 In a previous paper (Caínzos et al., 2006), as a preliminary step to an age-cohort-period analysis of the evolution of social trust and political confidence in Spain, we executed a Principal Component Analysis based on a pooled data set which merged data from several surveys covering the period 1980 to 2005. Two distinct components resulted: one with a political character, and the other with a social order character.

Model A. Stolle & Rothstein, 2002 Model B. Caínzos et al., 2006

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Parliament and the Government), as external control agents (newspapers and

television), or as internal control agents (Civil Service and Courts). On the other side,

the second dimension is made up of social order institutions: the Army, the police and

the Church.

χ2 df χ2/df GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA

1980

Model A 613.65 12 51.14 .917 .805 .906 .908 .153

Model B 332.41 13 25.57 .958 .910 .949 .951 .107

1990

Model A 772.03 24 32.17 .865 .748 .758 .762 .162

Model B 792.22 26 30.47 .860 .758 .751 .757 .157

19902

Model A 223.81 7 31.97 .974 .921 .986 .987 .104

Model B 69.17 8 8.65 .992 .978 .996 .996 .052

19963

Model A 880.18 32 27.51 .920 .862 .919 .922 .103

Model B 675.67 34 19.87 .945 .910 .938 .941 .087

20013

Model A 628.55 32 19.64 .948 .911 .945 .947 .086

Model B 1447.58 34 42.58 .890 .823 .873 .875 .129

20053

Model A 697.88 32 21.81 .954 .920 .928 .931 .083

Model B 867.84 34 25.53 .948 .916 .911 .914 .090

Sources: 1 World Values Surveys (measure: 1 to 4); 2Barometer, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (measure: 0 to 10); 3 Latinobarometer, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (measure: 1 to 4). Table 1. Goodness of fit statistics for two models of the dimensionality of confidence in public institutions.

We tested the two models for 1980, 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2006 in order to encompass

a wide period9. Surveys employed were mainly chosen by two reasons: the availability

of the questions about institutional confidence, which appear for the first time in 1980 –

it reappears again in 1990; and the selection of a sufficient distance between the

surveys, which would allow to trace possible changes over time (to examine the

available institutions for each of the selected years, with their means and typical

deviations, see appendix 2).

Although there are differences in the results obtained for each year, we can find a

similar pattern for some of them. If we focus our attention on global indexes of

goodness of fit, as displayed in table 1, we could say that our model achieves better

values for three surveys (1980, 1996, and the second of the surveys we have used for 9 See footnote 4 for more details about the surveys used in this analysis.

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1990), whereas Rothstein and Stolle’s model is more successful for the 2001 and 2005

surveys. Nevertheless, this general assessment of the models must be nuanced when

we also examine the values of the estimates parameters for the different models, and

not only to the goodness of fit statistics (see appendix 3).

Survey data collected in 1980 are more clearly characterized by the existence of two

dimensions (political and social order institutions), as shows the fact that in the two

indexes of global goodness of fit considered here (GFI and AGFI) model B achieves

values above 0.90 and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)

borders its admitted value (0.10). Better results for this model are also observed in the

Normed Fit Index (NFI) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), very close to 0.95. Model

A performs quite worse for all these indexes. Summing up, it seems to be more

appropriate for this year to maintain a two-dimensional solution.

Both models proved to fit very poorly to the data of the first survey that we used to

contrast their validity in 1990. According to the values from table 1, none of the models

achieves fit values within the recommended range of acceptability. Therefore, to solve

this weakness, which could be due to some peculiarity or anomaly of this survey, we

resorted to a different data source for this year10. Although this new survey has its own

deficiencies — it includes only 6 from the initial sample of 10 institutions —, both

models exhibit an excellent global fit, even though results are better for model B.

Nevertheless, if we check the correlation among the latent variables (see appendix 3),

we can observe an extraordinary overlap between factors, what points towards a one-

dimensional solution as the best description of this sample data.

For the 1996 data, both the goodness of fit statistics and the adequacy of parameters

estimates indicate the convenience of maintaining model B as the more valid

approximation to the components of confidence in institutions. Once again, data show

that the dimensionality is lower than that proposed by Rothstein and Stolle.

Data from 2001 reveal Model A to be the one with best fit. Nevertheless, correlation

between the political/biased and neutral/order factors is over 0.90, what reflects that

the distinction among both types of institutions is quite blurry. This makes us think that

10 In this survey (a barometer of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), confidence in institutions was measured using an eleven points scale (from 0 to 10), instead of the scale of 1 - 4 of WVS and Latinobarometer. Moreover, the sample is larger in this study.

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it is convenient to be cautious about the viability of the three-dimensional solution, even

if it offers a good fit to data.

Finally, Model A successes with data from 2005. However, in this case we must notice

that correlation between political/biased institutions and neutral/order institutions falls

outside the admissible range, surpassing value 1.0. These results lead us again to

reject the existence of three dimensions and throw us back to two-dimensionality.

Concluding, dimensionality of confidence in institutions in Spain seems to be restricted

to one or two dimensions for all the years we analysed. Even if, at first sight, a model of

higher dimensionality seems to have a better fit for some of the samples, this view is

disconfirmed by an inspection of the parameters of that model, which point towards the

preferability of a simpler solution. It is worth to draw attention to the fact that this low

dimensionality of institutional confidence is present all along a time-period through

which Spain suffered dramatic political and social changes. More specifically, we find

one- or, more commonly, two-dimensionality both in a moment of early development of

democracy and at a time when citizenship had a relatively long experience of living

under normal democratic political conditions. Hence, it does not seem that low

dimensionality of political confidence should be seen as an ephemeral phenomenon,

but rather as a stable feature of the structure of Spaniards’ political attitudes.

The preferred solution reduces institutional confidence to two factors. On the one hand,

confidence in social order institutions, which encompasses attitudes towards three

institutions: the army, the police and the church; the loadings of the army and the police

are consistently high along the whole time period, while the church presents lower

values after 1990. On the other hand, confidence in political institutions; under this

heading are subsumed government, parliament, political parties, courts, civil service,

newspapers and TV. Three of them have persistently high scores (government,

parliament and political parties), while other two have high loadings on this dimension

in most years (civil service, with the only deviation of 2001; and courts, with the

exception of 2005); newspapers and TV are the items which work worse in all years.

3.2 The determinants of confidence in institutions

Once we have knowledge of the existence of two types of institutions through factor

analysis, we are now able to study the elements that influence levels of institutional

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confidence in Spain. Moreover, considering both dimensions – social order institutions

and political institutions – will permit us to find out whether there are determinants that

are more relevant for one or another type of institutional confidence. That is, we will try

to establish which are the elements that promote confidence in social order institutions

as well as those that explain confidence in political institutions.

In this step of our work, we have been forced to restrict the scope of our data set,

because several of the surveys we used in our dimensionality analysis do not include

the kind of explanatory variables which have been given saliency in the literature on the

determinants of institutional confidence. For this reason, we will only use data from

1996 (Latinobarometer, CIS 2.218), 2001 (Latinobarometer, CIS 2.417) and 2005

(Latinobarometer, CIS 2620) surveys. They incorporate some important variables for

the analysis of social and institutional confidence, even if they are not wholly

satisfactory, because they lack information on such relevant aspects as political

participation and associational involvement.

By analysing data from these years, we cover a time period characterized by

consolidated democratic institutions, after almost twenty years of democracy.

Nevertheless, this period presents substantial diversity in terms of the prevailing

economic and political conditions, which may be of interest in order to check whether

changes in political climate alter the level of institutional confidence and, above all,

whether they modify the relationships between attitudes towards institutions and our

independent variables.

Year N Mean St. Dev. Stat. sign. of differences between the means

Year P<

2001 0.000 Political institutions 1996 2.062 16.66 4.74 2005 0.000 1996 0.000 Political institutions 2001 2.194 17.67 4.64 2005 0.001 1996 0.000 Political institutions 2005 2.614 17.24 4.42 2001 0.001 2001 0.003 Social order institutions 1996 2292 7.96 2.26 2005 0.015 1996 0.003 Social order institutions 2001 2338 7.74 2.27 2005 0.801 1996 0.015 Social order institutions 2005 2857 7.78 2.25 2001 0.801

Entries in the last column are p values associated with the Scheffé test.

Table 2. Aggregate levels of confidence in public institutions in Spain, 1996-2005.

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Table 2 reports the aggregate level of confidence in both political and social order

institutions for years 1996, 2001 and 2005, making possible to discern some

differences among them. Confidence in social order institutions would decrease very

mildly between 1996 and 2001, and then remains unchanged in 2005. Instead,

confidence in political institutions attains its highest value in 2001, and declines slightly

between 2001 and 2005. It is important not to overrate the magnitude of these

differences, but, with some caution, they might be interpreted as symptoms of more

general short-term movements in Spanish public opinion. The 1996 Latinobarometer

was done within a post-electoral frame, which would recover political stability after

several years of political turmoil related with corruption scandals; that climate could be

conducing to a relatively low level of confidence in overtly political institutions and,

conversely, could lead people to be more confident in social order institutions. Instead,

2001 was characterised by political stability, with the PP governing with absolute

majority in the Parliament, and had been preceded by several years of vigorous

economic growth; this could generate a feeling of security in public opinion, resulting in

a reinforcement of the confidence in political institutions. The small decline of

confidence in political institutions between 2001 and 2005 could be associated to the

high degree of polarization which pervaded Spanish political life since the 2004 general

election took place in unusual and very conflictive circumstances.

Anyway, the magnitude and possible explanations of these aggregate changes are

only of secondary interest for our purposes in this section of the paper. As stated

above, our main concern is to evaluate the relevance of some alleged factors of

institutional confidence and to assess its temporal consistency. For this we have run

two multivariate regression analyses. The need to assure comparability among the

three years has limited the range of independent variables which we could introduce in

our model. With this limitation, the model attends to some important factors for

understanding institutional confidence (a brief description of the independent variables

can be found in Appendix 1). These are of three types: sociodemographic features,

religion, and political variables.

Firstly, some socio-demographic variables have been generally related with higher

levels of institutional confidence. For example, literature states that people with more

studies or middle aged individuals tend to be more confident. Both variables are

included in the model, together with sex.

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Religion is considered here as a combination of religious orientations and observance,

which seeks to observe the existence of differences among Catholics, members of

other religions or non religious individuals, as well as among catholic practitioners, in

relation with institutional confidence.

Several kinds of political variables are also included in the regression model. First of

all, those related to stable value and motivational orientations: ideology and interest in

politics; these orientations may guide individual attitudes towards public institutions.

Secondly, we give place to variables representing more contextual views, such as the

evaluation of the economic situation, because they shape the way individuals perceive

the efficiency of institutions (for example, if there were a gap between government

performance and citizen’s expectations, institutional confidence could be reduced).

Vote in last national elections should probably be seen as a sort of link among stable

political orientations and short-term evaluations: it is highly dependent on long-term

political allegiances but it is also highly responsive to stimula from the immediate social

and political environment; furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that it will bias all kind

of political perceptions and evaluations. Finally, we pay attention to the exposure of

individuals to political information in diverse media. It is not easy to predict the sign of

its effects. It could work as promoter of institutional confidence, because being

informed about institutions would reinforce familiarity with them, and therefore make

institutions be closer to citizens; but it could also contribute to erode it, be it due to the

extensive coverage of negative aspects of political life (such as political scandals) in

mass media, or due to a raising of the standards of civic exigency among the most

informed citizens.

The regression model is:

Yinstitutional confidence= β0 + β1Age + β2Education + β3Sex + β4Religion + β5Ideology +

β6Political information + β7Vote in last national elections + β8Valuation of economic

situation + e 3.2.1. Determinants of confidence in social order institutions When comparing the determinants of confidence in social order institutions in 1996,

2001 and 2005, we do not find substantial discrepancies from year to year. Instead,

most of the variables introduced in the model behave similarly. Main disparities are

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located in those variables related to political information and interest in politics, while

the magnitude and significant of coefficients of the other independent variables do not

strongly vary.

Attending to socio-demographic variables, only age is significant in our model for 2001

and 2005. Thus, older people seem to be more confident in social order institutions

than young people, even if the effects are small in both cases. Regarding education,

effects are significant in none of the years, even if we do not control by the other

independent variables11, what would contradict the hypothesis of the existence of a

relationship between higher levels of education and more institutional confidence.

