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s h e e t s of Southern Reporter. Readers a re r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t he Reporter of Decisions,

Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229

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t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1090638

Clay C. Slagle

v.

Beverly Ross et a l .

Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t Court

(CV-09-1846)

On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

On r e h e a r i n g , C l a y C. S l a g l e moves t h i s Court t o

" d i s q u a l i f y " Robert B e r n a r d Harwood, J r . , from s i t t i n g as a

S p e c i a l J u s t i c e on t h i s case on the ground, among o t h e r s , t h a t


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he i s c u r r e n t l y engaged i n t h e p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e of law.

S l a g l e bases t h i s argument s o l e l y on the t e x t o f A r t . V I ,

147(a), A l a . Const. 1901 ( O f f . Recomp.), 1 which p r o v i d e s :

"No judge of any c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l , d u r i n g h i s

continuance i n o f f i c e , engage i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f la w or

r e c e i v e any remuneration f o r h i s j u d i c i a l s e r v i c e except t he

s a l a r y and allowances a u t h o r i z e d by law." (Emphasis added.)

In e f f e c t , S l a g l ei s

contending t h a t , notwithstandingt he

p r o v i s i o n i n 12-2-14, A l a . Code 1975, f o r t he appointment of

"member[s] of t he b ar " t o s i t as S p e c i a l J u s t i c e s i n c e r t a i n

circumstances, th e C o n s t i t u t i o n prevents such an appointee

from engaging i n t h e p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e o f la w. We r e j e c t

S l a g l e ' s c o n t e n t i o n .

In Johnson v. Board of C o n t r o l of the Employees'

Retirement System of Alabama, 740 So. 2d 999, 1011-12 ( A l a .

1999), t h i s Court observed:

"Under t he p r o v i s i o n s of the J u d i c i a l A r t i c l e ,

c o n s t r a i n t s a re p l a c e d upon a judge's a c t i v i t i e s

only 'during h i s continuance i n o f f i c e . ' 6.08(a).

In 1980, t h i s Court adopted a 'Commentary' t o the

Canons o f J u d i c i a l E t h i c s t o make i t c l e a r t h a t

1

Before th e o f f i c i a l r e c o m p i l a t i o n of the Alabama

C o n s t i t u t i o n , 147 was found a t 6.08 o f Amendment No. 328,

A l a . Const. 1901.

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r e t i r e d judg es do not ' co nt in ue i n o f f i c e ' under

6.08. The Commentary reads:

" ' R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s

or judges are not c o n t i n u i n g i n o f f i c e

un de r 6.08 of Amendment 328, C o n s t i t u t i o n

of Alabama of 1901.'"

740 So. 2d at 1011-12 (emphasis added).

The John son C ou rt qu ot ed from th e Commentary to the

s e c t i o n of Alabama's Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s c o n c e r n i n g

"Compliance w i t h the Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s . " S p e c i a l

J u s t i c e Harwood i s a r e t i r e d A s s o c i a t e J u s t i c e . The

Commentary makes i t c l e a r t h a t S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood i s not

" c o n t i n u i n g i n o f f i c e " f o r purposes of A r t . VI , 14 7( a) ;

thus, the p r o h i b i t i o n i n 147 on en ga gi ng i n th e p r a c t i c e of

law does not app ly t o him.

S e c t i o n D of the "Compliance" p o r t i o n of Alabama's Canons

of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , p e r t a i n i n g t o " R e t i r e d and Supernumerary

Judges," r e i n f o r c e s the n o t i on t h a t p r a c t i c i n g law i s no t an

impediment to a r e t i r e d judge or J u s t i c e s e r v i n g as a S p e c i a l

J u s t i c e . In p a r t , t h a t s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s :

" ( 2 ) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s orjudges, who are s e r v i n g p a r t time on the Supreme

Court or on e i t h e r of the c o u r t s of appeals or on

any c i r c u i t c o u r t or d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n the s t a t e , i n

an a c t i v e duty s t a t u s , s h a l l be r e q u i r e d to comply

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w i t h a l l of these Canons, except Canon 5C(3), D, E,

F, G and Canon 6C.

"(3) Retired and supernumerary j u s t i c e s a n d

judges, who are s e r v i n g f u l l time at the request of

the ch ie f j u s t i c e , on the Supreme Court or on e i t h e r

of the co ur t s of appeals or on any c i r c u i t court or

d i s t r i c t cou rt i n the sta te , i n an a c t i v e duty

s t a t u s , s h a l l be required to comply w i t h a l l o f

these Canons."

