ross v ross

8/12/2019 Ross v Ross

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Ross v. Ross

Frank Ross, Appellant; and

Annie Ross and others, Respondents.

Annie Ross and another, Appellants; and

Frank Ross and others, Respondents.

(1894), 25 S.C.R. 307(1894), 25 R.C.S. 307

Supreme Court of Canada

1893: October 4, 5, 6 / 1894: March 3.

Present: Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Fournier,Taschereau,

Sedgewick and King JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OFQUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWERCANADA(APPEAL SIDE).

Will, form of — Holograph willexecuted abroad — Quebec Civil Code, art.7 — Locus regit actum — Lex domicilii —Lex rei sitae — Trustees and executors —Legacy in trust — Discretion of trustee —

Vagueness or uncertainty as to beneficiaries — Poor relatives — Public Protestantcharities — Charitable uses — Right ofintervention — Persona designata.

In 1865 J.G.R., a merchant, then and atthe time of his death domiciled in the city ofQuebec, while temporarily in the city of New York made the following will inaccordance with the law relating toholograph wills in Lower Canada:

"I hereby will and bequeath all my property, assets or means of any kind, to my brother Frank, who will use one-half of themfor Public Protestant Charities in Quebecand Carluke, say the Protestant HospitalHome, French Canadian Mission, andamongst poor relatives as he may judge best,the other half to himself and for his own use,

excepting 2,000 pounds, which he will sendto Miss Mary Frame, Overton Farm."

A.R. and others, heirs at law of thetestator, brought action to have, the willdeclared invalid.

Held, Taschereau J. dissenting, that thewill was valid.

Held further, Fournier and TaschereauJJ. dissenting, that the rule locus regit actumwas not in the Province of Quebec, beforethe code, nor since under the code itself (art.7), imperative, but permissive only.

Held also, Taschereau J. dissenting, thatthe will was valid even if the rule locus regit

actum did apply, because it sufficientlyappeared from the evidence that by the lawof the State of New York the will would beconsidered good as to movables whereversituated, having been executed according tothe law of the testator's domicile, and goodas to immovables in the Province of Quebec,having been executed according to the lawof the situation of those immovables.

In this action interventions were filed byMorrin College, an institution where youth

are instructed in the higher branches oflearning, and especially young men intendedfox the ministry of the Presbyterian Churchin Canada, who are entitled to receive a freegeneral and theological education, and areassisted by scholarships and bursaries tocomplete their education; by the FinlayAsylum, a corporate institution for the reliefof the aged and infirm, belonging to thecommunion of the Church of England; and by W.R.R., a first cousin of the testatorclaiming as a poor relative.

Held, that Morrin College did not comewithin the description of a charitableinstitution according to the ordinarymeaning of the words, and had therefore nolocus standi to intervene; Sedgewick J.dissenting; but that Finlay Asylum camewithin the terms of the will as one of thecharities which F.R. might select as a



beneficiary, and this gave it a right tointervene to support the will.

Held further, that in the gift to "poorrelatives" the word "poor" was too vagueand uncertain to have any meaning attached

to it, and must therefore be rejected, and theword "relatives"' should be construed asexcluding all except those whom the law, inthe case of an intestacy, recognized as the proper class among whom to divide the property of a deceased person, and W.R.R.not coming within that class his interventionshould be dismissed.

Held, per Fournier and Taschereau JJ.,that the bequests to "poor relatives"absolutely null for uncertainty.

APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from adecision of the Court of Queen's Bench forLower Canada (appeal side), Q.R. 2 Q.B.413, affirming the judgment of the SuperiorCourt by which the action to set aside thewill of the Hon. James Gibb Ross wasdismissed as to part of the claim andaffirmed as to the remainder.

The will, which appears at length in thehead note, was wholly written and signed by

the testator while temporarily in New Yorkin 1865, and was by him mailed from NewYork to Quebec, addressed to his brotherFrank; it was subsequently restored to thetestator, who on various occasionssubsequently at Quebec delivered it to Mr.F. Ross, the last occasion being in 1883, fiveyears before his death.

The estate in the province of Quebecalone is sworn at about four millions. Thetestator further had large property, both real

and personal, in other provinces of Canadaand in the United States.

During the pendency of the suit WilliamRussell Ross, a first cousin and former partner of the testator, then in bad health andadvanced in life, in poor circumstances andwith a large family, applied for assistance, pleading the terms of the will, and upon

being refused he presented a petition inintervention which was allowed, cause to thecontrary being shown by plaintiffs anddefendants.

Subsequently further interventions were

filed by Morrin College and Finlay Asylum,claiming to be public protestant charities andas such to be interested in supporting thevalidity of the will.

Plaintiffs and defendants also opposedthese interventions, but the points takenwere decided against them by the SuperiorCourt.

The plaintiffs contended that the willwas invalid because, being in holograph

form, it was made in New York where willsmade in that. form are not in generalrecognized; and, further, that the trust deviseis void for uncertainty, and that thus the trusthalf should be apportioned amongst theheirs-at-law. Mr. Frank Ross answered thatthe will was in all respects valid, that underit he took the estate "subject to the truststherein stated," and that, by the law of NewYork, wills made by persons domiciledelsewhere are valid in that State, so far as personalty therein is concerned, if made in

the form required by the law of the testator'sdomicile. To the interventions, the plaintiffsand the defendant, Frank Ross, pleadedsimilar defences - the defendant in additiondemurring.

For pleas to the interventions plaintiffsset up:

1. The will was bad in form as having been made in New York.

2. Under no circumstances is MorrinCollege - an institution under Presbyteriancontrol - entitled to anything.

3. Under no circumstances is the FinlayAsylum - an institution under the control ofthe Church of England - entitled to anything.



4. Under no circumstances is WilliamRussell Ross entitled to anything, becauseMy. Frank Ross "has declared that in his judgment the said intervenant is not entitledto any part of the money so bequeathed asaforesaid."

5. The firm, composed of W.R. Rossand testator, lost money, which factdisqualifies W. R. Ross from receivinganything under the will.

6. The whole of the estate of the testatorhas been vested in Frank Ross by the will,and no separate trust has been created by thewill, and neither the intervenants nor anyother person have a right to interfere withFrank Ross in the matter of any bequest

whatever, the whole will (except the bequestto Mary Frame) being entirely andabsolutely at his discretion, supposing thatthe will is valid as the intervenants pretend.

The defendant Frank Ross contested theinterventions on the grounds following:

1. That the whole estate and successionwas absolutely his own, and the bequests infavour of public protestant charities and of poor relations were void for vagueness and

uncertainty, and conferred no right whateverin favour of any charity or relation.

2. As Episcopalian and Presbyterianinstitutions, the Finlay Asylum and MorrinCollege have no claim under the will.

3. At the time of the death of the testatorW.R. Ross was indebted to his estate in thesum of $116,279.30, for his share of a losingspeculation in 1872, and for a subsequentadvance of $40,000 made in 1885, and is

consequently disqualified from taking underthe will.

4. For the reasons stated, and denyingthat he is called upon to exercise anydiscretion, Frank Ross declared that underno circumstances will he ever give anythingto his cousin, W. R. Ross.

McCarthy Q.C. and Stuart Q.C. for theappellant Frank Ross.

The present appeal is from part of the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench forQuebec, confirming the judgment of the

Superior Court, whereby the legality of the bequest in the will directing the appellant touse one-half of his estate for public protestant charities in Quebec and Carlukeand amongst poor relatives as should judge best, was sustained.

The evidence establishes that aholograph will is invalid according to thelaws of New York unless executed by thetestator in presence of two witnesses andattested by them; that nevertheless, a

holograph will, executed in New York by a person domiciled in Quebec, would be validin New York to pass personal property, butnot real estate, provided the will were validin Quebec. Sec. 2611 N.Y. Code ofProcedure.

A testamentary bequest, to be valid,must be the expression of the will of thetestator; he cannot make a legacy dependupon the will of a third person, nor can heleave the choice of the legatee to a third

person. Pothier, (Bugnet' ed.) vol. 8 Traitédes Donations entre-vifs no. 73; C.C. art.756; 7 Aubry & Rau, p. 69, ss. 655, 656;Toullier, vol. 5, nos 305, 351, 606; 3Zachariae (Massé & Vergé), p. 34, note 8;18 Demolombe, nos. 608, 618; Re JeanMerendol, Merlin Repertoire vo. Légatairesec. II, p. 425 Belgian edition; Merlin,Répertoire vo. Institution d'Héritier, sec. v.ss. 1, no. xviii, vol. 15, p. 367; de Sauvan v.de Sarrieu, S.V. 57, 1, 182; Moeglin v.Willig, S.V. 52, 2, 435; Détève & Détève,

S.V. 49, 2, 538; Laboujouderie v. Raffier,SS.V. 41, 2, 240; Legrand-Masse v.Héritiers Lépine, S.V. 27, 1, 408; Beurier v.Emorine, S.V. 60, 1, 346; Britelle v.Déyvrande, Dalloz Recueil, 70, 1, 202;Simon v. Simon, Journal du Palais, 1827, p.132.



Saving that if no discretionary powerhad been given the law would imply equaldistribution and the court would distributeequally, would be to assume the validity of a bequest to charities unnamed and undefined,and to relatives undescribed. In Liddard v.

Liddard, 28 Beav. 266, the question arose asto the distribution of property among thechildren of the deceased. In such a case ourlaw provides for equal distribution but as between relatives, some distant and someclose, the law gives to the nearer collateralrelations to the entire exclusion of thefurther.

The Superior Court has not the powersof the courts in France, nor of the Parlementde Paris, and cannot overrule the express

provisions of the statute 34 George 3, ch. 6,which while conferring upon the Courts ofKing's Bench, to which the Superior Courtsucceeded, the jurisdiction of the Prevôté deParis, provided that nothing in the act shouldgrant the court legislative powers possessed by any court prior to the conquest. Stuart v.Bowman, 3 L.C.R. 309; McGibbon v.Abbott, 8 Legal News 267; Tilden v. Green,130 N.Y. 29; Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. 107.

What shall be considered charities in

England is settled by the statute 43 Elizabethc. 4.

The doctrine of the English law, whichit is suggested. the court should follow inthis case, for the purpose of preventing thelegacy from lapsing in the event of theappellant not executing it, has been harshlycriticised and does not recommend itselfeither by its wisdom or its justice. Cary v.Abbot, 7 Ves. 490. See remarks by SirWilliam Grant in Morice v. The Bishop of

Durham, 9 Ves. 399; 10 Ves. 537.

The decisions in Contant v. Mercier, 20R.L. 379, 382, have no material bearingupon this discussion, as the question of jurisdiction and power was never raised.

The intervening parties should be notonly possible but certain beneficiaries, to

justify their intervention. The old rule"l'intérêt est la mesure des actions," ascontained in the Code of Procedure art. 13,applies. The decision in the Privy Council inMcGibbon v. Abbott, 10 App. Cas. 653,appears to support the view that where a

person's rights are dependent upon theexercise of a legal discretion vested inanother, no right to defend the instrumentcreating the discretion accrues until after theexercise of the discretion has created a right.Isaac v. Defriez, 17 Ves. 373n; Attorney-General v. Price, 17 Ves. 371; Anon, 1 P.Wm. 327.

As to the Morrin College, it is aneducational institution and in no sense acharity.

The Finlay Asylum, though a charitableinstitution in the proper acceptation of theword, is not a public charity. By its Act ofIncorporation, 20 Vic. ch. 219, the FinlayAsylum is founded for the relief of personsof the communion of the Church of England,and the government of the institution isvested in the rector and church wardens ofthe parish church of Quebec.

Geoffrion Q.C. and Lafleur for

appellants, Annie Ross and John TheodoreRoss. The will in question was made beforethe coming in force of the Civil Code,and itsformal validity must be decided by the lawat the time of its execution. Dalloz, Rép."Dispositions entre-vifs et testamentaires",nos 3499, 2504 and 2507 and the authoritiesthere cited.

None of the articles of the Code whichrefer to this subject purport to introduce newlaw. They express the law as it stood

immediately before the passing of the Code,and for a long time anterior thereto.