Religion is the most outstanding variable of the model, as shown by the magnitude of

its coefficients and their significance. However, we must be cautious with their

interpretation, because of the presence of the Church as part of the dependent

variable. Faith in another religion different to Catholicism or not being religious is

clearly related to less confidence in social order institutions, compared with those who

are catholic. Moreover, the more practicing are catholic individuals, the more they tend

to trust in social order institutions, as coefficients grow from those who are not very

practicing to the individuals who say they are very practicing, being the “Catholic

practicing” the reference category. Religion is therefore a central determinant of

confidence in social order institutions.

Coefficients of the variable of ideology are positive and significant for the three years,

what indicates that right – wing individuals demonstrate to be more confident than

leftists. This is what we would expect, given the emphasis rightist ideologies have

traditionally put on issues of social order and stability. This effect of the ideology is

compounded by the impact of vote in last national elections, as individuals who voted

PSOE, IU, another party or did not vote are significantly less confident than those who

voted PP, independently of the party in the Cabinet in those years. Indeed, even when

PSOE is governing (2005), PP voters still have more confidence in social order

institutions than other citizens.

Net of the effect of other political variables, interest in politics appears to be positively

related with more confidence in social order institutions. Only 2001 is different at this

point, as coefficients of political interest are not significant for this year (apart from for

11 When attending to the education as an unique independent variable, effects are not statistically significant.

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the category “quite interested”). The effects of the variables linked with political

information are not remarkable, with the exception of “Exposure to political information

by reading newspapers”, which has significant but tiny negative effects in 1996 and

2001.

1996 2001 2005

B St. errors B St.

errors B St. errors

Age 0.005 0.003 0.009 *** 0.003 0.017 *** 0.003 Education (r: primary education) Higher education 0.039 0.131 0.148 0.138 -0.147 0.112 Secondary education 0.040 0.106 -0.053 0.108 -0.018 0.096 Less than primary education 0.168 0.131 -0.093 0.117 0.006 0.115 Without information -0.437 0.507 0.468 0.372 0.300 0.301 Sex 0.009 0.082 -0.061 0.083 0.004 0.074 Religion (r: Catholic; observant) Catholic; very observant 0.660 *** 0.191 0.666 ** 0.224 0.243 0.226 Catholic; not very observant -0.738 *** 0.109 -.583 *** 0.117 -0.617 *** 0.112 Catholic; not observant at all -1.497 *** 0.122 -1.535 *** 0.122 -1.267 *** 0.114 Another religion -1.779 *** 0.296 -1.661 *** 0.218 -1.554 *** 0.229 Not religious -2.710 *** 0.137 -2.666 *** 0.158 -2.415 *** 0.124 Without information -1.392 ** 0.442 -1.913 *** 0.310 -1.730 *** 0.309 Ideology 0.142 *** 0.025 0.194 *** 0.030 0.235 *** 0.025 Political interest (r: Not al all interested) Very interested 0.448 ** 0.165 0.014 0.168 0.567 *** 0.140 Quite interested 0.305 ** 0.113 0.259 * 0.113 0.308 *** 0.100 Hardly interested 0.161 0.103 -0.043 0.103 0.283 *** 0.093 Political information Exposure to political information at TV 0.013 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.015 0.016 Exposure to political information to the Radio 0.030 * 0.013 -0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 Exposure to political information in Newspapers -0.034 * 0.016 -0.056 *** 0.016 -0.025 0.015

Vote in last national elections (r: PP) PSOE -0.344 ** 0.126 -0.387 ** 0.133 -0.232 0.119 IU -0.793 *** 0.175 -0.506 ** 0.017 -0.701 ** 0.230 Other -1.026 *** 0.161 -0.993 *** 0.177 -1.048 *** 0.166 Did not vote -0.402 0.240 -0.727 *** 0.128 -0.550 *** 0.123 Without information -0.776 *** 0.113 -0.465 *** 0.131 -0.500 *** 0.123 Valuation of economic situation (r: Bad) Very good -0.977 1.065 1.001 ** 0.347 0.730 0.397 Good 0.646 *** 0.153 0.518 *** 0.135 0.570 *** 0.114 So-so 0.251 ** 0.089 0.235 0.123 0.286 ** 0.099 Very bad -0.277 * 0.141 -0.713 ** 0.250 -0.464 ** 0.179 Constant 8.135 *** 0.256 7.627 0.294 6.933 0.263 N 2.179 2.213 2.720 R-squared 0.361 0.337 0.338

r: Reference category. Significant differences with 2005 in bold. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. TABLE 3. Factors of confidence in social order institutions. Finally, effects of the valuation of the economic situation are significant and quite

strong for most of the categories in comparison with those who affirm that the

economic situation is bad: the better is the opinion about the economy the higher are

levels of confidence.

16

3.2.2. Determinants of confidence in political institutions Contrary to confidence in social order institutions, where little difference could be

established between the three years, there seem to be more temporal variation in the

results when trying to explain confidence in political institutions. There are important

differences among 2005 and the other two years, as shown in the table 4 (differences

with 2005 are marked in bold). In spite of these fluctuations, some similarities can be

found.

The main regularities concern the strength of the influence of interest in politics and

valuation of the economic situation. The magnitude of their coefficients reveals that

these are probably the variables that have the most pervasive and consistent impact

over the whole period. Higher levels of political interest are related with more

confidence in political institutions. Something similar happens with the valuation of the

economic situation: the better is the perception of the economy the higher is the

confidence in political institutions. Less strong, but also persistent along the time, is the

effect of exposure to political information at TV, which has always a positive sign;

perhaps this is due not only to the impact of political information in itself, but also to the

fact that people who watch TV more often have distinctive profiles according to some

characteristics which are not included in our model.

The remaining variables behave less regularly over time. Ideology has a relatively

important positive effect in 1996, which becomes non significant in the other two years.

Even more impressive, but maybe predictable, is the change of the effects of “Vote in

last national elections”. While in 1996 and 2001 all categories but IU voters have less

confidence in political institutions than PP voters, in 2005 only PSOE voters differ

significantly from PP voters, and this difference has a positive sign. The change in the

party in office can explain this dramatic change in the sign of the relationship. Thus,

individuals would have more confidence in political institutions if the party they voted for

were in the Cabinet. In 1996 and 2001, when PP is governing, voters who had not

voted PP were less confident in political institutions than those who voted PP. Instead,

in 2005, only those who voted PSOE have more confidence in political institutions. In

summary, it looks like confidence in political institutions has an important partisan

component.

17

Religion also counts differently as an explanatory variable for each year. Whilst

coefficients are significant in all categories but two in 2001 and 1996 (“Catholic very

observant” in both years, “Catholic not very observant” in 2001 and “Without

information” in 1996), with more negative effects for those who are not religious or are

believers of a religion different of Catholicism, religion is much less relevant in 2005. In

this year, only one group (“Not religious”) differs from the reference category.

Finally, level of education affects the confidence in political institutions merely in 2005,

with negative coefficients, apparently contradicting the expectations we would derive

from the literature. This is due to the following reason: when introduced in the

regression model as unique independent variable, the effects of education level are

positive, though quite often non significant; however, once we consider other variables,

the effects are progressively cancelled and even become negative for 2005.

1996 2001 2005 B e B e B e Age -0.006 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.005 Education (r: primary education) Higher education 0.284 0.282 0.272 0.285 -0.529 * 0.224 Secondary education 0.094 0.232 0.150 0.224 -0.524 ** 0.195 Less than primary education 0.339 0.307 -0.014 0.248 -0.318 0.244 Without information 1.740 1.072 1.491 0.823 0.725 0.636 Sex -0.087 0.180 -0.262 0.174 -0.406 ** 0.151 Religion (r: Catholic; observant) Catholic; very observant -0.582 0.450 -0.037 0.513 -0.080 0.473 Catholic; not very observant -0.403 *** 0.244 -0.473 0.246 0.184 0.234 Catholic; not observant at all -1.440 *** 0.272 -1.379 *** 0.256 -0.159 0.237 Another religion -1.284 * 0.636 -1.576 *** 0.466 -0.445 0.463 Not religious -1.571 *** 0.299 -2.970 *** 0.332 -0.993 *** 0.255 Without information -0.241 0.962 -2.188 *** 0.634 -0.899 0.635 Ideology 0.215 *** 0.055 0.101 0.063 0.084 0.050 Political interest (r: Not al all interested) Very interested 2.303 *** 0.362 0.864 * 0.348 1.524 *** 0.282 Quite interested 1.861 *** 0.251 1.286 *** 0.237 1.724 *** 0.205 Hardly interested 1.395 *** 0.233 0.670 ** 0.218 1.520 *** 0.194 Political information Exposure to political information at TV 0.155 *** 0.039 0.168 *** 0.037 0.097 ** 0.033 Exposure to political information to the Radio -0.046 0.030 0.001 0.028 -0.026 0.025

Exposure to political information in Newspapers -0.022 0.034 -0.049 0.033 -0.002 0.029

Vote in last national elections (r: PP) PSOE -0.507 0.283 -0.609 * 0.279 1.396 *** 0.243 IU -0.275 0.383 -0.486 0.453 0.482 0.455 Other -0.950 ** 0.350 -1.592 *** 0.364 -0.109 0.339 Did not vote -1.633 *** 0.513 -1.347 *** 0.270 0.135 0.254 Without information -1.083 *** 0.254 -0.784 ** 0.277 -0.007 0.252 Valuation of economic situation (r: Bad) Very good 3.107 2.249 2.118 ** 0.780 5.324 *** 0.826 Good 2.772 *** 0.342 1.811 *** 0.286 3.062 *** 0.235 So-so 1.450 *** 0.198 0.885 *** 0.260 2.241 *** 0.207 Very bad -1.203 *** 0.313 -1.549 ** 0.544 -0.976 ** 0.365 Constant 14.491 0.571 16.503 0.619 13.503 0.545 N 1.974 2088 2499 R-squared 0.184 0.173 0.187

r: Reference category. Significant differences with 2005 in bold. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.

18

TABLE 4. Factors of confidence in political institutions. 3.2.3 Confidence in social order institutions vs. confidence in political institutions After having analysed the two regression models for confidence in political and social

order institutions, some general conclusions can be drawn. Although there are

similarities among the determinants of confidence in social order institutions and

confidence in political institutions (for example, education has no significant effects on

institutional confidence), we discover some disparities which must be mentioned.

Those variables highly affecting confidence in social order institutions are directly

associated with more stable individual orientations, such as religion or ideology.

Indeed, being an observant Catholic is strongly correlated with more confidence in

social order institutions. Conservative individuals are also more confident in this type of

institutions. Contextual changes do not happen to influence their perceptions about this

kind of institutions, as there is no significant variation of these effects over time.

Confidence in political institutions, however, depends heavily on contextual political

factors such as the situation of the economy and, above all, the presence of one’s

preferred party in government. In actual fact, changes can be seen among the three

years in the impact of the independent variables (even modifying the effects of

allegedly stable individual orientations), as a result of the transformations in the

economy and the political life. Perhaps their most visible consequences can be seen

through the variable of vote in last national elections, in which coefficients are

completely different for 2005, on the one hand, and for 1996 and 2001, on the other.

The effect of having voted for the PSOE is significant and positive for this year,

whereas it is significant and negative in 1996 and 2001. Therefore, individuals tend to

have more confidence in political institutions when they feel close to the party that

governs.

The punch-line of this story seems quite straightforward. Interpersonal variations in

confidence in social order institutions depend heavily upon beliefs, political orientations

and political loyalties which can be seen as long-term predispositions of individuals.

Furthermore, the effects of these factors –and, more generally, of the determinants of

confidence in this kind of institutions- display a notable temporal persistence in their

19

magnitude and their sign. One is tempted to assert that confidence in social order

institutions is part of a general social worldview and that individuals can be expected to

be faithful to their views on this kind of institutions. Quite the opposite, confidence in

political institutions is more contingent on short-term factors, such as the valuation of

economic situation, and -perhaps more interestingly- on the interaction among, on the

one side, stable beliefs and political commitments and, on the other side, contextual

factors such as which party is in office. This last point implies that confidence in political

institutions is strongly affected by a partisan bias, which is in itself a stable explanatory

factor. However, it also means that individuals will be prone to change their confidence

in this kind of institutions according to their proximity to the political actors who are in

charge of running those institutions.