Canon 5F of the Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , from which r e t i r e d

or former J u s t i c e s o r judges s e r v i n g part-time are exempted,

states that "[a] judge should not practice law." Thus,

s e c t i on D(2) of the "Compliance" po rt io n of the Canons c l e a r l y

provides t h a t a r e t i r e d judge or J u s t i c e who serves part-time

on the Supreme Court i s not re qu ir ed t o comply with the

p r o h i b i t i o n on p r a c t i c i n g law imposed on a f u l l - t i m e judge or

J u s t i c e .I n c o n t r a s t , a r e t i r e d

judgewho i s s e r v i n g on a

f u l l - t i m e basis on the Supreme Court must comply w i t h a l l t he

Canons, i n c l u d i n g th e p r o h i b i t i o n i n Canon 5F concerning the

p r a c t i c e o f l aw . S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood was appointed to

serve as a Ju st ic e i n t h i s case and no t on a f u l l - t i m e b a s i s ;

consequently, he i s not expected t o r e f r a i n from t h e p r i v a t e

pr ac t ic e of law.

Based on the fo re go in g, we conclude tha t the f ac t that

S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood i s engaged i n t he p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e o f

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law does n ot d i s q u a l i f y him from s i t t i n g as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e

i n t h i s case. S l a g l e ' s motion i s denied.

MOTION DENIED; APPLICATION OVERRULED.

Moore, C. J. , and S t u a r t , Parker, and Murdock, J J . , and

Harwood, S p e c i al J u s t i c e , * concur.

B o l i n , Shaw, Main, and Bryan, J J . , concur i n p a r t and

d i s s e n t i n p a r t .

Wise, J . , recuses h e r s e l f .

* R e t i r e d A s s o c i a t e J u s t i c e R. Bernard Harwood, J r . , was

appointed on May 1, 2012 , t o serve as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e i nregard t o t h i s appeal. Although he was not present a t the

o r a l argument i n t h i s case, he has viewed a video r e c o r d i n g o f

t h a t o r a l argument.

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BOLIN, J u s t i c e ( c o n cu r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) .

I concur i n denying Clay C. S l a g l e ' s motion t o

" d i s q u a l i f y " S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Bernard Harwood. I continue t o

agree w i t h J u s t i c e Shaw's w e l l reasoned s p e c i a l w r i t i n g i s s u ed

on o r i g i n a l submission; t h e r e f o r e , I d i s s e n t from the

o v e r r u l i n g of the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g .

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SHAW, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) .

I concur i n denying C l a y C. S l a g l e ' s motion t o

" d i s q u a l i f y " S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood; I adhere t o my d i s s e n t

i n t h i s matter i s s u e d on o r i g i n a l submission, and I t h e r e f o r e

d i s s e n t from the o v e r r u l i n g o f the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g .

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MAIN, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) .

I concur i n denying the motion t o d i s q u a l i f y S p e c i a l

J u s t i c e Harwood, bu t I d i s s e n t from o v e r r u l i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n

f o r r e h e a r i n g .

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BRYAN, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r in g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) .

I was no t y e t s i t t i n g on t h i s Court when t h i s case was

d e c i d e d o r i g i n a l l y ; t h e r e f o r e , I d i d not vote on t h i s case on

o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n . However, i n r e v i e w i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n

f o r r e h e a r i n g , I have c o n s i d e r e d both the r e h e a r i n g m a t e r i a l s

and the m a t e r i a l s s u b m i t t e d on o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n , i n c l u d i n g

a v i d e o r e c o r d i n g o f o r a l argument. I concur i n the h o l d i n g

o f the o p i n i o n i s s u e d on a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g t h a t

addresses the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f the S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood

i s s u e . However, I agree c o m p l e t e l y w i t h J u s t i c e Shaw's

d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n on o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n , and I a l s o agree

w i t h p o r t i o n s o f J u s t i c e Main's d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n on o r i g i n a l

s u b m i s s i o n . T h e r e f o r e , I d i s s e n t from the o v e r r u l i n g o f the

r e he a ri n g a p p l i c a t i o n .

As J u s t i c e s Shaw and Main noted i n t h e i r d i s s e n t i n g

o p i n i o n s , the language used by the l e g i s l a t u r e i n th e Alabama

Open Meetings A c t , 36-25A-1 e t se q. , A l a . Code 1975 ("the

A c t " ) , i s ambiguous w i t h r e g a r d t o i t s e f f e c t upon the

d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f a governmental body, a committee, or a

subcommittee. T h i s Court must l o o k t o l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o

r e s o l v e the a m b i g u i t y . C i t y of Bessemer v. M c C l a i n , 957 So.