Article 7 of our Civil Code adopts in itsentirety the rule locus regit actum. This rulewas always considered is imperative, andnot merely facultative. Re Gilbert Andras,17 Guyot Rép. vo. Testament, 167-8; dePommereu, 7 Journal Audiences, 515;



Merlin, Rép. vol 17, p. 532-3; in re deBoisel, 7 Journal des Audiences, 689; in red'Argelos, 7 Journal des Audiences, 520.

All decided in the Picqassary case,Journal des Audiences, vol. VII, p. 528, was

that holograph wills were authorized by thecustom of Angoulème. See also, Bourjon,vol. II, p. 305; Ricard, Don. vol. I, p. 322,no. 1286.

Article 999 C.N. really emphasizes therule by creating a special exception infavour of holograph wills made abroad byFrenchmen. Demolombe, vol. XXI, pp. 450-4, nos. 482-3; Marcadé sur art. 999. Laurent,Principes, vol. XIII, p. 166, no. 159;Browning v. de Nayve, Dal. 53, 1, 217;

Mendès v. Brandon, Journal de Palais 1850,2, 187; Aubry & Rau, Vol. I, p. 112, par. 31.

In England and Scotland, up to 24 & 25Vic. ch. 114, the rule was that validity of thewill depended on the law of the testator'slast domicile. By this act British subjects,only in so far as regards personal estate, mayadopt the forms recognized by the lex actus,or by the law of the domicile of origin.Dicey On Domicile, Pp. 298, 303.

In the United States the rule recognizedis that of the testator's domicile. Story Con-fl. of Laws, par. 468.

The rule of the law of New Yorkrequires conformity to the law of Quebec;and as the law of Quebec requires that theformalities of foreign law should be adoptedand followed the provisions of our law havenot been complied with, and the will isinvalid.

The Marquis de Bonneval died in 1836,in London, where he had resided for aconsiderable period, and left a will executedin England in the English form dated 19thSeptember, 1814. The will was contestedand the question debated whether theMarquis de Bonneval was domiciled inEngland or in France. The court held that thetestator had never lost his French domicile

of origin, notwithstanding his prolongedresidence in England, that the validity of thewill should be decided by the French law,and ordered a suspension of proceedingsuntil a decision should be obtained from theFrench courts. De Bonneval v. De Bonneval,

Jour. du Palais 43, 1, 288; 1 Curt. 856.

Both the Court of Appeal and the Courde Cassation held that as the testator hadfollowed the usual form required by the place of execution (England), the will must be held valid.

If the will in question is considered as awill in the English form it could not operatein regard to realty even in Quebec, inasmuchas it does not comply with the requirements

of the Statute of Frauds. Meiklejohn v.Atty.-Gen., Stuart's L.C. Rep. 581; 2 Kn.328.

Sec. 10 of the Quebec Act merelyintroduced a new form of will, and must beinterpreted as referring to wills made withinthe province. Endlich on Statutes, ss. 174,387; Migneault v. Malo, 16 L.C. Jur. 288;L.R. 4 P.C. 123.

The French rule locus regit actum is part

of our law, is an imperative rule, and wasconstantly and inflexibly applied by thehighest courts in old France, and is stillapplied by the Cour de Cassation in France,and cannot be characterized as unreasonableor inconvenient as compared with theEnglish rule in force when the Quebec Actwas passed, and down to the Imperial Act 24& 25 Vic. c. 114.

The power of election given Frank Ross by the will is so absolute that he might,

following McGibbon v. Abbott, 8 Legal News 267, entirely exclude any one of theintervenants.

The rule known as the cy près doctrine,when the beneficiary can not be ascertained,has no place in our law, nor do the modernFrench decisions apply, Dalloz 46, 2, 155.To follow the case of Liddard v. Liddard, 28



Beav. 266, would be to violate the testatorsexpress intention. The legacy to charitiesand poor relations should be declared to bevoid for vagueness and uncertainty, and because, in the absence of the exercise byFrank Ross of the discretionary powers

vested in him by the will, the courts of this province could not enforce the execution ofthis bequest.

The present appellants do not agree withFrank Ross as to the disposition whichshould be made of the fund representing thistrust in the event of the bequest being setaside. If the charitable bequest is void heirs-at-law are entitled to half the estate.Presumptive heirs of a man still livingwould not be permitted to take any

proceedings, even conservatory, with respectto an estate in which they may never haveany real interest, and it is difficult to seewhy the present intervenants should be inany better position than presumptive heirs.

With regard to William Russell Ross,such discretion as the trustee may have has been exercised so as exclude him from all participation in the estate.

As to Morrin College, under its charter,

24 Vic. ch. 109, which provides in section 1that all the property belonging to thecorporation shall be exclusively applied tothe advancement of education in the college,and to no object, institution or establishmentwhatever not in connection with norindependent of the same, it cannot beregarded as constituting a charitableinstitution.

As regards the Finlay Asylum,incorporated by 20 Vic. c. 219, such a

sectarian institution cannot pretend to be a public charitable institution of Quebec, andhas no locus standi in this case, and no rightor interest to support the will in question.

McCarthy Q.C. and Stuart Q.C. forrespondent Frank Ross on the appeal ofAnnie Ross et al, prayed the confirmation ofthat part of the judgment appealed from,

whereby the sufficiency of the will isestablished, citing: - C.C. art. 7; PothierDon. ch. 1, art. 1, s. 1; Arrêt of 14th July,1722 (Jour. des Audiences, lib. 5, ch. 31.Ricard, Traité du Don Mutuel no. 306;Bornier, Ch. 28, no. 20; Boullenois, vol. 2

pp. 75, 78; Savigny, Private InternationalLaw, p. 265. Foelix, Droit InternationalPrivé, no. 83, p. 107; 5 Pardessus, Droitcommercial, p. 255, no. 1486; 1 Laurent,nos. 100, 101, 102; Dalloz, Répertoire vo.Lois, no. 430; 1 Aubry & Rau, p. 112, par.31, no. 6, note 79.

Geoffrion Q.C. and Lafleur forrespondents Annie Ross and John T. Rosson the appeal of Frank Ross. The reasonsand authorities on behalf of these

respondents have been set forth at length ontheir own appeal.

Irvine Q.C. and Cook Q.C. forrespondents "The Morrin College" and "TheFinlay Asylum." (Fizpatrick Q.C. withthem).

The question for solution is: Is aholograph will made in New York by a person temporarily there, but domiciled atthe time in the province of Quebec, and

owning both moveable and immoveable property in said province, which is disposedof by the will, valid, such form of will not being locally recognized by the laws of NewYork, although the rule prevails there aselsewhere generally in the United States,that a will disposing of moveable property isvalid if made in the form prescribed by thelaws of the testator's domicile - onedisposing of immoveables being only validif made in accordance with the law of the place where the real property is situated - lex

rei sitae?

Against the validity of the will it isurged that the matter must be governed byour own law, and that by it the maxim, locusregit actum, requires a will made in NewYork to be made in a form valid by the lawsof that state on pain of nullity. It iscontended that article 7 of our Code, based



on the ancient law, follows this rule, anddeclares, at least by implication, that actsand deeds are invalid if not made in the formrequired by the lex loci actus; that our Codemust be interpreted on this point inconformity with the old French law which

prevailed in this province, and that by thatlaw such a will was invalid.

Such a conclusion seems to be contraryto the whole avowed policy of our Code andof the Imperial statute 14 George 3, ch. 83,on the subject of wills, by which freedom ofwilling and facilities for doing so wereextremely favoured and carried far beyondanything known to the old law, the policy ofwhich in this respect was the very reverse ofour own, seeking as it did uniformly to

restrict the powers of and facilities fordisposal by testament.

See Merlin's opinion re de Mercy,Répertoire vo. Testament, sec. 2, par. 3, art.8. He is far from placing the maxim locusregit actum on a firm foundation as a rule ofsettled law. He cites the law and a largenumber of writers, including Vinnius,Burgundius, Rodenburg, against the rule.Again in the same article, sec. 2, par. 4, art.1, Merlin reports an appeal judgment in the

case of the will of Despuget, of the 20thAugust, 1806, which clearly shows how farthe doctrine was from settled law. Troplong,Don. Test. no. 1734, speaking of article1999 of the Code Napoleon, does not saythat it is an innovation or new law, butasserts that it gives the preference to theopinion of Ricard and his school, theopposite opinion, that is, from that ofFurgole, Guyot and Merlin, which opinionwas supported not only by Ricard, but byBoullenois, Cujas and many of the greatest

names in French jurisprudence as well as byarrêts of parliament. Troplong refers to anarrêt to that effect as not an isolated one; andhow divided views were on the question isseen in the statement of the various opinions by Pothier, and by all the authors, whodiscuss it (Laurent, Droit Int., vol. 6, nos.406, 422, 424), or by referring to even thelast arrêt reported by Merlin, or to any arrêt

that deals with the subject, an example ofwhich is seen in the arrêt of Cambolas, liv.4, ch. 41, where the question is discussed both as regards wills and contracts in anarrêt of the 7th of August, 1622, therereported. The old writers and Ricard, cited

under C.C. art. 854, are in favour of thevalidity of such wills made abroad, inconformity with the law of the testator'sdomicile. In this they are supported byBoullenois and by Cujas. At no. 191 of partI of Ricard, he cites an (ti.7.dt in support ofthe validity of a holograph will by lettermissive, and gives as a precedent the case ofthe codicil made by Lentulus in a letterwritten from Africa, which was approved byAugustus, and became law as stated in theInstitutes B. 2, tit. 25.

Wharton, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. p.573, and sec. 588; Story, Conflict of Laws,ss. 465, 468, et seq.; 4 Burge, Colonial andForeign Laws, p. 582 et seq., and p. 590;Savigny, sec. 381, p. 324. The observance ofthe form in use at the place of the act ismerely facultative, and allows an election.Foelix, p. 107. Bar 36. Westlake, PrivateInternational Law, 123. Foelix, vol. 1, p.181. C.C. art. 6 and authorities in pede, art.7, C.N. 999; Abbott v. Fraser, Ramsay's Dig.

p. 857, C.C. arts. 850, 854; Troplong, Don.Test. vol. 3, p. 392, no. 1465; 1 Laurent,Droit Civil, 158, 162; 6 Laurent, Droit. Int,653; Aubry & Rau, vol. 7, subsec. 699; 21Demolombe 142.

The Imperial statute 14 Geo. 3,introducing the absolute freedom of devise by will, and the right of willing in theEnglish form "with all its incidents," laiddown by the Privy Council in Migneault v.Malo, 16 L.C. Jur. 288, necessarily

introduced the right of making a will in theform of the lex domicilii. Until the Code the power to make wills in this form existed,and British subjects could make themanywhere. Meiklejohn v. The AttorneyGeneral, Stuart's L.C. Rep. 581; 2 Kn. 328.Personalty follows the law of the domicile,wills are valid if made in accordance withthe law of the domicile and only valid (till



24 & 25 Vic.), if made according to suchlaw. This principle is a rule of privateinternational law, and part of the jusgentium. Croker v. The Marquis of Hertford,4 Moore P.C. 339; Bremer v. Freeman, 10Moore P.C. 306; Whicker v. Hume, 7 H.L.

Cas. 124; Story, Conflict of Laws, Secs.380, 381, Wheaton, 3 ed. p. 134.

Under the old law of France previous tothe cession the weight of authority was infavour of the rule locus regit actum beingfacultative and not imperative, in relation towills; and during the last 150 years the rulethat a testator may make his will, in relationto personalty, according to the lex domicilii,has by common assent become a rule of private international law.

The will is valid under 14 Geo. 3, ch.83, in force when it was made, and preserved quoad it, by C.C. art. 2613.

The lex loci actus was not violated butobserved, the law of New York empoweringstrangers to make wills according to the lexdomicilii. The devise in trust and thediscretion of the trustee come expresslyunder art. 869 of the Civil Code which thecodifiers (fourth report art 124 bis, p. 181)

state to be purely old law. The nature andextent of this discretion is well stated byTroplong, Pothier and all the authors, 1Troplong, Don. Test., nos 277, 278; 6Pothier, Don. Test., ch. 2, art. 8. Quoniamquasi viro bonu ei potius commissum est,non in meram voluntatem haeredis collatum.The discretion in this case is much less thanin those cited.

