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ADFP 3.8.1

SERIES TITLE

ADFP 3.8.1

PEACE OPERATIONS, PLANNING AND PROCEDURES

Australian Defence Force Publication 3.8.1—Peace Operations, Planningand Procedures is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and iseffective forthwith.

P.J. COSGROVE AC, MCGeneralChief of the Defence Force

Australian Defence HeadquartersCanberra ACT 2600

July 2004

© Commonwealth of Australia 2004

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the CopyrightAct 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior writtenpermission from the Department of Defence.

Announcement statement—may be announced to the public. There are nolimitations, security classifications, caveats or privacy markings preventingthe announcement of the document to the widest possible audience.

Secondary release—may be released to the public. There are no limitations,security classifications, caveats or privacy markings restricting the releasedof the document.

All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected fromunauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914. Defence informationmay only be released in accordance with the Defence Security Manual and/or Defence Instruction (General) OPS 13–4—Release of Classified DefenceInformation to Other Countries, as appropriate.

Requests and inquiries should be addressed to Defence Publishing Service,CP3–1–039, Department of Defence, CANBERRA ACT 2600.

ADFP 3.8.1First edition 2004

Sponsor Chief of Joint Operations

Developer CommandantAustralian Defence Force Warfare Centre

Publisher Defence Publishing ServiceDepartment of DefenceCANBERRA ACT 2600

Defence Publishing ServiceDPS: October 2004

ADFP 3.8.1

FOREWORD1. The continued participation of Australian Defence Force (ADF)personnel in United Nations (UN) sponsored peace operations has led to arequirement for a greater understanding of these types of operations.

2. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.8—PeaceOperations is the parent publication to this Australian Defence ForcePublication (ADFP). It is directed at the strategic/operational levels, with theintention of providing information to assist Commanders and their staff inunderstanding the nuances of peace operations and in planning ADFparticipation. Significantly, ADDP 3.8 also contains the AustralianGovernment’s Peace Operations Policy, and a chapter outlining the ADFconduct of peace operations.

3. This ADFP is directed at the operational/tactical levels, with theintention of providing additional information to assist commanders and staff atall levels in understanding the nuances of peace operations and in planningADF participation.

4. Chapter 1 provides information on peace operations terminology andprinciples, describes the nature and type of peace operations that the ADFmay be involved in, and identifies the various components that are part ofcontemporary peace operations. Chapter 2 outlines legal issues such asmandates, rules of engagement and other operations law considerations.

5. The following chapters provide additional information on the variouscomponents of peace operations. Chapter 3 details the UN system of logisticsupport to peace operations, and chapter 4 outlines the approach ofhumanitarian organisations towards peace operations, identifying theiremergency, development and human rights focus and the roles andrelationships they desire of the military component. Chapter 5 covers UNcivilian police operations and issues that need to be considered if the militarycomponent has a law and order responsibility. Chapter 6 reviews the electoralaspects of peace operations and identifies the military support that may berequired in an electoral support mission.

6. Finally, chapter 7 reviews the education, training and force preparationrequirements for military forces deploying on a peace operation.

7. The material in this ADFP has been sourced from operationalexperience, other nations’ doctrine, the Multinational Interoperability Counciland a wide range of unclassified publications and web sites.

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ADFP 3.8.1

AMENDMENT CERTIFICATEProposals for amendment of ADFP 3.8.1 are to be forwarded to:

DirectorDoctrine and TrainingAustralian Defence Force Warfare CentreRAAF BaseWILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

Amendment Effected

No Date Signature Date

This publication is current as at July 2004.

This publication will be periodically reviewed and amended. Thelatest version of this publication is available on the ADFWC DRN web sitehttp://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/adfwc.

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http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/adfwc

ADFP 3.8.1

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

Abbreviation SupersededADFP No

Title

CAPSTONE DOCTRINE

ADDP–D N/A Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine

ADDP–D.1 N/A Australian Approach to Warfare

ADDP–D.2 N/A Force 2020

ADDP–D.3 N/A Future Warfighting Concepts

ADDP–D.4 N/A Joint Warfighting

0–EXECUTIVE SERIES

ADDP 00.1 2 Command and Control

ADDP 00.2 4 Preparedness and Mobilisation

ADDP 00.3 N/A Coalition Operations

ADDP 06.1 3 Rules of Engagement

ADDP 06.2 3 Sup 1 Rules of Engagement—Operational Rules

ADDP 06.3 3 Sup 3 Combined Rules of Engagement for Australian and United States Military Forces

ADDP 06.4 37 Law of Armed Conflict

1–PERSONNEL SERIES

ADDP 1.0 N/A Personnel

ADDP 1.1 N/A Personnel Services

ADDP 1.2 53 Defence Health

ADDP 1.3 N/A Chaplaincy

2–INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERIES

ADDP 2.0 19 Intelligence

ADDP 2.1 19 Sup 1 Counterintelligence

ADDP 2.2 N/A Security

ADDP 2.3 N/A Geospatial Information and Services

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ADFP 3.8.1

3–OPERATIONS SERIES

ADDP 3.0 6 Operations

ADDP 3.1 11 Offensive Support

ADDP 3.2 12 Amphibious Operations

ADDP 3.3 13 Aerospace Battle Management

ADDP 3.4 15 Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Environment

ADDP 3.5 24 Electronic Warfare

ADDP 3.7 29 Collection Operations

ADDP 3.8 35 Peace Operations

ADDP 3.9 39 Airborne Operations

ADDP 3.10 43 Evacuation Operations

ADDP 3.11 44 Civil-Military Cooperation

ADDP 3.12 45 Special Operations

ADDP 3.13 N/A Information Operations

ADDP 3.14 23 Targeting

ADDP 3.15 N/A Airbase Operations

4–LOGISTICS SERIES

ADDP 4.0 N/A Defence Logistics

ADDP 4.1 N/A Capability Support

ADDP 4.2 20 Support to Operations

ADDP 4.3 N/A Supply

ADDP 4.4 14, 21 and 22 Movement and Transport

ADDP 4.5 N/A Equipment Engineering and Maintenance

ADDP 4.6 N/A Infrastructure Engineering and Maintenance


Title

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ADFP 3.8.1

5–PLANS SERIES

ADDP 5.0 9 Joint Planning

ADDP 5.01 N/A Joint Planning (Provisional)

ADDP 5.1 9 Sup 1 ANZUS Planning Manual

6–COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SERIES

ADDP 6.0 10 Communications and Information Systems

7–DOCTRINE AND TRAINING SERIES

ADDP 7.0 N/A Doctrine and Training

ADDP 7.1 N/A Individual Training

ADDP 7.2 17 Collective Training


Title

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ADFP 3.8.1

CONTENTSPage

Foreword iiiAmendment Certificate vAustralian Defence Doctrine Publications viiContents xiList of Figures xvList of Tables xvii

Paragraph

CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONSINTRODUCTIONINTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITYOrganisations 1.3Terminology 1.10Principles 1.12Components 1.13Missions 1.15

Annexes:A. United Nations peace operationsB. Multinational peace operations involving the

Australian Defence Force

CHAPTER 2 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONSIntroduction 2.1LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACE OPERATIONSLEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE DURING A

PEACE OPERATIONMission accomplishment and the use of force 2.7Rules of engagement 2.11Status of deployed forces 2.15Rights, privileges and immunities 2.19Command and discipline 2.25Law of Armed Conflict in peace operations 2.30Human rights in peace operations 2.35OTHER OPERATIONS LAW

CONSIDERATIONS

Annex:A. Summary of guidelines for the development

of rules of engagement for United Nations peacekeeping operations

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ADFP 3.8.1

CHAPTER 3 LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Introduction 3.1Scope 3.4UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICSDefinition 3.5Structure 3.6Concepts 3.8Logistic support 3.13Equipment 3.15Contingent owned equipment 3.16Verification and control for contingent owned

equipment 3.24MULTINATIONAL FORCE LOGISTICSSUMMARY

CHAPTER 4 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND AID AGENCIESIntroduction 4.1HUMANITARIAN ACTORS, PRINCIPLES AND

COORDINATIONNon-government organisations 4.5United Nations agencies involved with humanitarian

operations 4.17International organisations 4.19Australian Government aid 4.24Principles of humanitarian relief 4.28Coordination mechanisms 4.37Conclusion 4.44

Annexes:A. The Humanitarian CharterB. The Humanitarian Code of ConductPurposeC. Minimum standards in disaster relief

CHAPTER 5 CIVILIAN POLICEIntroduction 5.1POLICE INVOLVEMENTHistory 5.4The value of civilian police 5.6The need for civilian police 5.7Policing planning principles 5.11Capability and component structure 5.16Unarmed or armed 5.22Police involvement 5.25

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ADFP 3.8.1

Roles and tasks 5.29The Civilian Police—Military distinction 5.37RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MILITARYLiaison 5.38Military providing law and order 5.41Command and control 5.47LONG–TERM POLICING BENEFITSCONCLUSION

CHAPTER 6 ELECTORAL ASPECTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Introduction 6.1Historical aspects 6.7ELECTORAL OPERATIONSUnited Nations electoral operations 6.15Phases of an electoral operation 6.22Planning considerations 6.29Military component support requirements 6.33Coordination and integration 6.38ELECTORAL MISSION SUCCESSFactors defining success 6.43Conclusion 6.45

CHAPTER 7 PEACE OPERATIONS TRAININGIntroduction 7.1Training 7.5Auditing 7.6United Nations training and force preparation 7.7United Nations standardised guidelines 7.12Multinational force training guidelines 7.17Australian Defence Force training support 7.18

Annexes:A. United Nations peacekeeping training

standards and guidelinesB. Multinational force training guidance

Glossary

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Humanitarian relief, aid and development operations/agencies and miscellaneous United Nations agencies

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ADFP 3.8.1

LIST OF FIGURESFigure Title Page

7–1 An example of pocket cards produced by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which will be distributed by the ADF peace operations training organisations during force preparation training 7–8

xv

ADFP 3.8.1

LIST OF TABLESTable Title Page

4–1 Gap identification chart—matrix showing emergency sector providers within each region in an area of operations 4–13

4–2 UNHCR’s view on the role of military force 4–16

4C–1 Water requirements in relief operations 4C–14C–2 Food and nutrition in relief operations 4C–2

5–1 The differences between civilian police and the military 5–11

7–1 United Nations standardised generic training modules 7–10

7A1–1 UNMO pre-deployment training core curriculum check list 7A1–5

7A1–2 UN Staff Officer pre-deployment training core curriculum check list 7A1–9

7A1–3 United Nations peacekeeping contingent pre-deployment training core curriculum check list 7A1–14

xvii

ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 1

1

INTRODUCTION 1.1

1.1 Peace operations are undertaken by the international community aspart of wider diplomatic efforts to assist in the prevention, resolution orcontainment of a conflict. The first peace operations involved unarmed UnitedNations (UN) observers or lightly armed military peacekeeping forces,deployed after the cessation of hostilities between two or more States andwith the consent of the parties involved. In the modern, post-Cold War, worldhowever, such operations are more complex and multi-dimensional, andrange from pure peacekeeping to peacebuilding operations, preventivediplomacy, peace enforcement and peacemaking activities.

. . . peacekeeping operations of different sorts, are the most likelyoperations we might need to undertake in our immediate neighbourhood.

Defence 20001

Executive summary

• A peace operation is one response option available to theinternational community to assist in the prevention, resolution orcontainment of a conflict.

• Peace operations are conducted in support of political anddiplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

• The functional principles guiding the military component in peaceoperations are legitimacy, consent, impartiality and the use of force.

• In modern peace operations, a military force will often be required tocreate and maintain a secure environment to permit the conduct ofpolitical/diplomatic negotiations and the delivery of humanitarianassistance.

• A peace operation may include diplomatic and political, civiladministration, military, humanitarian assistance, civilian police andelectoral components.

1 Australia’s Defence Policy, p 49.

1–1


1.2 This Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) builds upon thephilosophical basis outlined in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication(ADDP) 3.8—Peace Operations, and provides further practical information toassist commanders and staff at all levels to understand the nuances of peaceoperations and to assist in planning Australian Defence Force (ADF)participation in such operations.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 1.3

Organisations 1.3

1.3 United Nations. The UN developed during World War II, building onthe strengths of its predecessor, the League of Nations. The UN has playeda pivotal role in peace operations since its inception in 1945, although in thepost-Cold War environment fresh approaches have been considered.

1.4 The UN Charter provides the authority for establishing UN peaceoperations. Detail on the UN and its Charter is contained in ADDP 3.8,chapters 2 and 3. Traditionally, peace operations fell into either of twocategories—‘peacekeeping’ or ‘peace enforcement’ (based on Chapters VIand VII respectively of the UN Charter). In more recent times however,missions have arisen with characteristics and requirements, which overlapboth chapters.

1.5 Regional and multinational aspects. In the post-Cold Warenvironment, it has increasingly become apparent that the UN may not be themost suitable (or willing) organisation to undertake certain military operations.

1.6 Where operations are conducted by coalitions or under the auspicesof a regional arrangement, relieving the UN of a considerable burden, the UNprovides the international legitimacy for such an operation. This process isknown by the UN as ‘burden-sharing’, and is an arrangement which hasproven itself in operations undertaken by several regional organisations (forexample: in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, and the EconomicCommunity of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone).

1.7 Regional or alliance operations are specifically provided for inChapter VIII—‘Regional arrangements’ of the UN Charter. Peace operationsunder this chapter can be peacekeeping or peace enforcement, however theuse of force does require the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Suchpeace operations will be governed by the terms of an agreement betweenparties to a dispute, and must be conducted in accordance with the dictatesof international law.

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1.8 Examples of such operations include the South Pacific PeacekeepingForce (SPPKF) operation on Bougainville2 and the Multinational Force andObservers (MFO) in the Sinai, established to supervise the Camp DavidAccords between Israel and Egypt (created under US sponsorship becausethe then Soviet Union was opposed to any UN peacekeeping involvement) 3.

1.9 Asia-Pacific arrangements. Within the Asia-Pacific region there areseveral alliances, treaties and arrangements to which Australia is signatory,and Australia conducts bilateral regional security dialogue with most of thecountries in the East Asia/Pacific region. It should be noted however thatnations choose to be involved in peace operations for many reasons, andmembership of an alliance or organisation does not automatically guaranteethat nation’s participation in a peace operation.

Terminology 1.10

1.10 Peace operations make use of diplomatic, civil and military means,normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore ormaintain peace. Today, peace operations may include the following activities(refer to ADDP 3.8, chapter 1 and ADFP 04.1.1—Glossary for details):

a. Peacekeeping—non-coercive initiatives, including thedeployment of an international civil and/or military coalition withthe consent of the belligerent parties. In peacekeepingoperations, consent of the belligerents must be assured, theuse of force is only for self-defence, and it is much easier forthe military force to be impartial and be seen to be impartial.Peacekeeping operations have their basis inChapter VI—‘Pacific settlement of disputes’ of the UN Charter.

b. Peace enforcement—the coercive use of civil and militarysanctions and collective security actions (military enforcement)by international intervention forces, where the belligerents maynot consent to that intervention. In peace enforcementoperations, consent may vary from grudging acquiescence toenthusiastic support, impartiality must be activelydemonstrated, and force may be applied to compel or coercecompliance with the mandate or mission objectives. Peaceenforcement operations are founded on Chapter VII—‘Actionwith respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace andacts of aggression’ of the UN Charter.

2 Australia was lead-nation for the SPPKF, and Brigadier Peter Abigail was the SPPKF forcecommander. Operation LAGOON was the first Australian-led joint and combined peaceoperation.

3 Major General David Ferguson AM from Australia was MFO force commander (21 April 1994to 10 April 1997).

1–3


c. Peacebuilding—a set of strategies (pre- or post-conflict)which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and othermajor crises do not arise.

d. Preventive diplomacy—action (including the deployment ofmilitary forces with sufficient deterrent capabilities) to preventdisputes from developing or escalating into conflict.

e. Peacemaking—actions (including direct or indirect use ofmilitary assets) conducted after the initiation of a conflict tosecure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement.

1.11 The traditional peacekeeping operations can be divided into fourbroad, sometimes overlapping, categories:

a. Military observer/liaison missions—traditional observermissions rely on unarmed multinational UN Military Observers(UNMO) or Military Liaison Officers. The UN can establishUNMO-only military observer missions, or it may deploy UNMOwithin the same area of operations as a UN peacekeepingforce.

b. Comprehensive settlement missions—peacekeeping forceswhich provide the stability necessary for the conduct of freeand fair elections and establishment of new government.

c. Humanitarian assistance missions—missions in which apeacekeeping force is deployed to protect the distribution of aidand the distribution agency involved.

d. Interpositional forces—lightly armed peacekeeping forcesdeployed into a disputed area following the signing of aceasefire agreement or truce. Interpositional forces may alsomonitor the withdrawal of opposing and international forcesthat are, or are believed to be, sympathetic to one side or havebeen used in a support role during the conflict. The use of aninterpositional force during the preventive diplomacy processcan also be a useful de-escalation tool. The sequencing andoccupation of the ceasefire line by an interpositional forceneeds to take into consideration the following:

(1) acceptance by all parties of the presence of thepeacekeeping force;

(2) deployment along agreed demarcation lines;

(3) withdrawal of opposing forces (if not alreadyundertaken);

1–4


(4) expansion of the peacekeeping force into a buffer zoneor area of separation; and

(5) potential areas of limitation designed to prevent majorweapon systems or troop concentrations adjacent tothe buffer zone.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE NATURE OF A TRADITIONAL UNITED NATIONS MISSION

The deployment of Major George Mayes to the Middle East typifiesthe nature of a ‘traditional’ UN mission, the importance of havingobservers ‘on the spot’, and the importance of maintaining aninherent ability to respond.Born in Maryborough, Queensland, George Mayes underwentNational Service training in 1956 and subsequently served in theCitizens’ Military Forces, later Army Reserve, until 1983. At theheight of the Vietnam War, Army Reserve officers were employed onfull-time service to fill many of Australia’s UN commitments. Mayeswas Officer Commanding B Company, 42nd Battalion, The RoyalQueensland Regiment in 1972 when he was selected for duty as aUNMO with the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) fromSeptember 1972. He served as Duty Officer in Damascus and Amman, and inobservation posts (OP) along the Demarcation Line on the GolanHeights between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. In October1973 he shared duty in OP X-Ray on the Syrian side of theDemarcation Line with fellow UNMO Captain Chris Linde (SwedishArmy) and Lieutenant Mustapha Ramadan (Syrian Army liaisonofficer). Life in an OP followed the pattern of a ‘traditional’ UNmission, maintaining a presence in a self-sufficient, isolated outpostbetween former belligerents. UNMO attend to their own domesticchores whilst observing the maintenance of the cease-fireagreement and reporting violations––a relentless cycle of ‘cookingand looking’.Mayes and Linde were on duty at OP X-Ray on 06 October when aSyrian armoured division crossed the Demarcation Line at that verylocation to invade Israel, commencing the ‘Yom Kippur’ War. Thefortuitous presence of the UNMO gave the UNTSO forcecommander a unequivocal and quantitative assessment of thisbreach of the Golan Heights cease-fire, which had been in placesince the conclusion of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

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Principles 1.12

1.12 The fundamental principles that guide the military component in peaceoperations are:

a. Legitimacy—provided through a mandate issued by the UN orother regional organisation.

b. Consent—the consent and cooperation of the parties to theconflict is required to allow a peacekeeping force to deploy andcarry out its tasks.

c. Impartiality—impartiality is essential to preserving thelegitimacy of the operation and the consent of the parties.

d. Use of force—peacekeeping is ideally a non-coerciveinstrument of international diplomacy and force should only beused as a last resort to achieve the mandate. Peaceenforcement operations however, are coercive in nature andwill involve use of force although, to maintain legitimacy, forcemust be appropriate and justifiable.

Components 1.13

1.13 There will be a number of components within a particular mission area,each operating within its own sphere of competence and influence. The goalshowever should be intertwined and the efforts coordinated. Because of thelimited opportunities for these components to operate together outside of apeace operation, the relationship between the components will at times bestrained. A clear understanding of each component’s role will better facilitatethe attainment of the peace operation’s endstate.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)After a cease-fire was established between Israeli and Syrian forceson the Golan Heights, the UN Disengagement Observer Force wascreated on 06 June 1974 as an interpositional force to supervise theterms of the cease-fire. Major Mayes was one of several UNMOdetached from UNTSO to create this new force immediately uponthe cease-fire coming into effect, the ability to respond in such a waybeing an inherent capability of missions such as UNTSO.

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1.14 These various components, and the structure of contemporaryoperations, are discussed in of ADDP 3.8, chapter 1. The components whichmight typically be found in a peace operations mission include:

a. Diplomatic and political. The diplomatic component willinitially seek to broker an agreement between conflictingparties to cease armed aggression, and a peace operation maybe initiated to aid its implementation or to build confidence inthe diplomatic process. The political representative providingleadership in most UN missions is the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General (SRSG) or head of mission (HOM).

b. Civil administration. The civil administration, led by theDirector of Administration or Chief Administrative Officer,supports the SRSG or HOM in the fields of logisticsprocurement, sustainment, movement and communications.Detailed information concerning logistics can be found inchapter 3—‘Logistics support’.

c. Military. The military component will be provided by severaltroop contributing countries; in coalition operations, the termmore commonly used is troop contributing nations. The militarycomponent and ADF conduct of a peace operation isdiscussed in ADDP 3.8, chapter 5. Detailed informationconcerning legal considerations and force preparationguidance is provided in chapter 2—‘Legal considerations’ andchapter 7—‘Peace operations training’.

d. Humanitarian assistance. In almost every crisis, there will bean interdependence between the roles of the military andhumanitarian groups. Detailed information on the variety ofhumanitarian and human rights agencies can be found inchapter 4—‘Humanitarian operations and aid agencies’.

e. Civilian police. The need to restore and uphold law and orderis a growing trademark of contemporary peace operations thatdemands the expertise of international civilian police(CIVPOL). Detailed information on CIVPOL operations is inchapter 5—‘Civilian police’.

f. Electoral. Operations that are focused on nation or peacebuilding will often require a plebiscite as part of the peaceagreement. Detailed information on the electoral process ofoperations can be found in chapter 6—‘Electoral aspects ofpeace operations’.

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Missions 1.15

1.15 UN peace operations and multinational peace operations involving theADF are detailed in annexes A and B. In addition, Australian Police haveserved in a variety of UN and non-UN peace operations (see chapter 5).

1.16 In addition to peace operations, Australia has also made significantmilitary and police commitments to UN humanitarian operations, including:

a. United Nations Children’s Fund’s evacuation of SouthVietnamese orphans (1975).

b. The UN Mine Clearance Training Team in Afghanistan(1989–1993).

c. Assistance to Cambodian refugees along the Thai border(1989–1993).

d. Assistance to Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northernIraq (1991).

Annexes:A. United Nations peace operationsB. Multinational peace operations involving the Australian Defence Force

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Annex A toADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 1

UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS1A

Middle East

UNTSOUnited Nations Truce Supervision OrganisationJune 1948 to present

UNEF IFirst United Nations Emergency ForceNovember 1956 to June 1967

UNOGILUnited Nations Observer Group in LebanonJune 1958 to December 1958

UNYOMUnited Nations Yemen Observer MissionJuly 1963 to September 1964

UNFICYPUnited Nations Peacekeeping Force in CyprusMarch 1964 to present

UNEF IISecond United Nations Emergency ForceOctober 1973 to July 1979

UNDOFUnited Nations Disengagement Observer ForceJune 1974 to present

UNIFILUnited Nations Interim Force in LebanonMarch 1978 to present

UNIIMOGUnited Nations Iran-Iraq Observer GroupAugust 1988 to February 1991

UNIKOMUnited Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation MissionApril 1991 to present

1A–1

ADFP 3.8.1

1 This list does not include operations sponsored by the Department of Political Affairs (forexample, the early preventative measures in Korea, the Special Commission on Iraq, and theUnited Nations Political Office in Bougainville) or United Nations Development Programmissions (such as demining throughout the world). The Australian Defence Force has notserved in all missions noted.