3.3 Towards a causal model of confidence in institutions and social trust

To carry out our third goal we have specified a structural equation model, trying to

achieve three different aims. Firstly, we will explore the direction of the controversial

relationship between social trust and confidence in institutions. Secondly, but at the

same time, we will pay attention not only to the relation between our two ultimate

dependent variables (social trust and confidence in institutions), but also to their

associations with some other variables that the literature has singled out as their causal

antecedents. This will let us try to test some of the relations that have been drawn by

scholars in this field of study. Thirdly we will compare the resultant model for Spain with

data from five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and United

Kingdom), in order to look for commonalities across countries. The existence of such a

regular pattern would give strong evidence for the robustness of the model.

3.3.1. Introducing the model.

Due to the number of variables taken into account, we have grouped similar variables

in blocks in order to simplify the presentation of the model, making easier for the reader

to understand its main components. In the following paragraphs we briefly explain each

of these blocks and the relations among variables that we have proposed (more

information about each variable can be found in an appendix 1).

20

Sociability. Within this block we include both formal and informal sociability.

Involvement in associations is usually thought as having an important role in promoting

social trust. Informal networks with friends, workmates and relatives have also been

underscored as cornerstones of social trust. The relation of both variables with

confidence in institutions is less clear according to literature. Our model states that both

formal and informal sociability are related to social trust and confidence in institutions,

but their effects on them could have different weights. We presume that associational

membership is influenced by religious observance, as it promotes membership in

particular kinds of associations. We also assume that it is easier for those strongly

related to friends, relatives and workmates to be part of associations because the

higher density of their social connections provides them the opportunity of entering in

organizations. The last pathway reaching associational membership comes from

political interest, as those more interested in politics are more prone to be part of public

good associations. Informal sociability receives one arrow in our model, coming from

religious observance, because attendance to religious services puts people in face to

face interaction settings, helping them to create and reproduce informal networks of

relations.

Satisfaction with life. This variable is considered here to be a trait of personality,

which could be based on adult life experiences (Delhey and Newton, 2002) but could

also be related to earlier influences or to the socialisation process at the first steps of

our life (Uslaner, 2002). It could have influence both in social trust and in institutional

confidence, because, as previously stated, we assume that satisfaction with life is

associated with a generally optimistic outlook and this, in its turn, entails more positive

attitudes towards the others. We have also drawn lines to variables related to levels of

satisfaction with the political context (with the government, the economy and welfare

policies).

Religious observance. This variable must stand alone as it is qualitatively different

from the others. It measures the frequency of attendance to daily practices in religious

services. We assume that it is an exogenous variable. Apart from the relations we have

already explained, we predict that it will influence political ideology.

Satisfaction and evaluation of different aspects of the functioning of the political system. In this block we include three different variables: satisfaction with government,

with the state of the economy and evaluation of welfare state policies (concretely health

care system and education). These variables have a more temporary character, and

21

partly depend on the electoral cycle. Satisfaction with the government can be directly

linked with institutional confidence. It should receive influence from closeness to the

party in government, because citizens’ attitudes towards government are not simply an

evaluation of its performance, but also involve partisan biases. The direct arrow from

satisfaction with the economy to satisfaction with the government is based on the

classical assumption of the literature about economic voting. In keeping with that

literature, we also predict that satisfaction with the economy is influenced by the

closeness to the party in government and impacts on institutional confidence. The

evaluation of welfare policies is directly connected to satisfaction with the government,

although there is a long-term component in both policies.

Stable political orientations. It includes value orientations (political ideology) and

motivational orientations (interest in politics). Even if less categorically, closeness to

the party in government could be considered under this heading, because it is

generally associated with political ideology12. These three variables have also been

stressed by literature as influencing confidence in institutions (Pharr and Putnam, 2000;

Denters et al, 2007). Apart from its relation to confidence in institutions, political

ideology has also a direct line to social trust, because left – right scale intends to

measure basic political orientations, which go together with different visions of human

being and, therefore, different conceptions about trustworthiness of others (Rosenberg,

1956).

Political participation. We include it in our model after some political variables

(ideology, political interest) and at the same position as associational membership. It

influences both social trust and confidence in institutions.

Our two main dependent variables are social trust and confidence in institutions. Both

are included in the model as latent variables, which make them different from all the

others. We have drawn a reciprocal relation between them, precisely because one of

our aims is to test which is the direction with a stronger weight.

12 This variable plays two roles in our model. On the one hand, it is important in itself, because partisanship strongly affects citizens’ evaluations of all kind of political objects. On the other hand, it plays an instrumental role. If we intended to include in our model the direct effects of ideology on political evaluations and on confidence in political institutions, we would probably find some artificial differences among countries in the sign of the coefficients, associated to the ideological profile of the party in government, because for some purposes the really relevant variable is not ideology but ideological distance to party in government. Introducing proximity to party in government as an intermediate variable allows capturing some of the effects of ideology in a way that is interpretable in a relatively consistent way across countries.

22

Social trust. This latent variable is formed by three items13 based on the five items of

the Rosenberg scale of misanthropy (Rosenberg, 1956). The first item measures

generalized trust of people, the second measures fairness and the third helpfulness.

Confidence in political institutions. The other latent variable is also formed by three

items. In the ESS there are questions about confidence in six different institutions. We

decided to exclude from our variable confidence in European Parliament and in United

Nations, due basically to two reasons: the first one was that item non response

severely reduced sample size, and the other one was that these two institutions were

qualitatively different from the others (these are less known institutions for people in

general, citizens have less contact with them). The other institution which was not

taken into account was the police, because our previous analysis of dimensionality

proved that this variable loads on the dimension of the social order institutions. With the

variables we use in our analysis (confidence in courts, politicians and the Parliament),

we assured a compact block of political/representative institutions.

Figure 2 presents a graphic representation of our model of social trust and confidence

in political institutions. Table 5 displays goodness of fit statistics for the six countries

included in our analysis, which reveal that the fit of the model is in general quite

satisfactory. Only the case of Italy requires some nuance of this general positive

assessment, and this is probably due to the small sample size.

13 As it has been recently demonstrated, it seems that the number of indicators and the precision of the measure are very important as the results of the analysis seems to change with three items and an 11-point scale compared with analysis with the traditional measures (see Zmerli et al., 2007).

23

Figure 2. Causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Original specification.

χ2 d.f. χ2/df GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA RMR AIC

Spain 323.05 90 3.59 0.968 0.946 0.928 0.946 0.047 0.0457 449.05

France 378.97 90 4.21 0.968 0.946 0.924 0.940 0.049 0.0466 504.97

Germany 539.86 90 6.00 0.975 0.957 0.938 0.947 0.045 0.0336 665.86

Italy 486.12 90 5.40 0.945 0.906 0.875 0.895 0.070 0.0627 612.12

Sweden 364.29 90 4.05 0.973 0.955 0.941 0.954 0.044 0.0358 490.29

United Kingdom 399.25 90 4.44 0.976 0.958 0.949 0.960 0.043 0.0373 525.25

Table 5. Goodness of fit statistics for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Original specification.

In spite of the good fit of the whole model, an inspection of the estimated parameters

allowed us to observe that some of the relations initially considered were not relevant

at all. This leads us to simplify the model slightly by deleting those relations which

satisfied two conditions: they were not significant and their removal did not affect

significantly any of the other parameters of the model. This resulted in the re-

specification of the model displayed in Figure 3. Goodness of fit statistics for this model

are presented in Table 6.

SocialTrust

Trust_1 e1

Trust_2 e2

Trust_3 e3

Confidence in institutions

Courts e4

Politicians e5

Parliament e6

Religious observance

Informal sociability res1

Political interest

Political ideology res2

Closeness party government res3

Associationalmembership

res4

Politicalparticipation

res5

res7

Satisfactioneconomy

res8

res10

res11

State of welfare policies res6

Satisfactionwith life

res9

Satisfaction withthe government

24

Figure 3. Causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Final specification. χ2 d.f. χ2/df GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA RMR AIC

Spain 331.99 97 3.42 0.967 0.948 0.926 0.946 0.046 0.0479 443.99

France 421.60 97 4.35 0.965 0.944 0.915 0.933 0.050 0.0505 533.60

Germany 612.94 97 6.32 0.972 0.955 0.929 0.940 0.046 0.0410 724.94

Italy 508.81 97 5.25 0.942 0.908 0.870 0.891 0.069 0.0619 620.81

Sweden 374.06 97 3.86 0.973 0.957 0.939 0.954 0.042 0.0366 486.06

United Kingdom 419.88 97 4.33 0.974 0.959 0.946 0.958 0.042 0.0406 531.88

Table 6. Goodness of fit statistics for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Re-specified model. 3.3.2. Substantive results for the model in Spain. Taking for granted the good fit of the model, we can now go into the core of our

analysis, that is, the examination of the estimated parameters of the model for Spain.

The first point on which we will focus our attention is the relationship between social

trust and confidence in political institutions. It should be recalled that our starting point

was the idea that public institutions have an outstanding role in the formation of social

SocialTrust

Trust_1 e111

Trust_2 e21

Trust_3 e31

Confidence in institutions

Courts e4

Politicians e5

Parliament e6

1

1

11

Religious observance

Informal sociability res1 1

Political interest

Political ideology res2 1

Closeness party government res3 1

Associationalmembership

res4 1

Politicalparticipation

res5

res7

Satisfactioneconomy res8

1

res10

res11

1

1

1

1

State of welfare policies res6

1

Satisfactionwith life res9

1

Satisfaction with government

25

capital and, more specifically, of social trust. Now, it seems reasonable to think that the

ability of social institutions to play that role will be contingent on the fact that citizens

have high levels of confidence in those institutions, although it could be plausible to

expect the existence of an influence with reverse direction. The estimated parameters

for the relationship between social trust and institutional confidence displayed in Table

7 show that the causal connection goes from confidence in institutions towards social

trust. Indeed, confidence in institutions is the best single predictor of social trust among

the variables included in our model: the standardized coefficient of 0.385 indicates a

moderately strong relationship. Meanwhile, the reverse effect is almost null and non

significant. These results allow us to specify the direction of the causal relationship

between these two variables, corroborating the expectation that institutional confidence

is a key factor in the generation of social trust, whereas the opposite is not true. This

confers great relevance to the elucidation of the factors that promote or inhibit

confidence in institutions.

Paramount among these factors are variables consisting in evaluations of – and/or

statements on level of satisfaction with – different aspects of the functioning of the

political system: government performance, state of the economy (which can be taken

as a determinant, or even a proxy, of the evaluation of government performance in this

area) and the current state of two major social policies (policies on health and

education). If we pay attention to the direct effects of these variables, satisfaction with

government stands out as the most important. However, as we turn to the sum of direct

and indirect effects, the total impact of the three variables becomes very similar. A

large part of the effects of satisfaction with the economy and evaluation of social

policies is channelled through satisfaction with government, something that is

consistent with expectations derived from previous research on the influence of policy

and economic evaluations on government popularity. The magnitude of the effects of

this set of variables gives support to the idea that citizens’ confidence in institutions is

highly sensitive to their evaluation of the functioning and outcomes of the political

system, i.e., to perceptions submitted to relatively short run fluctuations dependent on

the ordinary working of the political system.