The expression, as he may judge best,would not admit of discussion in view of the

opinion expressed by all the authors - that si putaveris is binding. Frank Ross is bound todistribute the trust estate whether he will ornot, to the best of the judgment of a bonusvir, due regard being had, as Troplong says,to the fortune to be distributed, the positionand needs of the recipients and all othercircumstances.

To judge of the distribution evidencecan be given, even parol, before the court ofall matters that will enable it to judge of the bona fides of the distribution, and how far itconforms to the judgment or arbitrium boniviri, 4 Demolombe, Don. Test., no. 37; 7

Aubry & Rau, par. 712; Dellevaux v.Jambon, S.V. 80, 2, 197 and 72, 1, 406; andsee Wigram on Interpretation of wills, p. 51;Jarman on Wills, 392, 397.

The trustee cannot defeat the trust byrefusing to distribute the fund. The courtwill do it for him even under English lawwhere the courts allow much more absolutediscretion to trustees than does our own,which in this respect is based on theequitable doctrine of the Roman law

approved and adopted by Pothier and our best jurists. But even by English law thetrustee must distribute the funds. ThusLewin on Trusts ch. 28, p. 836, is in point.Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. 87.

The fact of a trustee having refused orfailed to make a distribution is a ground onwhich the court will interfere and controlhim. Lewin, 777. The discretion is not as towho are to be the objects of the charity or bequest, but as to the proportion to each, and

that must be bona fide and not capriciouslydetermined. Lewin, 839.

Abbott v. McGibbon, 8 Legal News,267, does not apply, as the object arrived atin substitutions is to conserve the property inthe family, and that object is secured bygiving to one of the family. In the Ross willthe object is to support charities generally ofa particular class and poor relations, and togive all to one or to a few is to defeat theintention of the testator. For arrêts see

Ricard, no. 589, and Beaucourt v. Soc. &c.de Lille, S.V. 75, 1, 307.

There is no vagueness and uncertaintyin the sum, for the amount is fixed, nor inthe objects, for they are readilyascertainable. No microscopic search isrequired to discover the public, Protestant



corporate charities of this city and of a smallScotch village.

See also Noad v. Noad, 21 L.C. Jur.312; Molson's Bank v. Lionais, 3 Legal News, 83; Comte v. Lagacé, 3 Dor. Q.B.

319; Russell v. Lefrançois, 8 Can. S.C.R.335; Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; Taylor,Ev., 9th ed. s. 1131; Moggridge v.Thackwell, 3 Bro. C.C. 517; Power v.Cassidy, 79 N.Y. 602.

It is sufficient for the intervenants toestablish a prima facie interest; the questionof their absolute rights is to be decided whenother claimants have been notified to appear.The immediate object is to defend thedocument on which their rights depend,

which is impugned by both the plaintiffs andthe defendant.

The charter of the Finlay Asylum (20Vic., ch. 219) establishes that it is a publicProtestant charity at Quebec.

The case of Morrin College is stillstronger. The testator was for years agovernor; he repeatedly expressed hisintention of providing for it substantially; ashort while before his death he stated that

the college had been opened prematurelyand on insufficient means, that it was doinga good work and would succeed, and he wasin the habit of contributing to its bursaryfund for the assistance of students withlimited means.

What Morrin College is, and wasintended to be, its charter (24 Vic. ch. 109),the trust deed and deed of gift produced inthe case, the statement of the first principal,and the evidence abundantly show. The

deeds explain Dr. Morrin's intentions:-

"Whereas, the said Joseph Morrin isdesirous of leaving some permanentmemorial of his regard for the city ofQuebec, ... and at the same time of markinghis attachment to the Church in which hewas reared, and to which he has always belonged;

"And, whereas, he considers none can be more suitable for both purposes than a provision for increasing and rendering more perfect the means of obtaining for the youthgenerally, and especially those who may

devote themselves to the ministry of the saidChurch, the means of obtaining a liberal andenlightened education; he does, &c., &c.

The inaugural address declares the principles which were intended to guide the policy of the college, and which have eversince been pursued. For over thirty years,with very limited resources, it has, apartfrom theological instruction which wasnecessarily presbyterian, afforded a liberaland enlightened education to all desirous of

obtaining it, without test or subscription ofany kind, and by means of professors belonging, not only to the various Protestantchurches, but to the Roman Catholic church. Nominal fees exacted from others havenever been required from poor students, whohave also, apart from their religious belief, been aided by money bursaries and freeaccommodation in the college rooms. Thegenerous intention of the founder was tosupply a want which, the University beingexclusively Catholic, and its instructions

given almost entirely in the Frenchlanguage, could not so well render to theProtestant and English speaking youth.

Both French and English law regardcolleges as charities. If the statute ofElizabeth on charitable trusts is in force inthis province the question does not admit ofa, doubt; and in a sense it is submitted thatthat statute is in force. From the earliest period the King, as pater patriae, was by his prerogative the guardian. and protector of

charities. The act of Elizabeth declared anddefined the charitable objects over which the prerogative extended, and in this sense itforms part of our law, as necessarily beingintroduced at the cession of the country tothe British Crown. C.C., 869. Theobald, pp.181, 182. Pomeroy v. Willway, 59 L.J. Ch.172.



The King's Edict of 1743, cited inFraser v. Abbott, Ramsay's Digest, 861, prohibited under certain circumstances thefoundation of charitable establishments bywill.

Our own statute book, in which for thelast hundred years educational and benevolent institutions are classed together,fully bears out this view. Desrivières v.Richardson, Stuart's L.C. Rep. 226.

No order was made in the SuperiorCourt as to costs. As to whether the estategenerally, as held by Chief Justice Meredith,in Russell v. Lefrançois, 5 Legal News 81,and supported by this court, 8 Can. S.C.R.375, 384, the losing parties individually,

should bear the costs, it is for the court tosay. It is clearly a hardship for the successful parties to be compelled to bear their own. Itmay be said that no appeal has been taken by the intervenants in. this case. That is true; but all costs are in the legal discretion of thecourt seized of the cause; and in Peters v.The Quebec Harbour Commissioners, 19Can. S.C.R. 685, where no appeal was takenon this subject, the court dealt in its ownway with costs. The respondents submit thatcosts should be awarded in all courts.

The respondents ask that the judgmentappealed against be affirmed, and costsawarded them in all courts;

1. Because the will is in all respectsvalid, both as a holograph will under theFrench system, and as a will of personaltyunder the English system in force in this province in 1865;

2. Because, under the will, a valid trust

was established, to the extent of one-half ofthe estate passing under it, in favour ofcharities and poor relations, and by provingthe will and accepting and administering theestate, Mr. Frank Ross accepted the officeand assumed the duties and responsibilitiesof a trustee;

3. Because Morrin College and theFinlay Asylum are public Protestantcharities within the meaning of the will; andWilliam Russell Ross is a poor relativewithin such meaning, and as such they hadan interest to intervene for the purpose of

defending and establishing the validity ofthe document upon which their rights andthose of their co-beneficiaries depend;

4. Because Frank Ross having assertedthat the whole estate devised was his ownabsolutely, and having disregarded theobligations of a trustee, the respondentswere bound to intervene to protect theirinterests; particularly as the plaintiff anddefendant plead that the trust devise of halfthe estate is void, and only differ as to its

distribution;

5. Because Frank Ross, pleading thatthe will was valid, is estopped from denyingthe validity of such trusts on the issues withthe intervening parties.

Irving Q.C. and Cook Q.C. forrespondent W.R. Ross on both appeals.

William Russell Ross is admitted to be a poor relation. His interest, however, is

barred, in the opinion of both plaintiff anddefendant, from the double fact of hishaving lost money when in partnership withthe testator, and having owed money to theestate when he died. And so Frank Ross,while denying that he is called upon toexercise any discretion, uses what he termshis discretion, and excludes his cousin.Rights, conferred by the testator, cannot bethus summarily dealt with without amockery of justice. That James Gibb Rossintended that his poor relations, others than

his heirs-at-law, should be benefited is proved by this. In 1865 he had but two heirs-at-law apart from Frank, for whom the will provided, and they both were then aswealthy as, if not more wealthy than, J.G.Ross himself.

The respondent, William Russell Ross,submits that the judgment of the court



appealed from is in all respects right, in sofar as it affects him, save as to costs. Herelies on the opinions of Mr. JusticeAndrews, and of the Chief Justice of theCourt of Queen's Bench, and on the reasonsurged by the intervening parties, Morrin

College and Finlay Asylum, and prays thatthe appeals be dismissed with costs in allcourts.

McCarthy Q.C. and Stuart Q.C., for theappellant Frank Ross.Geoffrion Q.C. and Lafleur, for appellants,Annie Ross and John Theodore Ross.Irvine Q.C. and Cook Q.C., for respondents"The Morrin College" and "The FinlayAsylum."Solicitors for appellant Frank Ross: Caron,

Pentland & Stuart.Solicitor for appellants Annie Ross et al.:Eugene Lafleur.Solicitors for respondents, Morrin College,Finlay Asylum and W.R. Ross: W. & A.H.Cook.Solicitor for respondent Mary Frame: G.Irvine.

------------------------------------------------------

SIR HENRY STRONG C.J.:— First,

as regards the principal action which had forits object a declaration that the will was nulland void, I am of opinion that the plaintiffsfail and that the action must be dismissed asagainst the defendants Frank Ross and DameMary Frame, with costs. In other words, Iam for affirming the judgment of theSuperior Court so far as it relates to the principal action in all respects, except that portion of it which declares the will void asto immovables situate in Ontario, NewBrunswick, British Columbia and in the

United States. I think the judgment in thislast respect was wrong. There was no jurisdiction in the Quebec courts to dealwith such immovables, the question of thevalidity or invalidity of wills as toimmovable property being one exclusivelyfor the forum rei sitae. I will not say that the judgment does any harm by this declaration, but it being irregular and without

jurisdiction I think the judgment of theSuperior Court, and of the Court of Queen'sBench which affirms it, should be rectified by striking out all about immovables inOntario, New Brunswick, British Columbiaand the United States. This would leave the

judgment, so far as concerns the principalaction, a judgment dismissing the action.This dismissal of the action should, formanifest reasons, be with costs to FrankRoss and Dame Mary Frame.

My reasons for this conclusion as to thedisposition of the appeal from the judgmentin the principal action, are as follows: First, Iam of opinion that the rule locus regitactum, was not before the enactment of thecode (nor since under the code itself, art. 7)

imperative, but permissive only. The jurisprudence is, it is true, contradictory, butPothier treats it as an unsettled point, andsuch great authorities as Boullenois, Ricard,Massé, Mailher de Chassat, Wharton, Story,Westlake, and I may say all modern writerswhose opinions are entitled to weight, are infavour of locus actum being regarded as permissive only. To hold it to be imperativewould be harsh and unreasonable, entirely atvariance with the policy of the law of LowerCanada, since the Quebec Act, 1774, which

favours the exercise of the testamentary power instead of discouraging it, as was the policy of the old law of France, and mostarbitrary in making the sufficient executionof a will depend upon the locality of atestator who, whilst in transitû, makes hiswill according to the law and forms of hisown domicile. Viewed as permissive onlythe rule locus regit actum is, on the otherhand, most beneficent and reasonable sinceit enables a testator who wishes to make anauthentic will to avail himself of the notaries

and public officers of a foreign countrythrough which he may be passing at a timewhen he would not be able to avail himselfof the instrumentality of the notaries and public officers of his domicile. I thereforeconclude that the will was good becausemade in strict accordance with the lawrelating to holograph wills prevailing in the province of Quebec, in which province the



testator was domiciled, both at the time ofthe will and at the time of his death.