Europe

UNPROFORUnited Nations Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)February 1992 to March 1995

UNOMIGUnited Nations Observer Mission in GeorgiaAugust 1993 to present

UNCROUnited Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia)March 1995 to January 1996

UNPREDEPUnited Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia)April 1995 to February 1999

UNMIBHUnited Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (incorporates International Police Task Force)December 1995 to present

UNPSGUnited Nations Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia)January 1998 to October 1998

UNTAESUnited Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western SirmiumJanuary 1996 to January 1998

UNMOPUnited Nations Mission of Observers in PrevlakaJanuary 1996 to present

UNMIKUnited Nations Interim Administration Mission in KosovoJune 1999 to present

1A–2

ADFP 3.8.1

Africa

ONUCUnited Nations Operations in the CongoJuly 1960 to June 1964

UNAVEM I, II & IIIUnited Nations Angola Verification MissionDecember 1988 to June 1997

UNTAGUnited Nations Transition Assistance GroupApril 1989 to March 1990

MINURSOUnited Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western SaharaApril 1991 to present

UNOSOM I & IIFirst & Second United Nations Operation in SomaliaApril 1992 to March 1995

ONUMOZUnited Nations Operation in MozambiqueDecember 1992 to December 1994

UNOMURUnited Nations Observer Mission Uganda-RwandaJune 1993 to September 1994

UNAMIRUnited Nations Assistance Mission for RwandaOctober 1993 to March 1996

UNOMILUnited Nations Observer Mission in LiberiaSeptember 1993 to September 1997

UNASOGUnited Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (Chad/Libya)May 1994 to June 1994

MONUAUnited Nations Observer Mission in AngolaJune 1997 to February 1999

MINURCAUnited Nations Mission in the Central African RepublicApril 1998 to February 2000

1A–3

ADFP 3.8.1

UNOMSILUnited Nations Observer Mission in Sierra LeoneJuly 1998 to October 1999

UNAMSILUnited Nations Mission in Sierra LeoneOctober 1999 to present

MONUCUnited Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoDecember 1999 to present

UNMEEUnited Nations Mission in Ethiopia and EritreaJuly 2000 to present

Asia

UNMOGIPUnited Nations Military Observer Group in India and PakistanJanuary 1949 to present

UNSFUnited Nations Security Force in West New GuineaOctober 1962 to April 1963

UNIPOMUnited Nations India-Pakistan Observation MissionSeptember 1965 to March 1966

UNGOMAPUnited Nations Good Officers Mission in Afghanistan and PakistanApril 1988 to March 1990

UNAMICUnited Nations Advance Mission in CambodiaOctober 1991 to March 1992

UNTACUnited Nations Transitional Authority in CambodiaMarch 1992 to September 1993

UNMOTUnited Nations Mission of Observers in TajikistanDecember 1994 to present

UNAMETUnited Nations Mission in East TimorJune to September 1999

1A–4

ADFP 3.8.1

UNTAETUnited Nations Transitional Administration in East TimorOctober 1999 to May 2002

UNMISETUnited Nations Mission of Support in East TimorMay 2002 to present

Americas

DOMREPMission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican RepublicMay 1965 to October 1966

ONUCAUnited Nations Observer Group in Central AmericaNovember 1989 to January 1992

ONUSALUnited Nations Observer Mission in El SalvadorJuly 1991 to April 1995

UNMIHUnited Nations Mission in HaitiSeptember 1993 to July 1996

UNSMIHUnited Nations Support Mission in HaitiJuly 1996 to July 1997

UNTMIHUnited Nations Transition Mission in HaitiAugust 1997 to November 1997

MIPONUHUnited Nations Civilian Police Mission in HaitiDecember 1997 to March 2000

MINUGUAUnited Nations Verification Mission in GuatemalaJanuary 1997 to May 1997

1A–5

Annex B toADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 1

MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCEB

1. Detailed below are the majority of Australian Defence Force (ADF)contributions to multinational force operations. This list is not definitive, andthird country deployments of individuals or small groups may not be recorded.

Middle East

MFOMultinational Force and ObserversSinai PeninsulaMarch 1982 to present (but no ADF commitment 1987–92)

MIFMultinational Interception ForceGulf RegionSeptember 1990 to present (several breaks in the RAN contribution)

IraqThere have been numerous operations involving ADF members, including humanitarian relief (Operation HABITAT, May to June 1991) and contributions to the no-fly zone operation.

Europe

SFOR/KFORStabilisation Force/Kosovo ForceBosnia-Herzegovina, KosovoJanuary 1997 to present

Africa

CMFCommonwealth Monitoring ForceRhodesiaDecember 1979 to March 1980

UNITAFUnified Task ForceSomaliaDecember 1992 to May 1993

1B–1

ADFP 3.8.1

2. This list does not include support to peace building/capacitydevelopment activities undertaken within the same area of operations as aUnited Nations or multi-national force operation. This includes:

a. Australian Training Support Team—East Timor, operating inEast Timor contiguous with the United Nations (UN)Transitional Administration in East Timor/UN Mission ofSupport in East Timor.

b. International Military Advisory and Training Team—theBritish-led organisation working with the Sierra Leone armedforces and the United Nations peacekeeping force UNAMSIL(UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone).

Asia

SPPKFSouth Pacific Peace Keeping ForceBougainvilleSeptember to October 1994

TMGTruce Monitoring GroupBougainvilleNovember 1997 to April 1998

PMGPeace Monitoring GroupBougainvilleApril 1998 to present

INTERFETInternational Force East TimorEast TimorSeptember 1999 to February 2001

IPMTInternational Peace Monitoring TeamSolomon IslandsNovember 2000 to July 2002

1B–2


CHAPTER 2

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 2

1

Introduction 2.1

2.1 Australian participation in peace operations raises a host of often verycomplex legal considerations. These range from contractual support for thepeace operation, through force status issues in host nations, to the law ofarmed conflict (LOAC).

A good legal advisor is a force multiplier, and will assist you inaccomplishing your mission in a lawful manner.

Handbook for Peace Operations (USA)1

Executive summary

• The mandate will influence the nature of the peace operation, andprovide specified and implied tasks.

• Rules of engagement result from the complex interaction of legalconstraints, Australian Government policy, United Nations (UN)and/or coalition policy and operational requirements.

• The mandate will contribute to determining the circumstances inwhich force can be used, and to the development of mission-specificrules of engagement.

• Use of force is commonly divided between that used for self-defenceand that employed for mission accomplishment. Members of theAustralian Defence Force (ADF) will always have the right ofindividual and unit self-defence. Use of force for missionaccomplishment will depend on the nature of the peace operation.

• A status of forces agreement (SOFA) applicable to ADF forces maybe concluded between the UN and the host nation or, wherecircumstances allow, between the host nation and the AustralianGovernment.

1 Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations, USA, 16 June 1997,p IX–2.

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2.2 These legal considerations will impact on many aspects of theplanning and execution of peace operations, and will be as extensive as thosetraditional considerations impacting on armed conflict. The relevance of thevarious considerations will be determined by the nature of the peaceoperation contemplated, the extent of Australian and allied involvement, andthe location of the operation. Such complexity necessitates the involvementof The Defence Legal Service (TDLS) at the earliest stages of planning for aproposed peace operation.

2.3 This chapter will outline the more important legal considerations whichwill impact on the planning and execution of peace operations by the ADF2.

LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS 2.4

2.4 The legal basis for a peace operation refers to an operation’s legalauthority under either domestic or international law. In the Australiandomestic sense, the legal basis for any military operation will be foundprimarily in the executive’s prerogative power under sections 2 and 61 of theCommonwealth Constitution. This chapter deals predominantly with the legalbasis under international law.

2.5 Establishing the correct legal basis in international law is fundamentalto the planning and subsequent execution of all types of peace operations.The legal basis for the operation, often referred to as the ‘mandate’, willinfluence the nature of the peace operation and determine the scope ofauthority to act towards mission accomplishment.

2.6 Further, the legal basis for the operation will assist in determiningspecified and implied tasks, and in the resolution of many legal issues thatarise during the conduct of the operation such as the status of participatingmilitary forces and the mission rules of engagement (ROE). Notwithstandingthat the legal basis will be determined and articulated at the strategic level,understanding the legal basis for a peace operation is fundamental toplanning at the operational and tactical levels.

2 See also Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.8—Peace Operations, chapter3—‘The authority to act’.

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LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE DURING A PEACE OPERATION 2.7

Mission accomplishment and the use of force 2.7

2.7 As peace operations inevitably attract considerable public attention,ensuring that the military component does not exceed the limits of its mandatebecomes an issue of enormous importance, particularly in relation to the useof force. The use of unnecessary force is unlawful, and tends to underminethe moral authority of the operation, which would inevitably compromise theachievement of mission objectives. For convenience, the use of force byarmed forces is commonly divided between that used in self-defence and thatemployed for mission accomplishment.

2.8 Self-defence. Notwithstanding the relatively benign environment thatmay characterise many peace operations, members of the ADF will alwayshave the right of individual and unit self-defence. This right will applywhenever ADF members are deployed overseas. The right is expressed asenabling ADF units to spontaneously defend themselves and other ADFmembers against actual armed attack, or threats of armed attack. Actionstaken in self-defence must be necessary and proportionate to the threatfaced. More detail on the right of self-defence is contained inADDP 06.1—Rules of Engagement.

2.9 Force used in mission accomplishment. Whether the use of forcecan be authorised in circumstances not justifying acts in self-defence willdepend largely on the nature of the peace operation. As peace operationsgenerally involve an attempt to reduce tension, use of lethal force will typicallyonly be authorised in self-defence. This will ordinarily be the case in atraditional peacekeeping operation. There may however be circumstances,typically in peace enforcement operations, where lethal force is authorised formission accomplishment. Although uncommon, this may also beaccompanied by a declaration of certain forces as ‘hostile’, therebyauthorising engagement of these forces upon identification.

2.10 The use of non-lethal force, while an ostensibly less volatile issue,tends to be similarly complicated. Non-lethal force may be required forexample to restore law and order, to protect certain classes of civilians or inthe supervision of elections, and may include power to search and arrest, therestriction of movement or the placement of barricades. The decision toauthorise the use of force will be affected by many legal considerationsincluding host nation laws and international human rights, and will be strictlydefined in the issued ROE.

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Rules of engagement 2.11

2.11 ROE are lawful military orders endorsed by Government and issuedby commanders, which delineate the circumstances and limitations withinwhich armed force may be applied by the ADF to achieve military objectivesin furtherance of Australian Government policy. ROE result from the complexinteraction of legal constraints, Australian Government policy, UN and/orcoalition policy and operational requirements.3 The UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations has issued provisional guidelines for thedevelopment of ROE for UN peacekeeping operations. These guidelinescontain basic UN doctrine on the drafting and use of ROE by UN forces duringa peace operation. A summary of these guidelines is in annex A.

2.12 Influence of the mandate. The drafting of ROE for peace operationswill be influenced by factors similar to those that shape ROE for moretraditional military operations. In relation to peace operations, the mandate orUN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) will be the most influential factor indetermining the circumstances in which ADF members can use force andconsequently, will contribute considerably to the development ofmission-specific ROE. This is particularly the case where the operationinvolves a ‘humanitarian relief’ element that has to be combined with moretraditional military tasks.

2.13 Coalition issues. As peace operations will generally involve two ormore nations in coalition, the ROE authorised will have to satisfy the politicaland legal requirements of all participants. Consideration must also be madeof the need for each individual participating state to approve and issue ROEin accordance with their own domestic practice. In light of these difficulties,the practice has developed for participating states to draft and implementnational ROE, which takes cognisance of unique legal and politicalrequirements but are no less restrictive than the ROE issued by the forcecommander for application to all national contingents.

2.14 Security issues. There is a need for operational security in order toprotect ROE details becoming common knowledge amongst belligerentparties in the theatre of operations. Such measures will avoid the practice ofbelligerents testing peace operations forces beyond the approved use offorce levels.

3 ADF doctrine on ROE is contained in ADDP 06.1 and ADDP 06.2—Rules ofEngagement—Operational Rules.

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Status of deployed forces 2.15

2.15 Generally, where a military force enters the territory of another stateother than during an armed conflict, it will be subject to that state’s law andjurisdiction. Consequently, members of the ADF participating in a peaceoperation could be brought before the courts of another state in relation to civilmatters or for alleged criminal offences.

2.16 The application of host nation law however can be modified by way ofagreement. Criminal and civil matters, as well as a vast array of otherconcerns including liability to pay taxation and other duties can be addressedin bilateral or multilateral agreements referred to as SOFA.

2.17 A SOFA applicable to ADF forces deploying on a peace operation maybe concluded between the UN and the host nation (and applicable tomembers of national contingents) or, where circumstances allow, betweenthe host nation and the Australian Government. The SOFA is a legalagreement between governments and, as such, will take time and effort tonegotiate to a mutually-acceptable state.

2.18 Among other matters, the SOFA may also address:

a. rights of entry and exit;

b. freedom of movement in the host nation;

c. the right to carry weapons on host nation territory;

d. the right to administer the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982(DFDA) in relation to members of the deployed force; and

e. the allocation of liability for damages caused by members ofthe force deployed.

Rights, privileges and immunities 2.19

2.19 In the absence of an agreement such as a SOFA specifying theimmunities of the deployed force from host nation law, certain rights andprivileges may be invoked by international conventions. The Convention onthe Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946 and the Conventionon the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994, both providevarying levels of immunity to specific classes of person, including UN civiliansand some non-government organisation (NGO) personnel.

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2.20 The privileges and immunities outlined in the Convention on thePrivileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946 may be invoked byagreement between Australia and the UN for operations overseas. This wasthe case in relation to East Timor:

a. Firstly, the provisions of the Convention were invoked for thebenefit of International Force East Timor (INTERFET) throughan Exchange of Notes between Australia and Indonesia(24 September 1999).

b. Secondly, there was an Exchange of Notes constituting anArrangement between the Government of Australia and UnitedNations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)applying to the activities of the multinational force operatingunder unified command structure in East Timor from26 October 1999.

2.21 In the rare case where no SOFA can be negotiated and the provisionsof the conventions mentioned above cannot be imported to the operation,members of a military force will be subject to host nation laws.

2.22 Further, while the Australian national contingent will be subject toAustralian laws via the extra-territorial operation of the DFDA, the Australiancontingent commander will only be permitted to exercise primary jurisdictionover ADF members with the consent of the host nation. Advice will beprovided by TDLS to the Australian national contingent on the application ofhost nation laws and the exercise of jurisdiction under the DFDA in that hostnation.

2.23 Conversely, a UN or coalition force may be deployed into a nationwhose legal system, because of conflict or other emergency, has beendegraded to the point that it is unable to function effectively. This was the caseduring the ADF deployment as part of Unified Task Force (UNITAF) inSomalia and to an extent as part of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

2.24 Whether the UN force is authorised to undertake the administration ofjustice in the host nation, will depend largely on the extent of the mandate oron whether the force could be regarded as an occupying force in accordancewith the spirit and principles of international humanitarian law (IHL).4

4 During the INTERFET deployment, the spirit and principles of the law of occupation wereapplied as a matter of policy and, in conjunction with UNSCR 1264, were relied on toestablish an interim justice system.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MANDATES, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS, AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Some UN operations in recent times have demonstrated how thestrength or weakness of a mandate, SOFA and mission-specificROE can influence the success or otherwise of a peace operation. The UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM 1), 1992–1993, wasestablished by the UNSC to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, toprovide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment andsupplies at the seaports and airports, and to escort deliveries ofhumanitarian assistance (HA) supplies to distribution centres. Themission was unsuccessful because its initial mandate under ChapterVI was not robust enough, and did not allow the mission to provideadequate protection for the HA convoys. UNOSOM 1 had to bereplaced by a US-led coalition (UNITAF) which had a robustmandate and adequate ROE. UNITAF was then succeeded byUNOSOM 2 (1993–1995), a Chapter VII UN mission authorised touse enforcement measures to establish throughout Somalia asecure environment for HA operations. This mission included civilianpolice personnel, and implemented judicial processes and a policeforce. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1993–1996, wasestablished to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement and ensurethe security of Kigali. It was also established under Chapter VI of theUN Charter, which provided the force with inadequate powers. Inaddition, the lack of commitment by some troop contributing nationsdemonstrated a significant weakness in the SOFA. As a result, in1994 the UN dedicated a period of some 30 days for theestablishment of safe areas for the Hutu people, and this task wasundertaken by the French with the use of force authorised underChapter VII. UN mandates generally do not provide for security force activityoutside the boundaries of the host nation, and this provides asignificant planning consideration. In September 2000, a series ofarmed militia attacks against East Timorese people in refugeecamps in West Timor culminated in the murder of three UN staffmembers in Atambua, and HA efforts in the region were suspended.Without the government of Indonesia taking immediate steps toensure safety and security in the refugee camps and forhumanitarian workers, the Peacekeeping Force of theUNTAET—restricted to operations east of the border—waspowerless to intervene.

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Command and discipline 2.25

2.25 As peace operations can involve a variety of national militarycontingents, UN civilians, NGO representatives and locally engagedpersonnel, the question of command will often be contentious. Theappropriate command and control structure will depend largely on the natureof the operation contemplated and the extent of the authority granted by theUN Security Council. The issue of command and control is discussed inADDP 3.8, chapter 3.

2.26 Notwithstanding the higher level command arrangements, membersof the Australian national contingent will always be part of the ADF chain ofcommand and will always be subject to the discipline arrangementsestablished pursuant to the DFDA. Ordinarily, a senior Australian commanderin the theatre/mission area will be appointed to safeguard Australian nationalinterests and will be given national command over the contingent.5

2.27 The Australian contingent to a peace operation will ordinarily beassigned to the force commander under ‘operational control’, allowing fortasking by a foreign commander for the accomplishment of specific missionsor tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location. Care should betaken by the Australian national commander to ensure that the foreigncommander does not attempt to give deployed ADF elements missions whichmay exceed the limitations of the mission as approved by the AustralianGovernment. Relationships between the forces of participating states can beregulated by way of agreement.6

2.28 Civilian contractors. Contractors providing goods and services to theUN mission or individual national contingents are not regarded as a part of themission unless they are fully integrated into the Australian contingent andhave accepted the status of ‘Defence civilian’ in accordance with the DFDA.

2.29 International Committee of the Red Cross. Notwithstanding thestatus of NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross and RedCrescent (ICRC) has a unique mandate under international law. As outlinedin the Geneva Conventions, this mandate includes the provision ofhumanitarian relief during all forms of conflict or emergency as well as theauthority to visit prisoners-of-war and detained persons. The ICRC also hasa general responsibility for the promotion of IHL (refer ADDP 06.4—Law ofArmed Conflict). The presence of the ICRC during a peace operation shouldbe expected, and cooperation with ICRC representatives should be

5 ‘National Command’ is defined as a command that is organised by, and functions under theauthority of a specific nation.

6 During the INTERFET deployment, command relationships were specifically addressed inthe Agreement on Participation in the International Force East Timor.

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coordinated by planning staff. The role and responsibility of the ICRC iscovered in more detail in chapter 4—‘Humanitarian operations and aidagencies’.

Law of Armed Conflict in peace operations 2.30

2.30 The application or otherwise of LOAC is a vitally important preliminaryquestion when planning a peace operation. LOAC is necessarily onlyapplicable in strictly defined circumstances and accordingly its impact willdepend on the nature of the operation contemplated.

2.31 Generally, LOAC applies only to the participants in an international orinternal armed conflict—whether those participants recognise themselves asbeing in an armed conflict or not—and only to the extent that individualparticipating states are bound by LOAC. This is a question of fact, based uponthe level of intensity of the conflict and not political assertion. Consequently,the authorisation of an operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,although indicative, will not of itself determine whether LOAC applies to UNor coalition forces.

2.32 A prominent indicator of whether LOAC applies will be the extent towhich the use of force is authorised in accomplishment of the mission. Amandate authorising only limited powers may signify that LOAC does notapply to a UN or coalition force acting in accomplishment of its mission,notwithstanding that LOAC does apply between the parties to the originalconflict. This was the case when the UN Protection Force deployed to Croatiapursuant to UNSCR 749.

2.33 However, in 1999, the UN Secretary-General issued a bulletin on theobservance of LOAC by UN forces. This bulletin provides not only guidanceon the application of the LOAC to forces conducting operations under directUN command and control, but also extensive guidance on the interpretationof the principles of LOAC that may apply.7

2.34 Further, in situations where LOAC may not technically apply to UN orcoalition forces, the Australian Government (as a matter of policy) may directthe national contingent to comply with the principles and spirit of LOAC (to theextent relevant in the circumstances). Further detail on the application ofLOAC is contained in ADDP 06.4.

Human rights in peace operations 2.35

2.35 Human rights law recognises and articulates those rights thatindividuals possess, relative to those in authority. Such rights can only bedetracted from in well-defined circumstances. This will have a direct effect on

7 Secretary-General of the United Nations Bulletin, of 19 August 1999.

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how a UN or coalition force deployed on a peace operation relates to civilianspresent in the host nation’s territory—including refugees and internallydisplaced persons.

2.36 The impact of human rights will be more keenly felt where broaderpowers are authorised under the mandate—particularly where the UN orcoalition force is authorised to conduct law enforcement operations. Adviceon the extent of the application of human rights law will be provided by TDLS.

2.37 Some human rights however, are regarded as fundamental and arerequired to be respected at all times, including the right to life, the prohibitionon torture and slavery, and the right to certain judicial guarantees. Many ofthese principles had considerable influence on the INTERFET operation,including the force’s arrest and detention policy.

OTHER OPERATIONS LAW CONSIDERATIONS 2.38

2.38 A number of other legal issues may arise during the planning andconduct of any peace operation. These matters will not differ greatly fromthose that would ordinarily impact on any other type of ADF operation andaccordingly, will not be discussed in detail in this publication. Such mattersmay include:

a. Navigational issues. This may include passage throughdesignated waterways and overflight of national airspace. Itmay also include the assumption of control of airspace by theUN or coalition force as was the case for UNITAF in Somaliaand INTERFET in East Timor.8

b. Environmental law. This may include the interpretation ofinternational treaties as well as the extra-territorial effect ofAustralian domestic legislation.

c. Commercial law matters. This may typically include themanagement of commercial contracts for supply of logisticsupport, the interpretation of logistic support arrangementswith friendly states, the employment of local staff and themanagement of claims made against the force by host nationnationals.

8 Navigational issues are discussed in detail in Australian Book of Reference 5179—Manual ofInternational Law and in AAP 1003—Operations Law for RAAF Commanders.

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d. Telecommunications law. The establishment and operationof many forms of communications networks are governed byinternational treaties, some of which impose restrictions ontheir use by armed forces.9

e. The International Criminal Court. As Australia is a party tothe Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),Australian forces may also fall under the jurisdiction of the ICCfor the commission of crimes against humanity or war crimeswhere Australia has not undertaken investigation orprosecution for these offences. It is an offence under the RomeStatute to attack a UN peacekeeper, and it is also an offenceto misuse UN symbols.

Annex:A. Summary of guidelines for the development of rules of engagement for

United Nations peacekeeping operations

9 For example, the International Maritime Satellite Organisation (INMARSAT) Conventionstates its purpose is to provide mobile satellite communications for ‘peaceful purposes’. TheInternational Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (INTELSAT) agreement provides forthe use of INTELSAT satellites for ‘specialised telecommunications services’, but only for‘other than military purposes’.

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SUMMARY OF GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS1

A

Introduction 1

1. United Nations (UN) rules of engagement (ROE) provide theparameters within which armed military personnel assigned to UNPeacekeeping operations may use force. They ensure that the use of force byUN armed military personnel is undertaken in accordance with the purposesof the UN Charter, the UN Security Council mandate and the relevantprinciples of international law, including the laws of armed conflict. The ROEalso assist the force commander (FC) in implementing the military objectivesof the mandate of a peacekeeping operation pursuant to the pertinent UNSecurity Council Resolutions (UNSCR).

Context 2.2

2. These guidelines are an essential element of the UN military planningprocess and operating procedures for peacekeeping operations, therebyassisting the development of ROE for a new peacekeeping operation. It isintended that the document will provide simple and informative direction,which will not only expedite the production of ROE for peacekeepingoperations but may also be used for generic training purposes.

Aim 2.3

3. The aim of these guidelines is to ensure consistency in thedevelopment and implementation of ROE for peacekeeping operations.

Limitations 2.4

4. Any UN guideline(s) or directive(s) in no way restricts an individual’sinherent right to act in self-defence.

Rules of engagement amendment or change 2.5

5. ROE can only be amended or changed with the authority of theUnder-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

1 Abridged from UN Document MD/FGS/0220.0001 (May 2002).

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ADFP 3.8.1

Review 2.6

6. This document and all its attachments have been reviewed by both,the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Office of LegalAffairs. Therefore, in preparing mission-specific ROE, if changes to thelanguage of any part of the proposed text are deemed necessary, theproposed changes must be subject to the same review procedures. As aroutine review/revision, these guidelines and attached sample ROE will berevised and updated annually by the Military Division, taking into account allcomments and observations of the DPKO Office of Operations and the Officeof Legal Affairs on mission-specific ROE during this period. Any suggestionsmade by troop contributing countries will also be taken into account during therevision. The Military Division will provide a copy of the revised guidelines andsample ROE, duly approved by the Under-Secretary-General forPeacekeeping Operations, to the Office of Operations and the Training andEvaluation Service of DPKO, and the Office of Legal Affairs, after all periodicreviews/revisions. A copy of all approved mission-specific ROE must beprovided to the Office of Legal Affairs.

Use of sample rules of engagement for training purposes 2.7

7. The Training and Evaluation Service will provide these guidelines andsample ROE to troop contributing countries for generic training of their troopsfor peacekeeping duties. It must be clearly mentioned that, whereas sampleROE may be used for generic training purposes they do not substitute themission-specific ROE. Whenever a country decides to contribute armedtroops to a peacekeeping operation, these troops must receive adequateinformation and training about the approved ROE for that particular mission.