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2d 1061, 1074-75 (Ala. 2006) . As J u s t i c e Main e x p l a i n e d i n

h i s d i s s e n t on o r i g i n a l submission, the Ac t was d r a f t e d t o

ensure p u b l i c access t o the d e l i b e r a t i v e processes of p u b l i c

bodies. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of th e A c t i n th e main o p i n i o n on

o r i g i n a l submission i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t purpose.

Moreover, i t appears t h a t the a c t i o n s of th e Montgomery County

Board of Education i n t h i s case were an i n t e n t i o n a l attempt t o

circumvent the requirements of the A c t . 2 Therefore, I

r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from o v e r r u l i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r

r e h e a r i n g i n t h i s case.

2Furthermore, Montgomery County Board of Education member

C h a r l o t t e Meadows acknowledged as much i n a statement t o the

press t h a t was admitted i n t o e v i d e n c e : " I t was c l e a r the o n l y

reason t o form these sub-groups was t o a v o i d the media and th e

p u b l i c . " She a l s o t e s t i f i e d : " I t h i n k we met i n those groups

i n those types of s e t t i n g s so we c o u l d s p e c i f i c a l l y a v o i d the

media, and I t h i n k t h a t ' s wrong." These statements c o n f i r m my

o p i n i o n t h a t the Board's a c t i o n s were an i n t e n t i o n a l attempt

t o circumvent p u b l i c access to the d e l i b e r a t i v e processes of

the Board.

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HARWOOD, S p e c i a l J u s t i c e (statement o f n o n r e c u s a l ) .

F o l l o w i n g t he r e c u s a l i n t h i s case o f A s s o c i a t e J u s t i c e

A. K e l l i Wise, the Chi ef J u s t i c e of the Alabama Supreme Court

requested that I, as a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e o f t h e Court, t r a n s f e r

from i n a c t i v e s t a t u s t o a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s p r o tempore for the

s p e c i a l and r e s t r i c t e d purpose of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s case

as a S pe ci a l J u s t i c e . I was t o have no other duties or

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o r a u t h o r i t y , and my " a c t i v a t i o n " would cease

a u t o m a t i c a l l y upon the is su an ce of the c e r t i f i c a t e of judgment

i n the case. I accepted t h a t assignment, as I have done on

se ve ra l occ asio ns i n the pas t, without th er e be in g any

attendant monetary remuneration or other emolument o f s e r v i c e

to be pr ov id ed .

F o l l o w i n g my p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t he pe r curiam o p i n i o n o f

the Court i s s u e d June 15, 2012, i n which I voted with the

five-member m a j o r i t y , t h e a p p e l l a n t , C l a y C. S l a g l e , f i l e d an

a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g . I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h a t

a p p l i c a t i o n , M r . S l a g l e , through h i s a t t o r n e y , t h e Honorable

Mark G . M o n t i e l , f i l e d h i s "Motion f o r D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n and/or

Recusal of R e t i r e d J u s t i c e Bernard Harwood from P a r t i c i p a t i o n

i n t h i s Case on A p p l i c a t i o n f o r Rehearing on Be ha lf of

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P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t Clay C. S l a g l e . " I n t h a t motion,

Mr. M o n t i e l a s s e r t e d three grounds fo r "the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n

and/or r e c u s a l from t h i s case of R e t i r e d J u s t i c e Bernard

Harwood." F i r s t , he c i t e d and se t out i n f u l l 147, A r t . VI ,

C o n s t i t u t i o n of Alabama of 1901 ( f o r m e r l y 6.08 of Amendment

No. 328 to the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1901). Tha t s e c t i o n

s t a t e s :

"Sec. 147. P r o h i b i t e d a c t i v i t i e s .

"(a) No judge of any c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l ,

d u r i n g h i s continuance i n o f f i c e , engage i n the

p r a c t i c e of law or r e c e i v e any remu neratio n f o r h i s

j u d i c i a l s e r v i c e except the s a l a r y and allowances

a u t h o r i z e d by law.

"(b) No ju dg e, exc ep t a ju dg e of a pr ob at e

c o u r t , s h a l l seek or accept any n o n j u d i c i a l e l e c t i v e

o f f i c e , or h o l d any other o f f i c e of p u b l i c t r u s t ,

excepting s e r v i c e i n the m i l i t a r y f or ce s of the

s t a t e or f e d e r a l governments.