26

Estimate S.E. P Standard.Regression Weights Religious observance → Political ideology 0.337 0.11 0.003 0.088Religious observance → Associational membership 0.050 0.02 0.029 0.063Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.110 0.03 0.001 0.092Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.238 0.04 *** 0.198Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.071 0.02 0.002 0.088Informal sociability → Social trust 0.053 0.04 0.130 0.048Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.219 0.03 *** 0.234Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.359 0.03 *** 0.331Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.142 0.03 *** 0.156Political interest → Associational membership 0.216 0.04 *** 0.140Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.074 0.06 0.194 -0.035Political interest → Political participation 0.572 0.05 *** 0.302Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.369 0.07 *** 0.167Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.01 *** 0.161Political ideology → Political participation -0.003 0.01 0.624 -0.013Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.148 0.03 *** 0.130Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.294 0.04 *** 0.224Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.364 0.03 *** 0.247Associational membership → Political participation 0.352 0.03 *** 0.285Associational membership → Social trust -0.042 0.05 0.346 -0.031Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.021 0.04 0.621 0.015Political participation → Social trust 0.146 0.04 *** 0.133Political participation → Confidence in political institutions -0.033 0.04 0.377 -0.028State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.193 0.03 *** 0.149State of welfare policies → Social trust -0.014 0.04 0.714 -0.015State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.181 0.03 *** 0.176Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.586 0.03 *** 0.523Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.162 0.03 *** 0.183Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.283 0.03 *** 0.357

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions -0.034 0.07 0.607 -0.032Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.361 0.06 *** 0.385

Social trust → Trust_1 1.000 0.775Social trust → Trust_2 0.945 0.05 *** 0.739Social trust → Trust_3 0.826 0.05 *** 0.643Confidence in political institutions → Courts 0.888 0.04 *** 0.696Confidence in political institutions → Politicians 0.938 0.04 *** 0.759Confidence in political institutions → Parliament 1.000 0.797

Covariances Estimate S.E. P CorrelationReligious observance ↔ Political interest -0.014 0.04 0.728 -0.010res6 ↔ res8 1.151 0.11 *** 0.338

R2 Estimate Informal sociability 0.000 Political ideology 0.008 Distance party government 0.026 Associational membership 0.031 Political participation 0.196 State of welfare policies 0.073 Satisfaction economy 0.160 Satisfaction government 0.487 Satisfaction with life 0.048 Confidence in political institutions 0.349 Social trust 0.193

Table 7. Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Spain.

27

Besides these relatively short run political factors, a significant direct effect of political

interest can be seen. We take this as a signal of the relevance of a kind of stable

political orientation, in this case of a motivational nature. This stands in stark contrast to

what happens with another kind of political orientations, such as ideology: a previous

specification of our model included a path from political ideology to confidence in

institutions, but, contrary to our expectations, it proved to be entirely irrelevant.

Furthermore, although political ideology does exert an indirect effect on institutional

confidence through other variables included in our model, it is a tiny effect (standard

coefficient = 0.032), which is associated to its correlation with perceived closeness

between the individual and the political party in office (or one of the political parties in a

governing coalition). In its turn, this variable has a not inconsiderable impact on

confidence in political institutions (standard coefficient =0.198) through a pathway that

goes from party closeness to the political evaluation variables and from these to

institutional confidence. The most obvious interpretation for this indirect effect is that

citizens’ perceptions on government performance and the outcomes of social policies

are not the bottom-line of a strictly rational calculus but are shaped by their partisan

biases and channel out their effects.

There is still one more variable that plays a significant role in the explanation of

individual levels of institutional confidence – satisfaction with life. The whole effect is

indirect (standard coefficient =0.169) and it is mediated by political and economic

evaluations. There could be some disagreement about the direction and nature of the

causal relation between satisfaction with life and these political variables. However, we

lean to think that satisfaction with life is not simply a mirror reflection of the social and

political context or the reaction of the individual to the influence of that context in his or

her life, but rather it involves both a stable predisposition which can be seen both as a

personality trait and an outcome of the experience of social relationships in everyday

life (notice the coefficient of 0.198 for the path from informal sociability to life

satisfaction)14.

As striking as the positive findings we have just highlighted are some negative results

concerning two variables that have received much attention in the literature – political

participation and, especially, membership of associations. These two variables are

directly correlated, confirming that the probability of joining some kind of political action

14 At this point in the argument, it is worth to draw attention to the existence of a quite strong correlation between our variable of “satisfaction with life” and a measure of personal happiness (Pearson r=0.688, p<0.000).

28

increases together with civic involvement. However, none of these variables has a

significant effect on confidence in institutions. It is also noteworthy that, contrary to the

extended belief that participation in informal social networks and belonging to

associations are closely linked, we have found that the relationship between them is

quite small (standard coefficient = 0.088), though statistically significant.

Summing up the main outcomes of our analysis, we can point to three ideas

concerning the relative impact that the variables included in our model exert on

confidence in institutions. Firstly, political and economic evaluations are the most

important variables; this corroborates that, at least in Spain and as seen in the

regression analysis presented in section 3.2, interpersonal differences in confidence in

political institutions are highly dependent on contextual and short run factors, including

who governs. Secondly, there are two kinds of stable personal features that have a not

negligible impact on institutional confidence: on the one hand, general satisfaction with

life, which we understand as a proxy of an optimistic general outlook; and, on the other

hand, a positive interest in political affairs. Finally, it should be emphasized that some

variables which have been given great saliency in the literature –such as political

participation, civic engagement and involvement in informal social networks- play no

significant role in our model.

Even if our main concerns here are disclosing the immediate causes of variation in

confidence in political institutions and highlighting the fact that it is the main correlate of

social trust, there are a few additional points in our model that can shed some light on

the generation of social trust. For one thing, satisfaction with life enhances social trust,

both directly and in an indirect way, through its positive impact on institutional

confidence. In the second place, and a bit striking after what we have seen regarding

confidence in institutions, political participation has a significant (though quite weak)

effect on social trust; maybe political action works as a space of social learning that

contributes to promote generalized trust through the creation of the feeling of belonging

to a collectivity that extends beyond the realm in which individuals develop their

everyday life. Instead, the frequency of informal social contacts and the membership of

associations do not have a significant direct relationship with social trust.

3.3.3. Analysis of invariance of the model.

29

The next stage in our analysis has dealt with the possibility to generalize the model that

we have built to other European countries. For this purpose we have created a data set

selecting five additional countries covered by the ESS (France, Germany, Italy,

Sweden and the United Kingdom) and we have proceeded in two steps. Firstly, we

have replicated the model for each one of these countries. In a second moment, we

have made an analysis of invariance addressed to test the hypothesis that the main

parameters of the model for each of the countries are statistically equivalent to those

we had found for Spain. In this way, we try to identify invariant patterns in the causal

structure across countries.

χ2 df χ2/df GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA AIC

SPAIN-FRANCE Unconstrained 753.59 194 3.88 0.966 0.946 0.920 0.939 0.034 977.59

Measurement weights 757.19 198 3.82 0.966 0.947 0.920 0.939 0.034 973.19Structural weights 788.77 222 3.55 0.964 0.950 0.916 0.938 0.032 956.77

SPAIN -GERMANY Unconstrained 944.95 194 4.87 0.970 0.953 0.928 0.942 0.033 1168.95


SPAIN -ITALY Unconstrained 840.84 194 4.33 0.956 0.930 0.899 0.920 0.040 1064.84


SPAIN -SWEDEN Unconstrained 706.06 194 3.64 0.970 0.953 0.933 0.950 0.031 930.06


SPAIN –UNITED KINGDOM Unconstrained 751.88 194 3.88 0.971 0.955 0.939 0.953 0.031 975.88


Table 8. Goodness of fit statistics for the analysis of invariance of the causal model of social trust and confidence in institutions. Two-way comparisons between Spain and five other European countries.

Table 8 reports the goodness of fit statistics of this analysis of invariance. It also gives

useful information on to what extent it is possible to constrain parameters to be equal

for each pair of countries. Three points deserve special attention. First, and keeping in

mind that we have tried to equalize 35 parameters (including 4 measurement weights

and 31 structural weights) and that if it were possible to achieve a complete

equivalence in all parameters we would get 229 degrees of freedom, the third column

in the table allows us to identify the number of parameters that cannot be equalized for

each comparison (i.e., the difference between de maximum of 229 d.f. and the number

30

of d.f. entered in the “structural weights” row). It can be seen that the largest similarity

is found between Spain and Italy, on the one hand, and between Spain and France, on

the other. In the first case, four parameters could not be constrained to be equal or,

seen from the reverse viewpoint, it was possible to equalize 31 out of 35, while in the

second case the parameters resilient to equalization were 7 and it was possible to

equalize 28. Secondly, the goodness of fit statistics reflected in the other columns of

the table make clear that there is no significant difference between the adjustment of

the unconstrained model and the final constrained model achieved for each pair of

countries. Finally, in an analogous way, inspection of the rows on measurement

weights leads to say that the total equivalence of the parameters of the measurement

model can only be stated for the comparison between Spain and France. In all the

other cases, it is necessary to relax the constraining assumption for one parameter,

which corresponds to the loading of “courts” on the factor “confidence in political

institutions”15.

Taking stock of all this information, the main substantive conclusion that we draw from

Table 8 is that the model we built for Spain cannot be extended to all the countries we

have included in our analysis. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to fully replicate the

model for any other country, because it is always necessary to relax some equality

constraints between parameters. However, it is also clear that some nuances should

be added to this blunt statement. First, it would be extremely ambitious to intend to

achieve full invariance of all the structural parameters across countries, especially

because the nature of some of the variables included in the model makes reasonable

to expect that both their distribution and their mutual relationships will be highly

dependent on the political context of each country and subject to short term

fluctuations. Second, under the cross-national variations that we have found, it seems

possible to disclose a pattern, which differentiates between two groups of countries

according to their degree of similarity to Spain. Our analysis has shown that there is a

high degree of commonality among Spain, Italy and France regarding the causal

structure specified by our model, while Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom

differ more sharply from those countries. Furthermore, all the differences we have

identified within the first group have to do with the kind of highly contextual political

variables we have just mentioned, while the divergence between groups also affects to

15 Tables in appendix 4 report both the parameters of the baseline model for the five countries that we have compared with Spain and the parameters of the constrained model for each comparison. In those tables, the parameters that cannot be equalized are printed in boldface.

31

variables and relationships to which a priori we would have attributed a more stable

nature (see Appendix 4).

Taking this distinction between two groups of countries as our starting-point, we have

extended our analysis through a three-way comparison of Spain, Italy and France. With

this we try to submit the robustness of our model to a more stringent test. Tables 9 and

10 display the results. From Table 9 we will single out only one piece of information: we

can constrain to be equal 55 parameters out of 70, allowing 15 to stay free.

χ2 df χ2/df GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA AIC

SPAIN – ITALY – FRANCE Unconstrained 1262.45 291 4.338 0.959 0.936 0.905 0.925 0.031 1598.45


Table 9. Goodnes of fit statistics for the analysis of invariance of the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Three-way comparisons between Spain, Italy and France.

A quick look at Table 10 lets us identify which are the parameters of the model for

which it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of inequality among countries. One

of these parameters belongs to the measurement model; more specifically, the loading

of the “courts” on the latent variable “confidence in political institutions” is significantly

minor in Italy. This reflects an imbalance in the contributions of the different institutions

we have included in our model to the definition of this construct, perhaps because

Italian citizens perceive the action of the judiciary power as less partisan than Spanish

and French citizens, something that makes sense after the experience of judicial fight

against partitocrazia during the 1990’s.

Most of the other unconstrained parameters (ten out of fourteen) involve short term and

context-dependent political variables, be it in the origin or in the destination of the

pathway. In all cases, differences are only of magnitude and do not imply change of the

sign of the relationship; and, in general terms, their size is fairly small. Notwithstanding,

even if they are not impressive, some of these differences are noteworthy. Firstly,

political ideology has a non-negligible correlation with political participation both in Italy

and in France (more leftist citizens being more prone to political action), whereas in

Spain – and contrary to our expectations, but in keeping with the result of our previous

regression analyses- we have not found such a relationship. In the second place,

satisfaction with government performance – a paramount predictor of confidence in

32

political institutions in the three countries – has a higher saliency in Spain, especially if

we focus our attention on standardized coefficients. Finally, citizens more interested in

politics seem to have a more negative perception of health and education policies in

Italy and Spain than in France, perhaps reflecting a more critical attitude toward public

affairs.

As we turn to the variables which we have tended to see as more stable and less

subject to temporal fluctuations, there are three path coefficients that cannot be

constrained to equality. The relationship between general life satisfaction and

satisfaction with the state of the national economy is weaker in Italy than in France and

Spain. In France, frequency of informal social contacts is positively related to social

trust to a larger extent than either in Italy or Spain, where this relationship is much

weaker and is not statistically significant unless we merge the samples for both

countries. The relationship between frequency of attendance to religious services and

political ideology changes among countries in different ways depending upon the focus

being put on individual level effects (as measured by non-standardized coefficients) or

on overall contribution to explain variance at the aggregate level (as captured by

standardized coefficients); the individual effect of religious attendance is stronger in

France and Spain than in Italy, while its global impact is larger in France than in the

other countries.