Summary 2.8

8. ROE are one of the key documents in any peacekeeping operation. Itis essential that they are unambiguous and easy to use. Although thisinstruction defines what should be included in future ROE for specificpeacekeeping operations, adjustments may have to be made if so required.

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ADFP 3.8.1

SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS MASTER LIST OF NUMBERED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 2.9

SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FORMAT 2.10

Rule 1—Use of Force (Rules 1.1–1.10)

Rule 2—Use of Weapons Systems (Rules 2.1–2.6)

Rule 3—Authority to Carry Weapons (Rules 3.1–3.6)

Rule 4—Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm (Rules 4.1–4.5)

Rule 5—Reaction to Civil Action/Unrest (Rules 5.1–5.2)

Introduction

Authority

Mission

Execution of ROE

Principles

General

Self-defence

Applicability

Responsibility of the FC and subordinate commanders

ROE contravention

Security classification

ROE changes

Revocation

Annexes

a. Authorised numbered ROE for the mission

UNSCR

Specific ROE for mission

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ADFP 3.8.1

b. UN definitions (for use with UN ROE)

Civil unrest

Collateral damage

Cordon

Detainee

Force

Armed force

Deadly force

Non-deadly force

Minimum force

Unarmed force

Hostile act

Hostile intent

Loaded weapon

Positive identification

Proportionality

Reasonable belief

Self-defence

Unloaded weapon

UN personnel

Other international personnel

Warning shots

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ADFP 3.8.1

c. Supporting directions and procedures

General

Identification

Prohibitions

Cordon principles

Warning procedures

Graduation

Verbal negotiation and/or visual demonstration

Unarmed force

Charge weapons

Warning shots

Armed force

Opening fire without warning

Firing procedures

Procedures after firing

Medical assistance

Recording

Reporting

Search and apprehension procedures

Authority to stop and search

Search procedure

Authority to apprehend and detain

Treatment of detainees

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ADFP 3.8.1

d. UN peace keeping operations weapons states

General

Graduated weapon states

State 1—Weapons

State 2—Heavy machine guns

State 3—Mortars

State 4—Recoilless rifles and rocket launchers

State 5—Vehicle mounted weapons

State 6—Aircraft/helicopter-mounted weapons

State 7—Vessel-mounted weapons

State 8—Infra-red and laser equipment

State 9—Riot control equipment and weapons

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CHAPTER 3

LOGISTICS SUPPORT 3

1

Introduction 3.1

3.1 The deployment of military forces for operations requires the provisionof considerable logistics support to ensure and maintain their capability. Theestablishment and maintenance of a peace operation is no different. Logisticsis an essential element of any peace operation deployment.

3.2 For UN missions, the UN has its own logistics infrastructure whichplans new missions and coordinates support for existing and new missionsfrom member nations. The UN relies on a combination of the inherent logisticssupport provided by of individual nations, and common support provided to alltroop contributing countries (TCC).

Apart from the normal Combat Service Support (CSS) functions, certain[peace operations], especially those with a humanitarian focus, will bealmost entirely of a logistic nature.

Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 (UK)1

Executive summary

• The United Nations (UN) logistics system relies on a combination ofthe inherent logistics support of troop contributing countries andcommon support that is provided to all contributing nations.

• Multinational forces generally rely on one of the coalition forcestaking the lead for logistics support.

• The UN mission logistics support system supports all involved UNelements, not just the military/peacekeeping component.

• A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between nations, orbetween a nation and the UN, will identify the equipment, personneland self-sustainment requirements, and detail the maintenancesupport arrangements of that equipment and who is responsible forit.

1 Joint Warfare Publication 3–50—Peace Support Operations, UK, p 5–20.

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3.3 On the other hand, peace operations conducted by coalitionmultinational forces (MNF) generally rely on one of the troop contributingnations (TCN) taking the lead on logistics support.

Scope 3.4

3.4 This chapter will focus on the logistic support of peacekeepingmissions, and will define the UN logistics organisation, its structure,terminology and the concepts of logistics support. It will define theresponsibilities of the UN and TCC with respect to a peace operationdeployment.

UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS 3.5

Definition 3.5

3.5 The UN definition of logistics is:

Logistics covers all aspects of the needs and physical support formissions to be carried out. This covers finances, supplies,transportation, technical support and housing needs, as well asadministrative, communications, engineering and aviationservices.

Structure 3.6

3.6 UN logistics is structured on the Office of Mission Support (OMS) ofthe Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).2 The role of this officeis the overall coordination of all administrative and logistic support activitiesfor field missions, including staffing, finance, logistics and procurement. Itcomprises the Administration Division and the Logistics Support Division, andalso operates the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi in southern Italy.

3.7 The Chief Administration Officer (CAO) is the head logistician on a UNmission. The CAO is appointed by and is responsible to DPKO for all missionlogistics functions. The CAO is normally a civilian, permanent (professional)employee of the UN Secretariat rather than a military officer of any nationalcontingent.

2 OMS was previously the Field Administration and Logistics Division. DPKO’s structure isdetailed in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.8—Peace Operations,chapter 2.

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Concepts 3.8

3.8 The UN’s logistics responsibilities in mounting a peacekeepingmission are as follows:

a. To ensure that the peacekeeping mission is provided with theappropriate personnel and equipment required to fulfil itsmandate.

b. To ensure that the troop-contributors provide personnel,equipment and services as detailed in the specific MOUbetween them and the UN.

c. To ensure that the contingents perform according to theestablished standards.

3.9 The UN logistics mandate is based on integration and coordination ofthe various types and sources of available logistics support. In addition, UNlogistics support to missions incorporates the complex, multi-dimensionalapproach of the UN to the mission. This means the mission logistics supportsystem supports all UN elements to varying extents, not just themilitary/DPKO component.

3.10 The principles for the UN’s provision of logistic support for TCC aresimplicity, accountability and financial and management control.

3.11 These principles are achieved through the following means:

a. Reduction of the administrative burden on troop-contributors,the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions.

b. Standardisation of reimbursement rates on an equitable basis.

c. Standardisation of standards to be applied to equipment andservices to be provided.

d. Establishment of prior agreements between the UN and theTCC for the leasing of major equipment and the provision ofservice personnel and self-sustainment. Any equipment,personnel and services above those agreed are to be providedas the sole responsibility of the TCC and are not subject toreimbursement by the UN.

3.12 This system is focused on management rather than accounting forcontingent-owned equipment. It is performance driven, and provides fortransparency of deployment as well as accountability, and enables MemberStates to appreciate their commitment to peacekeeping at the outset, thus

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leading to simplified budgeting and reimbursement. A further key benefit isthat missions will be able to implement an integrated management structurein the field.

Logistic support 3.13

3.13 There are three basic concepts of UN logistics support to missions:

a. Self-reliance concept. The mission has reliance on the localeconomy; this is particularly used for small missions (such asmilitary observer missions).

b. Lead Member State concept:

(1) For smaller missions, the lead member may assumeresponsibility for all logistic support. Other nations’contingents would rely on the lead Member State fortheir logistic support needs.

(2) For larger missions, one Member State assumesoverall responsibility for coordination of all logisticselements—grouped under a Force Logistic SupportGroup (FLSG). The FLSG comprises specialisedsupport units in areas such as signals, air transport,engineers, supply, ground transport, movement control,postal and medical (other aspects, such as catering andfuel, are arranged and provided centrally by the FLSG).

c. Commercial sources. The overall aim for the logistics supportof any UN mission is to progress to the most economicalmeans of support—this generally means a reliance oncommercial sources, rather than any TCC logistics capability orthe inherent UN system (such as supporting from UNLBBrindisi).

3.14 For major equipment provided by a TCC (‘contingent ownedequipment’), the UN provides support to that equipment through acombination of ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ lease arrangements, as follows:

a. Wet lease. The TCC itself provides the major equipment itemsand all maintenance. Under a wet lease, contingents areresponsible for:

(1) maintenance;

(2) warehousing;

(3) repairs;

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(4) labour;

(5) resupply/shipment; and

(6) equipment replacement.

b. Dry lease. The TCC provides the major equipment only, and isto deploy with serviceable equipment. The UN maintains theequipment, and provides maintenance by:

(1) commercial contract;

(2) UN employed personnel; or

(3) from another contingent’s capability.

Spare parts are provided either from commercial sources or viaa letter of assist (LOA), see below.

Equipment 3.15

3.15 The equipment utilised on a UN mission may come from a variety ofsources. Of most direct relevance to a TCC is contingent owned equipment,but equipment may also be UN-owned (for example: transferred from otherUN missions), come from ‘host nation support’ (such as buildings or fixedinfrastructure/plant) or be provided through commercial sources.

Contingent owned equipment 3.16

3.16 Contingent owned equipment (COE) is that equipment required by aTCC to support its own or other agreed forces deployed on a peace operation.The range and quantity of equipment must be agreed to by the UN to ensurereimbursement, and the supply of the agreed items into theatre is verified byUN inspection prior to reimbursement being authorised.

3.17 In 1996, the UN COE Manual3 was authorised by the UN GeneralAssembly to be a means for determining reimbursement to Member States forCOE, replacing the previous methodology whereby troop-contributors werereimbursed based on in and out surveys and depreciation of equipment.

3.18 The scope of the UN COE Manual primarily covers the administrative,logistics and financial aspects related to contingent-owned equipment (majorequipment and self-sustainment). It contains the policies, procedures and

3 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of ContingentOwned Equipment of Troop-contributors participating in Peacekeeping Missions (UN COEManual), 25 April 2001 (approved by UN General Assembly Resolution 50/222 of11 April 1996).

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actions to be followed by the UN Headquarters and missions, and is intendedto provide assistance to TCC to ensure that the intent of the UN GeneralAssembly is fully and consistently implemented.

3.19 One of the key aims of the UN COE Manual however, is to facilitatethe preparation of a MOU for the deployment of troops and equipment to apeacekeeping operation. To facilitate this, the UN COE Manual containsinformation relating to deployment/re-deployment of personnel, proceduresfor death and disability claims, painting/repainting claims, inlandtransportation claims, and provision of goods and services to contingents bythe UN.

3.20 The UN COE Manual should be read in conjunction with other relateddocuments such as the UN Operation Support Manual, the StandbyArrangements in the Service of Peace, Table of Organizations andEquipment (1998) and mission-specific directives and guidelines produced byDPKO or the UN General Assembly/UN Security Council. In the event of anydiscrepancy between the UN COE Manual and the documents of the UNGeneral Assembly, the resolution/reports approved by the General Assemblyshall prevail.

3.21 Special case equipment. Special case equipment is equipmentwhich, because of its nature or cost, is not identified in the UN COE Manual.In general, a ‘special case’ requirement exists for aircraft, medical and dentalequipment, naval vessels and specialist communications equipment. Thisequipment is provided under a LOA.

3.22 Self-sustainment. Minor equipment and consumables not directlyrelated to major equipment can be reimbursed as ‘self-sustainment’ servicesbased on troop strength. Self-sustainment services are defined as thoseservices, which the UN requests a TCC to provide for its contingent deployingto the mission area. Self-sustainment categories are not subject toaccountability upon entry into and departure from the mission area, but ratherto verification and inspection to ensure that they meet the agreed standardsand mandate of the contingent.

3.23 Only those services specifically requested by the UN arereimbursable. These services are defined within the MOU or LOA asapplicable. When a contingent provides less major equipment orself-sustainment than that stipulated in the MOU, the troop-contributor will bereimbursed only for actual numbers.

Verification and control for contingent owned equipment 3.24

3.24 Arrival inspection. The UN Mission Inspection Team, under theauthority of the Chief Administration Officer (CAO), inspects the TCCdeployed equipment within one month of arrival into the area of operations.

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The inspection is designed to ensure the categories, groups and numbers ofequipment delivered into theatre correspond to the contributionagreement/MOU between the UN and TCC.

3.25 Readiness inspection. Operational readiness inspections areconducted by the mission inspection team at least once during the mandateof the contingent in the mission area and at least once every six months. Theinspection is intended to ensure the equipment is operational and being usedin accordance with the contribution agreement. This inspection is used tovalidate the contingent’s capability in accordance with the MOU and is usedto commence the monthly reimbursement process from UN Headquarters.

3.26 Repatriation inspection. This is conducted by the mission inspectionteam at the time of the repatriation of the contingent or component thereof.The inspection shall verify and account for all of the contingent’s majorequipment and ensure UN equipment remains in the mission area.

3.27 Inspection reports. In each instance following an inspection, aninspection report is forwarded to DPKO/OMS to progress reimbursementpayments to the TCC.

3.28 Support documentation. Support documentation is required toconfirm the equipment and personnel to be deployed into a mission area. Thisdocumentation details which organisation is responsible for various supportfunctions for the TCC contingent in the mission area. Further, it is required toensure the reimbursement of the troop contributing country by the UN viaDPKO/OMS. Support documentation includes:

a. Status of forces agreement. This is a legal agreementbetween nations defining the rights of personnel and conditionsof deployment to that country. It includes, inter alia, powers ofarrest and charging, freedom of movement conditions and therequirement to pay taxes and tariffs.

b. Memorandum of understanding. This is an equipment andsupport agreement between nations or a nation and the UN. Itidentifies the COE, personnel and self-sustainmentrequirements, and details the maintenance supportarrangements of that equipment and who is responsible for it.An MOU eliminates the need for detailed surveys ofequipment, spare parts and consumables, and puts theemphasis on the TCC for asset management. A model MOU isprovided in chapter 9 of the UN COE Manual.

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c. Letter of assist. This is an agreement between the TCC andUN for essential items or services not available from normalsources of supply and where a contingents nationalgovernment is the only logical source of supply and the itemsor services are not covered by the contingents COE MOU.

3.29 Reimbursement. Reimbursement to TCC is made in accordance withchapter 8 of the UN COE Manual.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—AUSTRALIAN LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS

The UN looks to countries with sophisticated armed forces to providespecialist support for its forces—any country can provide infantry,but logistics and communications elements are scarce commodities.This burden was long shouldered by Canada, until the 1980s whenit decided that the continuing disruption to its own force support hadbecome unacceptable. Australia is well regarded by the UN as acompetent all-rounder, and during the early discussions towards aresolution of the conflict in Namibia, a request was made forAustralia to provide the logistics support for the planned transitionforce. Whilst complimentary, this request was met with somereluctance by Army, both because of the preference to deploycombat units (which had been homebound for ten years) and theneglected status of the logistic support units which made such acommitment fraught with risk. The ideal compromise was anengineer construction squadron (1989–1990), with a parallelengineer presence in the mine clearance training team inAfghanistan (1989–1993).

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE LOGISTICS 3.30

3.30 Peace operations conducted by coalition MNF generally rely on one ofthe TCN taking the lead on logistics support. This lead would be structuredsimilar to the UN’s logistics lead Member State concept discussed in thischapter. Similar to the UN logistics system, coalition force member nationsrely on a combination of their own logistics support system plus the logisticslead nation.

3.31 Detail on logistics and administrative information requirements andplanning guidance in multinational military operations is contained in theMultinational Interoperability Council’s Coalition Building Guide4

4 Refer Australian Defence Force Publication 00.3.1—Multinational Interoperability CouncilCoalition Building Guide.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)A movement control unit was provided by Australia to ForceHeadquarters for the control of relief operations in Somalia(1992–1993). From this point on, the demonstrated competence ofthe movement control elements, and the relative economy of such anational contribution, made this a regular component of subsequentUN forces. In addition, the successful deployments of medical(Somalia, 1992–1995) and communications (Western Sahara,1991–1994 and Cambodia, 1991–1993) elements have provided awidening base for ongoing Australian Defence Force (ADF)contributions in those fields. Air transport support in support of UNmissions was initiated with a flight of CC–08 Caribou on thePakistan-India border (1975–1980). Since then, elements of all threeServices have made direct contributions to UN and othermultinational peacekeeping forces, or have flown missionssupporting ADF elements. Major peacemaking actions are few in comparison to missionsfacilitating settlements and protection of humanitarian aid. TheInternational Force East Timor (INTERFET) mission in East Timor(1999 to 2000), led by Australia both operationally and logistically,was a prime example of such facilitation missions. For the majorityof operations however, the ADF contribution will be small andspecialised, drawing on the expertise of the support and logisticsresources of the ADF in joint and single-Service organisations.

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3.32 For NATO-led operations, logistic principles are detailed in therelevant NATO Military Committee publications5.

3.33 In the case of an MNF (non-UN) peace operation where the ADF is thelogistics Lead Nation, normal ADF operational logistics and coalition doctrinewould be the basis of the logistics system.6

3.34 As the logistics concept under a non-UN MNF peace operation isparticular to the systems and doctrine of the logistics lead nation, it will not befurther considered in this publication.

SUMMARY 3.35

3.35 TCC provide personnel and equipment in accordance with MOUs orLOAs and, under the terms of these agreements, obtain reimbursement fromthe UN for the capability provided. For a TCC to obtain promptreimbursement, it is imperative that the country negotiate effectively with theUN for the provision of personnel and equipment, and for these negotiationoutcomes to be correctly recorded in the resultant MOU or LOA. Failure to doso will impact on the efficiency of the reimbursement process.

3.36 The provision of efficient and effective logistic support to a UN missionis imperative for the mission’s success. The UN relies heavily on troopcontributing countries to provide a large portion of this support and equipmentand to maintain the capability whilst deployed. It is in a troop contributingcountry’s own interests to ensure the documentation is correctly prepared andprocessed prior to deployment.

5 NATO Military Committee publications MC319/1 and MC327/1.

6 See ADDP 4.0—Defence Logistics and ADDP 4.2—Support to Operations.

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CHAPTER 4

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND AID AGENCIES 4

1

Introduction 4.1

4.1 As peacekeeping missions have evolved, the need for concomitanthumanitarian relief activities has become increasingly apparent. During theUnited Nations (UN) Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1992–1994, ahumanitarian assistance program was launched to help the 3.7 million peopledisplaced by the war. In the three-year operation, the biggest ever undertakenin Africa by the UN High Commission for Refugees, 1.3 million refugees wererepatriated. At the same time, ONUMOZ demobilised more than 76 000soldiers from both sides (10 000 of whom were reintegrated into the newnational army) and recovered about 155 000 weapons.

Today’s real borders are not between nations, but between powerful andpowerless, free and fettered, privileged and humiliated. Today, no wallscan separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the worldfrom national security crises in another.

UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan1

Executive summary

• The most suitable organisations to undertake humanitarian relief areUN agencies and non-government organisations.

• The military component’s focus in humanitarian operations is theprovision of security in order to permit freedom of movement andaccess to the affected local population by the humanitarianagencies.

• Non-government organisations’ involvement in conflict zones isfocused on three main areas of activity: humanitarian, human rightsand conflict resolution.

• The three internationally accepted principles of humanitarian reliefare humanity, impartiality and neutrality.

1 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ‘We can love what we are, without hating what—andwho—we are not,’ Nobel Lecture, Oslo, 10 December 2001 (UN Secretariat Press ReleaseSG/SM/8071).

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4.2 The needs for humanitarian relief activities are most likely to be apermanent line of operation in future peace operations, and certainly incomplex environments where conflict is ongoing. The most suitableorganisations to undertake humanitarian relief are UN agencies,non-government organisations (NGO) and private voluntaryorganisations (PVO). This will allow the military component to focus on theprovision of security in order to permit freedom of movement and access tothe affected local population by humanitarian agencies. There will however betimes when the military will be intimately involved in the provision ofhumanitarian assistance.

4.3 Although UN agencies, NGO and PVO share a similar goal, theself-motivation of such groups can lead to conflicts in priorities andinefficiencies in the delivery of aid. In spite of this, they can achieve resultswith greater speed and compassion than many nations.

4.4 This chapter will list the humanitarian principles and UN/NGO codesof conduct, potential support humanitarian agencies may request from themilitary and provide accepted minimum standards for the provision of lifesaving support that may assist as a planning tool for potential militarydeliberate involvement. The intent is to convey the humanitarian agency’sperspective.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS, PRINCIPLES AND COORDINATION 4.5

Non-government organisations 4.5

4.5 NGO may also be known as PVO or Voluntary Agencies. They areorganisations that may be formed by general charity groups; church orreligious affiliated groups; or trade, business or union affiliated groups. Theyare, in effect, not-for-profit organisations focused on preventing andalleviating human suffering, protecting life and health, protecting the humanbeing, promoting education and economic development and encouraging theestablishment of democratic institutions and civil society2.

4.6 The structure and capacity of NGO to respond to local andinternational emergencies is as diverse as the fields of interest and thebudgets they operate within. Funding for NGO activity can be from bothpublic3 and private sources, with many relying purely on private donations.

2 Aall P, (2000) International Peacekeeping, volume 7(1).

3 The 2002–2003 AusAID budget contribution to NGO was estimated at $AUD 26.4 million,and an estimated $116.4 million was contributed to international agencies (excluding the UN)in emergency, humanitarian and refugee aid (AusAID Budget Summary,http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget).

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http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget


4.7 Concerning the involvement of NGO in conflict zones, there are threemain areas of activity: humanitarian, human rights and conflict resolution.

4.8 The preponderance of effort of conflict resolution NGO is directedtowards stopping conflicts from arising, acting as advocates andnegotiating/mediating with the parties to the conflict. The presence of theseorganisations cannot be discounted in the theatre of operations however it isunlikely that ADF elements would be required to work closely with them. Onthe other hand, humanitarian and human rights groups should be expected atthe operational and tactical level, and should be expected to wield individualor collective authority and influence.

4.9 Humanitarian non-government organisations. This group of NGOis by far the most extensive, and organisations such as CARE, CAA(OXFAM), World Vision and the International Federation of the RedCross/Crescent are synonymous with activities in this field.

4.10 The activity of humanitarian organisations is usually divided betweenrelief (emergency response) and development. It is international agenciessuch as these that will be present in a region/country prior to the demand fora military commitment, undertaking sustainable development projects, andwho will remain during the emergency phase and beyond (nation or peacebuilding).

4.11 During the emergency phase, relief experts will replace or supplementthe development staff. The focus during emergency operations is to relievesuffering and save lives, and may include provision of food, clean water,sanitation equipment, shelter, medical aid including disease control and therepair of essential infrastructure. This group of NGO will be the most prevalentand will have the most interaction with the military component during the earlystages of a deployment.

4.12 Refugee4 assistance ranges from supplying basic human needsduring mass movement of people to protecting asylum seekers. Refugees areusually contained in makeshift camps administered by the UN HighCommission for Refugees (UNHCR) or a refugee NGO. Because of the massof people accommodated in the camps it is probable that these camps will bea haven for elements of groups responsible for the conflict or forceddisplacement. This poses a security threat to the people, the administratingauthority and also the military component. Security screening of refugees is aUNHCR responsibility, aided by the UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). Themilitary will have an interest in the security and screening processes in order

4 Within this Australian Defence Force Publication, the term ‘refugee’ collectively refers tothose people who cross an international border in order to seek protection, and also thosepeople who are displaced within their national borders having fled conflict or been forciblymoved but unable to sustain themselves (often termed ‘internally displaced persons’).

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to gain pertinent tactical information. The security responsibility within a camprests with national police authorities however in their absence the militarycomponent and UNCIVPOL may be requested to assist.

4.13 Human rights non-government organisaions. Human rightsviolations during intra-state and interstate conflict have become anunfortunate reality. This has seen an increase in the number of human rightsspecialists present in a theatre during a peace operation. Human rights NGOfocus on promoting the basic rights of all people regardless of theirbackground. The protection of these rights is often a contentious issue, notonly in states with repressive regimes but also with governments whosereligious or cultural values are at odds with the principles of individual rights.5

4.14 These NGO groups do not have the same focus as relief operatives,in that they seek out, research and address situations where repressionoccurs. The relationship requirements between these specialists and themilitary will vary from the provision of case evidence/information gainedduring operations to the protection of monitors in the conduct of their duty.

4.15 There are over 2100 NGO with consultative status with the UN,ranging in size from small voluntary organisations to large well-known,professional organisations. Not all of these will be represented in anemergency, however it is most likely that NGO working in the same conflictzone will operate in partnership with the UN and in some cases may beviewed as sub-contractors for the delivery of sector support.

4.16 It will be important for the Australian Defence Force (ADF)/forcecomponent responsible for the coordination of military support to thehumanitarian disaster to know which agencies have been endorsed tooperate in the mission area, as these will be afforded the same protection asUN representatives.

United Nations agencies involved with humanitarian operations 4.17

4.17 There are many UN agencies and organisations directly involved withhumanitarian operations. The mandates of the various organisations arespecific to a particular beneficiary population or sectoral interest, of whichthere may be some overlap. Regardless of the organisation, UN assistancein emergencies is usually at the request of a government.

