ADDP 3.8

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OPERATIONS SERIES

ADDP 3.8

PEACE OPERATIONS Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8 is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This publication supersedes Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8 edition 1 dated July 2004.

A.G. HOUSTON, AC, AFC Air Chief Marshal Chief of the Defence Force Department of Defence CANBERRA ACT 2600 14 December 2009

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2009

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Department of Defence.

Announcement statement—may be announced to the public.

Secondary release statement—may be released to the Australian Government Department of Defence, its contractors and their equivalents in America, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, and other Australian Federal Government Departments and Agencies.

All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914. Defence information may only be released in accordance with the Defence Security Manual and/or Defence Instruction (General) OPS 13-4—Release of Classified Defence Information to Other Countries, as appropriate.

The Commandant of the Joint Warfare Doctrine and Training Centre is the approving authority for the release of Unclassified joint doctrine publications to countries not covered by the secondary release statement.

ADDP 3.8 First edition 2004 Second edition 2009

Sponsor: Chief of Joint Operations Headquarters Joint Operations Command

Developer and producer: Commandant Joint Warfare Doctrine and Training Centre Royal Australian Air Force Base WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

Publisher: Director Defence Publishing Service Department of Defence CANBERRA ACT 2600

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FOREWORD

1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFP) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of ADF operations. ADDP are pitched at the philosophical and high-application level, and ADFP at the application and procedural level. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing, however it provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.

2. The continued participation of ADF personnel in United Nations (UN) sponsored peace operations (PO) has led to a requirement for a greater understanding of these types of operations. The framework for the ADF participation in PO will generally be mandated by the UN, and either UN or multinational force led.

3. This ADDP is directed at the strategic and operational levels of conflict, with the intention of providing information to assist commanders and their staff in understanding the nuances of PO and in planning ADF participation in such operations.

4. Chapter 1 provides background, discusses the nature of PO and provides terminology, definitions and principles. Chapter 2 describes the role of the UN in PO and explains the principal organs of the UN. Chapter 3 explains the ‘authority to act’ that authorises PO to be undertaken. Chapter 4 discusses the ADF conduct of PO principles with particular regard to intelligence and information operations, characteristics and constraints associated with PO, potential PO tasks, and other ADF specific considerations.

5. Further detail regarding PO and ADF participation is contained in ADFP 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures. This publication provides additional information on humanitarian organisations’ approach to PO, command, control and coordination, potential tasks, planning, legal and operations law considerations, training and force preparation requirements, and logistic support arrangements.

6. The material in this ADDP has been sourced from operational experience, other nations’ doctrine, and a wide range of unclassified publications and websites.

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AMENDMENTS

Proposals for amendment of ADDP 3.8 may be sent by Minute or Email to:

SO1 Doctrine Joint Warfare Doctrine and Training Centre RAAF Base WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314 SO1Doctrine.jwdtc@defence.gov.au

Amendment Effected

Number Date Signature Date 1 3 Sep 10 J. Kowald SO2 Doc JWDTC 3 Sep 10

Note: AL1 simply amends ‘Organisation of African Unity’ to ‘African Union’ in pages vii, 1-9 and 3-3.

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY The hierarchy of ADDP and ADFP and the latest electronic version of all ADDP and ADFP are available on: DRN located at: http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/jwdtc/; and DSN located at: http://web.wlm.nnw.dsn.defence.mil.au/jwdtc/.

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CONTENTS Page Authorisation - Foreword iii Amendment Certificate v Contents vii List of Figures x List of Tables x Paragraph

CHAPTER 1 PEACE OPERATIONS INTRODUCTION Background 1.1

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY Origins 1.4

ORGANISATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PEACE OPERATIONS

United Nations 1.10 Asia-Pacific arrangements 1.17 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1.20 European Union 1.23 African Union 1.24 European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid 1.25

THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS Terminology 1.26 Principles 1.28 Peace operations 1.29 Distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 1.33

Peacekeeping operations 1.34 Peace enforcement 1.38 Defining success 1.41

UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS COMPONENTS Components 1.45 The media 1.51

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CHAPTER 2 THE UNITED NATIONS

HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS Origins of the United Nations 2.2 Purpose and principles of the United Nations 2.9

PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS United Nations General Assembly 2.13

United Nations Security Council 2.16 Economic and Social Council 2.21 The International Court of Justice 2.24 The Secretariat 2.25 The Trusteeship Council 2.28 UNITED NATIONS REFORM United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2.32

AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENT Australian diplomatic connections 2.37 Australian military connections 2.45 Other connections 2.47

CHAPTER 3 THE AUTHORITY TO ACT Introduction 3.1

LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS The United Nations Charter 3.2 International agreement 3.6

KEY DOCUMENTATION

Mandates 3.8 Operational directives 3.14 Rules of engagement 3.18 Status of forces/Status of mission agreements 3.19 Finance 3.23

CHAPTER 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE CONDUCT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Introduction 4.1

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE Information operations 4.5 Intelligence 4.6

CHARACTERISTICS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PEACE OPERATIONS

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Belligerents 4.12 Deep roots to the conflict 4.14 Political dimension 4.15 National interest 4.16 Multinational 4.17 Media 4.19

CONSTRAINTS FOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PARTICIPATION

Intelligence 4.21 Logistics 4.22 Planning 4.24 United Nations staff procedures 4.27 Manoeuvre 4.28

PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS Fact-finding missions 4.30

Liaison, negotiation and provision of good offices 4.31 Inspection, investigation, verification and monitoring missions 4.32 Sanction operations 4.33 Observation missions 4.34 Interpositional missions 4.35 Preventive deployments 4.36 Defence of protected zones 4.37 Cantonment, disarmament and reintegration of belligerent/opposing forces 4.38 Humanitarian operations 4.40 Restoration of law and order 4.41 Support to elections 4.42

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE CONSIDERATIONS Planning 4.44 Logistics 4.46 Civil-military operations 4.48 Cooperation mechanisms 4.53 Command in combined and coalition operations 4.55

Annexes: A. Administration and Logistics Considerations B. United Nations Command and Control of the Military Component

Glossary Acronyms and Abbreviations

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LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page 1–1 Peace operations interface with the United Nations Charter 1–5

1–2 Relationship between types of peace operations 1–11

1–3 Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations differ with respect to the levels of consent, impartiality and the use of force 1–14

1–4 The generic structure of a contemporary United Nations peace operation, showing the various components or ‘pillars’ 1–20

2–1 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees provides food and aid packages for returning refugees 2–8

2–2 Training pocket cards for issue to members during force preparation training 2–10

3–1 International legitimacy and local acceptance are

key factors for peace operations 3–3 4–1 Australian Defence Force personnel – restoring peace and promoting well-being by direct support of host nation local people 4–12

4–2 Australia’s commitment to United Nations Peace Operations—East Timor 4–16

4–3 Civil-military liaison elements will facilitate the co-operation required to ensure achievement of mission objectives 4–18

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LIST OF TABLES Tables Page

4A–1 Administration and logistics checklist 4A-2

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CHAPTER 1

PEACE OPERATIONS

Executive summary

• Conducting a peace operation (PO) is one option available to the international community to assist in the prevention, resolution or containment of a conflict.

• Contemporary PO involve political, military and humanitarian organisations striving to meet a common objective.

• PO make use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles.

• Consent, impartiality, the use of force and legitimacy and are the fundamental principles that guide a military force in PO.

• Contemporary PO often require a military force to create and maintain a secure environment that permits the conduct of political negotiations and the delivery of humanitarian assistance (HA).

• UN PO may have various components operating within the mission area including diplomatic, political, civil administration, military, HA, civilian police (CIVPOL) and electoral.

The United Nations and the UN Charter are central to the rules-based global security order. This means that where we are able, and within the limits of our military power, we should continue to support the efforts of the United Nations and the international community in dealing with such problems, including through ADF deployments on occasion.

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030

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INTRODUCTION

Background

1.1 The first UN PO were relatively straight forward. They were essentially observer or interpositional missions undertaken by unarmed observers or lightly armed military peacekeeping (PK) forces, deployed after the cessation of hostilities between two or more States, and with the consent of the parties involved. The tasks of these PK forces included observing and reporting the implementation of a ceasefire agreement and maintaining a presence in disputed territories. By comparison, post-Cold War PO are complex and multidimensional, and include not only PK but also conflict prevention, peace enforcement (PE), peacemaking (PM) and peacebuilding (PB) activities.

1.2 Contemporary PO involve political, military and humanitarian organisations striving to meet a common objective. The complexity of most PO requires a military force to have an understanding of not only the military role in a PO, but also the interrelated roles of diplomatic, electoral, human rights, CIVPOL, humanitarian and other civilian organisations.

1.3 This publication has a dual purpose. First, it provides information to assist commanders and their staff in understanding the overarching principles and nuances of PO. Second, it guides the planning of Australian Defence Force (ADF) participation in PO. Amplification of some of the themes contained in this publication can be found in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 3.8.1––Peace Operations Planning and Procedures.

United Nations peacekeeping operations have brought hope to countries riven by conflict. They have saved lives, helped communities, helped societies and helped rebuild nations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, 20081

1 The Honourable Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives Ministerial Statements. 60th Anniversary of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Wednesday 28 May 2008.

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INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Origins

1.4 Attempts by States to resolve conflict peaceably have a long history that can be traced back to the Delian League, an alliance of Greek States in the Aegean, in the 5th century BC. In 1623, the French political writer Emeric Crucé proposed the formation of a world council of leaders.2 There are parallels between the role of this proposed world council and the modern UN in that its intention was for leaders to be prepared to seek resolution of disputes through mediation by council members.

1.5 A trend of State based alliances to maintain peace can be seen by the establishment of the Concert of Europe in 1815. The Concert of Europe was established for the management of European affairs, as well as more ‘humanitarian’ endeavours where States banded together to defeat slave trading. Such alliances, however, were not capable of preventing large scale conflicts such as World War I.

1.6 The League of Nations, established in the aftermath of World War I, undertook tasks similar to PK throughout Europe. These tasks generally related to monitoring plebiscites. The League of Nations could not prevent conflict on a broader scale, for example Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

1.7 The modern UN system capitalised on the strengths of the League of Nations. It was established with the prime purpose of maintaining international peace and security, reflecting the collective will of its Member States. Detail on the UN and its Charter is contained in chapter 2––‘The United Nations’ and chapter 3––‘The Authority to Act’.

1.8 In recent years the UN has come to recognise that it may not be the most suitable organisation to undertake certain military operations, and that many PO will be conducted by organisations other than the UN. Since the release of the ‘Agenda for Peace’ in 1992 by former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, there has been an increased interest in maintaining international peace and security through regional organisations or alliances.

2 Benton, B (1996) Soldiers for Peace. American Historical Publications.

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1.9 Although the UN lacks a standing military capability, it does provide international legitimacy to alliance and regional arrangement operations. Accordingly, there is a need for Australia to establish closer relationships with the UN and to continue to develop alliances and regional agreements. This is a burden-sharing arrangement of international peace and security that has proven itself in operations undertaken by several regional organisations (for example, in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, and by the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone).

ORGANISATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PEACE OPERATIONS

United Nations

1.10 The UN has played the pivotal role in PO since its inception in 1945. Detail on the UN system, the UN Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) can be found at the UN website www.un.org.

1.11 Australia’s first experience with multinational (MN) PK was its contribution to the UN Good Offices Commission (UNGOC), established under UNSC Resolution 31 of 1947 to monitor a ceasefire between Dutch Forces and the forces of the new Republic of Indonesia.3 Since the first UN PK operation (PKO) in 1948 to monitor the Arab-Israeli ceasefire, there have been over 60 PO established, as well as numerous diplomatic peace initiatives.4

1.12 The authority for establishing UN PO is based on the UN Charter, the principles and purposes of which all Member States are legally obliged to support. Although PO were not envisaged when the Charter was written, nonetheless these operations have their basis in the following chapters:

• The principles of PKO are given in Chapter VI—‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes.

3 UNGOC is not recorded as a UN peacekeeping operation: all UNGOC military observers were members of their respective national delegations (Australia initially provided four officers in 1947), and were not directed by the Secretary-General or the UN. UNGOC became the UN Commission in Indonesia (UNCI) in January 1949.

4 Refer to the DPKO section of UN website for current statistics at www.un.org.

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• PE operations are founded on Chapter VII—Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.