Secondly, I agree with the reasons ofthe learned Chief Justice in his judgment inthe Court of Queen's Bench, that even if the

rule focus regit actum does apply, yet itsufficiently appears from the evidence, that by the law of the State of New York this willwould be considered good as to movableseverywhere, and as to immovables inQuebec. Good as to movables whereversituated because it was executed accordingto the law of the testator's domicile, andgood as to immovables in the province ofQuebec because executed according to thelaw of the situation of those immovables.Therefore, applying the rule locus regit

actum the will was a good will according tothe law of the State of New York, at least tothe extent to which it can properly comeunder the jurisdiction of the courts of the province of Quebec; that is to say, excludingthe immovables situate in the provinces ofOntario, New Brunswick and BritishColumbia, and in the United States.

Then as to the Interventions. As the principal action was to annul the will, and asthat action is dismissed, we are not called

upon to interpret the legacies to any greaterextent than is rendered necessary for the purpose of disposing of the interventions, but to this extent we must interpret it inorder to ascertain if the parties had any rightto intervene.

Then the intervention of WilliamRussell Ross must be dismissed because hehas no locus standi to maintain it.

The gift to "poor relations" is, according

to the terms of the will, not an absolute giftto the objects the testator intended to benefit, but rightly interpreted is to be read asconferring upon Frank Ross a faculty ofselection amongst persons coming withinthat description. Could William, RussellRoss have possibly derived any benefitunder this disposition? If it had been in the power of Frank Ross to select him as one of

the beneficiaries I should unhesitatinglyhave agreed with the learned Chief Justiceof the Queen's Bench in holding thatWilliam Russell Ross had a locus standi tomaintain an intervention in favour of theassailed will, though his interest would be

contingent and uncertain until Frank Rossshould exercise his faculty of selection. Butaccording to the interpretation which I puton the description "poor relations," FrankRoss had no power to select this WilliamRussell Ross, who was a cousin of thetestator only and not one of his heirs-at-law,as a beneficiary under the will. "Poorrelations" must be interpreted as meaning"heirs-at-law." The word "poor" is too vagueand to have any meaning attached to it, andmust therefore be rejected. The word

"relations," then standing alone, must berestricted to some particular class, for if itwere to be construed generally as meaningall relatives it would be impossible ever tocarry out the directions of the will. The linemust therefore be drawn somewhere, andcan only be drawn so as to exclude allexcept those whom the law, in the case of anintestacy, recognizes as the proper classamong whom to divide the property of adeceased person who dies intestate, namely,his heirs. Then William Russell Ross is not

an heir; therefore his intervention must bedismissed with costs to Frank Ross, butwithout costs as regards the plaintiffs andother heirs who contested the interventionon a ground which failed, namely, that thetestament was null.

As regards the intervention of "MorrinCollege," it does not come within thedescription of a charitable institutionaccording to the ordinary meaning of thewords, for in administering the law of the

province of Quebec we have, of course,nothing to do with technical charities underthe English law and the statute of Elizabeth.If, therefore, Frank Ross were to selectMorrin College as a charitable institutionentitled to benefits under the will hisselection would be unauthorized and void,for it does not appear from the record thatthat seminary of learning is, an



eleemosynary institution. Consequently, forthe same reason as in the case of WilliamRussell Ross, the intervention of MorrinCollege must be dismissed with costs toFrank Ross.

As regards the intervention of FinlayAsylum, it stands on a different ground fromthe other interventions and must bemaintained upon the principle the learnedChief Justice states. It would be competentto Frank Ross to select Finlay Asylum as a beneficiary, and this gives that institution aright to intervene for the purpose ofsupporting the will. Frank Ross fails,therefore, in his contestation in this respectand must pay the costs of the intervention ofFinlay Asylum.

As I say above, I only interpret the willso far as is necessary for disposing of theinterventions. I disclaim any intention ofconstruing its provisions as to these legaciesto poor, relatives and charities beyond this. Itherefore leave open for futureconsideration, and for a determination insome further action or proceeding if the parties cannot agree, the questions of howfar Frank Ross's powers of selection go;whether he can give to some of the heirs and

exclude others, or whether he must givesomething to all; and I would say the samewith reference to the charities. Further, thequestion of whether Frank Ross himself isentitled to benefit as one of the heirs is notin any way prejudiced by the present judgment. The judgment in the principalaction must, therefore, be varied by omittingall reference to the immovables outside the province of Quebec, and by simplydismissing the action with costs to FrankRoss and Dame Mary Frame. The

intervention of William Russell Ross andthat of Morrin College must both bedismissed with costs payable to Frank Ross.The intervention of Finlay Asylum must bemaintained with costs against Frank Ross.

As regards the costs in the Court ofQueen's Bench, Frank Ross and Dame MaryFrame are to have their costs of the appeal

from the judgment in the principal action,and Frank Ross is to have his costs of theappeal in respect of the intervention byWilliam Russell Ross and Morrin Collegeand must pay the costs of the appeal ofFinlay Asylum, and in this court the costs

must be disposed of in the same way as inthe court of Queens Bench.

FOURNIER J.:— L'action en cettecause, intentée par Dame Annie Ross contreFrank Ross et autres, a pour but principal defaire déclarer nul le testament olographe defeu James Gibb Ross. Après avoir allégué ledécès, à Québec, le 1er octobre 1888, du ditfeu James Gibb Ross, elle déclare que plusd'un an après, le 28 octobre 1889, untestament olographe, daté du 8 février, 1865,

à New-York, a été trouvé à sa résidence,lequel se lit comme suit:

I hereby will and bequeath all my property,assets ormeans of any kind to my brother Frank, whowill use onehalf of them for public protestant charities inQuebecand Carluke, say the Protestant HospitalHome, theFrench-Canadian Mission, and amongst

poor relatives, ashe may judge best, the other half for himselfand forhis own use, excepting two thousand poundswhich he willsend to Miss Mary Frame, Overton Farm.

(Sd.)

JAMES G. ROSS.

Elle allègue ensuite que ce testament estnul, parce qu'il a été fait à New-York dans

une forme qui n'est pas reconnue par la loide cet État; elle allègue de plus que ledéfendeur Frank Ross a seul pris possessionde la succession en vertu de ce testament, etqu'elle, la demanderesse, ainsi que les autresdéfendeurs sont les seuls héritiers légitimesdu dit feu James G. Ross, ayant droit à sasuccession.



En vertu d'un amendement permis plustard, la demanderesse a ajouté à sadéclaration les allégations suivantes, quemême si ce testament pouvait être considérévalable dans aucune partie, il étaitcertainement illégal quant à tous les

immeubles situés en dehors de la provincede Québec, parce que la loi des pays de leursituation, ne reconnaissait pas la validitéd'un semblable testament quant auximmeubles, et que quant à l'autre moitiéléguée à Frank Ross pour être distribuée à sadiscrétion parmi les institutions charitables,et à des parents pauvres, le dit James G.Ross devait être considéré comme décédé abintestat, attendu que ce legs était nul pourcause d'incertitude. Elle concluait à la nullitédu testament, que le dit Frank Ross fut

condamné à lui livrer un neuvième de lasuccession, et de plus, à lui rendre comptedes fruits et revenus.

Frank Ross et Mary Frame, ont seuls plaidé à l'action, la validité du testament dudit James Gibb Ross; que ce testament,quoique fait à New York, a été apporté parle testateur à son domicile à Québec, qu'il l'atoujours conservé jusqu'à sa mort; cetestament est fait suivant les formalités de la province de Québec, où il avait son

domicile, et par la loi de New-York, touttestament fait dans cet état, suivant la loi dudomicile du testateur, est légal; lesdéfendeurs nient aussi que le testament a étéexécuté dans l'État de New-York. Lesconclusions demandent le renvoi de l'action.

Tous les faits qu'il était nécessaire de prouver à l'appui de cette contestation ontété admis.

À cette action se sont portées parties

intervenantes.

1. W. Russell Ross, se disant un parent pauvre du testateur; 2. le Morrin College; et3. le Finlay Asylum, alléguant qu'ils étaientdes institutions charitables, (public charities)suivant l'intention du testateur, pour soutenirla validité du testament.

Le droit des intervenants a été contesté par la demanderesse et le défendeur, qui ontallégué quant au Morrin Collège qu'il n'était pas une institution charitable suivantl'intention du testament, et, quant au FinlayAsylum que ce n'était pas une institution

publique charitable, et quant à W. RussellRoss, le dit Frank Ross disait avoir déjàexercé à son sujet la discrétion qui lui étaitlaissée par le testament, en l'excluant de la participation du legs pour les motifs qu'il aindiqués.

La cause présente pour la décision decette cour, les questions suivantes :

1. Validité du testament de James G.Ross, fait à New-York.

2. Les legs qu'il contient en faveur desinstitutions charitables et des parents pauvres du testateur, est-il valable?

3. S'il est nul, à qui doivent, revenir les biens légués, aux héritiers du testateur, ou àson légataire, Frank Ross?

4. Les intervenants avaient-ils un intérêtsuffisant pour justifier leur intervention dansla cause?

Le testament ayant été fait en 1865, c'està la loi antérieure au code civil de la province de Québec qu'il faut recourir pouren décider la validité. Le testament étantdans la forme olographe, sa validité doit êtredécidée d'après les principes de l'anciendroit français qui était alors en force dans la province de Québec.

L'Honorable Sir Alexandre Lacoste, juge en chef, a discuté dans ses savantesnotes sur cette cause, les opinions les plus en

vogue parmi les auteurs qui ont écrit sur ledroit des gens et traité de la validité destestaments faits à l'étranger. D'après les uns,le testament n'est valide que s'il est fait,selon les formalités requises par la loi dulieu de sa confection, d'après la maximelocus regit actum, Une autre opinion veutqu'il soit fait suivant la loi du domicile dutestateur. La troisième, qui est la plus



généralement adoptée, dit-il reconnaît tousles testaments faits en la forme requise, soitlà où, se trouve le testateur, soit en celle deson domicile.

Après avoir passé en revue ces diverses

opinions et cité beaucoup d'arrêts l'Hon.Juge en arrive à la conclusion que la maximelocus regit actum régissait le territoireassujetti à la coutume de Paris et que d'aprèsnotre droit en 1865 le testament fait àl'étranger par une personne domiciliée dansle Bas-Canada devait être fait suivant lesformes du lieu où il était passé à peine denullité.

Le droit ancien a été reproduit dansl'article 7 de notre code civil qui se lit

comme suit:

Les actes faits ou passés hors du Bas-Canada sont valables, si on y a suivi lesformalités requises par les lois du lieu où ilssont passés.

On a soutenu à l'argument que lestestaments olographes n'avaient pas deforme. Certains auteurs ont émis cetteopinion. Cependant, le grand nombre est

d'un sentiment contraire et la jurisprudencese déclare dans leur sens.

En nous référant à notre code civil, ditl'Hon. Sir A. Lacoste, nous trouvons quel'article 842 qui a trait aux conditionsexigées pour la validité des testaments engénéral et du testament olographe en particulier se trouvent sous la rubrique "Dela forme des testaments." Comme le ditPothier, la forme du testament olographeconsiste dans le fait qu'il doit être écrit en

entier par le testateur, et signé par lui.

Quelle est, d'après la loi de l'État de New-York, la validité du testament de JamesG. Ross fait à New-York en 1865? Si cetestament eut été fait par un résident del'État, il serait nul, comme n'ayant pas étéattesté par deux témoins. Mais l'art. 2611 du

code de procédure de cet État, permettantaux étrangers de faire un testament suivantles formes du pays de leur domicile, cetestament est légal en vertu de cettedisposition introduite en faveur desétrangers. Ce testament, entièrement écrit de

la main du testateur et signé de lui, setrouvant en la forme olographeconformément à la loi en force, lors du, sadate, dans la province de Québec, est parl'exception de l'art. 2611 de la loi de New-York, en faveur des étrangers, reconnuvalable comme le testament d'un étranger,autorisé par cette loi à se servir de la formede testament de son pays. C'est comme si laloi de New-York avait admis spécialementla forme olographe en faveur des étrangers,et, en ce sens, c'est par application de la

règle locus regit actum, que ce testamentdoit, être considéré comme valable. Cetestament quoique valable ne peut cependant pas avoir le même effet partout. S'il devaitêtre invoqué dans l'État de New-York, il ne pouvait avoir d'effet que par rapport auxmeubles comme étant fait suivant la formedu domicile du testateur. Mais n'étant pasexécuté en présence de deux témoins, iln'aurait aucun effet quant aux immeublessitués dans l'État de New-York. Cependantsa validité comme testament fait d'après la

loi du pays où il a été exécuté (à New-York)n'en est pas affectée; l'effet seul en est limitésuivant la loi du pays où il est invoqué.