5 Aall P, (2000) International Peacekeeping, volume 7(1): 128.

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4.18 The more common organisations that may be encountered include:

a. UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR): In operationsinvolving refugees, UNHCR will be responsible for protectionand assistance activities on behalf of refugees. In somecircumstances, UNHCR may be appointed as the lead agency,and therefore assume responsibility for the coordination of theentire UN response.

b. UN Development Program (UNDP): The UNDP’s focus is ondevelopment of local capacities including governance, povertyreduction, recovery and the environment.

c. UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF): UNICEF holds a mandate forchild protection, education/development and povertyreduction.

d. World Food Program (WFP): The WFP is responsible for thealleviation of hunger, and has vast capacity to deliver food fordistribution. It is likely that military components will operateclosely with this organisation.

e. World Health Organisation (WHO): With a responsibility forhealth and disease control of a global nature, WHO elementsare likely to be in mission areas, but contact with the militarycomponent may be limited to medical staff.

f. UN Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR): This agency isresponsible for the supervision of the universal principles ofhuman rights, monitoring human rights within the mission areaand investigating human rights abuses including allegationsagainst the multinational force (MNF) or UN peacekeepingforce. UNCHR may be supported by NGO specialists.

g. The Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA): OCHA is not an operational (ie sector deliveryagency), but is part of the UN Secretariat tasked with thecoordination of UN assistance in humanitarian crises wheremore than one agency is deployed. This is the focusorganisation for the coordination of military support tohumanitarian assistance.

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6

International organisations 4.19

4.19 The major international organisations with a humanitarian focus arethe International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Theseorganisations combine to form the International Red Cross and Red CrescentMovement (often referred to as ‘the Movement’). They have specialinternational status derived from the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.They are the only aid agency with an official responsibility under internationalhumanitarian law (IHL) for reducing human suffering in times of conflict.

4.20 International Committee of the Red Cross. To these ends, the ICRCundertakes protection and assistance activities for the benefit ofprisoners-of-war, supervises prisoner releases and exchanges, providesemergency relief services to war-affected populations, traces displacedindividuals, organises family contacts and reunions, and develops,disseminates and interprets IHL. In times of conflict, the ICRC directs andcoordinates the relief activities conducted by the Movement.

4.21 International Federation of Red Cross and Red CrescentSocieties. The IFRC is an ‘umbrella’ organisation for the various nationalsocieties (including the Australian Red Cross): hence, the functions describedbelow are actually carried out by the various national societies—the IFRCcoordinates policy and contact between the societies.

4.22 These functions include some operational tasks of the ICRC such astracing and national custodial responsibility for IHL, however its humanitarianactivities include response to domestic disasters and activities such as firstaid and blood bank services.

4.23 There is a close affiliation between the ADF and the Australian RedCross, and members of the national movement have deployed on operationswith the ADF. The Red Cross in all its forms is fiercely independent andimpartial, and will not deploy on operations with a military force. Rather, theywill deploy independently into a humanitarian operation theatre, and thenliaise with the ADF elements there.

The aim of humanitarian assistance is to sustain dignified life, tostrengthen local institutions’ efforts to relieve suffering and buildself-reliance, and to assure that the first step is taken towardsreconstruction, rehabilitation and development.

UNHCR6

6 Handbook for UNHCR Field Officers on working with the Military (2002).

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Australian Government aid 4.24

4.24 The Australian Government aid agency, the Australian Agency forInternational Development (AusAID), administers Australia’s overseas aidprogram. AusAID is an autonomous body within the Department of ForeignAffairs and Trade, and its objective is to advance Australia’s national interestby assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainabledevelopment.7 The focus of AusAID is the Asia-Pacific region, however it alsoassists in wider global problems—notably development and emergency relief.The sectors that AusAID focuses on are health, education, infrastructure,rural development and governance.8

4.25 AusAID maintains close and effective partnerships with multilateralorganisations and NGO. By working with the UN, AusAID is able to addressglobal humanitarian and development issues through this wider network oforganisations. It also provides direct assistance to other Commonwealthcountries in development, advocacy and conflict management strategies.

4.26 Because of the links NGO have with communities in need, AusAIDcontinues to develop strong strategic links with these organisations includingthe integration of NGO and volunteers into its country programs. TheAustralian NGO umbrella organisation, the Australian Council for OverseasAid, works closely with AusAID in information dissemination and coordinatingresponses for aid donations.

4.27 The ADF, at strategic and operational levels, needs to establishinformation sharing and planning relationships with AusAID in order tobecome familiar with the aid aspect of the whole of government response tocrises.

7 AusAID Annual Report, http://www.ausaid.gov.au.

8 As an example, through the governance program, AusAID has been involved in East Timorsince the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) popular consultation in 1999, improving theEast Timor government’s capacity in public administration and supporting rural development,water supply and water sanitation.

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http://www.ausaid.gov.au


HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—INTERFET’S ROLE IN FACILITATING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

The operation of International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) inEast Timor clearly demonstrates the healthy and co-operativerelationship which must necessarily be engendered between amilitary force conducting peace operations and UN organisationsand NGO in order to further the interests of all parties. Following the rejection of a special autonomy for East Timor withinthe unitary Republic of Indonesia by a majority of voters in a popularconsultation held in 1999, pro-integration militias launched acampaign of violence throughout the territory. As a result of the visitto Jakarta and Dili by a UN Security Council mission, on12 September 1999 the government of Indonesia agreed to acceptan offer of assistance from the international community. ByResolution 1264, the Security Council then authorised INTERFET,under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to restore peace and securityin East Timor and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarianassistance (HA) operations.Organisations within the UN system began a large-scale emergencyrelief effort, including aid convoys and the provision of shelter andbasic services. INTERFET elements initially airdropped supplies offood and medicine, and protected convoys carrying aid workers,making sure supplies got to the East Timorese people. Reliefworkers and supplies were deployed incrementally as the securitysituation improved, and consideration was given to the manythousands of displaced East Timorese people in West Timor andother areas in Indonesia and the region.Part of INTERFET’s success can be attributed to the security andsupport it contributed to the stabilisation process, permitting freedomof movement and access to the affected local population byhumanitarian elements, who carry the central role of relief anddevelopment. INTERFET achieved this success through theeffective actions of a civil-military operations cell which directedactivities in support of NGO and the UN agencies including UNICEFand UNHCR.

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Principles of humanitarian relief 4.28

4.28 Humanitarian relief and aid agencies are bound by the HumanitarianCharter and Code of Conduct (see annexes A and B), and have agreedstandards for the provision of emergency relief (annex C).

4.29 With the provision of humanitarian relief by aid agencies, there aregenerally three internationally accepted principles. These are9:

a. Humanity. Human suffering should be relieved wherever it isfound. The inherent dignity and other human rights ofindividuals and groups must be respected and protected.

b. Impartiality. Humanitarian assistance should be providedwithout discrimination. Relief must address the needs of allindividuals and groups who are suffering, without regard tonationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex orethnicity. Needs assessments and relief activities should begeared toward priority for the most urgent cases.

c. Neutrality. Humanitarian relief should be provided without biastoward or against one or more of the parties to the political,military, religious, ideological or ethnic controversy which hasgiven rise to the suffering. Humanitarian actors must not allowthemselves to become allied with a party to a conflict.

4.30 These are sometimes supplemented with a fourth principle:‘independence of operations’. The UNHCR handbook notes that militaryforces respond to political direction and to political agendas, which may notnecessarily be fully consistent with humanitarian principles. Thisgeneralisation should be considered in the context of UNHCR working solelywith a host nation’s defence force. When deployed as part of a MNF or UNmission, all participating military contingents will be required to abide by anagreed code of conduct.

4.31 UN agencies and NGO will normally be present in a theatre ofoperations that demands a military presence because of conditions whichthese organisations consider as an emergency.

9 Handbook for UNHCR Field Officers on working with the Military (2002).

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4.32 To humanitarian organisations, a complex emergency is described as:

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there isa total or considerable breakdown in authority resulting frominternal or external conflict, and which requires an internationalresponse that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any singleagency and/or the ongoing UN country program.10

4.33 Characteristics that are likely to prevail include:

a. a large number of civilian victims, besieged or displacedpopulations, and human suffering on a major scale;

b. substantial international assistance is needed, and theresponse goes beyond the capacity of a single humanitarianrelief organization;

c. delivery of HA is impeded or prevented by parties to theconflict;

d. high security risks for relief workers providing HA; and

e. relief workers targeted by parties to the conflict.

4.34 Humanitarian relief operations will require the commitment of nationaland international agencies to reduce the impact of these conditions, as wellas diplomatic and political initiatives—which may include the deployment ofmilitary forces.

4.35 The principles of response11 for a humanitarian relief emergency arein most instances common regardless of the main demand of the operation.

4.36 The following guidance is provided to assist in understanding some ofthe difficulties confronted by humanitarian agencies, in order to conceptualisesector responses; this can then be extrapolated to assess the coordinationeffort needed to produce an effective response.

a. Get the right people to the right place at the right time. Thesingle most important factor in determining whether or notsufficient emergency assistance reaches those in need will bethe quality of people involved in planning and implementing theresponse. This includes the readiness to fund activities, andprovide sufficient materiel.

10 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, p 4.

11 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, pp 5–8, but adapted to reflect a generalisedresponse to humanitarian emergencies.

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b. Ensure measures are appropriate:

(1) Identify the need. An appropriate response in theprovision of protection and material assistance requiresan assessment of the needs of the affected populationthat considers material state, culture, age and gender.

(2) Flexibility. Planning and response must be flexibleenough to surge and meet new challenges early in anoperation. It should as far as possible use localresources (personnel and material).

(3) Identify the standards. UN and NGO responseagencies need to determine with the government andpartners the standards of assistance that areappropriate. In general, these standards must reflectthe special needs of the affected population based ontheir condition, physical situation and experiences.

(4) Remember long term objectives. From the outset ofthe response, the resources must be divided betweenimmediate needs and action aimed at longer termcapacity building and development. Emergencyassistance is to be allocated, to the maximum extentpossible, to activities that will be of lasting benefitthereby keeping the relief phase as short as possible.Transition planning to the long term situation needs tobe undertaken early in the response.

c. Involve the population and promote self-reliance. Thoseaffected by the emergency can inadvertently be regarded aspassive recipients of aid. This can have detrimental outcomesand breed unnecessary dependency. The population needs tobe involved from the outset in order for the response to beeffective and promote self-reliance. Be aware of social andeconomic roles—understanding the roles of men, women andchildren in society will be necessary to ensure responses donot cross social standards and will empower new sections inthe community. Involve community leaders.

d. Do not treat issues in isolation. The most effective responseis to have a multi-sector framework, and being mindful ofenvironmental degradation.

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e. Work for durable solutions. Encourage self-reliance in orderto reduce dependency, and be mindful of early actions havinglong term consequences.

f. Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the response.Implement monitoring, reporting and evaluation systems thatdetect change or success (develop measures ofeffectiveness).

Coordination mechanisms 4.37

4.37 OCHA has the responsibility for coordinating the UN and NGOresponse to complex emergencies. It does so through the Inter-AgencyStanding Committee established in the mission, a committee convened byOCHA with partners including WFP, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, andNGO invitees.

4.38 One of these agencies will be appointed the HumanitarianCoordinator, and coordination of UN assistance will be through one of thefollowing options12:

a. Resident Coordinator. The Resident Coordinator is theleader of the UN country team and is normally the head ofUNDP. In a complex emergency, the Resident Coordinatormay also be designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator.

b. Lead agency. One of the UN agencies may be selected to leadthe coordination, and this is often the agency that provides themajority of the assistance.

c. Humanitarian Coordinator. A Humanitarian Coordinator maybe appointed in large emergencies. This role normally phasesout once the emergency reaches the recovery phase, andresidual tasks are passed to the Resident Coordinator.

d. Regional Humanitarian Coordinator. If the emergencyaffects more than one country, a Humanitarian Coordinatorhaving regional responsibilities may be appointed.

4.39 Depending on the scope of the emergency, it may be necessary toestablish implementing agreements with partner organisations within the UNsystem or between UN agencies and NGO. To the military, this may confusethe operational responsibilities on the ground. For instance, the provision ofhealth care may be the responsibility of one organisation yet water/sanitationthe responsibility of another.

12 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, pp 59–60.

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4.40 Operational responsibilities may be further complicated by a divisionof responsibility into geographic regions within the mission area. It willtherefore be necessary for the ADF interface with humanitarian organisationsto develop a matrix of emergency sector providers within each sector orregion in an area of operations, as per the example given in table 4–1.

4.41 Coordinating the effort of civil-military resources is outlined inAustralian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8—Peace Operations, chapter 5.The following paragraphs outline the perspective of humanitarian agencies(including UN) regarding how the military could support the humanitarianrelief effort.

Table 4–1: Gap identification chart—matrix showing emergency sector providers within each region in an area of operations13

Region 1 Region 2 Region 3Refugee Protection UNHCR UNHCR UNHCRFood Distribution Agency M Agency M Agency RShelter Agency B Agency KWater Agency B Agency YHealth Agency J UNHCRLogistics Agency H Agency K

13 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, modified from p 52.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—UNTAET’S ROLE IN FACILITATING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

The success of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor(UNTAET) in facilitating HA operations in East Timor in 2000–2001largely resulted from an effective force structure, with a strongco-operative relationship through which the efforts of the militarycomponent permitted humanitarian elements to carry out theircentral role.On 25 October 1999, the Security Council established the UNTAETas an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fullyresponsible for the administration of East Timor during its transitionto independence. Resolution 1272, among other things, mandatedUNTAET (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to ensure thecoordination and delivery of HA and to assist in the establishment ofconditions for sustainable development. To maintain a secureenvironment in order to accomplish this, UNTAET included a CivilianPolice component and an armed peacekeeping force (PKF).Responsibility for military operations was transferred fromINTERFET to the UNTAET PKF on 24 February 2000.With the secure environment provided by the UNTAET PKF, theUNHCR implemented a shelter rehabilitation program and thedistribution of shelter kits, while UNICEF became involved inrebuilding schools.It is interesting to note that the ADF’s efforts in school, communityand other infrastructure reconstruction are generally not consideredas ‘humanitarian projects’ by the humanitarian agencies. Rather,they are construed as ADF elements deployed with a peace-keepingforce expressing a sentiment of wanting to help the communitywithin that unit’s area of operational responsibility, or as a means ofestablishing rapport between the ADF/PKF and the local community.UNHCR also looked towards facilitating the voluntary repatriation ofsome 250 000 East Timorese from West Timor and other areas inIndonesia and the region. With this aim, it pursued an effective massinformation program about conditions of return to East Timor.Convinced that stabilisation had occurred and trusting in the securityprovided by the UNTAET PKF, by April 2000 over 200 000 refugeeshad returned from Indonesia.

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4.42 Principles of engagement. Through experience in humanitarianrelief operations, three principles have evolved relating to engagement withthe military on the conduct and delivery of humanitarian relief. Theseprinciples represent the collective sentiment of the humanitarian community,and indicate the environment in which the ADF could operate:

a. HA work should be performed by humanitarian organisations(an agreed OCHA principle). When there are adequatehumanitarian agencies within a mission area, they shouldconduct all humanitarian relief operations. The conduct ofspecial projects is not necessarily considered as ‘humanitarian’by humanitarian agencies.

b. HA agencies can never operate under military command.

c. From the perspective of the humanitarian agencies, theprimary aims of international military peace forces should be:

(1) to establish and maintain order and security,

(2) to protect civilians, and

(3) to facilitate a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

4.43 The type of support the military is considered likely to provide to thepopulation is reflected in table 4–2. In addition, humanitarian agencies willexpect support to their organisations within the categories of informationsupport, security for the conduct of operations (convoy escorts and securityof personnel), asset protection and evacuation operations.

Conclusion 4.44

4.44 The events that require the deployment of the ADF on peaceoperations may require extensive humanitarian relief activities. It is agreedbetween humanitarian agencies and the military that this is the prime reasonfor UN and humanitarian NGO presence. One military task is to provide theenvironment for these humanitarian activities to be undertaken in safety.

4.45 Those UN agencies and leading NGO involved in humanitarian reliefoperations are capable and professional. They have agreed standards for theprovision of emergency relief and are bound by the Humanitarian Charter andCode of Conduct. Being aware of these standards, the focus of their activities,

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the coordination mechanisms they have in place and potential military supportrequirements, will assist in developing a cooperative approach to achievingunity of purpose and whole of mission success.

Notes

(a) Direct assistance: This involves direct interface with beneficiaries indelivering humanitarian assistance.

(b) Indirect assistance: The humanitarian deliverable is at least one stepseparated from the beneficiary. For example, provision of interimtransport and handling of relief goods.

(c) Infrastructure support: This would include repairing roads, buildingbridges and restoring electricity.

Table 4–2: UNHCR’s view on the role of military force14

Annexes:A. The Humanitarian CharterB. The Humanitarian Code of ConductC. Minimum standards in disaster relief

Type of support

Peacetime

(eg natural disasters)

Peacekeeping

UN Charter Chapter VI

Peaceenforcement

UN Charter Chapter VII

Combat

Direct assistance(a)

Yes Maybe No No

Indirect assistance(b)

Yes Yes Maybe No

Infrastructure support(c)

Yes Yes Yes Maybe

14 Handbook for UNHCR Field Officers on working with the military (2002), p 22.

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THE HUMANITARIAN CHARTER A

Humanitarian agencies committed to this Charter and to the MinimumStandards will aim to achieve defined levels of service for people affected bycalamity or armed conflict, and to promote the observance of fundamentalhumanitarian principles.

The Humanitarian Charter expresses agencies’ commitment to theseprinciples and to achieving the Minimum Standards. This commitment isbased on agencies’ appreciation of their own ethical obligations, and reflectsthe rights and duties enshrined in international law in respect of which statesand other parties have established obligations.

The Charter is concerned with the most basic requirements for sustaining thelives and dignity of those affected by calamity or conflict. The MinimumStandards which follow aim to quantify these requirements with regard topeople’s needs for water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter and health care.Taken together, the Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum Standardscontribute to an operational framework for accountability in humanitarianassistance efforts.

We reaffirm our belief in the humanitarian imperative and its primacy. By thiswe mean the belief that all possible steps should be taken to prevent oralleviate human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civiliansso affected have a right to protection and assistance.

It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in international humanitarian law andbased on the principle of humanity, that we offer our services as humanitarianagencies. We will act in accordance with the principles of humanity andimpartiality, and with the other principles set out in the Code of Conduct forthe International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement andNon-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief (1994).

The Humanitarian Charter affirms the fundamental importance of thefollowing principles:

This right is reflected in the legal measures concerning the right to life, to anadequate standard of living and to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degradingtreatment or punishment. We understand an individual’s right to life to entailthe right to have steps taken to preserve life where it is threatened, and acorresponding duty on others to take such steps. Implicit in this is the duty notto withhold or frustrate the provision of life-saving assistance. In addition,international humanitarian law makes specific provision for assistance to

1. Principles

1.1 The right to life with dignity

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ADFP 3.8.1

civilian populations during conflict, obliging states and other parties to agreeto the provision of humanitarian and impartial assistance when the civilianpopulation lacks essential supplies.1

This is the distinction which underpins the 1949 Geneva Conventions andtheir Additional Protocols of 1977. This fundamental principle has beenincreasingly eroded, as reflected in the enormously increased proportion ofcivilian casualties during the second half of the twentieth century. Thatinternal conflict is often referred to as ‘civil war’ must not blind us to the needto distinguish between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians andothers (including the sick, wounded and prisoners) who play no direct part.Non-combatants are protected under international humanitarian law and areentitled to immunity from attack.2

This is the principle that no refugee shall be sent (back) to a country in whichhis or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; orwhere there are substantial grounds for believing that s/he would be in dangerof being subjected to torture.3

We recognise that it is firstly through their own efforts that the basic needs ofpeople affected by calamity or armed conflict are met, and we acknowledgethe primary role and responsibility of the state to provide assistance whenpeople’s capacity to cope has been exceeded.

International law recognises that those affected are entitled to protection andassistance. It defines legal obligations on states or warring parties to providesuch assistance or to allow it to be provided, as well as to prevent and refrain

1.2 The distinction between combatants and non-combatants

1 Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Articles 6 and 7 of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; common Article 3 of the fourGeneva Conventions of 1949; Articles 23, 55 and 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention;Articles 69 to 71 of Additional Protocol I of 1977; Article 18 of Additional Protocol II of 1977 aswell as other relevant rules of IHL; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or Punishment 1984; Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966; Articles 6, 37 and 24 of theConvention on the Rights of the Child 1989; and elsewhere in international law.

1.3 The principle of non-refoulement

2 The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is the basic principle underlyingIHL. See in particular common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 andArticle 48 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. See also Article 38 of the Convention on the Rightsof the Child.

2. Roles and responsibilities

3 Article 33 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951; Article 3 of the Conventionagainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984;Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.

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ADFP 3.8.1

from behaviour that violates fundamental human rights. These rights andobligations are contained in the body of international human rights law,international humanitarian law and refugee law (note sources given below).

As humanitarian agencies, we define our role in relation to these primary rolesand responsibilities. Our role in providing humanitarian assistance reflects thereality that those with primary responsibility are not always able or willing toperform this role themselves. This is sometimes a matter of capacity.Sometimes it constitutes a wilful disregard of fundamental legal and ethicalobligations, the result of which is much avoidable human suffering.

The frequent failure of warring parties to respect the humanitarian purpose ofinterventions has shown that the attempt to provide assistance in situations ofconflict may potentially render civilians more vulnerable to attack, or may onoccasion bring unintended advantage to one or more of the warring parties.We are committed to minimising any such adverse effects of our interventionsin so far as this is consistent with the obligations outlined above. It is theobligation of warring parties to respect the humanitarian nature of suchinterventions.

In relation to the principles set out above and more generally, we recogniseand support the protection and assistance mandates of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees under international law.

The Minimum Standards are based on agencies’ experience of providinghumanitarian assistance. Though the achievement of the standards dependson a range of factors, many of which may be beyond our control, we commitourselves to attempt consistently to achieve them and we expect to be heldto account accordingly. We invite other humanitarian actors, including statesthemselves, to adopt these standards as accepted norms.

By adhering to the standards we commit ourselves to make every effort toensure that people affected by disasters have access to at least the minimumrequirements (water, sanitation, food, nutrition, shelter and health care) tosatisfy their basic right to life with dignity. To this end we will continue toadvocate that governments and other parties meet their obligations underinternational human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugeelaw.

3. Minimum standards

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ADFP 3.8.1

We expect to be held accountable to this commitment and undertake todevelop systems for accountability within our respective agencies, consortiaand federations. We acknowledge that our fundamental accountability mustbe to those we seek to assist.

Sources:

The following instruments inform this Charter:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951 and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967.Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984.Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979.Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998.

4A–4


THE HUMANITARIAN CODE OF CONDUCT B

These Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement and non-government organisations (NGO) in disasterresponse programs have been prepared jointly by the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of RedCross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Purpose

This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is notabout operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations orset up a refugee camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain the high standards ofindependence, effectiveness and impact to which disaster response NGOand the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspires. It is avoluntary code, enforced by the will of organisation accepting it to maintainthe standards laid down in the Code.

In the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct will be interpretedand applied in conformity with international humanitarian law.

The Code of Conduct is presented first. Attached to it are three annexes,describing the working environment that we would like to see created by HostGovernments, Donor Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations inorder to facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Definitions

Non-government organisations. Refers here to organisations, bothnational and international, which are constituted separate from thegovernment of the country in which they are founded.

Non-governmental humanitarian agencies. For the purposes of this text,the term non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHA) has been coinedto encompass the components of the International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement—The International Committee of the Red Cross, TheInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and itsmember National Societies—and the NGO as defined above. This coderefers specifically to those NGHA who are involved in disaster response.

Inter-governmental organisations. Inter-governmental organisations refers toorganisations constituted by two or more governments. It thus includes allUnited Nations Agencies and regional organisations.

Disasters. A disaster is a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, greathuman suffering and distress, and large scale material damage.

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ADFP 3.8.1

The code of conduct 4.1

1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first. The right to receivehumanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarianprinciple which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As membersof the international community, we recognise our obligation to providehumanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need forunimpeded access to affected populations, is of fundamental importance inexercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response todisaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstandthe stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not apartisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipientsand without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on thebasis of need alone wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aidupon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the localcapacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of ourprograms, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human sufferingmust be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of acountry as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree ofsuffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognisethe crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and willensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programs. Theimplementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy can onlybe effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources toprovide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.

3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religiousstandpoint. Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need ofindividuals, families and communities. Not withstanding the right of NGHA toespouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance willnot be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions. Wewill not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracingor acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreignpolicy. NGHA are agencies, which act independently from governments. Wetherefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and donot seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as itcoincides with our own independent policy. We will never knowingly—orthrough negligence—allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gatherinformation of a political, military or economically sensitive nature forgovernments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those whichare strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy ofdonor governments. We will use the assistance we receive to respond toneeds and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of

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ADFP 3.8.1

donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particulardonor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances byconcerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independenceof action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect ourindependence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single fundingsource.