• Regional or alliance operations are provided for in Chapter VIII—Regional Arrangements.

1.13 Figure 1–1 illustrates the PO interface, showing the more significant types of PO and the basis for these operations in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. In more recent times, a number of missions have arisen with characteristics and requirements which overlap both chapters.

1.14 Regional and multinational aspects. The burden-sharing approach to maintaining international peace and security comes from the UN document, the ‘Agenda for Peace’. In recognising that the UN cannot effectively undertake to address all military or diplomatic crises simultaneously, the use of coalitions or regional alliances to respond to threats to peace and security has relieved the UN of a considerable burden. Even so, this approach does not abrogate the UN of its responsibilities.

Figure 1-1: Peace operations interface with the United Nations Charter

1.15 Regional PO under UN Charter Chapter VIII may be PK or PE, however the use of force still requires the authorisation of the UNSC. UN authorisation to regional operations provides added legitimacy. It may take the form of noting and endorsing the actions of regional organisations, or it may comprise a UNSC Resolution (a 'mandate') authorising ‘all necessary measures’ to restore peace and security.

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1.16 The strengths brought to PO by coalitions and regional alliances are their responsiveness, and the military capacity and capability these forces can provide. The acceptance of lead nation (LN) status brings with it considerable responsibility to either satisfy force structure shortfalls or lobby for other nations to provide these capabilities. Further, the cost of coalition or regionally sponsored operations is borne by the participants. The cost is not borne by the UN. This is another benefit of regional arrangements as the funding of UN operations is a long and difficult process. Detail on coalition force structure and the role of the LN in MN military operations is contained in the Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide.

Asia-Pacific arrangements

1.17 In the Asia-Pacific region there are a number of alliances and arrangements to which Australia is a signatory. Some of these have been influential in managing conflicts. These include, but are not limited to:

• The New Zealand Alliance. Within the Asia-Pacific region the bilateral arrangements between Australia and New Zealand have allowed both nations to play leading roles in PO, such as in seeking the settlement of disputes in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands and New Zealand’s rapid and positive response to become a key contributor to International Force East Timor (INTERFET).

• Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). The FPDA, originally a commitment to the security of Singapore and Malaysia, is now compatible with multilateral security cooperation in the region.

• Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. Within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), members discuss regional security and political concerns, and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. The ARF has also held several intersessional meetings on PK training. The ARF focus on regional security was a key determinant in the role played by nine ASEAN members deploying forces to INTERFET and the follow-on UN missions.

1.18 Ad hoc arrangements will most likely continue to be the norm for coalitions of States engaged in PO. Nations choose to be involved in these endeavours for many reasons; membership of an alliance or organisation does not necessarily oblige participation.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

Australia’s involvement in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) grew out of a decade of intense international diplomatic activity in trying to restore representative government in Cambodia. The Australian proposal to establish a UN transitional authority was a key ingredient in developing a peace settlement acceptable to all factions.

Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 ended the rule of the Khmer Rouge. Even so, a four-sided civil war ensued. With the signing of the ‘Paris Agreements’ on 23 October 1991, the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia was created to maintain a ceasefire and facilitate the deployment of UNTAC. From March 1992, UNTAC verified the withdrawal of foreign forces, disarmed and demobilised Cambodian factional forces, monitored the agreed ceasefire, temporarily took over key areas of civil administration, supervised the return and resettlement of refugees and supervised a free and fair general election.

The military force was commanded by Lieutenant General John Sanderson AO (Australia), with Major General Tamlicha Ali (Indonesia) as Deputy Force Commander. They managed a contingent of almost 16,000 personnel drawn from thirty-four UN member States. The role of the military force changed during the mission from demobilisation to provision of security for the electoral process.

As well as troops, Australia’s commitment included a military support unit, civilian police and electoral observers. Australia made a voluntary cash contribution and financial contributions to the Cambodian Peace Process Trust Fund, the Human Rights Education Programme and the Cambodia Trust Fund, as well as ongoing contributions to demining programs. The UNTAC mandate ended in September 1993 with the promulgation of the Kingdom of Cambodia’s Constitution.

The UNTAC commitment demonstrated the ability of the Australian Defence Force to play a leading role in UN peacekeeping operations and Australia’s ability to influence regional developments in ways that promote regional peace and stability. The example of UNTAC also illustrates how Australia’s military capability and political and diplomatic efforts can work together to achieve outcomes that promote and protect Australia’s security interests.

1.19 Outside formal security links in the region, such as those mentioned above, Australia also conducts bilateral regional security dialogue with most

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of the countries in the East Asia-Pacific region. These countries can join Australia or other nations in forming coalitions for the pursuit of international peace and security. The success of the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville and the International Peace Monitoring Team in the Solomon Islands reinforces the observation that UN leadership is not always necessary to achieve successful regionally organised outcomes.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

1.20 The 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Strategic Concept confirms that its essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. NATO affirms the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and expresses its commitment not only to common defence but to the peace, security and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

1.21 In this regard, the NATO’s key role in conflict prevention and crisis management contributes to Euro-Atlantic peace and security through such operations as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Strategic Concept also emphasises a determination to pursue its long-standing policy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue with all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries, in order to preserve peace, promote democracy and contribute to prosperity and progress.

1.22 In particular, there is an acceptance of NATO ‘out-of-area’ action where it may become involved in security issues at the geographic periphery of the Alliance to prevent problems spilling into neighbouring or Alliance countries thereby threatening the security and stability of member States. The 2003 NATO assumption of control of PKO in Afghanistan illustrated the Alliance's commitment and ability in this regard. It also illustrated its capacity to provide a MN PK force to secure peace and provide HA in a hostile environment.

European Union

1.23 The European Union (EU) has identified the importance of cooperation with developing countries based on the principle of partnership to jointly address the security threats of terrorism, organised crime, corruption and drug smuggling, and the challenge of managing migration flows in a cooperative manner. In order to foster the development in the areas of freedom, security and justice, the EU assists regional and international organisations. It promotes the respect of human rights, the rule of law and international obligations, and the strengthening of judicial and law enforcement capacities in third world countries. Examples of EU involvement in PO include the Rule-of-Law Mission for Iraq in 2005/06 and involvement in

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the 2006-2010 Afghanistan Compact in conjunction with NATO and other members of the international community.

The African Union

1.24 The African Union (AU) was launched in 2002. The organ of the AU that is responsible for PO is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). It was established as a standing decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC is supported by the Commission of the African Union, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an Africa Standby Force and a Special Fund. The AU has undertaken PO in Sudan and Somalia. The objectives of the PSC include:

• Promoting peace, security and stability in Africa;

• Anticipating and preventing conflicts; and

• Promoting and implementing peace-building and post conflict reconstruction activities.

European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid

1.25 The EU is a significant international humanitarian aid donor. The Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) is the service of the European Commission responsible for this activity. ECHO is mandated to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union, ensuring goods and services get to crisis zones fast. Goods may include essential supplies, specific foodstuffs, medical equipment, medicines and fuel. Services may include medical teams, water purification teams and logistic support. Goods and services reach disaster areas via ECHO partners. The aid is intended to go directly to those in distress, irrespective of race, religion or political convictions in accordance with the humanitarian principals of non-discrimination and impartiality.

THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Terminology

1.26 PO make use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles. The aim of PO is to restore or maintain peace, and may include the following actions and initiatives:

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• Conflict prevention. A peace support operation (PSO) employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

• Peacekeeping. A PSO following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by a peace support force is normally limited to self-defence.

• Peace enforcement. A PSO conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially.

• Peace making. A PSO, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

• Peace building. A PSO employing complementary diplomatic, civil and, when necessary, military means to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long term process and may run concurrently with other types of PSO.

• Preventive diplomacy. Action to prevent disputes from developing between parties or to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

1.27 The boundaries between conflict prevention, PK, PE, PM, and PB have become increasingly blurred, as shown in figure 1–2. PO are rarely limited to one type of activity, whether UN-led or conducted by non-UN actors.

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Principles

1.28 The UN identifies three basic principles of PO: consent, impartiality and the use of force.5 These are fundamental principles that guide the military force in PO. The ADF acknowledges a fourth principle; legitimacy. The level of application of these principles may vary between PK and PE operations.

• Consent. PK requires the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict to allow a PK force to deploy and carry out its tasks. PE operations however, may be undertaken where consent is not guaranteed or universally acknowledged by all parties. An example of the successful completion of a UN PK mission following the withdrawal of consent is given on page 1–13.

5 DPKO United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 2008 pp. 21–24.

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Figure 1-2: Relationship between types of peace operations 6

• Impartiality. The impartial and objective pursuit of the mandate, regardless of provocation and challenge, is essential to preserving the legitimacy of the operation and to ensuring the consent and cooperation of the conflicting parties.

• Use of force. PK is a non-coercive instrument and, as a general rule, the use of force should be used only as a last resort to achieve the mandate. The right of self-defence remains inherent during PKO. Since 1973, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has stipulated that self-defence includes resistance to attempts by a potential adversary

6 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations–Principles and Guidelines, 2008. http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

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to prevent the PK force from discharging its duties as mandated.7 PE operations are coercive in nature, and will inevitably involve the use of force to some degree.

• Legitimacy. The UN or a regional organisation provides legitimacy through the mandating of a mission. For Australia, legitimacy is an important principle for any PO, demonstrating that the operation is representative of the will of the international community or region as a whole.

Peace operations

1.29 Establishing a PO is one option available to the international community to assist in the prevention, resolution or containment of a conflict. PO are conducted in support of political and/or diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

1.30 PO require the application of military force in an even-handed manner, but this does not mean that military capability should be downgraded. PO may not have an identifiable adversary; rather, they could involve belligerent parties that may or may not comply with the principles established in accordance with a mandate or other agreement. Dealing with factions that are uncooperative may require specific military measures. However, the critical aspect of any PO force will be the perception of the populace and belligerents of the impartiality of the military force.

1.31 The operational environment, whether PK or PE, will determine the nature of any military operation. A common requirement in contemporary PKO is for the military to create and maintain a secure environment that permits the conduct of political negotiations and the delivery of HA.

7 DPKO General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, p 20.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT, THE SINAI 1956–67

Confrontation between Egypt and Israel in 1956 raised the potential for a Middle East war following the closure of the Strait of Tiran to Israel, fedayeen raids from Egypt and bellicose Arab threats. At this time, following the Soviet arming of Egypt, Israel was cognisant of the time needed to mobilise its forces in response to a concerted Arab attack. After Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal, Israel, France and the United Kingdom (UK) invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956.

The United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) pressed vigorously for the withdrawal of troops. France and the UK complied immediately, while Israel did so in stages. To facilitate the disengagement in the face of a deadlocked United Nations (UN) Security Council (with the UK and France exercising their power of veto), the UN Secretary General (UNSG) secured a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution to create a force to establish a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was the UN's first peacekeeping (PK) force (as compared to observer missions), and it established the principles of impartiality, the non-use of force except for self-defence and legitimacy. Israel refused to accept UNEF troops on its soil however, so UNEF deployed on the Egyptian side of the border only.

While the UNEF deployment satisfied Egypt in the short term, viewing the agreement as the price of Israeli withdrawal, Egypt nevertheless (legitimately) insisted that UNEF could only remain in place with its ongoing consent. Although this consent was mutually agreed between the UNGA and Egypt, Egypt continued to publicly voice its right and ability to withdraw consent at any time. Tensions continued in other areas of the Middle East, especially on the Israeli-Syrian border, and Egypt was criticised by other Arab States for hiding behind UNEF protection. In April 1967, Egypt re-joined the Arab States in a common struggle against Israel, and President Nasser of Egypt demanded the withdrawal of UNEF. The UNSG had no option but to comply.

UNEF was, in fact, a resounding success and it provided a model for future UN PK operations. It helped resolve a crisis involving major powers, and it kept the peace in a sensitive area for over a decade.

The seeds of conflict remained, however, and there was no security for Israel in a climate of continuing Arab States vows to eliminate it. Within three weeks of UNEF withdrawal in 1967, Arab and Israeli forces mobilised on the borders, leading to the 'Six Day War'.

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1.32 Most PO will be conducted in areas where the local people will be traumatised. All military personnel deployed to the area should be aware of the “Responsibility to Protect” concept.8 While this concept is more the concern of the Australian Government the military always has a responsibility to support and uphold International Humanitarian Law when on PO.

Distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement

1.33 There is a clear distinction between PK and PE operations. These operations are undertaken in different circumstances characterised by three critical factors; the level of consent, impartiality and the use of force:

• In PKO, consent of the belligerents must be assured, it is easier for the military force to be impartial and be seen to be impartial, and the use of force is for self-defence.

• In PE operations, consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic support, impartiality must be actively demonstrated, and the use of force may be applied to compel or coerce compliance with the mandate or mission objectives.

A force that is structured for PE is also capable of conducting PKO. A force that is structured for PKO is not necessarily capable of conducting PE operations.

Figure 1-3: Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations differ with respect to the levels of consent, impartiality and the use of force

8 “Australia’s involvement in Peacekeeping Operations”, A report by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Aug 2007

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Peacekeeping operations

1.34 PKO are characterised by their impartial conduct, the consent of the parties involved in the dispute and the use of force only in self-defence (including defence of the mandate). They are designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreement so that the diplomatic process can proceed toward an agreed settlement. The level of consent demanded for these operations allows the military force to be lightly armed or even unarmed.

1.35 A trademark of these operations is the existence of a buffer zone or area of separation within which the PK force is deployed. Part of the ceasefire agreement will normally include limitations on the type and quantity of weapons held by all parties in regions parallel to the buffer zone. These limitations will normally be subject to verification.

1.36 PKO may also be undertaken in a more complex environment. Although a ceasefire agreement may have been signed, the number of parallel operations such as refugee resettlement, disarmament and demobilisation and other PB activities superimposed on the military activities makes management a complex issue. The degree of infrastructure and environmental degradation in the area of operations (AO), and the variety and focus of UN agencies, non-government organisations (NGO) and private volunteer organisations (PVO) can lead to friction. Commanders should be mindful of this and implement coordination mechanisms that strive to achieve unity of effort of the mission.

1.37 Types of peacekeeping operations. PKO can be divided into four broad, sometimes overlapping, categories. These categories are listed below:

• Military observer/liaison missions. These traditional missions rely on MN unarmed UN Military Observers (UNMO) providing information to a force commander (FC) or chief military observer (CMO). Observers are often vital in confidence building activities, mediation and negotiation. UNMO teams need freedom of movement to ensure that their reports are impartial and are in accordance with truce or ceasefire agreements. Several UNMO-only missions have been established, although it is also not uncommon to have UNMO deployed within the same AO as a UN PK force. In these circumstances, the command and control (C2) of military observers may vary but the task of independent reporting remains, and a close relationship between the PK force and the UNMO is necessary. Observers can also deploy as military liason officers in support of

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non-UN missions, as a method of increasing the legitimacy of regional operations.

• Interpositional peacekeeping forces. Lightly armed PK forces can be deployed as an interpositional force in disputed areas following the signing of a ceasefire agreement or truce. They may be required to monitor the withdrawal of forces, act as a deterrent to opponents, or act as a de-escalation tool supporting the preventive diplomacy process. The force structure and mandate for such ‘robust’ interpositional deployments should be thoroughly analysed. In order to prevent conflict escalation, there should be an inherent deterrent capability equal to or greater than the potential opposing force.

• Comprehensive settlement missions. PK forces may provide the stability necessary for the conduct of free and fair elections and establishment of a new government. Tasks may include disarmament, resettlement of refugees and logistics support to the electoral organisation. Comprehensive settlements can be complex and may comprise several large and disparate organisations such as electoral, political, CIVPOL, government administration, humanitarian and military organisations. Maintenance of unity of purpose by the head of mission (HOM) or Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) will be a key factor for success. Caution should be applied when deciding on the level of force and force capability necessary to achieve the political aims of these missions—in times of increased tension and volatility, a PK force may be inappropriate for the conduct of such operations.

• Humanitarian assistance missions. The conduct of humanitarian relief is generally not the task of the military, and there are many UN agencies, NGO and PVO established to conduct such operations. In times of conflict a PK force may be deployed to protect the distribution of aid and the agency/agencies involved. This should be at a level of force and capability sufficient to counter any credible threat. If coercion is necessary, or if consent is questionable or belligerent activity is at the higher end of operations, then a military force should deploy under a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate.

Peace enforcement

1.38 In PE operations, the use of force or threat of use of force is a critical element for success. Most recent PE operations have been mounted in response to intrastate conflicts, where belligerents fight to secure authority and control over a region and the population. In such conflicts, there may be

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a number of organisations operating where security, law and order and dire humanitarian circumstances are being addressed.

1.39 Peace enforcement operations differ from war. In war, the ultimate military aim is to defeat an enemy’s will to fight. In PE operations, the military aim will normally be to coerce the belligerent(s) into ceasing armed conflict and participate in peace negotiations. PE forces should have superior combat capabilities although there may be restrictions imposed on the force, for example, rules of engagement, weapons and targeting options. PE operations assist diplomatic efforts to restore peace between opposing forces, some of whom may not consent to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities.

1.40 Types of peace enforcement operations. There are two main enforcement operations involving the deployment of military force:

• Sanctions. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC can impose a range of economic sanctions on a nation - from restricting movement of key personnel to imposing import/export and postal/communications controls - to coerce it into negotiations in order to restore peace and to reduce its capacity to wage war. The problem with economic sanctions is the time they take to have sufficient impact on the government to effect a change in its course of action. Such sanctions adversely affect the majority of the citizens of the country. For example, the imposition of sanctions in 1990 against Iraq failed in the attempt to force Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. If economic sanctions do not in themselves deter nations from acting inappropriately, military force can be imposed to support the sanctions. Actions of this nature have had limited success in the Persian Gulf, Sierra Leone and the Balkans. It has been the norm in these operations to rely mainly on maritime and air power to enforce sanctions. Such enforcement requires considerable coordination.

• Military enforcement. Military enforcement is the capacity for a UN sanctioned or MN force (MNF) to use force in the achievement of a mandate. For example, for the safe passage and distribution of humanitarian relief, protection of humanitarian workers, responding to gross human rights abuse and in establishing law and order where none exists. In enforcement operations, which support comprehensive settlements, or in HA missions, force characteristics may be similar to those of a combat force, with a sustained combat capability and combat logistics.

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Defining success

1.41 The mandate will specify the desired political outcome and provide guidance for the military force. In Australia military strategic and operational level planners will interpret the political outcomes and guidance in order to determine the desired military end state. In most contemporary PO, a secure and stable environment suitable for sustainable development and PB or nation building will be the measure of military success.

1.42 Success will be evaluated against the achievement of identified measures of effectiveness. These may include, for example, compliance by all parties to the peace agreement or the repatriation or resettlement of internally displaced persons or refugees. In MN PE operations, success may be the creation of conditions for transition to a UN PK force.

UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS COMPONENTS

1.43 Regardless of the focus and complexity of an operation or the authority under which it is operating, there will be various UN PO components within a mission area. Each component will generally operate within its own sphere of competence and influence, however, the goals for the operation should be complementary and their efforts coordinated. The component structure of contemporary UN operations is shown at figure 1–4.

1.44 All appointments below the SRSG are usually considered equal in status, although this may vary if the mission is structured along functional pillars (for example Peacekeeping Force, Governance, Administration). The SRSG has a direct relationship to the Secretary-General and staff; component commanders/heads work for the SRSG with links to respective offices or departments in UN New York or UN Geneva. The Civil-Military Liaison Officer may be an independent appointment but will most likely be under operational control of the FC.

Components

1.45 Diplomatic and political. The diplomatic component will initially seek to broker an agreement between conflicting parties to cease armed aggression, and a PO may be initiated to aid its implementation or to build confidence in the diplomatic process. However, in exceptional circumstances, a PO may be initiated prior to an agreement being reached. The political representative providing leadership in most UN missions is the SRSG or HOM.

1.46 Civil administration. There will be a civil administration supporting the SRSG or HOM. In UN operations, the Director of Administration or Chief

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Administrative Officer wields considerable power and influence, particularly with logistics procurement, sustainment, movement and communications. From the military perspective, it is important for a clear understanding of what is expected of military forces, and the necessary links between the UN Peacekeeping Force Headquarters and the civil administration. Particularly important is the interpretation of integrated mission logistics and contingent owned equipment. Detailed information concerning logistics can be found at chapter 8 of ADFP 3.8.1.

1.47 Military. The military force will be provided by several troop contributing nations (TCN). The contribution and composition of the military force of a PO (and in certain circumstances UN political affairs missions) will depend upon the type of operation and the intensity of the conflict. Clearly, there are tasks that only the military can conduct and those in which it can play a supporting role. An important part of force preparation (FORCEPREP) will be an understanding of the mission structure, purpose, mandate and C2. The level of understanding in these areas will be dependent on the functions to be undertaken by members of the force. The military force should understand that, whilst it is a key player, a military solution may not be the measure of mission success. The military force and ADF conduct of a PO is discussed in chapter 5 of ADFP 3.8.1. This ADFP also contains detailed information concerning legal considerations (chapter 6) and FORCEPREP guidance (chapter 7).

1.48 Humanitarian assistance. A crisis that threatens international peace and security may also warrant HA. Such a crisis will almost certainly spark massive flows of displaced persons, may be complicated by on-going armed conflict, and may involve a risk to public health, for example, an epidemic). HA may be required to meet basic subsistence needs. This is quite different from the role of the military force. The ultimate aim of HA in these crises is to sustain dignified life as a first step towards reconstruction, rehabilitation and development. Information on the variety of UN humanitarian and human rights and NGO agencies can be found in chapter 2 of ADFP 3.8.1.

1.49 Civilian police. The need to restore and uphold law and order is a growing trademark of contemporary PO that demand the expertise of international CIVPOL. These international police will be provided by the UN, becoming the key secondary security partner in PO. Their role is the management and control of internal security and the provision of law and order as either the executive authority or in support of a national police force. CIVPOL may also be required to train and mentor a new police force. Given the internal security responsibility of CIVPOL and the responsibilities of the military force, it will be necessary to establish good working relationships with members of this organisation at the operational and tactical levels of conflict. Information on CIVPOL operations is at chapter 5 of ADFP 3.8.1.

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Figure 1-4: The generic structure of a contemporary United Nations peace operation, showing the various components or ‘pillars’

1.50 Electoral. Operations that are focused on nation building or PB may also require a plebiscite as part of the peace agreement. The electoral process is normally an extremely complex undertaking, even in the most sophisticated of nations, requiring considerable logistics, personnel and coordination. In failed, collapsed or disrupted States where large portions of the community are either internally displaced persons or external refugees and the civil infrastructure is degraded, the level of complexity is magnified. Regional or UN organisations will play a major role in an election process either as monitors, supervisors or facilitators of the entire event (registering of political parties, coordination of political rallies, conducting the vote and recording the results). Such operations become the focus of the entire mission and all available resources may be needed to achieve the aims set by the electoral coordinator. Coordination is critical and the military force

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may be required to provide logistic support to the electoral process during all phases of the campaign. Information on military support to electoral processes can be found at chapter 4 of ADFP 3.8.1.

The media

1.51 The media is a pervasive force during war and peace. The media can contribute to the initiation of a PO by drawing attention to circumstances that require such an operation, the PO strategy and the mission’s termination. World attention can be focused on the plight of individuals in a conflict area through vivid television images thereby encouraging the UNSC to consider a PO. Equally, the media image of US military personnel being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia is said to have been the catalyst for the US withdrawal from that country.

1.52 Advances in technology in recent years have provided the individual journalist with the capacity to globally broadcast events from anywhere in the world in real-time, for example, the intimate coverage provided by embedded journalists during combat operations in Iraq in early 2003. Relationships with media representatives need to be managed so as to minimise the inadvertent release of material that may imperil public safety or the safety of deployed forces.

Information and communications technologies have a central role to play in the quest for development, dignity and peace.

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 20079

1.53 Diplomatic. The importance of the media in modern conflicts is well understood by most parties. Indeed, it is through the media’s ability to rapidly disseminate information widely that the media has become a powerful tool in the diplomatic armoury. Images serve to provide diplomats and leaders with a valuable conduit to exchange information beyond conventional diplomatic forums. Equally, diplomats and leaders may seek to manipulate the media to influence local and world opinion.