Mais dans la province de Québec il doitêtre considéré quant à ses effets commetestament fait d'après la loi en force ici, et produit tous les effets que la loi en force luidonne.

On doit de plus, l'interpréterconformément à l'art. 8, code civil

reproduisant l'ancien droit, qui veut que

les actes s'interprètent et s'apprécientsuivant la loi du lieu où ils sont passés, àmoins qu'il n'y est, quelque loi à cecontraire, que les parties ne s'en soientexprimées autrement ou des autrescirconstances, il n'apparaisse que l'intentionn'ait été de s'en rapporter à la loi d'un autre



testament, mais plutôt transférer ce pouvoirà une tierce personne. Pothier, Donationstestamentaires, pose ainsi la règle:

No. 73. Une disposition testamentaire estnulle par vice d'obscurité lorsqu'on ne peut

absolument discerner quel est celui au profitde qui le testateur a voulu la faire. No. 78.De même que pour la validité du legs il fautqu'on puisse connaître à qui le testateur avoulu léguer, il faut aussi qu'on puisseconnaître ce qu'il a voulu léguer, autrementle legs est nul, selon cette règle, quae intestamento ita scripta sunt ut intelligi non possint, permissi sunt ac si scripta nonessint. L. 73 et 1er, ff de Reg. jur.

Troplong, Don. et Test. vol. 2, 517-18.

La certitude de la personne gratifiée estune des premières conditions de toutelibéralité. La raison donnée par Caius serésume dans ces paroles: "Incerta autemvidetur persona, quam per incertamopinionem, animo suo testator subjicit." Letestateur n'a eu aucune idée précise de la personne gratifiée; il n'aurait rien dit de positif.

Cette autre règle du droit romain inalienam voluntatem conferri legatem non potest, a été adoptée dans notre code, art. 56.

7 Aubry & Rau, p. 69, ss. 655 and 656.

Les dispositions testamentaires doivent êtrefaites en faveur de personnes certaines. Sielles étaient faites au profit de personnesincertaines, elles seraient à envisager commenon avenues.

On entend par personnes incertainescelles dont l'individualité n'est niactuellement déterminée, ni mêmesusceptible de l'être par l'arrivée de quelqueévénement indiqué dans le testament.

Les dispositions testamentaires doiventêtre l'expression directe de la volonté du

testateur. De ce principe résultent deuxconséquences suivantes:

(a) Le testateur ne peut faire dépendrel'existence même d'un legs, du pur arbitre,meram arbitrium de l'héritier ou d'un tiers.

(b) Le testateur ne peut faire dépendrel'effet d'un legs en ce qui concerne ladésignation du légataire du choix del'héritier ou d'un tiers. En d'autres termes, ilne peut conférer à qui que ce soit la facultéd'élire, c'est-à-dire de choisir soitindéfiniment, soit parmi plusieurs individusindiqués au testament, la personne qui devra profiter du legs, 5 Toullier, nos. 350, 351,606; 3 Zacharieae (Massé & Vergé) p. 34,note 2.

Demolombe dit comme suit, vol. 18 no.608 et 618:

Nous croyons qu'il faut entendre par personnes incertaines celles dont l'actemême de disposition ne détermine pasactuellement l'individualité et n'indique non plus aucun moyen aucun événement parl'accomplissement desquels elle pourrait plus tard déterminée.

Puisqu'il faut que le légataire soit désigné par le testament, lui-même, le testateur nesaurait confier l'héritier ou à un tiers le soinde le désigner: et voilà comment la facultéd'élire se rattache à la théorie des personnesincertaines.

Voir aussi Merlin in re Jean Merendol,Rép. vo. Lég. par. II, vol. 16,p. 425 [éd.Belge]; Merlin, Rép. vo. Institutiond'Héritier, s. V., par. 1, no. XVIII, vol. 15, p.

367 [éd. Belge]; Rej: 12 août 1811, Cass.Affre. Lauglier et Héritiers Merendol, S.V.11, 1, 391; Rej: 3 mars 1857, Cass. Héritiersde Sauvan v. de Saurieu, S.V., 57, 1, 182;Arrêt C. d'Appel de Colmar. Affre. Maeglinv. Willig. 22 mai 1850, S.V. 52, 2, 435.

Considérant que le testament doit êtrel'expression de la volonté du testateur, fixé



sur une personne certaine, et ne saurait être par suite subordonné à la volonté d'un tiers,que le légataire doit être clairement désignéetc.

Arrêt Cour d'Appel de Douai, 15 Déc.1848, Detète v. Detève, S.V. 49, 2, 538;Arrêt C. Royale de Bordeaux 6 mars 1841,Laboujouderie v. Raffier, S.V. 41, 2, 240;Rej. Cass. 8 août 1826. Legrand Masse v.Lepine, S.V. 27, 1, 409; Cass. 28 mars 1859.Beurier v. Emorine, S.V. 60, 1, 346. Rep.Cass. 30 nov. 1869. Britelle et al. v.Deyvrande, Dalloz, Recueil 1870, 1, 202;Simon v. Simon, Journal du Palais 1827,132.

D'après l'énoncé de ce jugement, on voitque la certitude sur la personne de légataireest une des premières conditions de lavalidité de tout legs. Tout legs fait à une personne incertaine doit être considérécomme nul. Les personnes incertaines sontcelles dont l'individualité n'est pasdéterminée par le testament ni susceptible del'être par l'événement de quelque conditionindiquée dans le testament. Il suit de là quela validité du legs ne peut dépendre del'arbitraire de l'héritier ou d'un tiers, et que le

testateur ne peut non plus en ce qui concernele choix du légataire, le faire dépendre duchoix de l'héritier ou d'un tiers.

L'Hon. Juge qui a décidé en premièreinstance a énoncé dans sa savantedissertation sur cette cause, les principessouvent formulé, ainsi qu'il suit:

1st. It is the certain policy of our law andmy clear duty to give effect to the wholewill of the testator unless prevented by

insuperable difficulties. 2nd. If the will hadnot contained the words giving Mr. FrankRoss a discretionary power as to theselection of the particular individual bodiesand persons to be benefited, but had simplysaid that he should give one half of theestate to the public protestant charities ofQuebec and Carluke and to poor relatives, Ithink the law would imply that the

distribution between them be an equaldistribution. 3rd. I think that if Mr. FrankRoss shall refuse or neglect to exercise thediscretion vested in him by the will, thecourts here should not allow such refusal orneglect to defeat the testator's bequest; but

as the court lacks the special knowledgewhich Mr. Frank Ross presumably has ofwhat would have been the distribution whichthe testator would have wished, it wouldmake no endeavour to exercise anydiscretion or discrimination beyond that pointed out by the lines of the will itself andwould therefore distribute the testator's bounty equally among all the individualscomposed in the category or class of beneficiaries therein designated.

Le premier de ces principes est admis. Iln'en est pas de même de deux autres. Il n'estcertainement pas correct de dire que si letestament n'avait pas donné à Frank Ross le pouvoir de faire lui-même la distribution,elle aurait lieu par parts égales d'après la loi;et que dans le cas où il refuserait d'exercerles pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés la cour enferait la distribution. Cette distribution égalene peut avoir lieu qu'entre successibles aumême degré, mais entre parents à différents

degrés les plus proches excluent les pluséloignés. Si Frank Ross décédait sans avoirfait la distribution la cour ne pourrait enordonner une distribution égale entre les parents, car les tribunaux dans la provincede Québec ne possèdent aucun pouvoir à cetégard. La 34 Geo. 3, tout en conférant à lacour du Banc du Roi remplacée par la courSupérieure, la juridiction de la Prévôté deParis, a cependant déclaré qu'aucun pouvoirlégislatif possédé par aucune cour avant laConquête n'était transféré à la Cour du Banc

du Roi.

La cause du testament de Dame Anne,&., Beauvoisin, Ricard no. 589, citée dans lefactum de l'appelant, qui avait laissé lerésidu de ses biens aux pauvres honteux quiseront choisis par les exécuteurstestamentaires se rapportant au choix des pauvres à leur discrétion, est une de ces



causes où les cours par l'exercice de leur pouvoir législatif substituait leur volonté àcelle du testateur. C'est en vertu de ce pouvoir que la cour ordonna que la moitiédu résidu des biens serait divisée entre, leshéritiers suivant l'ordre dans lequel ils

auraient succédé si la succession avait été abintestat et l'autre moitié à l'Hôtel-Dieu deParis et aux pauvres de l'aumône de Lyon.Quoique cette distribution soit contraire autestament on voit cependant que dans lamoitié attribuée aux parents, la cour a suivil'ordre de succession. Il en doit être demême dans le cas d'un legs faits aux pauvres parents. C'est l'ordre de succession qu'ilfaudrait suivre. Fautres causes de ce genresont citées, mais elles sont comme celle-ci,fondées sur l'exercice du pouvoir législatif

de ces cours.

Maintenant en France les legs faits aux pauvres ou pour des fins de charité sontconsidérés comme faits au bureau deBienfaisance de la Commune. Nous n'avonsaucune institution de ce genre dans notre province. Parmi les nombreuses institutionsde charité existant dans le pays, aucune n'estautorisée par la loi à réclamer et administrerles legs présumés faits par ces objets.

Considérant le legs fait aux parents pauvres comme absolument nul pour caused'incertitude, je suis d'avis que W.R. Rossn'avait aucun droit d'intervenir dans la présente cause et que son intervention doitêtre renvoyée.

Le jugement doit aussi être modifiédans cette partie qui condamne le défendeurFrank Ross à remettre et livrer à lademanderesse un neuvième indivis des biensde la succession située en dehors de la

province de Québec, savoir dans la provinced'Ontario, New Brunswick, la ColombieAnglaise, et les États-Unis, parce qu'il n'est pas prouvé que le dit défendeur en ait jamaiseu possession; cette partie du jugement doitêtre retranchée; en outre, la cour n'avaitaucune juridiction pour décider sur l'effet dece testament dans les provinces ci-dessusnommés. Le testament attaqué doit être

déclaré bon et valide, et l'action renvoyéeavec dépens ainsi que les interventions duMorrin College et de W.R. Ross, aussi avecdépens.

TASCHEREAU J.:— I dissent, I would

allow the appeal. There is, however, one ofthe questions of law arising in the case uponwhich I agree that the conclusion reached bythe judgment appealed from is entirelycorrect. That is, as to the absolute nullity ofRoss's will by the law of the province takenalone and exclusively of the New Yorkstatute. The learned Chief Justice, SirAlexander Lacoste, has so amplydemonstrated the soundness or the doctrineunanimously adopted by the Court ofQueen's Bench on this part of the case, that I

would have thought it unassailable. Therespondent, however, not quite sure perhapsof his position on the other question in thecase, to which I shall presently refer, uponwhich he succeeded before the Court ofQueen's Bench in having the will in questionmaintained, has strenuously argued beforeus, as we had a perfect right to do, that thiswill is valid by the law of the provinceindependently of the New York law, andthat the Court of Queen's Bench's judgmentto the contrary is erroneous. Under the

circumstances, though I feel that I cannotadd anything to the strength of the reasoningof the learned Chief Justice of the Court ofQueen's Bench, I have thought that therespondent was entitled to expect at ourhands a full review of the question.

It is a general rule, in relation to formsof acts or deeds, that forms prescribedmerely for the purpose of facilitating thesolemnization of all act or deed arefacultative or optional, but that forms

necessary to their validity, as those for willsall are, must imperatively be with. Inaccordance with this principle besides otherreasons, the jurisprudence was uniform inFrance, before the Code Napoleon, that therule locus regit actum, re-enacted by art. 7 ofthe Quebec code, imperatively governedwills made in foreign countries, includingholograph wills.