5. We shall respect culture and custom. We will endeavour to respect theculture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we areworking in.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities Allpeople and communities—even in disaster—possess capacities as well asvulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities byemploying local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with localcompanies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHA as partners inplanning and implementation, and cooperate with local governmentstructures where appropriate. We will place a high priority on the propercoordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within thecountries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations,and should include representatives of the relevant United Nations bodies.

7. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in themanagement of relief aid disaster response assistance should never beimposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation canbest be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design,management and implementation of the assistance program. We will strive toachieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programs.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as wellas meeting basic needs. All relief actions affect the prospects for long termdevelopment, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, wewill strive to implement relief programs which actively reduce thebeneficiaries’ vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainablelifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in thedesign and management of relief programs. We will also endeavour tominimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoidlong-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist andthose from whom we accept resources. We often act as an institutional link inthe partnership between those who wish to assist and those who needassistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to bothconstituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect anattitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report onour activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective ofeffectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring

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ADFP 3.8.1

of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact ofdisaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon theimpact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Ourprograms will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertisein order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shallrecognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.

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Annex C toADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 4

MINIMUM STANDARDS IN DISASTER RELIEF C

Introduction 1

1. The purpose of this annex is to provide Australian DefenceForce (ADF) planners with details of what humanitarian agencies considerthe minimum standards for the provision of water, sanitation, food, nutrition,shelter and health care in relief operations. Should the provision ofhumanitarian aid be an implied or essential task (deliberate or consequential)early in a deployment, it may serve to assist in planning the logisticrequirements for such tasks.

2. The reference for this data includes the ‘Humanitarian Charter andMinimum Standards in Disaster Response’ handbook, and the Office of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ‘Handbook forEmergencies’, second edition.

3. Water. Water requirements in relief operations are detailed intable 4C–1.

4. Food and nutrition. Food and nutrition requirements in reliefoperations are detailed in table 4C–2. Every effort should be made to providefamiliar foodstuffs and maintain traditional food habits. Staples should not bechanged just because there are alternatives readily available. The need isnutrition versus volume.

Table 4C–1: Water requirements in relief operations

Individual need Minimum survival requirement is 7 litres per person/day, increased to 15 litres per person/day as soon as possible

Public toilets 1–2 litres/user/day for hand washing2–8 litres/cubicle/day for cleaning toilets

All flushing toilets 20–40 litres/user/day for conventional flushing toilets3–5 litres/user/day for pour-flush toilets

Anal washing 1–2 litres/person/dayHealth centre and hospitals 5 litres/outpatients

40–60 litres/inpatient/dayAdditional quantities may be needed for some laundry equipment, flushing toilets, etc

Feeding centres 40–60 litres/patient/day

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ADFP 3.8.1

Table 4C–2: Food and nutrition in relief operations

Commodity Energy (kcal)Cereals—wheat, rice, sorghum/millet, maize

330, 360, 335, 350

Processed cereals—maize meal, wheat flour, bulgur wheat

360, 350, 350

Blended food—corn soya blend, wheat soya blend, soya-fortified bulgur wheat, soya-fortified wheat flour, soya-fortified sorghum grits

380, 370, 350, 390, 360, 360

Dairy products—dried skim milk (enriched/plain) dried whole milk, canned cheese, therapeutic milk

Both skim milks 360, 500, 355, 540

Meat and fish—canned meat, dried salted fish, canned fish

220, 270, 305

Oils and fats—vegetable oil, butter oil, edible fat

885, 860, 900

Pulses—beans, peas, lentils 335, 335, 340Miscellaneous—sugar, high energy biscuits, dates, dried fruit

400, 450, 245, 270

Nutrient Mean population requirementsEnergy 2 100 kcalProtein 10–12% total energy (52–63 g) but

<15%Fat 17% of total energy (40 g)Vitamin A 1 666 IU (or 0.5 mg retinal

equivalents)Thiamine (B1) 0.9 mg (or 0.4 mg per 1 000 kcal

intake)Riboflavin (B2) 1.4 mg (or 0.6 mg per 1 000 kcal

intake)Niacin (B3) 12.0 mg (or 6.6 mg per 1 000 kcal

intake)Vitamin C 28.0 mgVitamin D 3.2–3.8gIron 22 mg (low bioavailability (ie 5–9%))Iodine 150 g

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ADFP 3.8.1

5. Shelter. Shelter requirements, clothing and household items requiredin relief operations are as follows:

a. The covered area per person averages at 3.5–4.5 m2.

b. In warm, humid climates, shelter should allow for ventilationand protection from the sun.

c. In cold climates, shelter material and construction shouldensure optimal insulation.

d. Clothing should be appropriate for the weather; children shouldhave two sets and all should have access to blankets.

e. Basic household items—cooking pot, basin, knife, spoons andtwo water collection containers (~20 litres) plus 20 litres waterstorage; soap; individual eating utensils—plate, spoon, mug.

6. Health care. The main causes of death and disease in emergencysituations are measles, diarrhoeas (including cholera), acute respiratoryinfections, malnutrition and malaria (where prevalent). Effort should be placedon means of averting instances of these breaking out.

Conclusion 4.7

7. The information provided here is purely for an understanding of thelengths necessary for response organisations to provide essential care. Thecircumstances and figures outlined here are not limited to conflict zones butmay also apply in generic disasters, such as the ADF response to thePapua New Guinea tsunami in 1998. Clearly the ADF and other militarycomponents are not scaled to undertake many of the relief activities that thisannex demands, however it does describe the types of support needed andhow inappropriate the provision of combat rations and other foods may be.The ADF may have the capacity to move stores, provide or support the waterand sanitation requirements and could assist—within capacity, and should itbe needed—to support shelter and camp construction.

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CHAPTER 5

CIVILIAN POLICE 5

1

Introduction 5.1

5.1 The complexities of modern peace operations are evident not only inthe environmental circumstances that prevail but also by the range ofcomponents that make up either United Nations (UN) or multinationalforce (MNF) operations. Just as separation of forces or belligerents andreducing the influence of external security threats are implicit in an operation,so too is the need for internal security and establishment of the rule of law inachieving lasting peace and good governance.

We all appreciate that it’s not easy to leave family and friends in mostcases for extended periods of time, often in less than comfortableconditions. However, time and again we see peacekeepers doing this inthe interests of maintaining world peace.

Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mr Mick Keelty1

Executive summary

• Police activities in peace operations are based upon the underlyingprinciples of a democratic society: to uphold the rule of law, touphold the rights of individuals, and to resolve incidents withminimum force.

• There are distinct differences between civilian police (CIVPOL) andmilitary personnel; most notably, police from developed nations areempowered to discharge responsibilities at the lowest level.

• The option of using police should always be the ‘non-military option’,and should be seen and perceived by the people as such to buildand maintain independence.

• CIVPOL contributions can be operational, training andhumanitarian.

1 Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner Mr Mick Keelty. AFP Media Release29 May 2003, ‘United Nations commemorates 29 May as International Day of United NationsPeacekeepers’.

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5.2 The military component’s tasks may authorise the use of force to denybelligerents freedom of action and coerce them to abide by the agreementsand mandate under which an operation is established. To achieve internalsecurity, and to build institutions that represent mature and democraticprinciples of law and order, requires an interface that is not threat-based butone that can move freely among the community focused on protection of therights of the individual. This task over the past decades has fallen tointernational CIVPOL.

5.3 The purpose of this chapter is to outline the need for CIVPOL, tasks,responsibilities, functions and limitations of CIVPOL, and the relationshipsnecessary to be developed between the military and CIVPOL componentsbecause of shared mission responsibilities.

POLICE INVOLVEMENT 5.4

History 5.4

5.4 International CIVPOL (Ghanaian and later Nigerian police) were firstdeployed as part of the Civilian Operations Group within the UN Operation inthe Congo, and then again with the UN Temporary Executive Authority inWest New Guinea (Philippine police). The first formal use of the term CIVPOLoccurred with the raising of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. Fromthese humble beginnings, of just a few hundred police officers, the number ofdeployed CIVPOL personnel increased to 1500 serving with UNTAG inNamibia (1989), and to a total of 5333 deployed personnel as atDecember 2002.

5.5 Australian Police have served in a variety of UN peace operationssince 1964: volunteers from State and Territory police forces (attached forduty with the Commonwealth Police), and from the AFP after itsestablishment in 1979. UNFICYP in Cyprus has been the longestcontribution, with some 1300 State and AFP members serving from 1964 topresent. In addition, 20 members served in Cambodia (May 1992–September1993), 33 in Mozambique (March–December 1994), two in Somalia (July1993–February 1995) and some 500 in East Timor (June 1999 to present).Australian Police have also deployed on non-UN peace operations:30 members served with the US-led Multinational Force in Haiti (October1994–March 1995), 22 in Bougainville (November 1997–May 2000), and over80 with the International Peace Monitoring Team in the Solomon Islands(from November 2000).

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The value of civilian police 5.6

5.6 The involvement of CIVPOL adds a different dimension to thetraditional peacekeeping model involving the military and diplomacy. It is adimension that provides for a civilian unarmed (normally) interaction withinthe community. It also provides for the independent and professionalinvestigation of alleged breaches of human rights and, through working withthe community, the training and supervision of local police officials. Theeffective use of professional police in peace operations and the sustainableinfrastructure they leave behind will depend on the environment and mandatewithin which they are required to operate.

The need for civilian police 5.7

5.7 Analysis of recent operations involving CIVPOL has identified that themajority of missions were established to respond to internal conflicts.Generally, internal conflicts have displayed that the rule of law and the legalsystem is either weak or has collapsed. For sustainable peace, it is imperativethat society respects social expectations and has the ability to respond whenthese levels are not attained. This response must be one with a capability toprevent, investigate, judge and correct any deviation from acceptablepractice. This is achieved through an effective police, judicial and correctivesystems.

5.8 Pursuing these policy objectives within a UN/MNF operation facilitatesthe peace process and provides an environment that is more likely to besustainable after the withdrawal of the UN or coalition authority. A policepresence in peacekeeping works well alongside a military presence, directlyhelping communities to establish a stable environment to allow the peaceprocess to work effectively.

5.9 There are however distinct differences between civilian police andmilitary personnel, and a failure to identify these may mean anunder-utilisation of skills on joint activities. One of the main differences is thepolice command structure whereby police in developed nations areempowered legally and organisationally to discharge responsibilities at thelowest level. In the exercise of police powers relating to a dispute between anoffender and a victim, the constable is not subject to the direction of a seniorofficer. The formal accountability process is through the legal framework (iethe court system) and not a senior officer. This may appear brash to themilitary but it is this autonomy and accountability that needs to be understoodby the military component, particularly when CIVPOL exercise executivepowers.

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5.10 Furthermore police are guided by the principle of minimum forceacross the spectrum of the application of force.

Policing planning principles 5.11

5.11 While the structure and functions of police organisations in peaceoperations can vary, the activities of modern police services share threecommon policing principles that underpin their operations. These are:

a. to uphold the rule of law,

b. to uphold the rights of the individual, and

c. to resolve incidents with the minimum use of force.

5.12 These are the principles on which a modern and professional policeservice within any democratic society is based. The protection of the rights ofmembers of a community to pursue their legitimate interests peacefully andsafely is fundamental to the democratic, economic and social wellbeing of anyfree society.

5.13 Pursuing these principles in peace operations is essential to theacceptance and success of the CIVPOL component. From an Australianpolicing perspective, the transition from operational policing to UN/MNFoperations is a key reason for their deployment.

5.14 Australian police have operated in high risk and volatile situations,they are operationally focused to deal with domestic policing, and theireffectiveness and ability to contribute to establishing a sustainableinfrastructure is clearly circumscribed by the surrounding environment.

5.15 Ideally an environment which has the following characteristicsoptimises the use of police:

a. all involved parties have a commitment to and are prepared tocooperate with the UN or mandating authority,

The Office of Constable is the exercising of legitimate power and authoritywith community consent, and includes freedom from control by electedofficials. A vital aspect of police accountability is that no superior can takeaway the independence and discretion provided to the constable bystatute. Holders of the Office of Constable are solely responsible for theiractions and any consequences, and cannot be directed in the manner inwhich they undertake their duties.

AFP External Policing Branch, August 2002

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b. the operation has the full backing and the support of the UNSecurity Council or other international authority and awillingness to contribute resources and finance suchoperations,

c. the operation is under UN or agreed coalition command, and

d. there is recognition that CIVPOL peace operationsdemonstrate complete impartiality and neutrality between allparties.

Capability and component structure 5.16

5.16 In recent complex operations, the structure and capability of theCIVPOL component has varied from traditional monitoring roles to theprovision of executive police powers. The inclusion of ready reaction units ora gendarmerie has further enhanced this capability where the likelihood ofcivil unrest is high. These units are generally well-trained and resourced, andprovide a law enforcement paramilitary force which can respond to displaysof large-scale civil disobedience.

5.17 The existence of these units supported by air assets will generallymean that they can respond throughout the mission area, however it does notmean that the military component cannot be placed in a supporting role. Theoption of using police for any task should always be the ‘non-military option’,and should be seen and perceived by the people as such. This will build andmaintain the independence that police need for their role to be sustainable.

5.18 The request for ‘joint military and police patrols’ should be consideredwithin this context. If the local people cannot differentiate between militaryand police, the competitive advantage of CIVPOL will be lost. When themilitary seeks assistance from CIVPOL to carry out tasks, the request shouldbe based on a desired outcome and it will be up to CIVPOL to determine howbest to achieve the task.

5.19 Limitations. There are however, limitations with any CIVPOLcomponent, and these may be comparable when analysing the capability ofother troop contributing country (TCC) military contingents or UN MilitaryObservers (UNMO). The demand on the provision of international police inpeace operations has far exceeded the available pool of competentprofessional officers. The increase in the demand on CIVPOL since they firstdeployed in the early 1960s through to the mandated presence in currentmissions has seen a diminution of law and order competencies in missions.

5.20 In some cases, CIVPOL officers may not be language proficient. Theymay not understand basic principles of widely accepted community policing,may be unable to use radio and computer equipment, and may not even be

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able to drive. The Police Commissioner for the UN Transitional Authority inCambodia observed that too many police monitors were not instructed in thecivil police mandate, and a number lacked police experience in communityand/or field policing. Some were dressed in police uniforms without evenbeing policemen.

5.21 Whilst these factors may mean the CIVPOL structure has internalselection and management problems, it also impacts in the field for militarycommanders where there is the potential for law and order difficulties. It willbe incumbent upon the senior military commander in any region/sector tounderstand these limitations and seek assistance from the most capableCIVPOL in the district or seek guidance from the force headquarters.

Unarmed or armed 5.22

5.22 The debate on whether CIVPOL should or should not be armed canbecome emotive and, as a general principle, CIVPOL will deploy unarmed.Any change to this principle would require thorough analysis of the threat,operational deployment of CIVPOL officers and the relationship betweendeployed military units and CIVPOL posts.

5.23 The need to be armed may be authorised in the mandate or as theresult of a representation to the UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) from the Police Commissioner and SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or head of mission.

5.24 The security of CIVPOL (as well as UNMO and UN civilian staff) restswith the military component and the UN Security Coordinator.

Police involvement 5.25

5.25 Police expertise needs to be utilised in the earliest planning and at theinternational strategic level; this will be coordinated within DPKO and theDepartment of Political Affairs. From an Australian perspective, coordinationwith the AFP should commence at the first indication the government hasbeen approached to consider a commitment to an operation that has apolicing dimension.

5.26 The relationship built between the Australian Defence Force/AFPthrough interdepartmental committees and the Peace Operations WorkingGroup should have already established links with police planners and, as theconsideration for a commitment advances, so should the liaison between bothorganisations. This liaison will help in better understanding the potential rolesof CIVPOL, and commence the information-sharing and force preparationcross-pollination. The AFP may be able to provide guidance on the statureand capability of other contributing police forces based on past experience.This may help to appreciate the policing methodology and application of law.

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5.27 Policing intervention would ideally follow when organised armedconflict has been contained and there is a need to harness communityresources and protect it from disaffected elements, whether criminal orotherwise. Ideally the military and police can work together from the outset ofan operation to ensure effective and sustainable peace is restored andmaintained.

5.28 In MNF operations, commanders and planners should consider duringthe planning process whether there is a need for police liaison officer, a policeadviser or a contingent of CIVPOL.

Roles and tasks 5.29

5.29 CIVPOL operations have seen police undertake an advisory role,training duties, monitoring of local police, executive police functions andrefugee and border management. Border management may include amaritime policing2 effort dealing with smuggling and illegal people movement.Specific tasks will be outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution and, froma policing perspective, they are best reviewed as operational, training(capacity building) and humanitarian.

5.30 Operational tasks which can be undertaken by CIVPOL include:

a. investigation of criminal offences (when CIVPOL has executiveauthority);

b. specialist investigations, including human rights and genocideinvestigations, election fraud and providing scientific andforensic support to investigations;

c. provision of police advisers, accompanying local police orconducting independent patrols to assess the adequacy oflocal police;

d. preservation of civil order through planning and theimplementation of security operations (crowd control);

e. resolution of disputes between civilians;

f. controlling and apprehension of civilians in UN protectedareas;

g. monitoring or controlling host nation/s police;

2 If a maritime element is part of the military component, liaison with CIVPOL on borders,maritime jurisdiction, areas of responsibility and support is likely.

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h. escorting civilians through disputed areas; and

i. maintenance of public order at major incidents, including thesecurity of the election process.

5.31 Training tasks include:

a. training local police officers in general policing, investigationsand specialist areas such as close protection and scientificsupport;

b. raising a new police force, or instituting reform of an extantauthority; and

c. training UN military personnel in crowd psychology and crowdcontrol functions.

5.32 Humanitarian roles include:

a. transferring personnel on medical grounds from disputedterritories or areas;

b. delivery of pharmaceutical stores in disputed territories orareas;

c. family reunion management across disputed territories orborders;

d. civilian prisoners/body escorts;

e. visiting prisons and facilitating civilian visits;

f. escort and patrols to assist aid distribution; and

g. identification of deceased persons.

5.33 To maximise the output of CIVPOL, they should be deployed in smallprofessional teams rather than deploying large numbers of police personnelwho may potentially be inadequately and inappropriately equipped andtrained.

5.34 What law to apply. When CIVPOL is deployed in the traditional roleof monitoring and assisting host nation police forces, they are bound by theextant rule of law. Even in these controlled circumstances, the differentnational legal systems and standards of policing used by TCC can createfriction within the CIVPOL component.

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5.35 In operations where there is a complete breakdown of the rule of lawand domestic infrastructure, the legal system to be implemented can createhuge uncertainty and impose a limitation in the force preparation required byCIVPOL. Experience in these circumstances, has resulted in the applicationof host nation law except when in contravention of UN Conventions. Thisoption is considered the most effective because it is the law most widelyrecognised by the local population.

5.36 The UN Civilian Police Handbook, which should be issued to alldeployed CIVPOL personnel, contains the Universal Declaration of HumanRights and the UN Criminal Justice Standards for Peacekeeping Police, aswell as other useful tips for CIVPOL officers. A copy within force orregion/sector headquarters would be of value to commanders.

The Civilian Police—Military distinction 5.37

5.37 Both CIVPOL and the military component on peace operations havespecific and yet supporting tasks, so it is important to be aware of thedifferences between each organisation. Table 5–13, which compares civilianpolice and military activities, individual responsibility and organisationalculture, may assist in this understanding.

3 Drawn from MacFarlane, J & W Maley (2001) Civilian Police in United Nations PeaceOperations. Australian Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 64 (April 2001), pp 7–8.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS

The service of Sergeant Ron Schmerl (1921–1987) of the SouthAustralian Police Force typifies the commitment of Australian policeto UN missions. Born in Clare and raised on the family farm atAuburn, Ron Schmerl was the descendant of emigrants from Prussiawho had arrived in South Australia in 1841. He enlisted on02 May 1938 and served as a Special Constable in the Motor TrafficBranch. From 1951 he was successively Officer Commanding ofSwan Reach, Goolwa, Mount Barker and Plympton Police Stations.With a temporary commission, Schmerl was seconded to theCommonwealth Police as a member of the 5th Australian Contingentto UNFICYP, serving with the UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL)component from May 1968. The UNFICYP mission represents thefirst formal use of the term ‘CIVPOL’ (now also termed UNCIVPOLwithin a UN mission).Australian police have deployed to Cyprus every year since themission was created in 1964—volunteers from state and territorypolice forces, and from the Australian Federal Police since itsestablishment in 1979. Australian police patrol the UN buffer zonebetween the Turkish Cypriots in the north and the Greek Cypriots inthe south, and assist with the movement of people and property fromGreek to Turkish-controlled areas.Among the members of the 6th Contingent, which relieved the5th Contingent in May 1969, was Schmerl’s son Chester, also of theSouth Australian Police. On his return to Australia, Ron Schmerlresumed his duty with the South Australian Police, and was OfficerCommanding Darlington Station from 1973. Sergeant Schmerlretired on 31 March 1981 after 43 years continuous service, forwhich he received the National Medal and Police Long Service andGood Conduct Medal, in addition to the UNFICYP Medal.Schmerl’s service with the UNFICYP CIVPOL component includedtraditional community policing and investigation (crimes, propertyoffences and traffic duty), suppression of the illegal excavation ofantiquities, interaction and liaison with local Cyprus Police andTurkish Cypriot Police officials, and providing civilian support to theUN military units on the island. At all times since their first presenceon Cyprus in 1964, the deployment of the unarmed Australian policehas been marked by firm but cheerful interaction with all elements ofthe Cypriot and UN community on the island.

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Table 5–1: The differences between civilian police and the military

Activities Police MilitaryPrinciple purpose Law enforcement

Crime preventionCombat deterrence

Objective Justice Victory/political aimFocus Law and order; internal Security; externalActivity Constant Preparatory; periodicRelevant law Domestic law Law of armed conflictConstitution Instrument of law

No political interferenceInstrument of policyPolitical control

Accountability Domestic courtsRule of law

Chain of commandExecutive government

Procedures Gather evidenceNeed of proof

Limited informationDecisions under uncertainty

Use of force Minimum Graduated Individual responsibilityResponsibility Individual

‘Office of Constable’Primarily a member of a unit

Duty To the law/judiciary To the state/monarchKnowledge Law Lethal forceUnlawful orders Uphold the law Refuse unlawful orderStatus Citizen with special

powersCitizen with no special powers

Service Voluntary Voluntary or conscriptedCareer Starts ‘on the beat’ Soldier or officer entryOrganisational cultureControl Local/central CentralStructure Hierarchical Strongly hierarchicalPersonnel Uniformed/

non-uniformedUniformed

Origins Emerged in the 19th century

17th century and earlier

Public Direct relationshipPractical cooperation

Desire for general supportPublic esteem

Mobility Limited Part of core function

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RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MILITARY 5.38

Liaison 5.38

5.38 Given the similarity of some CIVPOL and military component tasks incomplex multi-dimensional operations, it is important to establish soundworking relationships at the operational and tactical level. Operational liaisonis best achieved through the operations branch of the UN PeacekeepingForce (PKF)/coalition headquarters and operations section of CIVPOLheadquarters. This liaison is also useful in establishing and coordinatingcombined training objectives aimed at addressing emergency responsecapabilities within the UN or MNF mission area.

5.39 At the tactical level, liaison and coordination is necessary atsector/region level and within battalion areas of responsibility. Unfortunately,the success of the CIVPOL/PKF relationship is often an issue of personalities.This can be overcome to some degree however, through the development ofa memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the force commander andPolice Commissioner identifying the areas where close cooperation,coordination of effort and support is to be achieved. Such an MOU shouldidentify generic circumstances that would predicate lead agency.

5.40 Security of CIVPOL, like other components of a UN mission, is theresponsibility of the SRSG based on advice from the mission securitycoordinator. In times of heightened tension however, the military componentmay be required to provide assistance. UN security is rated in fivephases—precautionary, restricted movement, relocation of non-essentialstaff, program suspension and evacuation. Commanders need to be briefedon these phases and analyse the implications for any military response orcontingency plan.

Military providing law and order 5.41

5.41 There have been operations where there is a law and order vacuumowing to either a complete collapse of the host nation police or safety andsecurity implications requiring the evacuation of CIVPOL. In suchcircumstances, the responsibility for imposing internal law and order will beeither a specified or implied task for the military component.

5.42 This is not a task the military component is structured or trained for,however it is likely that there will be no other alternative until host nationcapacity is rebuilt or sufficient international CIVPOL arrive in-theatre. Therewill be considerable capability differences within military contingents to dealwith this situation, but this mission-critical issue requires early planningconsideration during the pre-deployment stage.

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5.43 It is important to state that the military should not be tasked withmaintaining internal public security (as opposed to internal security)indefinitely.