9 Secretary-General's video message for opening session of the Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Global Alliance for Information and Communications Technologies and Development. New York, 27 February 2007

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1.54 Military. In order to promote a balanced coverage of the PO by the media, military information will need to be made available. A media and information operations (IO) plan, as part of the concept of operations, will be necessary at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

1.55 Humanitarian. A symbiotic relationship may exist between humanitarian relief and aid agencies and the media. Many humanitarian operations are dependent upon a range of support, either directly in the form of public donations or indirectly from government donations. This support is generally influenced by the public’s reaction to a situation as it is reported. Consequently these agencies may seek to use or influence the media’s reporting of a situation in order to promote their differing agendas.

1.56 Training. Participants in PO should appreciate that every aspect of the operation can come under the scrutiny of the media. Media awareness is a necessary part of FORCEPREP and continuation training in-theatre to ensure the messages of the commander and SRSG is understood. A typical UN mission will include a public affairs officer or spokesperson, and a public information cell. IO in PO is important and is thus included in chapter 5 of ADFP 3.8.1.

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CHAPTER 2

THE UNITED NATIONS

Executive summary

• The United Nations’ (UN) spectrum of interest is focused on international issues that range from equity and conflict resolution to the sustainable economic development of all nations.

• The UN provides a forum for the world’s governments to negotiate long-term problems in an effort to avoid conflict.

• The six principal organs of the UN are the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the UN Security Council (UNSC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat.

• The UN capacity to mount military operations is dependent upon the willingness of member States to contribute their forces.

• The UN Peacebuilding Commission aims to strengthen national capacity to recover after conflict and reduce the need for protracted peacekeeping operations (PKO) by improving coordination among the many actors involved in stabilisation and reconstruction.

We must strengthen the UN's ability to play its role to the fullest extent in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – these are all part of a continuum, and our approach must be integrated, coordinated and comprehensive. By enhancing our capacity for preventive diplomacy and supporting sustainable peace processes, we will build long-term solutions and respond more effectively to conflict.

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations1

2.1 The organisation of the UN is diverse and it is structured to respond to tasks traditionally considered the jurisdiction of States. The UN represents a

1 Priorities for Action—Peace and Security. http://www.un.org/sg/priority.shtml

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collection of States and endeavours to achieve negotiated outcomes by consensus, reflecting the will of the majority of States. UN concerns range from climate control and finance to international justice, peace and security.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Origins of the United Nations

2.2 The term ‘United Nations’, coined by United States of America (USA) President Franklin D Roosevelt, was first used in the Declaration of the United Nations of 1 January 1942 when 26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers of World War II.

2.3 The first major step towards the formation of a permanent organisation was taken at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, a meeting of diplomatic experts of the ‘Big Four’ (USA, United Kingdom (UK), United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and China) held at Dumbarton Oaks Estate in Washington, District of Columbia, USA from 21 August to 7 October 1944. Although substantial progress was made, there was disagreement on two essential issues: the voting system within the proposed UNSC (particularly the 'power of veto') and membership (the USSR was demanding seats in the UNGA for all of its constituent republics).

2.4 The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were later modified at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The modified proposals formed the basis of negotiations at the UN Conference on the International Organisation, which was convened in San Francisco, USA on 25 April 1945 with the aim of drafting the Charter of the UN. The UN Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June by the 51 participating nations, and it entered into force on 24 October 1945.

2.5 Australia played an important role in the drafting of the UN Charter, and was one of the first countries to join the UN - on 1 November 1945. Dr Herbert Evatt, Australia’s Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs from 1941, played a prominent part at the San Francisco Conference, and from that time he served on the Preparatory Commission of the UN, on the UNSC, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. He was also President of the third regular session of the UNGA (1948).

2.6 The building of the UN was not an easy process. It was to be the new international organisation to take the lead on issues that once were the aspirations of the League of Nations. The failure of the League of Nations to achieve international peace and security and the influence of the ‘Big Four’

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(later to include France) during conference deliberations created friction. The rule of unanimity usually adopted by political conferences was abandoned for a two-thirds majority vote in committee and commission decisions and plenary sessions.

2.7 The UN spectrum of interest covers international issues from equity and conflict resolution to the sustainable economic development of all nations. As a forum, it provides the government of nation-States the opportunity to negotiate long-term problems in an effort to avoid conflict. From the outset, issues involving domestic jurisdiction versus international competence were not considered the responsibility of the UN.

2.8 This ‘hands-off approach’ was achievable in 1945, when there were relatively few member States and the balance of power was shared amongst colonial authorities and superpowers. In the 21st century however, with membership at 192 and still increasing, such an approach is less feasible.2 Consequently the UN has increasingly become involved with domestic affairs when instances of gross breaches of human rights, humanitarian disasters or failed States require an international response and need the leadership or sanctioning of the UN. This is a trend which is likely to continue.

Purpose and principles of the United Nations

2.9 The preamble and first article of the UN Charter outline the purposes of the organisation, declaring that the primary objective is the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN is also dedicated to the development of friendly relations among nations, based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to serving as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

2.10 The key principles of the UN, as outlined in the Charter, are as follows:

• The UN is based on the sovereign equality of its members.

2 UN Member States are detailed at http://www.un.org/members/index.html - accessed 15 January 2009. The only Non-Member State with a Permanent Observer Mission to the UN is the Holy See. Several international organisations have standing invitations to participate as observers in the sessions of the work of the General Assembly, and maintain permanent offices in the UN Headquarters: among them, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Organisation for Migration.

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• Disputes are to be settled by peaceful means.

• Members undertake not to use force or the threat of force in contravention of the purposes of the UN.

• Each member must assist the organisation in any action it takes under the Charter.

• States that are not members of the UN are required to act in accordance with these principles in so far as necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

2.11 Membership of the UN is open to all States that accept the principles of the organisation. States are admitted during the annual sitting of the UNGA - on the recommendation of the UNSC and by a two-thirds vote of the UNGA. In financial terms, Australia has long been a significant contributor to the UN.

The demands on the UN are growing. The challenges of our time are increasingly collaborative in nature. They require our full engagement, all nations working together—rich and poor, north and south, developed and developing.

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations

PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

2.12 There are six principal organs of the UN: the UNGA, the UNSC, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the ICJ and the Secretariat. Each of these principal organs is briefly described below. Detailed information along with associated programs and funds, autonomous bodies, commissions and specialised agencies can be found at the UN website.3

United Nations General Assembly

2.13 The UNGA is the main deliberative organ of the UN and is made up of all member States. It has no direct executive powers accorded to it by the UN Charter in regard to maintenance of peace but it may, under Article 11:

3 The United Nations http://www.un.org.

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• consider the general principles of cooperation involved in maintaining peace, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members or to the UNSC;

• discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of peace brought before it by any member State or by the UNSC;

• make non-binding recommendations in respect to questions raised before it to the State or States concerned and/or to the UNSC, not however on disputes that the UNSC is deliberating on; and

• call the attention of the UNSC to situations that are likely to threaten international peace and security.

2.14 The UNGA approves the UN budget, including all costs in connection with peace operations (PO), and can establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. In addition to the committees and standing bodies, the UNGA manages a considerable number of funds and programs. Whilst the regular session of the UNGA is from September to December its work continues throughout the year by way of committees, conferences and the Secretariat.

2.15 The UNGA can and does mandate peacekeeping or political missions guided by the tenet of pacific dispute settlement. When the UNSC is deadlocked in its discussion or debate on threats to international peace and security the UNGA can, under the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’, mandate other operations (refer historical example on page 2-9).

Resolution 377 (V): Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

302nd Plenary Meeting, 3 November 1950

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United Nations Security Council

2.16 The UNSC consists of 15 members: five permanent members (the ‘P5’ - China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA), and 10 non-permanent members elected for a period of two years. Members of the P5 hold the power of veto over all decisions.

2.17 The election of the non-permanent members is based on geography, with members drawn from African & Asian States, Eastern European States, Latin America & the Caribbean and Western Europe & Other States (WEO)4; Australia belongs to the WEO grouping. Five non-permanent members are elected in alternate years, and a member State cannot be re-elected for successive terms.

2.18 The authority of the UNSC is quite clear: it has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNGA agrees that when the UNSC is carrying out its duties, the UNSC acts on behalf of the UNGA. The primary source of authority for the establishment of a PO is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. Further detail on the authority to act is provided in chapter 3. Legal considerations regarding the authority to act are outlined in chapter 6 of Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures.

2.19 The decisions taken by the UNSC are binding on all member States unlike the UNGA, which is empowered to only make non-binding recommendations to States.

2.20 As noted in chapter 1, the capacity of the UN to mount military operations is primarily limited by the willingness of member States to contribute their forces. Despite this, the UN Charter stipulates that members are to make available as requested their armed forces to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of these forces was to be based on plans prepared by the UNSC supported by the Military Staff Committee.5 In reality, this responsibility has been delegated to the

4 Africa & Asia hold 5 seats, Eastern Europe 1 seat, Latin America & Caribbean 2 seats and WEO 2 seats.

5 The Military Staff Committee is supposed to comprise of the Chiefs of Staff of the P5, and is meant to plan the operations of UN forces including command and control of the force. The committee does exist through Defence Attachés of the P5 in New York and meets on a regular basis, but not necessarily in relation to planning operations.

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Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (within the Secretariat).

Economic and Social Council

2.21 The UN Charter established the ECOSOC as the principal organ to coordinate the economic and social work of the UN and its specialised agencies. The council has 54 members who serve for three-year terms. Concerning PO, there is considerable coordination between ECOSOC agencies and the military force when deployed. Early warning of pending disasters requiring UN or other responses are often provided by these agencies.

2.22 Non-government organisations (NGO) work closely with ECOSOC through the Non-Government Liaison Service, which is a small inter-agency program working to strengthen cooperation and dialogue in the field of development, education and advocacy. There are nearly 2,100 NGO holding consultative status6 with ECOSOC, and 400 accredited to the Commission on Sustainable Development. This access provides another more formal avenue of approach to the UN by NGO to influence the work of the organisation.

Figure 2-1: The United Nations High Commission for Refugees provides food and aid packages for returning refugees

6 This status also allows NGO to be invited to attend international conferences called by the UN and the UNGA.

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2.23 Understanding the work of major NGO and private volunteer organisations deployed on operations assists in the planning of military operations. This understanding leads to improving coordination and cooperation which will permit civilian organisations and military forces to achieve their respective objectives. For example, figure 2–1 depicts a typical scene during almost any PO. The provision of humanitarian assistance often requires a UN military force to provide security and control measures. Detailed information on the variety of UN humanitarian, human rights and NGO agencies can be found at chapter 2 of ADFP 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures.

The International Court of Justice

2.24 The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN. The ICJ settles legal disputes between States and parties, and gives advisory opinions to the UN and its specialised agencies.

The Secretariat

2.25 The diverse functions of the Secretariat and its key departments involved in the planning and deployment of PO are detailed at the UN web site.7 Of prime significance with regard to PO is the DPKO.

2.26 Department of Peacekeeping Operations. DPKO provides executive direction, management and logistical support to UN PKO worldwide. Responsibilities of DPKO sub-units include the planning of new missions, support for existing missions, training and evaluation, demining, UN civilian police, personnel, logistics, finance, communications, operations desks, the situation centre, and policy and analysis units. Figure 2–2 provides an example of the training resources employed by DPKO for use by forces during preparation training.

2.27 DPKO is coordinated by an Under-Secretary-General reporting to the Secretary-General, and has six major arms: Best Practices Unit, Office of Operations, UN Mine Action Service, Police Division, Office of Mission Support and Military Division (headed by the Military Adviser). The DPKO has developed the ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’7 document which provides details on the UN approach to peacekeeping.

7 The United Nations, http://www.un.org/.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MANDATES

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is occasionally unable to approve actions, due to internal dissent or because of the conflicting national interests of member States. In such cases, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has the power to give its own approvals to circumvent such impasses. This is rare however, as dissent within the UNSC is usually reflected by parallel concerns amongst the member States within the UNGA.

A notable example of a successful UNGA mandate was the UN intervention following the 1956 Suez War (refer to the historical example in chapter 1). After Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the retaliatory invasion of Egypt by Israel, France and the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) sponsored a UNSC resolution calling on Israel to withdraw. France and the UK exercised their power of veto and this resolution was blocked. While the UNSC remained dead-locked, Israeli forces continued to advance toward the Suez Canal, and French and UK forces landed at Port Said. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the US threatened severe economic and military retaliatory action.