Laurent, Dr. Intern. par. 259, vol. 2, the

opinions expressed to the contrary by theGerman writer Savigny, and a few officerswhom Wharton, Conflict of Laws, 585-588,681, calls modern Roman Jurists, upon

whose writings the respondent has almost,exclusively to rely in support of hisimpeachment of the conclusion reached bythe court of Queen's Bench on this point. Not a single case has been cited by him insupport of his contention. On the contrary, Ifind that as far back as in 16-0, in a case ofPinard v. Andras, 17 Guyot Rep. 167-8, theParliament of Paris held that a holographwill made in Bruxelles by a Frenchmandomiciled in Paris was absolutely null because the Belgian law did not allow that

form of will. The same doctrine wasfollowed by the same high court in 1720, inthe case of d'Argelos, 7 Jour. Aud. 520, in1721 in the case of Pommereu, 7 Jour. Aud.515, and in 1722 in the case of Boisel, 7Jour. Aud. 689. These cases are all noted,with an acte de notoriété, in the same sense,re Paulo, in Guyot, Rep. vo. Testament,where the author adds, page, 166, that

It cannot be seriously contended that theformalities required by law for a will are

personal and are carried with the personeverywhere.

The Pommereu case, reported at lengthin 7 Journal des And. 515, commented upon by Merlin, Rep. vo. Testament, is preciselyin point. The will there in question had beenmade in the holograph form by a testatorwhose domicile was in Paris, while he wastemporarily in Douay where holograph willswere not legal. The argument in support of

the will was, as it is here on the part of therespondent, that as it was in the formallowed by the testator's domicile it wasvalid; that the testator carried everywherewith his person the right to make aholograph will; that the contrary doctrine isirrational and inconvenient; that a holographwill has no forms, &c., &c.

Against the will it was argued that a willnull by the law of the place where it wasmade is null everywhere even if madeaccording to the law of the testator'sdomicile; that it is all error to say that theoption to make a will either in this form or

in another is attached to the person andcarried with the person everywhere.

The question, it will be seen by thisshort extract of the report of the ease, wasfully argued on both sides, and the resultwas, as stated, that the highest court of theKingdom declared the will null.

In another case, re Millot, on the 15thJuly 1777, a holograph will, made in Paris by a testator domiciled in a place where such

wills were not legal, was held valid. And onthe 15th. Pluv. and 20th August 1806, bytwo arrêts, a will made in Bordeaux whereholograph wills were not legal, by a testatordomiciled in Paris where such wills werelegal, was declared void. The leadingcommentators under the old system adoptedthe same doctrine.

Auzanet, on art. 289 of the Coutume, deParis, says

What of a will by a Frenchman in Italy, inEngland, in Spain or any other foreigncountry in the form required by the lex loci?Held that it is valid, even for the propertiessituated in France. And if the will is notmade according, to the form required by thelaw of the country where it is made, it must be declared null, even if it is made inconformity with the laws of the countrywhere the property devised is situated, andthat as to immovables as well as tomovables.

"The formalities for a will," saysBourjon, 2, 305, "are those required by thelaw of the place where it is made." AndRicard says that the question whether it islex domicilii or the lex loci or the lex reisitae, which is to govern the formalities of awill had formerly been a subject much



discussed, but that it is now settled by auniform jurisprudence that the formalitiesmust exclusively be those required by thelaw of the place where the will is made.

Troplong, Donat. no. 1737, answers

what Ricard says to the contrary in another part of his writings which is also commentedupon in the Pommereu case I have referredto. Ferrière, Grand Coutumier, on art. 289Coutume de Paris vol. 4, p. 131 et seq,Rosseau de la Combe, vo. Testament, p.706, Furgole, vol. 1 p. 69, all adopt the samedoctrine, and recognize that the law isauthoritatively settled in that sense.

In France, now, under art. 999 of theCode Napoleon, and in Louisiana under art.

1588 of their Code, a holograph will,according to the French form, made in aforeign country is valid whether the law ofthat foreign country authorizes it or not, butthat provision is no where to be found in theQuebec Code. That it has been deliberatelyleft out there can be no doubt. The draftershad constantly before them in the course oftheir labours the enactments of those twoCodes, and they did not adopt a singlearticle without maturely weighing thechanges thereby made in the law and closely

scrutinizing their corresponding enactments,yet they entirely omitted this provision that aholograph will may be legally madeanywhere.

This, to my mind, is as conclusive onthe question as if the code had decreedexpressly that a holograph will cannot bemade in any foreign country where suchform of will is not allowed, and that suchhad always been the law in the province.

A reference to the leadingcommentators under the Code Napoleonalso supports that view.

Marcadé, vol. 4, p. 61 on art. 999, says:

C'est uniquement la loi du pays où l'acte sefait qui doit en régir la forme, locus regitactum. D'après ce principe un français ne

pourrait tester valablement en la formeolographe que sur le territoire français oudans un pays dont la loi admettraitégalement cette forme de tester. C'est ce quia eu lieu jusqu'à la publication du Code.

And he adds that it was generallyadmitted by the best commentators and by auniform jurisprudence under the old system,that a holograph will made in a countrywhere that form is not known to the law,was invalid. Coin-Delisle, Donat. et Test.,on art. 999, and Demante, vol. 4, p. 301, areof the same opinion. I refer also to Journaldu Droit International Privé, 1880, p. 381;Dalloz, rép. vo. Dispositions, entre-vifs ettestamentaires, no. 2506, says in the same

sense:

Il en est du lieu comme du temps; c'est laloi du lieu où le testament a été passé quirègle les formalités de cet acte. De là l'adagesi connu, locus regit actum. No. 2507.L'application de la règle, locus regit actumaux testaments olographes était quelque peucontestée sous l'ancienne jurisprudence. ...Mais l'opinion de Bouhier et de Ricard ne prévalent pas. Furgole ... et Pothier ...soutinrent l'opinion contraire. ... Ces auteurs

concluaient que le testateur quelle que fûtd'ailleurs sa loi personnelle, était capable ouincapable de tester par testament olographe,suivant que cette forme était ou non admisedans le lieu où le testament se trouvait écrit.Cette théorie a été consacrée par quatrearrêts de parlement du 10 mars 1620, 15 janvier 1721, 14 juillet 1722, 15 juillet 1777, par un acte de Notoriété du Châtelet, du 13septembre 1702, et appuyée de l'autorité deMerlin. Ces arrêts avaient fixé la jurisprudence d'une manière invariable, et il

ne restait de dissidence dans la doctrine quel'opinion contraire de Boullenois, opinioninfluencée par une extension systématique etévidemment exagérée des principes del'auteur sur les statuts. No. 2508. Le Code Napoléon ne s'est occupé de la maximelocus regit actum, que pour la confirmercomme il l'a fait par l'article 999 à l'égard dutestament authentique tout en la modifiant à



l'égard du testament olographe accomplisl'un et l'autre par un français en paysétrangers.

Domolombe, vol. xxi, nos 482-3 p. 453,says

Il est vrai que l'article 999 autorise leFrançais à faire un testament olographesuivant la forme française dans les paysmêmes où cette forme ne serait pas admise;mais c'est là une exception que la loifrançaise a faite en faveur des Français, afinde leur donner le plus de moyens possiblesde faire leur testament en pays étranger;exception de faveur, disons-nous, qui ne prouve nullement que les auteurs du Codeaient méconnu le vrai caractère de la loi qui

autorise cette forme de testament.

The same author then discusses theassertion of Foelix and Aubry and Rau thatthe rule locus regit actum is facultative so asto permit the execution of the will eitheraccording to the law, of the domicile oraccording to the law of the place ofexecution and adds, Dem. vol. xxi, no. 484, p. 454:

Cette doctrine, sans doute, pourrait paraîtreraisonnable, et nous sommes en effet porté àcroire qu'elle serait, si elle était admise, un progrès du droit nouveau sur l'ancien droit.Mais il faut reconnaître que l'ancien droit nel'avait pas admise; et nous avons aussiconstaté ailleurs qu'elle n'a pas encore non plus réussi à se faire reconnaître dans notredroit nouveau.

At par. 482, in fine, the author says that

the doctrine in France before the Code hadalmost universally prevailed that aholograph will made in a country where thatform of will is not recognized, is a nullity,even if the lex domicilii of the testatorrecognized it. And at par. 106 bis vol. 1, p.129 the same author says: "Is the rule, locusregit actum imperative or merelyfacultative?" The question was under the old

law much discussed but, however, theopinion that it was imperative had prevailed.And such is the tendency of our modern jurisprudence.

Laurent, Dr. Civ. vol. xiii, p. 166, no.

159, says:

La dérogation est claire, mais quelle en estla portée? En faut-il conclure que la formedes testaments olographes est un statut personnel? On l'a prétendu et nous verrons àl'instant que cette question de théorie a unintérêt pratique. Il nous semble que ladifficulté n'en est pas une, car les principesles plus élémentaires sur l'interprétation deslois suffisent pour la décider. Que la loi quirègle les solennités d'un acte ne soit pas une

loi personnelle tout le monde en convient;l'opinion de Boullenois et de Boubier esttoujours restée isolée. L'article 999 endérogeant à l'adage, locus regit actum, a-t-ilchangé la nature des lois concernant lesformes? Il a permis au Français de faire untestament olographe d'après la loi françaisedans les pays où cette forme de tester neserait pas admise. Toute exception doit êtrerenfermée dans les limites de la loi qui l'aétablie. L'exception de l'article 999 se borneà accorder à un Français une faculté qu'il

n'avait pas en vertu du droit commun, voilàtout. Le statut reste donc ce qu'il était, unstatut réel.

The same writer at par. 246 et seq. vol.2, droit international, repeats the samedoctrine. Also in vol. 1 droit civil 99 et seq.,and in vol. 6 droit intern., nos. 415-922, hesays of art. 999, Code Napoleon, that theCode has deviated from the old law on thesubject and inaugurated a new principle. In

vol. 7 dr. intern. nos. 5 et seq., are otherremarks of the same writer in the samesense.

Aubry and Rau, vol. 1, p. 112, though ofopinion that the rule locus regit actum ismerely facultative and not imperative,concede that under the old law the rule washeld to be imperative. That it is facultative



under art. 999 of the Code Napoleon isunquestionable, but i repeat it, that it is notand never has been law in the province ofQuebec; and Boileux, vol. 4, p. 122, says:

Under the jurisprudence anterior to the code

it was generally admitted that a Frenchmancould not validly make a holograph will in acountry where that form of will was notlegal.

I refer also to the decisions in De Veinev. Routledge, S.V. 52, 2, 289, to the samecase in Cassation, S.V. 53, 1, 274, sub. nom.Browning v. de Nayve, and to 3 Troplong,Donat. nos. 1736 et seq., where it is said thatthe opinion of Ricard and others to the

contrary did not prevail in France before theCode.

As to the contention faintly urged on the part of the respondent, that the fact thatholograph wills have no form and that theyneed not be dated from any place shows thatthey can be made anywhere, I need only saythat it is one that was propounded long ago by Ricard inter alios, whose opinion is sooften wrong says Troplong, no. 1463, buthas never been sustained by any court, and

is repudiated expressly by the judgment inthe Pommereu case, 7 Journal Aud. 515, towhich I have already referred, where thatsame point had been explicitly taken, andMerlin calls it a "subtilité." The respondentcontends that the rule locus regit actum isabsurd and irrational. That may or may not be. Laurent, 7 Dr. Intern. 10 et seq., andDespagnet, Journal de Dr. Intern. privé1890, think that it is the English rule that isabsurd. With this, however, clearly we arenot concerned.

For these reasons I agree with the Courtof Queen's Bench (and we are unanimous onthis point I understand, though I have notseen my learned colleagues' opinions), thatunder the law of the province, consideredalone and without reference to the NewYork law, Ross's holograph will made in New York is void.