5.44 In the circumstances where the military component assumes orsupports the restoration and maintenance of law and order, the followingconsiderations are critical to the intelligence preparation, planning, forcestructure and allocation of troops to task:

a. The law to be applied. The most potentially significant legalfactor is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and relatedinstruments. This body of law sets out in detail the rights andobligations under International Humanitarian Law to ensurepublic order and safety as well as the just and effectiveadministration of and support to a hostile or occupied territory.In some circumstances, International Human Rights Law maybe more relevant. Due consideration must also be given to thedomestic law of the State in which the operation is occurring.

b. Executive authority. Executive authority for law enforcementin UN missions would reside with the SRSG, based on the UNSecurity Council Resolution. However in instances where thereis a collapse of national civil authority and no UN structure, anMNF commander could be expected to act as the executivepolicing authority. A commander may, for example, use anauthorisation to ‘take all necessary measures’ to promulgateordinances or policy to establish an interim public orderframework.

c. Power of arrest. In operations where there is a specified orimplied task for the military component to provide internalpublic security, the force commander must ensure that powersof arrest exist and give consideration to what levels thosepowers will be devolved. On UN operations, it would beexpected that the SRSG would devolve this authority to thePolice Commissioner and, as necessary, the forcecommander.

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d. Power of detention. The force commander must understandthe difference between detention of a person for a short periodof time to alleviate the immediate threat of continuation of anoffence and detention for longer periods (remand). Remand isnormally necessary to negate any flight risk, to remove the riskthat the person will fail to attend any judicial procedure, toremove the potential for repetition of the offence, and any otherconsiderations that suggest that remand be warranted:

(1) The force commander must ensure that there are clearpolicy guidelines laid down governing detention action.It is normal for the military component to have the powerof detention for security reasons. The military may alsodetain persons in other circumstances where it does nothave the power of arrest.

(2) The force commander will need to identify a suitableplace for a detention facility and staff this with sufficientpersonnel to adequately protect detainees and cater totheir needs during the period of incarceration, havingdue regard to reporting requirements and internationalconventions concerning human rights4. The militarycomponent detention arrangements must meet externalscrutiny, as failure in this regard can have seriousconsequences for individual force members, the ForceCommander and the overall mission.

e. The ability to investigate offences. Consideration should begiven to utilising resources available to the force commander(force military police units for example) in circumstances of nolocal authority or CIVPOL, to investigate and gather evidencein relation to offences detected. Investigation may includeinterviews of suspects, obtaining witness statements, obtainingdocumentary and photographic evidence and the seizure ofexhibits that can be passed to CIVPOL or other authorities forpresentation in judicial proceedings. The military componentmay also be tasked with the provision of security forinvestigators, investigation sites or to apprehend indictees.

f. Judicial capability. In the event that it is unlikely a judicialsystem will be re-established prior to the reintroduction ofcivilian police authority, there is a requirement for correct

4 These are identified in several publications, for example the ‘Body of Principles for theProtection of All Persons Under any form of Detention or Imprisonment’ and the GenevaConventions. A quick reference for these and other conventions concerning human rights inthe administration of justice can be found at: http://unhchr.ch/html/intlist.htm.

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http://unhchr.ch/html/intlist.htm

http://unhchr.ch/html/intlist.htm


storage and continuity of evidence if successful prosecutionsare to follow. This is critical to provide due process to detainedpersons. The force commander must make adequateprovisions for the safe storage of evidence and have the abilityto demonstrate continuity of possession of that evidence. Itmay also be necessary to establish a military judicialmechanism to conduct preliminary hearings to enableextended detention of individuals and even a trial capability ifthere is a lengthy delay in establishing civil courts.

g. Public support. It will be essential to the success of themission to ensure public order actions are well communicatedto the community and done on a basis that will not createuncertainty or undue cultural offence. Consultation with thecommunity and understanding of the host nation operatingenvironment will be critical.

h. Limitations. Limitations (if any) in the application of law alsoneed to be considered.

5.45 While this aspect of an operation will pose challenges for the militarycomponent, it may be unavoidable due to mandate and legal requirements. Aforce commander could be exposed under the doctrine of commandresponsibility to legal action if these issues are neglected. Handled with careand discipline, support and action at critical points of weakness in the publicorder phase of operations could enhance the opportunity for an earlydeparture of the force.

5.46 These tasks do have a training implication for force preparation anddemand a mature and professional approach in understanding the traumaexperienced by the civil population. In complex peace operations, thepresence of yet another uniformed military force in chaotic circumstances canbe seen as a threat; the conduct of information operations and psychologicaloperations can reduce this perception.

Command and control 5.47

5.47 Command and control arrangements of CIVPOL can vary fromoperation to operation dependant on the mandate. In a traditional peaceoperation such as the UNFICYP, the police are placed under the operationalcontrol of the force commander and are deployed in teams to support militarysector commanders. In UN complex multi-dimensional operations, theCIVPOL component would be placed under the operational command of thePolice Commissioner and, like the military component, is responsive to theSRSG.

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5.48 CIVPOL officers provide an alternative flow of information to thatprovided by the PKF/MNF or UNMO and for this reason it is important toestablish good working relationships with them at all levels. CIVPOL freedomof movement is the same as for UNMO, and therefore it is important thatcommanders are situationally aware of their patrol program. CIVPOLoperations should be superimposed on those of subordinate commanders.military commanders may request CIVPOL assistance, but CIVPOL shouldbe left to decide how best to achieve the task.

5.49 Collocation of headquarters and operations centres for both CIVPOLand the PKF/military component may be seen as the preferred option ininstances of collapsed internal security, as military and policing tasks must beseen as supporting.

5.50 If this is not practical for whatever command and control perceptions,it will be necessary to employ CIVPOL liaison officers in the militaryoperations centre. The communications, air support, mobility and logisticscapabilities of the military component can best facilitate the most appropriateresponse to a particular security incident. When developing or reviewingcontingency plans or projecting changes in force structure and taskscombined planning or the development of mutually supporting plans shouldbe considered the norm.

5.51 Command of national police contingents is the responsibility of thenational contingent commander.

LONG–TERM POLICING BENEFITS 5.52

5.52 From a strategic policing perspective, Australian contributions topeace operations can have long term national benefits. These include:

a. The ability to identify potential criminal threats from countriesemerging from conflict situations. For example, there is agrowing body of evidence that indicates that criminal interestsare quick to exploit vulnerable governments and communities.Similarly, countries with immature or ineffective police servicescan unwittingly provide safe havens for criminal operations.

b. The development of contacts within emerging societies, andreinforcing the new police networks with solid principles.

c. The development of police skills from emerging communities,and giving them heightened awareness of human rightsrequirements.

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CONCLUSION 5.53

5.53 The function of public security is the foremost task of host nation policeor CIVPOL. There will be circumstances when neither of these agencies arefunctioning in a way that assures the public its basic freedoms and protection.In such circumstances the military can (and most likely will) be mandated toperform this executive function, but not as an enduring task. Early PKF/MNFpresence does need to be replaced as soon as possible by CIVPOL or theemerging police apparatus.

5.54 The conduct of joint CIVPOL/military patrols early in operations withsignificant law and order problems should be considered on its merits. Bothorganisations bring to a disrupted state environment a presence and calminginfluence to the local population, but there needs to be a clear understandingof the different function each force has. Consideration of collocatedheadquarters, the exchange of liaison officers, and involvement in ongoingjoint operational planning that affects public security will build confidence andcooperation between mutually supporting components.

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CHAPTER 6

ELECTORAL ASPECTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS6

1

Introduction 6.1

6.1 The United Nations (UN) can serve as a catalyst for parties to seekpeace. It can give support to the peace process, or provide a framework forthe attainment of a common goal. It is an immutable fact however, thatpolitical structures and governments cannot be imposed from the outside.

6.2 The UN acknowledges that no instrument can bring about peacewithout the will of the parties to the conflict to achieve peace. In most cases,the best, and most visible, demonstration of this resolve is participation in ademocratic election in order to restore, or create, proper and stablegovernance. It is by no means the case that all peace operations will have anelectoral dimension. However, when the requirement to conduct an electionis mandated, it is likely to be one of the most important aspects of theoperation.

The United Nations cannot keep peace when there is no peace to keep.

UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali1

Executive summary

• Electoral operations usually include the following five phases:establishment of broad policy parameters and legal framework,establishment of an electoral administration, preparation andconduct of voter registration, the campaign, and preparation andconduct of the polling and count.

• Support for the electoral process from the military componentusually involves security and logistics assistance.

• At the most basic level the aim of peace operations involvingelectoral processes is to produce, at the end, an elected system ofgovernment sufficiently well accepted by former combatants toensure that there will be no reversion to violence.

1 UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1996), In The Blue Helmets. A Review ofUnited Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd edition. UN Department of Public Information, NY, p 7.

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6.3 In such cases, holding an election tends to be a fundamental elementof the overall political agreement giving rise to the operation, and moreover,one which often constitutes the defined milestone which it is hoped will markthe successful conclusion of an operation. This has been the case in Namibia,Cambodia and Mozambique.

6.4 In 1992–1993, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)registered over four million Cambodians as voters, set up 1400 fixed pollingstations and 200 mobile teams, and recruited and trained some 50 000Cambodians to perform vital electoral tasks. The UN Operation inMozambique (ONUMOZ) registered some 6.3 million voters, educated thepopulation about their voting rights, and assisted the Mozambican NationalResistance (RENAMO) and other opposition groups to transform themselvesinto political parties to effectively contest the election. Under UN supervision,Mozambique’s first multi-party elections were successfully held inOctober 1994, monitored by some 2300 international observers.

6.5 The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the major issuesrelating to the successful planning and execution of electoral aspects of apeace operation. It identifies the various types of UN electoral involvement,looks at the phases of an electoral operation, notes some significant planningconsiderations and identifies the typical requirements for support from themilitary component of a mission. It also discusses issues relating tointeroperability and command and control, and puts forward some ideas onthe factors which determine the success or failure of an electoral operation.

6.6 This chapter does not discuss the provisions which need to be madefor deployed personnel to vote during Australian federal or state elections(refer to Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8—Peace Operations,chapter 5, annex A), nor external voting by Australians abroad2.

Historical aspects 6.7

6.7 Three major historical trends have given rise to the introduction ofelectoral elements into peace operations:

a. the widespread acceptance, particularly in the decolonisationand trusteeship context, of the concept of self-determinationset out in the UN Charter;

2 See Wall A, ‘External Voting, the Australian Experience’. Paper for the IFE/UNDP/IDEASeminario Internacional Sobre el Voto en el Extranjero (International Seminar on ExternalVoting), Mexico City, 11–12 August 1998, http://www.ife.org.mx/wwwcai/semaustl.htm.

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http://www.ife.org.mx/wwwcai/semaustl.htm




b. the growing emphasis on the need for countries to adoptdemocratic mechanisms to ensure the ‘good governance’which is increasingly being insisted upon by the donorcommunity, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and theWorld Bank; and

c. the recognition that the internal problems of a country can be athreat to international peace.

6.8 Self-determination. There has been a long history of UN involvementin electoral operations as part of the decolonisation process. The mostsubstantial involvement of this type in terms of electoral resources deployedwas the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989–1990.Following the successful election of a Constituent Assembly andproclamation of independence on 21 March 1990, independent Namibia wasaccepted as a member of the UN on 23 April3.

6.9 Good governance. The late 1980s and early 1990s not only saw theend of the Cold War, but also an increased perception of a link between theeconomic performances of countries and the adoption of democratic politicalinstitutions therein. Western nations, the IMF and the World Bank placedmore and more pressure on developing countries to meet specific democraticideals as a precondition for economic aid.

6.10 The need to be seen to be ‘doing the right thing’ created an explosivegrowth in the international election observation industry, which probablyprovided a greater impetus for the creation of the UN’s Electoral AssistanceDivision than did the need to support electoral elements of peacekeepingmissions.

6.11 Threats to international peace originating within a country. Untilrecently, elections were not seen as an integral part of peacekeeping. Thisreflects the focus of the UN Charter on conflicts between States rather thanon civil wars, and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs ofStates. Elections by their very nature are internal to a particular political unit,and their conduct is an important element of State sovereignty.

3 Refer ‘Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections’(A/46/609), Secretary-General’s Report to the General Assembly, 19 November 1991;Chester A (1992) High Noon in Southern Africa, W.W. Norton & Company, NY; The BlueHelmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd edition. UN Department of PublicInformation, NY. The Australian Army’s contribution to UNTAG is recorded in TrainingInformation Bulletin No 63 (1995).

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6.12 The notion that the internal situation in a country could be a threat tointernational peace started to gain currency in the 1960s, and formed thebasis for UN action in response to apartheid in South Africa, and to theUnilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. This change in viewgave rise to a growing possibility of UN involvement in electoral processes.

6.13 The various threads of UN electoral experience came together in theNamibian peacekeeping mission (UNTAG), which not only constituted theend of a long trusteeship/decolonisation process, but also the end of anelaborate peacemaking process. The success of UNTAG created somethingof a euphoria about what elections could achieve in the peacekeepingcontext, and since then the UN has been involved in various types of electionoperations. These have been conducted in Africa, the Americas and SouthEast Asia with varying degrees of success.

ELECTORAL OPERATIONS 6.14

6.14 The UN General Assembly has tasked the Secretary-General toestablish terms of reference and guidelines for UN electoral involvement inUN activities4. The guidelines constitute the UN’s basic doctrine in relation toelectoral operations, and identify six basic operational concepts for electoralassistance, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

United Nations electoral operations 6.15

6.15 Supervision of an electoral process. Electoral supervisionoperations involve certification of the election results, the process and politicaland electoral aspects by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General(for example, UNTAG in Namibia). Operations of this type are likely to be veryrare, since the certification process impinges on the national sovereignty ofthe country involved. Such missions will typically arise as part of apeacekeeping operation, in circumstances where national sovereignty hasnot been established, or is in dispute. Terms of reference may vary from caseto case, but will typically require coverage of the following aspects of theelectoral process:

a. the impartiality of the electoral authorities;

b. freedom of organisation, movement, assembly and expressionof political parties and alliances;

4 General Assembly Resolution 46/137 of 19 December 1991, published as Guidelines forMember States considering the formulation of requests for electoral assistanceA/47/668/Add.1, 24 November 1992. The Report of the Secretary-General of 7 August 1995,entitled Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote andConsolidate New or Restored Democracies (A/50/332), reviews and discusses the basicoperational concepts of electoral assistance in more detail.

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c. the opportunities given to the parties to deploy scrutineers toobserve all aspects of the process;

d. fairness of access to State media and other State resources;

e. the registration of voters; and

f. the conduct of the polling and the count.

6.16 Verification of an electoral process. Verification operations areconducted in situations where a country is conducting its own election butrequests the UN to verify the freedom and fairness of certain aspects of theprocess because of mistrust of competing parties, in order to legitimise theprocess and outcome. Verification missions are similar to supervisionmissions but are less intrusive because they are based on the invitation of asovereign state. Because of the number of international observers and theneed to coordinate them, these operations tend to be resource intensive andprolonged. Verification may be undertaken as part of a peacekeeping missionwith a military element (for example, the UN Angola Verification Mission(UNAVEM) and ONUMOZ in Mozambique), or it may be purely civilian incharacter, as in South Africa in 1994.

6.17 Provision of support to other international observers. Thisapproach is one that can be used where several countries andinter-governmental or non-government organisations have been invited by acountry to send observers to its election. The aim of this process is tointegrate and coordinate the operations of the various bodies, therebyincreasing the efficiency of their observation efforts. Such coordination mayarise within a peace operation mission (for example, ONUMOZ inMozambique).

6.18 Technical assistance in electoral matters. This is the most commontype of UN involvement in electoral activities. Based on the specificrequirements of the country being assisted, assistance can include theprovision of analysis, advice, equipment or training to governmentalinstitutions. Assistance of this type may be provided within a peace operationcontext (such as the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)).

6.19 Capacity building. As in the case of the UN TransitionalAdministration in East Timor (UNTAET), a task of the UN administration maybe to establish an indigenous Electoral Commission capable of conductingfuture elections without external assistance. The implications for the militarycomponent are similar to those for organising an election however the supportrequirements will be limited to certain phases of the operation.

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6.20 Organisation and conduct of an electoral process. Such a missionarises where the UN is called upon to run an election (for example UNTAC,and UNTAET, 2001) or a referendum/ballot (UN Mission for the Referendumin Western Sahara (MINURSO), and UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET),1999). Operations of this nature require the UN to undertake a wide range ofelectoral administration tasks, and will normally only arise as part of apeacekeeping mission.

6.21 Organising and conducting an election is more complex and resourceintensive than merely supervising or verifying one. When the UN is organisingan election, it has to recruit, train, deploy all the polling staff, provide all thevoting stations with all the equipment they require and provide all thenecessary logistical support for the process. The scale of these tasks isbroadly speaking proportional to the voting population—for example, it isestimated that for every million voters, about 10 000 polling officials arerequired. The UN will also be responsible for providing security for theprocess and, depending on the mandate, this may be either a civilian police(CIVPOL) or Peacekeeping Force-led task.

Phases of an electoral operation 6.22

6.22 The conduct of an electoral operation usually requires five phases,which tend to be undertaken in an overlapping manner.

6.23 Phase 1: Establishment of broad policy parameters and legalframework. This is a critical phase. The success of an electoral operationdepends on the extent to which the participants in the political process acceptit as legitimate and binding. This phase requires high level interaction with theleadership of the mission, and the participants in the process. Unless thepolicy parameters and legal framework have been totally predetermined in apeace agreement, the UN will have a major task to perform in this area, evenif it is only supervising or verifying the process.

6.24 Phase 2: Establishment of an electoral administration. Both theconduct and the supervision of an election are by their very naturedecentralised operations. Their management requires both a central structureand a field structure. The central structure is responsible for developmentwork, policy analysis and planning, and the overall management of theprocess. The field structure is responsible for implementing agreedprocedures at the local/village level. This local level introduces a furtherdifficulty because electoral administrators have to achieve a greaterpenetration of the countryside than the military and other civilian components.This phase of the operation requires close cooperation with administrativebodies in New York, Geneva and the mission area. In order to enhance thelegitimacy of the election process, an ‘independent’ electoral commission, notsubject to day-to-day direction from the mission leadership, may beestablished (the elections held in East Timor in 2001 and 2002 are examples).

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6.25 Phase 3: Preparation for and conduct of voter registration. Thisphase is not always required. If voter registration is required, there may bedemands placed on the military component to provide logistic support(including air transport) and security to the registration units.

6.26 When there is to be no registration period, voters are usually requiredto bring some specified document to the voting station to establish their rightto vote. There are however, three advantages associated with a registrationprocess:

a. The first and most important is that it enables questions aboutan individual’s right to vote to be resolved in a measured waywell before the poll, rather than giving rise to disruptivedisputes in voting stations.

b. Secondly, the registration process generates a great deal ofdetailed information about the locations of concentrations ofvoters, which can be used to good effect during planning.

c. Finally, the pursuit of voter registration can give the people of acountry or a territory an opportunity to demonstrate theirsupport for an electoral process.

6.27 Phase 4: The campaign. A free and open campaign is generallyaccepted to be a necessary precondition for a free and fair election.Depending on the circumstances, the electoral component may have a role toplay in implementing procedures designed to ensure such a campaign. By thenature of this phase, the provision of security and crowd control is aresponsibility of the CIVPOL component, however coordination with themilitary component may be necessary for implementation of contingencyplans.

6.28 Phase 5: Preparation for and conduct of the polling and count.These tend to be the most demanding parts of the process because, unlikevoter registration, they are undertaken under rigid time constraints. Thisrequires a high degree of logistical planning and precision, regardless ofwhether the election is being conducted or only supervised.

Planning considerations 6.29

6.29 Electoral planning is typically divided into three stages:

a. pre-agreement negotiations;

b. post-agreement (but pre-mission) planning; and

c. planning during the mission.

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6.30 Pre-agreement negotiations. At this strategic stage of the process,issues such as the voting system and franchise are resolved. It is critical atthis time for the UN or mandating authority to be involved because it is herethat they can influence the planning process. This should ensure issues thatcan only be resolved by the contending parties are addressed and ensure thatwhat is agreed upon is feasible. However the potential to set strategictimetables for the conduct of elections at this stage can impose significantoperational problems not envisaged during the negotiation—such as weatheror seasonal limitations, preparation requirements and infrastructuresuitability.

6.31 Post-agreement planning. Planning undertaken at this stage istypically intended to decide the broad modalities of the proposed electoralprocess, taking into account those matters which have already been dealtwith in any peace agreement. In the past, this had tended to be done bydeploying an electoral survey mission, tasked with developing a broadoperational plan for the electoral process, and a budget sufficiently detailed tobe presented by the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council forendorsement in principle.

6.32 Planning during the mission. The limitations of the survey missionprocess are such that, no matter how well the survey team has performed itstask, there will still be a great deal of detailed planning required during thecourse of the operation. This can be undertaken in a number of ways such asthe project management approach—defining objectives, establishingdeadlines and ensuring multi-disciplinary/component inputs are understoodand implemented. From the military component perspective, establishingliaison with the electoral planning team early in the mission will guaranteecritical military considerations are not overlooked.

Military component support requirements 6.33

6.33 Support for the electoral process from the military component tends tobe required in two key areas—security and logistics.

6.34 Security. The electoral component tends to look to the military notonly for advice on security issues based on up-to-date information about thesituation on the ground, but also for the provision of physical security.Physical security encompasses not just for the electoral process, but for thewider process of political transition, of which the ballot may be only a part.

6.35 This concept of security needs however to be balanced with themandate of the CIVPOL component and the military component, with theformer often required to provide internal security and the latter responsible forexternal threats. Again, close liaison with CIVPOL and the electoralcomponent at the operational and tactical level will be important. It will benecessary to establish responsibilities for security and transportation of the

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ballot boxes and papers, and the security of polling centres (including theactual centre/booths and the approaches to the centre) and security ofcounting sites.

6.36 The wishes and culture of the people need to be recognised as theymay have particular concerns, based on previous events, on the impartialityof police and the military in such sensitive areas.

6.37 Logistics. The second area in which military support is required islogistics. Elections are extraordinarily demanding logistical operations, andsometimes it will only be the military component in a mission which will havethe expertise and the resources required to bring them to a successfulconclusion. A joint military and electoral working group may be establishedbefore the election to pursue the necessary logistic planning andimplementation requirements.

Coordination and integration 6.38

6.38 The scale of an election operation requires the full mobilisation atelection time of the resources of the mission. This requires a high degree ofcoordination and interaction with the other components, particularly themilitary. Integration should be built into the structure of a mission and, if it isnot, has to be pursued by staff of the mission after deployment.

6.39 Integration between the military and electoral components can oftenbe facilitated by the fact that both components are fundamentallyoutcome-oriented rather than process-oriented and mentally prepared towork towards defined deadlines.

6.40 Command and control of the election phase can be problematic andwill depend on the nature of the mission and the extent of integration.Communications standards continue to improve and most components havetheir own equipment and facilities, however there needs to be a level ofredundancy planned for the election. Given the dispersion of the military in themission area it can be expected that it will provide the required redundancy.This has the potential to see ‘command’ of the election moving from theelectoral component to the military and this should be avoided. Theestablishment of joint operations centres at sector/regional headquarters mayassist.

6.41 Coordination of the civil administrative and some other components atthe operational level may be difficult to achieve on all occasions. To assist thisprocess it is strongly recommended that liaison officers are established withinthe key planning agencies responsible for the safe and effective conduct ofthe phases of the election. Military, CIVPOL and electoral officers from theoperations and plans branches need to focus on unity of effort and purposein order to achieve this critical aspect of election based operations.

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6.42 There may also be a requirement to conduct training of eachcomponent in the conduct of security operations and contingency plans. If thethreat environment is benign, the logistic support requirement to the electoralcomponent is likely to be the greatest task of the military.

ELECTORAL MISSION SUCCESS 6.43

Factors defining success 6.43

6.43 The success of an electoral operation can potentially be defined inmany different ways. At the most basic level however, the aim of peaceoperations involving an electoral process is to ultimately produce an electedsystem of government sufficiently well accepted by the former combatants toensure that there will be no reversion to violence. If this system of governmentis ‘democratic’, or represents ‘good governance’, so much the better.

6.44 Any analysis of a successful peace operation involving elections willidentify many factors contributing to its success, which are unique to themission. There are also discernible, however, a number of factors whichappear common to successful missions, including the following:

a. Acceptance of the validity of the elected government.Elections serve the purpose of conferring legitimacy on aparticular government of a State.

b. Acceptance of the validity of the State. Elections cannot tothe same extent confer legitimacy on the State itself. Where thelegitimacy of the State is a fundamental aspect of a dispute, themere conduct of an election cannot be expected to have muchbeneficial effect. On this point, it is notable that a number of themore successful UN electoral operations have been thosewhere the people of the territory in question were united by astrong sense of nationalism.

c. War weariness. Most of the successful peacekeepingmissions with an electoral mandate have arisen in situations oflong-standing conflict. In these cases, the length of the conflictshad sufficed to eliminate any expectations of imminent totalvictory, and the costs on both sides of the divide had been suchas to focus the minds of the belligerents on the search foralternatives to warfare. These sorts of influences are lesspotent in situations of flashpoint crisis.

d. Lack of political alternatives. Parties are likely to accept theresult of an election when they have no other political options.For example, prior to the finalisation of the agreements which

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led to the Rhodesian independence elections of 1980, it hadbeen clearly recognised by the liberation movements that theyhad no choice but to participate in the electoral process andaccept its outcome.

e. Withdrawal of outside patronage. This factor relates closelyto the preceding one. Combatants who have been sustained intheir belligerence over the years by outside patrons tend to seetheir range of political options diminishing rapidly when thepatrons decide to withdraw. The end of the Cold War hasclearly been of fundamental importance in this regard.

f. Benefits of international legitimacy. In many of the moresuccessful missions, the use of electoral processes has eitherbeen advocated from outside the territory, or proposedinternally, as a means for securing international recognition ofa government as legitimate. Funding and wide donor supportfor nation-building will follow legitimacy.

g. Provision of incentives to participate. Elections are not, andshould not be seen as, ‘winner-takes-all’ processes. Variousmechanisms can be adopted to encourage participation andmake elections competitive, and these have been crucial in anumber of successful electoral operations.