In his attempt to separate forces, gain staged withdrawals and clear the Suez Canal from block ships set by Egypt, the Secretary-General found the UNSC beset by vetoes and threats of vetoes from the permanent members, which included France and the UK. Invoking a resolution, which had foreseen such a lack of unanimity amongst the permanent members, the Secretary-General quite correctly took the issue to the UNGA. The issue was finally settled with a mandate issued by the UNGA: ‘to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces’. In forming the UN Emergency Force, the UNGA wisely excluded from the troop contributing countries the five permanent members and any other member State which might have had a vested interest in the region.

While the UNSC is the 'crisis management' arm of the UN, there exists a valid avenue through the UNGA as an alternative to a deadlocked UNSC. If the UNSC is unable to exercise its primary responsibility, the UNGA can consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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Figure 2-2: Training pocket cards for issue to members during force preparation training

The Trusteeship Council

2.28 The Trusteeship Council was established to supervise the administration of the original eleven Trust Territories in order to promote and progress them to achieve self-government (refer to the historical example on page 2–15). Membership of the council is the P5; however, as the last Trust Territory achieved self-determination in 1994 and the UNSC terminated the UN Trusteeship Agreement, in essence the Trusteeship Council does not have a role. It has been suggested however, that this council could play a leading role in the governance of failed States and assistance with nation-building activities.

UNITED NATIONS REFORM

2.29 The UN has made a commitment to its member States that it will undertake a series of reform activities aimed at achieving greater economies of scale and to make the UN more effective in dealing with today’s threats and challenges. Many of these changes have been made to the administration of the organisation; however they have not in themselves provided quantifiable improvements in the operation of the UN, particularly concerning the conduct of PO.

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2.30 A Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was established under GA Resolution 2006 (XIX) in 1965 to undertake a comprehensive review of PKO in all their aspects. The committee comprises 100 member States, most of whom are present or past troop-contributing nations; observers may also participate. The committee meets annually and is influential on all issues from finance to the conduct of operations. It reports to the UNGA through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonisation).

2.31 Combined with the inroads made by the Panel of Experts into UN Peacekeeping (the 'Brahimi Report'), this committee’s efforts on training, force preparation, finance, rapid deployment goals, logistics, engagement with a troop-contributing nation, mission structure development and management, are resulting in incremental reform and productivity improvements. These steps and the closer relationship with regional organisations should take some of the stigma away from what, in the past, was perceived as the inability of the UN to succeed in maintaining international peace and security.

United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

2.32 As part of the reform process, in 2005 the UNGA and UNSC concurrently resolved to establish the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).8 By improving coordination and reducing duplication of effort among the many actors who become involved in a country experiencing or coming out of conflict, the PBC seeks to improve overall efficiency and reduce the likelihood of a costly relapse into conflict. The primary aim of the PBC is to strengthen a country’s own capacity to recover after conflict and reduce the long-term necessity for recurring PKO.

2.33 The PBC undertakes the following:

• proposes integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding (PB) and recovery;

• helps to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium - to longer - term;

• extends the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery; and

8 See UNPBC website at http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding

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• develops best practice on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, military, humanitarian and development actors.

2.34 Membership of the PBC is comprised of member States from the groups listed below. No State may represent more than one group.

• Seven member States from the UNSC (including permanent members).

• Seven from the ECOSOC, giving particular consideration to those that have experienced post-conflict recovery.

• Five out of the top 10 financial contributors to the UN budgets including voluntary contributions to UN agencies and programs and the Peacebuilding Fund.

• Five out of the top 10 providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions.

• Seven additional members, to redress remaining geographical imbalances and include countries with post-conflict experience, to be elected by the USGA.

2.35 A Peacebuilding Fund is established to fund the initiatives of the PBC. The PBC is designed to support post-conflict stabilisation initiatives, such as the implementation of peace agreements and the prevention of the recurrence of conflicts. The fund is expected to provide immediate assistance to countries emerging from conflict and lay the groundwork until sustained support from the international community has been assured.

2.36 A Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO) within the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General provides expert advice to the PBC on PB strategies, sustainable financing, best practices in PB and other relevant matters. The PSO will also assist in communication and liaison between the PBC and all relevant bodies and actors of the UN.

AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENT

Australian diplomatic connections

2.37 Australia has established four posts representing Australia’s interests in the UN system: the Australian Mission to the UN in New York, and

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diplomatic missions in the UN offices in Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi. The Australian Mission to the UN in New York9 is headed by an Ambassador and is staffed by Australian personnel with some locally engaged employees. The Mission provides the nucleus of Australia’s delegation to UN conferences and meetings in New York, including regular and special sessions of the UNGA. It also participates in the ongoing work of other UN organs, such as the UNSC, and monitors the activities of the specialised UN agencies and programs.

2.38 Australia also has an Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UNSC, a Chargé d’ Affairs and a Counsellor for the Australian Delegation to the UNGA. Among the military staff are a Military Adviser (Lieutenant Colonel) and Second Secretary/Assistant Military Adviser (Major-equivalent).

2.39 United Nations Security Council. Australia has four times been a member of the UNSC: 1946–47, 1956–57, 1973–74 and 1985–86. The Australian Ambassador to the UN concurrently holds the position of Permanent Representative to the UNSC.

2.40 Disarmament and international security. Australia sees global disarmament efforts as central to international peace and security. Australia played a valuable role in negotiations at the 6th Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2000. Australia also played a constructive role in the July 2001 Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, which resulted in the adoption of an international program of action addressing areas such as management of weapons stockpiles, export controls and transparency.

2.41 Environment. Australia is a signatory to a number of conventions on environment protection and conservation, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1993). Australia is currently a member of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development.

2.42 International law. Australia was at the forefront of efforts to create an International Criminal Court (ICC) to address serious crimes of concern to the international community. Australia also made a significant contribution to the negotiation of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, and played an active role in the post-Rome negotiations, in the work of the Preparatory Commission, and as Chairman of the Likeminded Group in New York. The

9 See http://www.australiaun.org

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ICC is now in operation at The Hague in the Netherlands and is hearing cases.

2.43 Human rights. Australia is a party to most major human rights treaties. On 11 December 2002, Australia signed an important Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the ‘People Trafficking Protocol’). This protocol aims to address a growing trend in transnational organised crime to physically move people through deception, coercion or force for the purpose of their exploitation. On 21 October 2002, Australia’s Ambassador to the UN signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

2.44 Sanctions. Australia currently has a number of sanctions in place in support of UNSC Resolutions.

Australian military connections

2.45 Secretariat. The Military Division of the DPKO was headed by an Australian Army officer, Major-General Tim Ford, as Military Adviser in 2000–2002. Australia generally has other officers serving on posting with DPKO, with responsibilities ranging from Training & Evaluation Service to Force Generation and the Military Planning Service.

2.46 Peace and humanitarian operations. Australia has a long and proud history of helping to keep the peace, and also of military and police contributions to UN humanitarian operations. The Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police have contributed to over 37 PO. To date Australia has been lead nation for three operations, and has provided several senior officers to command appointments on UN or UN-sanctioned missions.

Other connections

2.47 As at 2008 Australia was an elected member of eighteen UN bodies: ICC Committee on Budget and Finance, UNEP Governing Council, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Committee on Contributions, UN Commission on International Trade Law, Human Rights Committee, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, World Food Programme Executive Board, International Narcotics Control Board, Universal Postal Union Council of Administration & Postal Operations Council, International Telecommunications Union, International Civil Aviation Organisation Council, World Heritage Committee, International Maritime Organization Council, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, International Labour Organisation and Commission on the Limits of the

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Continental Shelf. These election victories underscore Australia’s good international reputation and demonstrate the global community’s high regard for our valuable and constructive role within the UN system.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—TRUSTEESHIP AFTERMATHS

After World War I the League of Nations mandated that the former colonies and territories of the defeated Central Powers were to be administered by the countries that had taken custody of them during the war. Accordingly, Australia was given a mandate over the majority of the South West Pacific territories of New Guinea and the neighbouring archipelago (including New Ireland and New Britain) which had been seized in 1914 by the 1st Battalion, Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (1 ANMEF). In 1921, the Solomon Islands were split into North and South Solomons. North Solomons was included in Australian territorial responsibilities.

Australia administered these territories as the occupying power, and it then administered them as part of Australia. They were then amalgamated with the Territory of Papua as an administrative entity, militarily designated the 8th Military District. Meanwhile the UK secured, without significant Australian opposition, its original protectorates of the South Solomons and Gilbert and Ellice Islands. These were relatively easy to administer and had few apparent internal problems. However, the artificial division of the Solomon Islands had repercussions later. After World War II, the UN affirmed the Trusteeship of these territories as originally assigned by the League of Nations. As pressure to decolonise gained momentum in the 1960s however, both Australia and the UK facilitated a transfer to self-government: Papua New Guinea (including the North Solomons) gained independence in 1976 and the South Solomons in 1978, becoming the Solomon Islands.

Land ownership problems in the North Solomons, primarily centred on a copper mine on Bougainville, evolved into a separatist movement in 1989. The Papua New Guinea government was unsuccessful in forcibly suppressing these Bougainville rebels because they gained much support from their cultural neighbour, the Solomon Islands. Sheer exhaustion brought all parties to a negotiated truce in 1998, brokered by New Zealand and managed by an Australian-led peacekeeping mission. Whilst this settlement was being effected, by 2000 inter-island and tribal problems in the Solomon Islands escalated into warfare, resulting in another Australian-led peacekeeping and reconstruction effort, just as the one on Bougainville was closing down.

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Trusteeship under UN auspices was designed to progress Trust Territories toward achieving self-government. In this example, the casual splitting in 1921 along geographic lines, without regard for cultural entity, prevented an integrated solution to Solomons independence half a century later, and so denied an opportunity to avoid the ongoing problems of the present day.

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CHAPTER 3

THE AUTHORITY TO ACT

Executive summary

• The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the general responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

• The primary source of authority for the establishment of a peace operation (PO) is found in the United Nations (UN) Charter, specifically:

- Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes);

- Chapter VII (actions to maintain or restore peace and security); and

- Chapter VIII (regional arrangements).

• A mandate authorising a PO is often the result of crisis action planning involving member States and non-State actors.

• Preparation of a mandate involves considerable diplomatic negotiation, persuasion, energy and compromise, and will often provide little in the way of detailed military guidance and objectives.

Over the past years, the United Nations has sought to strengthen the three pillars of this institution—those of security, development and human rights, all underpinned by the rule of law - in order to build a more peaceful, more prosperous and more just world for succeeding generations. We have important achievements to build on, from the Peacebuilding Commission to the Human Rights Council and the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as well as the Responsibility to Protect.

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations1

1 Remarks at the UN Security Council meeting on threats to international peace and security January 2007

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Introduction

3.1 PO involving issues of sovereignty require a sanctioning authority to confer upon UN or coalition forces the legitimacy to act. The UN is the highest international authority for member States to undertake action for the sake of establishing or maintaining international peace and security. In most instances a UNSC or United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution authorising and defining a PO, referred to as a ‘mandate’, is the authority under which a PO is conducted.

LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

The United Nations Charter

3.2 The UN Charter is the primary source of international law governing relations between States and the use of force within the international community. The Charter establishes as a fundamental principle the political independence and territorial integrity of States and strictly defines the circumstances under which it may be violated. Notwithstanding that the Charter does not specifically refer to PO of any kind, the primary source of authority for their establishment can be found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII, and in the UNSC general responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3.3 Chapter VI. Chapter VI deals with the pacific settlement of disputes. Its invocation in support of a PO requires a high degree of consent among the parties to the dispute. Chapter VI authorises the UNSC to recommend appropriate procedures for the settlement of the dispute. This power is generally relied on to support the establishment of peacekeeping (PK) operations.

3.4 Chapter VII. Chapter VII provides the UNSC with the power to authorise actions to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 42 in particular authorises the use of “air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. It is generally relied on to support the establishment of peace enforcement operations and accordingly, does not necessarily rely on the consent of the parties involved in the dispute. The UNSC Resolution supporting the operation will typically refer to Chapter VII and authorise ‘all necessary means’ to accomplish the mission. Examples of Chapter VII operations include the Unified Task Force in Somalia (pursuant to UNSC Resolution 794/1992) and the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) (UNSC Resolution 1264/1999). Resolutions are generally structured with a national strategic focus and a certain degree of interpretation is required at the military strategic and operational levels.