Taking together everything that we have said up to this point, the overall picture we

obtain is one of minor differences among countries within a common general pattern. It

is worth to emphasize that the sign of the significant relationships is always the same in

the three countries and the relative relevance of each block of variables is almost

constant. And, above of all, we have corroborated that the direction of the relationship

between confidence in political institutions and social trust is the same in all three

countries: effects go from the former to the latter.

33

SPAIN ITALY FRANCE Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Estimate Estimate S.E. P Estimate Estimate S.E. P Estimate Religious observance → Political ideology 0.358 0.05 *** 0.093 0.171 0.05 *** 0.126 0.358 0.05 *** 0.198 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.057 0.01 *** 0.071 0.057 0.01 *** 0.080 0.057 0.01 *** 0.057 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.101 0.02 *** 0.086 0.101 0.02 *** 0.076 0.101 0.02 *** 0.053 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.196 0.02 *** 0.164 0.196 0.02 *** 0.153 0.196 0.02 *** 0.112 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.086 0.01 *** 0.106 0.086 0.01 *** 0.127 0.086 0.01 *** 0.095 Informal sociability → Social Trust 0.066 0.03 0.008 0.062 0.066 0.03 0.008 0.066 0.167 0.03 *** 0.172 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.216 0.01 *** 0.229 0.216 0.01 *** 0.258 0.216 0.01 *** 0.295 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.342 0.02 *** 0.316 0.228 0.03 *** 0.246 0.342 0.02 *** 0.411 Satisfaction with life → Social Trust 0.099 0.01 *** 0.112 0.099 0.01 *** 0.127 0.099 0.01 *** 0.178 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.103 0.04 0.009 -0.048 -0.103 0.04 0.009 -0.056 0.039 0.05 0.432 0.020 Political interest → Associational membership 0.263 0.02 *** 0.170 0.263 0.02 *** 0.226 0.263 0.02 *** 0.186 Political interest → Political participation 0.562 0.03 *** 0.294 0.562 0.03 *** 0.381 0.562 0.03 *** 0.316 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.385 0.03 *** 0.177 0.385 0.03 *** 0.216 0.385 0.03 *** 0.200 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.104 0.02 *** 0.092 0.104 0.02 *** 0.071 0.104 0.02 *** 0.085 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.269 0.03 *** 0.206 0.269 0.03 *** 0.165 0.106 0.03 0.002 0.076 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.414 0.03 *** 0.283 0.414 0.03 *** 0.227 0.121 0.03 *** 0.082 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.01 *** 0.161 0.302 0.02 *** 0.536 0.231 0.02 *** 0.361 Political ideology → Political participation -0.003 0.01 0.637 -0.012 -0.105 0.01 *** -0.158 -0.105 0.01 *** -0.150 Associational membership → Political participation 0.369 0.02 *** 0.299 0.369 0.02 *** 0.291 0.369 0.02 *** 0.293 Associational membership → Social Trust 0.010 0.03 0.690 0.008 0.010 0.03 0.690 0.007 0.010 0.03 0.690 0.009 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.039 0.02 0.098 0.028 0.039 0.02 0.098 0.025 0.039 0.02 0.098 0.028 Political participation → Social Trust 0.092 0.02 *** 0.087 0.092 0.02 *** 0.078 0.092 0.02 *** 0.107 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.049 0.02 0.016 0.043 0.049 0.02 0.016 0.040 0.049 0.02 0.016 0.045 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.198 0.03 *** 0.153 0.256 0.03 *** 0.206 0.153 0.03 *** 0.126 State of welfare policies → Social Trust 0.045 0.02 0.029 0.047 0.045 0.02 0.029 0.048 0.045 0.02 0.029 0.058 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.158 0.02 *** 0.155 0.240 0.03 *** 0.247 0.158 0.02 *** 0.163 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.561 0.02 *** 0.499 0.561 0.02 *** 0.500 0.561 0.02 *** 0.524 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.136 0.02 *** 0.154 0.136 0.02 *** 0.156 0.271 0.02 *** 0.318 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.293 0.03 *** 0.372 0.232 0.02 *** 0.298 0.232 0.02 *** 0.291 Social Trust → Confidence in political institutions 0.043 0.04 0.237 0.040 0.043 0.04 0.237 0.041 0.043 0.04 0.237 0.034 Confidence in political institutions → Social Trust 0.291 0.03 *** 0.315 0.291 0.03 *** 0.301 0.291 0.03 *** 0.371 Social Trust → Trus_1 1.000 0.761 1.000 0.726 1.000 0.643 Social Trust → Trus_2 0.989 0.04 *** 0.750 0.989 0.04 *** 0.723 0.989 0.04 *** 0.616 Social Trust → Trus_3 0.845 0.03 *** 0.642 0.845 0.03 *** 0.641 0.845 0.03 *** 0.521 Confidence in political institutions → Courts 0.891 0.03 *** 0.690 0.619 0.05 *** 0.455 0.891 0.03 *** 0.667 Confidence in political institutions → Politicians 0.988 0.02 *** 0.778 0.988 0.02 *** 0.811 0.988 0.02 *** 0.833 Confidence in political institutions → Parliament 1.000 0.788 1.000 0.790 1.000 0.785

Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest -0.014 0.04 0.728 -0.010 -0.196 0.05 *** -0.125 0.069 0.03 0.043 0.056 res6 ↔ res8 1.158 0.11 *** 0.339 1.343 0.12 *** 0.410 0.975 0.10 *** 0.289

R2 Estimate Estimate Estimate Informal sociability 0.000 0.000 0.000 Satisfaction with life 0.034 0.029 0.015 Political ideology 0.009 0.016 0.039 Distance party government 0.026 0.288 0.131 Associational membership 0.045 0.069 0.048 Political participation 0.206 0.305 0.242 State of welfare policies 0.063 0.075 0.095 Satisfaction economy 0.142 0.088 0.175 Satisfaction government 0.479 0.482 0.355 Confidence in political institutions 0.387 0.415 0.475 Social_Trust 0.182 0.180 0.315 Table 10. Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and Confidence in political institutions. Comparison: Spain, Italy and France.

34

4. CONCLUSIONS.

This paper was triggered off by the awkwardness we felt because of the existence of a

gap between two different lines of research: on the one side, literature on the factors

which contribute to generate social trust, and, on the other side, research on the

determinants of confidence in public institutions. This gap is especially remarkable

given the emphasis which has been recently put on the major role institutions play in

the creation of social trust. Advocates of so-called institutional approach to social

capital have pointed to several ways through which public institutions can generate

social trust as a by-product of their ordinary working (Levi, 1998; Stolle, 2002;

Rothstein & Stolle, 2002; Rothstein, 2005; Herreros, 2004). However, they have not

paid enough attention to the mediating role of confidence in institutions in this process,

derived from the fact that in order to be able to develop trust, institutions should be

perceived as trustworthy. For their part, scholars who have intended to light the factors

that determine institutional confidence (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Denters et al, 2007)

have not systematically related them to the emergence of social trust.

Our aim has been to contribute to fill this gap by elucidating the existing links between

social trust and institutional confidence as well as among their respective determinants.

Now, undertaking this task required a previous clarification of the concept and

dimensionality of confidence in public institutions. For this reason, we started our

empirical analysis studying the dimensionality of institutional confidence. On the basis

of the resulting distinction between different types of institutions, we proceeded to an

analysis of some of the determinants of institutional confidence. Firstly, through a

regression analysis limited to data on Spain. Later, through the specification of a causal

model which we applied to Spanish data and replicated for data from five more

European countries. This causal model also allowed us to disentangle the relationship

between social trust and institutional confidence.

Our analyses produced five blocks of conclusions.

1. On the dimensionality of confidence in public institutions.

In Spain, even with some reservations, the preferred solution reduces institutional

confidence to two factors. On the one hand, confidence in social order institutions,

which encompasses attitudes towards three institutions: the army, the police and the

35

church. On the other hand, confidence in political institutions; under this heading are

subsumed government, parliament, political parties, courts, civil service, newspapers

and TV. This low dimensionality of institutional confidence is present all along a time-

period through which Spain suffered dramatic political and social changes. More

specifically, we find it both in a moment of early development of democracy and after a

relatively long period of working of democracy. Hence, it does not seem that low

dimensionality of political confidence should be seen as a transient phenomenon, but

rather as a stable feature of the structure of Spaniards’ political attitudes.

2. On the determinants of confidence in social order institutions.

Main determinants of interpersonal variation in confidence in social order institutions

are stable individual orientations and beliefs, such as religion and ideology, and

partisan allegiances. Indeed, being an observant Catholic, placing oneself in the right

of the ideology scale, and being a voter of the conservative Popular Party is strongly

and consistently correlated with more confidence in social order institutions. Contextual

changes do not seem to influence confidence in this kind of institutions, as there is no

significant variation of the observed effects over time. This is coherent with the

emphasis on issues of social order and stability that has been traditionally distinctive of

conservative ideologies.

3. On the determinants of confidence in political institutions.

Both the regression analysis and the structural equation model give us important

information about the determinants of confidence in political institutions in Spain. They

concur in bringing out some common findings. On the one hand, variation in confidence

in political institutions is strongly contingent upon short-term factors, even if in each

analysis different indicators of this kind of factors were available. Variables such as

valuation of the economic situation, satisfaction with government and evaluation of the

state of welfare policies proved to be salient. On the other hand, even ideational and

attitudinal variables with a more unchanging character (ideology, religion, party

allegiances) affect confidence in political institutions in a different way depending on

context, specially defined by the colour of the party in office. This means that

confidence in political institutions relies heavily on a partisan bias, which is in itself a

stable explanatory factor. However, it also means that individuals will be prone to

change their confidence in this kind of institutions according to their proximity to the

political actors who are in charge of running them. Finally, there is only one stable

36

orientation that displays consistency in its effects across different years and datasets:

political interest, which has a positive impact on confidence in political institutions.

The structural equation model we built permits us to deep in our conclusions, adding

some relevant elements to the previous picture. Firstly, general life satisfaction has a

not negligible effect on confidence in political institutions; this points towards the

convenience to incorporate in future analysis more information items on personality

traits. Secondly, according to our results, some variables which have been given great

saliency in the literature –such as political participation, civic engagement and

involvement in informal social networks- have no significant impact on confidence in

political institutions. This might be due to shortcomings in the measures we have used

or reflect the genuine reality.

4. On cross-national regularities and variations of the determinants of confidence in political institutions.

Our analysis has shown that there is a high degree of commonality among Spain, Italy

and France regarding the causal structure specified by our model, while Germany,

Sweden and the United Kingdom differ more sharply from those countries. All the

differences we have identified within the first group of countries have to do with highly

contextual political variables, while the divergence between both groups also affects to

variables and relationships to which a priori we would have attributed a more stable

nature, including the effects of some of the variables that have received more attention

in the literature, such as associational membership. These findings call for a more

detailed comparative analysis, encompassing a larger number of countries, in order to

confirm, modify or discard this pattern of cross-national variation.

5. On the relationship between confidence in political institutions and social trust.

One of our main goals in this paper was to clarify the relationship between confidence

in political institutions and social trust, because, although it has been argued that

institutions promote social trust, the existence of an influence in the reverse direction

has been also stated. The results of our structural equation model suggest that the

causal connection is stronger –and in some cases, unique- from confidence in

institutions towards social trust. In Spain, Italy and France, the relationship is

unidirectional. In Sweden, United Kingdom and Germany there are effects in both

37

directions, but they are always more powerful from political to social trust. Indeed,

confidence in institutions is the best single predictor of social trust among the variables

included in our model in all countries. These results allow us to specify the direction of

the causal relationship between these two variables, corroborating the expectation that

institutional confidence is a key factor in the generation of social trust, whereas the

opposite is less true. This confers great relevance to our previous elucidation of the

factors that promote or inhibit confidence in institutions.

This final finding reinforces one of the core propositions of the institutional approach:

the relevance of institutions in the creation of social trust. However, the preponderance

of short-term factors in the explanation of the confidence in political institutions, shown

by previous analyses, may qualify the implications of that statement: variations of social

trust would be more influenced by immediate contextual conditions than it is usually

thought. To put it in a nutshell: what matters in the formation of social trust is not only

what institutions do and how they are, but also how they are perceived and who runs

them; and governments and social perceptions are more changing than the nature of

public institutions.