Conclusion 6.45

6.45 Two concluding observations can be made. First, the introduction ofelectoral processes into peacekeeping operations is not a magic formula forresolving political conflicts. In the right circumstances, they can represent apotent conflict resolution mechanism, but in the wrong circumstances theycan waste a great deal of money while achieving nothing in either the short orthe long term. One of the challenges therefore facing policy makers is that ofdiscerning the situations in which electoral solutions can be applied.

6.46 Secondly, it should be stated that whenever a UN/multinational forcepeace operation has an electoral mandate, the military component is likely tobe critically involved in its execution. Understanding the nuances of anelection-based operation and the need to build understanding andcooperation between each component will be important in achieving success.The military cannot conduct the operation but is a key player.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN CAMBODIA

The rule of Pol Pot’s brutal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia wasended only by Vietnamese military intervention in late 1978. Threefactions however, opposed the newly installed government inPhnom Penh, and a four-sided civil war ensued.After more than a decade of conflict, producing a massive refugeecrisis in neighbouring Thailand, the Agreements on theComprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (the‘Paris Agreements’) were signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. Acease-fire was maintained by the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia(UNAMIC), allowing the deployment of UNTAC. During its briefexistence, from March 1992 to September 1993, UNTAC ensuredthe implementation of the Paris Agreements and supervised ageneral election in Cambodia.The Australian Defence Force made a significant contribution toUNTAC under Operation BANNER, and the force commander wasAustralia’s Lieutenant-General John Sanderson AO. Australia alsocontributed a small Federal Police detachment and ElectoralCommission personnel to assist with voter registration, electoraleducation and the conduct of the federal election during the period23–28 May 1993.UNTAC’s mandate ended with the promulgation of the Constitutionfor the Kingdom of Cambodia and the formation of the newGovernment. The goal of the Paris Agreements had beenachieved—UNTAC had ensured the conduct of a free and fairelection in Cambodia, laying a sound foundation for a stable andpeaceful future for the people of Cambodia. Its success lay in abalanced force structure: a strong military component (including UNMilitary Observers) providing security and logistics assistance, aCIVPOL component and an effective civil administration component,working in concert with the electoral and other components(repatriation, rehabilitation and human rights).

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CHAPTER 7

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING 7

1

Introduction 7.1

7.1 Force preparation and training is a necessary enabler for missionsuccess, particularly given the complex, multi-dimensional nature of modernpeace operations. Effective force preparation is an enabler for missionsuccess. The responsibility for this training rests with the commander,however there are organisations within the ADF and other governmentdepartments and non-government organisations (NGO) that can assist.

In one block, a Marine will provide food, care and comfort an emaciatedchild. In the next block, you will see this Marine with outstretched arms,separating warring tribes. Then in the third city block, this same Marine willengage in intense house-to-house fighting with hostile forces . . . all on thesame day, all within three city blocks.

Major-General Charles C Krulak USMC1

Executive summary

• The Australian Defence Force (ADF) approach to peace operationspreparation is that the capacity to conduct peace operations has itsbasis in being able to undertake single-Service and joint warfightingroles.

• Specific education, training and force preparation programs will bederived from the mission analysis and commander’s guidance.

• Member States are responsible for peace operations training,however the United Nations (UN) provides guidelines andperformance standards.

• The ADF’s dedicated peace operations training organisations arethe ADF Peacekeeping Centre, Deployed Forces SupportUnit–Sydney and Force Preparation Squadron–Darwin.

1 ‘Urban Patrolling and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). Military Operations onUrbanized Terrain (MOUT)’, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, MCWL X–File 3–35.6(1998).

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7.2 A Resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 19892

encouraged Member States to establish national training programs formilitary and civilian personnel assigned to peace operations.

7.3 The current ADF approach to peace operations preparation is basedon the principle that being capable to undertake single-Service and jointwarfighting roles will be the basis for the conduct of less intense operations.This approach also acknowledges that there are additional constraints placedon the military during peace operations, and force preparation must addressthese. This applies to UN and multinational force operations.

7.4 Force preparation comprises two elements: pre-deployment trainingand auditing of the mandatory pre-deployment criteria.

Training 7.5

7.5 The structure of education, training and force preparation programswill be derived from the mission analysis and commander’s guidance. Somegeneric areas that may require addressing include all or parts of the followinglist (by no means exhaustive):

a. What is the mission mandate, and therefore what are thedirected, implied and essential tasks?

(1) What is the lead organisation: structure and leadership(function, unity of purpose/effort)?

(2) National command relationships: force commander,ADF contribution to mission success, powers ofdiscipline, costs of a national command element.

(3) Peacekeeping vs peace enforcement: strategicimplications of tactical outcomes.

(4) Adversary/belligerent capabilities and tactics.

(5) Use of non-lethal weapons.

(6) Public security operations: law enforcement tasks,operations with UN civilian police (UNCIVPOL) or localpolice.

2 UN General Assembly Resolution 44/49, of 08 December 1989.

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b. Troop contributing nations’ capacities:

(1) boundary operations;

(2) cultural norms;

(3) interoperability; and

(4) liaison officer requirements: cultural awareness,linguistic skills, ability to temper ADF operational focus,express troop contributing countries’ (TCC) approach toADF commanders.

c. Working with humanitarian agencies (civil-military operations(CMO)/civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), noting that this is nota Corps or Service-specific task) and civilian police.

d. Understanding of the local environment: country, history,culture, language, customs and local laws and societal norms.There is a specific need to develop an understanding of theimpact of conflict on the population, which can then form thebasis of actions directed towards winning the confidence of thelocal population.

e. Rights, privileges and immunities under status of force (ormission) agreements or other arrangements.

f. Liaison and negotiation: these are traits required in all peaceoperations, and are not restricted to headquarter staffs andsenior officers. These skills at the tactical level can impact onoperational and strategic outcomes, therefore role-playing aspart of scenario-based force preparation will be necessary.

g. Combat functions:

(1) land, maritime and air component force preparation;

(2) excellence in individual and collective skills;

(3) legal provisions, including rules of engagement(ROE)/orders for opening fire;

(4) human rights and humanitarian law issues appropriateto operations;

(5) urban warfare requirements and limitations; and

(6) force protection.

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h. Logistics and administration management tools:

(1) UN contingent owned equipment (COE) and table ofentitlement;

(2) memoranda of understanding, reimbursement ofnational equipment beyond COE, and sustainmentoptions;

(3) coalition cross-servicing arrangements and the coalitionmaintenance plan; and

(4) conditions of service: including pay and allowances,dependant responsibilities, pastoral care, rest andrecreation, and rotation plans.

i. Environment:

(1) health threats and precautions, and risk assessments;and

(2) characteristics and constraints of the area ofoperations.

j. Continuation training:

(1) skill maintenance;

(2) emerging tasks during operations;

(3) mission updates; and

(4) other skills or knowledge which, because of time orinformation constraints, were not available duringpre-deployment training.

Auditing 7.6

7.6 Effective force preparation includes a comprehensive assessment ofindividuals’ compliance with the mandatory criteria for deployment onoverseas operations. Some generic areas that may require addressinginclude all or parts of the following list (by no means exhaustive):

a. force preparation auditing of mandatory administrative criteriaincluding:

(1) must be aged 18 years or older;

(2) current individual readiness report;

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(3) physical fitness, as per single-Service directives;

(4) weapon qualification or competence;

(5) current military identification card (with correct rank);

(6) possession of identity discs;

(7) possession of an up-to-date International Certificate ofVaccination;

(8) medical pre-deployment check list certifying ‘fit todeploy’ by the examining medical officer;

(9) dental pre-deployment check list certifying ‘fit to deploy’by the examining dental officer, and stating clearly thedental classification and date of the last annual dentalexamination;

(10) completion of the relevant health countermeasuresprogram;

(11) evidence of having a will lodged, or a signed declarationstating no wish to have a will;

(12) members involved in an ongoing civil or military policeinvestigation or other legal or court action may not beallowed to deploy; and

(13) financial arrangements and personal allotments.

b. Auditing of the member’s status:

(1) Force assignment and/or deployment order authority orvisit approval. A posting order does not provide theauthority to deploy.

(2) Defence Reservists may not deploy unless full-timeservice or 4j(3) has been approved.

(3) Civilians may deploy under a particular authority toaccompany the ADF on operations.

(4) Deployment of foreign (non-Australian) defence forcepersonnel may generally only occur if they are in receiptof a third country deployment authorisation.

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(5) Members deploying into an operational area may do sounder the auspices of other Australian military activities(such as a training support team) or Defencecooperation program task.

United Nations training and force preparation 7.7

7.7 In 2000, the UN Secretary-General directed a study be undertaken onthe whole question of peacekeeping. This report (commonly referred to as theBrahimi Report after the project leader) and the Secretary-General’sresponse recognise that, while training is primarily the responsibility of theMember States, the UN should assist them by establishing basic guidelinesand performance standards by providing UN peacekeeping training material3.

7.8 The Training and Evaluation Services (TES) of the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for developing andproviding standardised peacekeeping training guidance, and MissionPlanning Services are responsible for the development of guidelines to TCC4,which includes some preparedness advice.

7.9 In August 2001, TES provided Member States with initial guidelines tostandardise their peacekeeping training. The paper, ‘Standardisation andEvaluation of UN Peacekeeping Training’ (also known as the UN CoreTraining Requirements), has been distributed to all ADF components andtraining commands by the Australian Defence Force WarfareCentre (ADFWC).

7.10 For UN peace operations, the UN has determined its responsibility toconfirm the preparedness of each TCC before they deploy to the mission areaas noted below:

5

3 Panel on UN Peace Operations UN A/55/305–S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000;Secretary-General’s Report UN A/55/502 of 20 October 2000.

4 These guidelines are issued to each TCC when their offer of contribution is accepted.

The Secretariat should as a standard practice, send a team to confirm thepreparedness of each troop contributor to meet the provisions of thememoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipmentrequirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet therequirements must not deploy.5

5 UN A/55/305-S/200/809, of 21 August 2000, paragraph 117(c).

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7.11 To enforce this, the Secretary-General has recommended6 that theUN should send a team of experts to TCC to ascertain their preparednessbefore deployment of personnel to mission areas. It was further proposed thatfield missions be visited every six months ‘to ensure that (training) standardsare continuing to be met’. Additionally, the development of comprehensivelessons learned from operations is to be available to TCC7.

United Nations standardised guidelines 7.12

7.12 The process of standardisation of peacekeeping training is a necessityif Member States are to confirm their preparedness to participate in UNpeacekeeping operations prior to deployment, as recommended by theBrahimi Report.

7.13 The standardisation guidelines, or core training requirements, includespecific curriculum requirements for the training of personnel to be deployedas UN Military Observers (UNMO), UN Staff Officers and UNCIVPOL. Thesetraining standards and guidelines (with the exception of UNCIVPOL) aredetailed in annex A.

7.14 Training assistance. The UN has several options to assist TCC withforce preparation, including mobile UN Training Assistance Teams foroperational and logistics training assistance. As part of the UN stand byarrangements system, the ADF supports this program and makes available tothe UN personnel to be part of a ‘fly-away’ training team to support TCC’preparations. These personnel are also available for ADF force preparation,and the ADF Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC) can provide details.

6 Secretary-General’s Report A/55/502 of 20 October 2000, paragraph 90–92.

7 The value of lessons learned (‘to be learned’) relies heavily on the availability of TCC lessonsduring their service on UN operations. Australian observations and post-operational reports,although having an ADF focus, are most likely also applicable to other TCC. As part of theADF rotation plan and tasks for the national command element, ADF lessons should bepassed to the Peacekeeping Force (PKF) Headquarters Training Cell, for inclusion in themission’s lessons to be passed to DPKO.

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Figure 7–1: An example of pocket cards produced by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which will be distributed by the ADF peace

operations training organisations during force preparation training

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Module Subject RequirementsThe UN The UN system;

UN peacekeeping operationsLegal framework for UN peacekeeping operations

UN Security Council Resolutions; The UN Charter;Status of forces agreement/status of mission agreement and rights;Privileges and immunities

The UN peacekeeper UN code of conduct (‘We are Peacekeepers’); Cultural awareness

Command and control UN command and control;ROE;Use of force; UN planning process

Tactics and techniques UN staff process;UNMO and contingent operations

Safety and security awareness

UN security alert system;PKF coordination with UN Security Coordinator;Personal security awareness;Mine and booby trap awareness;Terrorism

Media relations Public information; the media in UN peacekeeping operations;‘Key mission messages’ (UN, force commander, ADF)

Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation and mediation techniques and needs

UN CIMIC/CMO UN humanitarian mission aims (refugee, IDP, emergency requirements and focus); UN and NGO agencies’ roles and tasks;PKF humanitarian tasks and coordination

Gender and peacekeeping

Gender awareness (PKF, UN and NGO agencies, the people)

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

UN mission focus, as necessary

Human rights for peacekeeping

PKF human rights awareness;Reporting and monitoring human rights

Force generation Selection and management of PKF personnel;UN stand by arrangement system

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Table 7–1: United Nations standardised generic training modules

7.15 Standardised generic training modules. TES has developedtraining guidance at a generic level for UN peacekeeping operations, which isoutlined in table 7–1 and in annex A.

7.16 United Nations correspondence courses. The UN offers individualcourses that may be of interest to ADF members, coordinated by the UNInstitute for Training and Research (UNITAR)8.

Multinational force training guidelines 7.17

7.17 Training guidelines for multinational military operations are containedin annex B. For additional guidance, refer to Coalition Building Guide,Multinational Interoperability Council, 07 April 2003.

Australian Defence Force training support 7.18

7.18 In fulfilment of the UN General Assembly Resolution encouragingMember States to establish national training programs, the ADF has twodedicated peace operations training organisations: the ADFPKC based atADFWC, RAAF Base Williamtown, and the Deployed Forces SupportUnit (DFSU). DFSU comprises two key elements: Deployed Forces SupportUnit—Sydney (DFSU–S) and Force Preparation Squadron—Darwin(FPS–D).

7.19 ADFPKC looks at operational and strategic issues, and deals withinternational engagement. DFSU deals with tactical and practical forcepreparation requirements for small contingents and individuals, includingcivilians deploying with the ADF. The focus of DFSU–S is on minor overseascontingents (including administration of the elements whilst deployed), whilethe focus of FPS–D is on units, groups and individuals deploying as part of amajor contingent with its own command and administrative element.

7.20 These organisations have specific tasks concerning the forcepreparation (training and auditing) of ADF force elements and supportingstaff. Pre-deployment training can be conducted in a unit’s home location

Logistics UN logistics and support;COE and table of equipment entitlements; Mission integrated logistics

Medical UN medical support;Diseases and stress management

8 Refer to the UNITAR web site: www.unitarpoci.org.

Module Subject Requirements

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(using ‘fly-away’ training teams and local subject matter experts) or in amounting area or forward mounting base (FMB). The Australian contingent forthe UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) II (1994–1995), forexample, was trained in Townsville prior to deploying to Rwanda. FPS–D wasspecifically raised in Darwin in late 1999 as this was the FMB for operationsin East Timor.

7.21 These organisations have developed close working relations withexternal to ADF organisations that play key roles in the conduct of successfulpeace operations (UN or multinational force), and can assist with educationand training requirements as well as liaison with NGO, the Australian Agencyfor International Development and the Australian Federal Police.

Annexes: A. United Nations peacekeeping training standards and guidelinesB. Multinational force training guidance

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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING TRAINING STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES A

Introduction 1

1. The purpose of this annex is to outline the United Nations (UN)requirements for peace operations training and preparation. These standardsare minimums which the UN expects all nations to undertake prior tocommitting force elements regardless of size and service. Troop contributingcountries (TCC) can and must provide additional training based onknowledge of the theatre of operations and from lessons learned from earliernational or other nation’s contributions to the same operation or theatre.

2. The UN has developed and continues to research appropriate trainingpublications. The list below is the source of information for the trainingprograms listed in appendix 1 to this annex1:

a. UN Military Observers Handbook;

b. General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations;

c. United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook for Junior Ranks;

d. United Nations Stress Management Booklet;

e. Ten Rules: ‘Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets’;

f. ‘We Are United Nations Peacekeepers’;

g. Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UnitedNations Military Observers;

h. United Nations Military Observer Course Curriculum;

i. United Nations Training Assistance Teams: Advisor’sGuidebook;

j. A Peacekeeping Training Manual;

k. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration ofex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment—Principlesand Guidelines;

l. A Guide to Peace Support Operations;

1 Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre or Deployed Forces Support Unit should becontacted if copies of these publications are required.

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ADFP 3.8.1

m. Provisional Guidelines for Public Information Components inUnited Nations Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions;

n. Stand-by Arrangements in the Service of Peace: Tables ofOrganization and Equipment;

o. Security Awareness: An Aide-Memoire;

p. Medical Support Manual for United Nations PeacekeepingOperations;

q. ‘Hostage Incident’ Card;

r. Protect Yourself, and Those You Care About, AgainstHIV/AIDS;

s. HIV Prevention and Behaviour Change in International MilitaryPopulations;

t. Aide-Memoire: Policy Guidelines on HIV/AIDS Prevention andControl for UN Military Planners and Commanders;

u. United Nations Civilian Police Handbook;

v. Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UnitedNations Civilian Police; and

w. UN Military Symbols Handbook.

3. The following definitions are used by the Department of PeacekeepingOperations Training Evaluation Services to identify UN peacekeeping trainingactivities:

a. Classroom course. A series of lectures or lessons dedicatedto a particular subject, usually aided by specialised books andteaching aids.

b. Distance training. Standard training provided directly toindividual students world-wide. May include printedcorrespondence courses, web-based, compact disc, andothers.

c. Seminar. A short but intensive and research-based classroomcourse of study or discussion of experts on a particular subjector issue.

d. Workshop. A meeting for concerted discussions or activities,usually of experts and/or interested and committedparticipants.

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ADFP 3.8.1

e. Generic training. Training conducted in preparation ofcontributing officers and troops to any mission and before themission is made known to the respective TCC.

f. Pre-deployment training. National training or distancetraining conducted in preparation for deployment of policeand/or military officers and troops to a specific mission.

g. Exercise. A particular task or set of tasks designed for thepurpose of participating or testing the ability, technique orquality of a person, thing or process.

h. In-mission briefings. Briefings conducted to police and/ormilitary officers and troops in preparation for furtherdeployment into sectors in mission area and upon undertakingthe designated task and responsibilities.

Appendix: 1. United Nations pre–deployment training core curriculum check lists

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Appendix 1 to Annex A to


UNITED NATIONS PRE–DEPLOYMENT TRAINING CORE CURRICULUM CHECK LISTS 1

1. This appendix contains the following tables:

a. table 7A1–1: United Nations Military Observer (UNMO)pre-deployment training core curriculum check list;

b. table 7A1–2: United Nations (UN) Staff Officer pre-deploymenttraining core curriculum check list; and

c. table 7A1–3: UN Peacekeeping Contingent pre-deploymenttraining core curriculum check list.

2. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Training andEvaluation Service has promulgated these subjects, and they will form thebasis of any assessment or evaluation of Australian Defence Force forceelements (and any other troop contributing countries) offered to participate ina UN peace operation. The source of information to develop these packagesis noted in the annex, and from other national resources.

3. This guidance should also suit multinational force preparation, but willrequire supplementation by lead nation and/or organisation information.

UNMO Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Check ListSubject Subject Matter

ComponentsQuestions and Focal

AreasUN structure, functions and purpose

1.1

1.21.3

1.4

1.5

UN Charter and organisationUN peacekeepingStructure of peacekeeping operationsUN agencies and international organisationsLegal aspects

What is the UN?Charter Chapter VI/VII.What is peacekeeping and how was it developed?Who are the other players?What is the legal basis?

7A1–1

ADFP 3.8.1

Military observer duties and responsibilities

2.12.22.32.4

2.5

2.62.7

ObservationReporting PatrollingVerification and monitoringInvestigation and inspectionLead an UNMO teamBriefing and staff skills

UNMO duties.What to report.How to read a map/global positioning system.What to look at/for.How to inspect.Leading a team with higher ranked officers.How to conduct a briefing.

Negotiation, mediation and liaison procedures

3.13.23.33.43.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

Cultural factorsMedia relationsUse of interpretersCrisis managementNegotiation and mediation techniquesLiaison techniques and interpersonal skillsWorking with local authorities, international staff and organisationsSocial interaction with local population

How does culture and religion affect individuals?How the media behaves.Using an interpreter.How to handle difficult situation.How to build confidence in the local population.Restrictions to take into consideration while dealing with the local population.

Administration and pay

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

UN administrative arrangementsUN pay and allowancesUN leave/compensatory time off (CTO) policyUN, host and own country support

Familiarity with UN administration and support arrangements.



Areas

7A1–2

ADFP 3.8.1

Basic driving, maintenance and vehicle recovery skills

5.15.2

5.35.45.5

UN RegulationsVehicle checks and maintenanceDriving techniquesRecoveryConvoy driving and mine awareness

UN standards for vehicle maintenance.Vehicle use (including off-duty).Understanding the driving conditions,Self and assisted recovery.

Communications and radio telephone procedure

6.16.26.36.4

Operating UN radiosUN proceduresMilitary termsUN standard reports and report writing

Types of UN equipment.Transmit and receive messages.Understand UN report and return requirements.

Mine awareness and explosive ordnance

7.1

7.2

7.37.4

Mine and mined areas in area of operations (AO)Improvised explosive devices (IED)Casualty recoveryPrecautions in moving in mined or explosive ordnance (EO) threat

How to judge is an area is mined or not.What are IED?Dealing with mine casualties.Preparations for working in mined areas.

Personal health, hygiene and fitness

8.1

8.28.3

8.4

Risks with HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STD)Water and foodPersonal fitness and hygieneAlcohol and food

Staying fit and healthy in small team environment.

Personal survival skills

9.1

9.29.3

Chemical, biological and radiological protectionHostage and hijacksOthers

Personal protection requirement.Dos and don’ts.



Areas

7A1–3

ADFP 3.8.1

Medical and evacuation

10.110.210.310.4

10.510.610,710.8

10.9

Stress managementCasualty requirementsResuscitationWounds, fractures and burnsShockClimatic conditionsInsects and animalsEvacuation arrangementsReporting requirements

Recognition and management of stress.How to provide casualty support and priorities.Climatic survival requirements.Patient evacuation. Preparation and calling for medical evacuation.Report requirements.

Language 11.111.2

11.3

UN termsMission language testsLocal language

Understand basic phrases.Test requirements.

Human rights and humanitarian issues

12.1

12.2

12.312.4

12.5

12.6

12.7

12.8

Law of armed conflict (LOAC)/ international humanitarian law (IHL)Monitoring human rightsGender issuesChild and women issuesInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP)Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)/civil-military operations (CMO)Election monitoring

Familiar with LOAC/IHL/human rights (HR) issues.What are gender and women/children issues in AO?What may be considered HR abuses/violations and how to report.Refugee issues.Civilian police responsibilities.



Areas

7A1–4

ADFP 3.8.1

Table 7A1–1: UNMO pre-deployment training core curriculum check list

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants

13.1

13.213.3

13.4

Disarmament and weapon managementVerification needsDemobilisation and reintegration plansPost conflict peace building

What is DDR?What are UNMO responsibilities?

Mission information

14.1

14.2

14.3

14.4

History of the conflict, region and parties to the conflictMission mandate, agreements, standing operating procedures (SOP) and rules of engagement (ROE)Mission organisation, commanders and UNMO locationsDeployment and opposition force recognition



Areas

7A1–5

ADFP 3.8.1

UN Staff Officer Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Check listSubject Subject Matter


AreasBackground ofUN

1.11.21.31.4

UN CharterUN organisationOther UN agenciesNational lessons learned

What is the UN?Charter Chapter VI/VII.Peacekeeping, and how it was developed.The other players.

UN peacekeeping operations

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

Evolution of UN peacekeepingDefinitions—preventative deployment to peace enforcementUniversal principles and guidelinesOrganisation and composition of DPKO/UN mission

Development of UN peacekeeping.Legal framework for operations.What is DPKO and the UN mission structure?What is mission management?