"(c) The supreme c o u r t s h a l l adopt r u l e s of

conduct and canons of e t h i c s , not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , f o r the judg es

of a l l c o u r t s of t h i s S t a t e . "

Next, Mr. M o n t i e l "contends t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of

R e t i r e d J u s t i c e Harwood i n t h i s case without n o t i c e to the

p a r t i e s and i n v i o l a t i o n of the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n v i o l a t e s

the due process requirements of s t a t e and f e d e r a l

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c o n s t i t u t i o n . See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co al Co., In c. ,

U.S., 129 S. Ct . 2252 (2009)."

L a s t l y , Mr. M on t i el avers t ha t

" [ r ] e t i r e d J u s t i c e Harwood al so has main tain ed

an a c t i v e l aw p r a c t i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g s t a t e a g e nc i e s

and bodies, governed by the Alabama Open Meetings

A c t , d u r i n g h i s r e t i r e m e n t . T h i s p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e

o f l aw a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s u g g e st s a p o s s i b l e

b i a s or c o n f l i c t r e g a r d i n g t h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d i n

t h i s case. The p r o b a b i l i t y of a c t u a l b i as on the

p a r t of the judge i s too h ig h t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

t o l e r a b l e .See

Capertonv. A.T.

MasseyCoal Co.,I n c . , U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2252."

Mr. M o n t i e l re qu es ts t ha t I "be d i s q u a l i f i e d or recused

from t h i s case by [my] own o r d e r or t h a t of th e C o u r t . " 3

Add res sin g Mr. Mo nt ie l' s thre e grounds i n rev ers e orde r, I

submit th e f o l l o w i n g :

Mr. Montiel's b e l i e f that Ihave

" m a i n t a i n e d an a c t i v e

l aw p r a c t i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g s t a t e a g e n c i e s a nd b o d i e s , governed

by the Alabama Open Meetings Act , du ri ng [my] re ti re me nt ," i s

simply a misapprehension on h i s p a r t . The on ly s t a t e agency

3Mr. M o n t i e l g r a c i o u s l y s t a t e s i n t he i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s

motion th at "[ w] hi le under signed couns el has the hig he st

p e r s o n a l r e g a r d an d r e s p e c t f o r R e t i r e d J u s t i c e Harwood, the

Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s t h i s d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n and/or

r e c u s a l . " R e c i p r o c a l l y , I have t h e h i g h e s t p e r s o n a l r e g a r d

f o r M r . M o n t i e l , acknowledging h i s lon g and accom plis hed l e g a l

c a r e e r encompassing not onl y ex te ns iv e exper ienc e as a p r i v a t e

p r a c t i t i o n e r , but al so h i s se r vi c e as a st a te c i r c u i t judge

and on the Alabama Court of C ri m in a l Appeals.

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or body I have represented during my retirement i s Shelton

S t a t e Community College, based i n my hometown of Tuscaloosa.

I was at a l l times, commencing w i t h my appointment as a

S p e c i a l J u s t i c e i n t h i s case, up to the present, on r e t a i n e r

as counsel f o r Shelton State. The Alabama Open Meetings A c t ,

c o d i f i e d as 36-25A-1 et seq., Code of Alabama 1975, a p p l i e s

t o "governmental bod ies ." Shel ton Sta te i s not a

"governmental body" as that term i s d e f i n e d by th e Ac t (see

36-25A-2(4)); rather, i t i s an adjunct of the Alabama

Department of Postsecondary E duca tio n, which, i n t u r n , i s

simply a dep art men t of th e Alabama Department of Education.

The Alabama State Board of Education d i r e c t s and c o n t r o l s

Shelton State, and Shelton State has no independent or

separate governing board, body, or commission. Rather, i t i s

d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d by th e Alabama Board of Education through

t h a t Board's d i r e c t i v e s to the c h a n c e l l o r of the Alabama

Department of Postsecondary Education.

I do not otherw ise repr ese nt "s ta te agencies and bodies,

governed by the Alabama Open Meetings A c t . "

With respect to the i s s u e of my p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s

case as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e without advance notice having been

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given t o p a r t i e s t o the appeal of my appointment, I do not

p e r c e i v e how such lack of advance n o t i c e " v i o l a t e s the due

process requirements of s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . " By

l o n g and w e l l j u s t i f i e d t r a d i t i o n , the i d e n t i t y of th e r e g u l a r