The Court of Queen's Bench, however,have maintained the validity of that willupon the ground that it was made accordingto the form. required by the law of NewYork and consequently valid under art. 7 of

the Quebec Code and the rule locus regitactum. Now as a matter of fact alone, uponthe evidence in the record, I would say thatthis will is not made according to the formsrequired for wills in New York. The expertsexamined all agree that holograph wills areunknown to the New York law. That. should put an end to the controversy. But theconclusion reached by the Court of Queen'sBench on this branch of the case is basedupon art. 2611 of the New York Code ofProcedure by which it is decreed that:

A will of personal estate, executed by a person not a resident of the state accordingto the laws of the testator's residence, may be admitted to probate.

Therefore, they say, Ross's will is madein the New York form as to personal estate.

I am unable to adopt this reasoning. Itrests entirely, it seems to me on a

misconstruction or mis-application of the New York statute. (I cite here the cases ofBrewer v. Freeman, 10 Moo. P.C. 306,Concha v. Muriette, 40 Ch. D. 543, and CityBank v. Barrow, 5 App. Cas. 664, as to theconstruction of a foreign code.) The grantingof the probate of a will made under a foreignlaw is not conclusive and does not regulateand affect the ultimate destination of the property; Jarman, vol. 1, 5th Eng. ed. 5; Inre Kirwan's Trusts, 25 Ch. D. 373; Barnes v.Vincent, 5 Moo. P.C. 201; Abston v.

Abston, 15 La. An. 137; Atkinson v. Rogers,14 La. An. 633; and ancillary probate may be granted of a will made according to thelaws of the foreign domicile of the testatorthough that will is invalid according to thelex fori, Jarman p. 5 et seq.

In Thornton v. Curling for instance,reported in England in 8 Sim. 310, and in



France in Journal du Pal. 1826, 898,commented upon by the Vice Chancellor inPrice v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 300. Robertson onSucc. 287, the will there in question had been made in England, in the English form, by a testator domiciled in France. That will

was null according to English law, becausenot in the form required by the law of thetestator's domicile. Yet it was admitted to probate in England, 2 Addams, 6, because itwas valid as to form in France according tothe rule locus regit though eventually theCour de Cassation in France held itsdispositions illegal under the French law.And such a course of dealing would befollowed under the same circumstances in New York, I apprehend, as by art. 2624 ofthat same code, it is only of wills made in

the State by residents of the State that theSurrogate determines the validity. By art.2694 it is expressly enacted that the validityof a will of any personal property situatedwithin the State is regulated by the laws ofthe State or country of which the decedentwas a resident at the time of his death. It isonly to personal estate in New York that thisarticle can have any application, and it islikewise only to personal estate in NewYork that art. 2611 is intended to apply. Itcannot, it is evident, have any application in

the courts of any foreign country.

The form that, under art. 7 of theQuebec Code declaration of the old law, hasto be followed by a Quebecer who makes awill in New York, is the form required bythe law of New York for wills by its ownsubjects, the form generally used in NewYork, as the last part of art. 999 of the Code Napoleon reproducing the rule locus regitactum expresses in clear terms. And the New York Legislature had not the power to

alter that law for the province of Quebec,and to decree that a Quebecer could in NewYork make his will either according to hislex domicilii or to the lex loci actus, or toneither one nor the other, but according to amixture of both, at least so as to affectmovables in Quebec.

It cannot be that the legislature of NewYork had the right to pass a statute in thefollowing terms: " Whereas by the law ofthe province of Quebec a holograph willmade in New York by a citizen of the province is invalid in Quebec; whereas it is

expedient to provide otherwise; it is herebydecreed that hereafter such a will shall bevalid." Could such an enactment affect property in Quebec? I would say not, andthe New York legislature never intended todo so. To give to their statute the meaningthat the respondent contends for would be toextend it in a manner not justified by any principle of law that I know of.

The respondent, in other words, wouldargue, at least his argument leads to it, that

though the legislature in Quebec has refusedto adopt the change in the law made in thisrespect as to holograph wills by art. 999 ofthe Code Napoleon or by art. 1588 of theLouisiana Code, yet the New Yorklegislature has done it for them.

To so contend is evidently to forget thesovereignty of the province and of the law ofthe domicile of the testator in the matter andleads to a reasoning in a circle. And a saferule that I would apply here is the, one laid

down by Lord Pepzance in a somewhatanalogous case, Pechell v. Hilderly, L.R. 1P. & D. 673, that in determining thequestion whether such a will is valid or not,regard can be had to the law of one countryalone at a time and the court will not mix upthe legal precepts of different countries. Thelaw of Quebec is exclusively the rule here.But were it necessary to make the inquiry, itseems to me established in the case that thewill would be held invalid in New York.

Mr. Adams, one of the expertsexamined in the case, makes this point clearand I do not see that he is contradicted bythe other experts. As in England, in mattersof testate succession, when the will has beenmade by a person dying with a foreigndomicile, inquiry is made in New York, Iassume, with regard to the validity of thatwill by the law of the domicile and



according to the result of such inquiry, probate of the will is granted or rejected.Art. 2694 New York Code of Procedure,Robertson on Success. 26; Abd-ul-Messih v.Farra 13 App. Cas. 431.

Upon evidence that by the Quebec law aholograph will made in New York by acitizen of Quebec is not valid in Quebec totransmit property real or personal situated orto be found in Quebec if, by the New Yorklaw, holograph wills by citizens of NewYork are not valid in New York, this will inquestion here would not be admitted to probate in New York.

This art. 2611 of the New York Code ofProcedure does not cover this will as it

applies only to a will of personal propertyexecuted by a person not a resident of theState according to the laws of the testator'sresidence. And Ross's will is not executedaccording to the laws of the testators'sresidence.

It was said at the argument on the partof the respondent, this will is good by theQuebec law, it is also good by the New Yorklaw, why should it not be upheld? This is,however, but an assumption of the very

question at issue. That is precisely what hasto be determined, whether this will is validor not; and to such an argument theappellants have only to answer, with notmore but with as much force, by saying thatas the will is bad in Quebec, and also bad in New York, it cannot be upheld. If Ross hadleft personal estate in New York, and the New York Court *upon contestation of hiswill had referred the, question of its validityto the Quebec court's, following the courseadopted by the Prerogative Court in England

in de Bonneval's case, 1 Curteis 856, to havethe question settled by Ross's lex domicilii,the Quebec court's would have had toanswer, and the Court of Queen's Benchconcedes it, that by Ross's lex domicilli,alone and independently of the New Yorklaw, the rule locus regit actum imperativelygoverns, and that this will by that law istherefore null; that by the Quebec law a

Quebecer, who in New York desires to makea will disposing of either movables orimmovables, or both, in Quebec, must do soaccording to the New York forms. And as aholograph will is not in the New York form,that would have been the end of the

controversy, as art. 2694 of the New YorkCode of Procedure, above referred to,expressly says that as to personal estate it is by Ross's lex domicilii that, in New York,the validity of his will is to be concluded. Iutterly fail to understand the import of therule locus regit actum, if it does not mean,adapting it to this case, that a Quebecer whodesires when in New York to make a willhas to make it according to the formrequired by the law of New York for its ownsubjects; or to put it in other words, if a will

in the holograph form made by a NewYorker in New York is void under the NewYork law in New York, a Quebecer's will inthat form made in New York is also void inQuebec, which is Ross's lex domicilii.

This art. 26 1.1 of the New York Code,relied upon by the Court of Queen's Benchto maintain this will, requires no form at allfor any will in the sense that the word"requires" bears in art. 7 of the QuebecCode. It is a mere enabling enactment as to

probate when a foreign testator has left personalty in the State of New York. Theform that is required by the New York lawfor New York citizens for a will made in theState of New York is the form derived fromthe English law of a will before, witnesses.All that this article of the Code of Procedureenacts is that a will made by a non-residentof the State of movables to be found in theState may be admitted to probate if madeaccording to the law of the testator'sresidence. It does not purport to legalize any

will otherwise illegal. It merely decrees that probate may be granted in New York, as to personalty, of any will that is legal by thelaw of the foreign testator's residence. Itdoes not at all help any will, or in any waycome to the assistance of any will, that is not perfectly legal by the law of the testator'sresidence and by that law alone. The factthat Ross's will happens to have been made



in New York does not make the leastdifference. The article does not merely applyto wills made in New York; it has the sameapplication to a will made for instance inEngland by a Frenchman domiciled in Paris,or in Paris by an Italian, or to bring the

illustration closer to the present case, toRoss's will if it had been made in England.If, under such a will, the testator haddisposed of movables in New York, and probate was in consequence demanded in New York, the New York court would grant probate if the will is good by the law of thetestator's residence exclusively, and refuse itif the will is bad by that same law. Such isthe New York law. In the Marquis deBonneval's case above cited a Frenchmanhad made his will in England in the English

form. The court in England, 1 Curteis 856,held that by the English law the validity ofthat will as to personalty in England had to be determined by the law of France, the lexdomicilii of the testator, and accordinglyreferred the case to the French courts toascertain what that law was. Thereupon theCourt of Cassation in France, where the casewas eventually carried, determined, S.V. 43,1, 209, that, by the French law, that willmade in England, irrespectively of thequestion of the testator's domicile, by a

French subject in the English form was goodunder the common law and art. 999 of theCode Napoleon, which decrees, in expresswords, that a Frenchman in a foreigncountry may make his will in the formsrecognized (usitées) in that country, re-enacting thereby the rule locus regit actum,which had always governed in France andwhich is reproduced in art. 7 of the QuebecCode, as I have already remarked. But ifinstead of being a will in the English formde Bonneval's will had been a holograph

will, the courts in France wouldunquestionably before the Code have held itutterly void as they did for the PinardAndras, the d'Argelos, the Pommereu andthe de Boisel wills, and the other wills in thecases that I have cited.

This enactment of the New York code,art. 2611, upon which the respondent bases

this branch of his argument is, it seems tome, nothing more than a re-enactment of theEnglish common law; Bremer v. Freeman,10 Moo. P.C. 306; Croker v. The Marquis ofHertford, 4 Moo. P.C. 339. Now, wouldRoss's holograph will have been good

according to Quebec law if made inEngland? That is the same questionundoubtedly. The law of England, as I havesaid, is the same as the law of art. 2611 ofthe New York Code. Would not the courts inFrance, before the Code Napoleon, haveheld such a will null, as they did in theabove cited cases? Upon an application for probate of Ross's will, if it had been made inEngland the court in New York would nothave proceeded before inquiring what wasRoss's lex domicilii, and upon ascertaining

that by that lex domicilii a holograph willmade in England by one of its subjects isvoid, as the English law does not know ofholograph wills, probate would have beenrefused.

The New York article can apply only towills made by a subject of a foreign country,or of any other State of the Union where theEnglish law on this subject prevails, that isto say where, by the testator's lex domicilii,he carries everywhere with his person the

right to make a will in the forms prescribed by the law of his own country, a doctrinewhich, to use Guyot's words in the passage Ihave cited, cannot be seriously contendedfor under the French common law. With thelaw on the subject under the English systemthere is in the New York law no conflict;with the law under the French system thereis conflict.