38

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Delhey, Jan and Newton, Keneth. 2002. "Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in

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Denters, Bas, Oscar Gabriel, and Mariano Torcal. 2007. "Political confidence in

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41

6. APPENDIXES.

42

APPENDIX 1: VARIABLES. A1.1. Variables and questions in Latinobarometer used in the analysis.

Variable Question Original Measure

Confidence in political institutions Confidence in country's Parliament 1 to 4

(Additive index: 7 - 28 ) Confidence in Political Parties 1 to 4

Confidence in Government 1 to 4

Confidence in Civil Service 1 to 4

Confidence in the Courts 1 to 4

Confidence in Newspapers 1 to 4

Confidence in TV 1 to 4 Confidence in social order institutions

Confidence in the Army 1 to 4

(Additive index: 3 - 12) Confidence in the Police 1 to 4

Confidence in the Church 1 to 4

Interest in politics How interested in politics 1 to 4

Exposure to political information Exposure to political information at TV 1 to 7

Exposure to political information to the Radio 1 to 7

Exposure to political information in Newspaper 1 to 7 Valuation of the economic situation

How is the situation of the economy valued 0 to 5

Political ideology Placement on left right scale 0 to 10 Vote in last national elections (PP, PSOE, IU, other, did not vote, no information)

Which party was voted in last national elections 18 cat.

Religion Religious beliefs 6 cat. (Catholic, very observant; Catholic, observant; Catholic, not very observant; Catholic, not at all observant; Another religion; Not religious; No information)

Religious observance 1 to 4

Age How old Education (Higher education, Secondary education, Primary education, Less than primary education, No information)

Higher level of education achieved

Sex

43

A1.2. Variables and questions in ESS used in the analysis.

Variable Question MeasureSocial trust Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful 0 to 10

Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair 0 to 10

Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 0 to 10

Institutional confidence Trust in country's parliament 0 to 10

Trust in the legal system 0 to 10

Trust in politicians 0 to 10

Satisfaction with life How satisfied with life as a whole 0 to 10

Interest in politics How interested in politics 1 to 4

Satisfaction with the economy How satisfied with present state of economy in country 0 to 10 Satisfaction with the government How satisfied with the national government 0 to 10

Evaluation of Welfare politics State of education in country nowadays 0 to 10

(Mean index) State of health services in country nowadays 0 to 10

Informal sociability How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues 0 to 7

Political participation Worked in political party or action group last 12 months yes - no

(Additive index) Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months yes - no

Signed petition last 12 months yes - no

Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months yes - no

Boycotted certain products last 12 months yes - no

Bought product for political/ethical/environment reason last 12 months yes - no

Donated money to political organisation or group last 12 months yes - no

Participated illegal protest activities last 12 months yes - no

Formal sociability Sports/outdoor activity club, last 12 months: member yes - no

(Additive index) Cultural /hobby activity organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Trade union, last 12 months: member yes - no

Business/profession/farmers organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Consumer/automobile organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Humanitarian organisation etc., last 12 months: member yes - no

Environmental/peace/animal organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Religious/church organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Political party, last 12 months: member yes - no

Science/education/teacher organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Social club etc., last 12 months: member yes - no

Other voluntary organisation, last 12 months: member yes - no

Political ideology Self – placement on left right scale 0 to 10

Proximity of party in government Which party feel closer to

(Constructed variable: -4 to +4) Degree of proximity 1 to 4 Frequency of attendance to religious services

How often attend religious services apart from special occasions 0 to 7

44

APPENDIX 2: DISTRIBUTION OF THE VARIABLES OF CONFIDENCE IN PARTICULAR INSTITUTIONS IN THE 1980-2006 DATA SET. A2.1. Means and standard deviations of the items of institutional confidence included in survey data.

1980 19901 19902 19963 20013 20053 Confidence N Mean Dev. N Mean Dev. N Mean Dev. N Mean Dev. N Mean Dev. N Mean Dev.

Political parties 1196 2.45 0.69 2868 20.56 33.61 2481 3.24 1.72 2496 2.87 1.52 3033 2.99 1.26 Parliament 2145 2.49 0.87 1196 2.91 0.85 2868 26.56 36.53 2481 3.09 2.06 2496 2.71 1.80 3033 2.86 1.92 Government 1196 2.90 0.78 2481 2.98 1.72 2496 2.68 1.54 3033 2.73 1.42 Civil Service 2145 2.32 0.87 1196 2.88 0.82 2481 3.22 1.97 2496 2.74 1.56 3033 2.78 1.57 Courts 2145 2.52 0.84 1196 2.58 0.89 2868 24.45 35.74 2481 3.08 1.89 2496 2.87 1.51 3033 2.79 1.54 Army 2145 2.74 0.94 1196 2.90 0.88 2868 20.84 33.56 2481 2.71 1.75 2496 2.88 1.72 3033 2.64 1.64 Police 2145 2.73 0.87 1196 3.04 0.81 2481 2.48 1.58 2496 2.39 1.46 3033 2.32 1.37 Church 2145 2.57 1.04 1196 2.66 1.02 2868 18.82 31.28 2481 2.63 1.46 2496 2.69 1.40 3033 2.84 1.37 Newspapers 2145 2.45 0.80 1196 2.59 0.81 2868 22.47 33.65 2481 2.93 1.71 2496 2.63 1.57 3033 2.65 1.53 T. V. 2481 2.89 1.47 2496 2.73 1.28 3033 2.90 1.16

1World Values Survey; 2 Barometer (CIS); 3 Latinobarometer (CIS).

45

APPENDIX 3: CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS. REGRESSION WEIGHTS AND COVARIANCES. A3.1. Year 1980.

MODEL A MODEL B Estim S.E. P St. Estim Estim S.E. P St. Estim

Regression Weights Regression Weights Political → Parties 1 Political → Parties 1,000 ,754 Neutral → Army 1,286 0,04 *** ,79 Social Order → Army 1,000 ,823 Neutral → Police 1,214 0,038 *** ,803 Social Order → Police ,922 ,024 *** ,817 Neutral → Church 1,305 0,044 *** ,729 Political → Church ,979 ,028 *** ,732 Control → Civil Service 1 ,773 Political → Civil Service 1,015 ,031 *** ,765 Neutral → Courts 1 ,691 Political → Courts ,992 ,030 *** ,773 Control → Newspapers 0,572 0,027 *** ,482 Political → Newspapers ,631 ,028 *** ,519 Covariances Covariances Political ↔ Neutral 0,333 0,016 *** ,853 Political ↔ Social Order ,388 ,018 *** ,761 Political ↔ Control 0,464 0,019 *** ,794 Neutral ↔ Control 0,333 0,016 *** ,853

A3.2. Year 1990 (WVS).


Regression Weights Regression Weights Political → Parties 1 ,357 Political → Parties 1,000 ,354 Political → Parliament 2,823 0,244 *** ,831 Political → Parliament 2,828 ,244 *** ,824 Political → Government 1,335 0,142 *** ,42 Political → Government 1,333 ,143 *** ,416 Neutral → Army 0,638 0,056 *** ,371 Social Order → Army 1,000 ,378 Neutral → Police 1,205 0,061 *** ,763 Social Order → Police 1,801 ,141 *** ,742 Neutral → Church 0,497 0,063 *** ,249 Political → Church ,794 ,106 *** ,258 Control → Civil Service 1 ,701 Political → Civil Service 2,173 ,197 *** ,655 Neutral → Courts 1 ,575 Political → Courts 2,136 ,200 *** ,589 Control → Newspapers 0,717 0,048 *** ,508 Political → Newspapers 1,546 ,157 *** ,471 Covariances Covariances Political ↔ Neutral 0,134 0,014 *** 1,052 Political ↔ Social Order ,088 ,010 *** 1,078 Political ↔ Control 0,126 0,013 *** ,885 Neutral ↔ Control 0,294 0,02 *** 1,002

46

A3.3. Year 1990 (Barometer code number 1.871).


Regression Weights Regression Weights Political → Parties 1 ,878 Political → Parties 1,000 ,881 Political → Parliament 1,022 0,017 *** ,825 Political → Parliament 1,025 ,017 *** ,832 Neutral → Army 1,009 0,016 *** ,904 Social Order → Army 1,000 ,921 Neutral → Church 0,918 0,015 *** ,881 Political → Church ,907 ,012 *** ,896 Neutral → Courts 1 ,841 Political → Courts 1,024 ,016 *** ,849 Control → Newspapers 1 Political → Newspapers 1,026 ,014 *** ,903

Covariances Covariances Political ↔ Neutral 874,377 27,994 *** ,987 Political ↔ Social Order 870,540 26,388 *** ,951 Political ↔ Control 901,6 26,922 *** ,908 Neutral ↔ Control 892,59 27,652 *** ,883

A3.4. Year 1996.


Regression Weights Regression Weights Political → Parties 1 ,819 Political → Parties 1,000 ,797 Political → Parliament 1,135 0,028 *** ,774 Political → Parliament 1,149 ,029 *** ,761 Political → Government 0,876 0,023 *** ,716 Political → Government ,890 ,024 *** ,707 Neutral → Army 0,87 0,031 *** ,648 Social Order → Army 1,000 ,701 Neutral → Police 0,86 0,028 *** ,71 Social Order → Police ,997 ,033 *** ,775 Neutral → Church 0,501 0,025 *** ,448 Political → Church ,613 ,028 *** ,516 Control → Civil Service 1 ,749 Political → Civil Service 1,069 ,027 *** ,741 Neutral → Courts 1 ,69 Political → Courts ,954 ,027 *** ,691 Control → Newspapers 0,82 0,024 *** ,708 Political → Newspapers ,871 ,024 *** ,696 Control → T. V. 0,647 0,021 *** ,65 Political → T. V. ,680 ,021 *** ,634

Covariances Covariances Political ↔ Neutral 1,608 0,068 *** ,878 Political ↔ Social Order 1,332 ,060 *** 794 Political ↔ Control 1,949 0,076 *** ,939 Neutral ↔ Control 1,761 0,076 *** ,916

47

A3.5. Year 2001.


Regression Weights Regression Weights Political → Parties 1 ,789 Political → Parties 1,000 ,772 Political → Parliament 1,166 0,029 *** ,773 Political → Parliament 1,163 ,030 *** ,754 Political → Government 1,009 0,025 *** ,786 Political → Government 1,018 ,026 *** ,775 Neutral → Army 1,007 0,028 *** ,7 Social Order → Army 1,000 ,719 Neutral → Police 0,962 0,024 *** ,789 Social Order → Police ,963 ,027 *** ,816 Neutral → Church 0,658 0,024 *** ,561 Political → Church ,670 ,025 *** ,590 Control → Civil Service 1 ,719 Political → Civil Service ,756 ,027 *** ,567 Neutral → Courts 1 ,79 Political → Courts 1,007 ,025 *** ,779 Control → Newspapers 0,995 0,035 *** ,71 Political → Newspapers ,681 ,027 *** ,507 Control → T. V. 0,839 0,029 *** ,734 Political → T. V. ,535 ,022 *** ,488

Covariances Covariances Political ↔ Neutral 1,314 0,051 *** ,921 Political ↔ Social Order 1,283 ,054 *** ,889 Political ↔ Control 0,849 0,043 *** ,634 Neutral ↔ Control 0,846 0,043 *** ,633

A3.6. Year 2005.