J u s t i c e on the Court t o whom an appeal i s assigned f o r i n i t i a l

a n a l y s i s and issuance of an o p i n i o n or other d i s p o s i t i o n and

the i d e n t i t i e s of th e J u s t i c e s s e r v i n g on the same d i v i s i o n of

the Court as that J u s t i c e , which J u s t i c e s w i l l be v o t i n g i n

the appeal, ar e no t d i s c l o s e d i n advance t o th e p a r t i e s t o an

appeal. That nondisclosure i s designed t o avoid any t a r g e t e d

attempts at outsid e infl ue nc e during the d e l i b e r a t i v e process

f o r the p a r t i c u l a r appeal. When a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e has been

appointed t o cast the deciding vote i n a case where the

p a r t i c i p a t i n g r e g u l a r J u s t i c e s are evenly divided, the l o g i c

behind nondisclosure i n advance of th e i d e n t i t y of th e S p e c i a l

J u s t i c e i s even more com pel lin g. With res pec t t o

Mr. Mon tie l' s conc ludi ng c i t a t i o n i n support of t h i s ground

f o r r e c u s a l , Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., I n c . ,556 U.S.

868 (2009), I have c a r e f u l l y read that case, and I am unable

t o l o c a t e i n i t s d i s c u s s i o n of due-process c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

i n v o l v e d i n determining whether a judge shou ld recuse hi ms el f

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or h e r s e l f , or be d i s q u a l i f i e d from s i t t i n g , any statements

t h a t would r e l a t e to the i s s u e of advance n o t i c e of the

appointment of a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e i n a p a r t i c u l a r case.

F i n a l l y , t u r n i n g t o the p r o s c r i p t i o n s t a t e d i n 147(a),

C o n s t i t u t i o n of Alabama of 1901, my focus i s i n i t i a l l y upon

the i s s u e whether I , as a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e who i s s e r v i n g p a r t -

time on the Court at the request of th e C h i e f J u s t i c e , f o r the

s o l e purposeof

p a r t i c i p a t i n gi n a

p a r t i c u l a r case, thereby

become a "judge of [ t h a t ] court ... d u r i n g h i s continuance i n

o f f i c e , " i n the context i n which those terms are e n v i s i o n e d i n

147(a). In Johnson v. Board of C o n t r o l of th e Employees'

Retirement System of Alabama, 740 So. 2d 999 (A la . 1999), the

Court was c a l l e d upon t o decide whether a r e t i r e d c i r c u i t

judge, who designated on he r oath of o f f i c e as a r e t i r e d judge

t h a t she was t o be " i n a c t i v e " and who immediately t h e r e a f t e r

assumed appointed o f f i c e as a f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t judge, was

" h o l d i n g two o f f i c e s of p r o f i t , " i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of 280,

A r t . XVII, C o n s t i t u t i o n of Alabama of 1901. The Court

concluded t h a t" i t

i s c l e a r t h a t r e t i r e d , i n a c t i v e members o f

the j u d i c i a r y who are governed by the J u d i c i a l Retirement

System, are not h o l d i n g an o f f i c e , or e x e r c i s i n g any power of

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1090638

the St ate , unle ss or u n t i l they r e t u r n t o a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s ,

e i t h e r f u l l - t i m e or p a r t - t i m e . " 740 So. 2d at 1012. The

Court was c a l l e d upon s o l e l y to answer the q u e s t i o n whether a

r e t i r e d , i n a c t i v e member of the j u d i c i a r y who was governed by

the J u d i c i a l Retirement System was h o l d i n g an o f f i c e of

p r o f i t . The c o n t r a s t the Court made w i t h a r e t i r e d member of

the j u d i c i a r y who r e t u r n e d t o a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s , e i t h e r f u l l

time or p a r t - t i m e , was dictum, p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the e x t e n t t h a t

i t i m p l i c i t l y opined as to the s t a t u s of r e t i r e d judges

r e t u r n i n g to a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s , w i t h o u t making a d i s t i n c t i o n

between those who d i d so " f u l l - t i m e " and those who d i d so o n l y

" p a r t - t i m e . "

The pr ec is e que sti on now c o n f r o n t i n g me has been d i r e c t l y

answered by th e Court, however, by i t s a d o pt i o n of th e Canons

of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , which became e f f e c t i v e February 1, 1976,

and, as to the "Compliance" s e c t i o n , were l a s t amended i n

1980. I t i s t o be noted t h a t s u b s e c t i o n (c) of 147 of the

C o n s t i t u t i o n of Alabama of 1901 mandates t h a t " [ t ] h e supreme

c o u r t s h a l l adopt r u l e s of conduct and canons of e t h i c s , not

i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , f o r

judges of a l l c ou rt s of t h i s S t a t e . " The Court has d e c l a r e d

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t h a t " ' [ t ] h e Canons are not merely g u i d e l i n e s for proper

j u d i c i a l conduct. I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d t ha t the Canons of

J u d i c i a l E t h i c s have the f o r c e and e f f e c t of law.' In re

S h e f f i e l d , 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984)." Johnson, 740

So. 2d at 1011.