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3.5 Chapter VIII. PO may also be authorised by other established multinational organisations such as the British Commonwealth, the Organisation of American States and the African Union. Measures taken by such regional organisations are recognised by the UN Charter in Chapter VIII. Such operations will be governed by the terms of the mandate duly authorised by the international organisation. In accordance with Chapter VIII, any enforcement action undertaken must be authorised by the UNSC and must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. The UNSC Resolution provides international legitimacy to such alliance and regional arrangement operations.

Figure 3-1: International legitimacy and local acceptance are key factors for peace operations

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—LOCAL ACCEPTANCE

International legitimacy and local acceptance are key factors for peace operations. The Australian-led intervention in East Timor was solicited by the UN Secretary-General and was welcomed by the majority of East Timorese.

Intervening in the affairs of another country is not an action to be undertaken lightly but in this instance international opinion, both regional and world-wide, confirmed the Australian opinion that action was required.

Intervention was legitimised not only by a UN mandate but also by the high level of acceptance by the Timorese. Their faith was rewarded by a rapid resolution of the problem after intervention, and transition to a UN mission.

International agreement

3.6 PO can also be authorised independently of any established organisation and may rely exclusively on an agreement between parties to a dispute. Such operations will be governed by the terms of the agreement. Examples of such operations include those established pursuant to the Dayton Accords, the Multinational Force & Observers in the Sinai and the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force operation on Bougainville Island. Again, such operations must be conducted in accordance with the dictates of international law.

KEY DOCUMENTATION

3.7 There are several key documents that are necessary before undertaking military PK operations, some of which are legal in nature. These are discussed in detail in chapter 6 of Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures.

Mandates

3.8 UNSC (and in exceptional circumstances UN General Assembly (UNGA)) Resolutions establishing a mission are the initial authority for a PO. The mandate should establish broad strategic guidance for the mission including those conditions that define the operational end state. Resolutions and mandates are generally established for a finite time.

3.9 When a mandate is due for renewal the mission achievements and progress are reviewed and any necessary changes in direction or emphasis are made. Changes in the mandate prior to the review date can and do happen, however they must be well considered. Additional tasks beyond the

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capacity of the military force may lead to casualties, failure and the withdrawal of troop contributing nations’ (TCN) consent and participation making the mission even more challenging. The UNSC must be made aware of what can realistically be achieved by the forces likely to be made available.

3.10 UNSC resolutions are diplomatic in nature and language. They are prepared on a basis of having wide international support toward longer-term economic viability and social and political stability rather than looking for military solutions or outcomes. From a military perspective it is important to understand these limitations in order to establish realistic military objectives and end state. It is equally important to understand that achieving military objectives and/or measures of effectiveness does not signal the completion of a mission. In complex operations there are other variables, such as elections, developing police and security forces and the humanitarian situation that will be the final determinants.

3.11 A UNSC resolution will include the following information:

• the role, mission and component structure of the organisation;

• the tasks and or functions to be performed (Enforcement operations will be authorised under Chapter VII authorising the military force to take ‘all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate’);

• the military force size and composition, and generic tasks (the finer detail of this is left up to the Secretary-General and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO));

• the leadership appointments for the mission and key components to be appointed by the Secretary-General; and

• the time limitation for the mandate.

3.12 Past mandates which did not provide clear and achievable outcomes or end states have been the source of much criticism of the UN and debate within the organisation. A recent decision to involve potential TCN in the discussion and formulation of resolutions and mandates in cooperation with the UNSC is a positive step in addressing this shortcoming.

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result from treaties, accords or agreements from within the regional or international organisation.

Operational directives

3.14 Following the release of a mandate for UN PO lead departments, such as DPKO and Department of Political Affairs, will draft and release a series of operational directives. These directives will provide key mission appointments with more detail on the concept of operations (CONOPS), force composition (including TCN) and mission objectives.

3.15 In reality, at least for the military force, the identification and appointment of the force commander (FC) often follows the development of the CONOPS, limiting the FC ability to influence deployment timelines and areas of responsibility. Decisions of this nature are political, and agreement is between the TCN and the UN. Generally, the FC will exert personal influence over the shape of the operation during the post-deployment phase and at mandate review points.

3.16 Coalition operations will follow a similar process after receiving the authority to establish an operation from the mandating organisation (UN, regional or alliance).2 During the building of the multinational force (MNF) broad strategic consensus on the objectives of the mission should be established at the national strategic level between coalition partners and TCN. The political direction and strategic guidance will be prepared by the lead nation (LN) and issued to the coalition commander.3 This may be referred to as the terms of reference.

3.17 Whether the operation is UN or coalition based, participating countries will provide their national commander with a directive stipulating management of issues of national interest. The Commander of the Australian Contingent will receive a directive from the Chief of the Defence Force, the Chief of Joint Operations or the appointed environmental commander.

2 Refer to Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide.

3 The coalition commander is the strategic level commander in a coalition operation; the coalition force commander is the operational level commander (Coalition Building Guide).

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Rules of engagement

3.18 Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of developing a PO (UN or coalition) is the establishment of common rules of engagement4 (ROE). The UN continues to develop generic ROE in order to provide TCN with sufficient guidance for them to provide meaningful input into the formulation of the mission ROE. For the ADF, this process is generally through the Defence Attaché at the Australian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. The development of coalition ROE is similar in that the LN would develop the basis of the force ROE for subsequent input, discussion and amendment by coalition partners.

Status of Forces/Status of Mission Agreements

3.19 Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreements (SOMA) are treaties establishing the legal status of a PO force with the government and citizens of the host nation(s) (HN). For PO conducted pursuant to a UN mandate, the UN will negotiate a SOFA or SOMA with the HN. Countries contributing to the UN mission will then negotiate with the UN over the contribution of their personnel to the UN mission.

3.20 Personnel of TCN will be accorded status under the SOFA or SOMA negotiated by the UN. For operations undertaken at the invitation of a HN, as distinct from a UN led mission, the LN typically will negotiate a SOFA although operational considerations frequently require negotiation of a bilateral arrangement, such as a Status of Forces Arrangement, that can be completed more expeditiously than a bilateral treaty. In any PO, to maximise protection for participating members of the military force, some type of agreement or arrangement should be in place before deployment.

3.21 It should be noted that SOFA or SOMA may not necessarily be legally binding on the HN. For example, an agreement concluded with the HN executive may not be legally binding unless it has been passed by the HN parliament.

3.22 SOFA, SOMA and other agreements and arrangements do not alter the principle that members of the military force remain subject to their own national and military law. In addition, depending on the terms of the relevant

4 See Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 06.1—Rules of Engagement, ADDP 06.2—Rules of Engagement—Operational Rules, and ADFP 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures, chapter six.

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SOFA or other agreement or arrangement, they may also be subject to the civil and criminal laws of the HN and should abide by them when not in contravention of their own national or military law.

Finance

3.23 The financial arrangement for PO undertaken by the UN is a critical step in the development and final shape of a deployment. The budget prepared by the UN Secretariat is complex and follows a lengthy process of approval. The budget is first submitted to the UNGA Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions, then to the Assembly’s Fifth Committee before going to the plenary of the UNGA for a decision.

3.24 Missions cannot be established until the budget is approved, however, in certain circumstances the Secretary-General can ‘borrow’ funds from an approved existing PK operation. The budgetary process can create major delays in deployment and continues to be an area under reform.

3.25 Financing of non-UN operations is usually the responsibility of the TCN, based on an agreed formula. In some operations, the burden may fall to the LN or regional organisation responsible for the establishment of the operation, and will not necessarily follow the same review process as the UN.

3.26 There have been instances where either the UN or a regional organisation has established a trust fund to finance operations. This approach was used during the deployment of INTERFET, when governments such as Japan provided funds to help defray the deployment cost for some countries (along strict guidelines). Such options assist in establishing wide international representation in the mission area.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—BOUGAINVILLE 1996–2003

Bougainville was part of the territory over which Australia administered a Mandate following World War I, firstly from the League of Nations and then, after World War II, the United Nations (UN). This Trusteeship was managed by Australia until it facilitated a transfer to self-government in 1976. Land ownership issues grew into a separatist movement, which the Papua New Guinea government tried to suppress using military force, and then mercenary forces. After these enforcement actions to prevent secession failed, factional warfare on the island developed into a destructive no-win situation. Finally, when this stalemate was acknowledged by all parties, the time was ripe for a negotiated settlement.

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Australia was seen as a supporter of the Papua New Guinea central government however, and had links to the Conzinc Riotinto Australia copper mine, which had featured at the beginning of the dispute, so its status was questioned. It therefore fell to New Zealand to be the honest broker of a resolution. The Chatham and Lincoln Agreements provided the basis for a truce, but it was Australia that had the resources to lead a force to manage the settlement. A force of unarmed peacekeepers - drawn from New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu, and led by Australia’s 250-strong military and police contingent - was deployed to resolve problems by negotiation rather than force. The contingent's patrols gradually developed a confidence within the population and were eventually accepted as impartial arbitrators, helping to resolve disputes in accordance with local custom.

The deployment of the Peace Monitoring Group was an experiment, which claimed success after seven years on Bougainville Island. Its success was testimony to not only the dedication of unarmed peacekeepers who accepted the risk inherent in the volatile armed environment, but also to the desire of the warring parties for settlement (progressively overcoming their suspicions and longstanding bitter divisions).

This regional arrangement operation, given international legitimacy by the UN, is an example of overcoming the generational divisiveness and hatreds, which often underlay a dispute. As was the case with the Australian-led intervention in East Timor, this mission was welcomed by the local population. Although facilitated by peacekeepers, the solution was available only through the consent of the people.

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CHAPTER 4

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE CONDUCT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Executive summary

• While the principles of war are used primarily to guide warfighting activities, they may also be applied to the conduct of peace operations (PO).

• Information operations (IO) and intelligence are complimentary force multipliers, providing information for situational awareness and force protection (FP), and shaping stakeholders’ perceptions.

• PO are characterised by a range of belligerents, numerous stakeholders, deep-rooted sources of the crisis or conflict, a strong political dimension, the impact of varying national interests and a strong media presence.

• Constraints experienced by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) during PO may include short planning timeframes, limited intelligence, a logistics burden and the reduced ability to use manoeuvre at the operational level.

Our participation in successive United Nations peacekeeping operations is consistent with Australia’s strong national interest in maintaining international peace and security, including promoting stability in countries which might otherwise provide a haven for terrorists or transnational criminals.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, 20081

1 The Honourable Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives Ministerial Statements. 60th Anniversary of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Wednesday 28 May 2008.

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Introduction

4.1 The discussion of an ADF approach to warfare has established that there is an Australian perspective to warfighting that encompasses Australia’s national identity, geo-strategic influences and lessons from past conflict. Warfare is the foundation for the conduct of PO; the adage ‘train for war, adapt for peace (operations)’ should be applied. In the adaptation to PO it is important to recognise the following:

• The changing nature of PO: from the traditional disengagement or separation of forces to complex intrastate multi-dimensional operations, working closely with civilian police (CIVPOL), non-government organisations (NGO), private volunteer organisations (PVO) and other authorities.

• The impact on civil society: humanitarian and human rights, and implications for the force.

• The role of the civil authority: the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or Head of Mission (HOM) as the head of a UN mission, as opposed to national or military leadership.

• Information operations and intelligence challenges associated with multinational (MN) operations.

4.2 The guiding principles for the conduct of PO are the principles of war2. Commanders at all levels of conflict should be flexible in discerning which principles require more emphasis and perhaps even the level of applicability afforded to them. This may vary from one operation to another.

4.3 Due to the diverse agencies and organisations likely to be present, the MN nature of PO, and the political and diplomatic implications of any action, effective military leadership3 will be a key requirement for success. PO reflect the joint nature of ADF operations and the need for an integrated and dynamic team approach for success.

2 See Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP–-D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, chapter four.

3 See ADDP 00.6—Leadership.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

4.4 IO4 and intelligence should not be seen as a single entity; they are complimentary and can be force multipliers in PO as well as in warfighting. A military force requires information to ensure the situational awareness necessary for mission success and FP. Failure to effectively utilise or protect information may have catastrophic consequences. However, the manner and effectiveness by which information is utilised or protected by a force will be a reflection of the differences in culture, language, doctrine, information sharing agreements, national interests amongst troop contributing nations (TCN) and the context in which the operation occurs.