Regression Weights Regression Weights Political → Parties 1 ,692 Political → Parties 1,000 ,693 Political → Parliament 1,425 0,045 *** ,655 Political → Parliament 1,419 ,045 *** ,654 Political → Government 1,218 0,034 *** ,751 Political → Government 1,204 ,034 *** ,743 Neutral → Army 1,062 0,036 *** ,683 Social Order → Army 1,000 ,726 Neutral → Police 0,934 0,031 *** ,728 Social Order → Police ,823 ,030 *** ,725 Neutral → Church 0,601 0,028 *** ,463 Political → Church ,582 ,026 *** ,506 Control → Civil Service 1 ,732 Political → Civil Service 1,326 ,037 *** ,738 Neutral → Courts 1 ,672 Political → Courts 1,032 ,036 *** ,587 Control → Newspapers 0,781 0,026 *** ,59 Political → Newspapers 1,038 ,035 *** ,596 Control → T. V. 0,547 0,019 *** ,548 Political → T. V. ,717 ,027 *** ,546

Covariances Covariances Political ↔ Neutral 0,605 0,03 *** ,656 Political ↔ Social Order ,654 ,032 *** ,628 Political ↔ Control 1,048 0,04 *** 1,022 Neutral ↔ Control 0,83 0,04 *** ,685

48

APPENDIX 4: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL. REGRESSION WEIGHTS AND COVARIANCES. A.4.1 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. France. Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.362 0.05 *** 0.201 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.091 0.03 *** 0.091 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.058 0.05 0.264 0.031 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.168 0.05 *** 0.096 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.106 0.02 *** 0.115 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.185 0.03 *** 0.188 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.236 0.02 *** 0.321 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.340 0.02 *** 0.408 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.082 0.02 *** 0.145 Political interest → Associational membership 0.297 0.04 *** 0.208 Political interest → State of welfare policies 0.036 0.05 0.473 0.018 Political interest → Political participation 0.548 0.04 *** 0.303 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.380 0.05 *** 0.199 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.231 0.02 *** 0.361 Political ideology → Political participation -0.113 0.02 *** -0.160 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.057 0.03 0.073 0.047 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.093 0.04 0.007 0.067 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.124 0.03 *** 0.084 Associational membership → Political participation 0.424 0.03 *** 0.334 Associational membership → Social trust 0.033 0.04 0.385 0.031 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.055 0.04 0.109 0.041 Political participation → Social trust 0.062 0.03 0.039 0.074 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.070 0.03 0.015 0.067 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.164 0.03 *** 0.137 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.062 0.03 0.038 0.080 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.138 0.03 *** 0.144 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.536 0.03 *** 0.505 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.264 0.03 *** 0.311 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.238 0.02 *** 0.298

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions 0.071 0.06 0.252 0.057 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.264 0.05 *** 0.330

Social trust → Trust_1 1.000 0.650 Social trust → Trust_2 0.897 0.07 *** 0.575 Social trust → Trust_3 0.861 0.07 *** 0.535 Confidence in political institutions → Courts 0.893 0.04 *** 0.663 Confidence in political institutions → Politicians 1.019 0.04 *** 0.842 Confidence in political institutions → Parlamient 1.000 0.780

Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest 0.069 0.03 0.043 0.056 res6 ↔ res8 0.974 0.10 *** 0.289

R2 Estimate Informal sociability 0.000 Satisfaction with life 0.010 Political ideology 0.040 Distance party government 0.131 Associational membership 0.067 Political participation 0.269 State of welfare policies 0.106 Satisfaction economy 0.171 Satisfaction government 0.341 Confidence in political institutions 0.487 Social trust 0.286

49

A.4.2 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Germany. Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology -0.034 0.13 0.791 -0.005 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.195 0.02 *** 0.173 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.206 0.03 *** 0.120 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.237 0.03 *** 0.146 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.102 0.02 *** 0.095 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.070 0.02 0.004 0.064 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.191 0.02 *** 0.223 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.228 0.02 *** 0.256 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.162 0.02 *** 0.240 Political interest → Associational membership 0.427 0.03 *** 0.240 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.256 0.04 *** -0.111 Political interest → Political participation 0.448 0.04 *** 0.231 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.506 0.04 *** 0.230 Political ideology → Distance party government -0.010 0.00 0.004 -0.058 Political ideology → Political participation -0.001 0.00 0.792 -0.005 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.073 0.03 0.003 0.057 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.164 0.03 *** 0.123 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.245 0.02 *** 0.181 Associational membership → Political participation 0.352 0.02 *** 0.323 Associational membership → Social trust 0.024 0.03 0.337 0.023 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.120 0.02 *** 0.097 Political participation → Social trust 0.072 0.02 0.001 0.076 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions -0.037 0.02 0.085 -0.033 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.198 0.02 *** 0.187 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.072 0.02 *** 0.092 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.172 0.02 *** 0.180 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.496 0.02 *** 0.488 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.165 0.02 *** 0.181 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.325 0.02 *** 0.362

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions 0.137 0.04 *** 0.113 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.228 0.03 *** 0.275




50

A.4.3 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Italy.

Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.171 0.05 *** 0.126 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.036 0.02 0.119 0.051 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.119 0.04 0.007 0.089 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.158 0.04 *** 0.123 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.083 0.02 *** 0.123 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.059 0.04 0.088 0.061 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.177 0.03 *** 0.214 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.211 0.03 *** 0.229 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.112 0.03 *** 0.148 Political interest → Associational membership 0.257 0.04 *** 0.222 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.115 0.05 0.032 -0.063 Political interest → Political participation 0.570 0.04 *** 0.394 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.383 0.06 *** 0.214 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.302 0.02 *** 0.536 Political ideology → Political participation -0.093 0.02 *** -0.143 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.108 0.05 0.021 0.075 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.249 0.05 *** 0.154 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.500 0.04 *** 0.272 Associational membership → Political participation 0.313 0.04 *** 0.251 Associational membership → Social trust 0.042 0.05 0.442 0.029 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.016 0.05 0.756 0.010 Political participation → Social trust 0.079 0.05 0.091 0.069 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.128 0.05 0.005 0.103 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.249 0.03 *** 0.196 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.057 0.05 0.218 0.062 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.250 0.04 *** 0.253 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.565 0.03 *** 0.496 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.141 0.04 *** 0.160 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.226 0.03 *** 0.291



Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest -0.196 0.05 *** -0.125 res6 ↔ res8 1.340 0.12 *** 0.410


51

A.4.4 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Sweden.

Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.629 0.10 *** 0.150 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.313 0.04 *** 0.209 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.122 0.04 0.001 0.082 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.125 0.03 *** 0.100 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.009 0.03 0.757 0.007 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.037 0.03 0.230 0.031 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.201 0.03 *** 0.181 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.324 0.03 *** 0.274 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.184 0.03 *** 0.193 Political interest → Associational membership 0.416 0.05 *** 0.195 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.011 0.06 0.848 -0.004 Political interest → Political participation 0.578 0.05 *** 0.277 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.483 0.05 *** 0.210 Political ideology → Distance party government -0.072 0.01 *** -0.184 Political ideology → Political participation -0.019 0.01 0.013 -0.056 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.049 0.03 0.053 0.048 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.091 0.03 *** 0.084 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.213 0.02 *** 0.194 Associational membership → Political participation 0.303 0.02 *** 0.309 Associational membership → Social trust 0.084 0.03 0.002 0.088 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.105 0.02 *** 0.098 Political participation → Social trust 0.027 0.03 0.322 0.028 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.021 0.03 0.390 0.019 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.206 0.02 *** 0.191 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.080 0.03 0.002 0.094 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.139 0.02 *** 0.142 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.453 0.02 *** 0.447 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.036 0.02 0.098 0.040 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.499 0.02 *** 0.554





52

A.4.5 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. United Kingdom.

Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.118 0.04 *** 0.076 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.207 0.02 *** 0.202 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.055 0.03 0.079 0.041 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.079 0.03 0.019 0.054 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.057 0.02 0.017 0.052 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.013 0.03 0.638 0.011 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.222 0.02 *** 0.238 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.311 0.02 *** 0.309 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.133 0.02 *** 0.176 Political interest → Associational membership 0.424 0.04 *** 0.237 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.191 0.05 *** -0.087 Political interest → Political participation 0.507 0.04 *** 0.290 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.385 0.05 *** 0.172 Political ideology → Distance party government -0.137 0.02 *** -0.189 Political ideology → Political participation -0.036 0.01 0.005 -0.056 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.124 0.03 *** 0.110 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.177 0.03 *** 0.145 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.245 0.02 *** 0.183 Associational membership → Political participation 0.340 0.02 *** 0.346 Associational membership → Social trust 0.075 0.03 0.006 0.075 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.069 0.03 0.008 0.055 Political participation → Social trust 0.086 0.03 0.002 0.084 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.001 0.03 0.962 0.001 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.272 0.02 *** 0.229 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.132 0.03 *** 0.162 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.162 0.02 *** 0.159 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.540 0.02 *** 0.493 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.020 0.02 0.362 0.021 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.487 0.02 *** 0.568



Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest 0.163 0.03 *** 0.120 res6 ↔ res8 1.222 0.09 *** 0.331


53

A.4.6 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Comparison between Spain and France

SPAIN FRANCE Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.358 0.05 *** 0.093 0.358 0.05 *** 0.198 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.069 0.02 *** 0.086 0.069 0.02 *** 0.069 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.093 0.03 0.001 0.079 0.093 0.03 0.001 0.048 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.213 0.03 *** 0.178 0.213 0.03 *** 0.122 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.088 0.02 *** 0.107 0.088 0.02 *** 0.096 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.061 0.03 0.073 0.057 0.176 0.03 *** 0.177 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.229 0.02 *** 0.243 0.229 0.02 *** 0.312 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.347 0.02 *** 0.320 0.347 0.02 *** 0.415 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.098 0.02 *** 0.109 0.098 0.02 *** 0.172 Political interest → Associational membership 0.264 0.03 *** 0.170 0.264 0.03 *** 0.187 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.013 0.04 0.732 -0.006 -0.013 0.04 0.732 -0.006 Political interest → Political participation 0.560 0.03 *** 0.292 0.560 0.03 *** 0.313 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.376 0.04 *** 0.176 0.376 0.04 *** 0.192 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.01 *** 0.161 0.231 0.02 *** 0.361 Political ideology → Political participation -0.003 0.01 0.656 -0.012 -0.114 0.02 *** -0.162 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.103 0.02 *** 0.091 0.103 0.02 *** 0.084 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.278 0.03 *** 0.213 0.106 0.03 0.002 0.076 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.374 0.03 *** 0.259 0.119 0.03 *** 0.079 Associational membership → Political participation 0.390 0.02 *** 0.315 0.390 0.02 *** 0.308 Associational membership → Social trust 0.002 0.03 0.943 0.002 0.002 0.03 0.943 0.002 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.043 0.03 0.106 0.031 0.043 0.03 0.106 0.031 Political participation → Social trust 0.095 0.02 *** 0.089 0.095 0.02 *** 0.110 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions -0.052 0.03 0.107 -0.047 0.082 0.03 0.004 0.074 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.178 0.02 *** 0.140 0.178 0.02 *** 0.146 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.037 0.02 0.108 0.039 0.037 0.02 0.108 0.048 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.155 0.02 *** 0.156 0.155 0.02 *** 0.158 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.560 0.02 *** 0.507 0.560 0.02 *** 0.521 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.164 0.03 *** 0.190 0.259 0.02 *** 0.299 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.258 0.02 *** 0.330 0.258 0.02 *** 0.321

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions 0.042 0.04 0.325 0.040 0.042 0.04 0.325 0.033 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.286 0.04 *** 0.298 0.286 0.04 *** 0.363

Social trust → Trust_1 1.000 0.772 1.000 0.655 Social trust → Trust_2 0.928 0.04 *** 0.726 0.928 0.04 *** 0.595 Social trust → Trust_3 0.836 0.04 *** 0.645 0.836 0.04 *** 0.525 Confidence in political institutions → Courts 0.893 0.03 *** 0.683 0.893 0.03 *** 0.674 Confidence in political institutions → Politicians 0.987 0.03 *** 0.770 0.987 0.03 *** 0.836 Confidence in political institutions → Parliament 1.000 0.782 1.000 0.790

Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest -0.014 0.04 0.728 -0.010 0.069 0.03 0.043 0.056 res6 ↔ res8 1.144 0.11 *** 0.336 0.976 0.10 *** 0.289

R2 Estimate Estimate Informal sociability 0.000 0.000 Political ideology 0.009 0.039 Distance party government 0.026 0.131 Associational membership 0.047 0.050 Political participation 0.216 0.254 State of welfare policies 0.068 0.105 Satisfaction economy 0.147 0.179 Satisfaction government 0.464 0.365 Satisfaction with life 0.038 0.017 Confidence in political institutions 0.365 0.490 Social trust 0.161 0.304

54

A.4.7 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Comparison between Spain and Germany