The s e c t i o n of the Canons e n t i t l e d "Compliance With the

Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s " p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , as

f o l l o w s :

"B. Judge Pro Tempore. A judge pro tempore i s

a pe rs on who i s ap po in te d to ac t t e m p o r a r i l y as a

judge.

"(1) While a c t i n g as such, a judge pro tempore

i s not r e q u i r e d to comply w i t h Canon 5C(3), D, E, F,

and G, and Canon 6C.

"

"D. R e t i r e d and Supernumerary Judges.

"(1) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s or

ju dg es , who are not s e r v i n g on the Supreme Court or

on e i t h e r of the c o u r t s of appeals or on any c i r c u i t

c o u r t or d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n the s t a t e , i n an a c t i v e

duty s t a t u s , s h a l l not be r e q u i r e d to comply w i t h

any of these Canons.

"(2) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s or

ju dg es , who are s e r v i n g p a r t time on the SupremeCourt or on e i t h e r of the c o u r t s of appeals or on

any c i r c u i t c o u r t or d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n the s t a t e , i n

an a c t i v e duty s t a t u s , s h a l l be r e q u i r e d to comply

w i t h a l l of these Canons, except Canon 5C(3), D, E,

F, G and Canon 6C.

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"(3) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s and

judges, who are s e r vi n g f u l l time at the request of

the chief j u s t i c e , on the Supreme Court or on e i t h e r

of the co ur t s of appeals or on any c i r c u i t court or

d i s t r i c t cou rt i n the sta te , i n an a ct i ve duty

s t a t u s , s h a l l be required to comply w i t h a l l of

these Canons."

(Emphasis supplied.)

I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e Alabama Supreme Court f u l l y

intended that the Canons i t adopted, i n c l u d i n g D(2) of the

Compliance s e c t i o n , were n ot i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t he p r o v i s i o n s

of the Co n st it u ti on , as mandated by su bs e ct i on (c) 147.

That being so, i t i s fu rt he r cl ea r and c e r t ai n that the Court

concluded t h a t there was a s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between a

r e t i r e d J u s t i c e who was s er vi ng "p art time on the Supreme

Court ... i n an a c t i v e duty s t a t u s , " and one who was " s er v in g

f u l l time at the request of the c h i e f j u s t i c e , on the Supreme

Court ... i n an a c t i v e duty s t a t u s . " Whereas a n a c t i v a t e d

J u s t i c e s e r v i n g f u l l - t i m e would be required to comply w it h a l l

the Canons, a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e s e r v i n g o n l y part-time i s

s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted from complying w i t h Canon 5C(3), D, E,

F, G, and Canon 6C. Canon 5F, with which a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e

s e r v i n g part-time on the Supreme Court i n an ac ti ve duty

s t a t u s need not comply, reads as f o l l o w s : "F. P r a c t i c e of Law.

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A judge s h o u l d n o t p r a c t i c e l a w. " Thus, i t i s i n e s c a p a bl e

that the Alabama Supreme Court has concluded that a r e t i r e d

J u s t i c e se rv in g pa rt -t im e on the Court may, c on si st en t wi th

the Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , p r a c t i c e l aw .

The Supreme Court o f C o n n e c t i c u t reached a s i m i l a r

c o n c l u s i o n i n H o n u l i k v. Town of Greenwich, 293 Conn. 641, 980

A.2d 845 (2009), i n which i t addressed the issue "whether a

r e t i r e d j u s t i c e , by v i r t u e o f performing l i m i t e d j u d i c i a l

a c t s , n e c e s s a r i l y i s h o l d i n g t h a t o f f i c e . " 293 Conn. at 654

n. 15, 980 A. 2d a t 854 n. 15. That Court reasoned:

"The d e c i s i o n of the Supreme Court of New

Hampshire [ i n Claremont School D i s t r i c t v. Governor,

142 N.H. 737, 712 A.2d 612 (1998),] p r o vi d e s d i r e c t

support fo r the no ti on tha t temporary performance of

d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e does not

equate w i t h h o l d i n g t h a t o f f i c e . Other s t a t e

c o u r t s , i n a d d r e s s i n g c l a i m s p e r t a i n i n g t o

p o s t r e t i r e m e n t j u d i c i a l a c t i v i t y t h a t concededly are

d i s t i n c t from those a t i s s u e here and i n Claremont

School D i s t r i c t , a l s o have acknowledged the

d i s t i n c t i o n between performance of j u d i c i a l d u t i e s

and st a t u s as j u d i c i a l o f f i c e h o l d e r . See, e .g .,

S t a t e ex r e l . Wilcox v. D i s t r i c t Court, 208 Mont.