Geopolitical information

3.13.23.33.43.53.63.73.83.93.10

GeographyHistoryExternal influencesEconomyPolitical systemReligionsArmed forces/factionsDemographyCultural issuesThreats and hazards

What are the constraints of the mission area?What are the national cultural, religions issues?What is the origin of the conflict?What is the regional international intervention?What is the political situation?

Mission mandate 4.14.2

Mission historyAuthorities—status of forces agreement (SOFA)/ status of mission agreement (SOMA)

UN action—Security Council/General Assembly, mission organisation.Concept of operations (CONOPS).

7A1–6

ADFP 3.8.1

General military staff officer skills

5.1

5.2

5.35.45.5

5.6

Organisation of an operations centre– SOP– Orders and reports– Management of information– Coordination of operationsObservation, reconnaissance and surveillance techniquesPatrollingDriving skillsMap reading and navigationRapid reaction force procedures

What does the UN expect us to do?Deployment.SOP.Reporting.Riot and crowd control.Observation post duty.Tracking and tailing.Patrol duty.Inter positioning.Check-point duty.Guard duty.Show of force.Escort duty.Monitoring.Weapons confiscation and disarmament.Rapid reaction reserve.

UN peacekeeping skills

6.1

6.26.36.46.56.6

6.7

Negotiation and mediationROE comprehensionUse of forceUN Code of ConductComputer skillsPersonal communication skills– Mission language– Local languageLiaison requirements– Within mission– Media– Other UN agencies– Local authorities– CIMIC

Main principles of negotiation/mediation.De-escalation techniques.Why ROE?Principles of use of force.Knowing code of conduct (COC).Oral and written test in Mission language.Why use liaison officers?Modus operandi for UN agencies.Principles of CIMIC.



Areas

7A1–7

ADFP 3.8.1

UN Staff Officer operational skills

7.17.2

7.37.47.5

7.67.77.8

Staff coordinationHeadquarters (HQ) planning process– Consultation and decision– National consideration– Interoperability and multicultural awareness– Coordination of NGO/UN agencies– Estimates– Plans and ordersOrders formatSOPMinutes of meetings formatReports/returnsSymbols/map markingMessage handling– Internal/external– Information security

Familiarity with HQ composition and staff cells.Understanding staff working procedures.Developing understanding of the civilian functions in HQ.Being familiar with formats used.Knowing symbols for map marking.Communicating using voice or messages.Conforming to information security systems.Being able to give briefings.Computer skills.

Protective and safety measures

8.1

8.28.38.4

8.58.68.78.8

Medical, first aid and preventive health measures– Hygiene– Camp organisation– Food and water controlMedical evacuationSurvival skillsMine and EO awarenessFortification/sheltersFire safetyUN marking–visibilityCurfew and movement restrictions

Performing first aid.Local diseases.Hygiene and food/water control.Knowledge of UN medical system.Basic survival skills.Construction of fortifications and shelters.Knowing how to use UN markings and flags.



Areas

7A1–8

ADFP 3.8.1

Table 7A1–2: UN Staff Officer pre-deployment training core curriculum check list

Medical 9.19.2

9.3

9.4

Stress managementBasic facts on HIV/AIDSPersonal risk assessment– Prevention– Condom demonstrationMedical challenges

Understanding stress management.Transmission of STD—HIV/AIDS.Personal protection/prevention.UN COC.

Administration and welfare

10.110.210.310.4

PayCTO/Home leaveMailWelfare

Managing personal economy for tour of duty. Retrieving cash in mission.Leave entitlements.Sending/receiving mail.UN welfare issues.Planned national welfare.

DDR 11.111.2

11.311.4

DefinitionsAgreements and international standardsMain issues in DDRIntegrated planning

Why the need for DDR?Principles for DDR process.Actors and responsibilities.What is ‘unity of effort’ and ‘end-state’?How to achieve these goals?



Areas

7A1–9

ADFP 3.8.1

UN Peacekeeping Contingent Pre-Deployment TrainingCore Curriculum Check list

Subject Subject Matter Components Questions and Focal Areas

Background of the UN

1.11.21.31.4

UN CharterUN organisationOther UN agenciesNational lessons learned

What is the UN?Charter Chapter VI/VII.Peacekeeping and how it was developed.The other players.

UN peacekeeping operations

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

Evolution of UN peacekeepingDefinitions—preventative deployment to peace enforcementUniversal principles and guidelinesOrganisation and composition of DPKO/UN mission

Development of UN peacekeeping.Legal framework for operations.What is DPKO and the UN mission structure?What is mission management?

Geopolitical information

3.13.23.33.43.53.63.73.83.93.10

GeographyHistoryExternal influencesEconomyPolitical systemReligionsArmed forces/factionsDemographyCultural issuesThreats and hazards

What are the constraints of the mission area?What are the national cultural, religions issues?What is the origin of the conflict?What is the regional international intervention?What is the political situation?

Mission mandate 4.14.2

Mission historyAuthorities—SOFA/SOMA

UN action—Security Council/General Assembly, mission organisation.CONOPS.

7A1–10

ADFP 3.8.1

General military skills

5.1

5.2

5.35.45.5

5.6

Organisation requirements– SOP– Orders and reports– Management of information– Coordination of operationsObservation, recon and surveillance techniquesPatrollingDriving skillsMap reading and navigationRapid reaction force procedures

What does the UN expect us to do?Deployment.SOPs.Reporting.Riot and crowd control.Observation post duty.Tracking and tailing.Patrol duty.Inter positioning.Check-point duty.Guard duty.Show of force.Escort duty.Monitoring.Weapons confiscation and disarmamentRapid reaction reserve.

UN peacekeeping skills

6.1

6.26.36.46.56.6

6.7

Negotiation and mediationROE comprehensionUse of forceUN Code of ConductComputer skillsPersonal communication skills– Mission language– Local languageLiaison requirements– Within mission– Media– Other UN agencies– local authorities– CIMIC

Main principles ofnegotiation/mediation.De-escalation techniques.Why ROE?Use of Force.Knowing COC.Oral and written test in Mission language.Why use liaison officers?Modus operandi for UN agencies.Principles of CIMIC.



7A1–11

ADFP 3.8.1

UN peacekeeping operational skills

7.17.27.37.4

7.57.67.77.8

Use of forceCheckpoint operationEscort dutiesGuarding key and vulnerable pointsCrowd and riot controlInspection and searchTracking and tailingSignal and communications

Practical ex in constructing/operating a check point (CP)/Mobile CP.Escorting through CP.Guarding.Observe ROE/use of force.Exercise patrolling.Practical crowd/riot control.Inspecting and searching vehicles.Live communications exercise.

Protective and safety measures

8.1

8.28.38.4

8.58.68.78.8

Medical, first aid and preventive health measures– Hygiene– Camp organization– Food and water controlMedical evacuationSurvival skillsMine and EO awarenessFortification/sheltersFire safetyUN marking-visibilityCurfew and movement restrictions

Performing first aid.Local diseases.Hygiene and food/water control.Knowledge of UN medical system.Basic survival skills.Construction of fortifications and shelters.Knowing how to use UN markings and flags.

Medical 9.19.2

9.3

9.4

Stress managementBasic facts on HIV/AIDSPersonal risk assessment– Prevention– Condom demonstrationMedical challenges

Understanding stress management.Transmission of STD–HIV/AIDS.Personal protection/prevention.UN COC.



7A1–12

ADFP 3.8.1

Administrative and welfare

10.110.210.310.4

PayCTO/home leaveMailWelfare

Managing personal economy during the tour of duty. Retrieving cash in mission.Leave entitlements.Sending/receiving mail.UN welfare issues.Planned national welfare.

Logistics 11.111.211.311.411.5

11.611.7

Personnel adminDeploymentCOEInspectionsPetrols, oils and lubricantsFoodSelf sustainment

What is national responsibility and what is UN responsibility?Understanding the differences between contingent owned equipment, UN–owned equipment and nationally owned equipment.UN logistics versus national support element.

Human rights and humanitarian issues

12.112.2

12.312.4

12.512.612.7

Law of war/IHLInternational Human RightsGender issuesChildren and women issuesMonitoring of HRICRCRefugees and IDP

Familiarity with international laws.Understanding of human rights in connection with UN peacekeeping. Why the need for gender awareness?Why special concern for women and children?What to look for from violations of HR?How to report violations?Concerns in connection with refugees/IDP.



7A1–13

ADFP 3.8.1

Table 7A1–3: United Nations peacekeeping contingent pre-deployment training core curriculum check list

CMO/CIMIC 13.113.213.313.413.513.6

UN force civiliansNGOHost nation civiliansCultural sensitivityLocal authoritiesMedia

What are the roles and functions of UN civilian staff?How to deal with civilians/NGO?Sensitive issues.Authority of local police.Dealing with media/media awareness.Understanding principles of CIMIC.

DDR 14.114.2

14.314.4

DefinitionsAgreements and international standardsMain issues in DDRIntegrated planning

Why the need for DDR?Principles for DDR process.Actors and responsibilities.What is ‘unity of effort’ and ‘end-state’?How to achieve these goals?



7A1–14


MULTINATIONAL FORCE TRAINING GUIDANCE B

Introduction 1

1. The information contained in this annex is derived from the ABCACoalition Handbook1. Whilst the handbook is oriented towards landoperations, it is generic enough to be used as a guide for all componentpreparations. There are many similarities between information from thehandbook and the United Nations training guidance, therefore publicationsmay be considered interchangeable.

Conduct of training 7.2

2. Training and force preparation teaches participants about strengthsand weaknesses of multinational force partners, the area of operations (AO),tasks and the people the operation is to support. Training should beconducted at all levels, and include the staff. Importantly, training does notcease once deployed into the AO—a training continuum must be establishedto deal with mission changes, rehearsals for operations and conductingcombined operations. Activities of this nature can also broadcast thecapabilities of the force and act as a deterrent to adversaries.

3. Pre-deployment focus. Pre-deployment training should focus on thefollowing areas:

a. individual military skills;

b. individual and collective preventive medicine procedures andpractice;

c. first aid—both individual and ‘buddy’;

d. terrorism awareness and prevention;

e. education lessons in the coalition structure, mandate, chain ofcommand and division of responsibilities (to includenon-government organisation and international agencystructures).

f. unit training based on projected operations (rehearsals shouldbe mandatory);

g. team-building and staff training (to include training withcoalition forces and non-military organisations);

1 ABCA Coalition Handbook 1, November 2001

7B–1

ADFP 3.8.1

h. liaison officer training (to ensure that personnel areknowledgeable representatives);

i. customs, culture, religious practices, political situation,geography, economic, and historical background of thesituation and population of the AO;

j. adversary capabilities;

k. how to effectively communicate to the public through the newsmedia;

l. negotiation and mediation;

m. language training, especially key phrases (although ABCAarmies all speak English, not all operational terms have thesame meaning to each army);

n. situational awareness (to include mine and booby trapawareness, and weapons recognition);

o. rules of engagement;

p. law of armed conflict;

q. crowd control, and the use and employment of non-lethal riotcontrol agents;

r. employment and use of non-lethal weapons’ capabilities; and

s. in-theatre driving conditions and skills for drivers and vehiclecommanders.

4. In-country training. The coalition commander may need to evaluatethe level of training of each troop contributing country (TCC) to determine if itis ready to commit to the AO or if additional training may be necessary priorto commitment.

5. This training may be related to cultural or other issues related to thehost nation. A check list might include the following items:

a. What pre-deployment training has been conducted by TCCs?

b. Have designated troops from a TCC trained previously withtroops from other TCCs?

c. What pre-deployment or in-country training will be necessarybefore the commitment or deployment of troops into the AO?

7B–2

ADFP 3.8.1

d. What level of training is posed by each of the TCCs?

e. Does each of the TCCs have some form of training for liaisonofficers, or will the coalition headquarters need to establish aprogram?

7B–3

ADFP 3.8.1

GLOSSARYUnless stated otherwise, ADF terms and definitions are used within thispublication. Externally-sourced terms and definitions, approved for ADF use,are designated in brackets following the definition, using the following legend:

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, betweenthe Commander and civil actors, including the national population andlocal authorities, as well as international, national andnon-governmental organisations and agencies. (NATO, modified1)

operational command (OPCOMD)The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks tosubordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and toretain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or controlas may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself includeresponsibility for administration or logistic support. (NATO, modified2)

operational control (OPCON)The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned sothat the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks whichare usually limited by function, time or location; deploy unitsconcerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units. It doesnot include authority to allocate separate employment of componentsof the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrativeor logistic control.

peace enforcementThe coercive use of civil and military actions by legitimate,international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to restorepeace between belligerents, who may not consent to that intervention.These actions will take the form of a graduated response to conflictresolution: from the imposition of civil sanctions, followed by militarysupport of sanctions, military sanctions and finally collective securityactions.

NATO Allied Administrative Publication–6, NATO Glossary of Terms andDefinitions, 2003 (AAP–6).

1 The NATO definition refers to ‘NATO Commander’.

2 Includes ‘tactical command’ and has minor wording differences to the NATO definition.

1

ADFP 3.8.1

peace operationAn operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and militarymeans, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes andprinciples, to restore or maintain peace. (NATO, modified3)

peacebuildingA set of strategies which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflictsand other major crises do not arise in the first place or if they do arisethat they do not subsequently recur. It includes:a. Pre-conflict peace building refers to longer-term economic,

social and political measures which can help States deal withemerging threats and disputes.

b. Post-conflict peace building involves rehabilitation andconstruction assistance generally, support for various kinds ofinstitution building and specific practical programs likede-mining.

peacekeepingA non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate,international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consentof the belligerent parties, in an impartial, non-combatant manner, toimplement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aidoperations.

peacemakingAn operation conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure aceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomaticaction supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of militaryassets. (NATO, modified4)

preventive diplomacyAction to prevent disputes from developing between parties, or toprevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit theexpansion of conflicts when they occur.

tactical command (TACOMD)The authority delegated to a commander to specify tasks to forcesunder his command for the accomplishment of the mission specifiedby higher authority. (NATO, modified5)

3 The NATO term is ‘peace support operation’. The final line of the NATO definition (examples)is omitted.

4 The NATO definition uses the term ‘peace support operation’.

5 ‘Specify/specified’ replaces ‘assign/assigned’ used in the NATO definition.

2

ADFP 3.8.1

tactical control (TACON)The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements ormanoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.(NATO)

3

ADFP 3.8.1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONSUnless stated otherwise, approved ADF acronyms and abbreviations areused within this publication. Externally-sourced acronyms and abbreviations,herewith approved for ADF use, have the source designated in bracketsfollowing the definition, using the following legend:

ADDP Australian Defence Doctrine PublicationADF Australian Defence ForceADFP Australian Defence Force PublicationADFPKC Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping CentreADFWC Australian Defence Force Warfare CentreAEC Australian Electoral CommissionAFP Australian Federal PoliceAO area of operationsAusAID Australian Agency for International

Development

CAO Chief Administration OfficerCIMIC civil-military cooperationCIVPOL civilian policeCMO civil-military operationsCOC code of conductCOE contingent owned equipmentCONOPS concept of operationsCP check pointCTO compensatory time off

DDR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegrationDFDA Defence Force Discipline Act 1982DFSU Deployed Forces Support UnitDFSU–S Deployed Forces Support Unit—SydneyDOMREP Representative of the SG in the Dominican

Republic, 1965–1966DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EO explosive ordnance

FC force commanderFLSG Force Logistic Support GroupFMB forward mounting baseFPS–D Force Preparation Squadron–DarwinFYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

NATO Allied Administrative Publication–6, NATO Glossary of Terms andDefinitions, 2003 (AAP–6).

MIC Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide, 07 April 2003.

5

ADFP 3.8.1

HA humanitarian assistanceHOM head of missionHR human rights

ICC International Criminal CourtICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDP internally displaced personIED improvised explosive devicesIFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent SocietiesIHL international humanitarian lawIMF International Monetary FundINTERFET International Force in East Timor

LN (Coalition) Lead Nation (MIC)LOA letter of assistLOAC law of armed conflict

MFO Multinational Force and Observers, 1982 topresent

MIF Multinational Interception Force, 1993 to presentMINURSOUN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara,

1991 to present MNF multinational forceMOU memorandum/memoranda of understandingMTF Multinational Task Force, 1991 to present

NGHA non-governmental humanitarian agenciesNGO non-government organisation

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OMS Office of Mission Support (DPKO)ONUCUN Operation in Congo, 1960–1964ONUCAUN Observer Group in Central America, 1989–1992ONUMOZUN Operation in Mozambique, 1993–1994ONUSALUN Observer Mission in El Salvador, 1991–1995ONUVEHUN Observer Group for the Verification of Elections

in Haiti, 1990OP observation post

PKF peacekeeping forcePVO private voluntary organisation

ROE rules of engagement

SOFA status of forces agreement/separation of forcesagreement

SOMA status of mission agreement

6

ADFP 3.8.1

SOP standing operating procedureSPPKF South Pacific Peacekeeping ForceSRSG Special Representative of the

Secretary-GeneralSTD sexually transmitted disease

TCC troop contributing countryTCN troop contributing nation (NATO)TDLS The Defence Legal ServiceTES Training and Evaluation Services

UN United NationsUNAMET UN Mission in East TimorUNAMSIL UN Assistance Mission in Sierra LeoneUNAMIC UN Advance Mission in Cambodia, 1991UNAMIR UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1993–1996UNAVEM I UN Angola Verification Mission, 1989–1991UNAVEM II UN Angola Verification Mission II, 1991–1995UNAVEM III UN Angola Verification Mission, 1995 to presentUNBRO UN Border Relief Organisation (Thai-Cambodia

border), 1989–1992UNCHR UN Commission for Human RightsUNCI UN Commission for Indonesia, 1949–1951UNCIVPOL vCivilian PoliceUNCOK UN Commission on Korea, 1948–1950UNCRO UN Confidence Restoration Operation in

Croatia, 1995–1996UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan

Heights), 1974 to presentUNDP UN Development ProgramUNEF I UN Emergency Force (Gaza and Sinai),

1956–1967UNEF II UN Emergency Force (Sinai), 1973–1979UNFICYP UN Force in Cyprus, 1964 to presentUNGA UN General AssemblyUNGFNI UN Guard Force in Northern Iraq, 1991–1992UNGOC UN Good Offices Commission (Indonesia),

1947–1949UNGOMAP UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, 1988–1990UNHCR UN Office of the UN High Commissioner for

RefugeesUNICEF UN United Nations Children’s FundUNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978 to presentUNIKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, 1991 to

presentUNLB UN Logistics Base

7

ADFP 3.8.1

UNIMOG UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, 1988–1991

UNIPOM UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission, 1965–1966

UNITAF Unified Task Force in Somalia, 1992–1993UNITAR UN Institute for Training and ResearchUNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000 to

presentUNMIBH UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995 to

presentUNMIH UN Mission in Haiti, 1993 to presentUNMISET UN Mission of Support in East TimorUNMO UN Military ObserverUNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and

Pakistan, 1949 to presentUNMOP UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, 1996 to

presentUNMOT UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, 1994 to

presentUNOGIL UN Observation Group in Lebanon, 1958UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia, 1993 to

presentUNOMIL UN Observer Mission in Liberia, 1993 to presentUNOMUR UN Observer Mission in Uganda and

Rwanda,1993–1994UNOSOM I UN Operation in Somalia I, 1992–1993UNOSOM II UN Operation in Somalia II, 1993–1995UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment Force (FYROM),

1995 to presentUNPROFOR UN Protection Force, 1992–1995UNSC UN Security CouncilUNSCOB UN Special Committee on the BalkansUNSCOM UN Special Commission (Iraq), 1991 to presentUNSCR UN Security Council ResolutionUNSF UN Security Force in West New Guinea (under

UNTEA), 1962–1963UNSG UN Secretary-GeneralUNSOM UN Operation in SomaliaUNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia,

1992–1993UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East TimorUNITAF Unified Task ForceUNTAG UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia),

1989–1990UNTEA UN Temporary Executive Authority (West Irian),

1962

8

ADFP 3.8.1

UNTEAS UN Transitional Administration for Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, 1996 to present

UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organisation, 1948 to present

UNYOM UN Yemen Observation Mission, 1963–1964

9

ADFP 3.8.1

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, AID AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS/AGENCIES AND MISCELLANEOUS UNITED NATIONS

AGENCIES* French abbreviations in brackets where applicableACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and

Budgetary QuestionsACFOA Australian Council For Overseas AidACVA American Council of Voluntary Agencies

(New York)ADB (BAFD*) African Development Bank (Adidjan)AFP Agence France PresseAFSC American Friends Service Committee Inc

(Philadelphia)AICF Action Internationale Contre la FaimAID Agency for International Development

(Washington)AID Action In Distress (London)AJD CAmerican Joint Distribution CentreAP (BAD*) Asian Development BankAusAID Australian Agency for International

Development

BBF Brother’s Brother Foundation (Pittsburgh)

CAFOD Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (London)

CARE Cooperative for American Relief EverywhereCARICOM Caribbean Community (Georgetown)CARITAS Caritas Internationalis (Rome)CASA Christian Agency for Social Action (India)CCC (CCD*) Customs Cooperation Council (Brussels)CCIA Commission of the Churches on International

Affairs (WCC)CCPD Commission on the Participation of the

Churches in DevelopmentCD Conference on DisarmamentCFS Committee on World Food SocietyCHR Commission on Human RightsCE Council of Europe (Strasbourg)CENTO Central Treaty Organisation (Ankara)CICARWS Commission on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and

World Service (WCC)CIDA (ACDI*) Canadian International Development Agency

(Ottawa)

11

ADFP 3.8.1

CMC Christian Medical CommissionCMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(Moscow)COR UNUM Coordination of Roman Catholic Relief Agencies

(Vatican)CORR Christian Organisation for Relief and

Rehabilitation (Dacca)CORSO Council of Organisations for Relief Service

Overseas Inc (NZ)CRS Catholic Relief Service (New York and Geneva)CWS Church World Service (USA)

DAC (CAD*) Development Assistance Committee (OECD, Paris)

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency (Copenhagen)

DART Disaster Assistance Relief Team (USA)DD-II Second Development Decade (UN)DDW Das Diakonische Wark-German Churches

Service Agency (Stuttgart)DEC Disaster Emergency Committee (UK)

ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

ECOSOC Economic and Social CouncilERO Emergency Relief Operations of WHO (Geneva)ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

the PacificESCWA Economic and Social Commission for West Asia

FAO Food and Agriculture OrganisationFDRC Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator (USAID,

Washington)

GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System (FAO, Rome)

HABITAT Commission on Human Settlements

IAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and

DevelopmentICAO International Civil Aviation OrganisationICCB International Catholic Child Bureau (Geneva)ICEM (CIME*) Intergovernmental Committee for European

Migration (Geneva)ICJ International Court of JusticeICSC International Civil Service CommissionIDF Industrial Development Fund

12

ADFP 3.8.1

ILO International Labour OrganisationIMO International Maritime OrganisationITU International Telecommunication UnionICRC (CICR*) International Committee of the Red Cross

(Geneva)ICVA (CIAB*) International Council of Voluntary Agencies

(Geneva)IDA (AID*) International Development Association

(Washington)IIPE International Institute for Education Planning

(UNESCO, Paris)INCSEC Indo-China Secretariat (ICRC/LORCS, Geneva)IRC International Rescue Committee (New York)IUC WInternational Union for Child Welfare

LWF Lutheran World Federation (Geneva)LWS Lutheran World Service (Geneva)

MSF Medecins Sans Frontiers

NCR Norwegian Church Relief (Oslo)NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development (Oslo)NOVIB Netherlands Organisation for International

Development CooperationNPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OAS Organisation of American States (Washington)OAU Organisation for African UnityOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (Paris)OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID,

Washington)OSRO Office of Special Relief Organisation (FAO,

Rome)

PAHO Pan American Health Organisation (Washington)

SCF Save the Children FundSPEC South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation

(Suva)SWISSAID Swiss Association for Aid to Developing

Countries (Bern)

UNCHS UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)UNCLOS UN Convention/Conference on the Law of the

SeaUNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDCP UN International Drug Control Program

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ADFP 3.8.1

UNEP UN Environment ProgramUNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural

OrganisationUNFPA UN Population FundUNIDIR UN Institute for Disarmament ResearchUNIDO United Nations Industrial Development

OrganisationUNO (ONU*) United Nations OrganisationUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development (Geneva)UNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNDRO Office of the United Nations Disaster

Coordinator (Geneva)UNEP United Nations Environment Program (Nairobi)UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and

Cultural Organisation (Paris)UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (Geneva)UNIC United Nations Information CentreUNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund (New York)UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social

DevelopmentUNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

Refugees in the Near East

WCC World Council of Churches (Geneva)WEP World Employment Program (Geneva)WFC World Food Council (UN FAO, Rome)WOW War on Want (London)WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation

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series title adfp 3.8.1 peace operations, planning and ...j3.rtarf.mi.th/poc/pdf/article/series...

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