It has been said that it would be ananomaly if this will was held to be valid in

New York and invalid in the province ofQuebec. But anomalies of this kind,assuming that the New York courts mightuphold the validity of this will, areconstantly met with. It is the inevitableresult of the differences between themunicipal laws of the different countries ofthe civilized world. In a case of Guigonandv. Sarrazin, Jour. de Dr. Intern. privé, 1877,



p. 149, for instance, a will made in Austriawas declared null by the French courts,though it had been held valid by theAustrian courts. In a case of Meras v. Meras,Journ. de Dr. Intern. privé, 1882, p. 426, aholograph will made in France by a

Spaniard was held good by the Frenchcourts, though it had been held bad by theSpanish courts. And an English subject,temporarily in France may, by the Frenchlaw, make a holograph will in France, andsuch a will will affect both movables as wellas immovables situated in France, ReQuartin, S.V. 47, 1, 712; Meras v. Meras.But in England such a will at common lawwould have been invalid; Croker v. TheMarquis of Hertford, 4 Moo. P.C. 339;Bremer v. Freeman, 10 Moo. P.C. 306; as to

both movables and immovables. And a willin the English form, made in France by anEnglishman domiciled in England, is null inFrance both as to movables andimmovables, 4 Demol. Donat. 484; 6Laurent Dr. Intern. no. 420; DeVeine v.Routledge, S.V. 52, 2, 289; and inCassation, sub nom. Browning v. de Nayve,S.V. 53, 1, 274. See Mendes v. Brandon,Journ. de Pal., 1850, 2, 187. It is good inEngland as to both. In re Rippon, 3 S. & T.177; In re Raffenel, 3 S. & T. 49; Doglioni

v. Crispin, L.R. 1 H.L.C. 301. "Attendu,"says the Cour de Cassation, in Re Browning,4 Demol. Donat. 484; 6 Laurent Dr. Intern.no. 420; DeVeine v. Routledge, S.V. 52, 2,289; and in Cassation, sub nom. Browningv. de Nayve, S.V. 53, 1, 274, declaring, thenullity of a will in the English form made inFrance by an Englishman:

Qu'il est de principe de droit internationalque la forme extérieure des actes estessentiellement soumise aux lois, usages et

coutumes des pays où ils sont passés; que ce principe s'applique aux testamentsolographes comme tous autres actes publicset privés. Attendu que si tout ce qui tient àl'état du testateur, à l'étendue et à la limite deses droits et de sa capacité est régi par lestatut personnel qui suit la personne partoutoù elle se trouve, il en est autrement de lasolennité de l'acte et de sa forme extérieure

qui sont réglées par la loi du pays où letestateur dispose. Qu'ainsi le testamentolographe fait par un étranger en France, etdont l'exécution est demandée devant lestribunaux français ne peut être déclarévalable qu'autant qu'il réunit toutes les

conditions de forme exigées par lalégislation française, quelle que soit à cetégard la législation du pays auquelappartient le testateur.

The considérants of the same court, reQuartin and of the Paris Court of Appeal, inMendes v. Brandon, cited above, are asstrong and clear in the same sense.

On the same principle it is held in

France that a joint will, although null ifmade in France, is valid in France if it ismade by foreign consorts in their domicileof origin, according to the law of the place,even for immovables, Journ. de Dr. Intern. privé, 1882, pages 322, 360.

A case of Whall v. Van Often, Dal. 59,2, 158; S.V. 60, 2, 37, goes very far insupport of the same doctrine. There, aholograph will made in France by aDutchman was declared valid as to the

personal estate left by the testator in France,though by the Holland Code holograph willsare not merely not allowed, but prohibited;so that the estate in France went to thelegattees under the will and the estate inHolland went to the heirs at law, the courtunequivocally repudiating, as they did in theMeras case cited before, the preponderanceof the foreign law over the municipal law ofthe country that, in the present case, thedoctrine of the Court of Queen's Benchwould concede to the New York law over

the law of the province of Quebec.

These examples demonstrate that norules or, principles of private internationallaw, upon which the, respondent partly baseshis contentions on this point, can have any bearing on this case. There are on thequestion no rules ex comitate between Statesor ad reciprocain utilitatem that can be given



effect to in the courts of justice. Eachcountry, as the cases I have quoteddemonstrate, follows its own law in eachcase without reference to the foreign law.

In Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N.Y. 556, for

another instance, a citizen of New Yorkmade his will in France bequeathing bothreal and personal property in the formrecognized by the State of New York. Thatwill was clearly null in toto in France. Butthe New York Code held it good in toto, See7 Laurent, Dr. Intern. 21-2, on that case.

A New Yorker, who whilst temporarilyin Quebec, desires to make a will, has by the New York law to make it according to the New York form to devise his real estate in

New York, and if he desires to bequeath anyestate, real or personal, situate in Quebec, hemust, by the Quebec law, make another willaccording to the Quebec forms. But a will by a Quebecer in the New York forms,whilst temporarily in New York, will, by theQuebec law, pass his real and personal estatein Quebec, and, by the New York law, both,his real and personal estate in New York.And in this Dominion itself the samedivergence exists in the laws between thedifferent provinces, at least between the

province of Quebec and the English law provinces. A will made in Quebec, forinstance, under the French law form doesnot affect real estate in Ontario, but a willmade in Ontario under the Ontario formaffects real estate in Quebec. This showsthat international law has nothing to do withthe question.

In Louisiana, in 1848, in ReM'Candless, 3 La. An. 579, it was held thatunder the civil law in force in that State the

form of the will is to be decided accordingto the law of the place where made, whetherit relates to movables or immovablessituated in another country, whatever principles to the contrary may prevail incountries governed by the English commonlaw, and consequently, a will of movablesand immovables situated in the state, madein another country by a citizen of the state,

temporarily there according to the forms ofthat other country, was declared valid. ThisLouisiana decision, rendered under the samesystem of law that rules the province ofQuebec, is a striking instance of thedifference between the English and the

French law on the subject, a differencewhich we must constantly bear in mind indetermining this case.

Under the English law the rights thatattach to the person and are carried with himeverywhere, under the rule mobilia personam sequuntur, include, as to personalty, the right to make a will in theform of the testator's lex domicilii. Underthe French law that rule does not extend toforms of wills; this right of a testator is not

included in the rights that attach to the person, and the laws as to forms of deeds orwills are statuts réels, not statuts personnels.

Another great difference between thetwo is that under the French system the rulesfor the forms of wills are the same formovables as for immovables. Laurent, Dr.Intern. vol. 7, no. 10 et seq.; Pothier, Introd.aux Cout. ch. 1er, part 1ere; 1er Boileux, page 22; Quartin's case, cited above, andAnnotator's remarks; whilst under the

English system the lex rei sitae strictly prevails as to realty. It does not necessarilyfollow, however, (under both systems probably) that a will to be valid in formmust conform to that law which would haveregulated the succession to the testator's property if he had died intestate, as said perSir John Nicholl in England, in Curling v.Thornton, 2 Addams 19, and as results fromthe judgment of the Cour de Cassation inFrance in re Quartin above cited on the firstground of the pourvoi.

In Bremer v. Freeman, 10 Moo. P.C.306, the Privy Council held that by theFrench law an Englishm.,n domiciled inFrance, though not naturalized, cannotvalidly by a will made in France in theEnglish form bequeath movable property inEngland. The French courts wouldunquestionably have also held the will in



question in that case void, as under anycircumstances, by the French law, is a willin the English form made in France, even byan Englishman domiciled in England, valideither as to movables or as to immovables,whilst by the English law, such a will made

in France by an Englishman domiciled inEngland is valid, and, in fact, as to realestate in England, the only one that anEnglish court would recognize. The Frenchlaw had in that case been misconstrued inthe Prerogative Court, 1 Deane, 192.

The respondent's argument by which herelies on the private international law inforce in New York to uphold Ross's will is based on the same fallacy as his argument by which he tries to uphold it on the New

York Code of Procedure, Westlake PrivateInternational Law, pars. 83, 84. It is a petitio principii. It assumes that the will is good bythe Quebec law. It is merely an argumentthat could be invoked if Ross's. will had been made in Quebec. Then it wouldunquestionably be good in Quebec both asto movables and immovables, and good bythe, New York law to transmit personal property in New York. It is a settled principle of private international law that theformalities required for a deed or an

instrument of any kind, are those required bythe law of the place where the deed orinstrument is made. Locus regit actum;Journ. de dr. intern. privé, 1383, p. 85. Therespondent's argument begs the wholequestion and assumes that this holographwill made in New York is just as valid bythe Quebec law as if it had been made inQuebec. In other words, it assumes that art.9911 of the Code Napoleon is not new law,and that the rule locus regit actum is not lawin Quebec, both of which propositions are

untenable.

I would come to the conclusion thatRoss's will is void, but in any case, I do notsee how it can affect immovables in Quebec.It is only as to movables that the New Yorkstatute, in express terms, legalizes a devise by a foreigner made according to his lexdomicilii, and Ross's will, it is conceded,

would not affect immovables situated in New York, if he had left any. If he haddevised his immovables only clearly his willwould not be admitted to probate in NewYork. On what principle it can be made toextend to immovables in Quebec I cannot

see. The intentions of the testator are to begiven effect to, it is said. Certainly, but thatis so only of the intentions that he hasexpressed in a valid will, and so far only assuch will is valid. If intention alone was to be given effect to there would be no need forany form. If a will is valid as to movablesthe testator's movables will pass under it, butif invalid as to immovables theseimmovables are left intestate.

Such was the result of the two cases

before the Privy Council of Meiklejohn v.The Attorney General, 2 Knapp 328, andMigneault v. Malo, L.R. 4 P.C. 123, in bothof which, though the testators had clearlydisposed of both their movables andimmovables, yet the wills were held valid asto movables only. To use the words ofLushington J. in Croker v. The Marquis ofHertford, 4 Moo. P.C. 339:

We sit here not to try what the testator mayhave intended, but to ascertain on legal

principles what testamentary instrument hehas made.

And in France it is said on the same principle:

La solennité des testaments qui est de droit public est de beaucoup plus grande et plus puissante considération que l'entretènementde la dernière volonté d'un particulier.Brodeau sur Louet, vol. 2, p. 754.

In this very case it is evident that Ross'sintention was to bequeath all his immovable property wherever situated. Yet it isconceded that his will does not cover theimmovables he left in Ontario.

The only point that now remains for myconsideration in this case is the view taken



by the Superior Court that this will is validas made in the English form as it wasintroduced in the province in 1774. Now,under the Statute of Frauds, the English lawin force in Quebec in 1865 when this willwas made, nothing but personal estate could

be devised by a holograph will. And hereagain the judgment should in any case bereformed so as to maintain this will only asto the personal estate of the testator. But I gofurther, and I think, with what may beassumed to have been the unanimousopinion of the Court of Queen's Bench, thatthis will, as an English will, is null in toto.By the English law, different in this againfrom the French law, Dev. table gén. v.Testament, no. 37; Sirey 1er vol. CodesAnnotés sous art. 2, No. 163; Migneault v.

Malo, L.R. 4 P.C. 123, the will speaks at thedeath of the testator and it is the law at thetime of Ross's death that governs theexecution of his will. Now, by that law, art.851 of the Code, in force when Ross died,wills derived from the English form both asto movables and immovables must, as nowin England, be executed before witnesses.Art. 2613 C.C. invoked by the respondentagainst this has no application. That it is thelaw at the time of the death that governs thewills derived from the English law and its

execution is no new rule in the Code. Andthat article relates only to new rules orchanges made in the law by the Code so asnot to affect past transactions or acquiredrights. And when article 581 decrees thatthereafter all such wills must be executed before witnesses, that applies to the wills ofall those who died after the coming intoforce of the Code.

I would allow Annie Ross's appeal andmaintain her action. Consequently, and also

for the reasons given by my brotherFournier, I would dismiss all theinterventions with costs on all the issues,and allow Frank Ross's appeal with costs onthe appeal between him and thoseintervening parties. I remark that in theformal judgment of the Court of Queen'sBench there is no reference to these

interventions or any of them. However, thishas no consequence.

As to Frank Ross's appeal or cross-appeal as between him and the plaintiff,there should be a reformation at least of that

part of the judgment by which he iscondemned to deliver up the real estate left by the testator outside of the province ofQuebec, and to render an account of hisadministration thereof. It is established thathe never had possession of that real estate.The admission in the record relates only tothe estate devised by the will, and the realtyoutside of the province, it is conceded, didnot pass by the will. How can he deliver upwhat he never had, or render an account ofan administration which he never had?

SEDGEWICK J.:— I concur with thelearned Chief Justice in this case except asto that part of the judgment relating toMorrin College, whose intervention in myopinion should be maintained as that of acharity within the terms of the will, andexcept as to costs in the lower courts. I thinkthat the order of the Superior Court and theorder of the Court of Queen's Bench as tocosts should stand except as to theinterventions dismissed.

KING J.:— I concur in the judgment ofthe Chief Justice except as to costs in thelower courts. The orders in the Court ofQueen's Bench and the Superior Courtshould stand except as to the interventionswhich have been dismissed.

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed withcosts.

ross v ross

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