351, 358, 678 P.2d 209 (1984) ( ' r e t i r e d d i s t r i c t

judge c a l l e d i n [pursuant t o p r o v i s i o n a l l o w i n g f o r

temporary assignment of r e t i r e d judges] does not

become a second incumbent i n t h a t o f f i c e , but simply

e x e r c i s e s t h e powers of a d i s t r i c t judge on a

temporary b a s i s ' ) ; W e r l e i n v . C a l v e r t , 460 S.W.2d

398, 401 (Tex.1970) ('A r e t i r e d judge assigned to

a c t i v e duty i s a u t h o r i z e d t o e x e r c i s e th e powers of

an o f f i c e wh il e se rv in g on assignment. He does not

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by v i r t u e of the assignment, however, hold an o f f i c e

....') (reh. denied December 31, 1970); Nelson v.

M i l l e r , 25 Utah 2d 277, 288, 480 P.2d 467 (1971)

('we see no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t between

mandatory re ti re me nt fo r age and l e g i s l a t i v e

a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r c a l l i n g a judge back i n t o s e r v i c e

upon a " c a s e - t o - c a s e " b a s i s ' ) . "

293 Conn. a t 655-56, 980 A. 2d at 855 (f oo tn ot e o m i t t e d) . At

a n o t he r p o i n t i n i t s o p i n i o n , t h e Supreme Court of Conne cti cut

observed:

" F i n a l l y ,o t h e r c o u r t s ' j u r i s p r u d e n c e as t o

what

c o n s t i t u t e s an ' o f f i c e ' i s i n s t r u c t i v e . In United

S t a t e s v. H a r t w e l l , 73 U.S. (6 Wa ll .) 385, 393, 18

L.Ed. 830 (1867), the U n i t e d S ta te s Supreme Court,

i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e p r o s c r i b i n g

embezzlement by c e r t a i n o f f i c i a l s , a r t i c u l a t e d a

formula to apply i n det erm ini ng whether a p a r t i c u l a r

p o s i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an ' o f f i c e . ' According to the

Supreme Court, '[a]n o f f i c e i s a p u b l i c s t a t i o n , or

employment, co nf er re d by the appointment of

government. The term embraces the id ea s of ten ur e,

d u r a t i o n , emolument, and d u t i e s . ' Id . As one

commentator has noted, the Ha rt we ll fo rm ul at io n i s

d e s c r i p t i v e r a t h e r t h a n p r e s c r i p t i v e , and

contemplates a continuum. J . O'Connor, 'The

Emoluments C l a us e : An A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t I n t r u d e r i n a

F e d e r a l i s t C o n s t i t u t i o n , ' 24 H o f s t r a L.Rev. 89, 109

(1995). Thus, 'a p o s i t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by

s u b s t a n t i a l t e n u r e , d u r a t i o n , emoluments, and duties

i s t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c o f f i c e ; c o n v e r s e l y , a p o s i t i o n

p o s s e s s i n g none of these a t t r i b u t e s would r e s i d e a t

the other end of the continuum as c l e a r l y a non-

o f f i c e . ' I d . "

293 Conn. at 657-58, 980 A. 2d at 856 (f oo tn ot es o m i t t e d ) .

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In s e r v i n g on the Court f o r the l i m i t e d purpose of

p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r case, I have no "tenure" as

such; t h e r e i s no extended d u r a t i o n of my s e r v i c e ; and t h e r e

are no emoluments.

I am not o b l i v i o u s t o the p r o v i s i o n s of 12-18-7(b) A l a .

Code 1975, and p e r t i n e n t p a r t s of 12-18-10(e), Ala. Code

1975, which read as f o l l o w s :

S e c t i o n 12-18-7(b): "The r e t i r i n g j u s t i c e or judge,

upon b e i n g r e t i r e d , s h a l l take the oath of o f f i c e as

a r e t i r e d j u s t i c e or judge and thereupon become an

e x t r a or a d d i t i o n a l judge of th e s t a t e . T h e r e a f t e r ,

on the request of th e C h i e f J u s t i c e , the p r e s i d i n g

judge of one of the c o u r t s of appeals or th e

Governor, any such r e t i r e d j u s t i c e or judge may

serve on the Supreme Court, on e i t h e r of th e c o u r t s

of appeals or on any c i r c u i t c o u r t i n the s t a t e .