SPAIN GERMANY Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.337 0.113 0.003 0.088 -0.034 0.13 0.791 -0.005 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.051 0.023 0.026 0.064 0.196 0.02 *** 0.173 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.158 0.024 *** 0.132 0.158 0.02 *** 0.092 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.240 0.023 *** 0.198 0.240 0.02 *** 0.148 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.089 0.015 *** 0.109 0.089 0.02 *** 0.083 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.064 0.02 0.001 0.058 0.064 0.02 0.001 0.058 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.199 0.014 *** 0.214 0.199 0.01 *** 0.231 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.352 0.028 *** 0.326 0.231 0.02 *** 0.259 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.154 0.014 *** 0.171 0.154 0.01 *** 0.227 Political interest → Associational membership 0.215 0.044 *** 0.139 0.426 0.03 *** 0.240 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.073 0.057 0.201 -0.034 -0.258 0.04 *** -0.111 Political interest → Political participation 0.489 0.029 *** 0.261 0.489 0.03 *** 0.251 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.352 0.061 *** 0.161 0.515 0.04 *** 0.232 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.007 *** 0.161 -0.010 0.00 0.004 -0.058 Political ideology → Political participation -0.001 0.003 0.695 -0.005 -0.001 0.00 0.695 -0.006 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.150 0.032 *** 0.132 0.072 0.03 0.003 0.056 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.295 0.035 *** 0.224 0.164 0.03 *** 0.123 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.383 0.031 *** 0.268 0.241 0.02 *** 0.175 Associational membership → Political participation 0.350 0.017 *** 0.288 0.350 0.02 *** 0.319 Associational membership → Social trust 0.004 0.022 0.859 0.003 0.004 0.02 0.859 0.004 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.015 0.039 0.708 0.010 0.127 0.02 *** 0.102 Political participation → Social trust 0.091 0.019 *** 0.083 0.091 0.02 *** 0.098 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions -0.038 0.019 0.042 -0.033 -0.038 0.02 0.042 -0.034 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.196 0.015 *** 0.155 0.196 0.02 *** 0.183 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.051 0.019 0.006 0.053 0.051 0.02 0.006 0.065 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.178 0.017 *** 0.174 0.178 0.02 *** 0.186 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.523 0.014 *** 0.480 0.523 0.01 *** 0.507 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.163 0.017 *** 0.185 0.163 0.02 *** 0.177 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.266 0.024 *** 0.329 0.335 0.02 *** 0.376

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions 0.082 0.034 0.015 0.078 0.082 0.03 0.015 0.068 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.264 0.029 *** 0.279 0.264 0.03 *** 0.321


Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. rel_frec int_1_2 -0.014 0.041 0.728 -0.010 0.010 0.02 0.644 0.009 res6 res8 1.151 0.106 *** 0.338 1.228 0.08 *** 0.333


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A.4.8 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Comparison between Spain and Italy

SPAIN ITALY Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.194 0.04 *** 0.050 0.194 0.04 *** 0.142 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.042 0.02 0.009 0.053 0.042 0.02 0.009 0.060 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.114 0.03 *** 0.096 0.114 0.03 *** 0.084 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.206 0.03 *** 0.171 0.206 0.03 *** 0.160 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.078 0.02 *** 0.096 0.078 0.02 *** 0.116 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.058 0.03 0.020 0.054 0.058 0.03 0.020 0.057 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.198 0.02 *** 0.211 0.198 0.02 *** 0.238 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.352 0.03 *** 0.324 0.220 0.03 *** 0.238 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.127 0.02 *** 0.143 0.127 0.02 *** 0.163 Political interest → Associational membership 0.241 0.03 *** 0.156 0.241 0.03 *** 0.209 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.097 0.04 0.013 -0.046 -0.097 0.04 0.013 -0.053 Political interest → Political participation 0.569 0.03 *** 0.301 0.569 0.03 *** 0.391 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.396 0.05 *** 0.181 0.396 0.05 *** 0.219 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.01 *** 0.161 0.302 0.02 *** 0.537 Political ideology → Political participation -0.003 0.01 0.609 -0.014 -0.093 0.02 *** -0.143 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.136 0.03 *** 0.120 0.136 0.03 *** 0.093 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.280 0.03 *** 0.214 0.280 0.03 *** 0.173 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.409 0.03 *** 0.275 0.409 0.03 *** 0.225 Associational membership → Political participation 0.334 0.02 *** 0.272 0.334 0.02 *** 0.266 Associational membership → Social trust -0.010 0.04 0.775 -0.008 -0.010 0.04 0.775 -0.007 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.020 0.03 0.534 0.014 0.020 0.03 0.534 0.013 Political participation → Social trust 0.121 0.03 *** 0.113 0.121 0.03 *** 0.102 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.029 0.03 0.313 0.025 0.029 0.03 0.313 0.023 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.217 0.02 *** 0.165 0.217 0.02 *** 0.175 State of welfare policies → Social trust 0.018 0.03 0.542 0.019 0.018 0.03 0.542 0.019 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.215 0.03 *** 0.209 0.215 0.03 *** 0.217 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.577 0.02 *** 0.507 0.577 0.02 *** 0.516 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.152 0.03 *** 0.171 0.152 0.03 *** 0.171 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.256 0.02 *** 0.329 0.256 0.02 *** 0.323

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions -0.008 0.05 0.873 -0.007 -0.008 0.05 0.873 -0.008 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.348 0.05 *** 0.377 0.348 0.05 *** 0.364


Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest -0.014 0.04 0.728 -0.010 -0.196 0.05 *** -0.125 res6 ↔ res8 1.155 0.11 *** 0.339 1.343 0.12 *** 0.410


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A.4.9 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Comparison between Spain and Sweden

SPAIN SWEDEN Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.495 0.08 *** 0.128 0.495 0.08 *** 0.118 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.049 0.02 0.035 0.061 0.313 0.04 *** 0.209 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.115 0.03 *** 0.097 0.115 0.03 *** 0.077 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.239 0.04 *** 0.198 0.125 0.03 *** 0.100 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.047 0.02 0.010 0.059 0.047 0.02 0.010 0.038 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.042 0.02 0.069 0.037 0.042 0.02 0.069 0.036 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.210 0.02 *** 0.225 0.210 0.02 *** 0.189 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.341 0.02 *** 0.316 0.341 0.02 *** 0.287 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.166 0.02 *** 0.177 0.166 0.02 *** 0.180 Political interest → Associational membership 0.217 0.04 *** 0.141 0.417 0.05 *** 0.196 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.041 0.04 0.300 -0.019 -0.041 0.04 0.300 -0.017 Political interest → Political participation 0.576 0.04 *** 0.306 0.576 0.04 *** 0.274 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.442 0.04 *** 0.202 0.442 0.04 *** 0.192 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.01 *** 0.162 -0.072 0.01 *** -0.183 Political ideology → Political participation -0.010 0.01 0.042 -0.041 -0.010 0.01 0.042 -0.029 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.150 0.03 *** 0.133 0.047 0.03 0.062 0.046 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.295 0.04 *** 0.226 0.090 0.03 *** 0.083 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.363 0.03 *** 0.247 0.213 0.02 *** 0.194 Associational membership → Political participation 0.318 0.02 *** 0.259 0.318 0.02 *** 0.323 Associational membership → Social trust 0.050 0.02 0.029 0.036 0.050 0.02 0.029 0.054 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions -0.006 0.04 0.880 -0.004 0.121 0.02 *** 0.113 Political participation → Social trust 0.123 0.04 *** 0.108 0.037 0.03 0.155 0.039 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions 0.004 0.02 0.840 0.004 0.004 0.02 0.840 0.004 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.201 0.02 *** 0.155 0.201 0.02 *** 0.187 State of welfare policies → Social trust -0.022 0.03 0.519 -0.022 0.074 0.03 0.002 0.090 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.154 0.02 *** 0.150 0.154 0.02 *** 0.158 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.583 0.03 *** 0.518 0.455 0.02 *** 0.450 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.163 0.03 *** 0.183 0.034 0.02 0.124 0.037 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.290 0.03 *** 0.367 0.502 0.02 *** 0.556

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions -0.042 0.05 0.347 -0.041 0.080 0.04 0.073 0.068 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.371 0.03 *** 0.380 0.371 0.03 *** 0.436


Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest -0.014 0.04 0.728 -0.010 0.069 0.02 0.002 0.079 res6 ↔ res8 1.147 0.11 *** 0.337 1.157 0.09 *** 0.338


57

A.4.10 Estimated parameters for the causal model of social trust and confidence in political institutions. Comparison between Spain and United Kingdom

SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM Regression Weights Estimate S.E. P Standard. Estimate S.E. P Standard. Religious observance → Political ideology 0.138 0.03 *** 0.036 0.138 0.03 *** 0.089 Religious observance → Associational membership 0.050 0.02 0.031 0.062 0.207 0.02 *** 0.202 Religious observance → Satisfaction with life 0.080 0.02 *** 0.068 0.080 0.02 *** 0.059 Informal sociability → Satisfaction with life 0.236 0.04 *** 0.196 0.079 0.03 0.020 0.054 Informal sociability → Associational membership 0.064 0.02 *** 0.079 0.064 0.02 *** 0.059 Informal sociability → Social trust 0.028 0.02 0.183 0.026 0.028 0.02 0.183 0.025 Satisfaction with life → State of welfare policies 0.221 0.02 *** 0.234 0.221 0.02 *** 0.238 Satisfaction with life → Satisfaction economy 0.328 0.02 *** 0.304 0.328 0.02 *** 0.325 Satisfaction with life → Social trust 0.137 0.02 *** 0.152 0.137 0.02 *** 0.181 Political interest → Associational membership 0.216 0.04 *** 0.141 0.423 0.04 *** 0.237 Political interest → State of welfare policies -0.144 0.04 *** -0.067 -0.144 0.04 *** -0.066 Political interest → Political participation 0.528 0.03 *** 0.281 0.528 0.03 *** 0.300 Political interest → Confidence in political institutions 0.383 0.04 *** 0.174 0.383 0.04 *** 0.171 Political ideology → Distance party government 0.041 0.01 *** 0.161 -0.137 0.02 *** -0.190 Political ideology → Political participation -0.010 0.01 0.080 -0.041 -0.010 0.01 0.080 -0.016 Distance party government → State of welfare policies 0.132 0.02 *** 0.116 0.132 0.02 *** 0.117 Distance party government → Satisfaction economy 0.292 0.03 *** 0.224 0.181 0.03 *** 0.147 Distance party government → Satisfaction government 0.364 0.03 *** 0.248 0.246 0.02 *** 0.183 Associational membership → Political participation 0.340 0.02 *** 0.278 0.340 0.02 *** 0.345 Associational membership → Social trust 0.043 0.02 0.065 0.032 0.043 0.02 0.065 0.043 Associational membership → Confidence in political institutions 0.059 0.02 0.007 0.041 0.059 0.02 0.007 0.047 Political participation → Social trust 0.108 0.02 *** 0.099 0.108 0.02 *** 0.106 Political participation → Confidence in political institutions -0.012 0.02 0.589 -0.010 -0.012 0.02 0.589 -0.009 State of welfare policies → Satisfaction government 0.244 0.02 *** 0.189 0.244 0.02 *** 0.205 State of welfare policies → Social trust -0.016 0.04 0.659 -0.017 0.132 0.03 *** 0.162 State of welfare policies → Confidence in political institutions 0.166 0.02 *** 0.163 0.166 0.02 *** 0.163 Satisfaction economy → Satisfaction government 0.557 0.02 *** 0.494 0.557 0.02 *** 0.510 Satisfaction economy → Confidence in political institutions 0.160 0.03 *** 0.180 0.021 0.02 0.354 0.022 Satisfaction government → Confidence in political institutions 0.289 0.03 *** 0.364 0.484 0.02 *** 0.565

Social trust → Confidence in political institutions -0.039 0.06 0.536 -0.037 0.106 0.04 0.012 0.085 Confidence in political institutions → Social trust 0.359 0.06 *** 0.384 0.222 0.03 *** 0.277


Covariances Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Estimate S.E. P Correlat. Religious observance ↔ Political interest -0.014 0.04 0.728 -0.010 0.163 0.03 *** 0.120 res6 ↔ res8 1.160 0.11 *** 0.340 1.210 0.09 *** 0.328


social trust and institutional confidence in spain 1980-2005 … · 2014-05-07 ·...

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