Information operations

4.5 IO seeks to both utilise information to shape the perceptions of stakeholders about the PO and to ensure that information is not inadvertently compromised. IO has the following pro-active and reactive aspects:

• Pro-active (‘offensive’) IO aims to disrupt negative information and systems that may be employed by belligerents against the PO force, and to positively reinforce the key messages of the force commander (FC) and SRSG/HOM.

• Reactive (‘defensive’) IO are the protective measures taken to deny interference with systems and information from any belligerent or hostile party in the area of operations (AO) or surrounding region.

Intelligence

4.6 Intelligence (INT) provides commanders and their staffs with the fullest possible understanding of the belligerents operating within a theatre in order to plan and conduct successful PO. INT at all levels supports the planning and execution of an operation by delivering timely and accurate information about belligerents and their influences, aims and objectives, courses of action, intentions, centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

4.7 Due to the nature of UN operations and experience there is a history of member States and the UN Security Council (UNSC) not endorsing the need for ‘intelligence operations’ as an integral role of the military force. This is due to a combination of factors including; the sensitivity of the information

4 See ADDP 3.13—Information Operations.

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collected, the UN perception that INT collection may result in the military force not being considered impartial and a desire to avoid competing stakeholder interests. Accordingly, the UN does not have an INT organisation nor agreed procedural doctrine for INT direction, collection, processing or dissemination.

4.8 In many instances when the UN conducts operations TCN do not have the integral capacity or integrity of equipment and communications infrastructure to assure secure analysis of INT gathered or transmission to the force. This imposes limitations on the willingness and ability of contingents to share information other than that critical for FP.

4.9 In an effort to overcome these limitations, effective INT architecture should be established that can provide the commander and staff with situational awareness, INT support for planning and FP information. If conducted, INT operations must conform to the requirements of Additional Protocol II, Article 45. In addition, the INT architecture should:

• meet the requirements of each TCN participating in the operation; and

• provide a secure environment for the preparation, dissemination and storage of classified documents.

4.10 In the case of coalition or multi-national force (MNF) operations, the reluctance to support INT operations may be minimised by familiarity and interoperability between coalition members. Extant INT relationships between the ADF and other coalition members will endure and the sharing of INT may be conducted by sub-elements of any coalition. However, every effort should be made to ensure that all relevant INT is provided to the entire coalition. The two major methods of achieving this are to:

• create INT sharing arrangements between coalition partners prior to the commitment of forces, and

• have national agencies and coalition members caveat their material in accordance with national criteria for release.

5 ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts’, Geneva, 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol II).

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4.11 In contemporary operations the INT framework established by a MNF coalition should be an enduring legacy in any transition to a UN follow-on operation, even if the equipment capability and skilled staff are not.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PEACE OPERATIONS

Belligerents

4.12 In direct contrast to warfare, PO are not undertaken with a clear aim of defeating an adversary or opposing force. In most environments to which the ADF will deploy there will be political and military (perhaps including militia and para-military) elements within the AO that may oppose the presence of a MN or UN force. This may be because their aims and objectives have not been addressed in any peace agreement or ceasefire or, because of their lack of influence; they have not been involved in the peace processes.

4.13 In some operations, it will not be unusual for there to be many disaffected groups who see their authority being questioned or eroded simply by the presence of a MN force. These groups normally do not have sophisticated command and control (C2) structures and therefore the leadership capacity to control dispersed elements is minimal6. Regardless, it will be necessary for any PO force to treat all belligerent organisations in the same, impartial, manner. This will require discipline and a willingness to engage the belligerent leadership in order to display the force’s resolve.

Deep roots to the conflict

4.14 The circumstances that give rise to the deployment of a UN or MNF on PO are likely to be the result of ethnic tensions or drawn out conflict between government and freedom fighters/liberators. These circumstances may have been present for a long time, with generations knowing nothing else. This places a burden on the UN, the military force in particular, because the vast majority of locals may see the peacekeeping (PK) force as just another oppressive organisation they must deal with. Substantial effort may be required to ensure such views are minimised. Support from the

6 An example of this occurred in August 2002 shortly after the well-reported signing of a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, when a UN reconnaissance mission was ‘repelled’ by rocket propelled grenade and machinegun wielding fighters because factions had not passed details to outlying regions.

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SRSG/HOM and staff, IO and other sources will be necessary to reduce the burden on the military force.

Political dimension

4.15 Political scrutiny of UN or MNF operations will not only be in the interest of the Australian Government but also the other members of the UN or coalition. Interest from other UN member States, at times to advance political agendas, may range from challenging the cost of the operation to making allegations of human rights abuses by a member of the PK force. In coalition operations such friction may well be less likely but cannot be discounted. Deployment timelines, AO and other constraints are agreed at the political level; these may impose restrictions on how the commander of the Australian contingent builds the force and the flexibility to command it.

National interest

4.16 In situations where contribution to a UN or MNF mission is of questionable national interest in the eyes of the public, casualties will be unacceptable. An impression that the casualty rate is becoming 'excessive' may lead to lobbying for withdrawal from the mission. Similarly, public perception of what is the national interest can quickly change. Such influences can result in the withdrawal of a country’s troops, thereby leaving the balance of the force at increased risk.

Multinational

4.17 PO will always be MN; they may be UN led or UN sanctioned but will deploy under lead nation (LN) arrangements. Regardless of the leadership arrangements, it is likely that interoperability between deployed force elements (FE) of TCN will be a key issue.

4.18 PO are ad hoc; the force will include FE with disparate training standards, equipment capabilities and language and cultural barriers that should be addressed prior to and during the deployment7. From a commander’s perspective, this will require a pool of linguists (if LN), liaison officer teams and confirmatory back briefs of subordinate commanders’ concept of operations (CONOPS) to ensure that the commander’s intent is understood and implemented.

7 See Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures, chapter seven.

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. . . our military operations to provide a peaceful and secure environment in which the UN could conduct humanitarian assistance and nation building activity [in East Timor] were to be seen in two dimensions: what we were actually doing and achieving on the ground; and what we were perceived as doing, its relevance, proficiency and legitimacy.

Major General P. J. Cosgrove, AM, MC 8

Media

4.19 In a similar way to government scrutiny and interest, but for different reasons, PO will have world-wide public scrutiny focussed by the media. Crises are media targets. There is normally a proliferation of media agencies present in the early stages of a deployment and, depending on the speed of response and effectiveness of the operation, they may remain.

4.20 Used wisely, the media can support the FC through the delivery of key messages to the local population and wider viewing audience. Proactively engaging the media can be a force multiplier for the FC. Given the ease with which the media can quickly disseminate images and news, and their capability to find stories beyond the headquarters (HQ), media awareness training should be conducted for all members of the force and include the roles, functions, and purpose of the mission and the ADF.

CONSTRAINTS FOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PARTICIPATION

Intelligence

4.21 The key elements concerning IO and intelligence are noted in the preceding paragraphs. Linked to these is the reliance, with UN-led operations, on the willingness of member States to provide accurate and comprehensive intelligence from national sources that will assist in the UN planning and decision-making process. From an ADF preparation perspective, and with the exception of some recent PO, many of our commitments are beyond our immediate neighbourhood and area of direct military interest. This can limit the amount and quality of INT the ADF has readily available to prepare for operations and places additional constraints

8 ANZAC lecture, Georgetown University, 4 April 2000.

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through the requirement to rely on allies or other nations to provide timely and accurate data.

Logistics

4.22 PO are generally conducted outside the Australian logistic support area which may pose limitations on the force structure and logistics build up to sustain operations. Should Australia be the LN, assuming responsibility for the likely additional requirements, including closer and costlier preparations of less capable nations, effective logistic support will be critical to achieving success. In coalition operations the ADF must be aware of cross-servicing agreements with coalition partners that can support a deployment.

4.23 UN operations pose separate constraints on participating nations which may include the demand for operating stock, the options for UN logistics support, requirements for contingent owned equipment, tables of organisation and equipment. Additionally, ADF logistics planners will require a thorough understanding of the UN logistics staff structures. Any reliance on local purchase will hinge on the status of host nation (HN) infrastructure. These and other factors, such as points of entry, storage and material handling equipment, will be critical information requirements during any reconnaissance. Refer to chapter 3 of ADFP 3.8.1—Peace Operations Planning and Procedures for more detailed information.

Planning

4.24 International and national strategic level political imperatives to respond to emerging crises may limit the degree of warning to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) limiting time available to prepare and plan. The time compression versus the ratio of planning and incomplete information can therefore impose serious constraints on ADF (and other nations) responsiveness. It may also result in deployment planning not being properly sequenced, potentially resulting in an unbalanced force in the early stage of the operation.

4.25 From a UN commander’s perspective the political process of appointing the FC (at least for the initial deployment) may mean that the FC has no opportunity to influence the operation plan (OPLAN) until mandate review or when the operational focus changes. For coalition operations, the time imperative may still be a factor but LN planning at the strategic level should provide early warning to coalition partners in order to facilitate planning and force preparation (FORCEPREP).

4.26 The ADF Defence Attaché to the Australian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York plays an instrumental role in warning the ADF and

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coordinating responses for FE or specialists to, and requests for information from, UN operations. This also applies (dependent on the level of ADF contribution) with coalition operations that are sanctioned by the UN and operate in parallel with a UN mission’s administration.

United Nations staff procedures

4.27 UN staff procedures are not well known by ADF personnel deploying as part of a force HQ or at sector/battalion level. This can have implications for the force HQ maintaining productive work effort and continuity of operations. The normal ADF rotation plan of six months, whilst beneficial to the individual, is disruptive to the UN HQ when it affects key appointments. This means that ADF staff deploying as part of a UN HQ need to be briefed on the staff procedures and the operational level issues affecting the force as part of their FORCEPREP. The equal geographic representation requirements established by UN for TCN on a HQ may result in an unequal distribution of work effort to the staff officers from countries such as Australia.

Manoeuvre

4.28 At the operational level, PO are generally not manoeuvre-based because of the international restrictions placed on the force by the mandating authority, the belligerents and the TCN. However, commanders should establish and maintain the initiative and flexibility to respond to new challenges. At the tactical level, manoeuvre is implicit and freedom of movement essential despite belligerents’ attempts to impose restrictions. Such restrictions must be dealt with quickly through negotiations and, if necessary, a demonstration of resolve or use of force.

PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS

4.29 Within the generic framework of PO there are a myriad of potential tasks for the ADF that will be specified in a mandate, or implied and essential tasks identified when the mission is analysed as part of the Joint Military Appreciation Process9 (JMAP). Some of these tasks are discussed in the following paragraphs.

9 See ADFP 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process.

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Fact-finding missions

4.30 Members of the ADF could be requested to form part of an inspection or reconnaissance team tasked with establishing or confirming the need for a UN or MNF operation. Fact-finding missions will include, if a UN operation, personnel from DPKO, Department of Political Affairs and, dependent on the crisis, the UNSC. The military representative would be required to meet with relevant stakeholders and make preliminary assessments concerning the shape of any force.

Liaison, negotiation and provision of good offices

4.31 The UN normally undertakes liaison and negotiation operations at the request of the UNSC in order to provide a political presence in regions where there is a fragile peace, either before or following conflict. Military representation would be small and normally based on the need to maintain contact with military forces of the conflicting parties and provide military advice to the SRSG, HOM or the Personal Representative or Envoy of the SG.

Inspection, investigation, verification and monitoring missions

4.32 Operations of this type can combine political, military and specialist staff who may be tasked with ensuring that the destruction or disposal of weapons (small arms and weapons of mass destruction) or reduction of military capability is in accordance with peace agreements. The presence of personnel may also be a means of providing stability to a region that has experienced conflict. Monitoring requires close coordination and cooperation with the HN and belligerent parties as, in order to be effective, inspectors and monitors may require freedom of movement and access to industrial facilities and military establishments.

Sanction operations

4.33 The graduated response options concerning the imposition of sanctions on nations include economic, postal, telecommunications and travel limits that require member States to avoid or limit relationships with the ‘rogue nation’, through to the use of military measures in control and denial operations. These operations may involve naval control of shipping to verify cargo manifests and deny the shipment of arms, including the conduct of interception and boarding operations, patrolling of land borders and coordination of crossing points and combat air patrol and interception.