Such r e t i r e d j u s t i c e or judge, when s e r v i n g on a

c o u r t i n the absence or d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of th e

r e g u l a r j u s t i c e or judge, as th e case may be, s h a l l

have and e x e r c i s e a l l the d u t i e s and f u n c t i o n s of

the r e g u l a r j u s t i c e or judge f o r whom he i s

s u b s t i t u t i n g . When s e r v i n g on a c o u r t f o r reasons

other than the absence or d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of th e

r e g u l a r j u s t i c e or judge, the d u t i e s of a r e t i r e d

j u s t i c e or judge s h a l l be as p r e s c r i b e d by th e C h i e f

J u s t i c e when s e r v i n g on the Supreme Court or by th e

p r e s i d i n g judge when s e r v i n g on a c o u r t of appeals

or by the p r e s i d i n g judge, when s e r v i n g i n a c i r c u i t

c o u r t ; p r o v i d e d , t h a t n o t h i n g c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s

p r o v i s i o n s h a l l prevent the C h i e f J u s t i c e from

a s s i g n i n g a j u s t i c e or a judge t o s p e c i a l temporaryduty i n o t h e r c o u r t s . A r e c i t a l i n the minutes of

the c o u r t t h a t a r e g u l a r j u s t i c e or judge i s absent

or d i s q u a l i f i e d and t h a t a r e t i r e d j u s t i c e or judge

i s s i t t i n g i n h i s p l a c e a t th e request of th e C h i e f

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J u s t i c e , t h e p r e s i d i n g judge o f one o f t h e c o u r t s of

appeals or th e Governor s h a l l be c o n c l u s i v e evidence

of h i s a u t h o r i t y t o a c t . "

S e c t i o n 12-18-10(e) ( i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t ) : "Every

j u s t i c e or judge who has r e t i r e d pursuant t o t h i s

a r t i c l e may, on the request of the C h i e f J u s t i c e ,

t he p r e s i d i n g judge o f a c o u r t o f appeals or th e

Governor, be c a l l e d t o a c t i v e duty s t a t u s and, when

s e r v i n g w i t h the Supreme Court or c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s ,

s h a l l perform such d u t i e s as may be p r e s c r i b e d by

t he C h i e f J u s t i c e or the p r e s i d i n g judge of th e

c o u r t of appeals w i t h which he i s s e r v i n g and, when

s e r v i n g i n a c i r c u i t c o u r t , s h a l l perform such

d u t i e s as may be p r e s c r i b e d by the p r e s i d i n g judge

i n t h e c i r c u i t "

"

"A r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r judge of one o f t h e c o u r t s

of appeals o r c i r c u i t judge, w h i l e s e r v i n g w i t h t he

Supreme Court or one of the c o u r t s of appeals f o r

reasons o t h e r than t he absence o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n

of a j u s t i c e o r judge, s h a l l perform such d u t i e s as

may be p r e s c r i b e d by th e C h i e f J u s t i c e when s e r v i n g

w i t hthe Supreme

Court,or as

p r e s c r i b e dby thep r e s i d i n g judge of th e c o u r t o f appeals w i t h which

he may be s e r v i n g . "

A l l I know concerning t h e circumstances u n d e r l y i n g my

appointment as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s case

i s t h a t , as s t a t e d at the c o n c l u s i o n of the o p i n i o n on

o r i g i n a l d e l i v e r a n c e , "Wise, J . , recuse[d] h e r s e l f . " As

J u s t i c e P a r k e r made c l e a r i n h i s "Statement o f R e c u s a l "

appended t o the o p i n i o n on a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g i n C i t y

of Bessemer v. M c C l a i n , 957 So. 2d 106 1, 1085 ( A l a . 2006), a

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J u s t i c e may e l e c t to recuse h i m s e l f o r h e r s e l f without t h e r e

be in g any b a s i s f o r h i s or her d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n . R e g a r d l e s s ,

I revert to, and am guided by i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t he

d e l i b e r a t e de te rm ina ti on by the Alabama Supreme Court i n

adopting the Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , "not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

t he p r o v i s i o n s o f [ th e] C o n s t i t u t i o n , " t h a t a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e

serving on that Court, " p a r t - t i m e " may, " no t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

[th e] C o n s t i t u t i o n , " p r a c t i c e la w.

I n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a l l t he above, I, f o r my p a r t ,

d e c l i n e t o recuse myself from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the vote on

a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g . Because the motion i n q u e s t i o n

asks t h a t I be " d i s q u a l i f i e d or recused from t h i s case by [my]

own or de r or t h a t of th e Court," I w i l l not presume t o

a n t i c i p a t e the Court's own a n a l y s i s and de ter min at ion of t h i s

i s s u e .

24

slagle v. ross

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