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Observation missions

4.34 Military observer (MILOB) operations can be stand-alone missions, in support of other missions (for example the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) supports the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and UN Disengagement Observer Force whilst maintaining its own C2), or they may be part of the military force under operational control of a FC. Tasks of MILOB missions will vary from monitoring a ceasefire, conducting inspections and investigating breaches of ceasefires or peace agreements. MILOB are unarmed and generally live among the local population. UN MILOB missions can also be deployed to monitor, observe and report on the conduct of non-UN operations (for example, the UN Political Office in Bougainville).

Interpositional missions

4.35 Traditional PK often calls for the post conflict positioning of a lightly armed force to provide a buffer zone between nations with the consent of the parties in conflict. Operations in this environment permit time for continued diplomacy and rapprochement. Complex operations, requiring the forceful separation of belligerents or forces and the establishment of ceasefire lines, will demand a force structured and capable of undertaking higher intensity operations. In disrupted or failed States this may mean overwhelming force. Peace enforcement (PE) operations will require a comprehensive mandate and robust rules of engagement (ROE) that permit the military force to gain and maintain the initiative. The requirements for zones of separation, ceasefire lines, control lines and areas of weapon and troop disposition limitations will normally be required in both traditional and PE operations.

Preventive deployments

4.36 An outcome of preventive diplomacy may be the deployment of a military force to protect a State or region from being embroiled in an ongoing conflict. This may occur in a traditional PK or complex environment that may have force structure implications. Dependent on the modus operandi of the potential belligerents, the PO force may be required to use force to prevent escalation of conflict and must therefore be capable of forcible separation. Combat capable logistics will also be a consideration.

Defence of protected zones

4.37 In some operations it has been necessary to establish a protected zone for the defence and safety of at-risk communities. This is a difficult task and one that can be a source of protest by belligerents and other parties to the conflict as being partial. Regardless, if tasked with operations of this

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nature it will be necessary to disarm and, in effect, demilitarise the zone in order to deny the potential of it being used for offensive operations. Knowledge of the threat will assist in designing defensive measures necessary to protect the inhabitants, as well as defining force capability requirements. Normal considerations for the conduct of a defence position will guide the commander. Additional factors may be:

• the need for establishing and then enforcing weapon exclusion zones, and

• the establishing and maintaining of cantonment areas and weapon holding sites.

Figure 4-1: Australian Defence Force personnel—restoring peace and

promoting well-being by direct support of host nation local people

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Cantonment, disarmament and reintegration of belligerent/opposing forces

4.38 A ceasefire agreement in complex PO is likely to include a condition of disarmament of belligerents (and perhaps national forces), cantonment and preparation for reintegration into civil society. Aspects of these tasks - the political will and process - will be established by specialists, however setting the pre-conditions is a likely task for a military force. These pre-conditions may include the establishment and administration of secure assembly areas or cantonments, the coordination of the disengagement and withdrawal of belligerents/opposing forces and the securing or destruction of weapons and weapon systems.

4.39 Effective disarmament, including recovery and disposal of arms caches, will rely on the perception of impartiality of the PO force and can involve search and interdiction operations. Disarmament and reintegration operations can require the military force to retrain and restructure any residual HN defence force or rebuild a force from representatives of all factions as part of the peace agreement. Alternatively, the ADF could participate in parallel bilateral or multilateral operations for this task.

Humanitarian operations

4.40 Complex multi-dimensional environments requiring the deployment of a military force will undoubtedly be experiencing dire humanitarian and human rights situations. It will be most probable that UN agencies, NGO and PVO specialising in the provision of food, shelter, water, sanitation, medical and logistics support will be present to deal with the emergency and recovery aspects. In some circumstances, where the threat levels are high, the military force will be the only organisation capable of providing any life saving support. While such humanitarian response is necessary, the military priority should be to establish the conditions conducive to civil humanitarian actions10. Specific aspects of military support to the humanitarian sector are:

• Coordination. Coordination and control of routes and resources for the humanitarian relief requirements and the prosecution of security operations will be necessary. This will have to be conducted at the operational and tactical levels of conflict with the sponsoring humanitarian agency (most likely the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United Nations Development Program). In

10 See ADFP 3.8.1, chapter four.

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high threat situations, conduct of convoy escort and protection of distribution points and humanitarian workers may be essential tasks.

• Military conduct of humanitarian operations. There will be times when the military will be required to conduct humanitarian relief operations. This can vary from rapid aerial dispatch to specific delivery for the relief of suffering communities. In other circumstances, the military/ADF will want to contribute to the well-being of the society they are deployed to protect and assist. In doing so, commanders at all levels should be impartial, strive to not make the supported population dependent and avoid duplication of the effort of humanitarian agencies operating in the same region.

• Peace/nation building. The military will have the capability to conduct vertical and horizontal construction. This capability is to aid the conduct of military operations and, by their very nature, will have an enduring quality as part of nation building. The opportunity for minor works that have an immediate impact and build community goodwill will need to be judged on a case-by-case basis, with longer-term construction being left to civil contractors. Clearance of minefields and explosive ordnance devices is the responsibility (in principle) of those that laid them.11 However, given the likelihood of operating in an unconventional environment (disrupted or failed States) or when mines interfere with the conduct of military operations, clearance will be a key military task. The training of local civilians or national defence forces of the HN to relieve the military force of this responsibility will be part of the longer-term nation building strategies.

• Human rights monitoring. Protection of the human rights12 of people in conflict zones is the responsibility of all members of UN agencies, NGO and military forces. ADF personnel are not expected to have a detailed understanding of human rights issues to the level of

11 Conventional Weapons Convention (Protocol II) states the force/party that lays any mine is required to undertake to clear, remove or destroy or maintain the minefield unless it has been cleared or is no longer in the control or jurisdiction of the laying force.

12 The principle of human rights is embodied in the UN Charter Article 1 and contained in detail in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights are not bestowed on individuals by governments, however at its most basic, an abuse of human rights is an action by a government or representative of government denying fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

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advocates or appointed human rights monitors but they do need to understand the principles and the authority (mandate and ROE) to act to prevent a violation from occurring. On operations undertaken as a result of humanitarian crisis or gross human rights violations, ADF personnel should anticipate being informed of accusations of human rights violations by members of the community. These need to be accurately reported and any preliminary investigation recorded for follow on investigation.

• Refugees or internally displaced persons. On operations where significant dislocation of the civilian community has occurred there will be consequent support requirements for accommodating people and facilitating their repatriation. UN agencies, NGO and PVO are best suited for this task but a rapid surge in numbers is likely to trigger support requests of the military. The most likely requests will be for engineers to assist construction and logistics for the provision of food, water, transport and possibly shelter. When cross-border movement occurs there will be a need to conduct screening operations which is normally a task for UNHCR and/or CIVPOL. Screening by the military of refugees or internally displaced persons that have association with combatants/belligerents will be necessary to gather any current intelligence that may assist in operations. Cultural sensitivities, including those of the UN agencies, need to be appreciated.

Restoration of law and order

4.41 In PE operations, there may be a weakness in the maintenance of law and order or, in collapsed States; there may be no law and order or accompanying infrastructure at all. In situations such as these it is probable that the military force will, through either specified (mandated) or implied tasks, have a responsibility to restore and maintain order as an interim measure until a civil capacity can be established13. It may be difficult to discern criminal activity from belligerent operations, thereby requiring internal security, counter-insurgency and public security/order operations being undertaken by the military. Public security operations will have international law obligations and ROE and use of force issues. Resolution of these may mean engaging community leaders to gain a better understanding of societal norms.

13 See ADFP 3.8.1, chapter five.

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Support to elections

4.42 The shape and tasks of a military force deployed as part of a comprehensive settlement or transitional mission will depend on the levels of consent and threat. Comprehensive settlement operations may focus on the conduct of an election as the critical milestone for the ‘whole of mission’, and for the military this can be used as the end state criteria. A pre-condition for elections will be stable law and order and a secure environment. ADF personnel deployed on operations that include the conduct of elections may be required to provide, in addition to a secure environment, security of electoral staff and polling sites, and logistic support. Commanders should not anticipate significant redeployment of assets within an AO, but security operations will need to include the safety and integrity of the electoral process in order for it to be seen as fair and impartial. For example, Australia’s commitment to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which included UNMO and a military support unit, ensured a balanced force structure that contributed to the success of UNTAC in conducting a free and fair general election14.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

4.43 ADF PO are undertaken with the philosophy of joint operations as described in ADDP 00.3—Coalition Operations. Whilst in most PO the preponderance of effort will be by the ADF land component, effective and safe operations rely on the critical enabling support of both the maritime and air components.

Planning

4.44 The JMAP is used to plan PO. Planning for ADF participation in PO is complex and requires specific actions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels including the timely passage and synchronisation of information in order to facilitate parallel planning processes. Successful planning should recognise from the outset that achieving the military strategic end state may be only a part of ‘whole of mission’ success and therefore it must complement diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours.

14 See ADFP 3.8.1, chapter six.

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Figure 4–2: Australia’s commitment to United Nations Peace Operations—East Timor

4.45 During the planning process it is important to conceptualise the national strategic objectives and consider the other agencies that are likely to be involved when developing military lines of operation. When conducting strategic and operational level planning, including contingency planning, contact and liaison with key external agencies involved in crisis response, for example the Australian Agency for International Development, the Australian Federal Police and peak NGO may assist in better appreciating non-military considerations and requirements.

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Logistics

4.46 The detail on logistic support requirements for PO15 will depend on the leadership arrangements. Increasingly, in complex operations under UN C2, there may be a tendency for initial requests for an ADF contribution to be logistic in nature such as medical support, airlift, engineering or movement control. UN commanded operations are not well suited to high intensity military operations because of the UN inability to provide the combat logistics required to support manoeuvre operations. In MNF operations where it is the responsibility of contributing partners to provide integral logistic support, force structure limitations may be more easily resolved.

4.47 Administrative and logistic support to the ADF contribution to a UN operation is provided by the UN in accordance with a memorandum of understanding signed with Australia. The Director of Administration/Chief Administration Officer, who heads the UN administrative organisation, coordinates this support. In the mission area, an integrated logistic system responsible for engineering, communications and other logistic and support functions will be established. The UN Office of Mission Support is responsible for coordinating force support requirements with the integrated logistic system. A checklist of administration and logistics considerations and issues is at annex A.

Civil-military operations

4.48 Civil-military operations16 (CMO) can increase the support that a military force may receive from the civilian population and can contribute towards the mission end state. Complex PO are frequently undertaken by international and NGO humanitarian agencies working alongside, if not with the assistance of, the military. Some of these ‘partners’ are unwilling or vehemently opposed to cooperating with the military because of their charter and mandate.

4.49 In general, humanitarian NGO and international agencies are guided by three principles when they respond to a humanitarian crisis: humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Any conflict of interest associated with operating cooperatively with the military lies with agencies’ perceptions of impartiality and neutrality.

15 See ADFP 3.8.1, chapter three.

16 See ADDP 3.11—Civil-Military Operations.

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4.50 Although the military and international humanitarian organisations may find themselves working side-by-side in complex emergencies, each operates differently. As a consequence they each tend to regard their activities and information as proprietary, believing their respective organisational integrity, and therefore mission, are at stake should they appear to be ‘co-opted’ by the military on one hand, or subject to ‘mission creep’ (the military) on the other. Collaboration, or even its perception, can spell danger for NGO bound by a mandate based on the principle of neutrality. Military FE on the other hand are concerned about operations security.

Figure 4-3: Civil-military liaison elements will facilitate the co-operation required to ensure achievement of mission objectives

4.51 From a commander’s perspective, coordination and cooperation with HN and humanitarian agencies is aimed at developing an environment in which achieving the military end state minimises any undesired effects on the civil population and the conduct of humanitarian relief and peace building operations. This effort is particularly necessary at the operational and tactical levels where early engagement with agencies during education and training opportunities will assist in developing trust and an understanding of each other and in the development of supportive information sharing and planning processes. The conduct of collaborative planning and sharing of information

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at the strategic level will assist in developing a ‘whole of government’ response and OPLAN.

4.52 A key task of the military contribution to a PO will normally be the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment within which humanitarian and governance functions can be undertaken without fear of intervention. This is not to say that the military will not be intimately involved in the provision of humanitarian and other assistance but in such instances effort should be made to hand over responsibility of these assumed tasks to the appropriate civil agencies as soon as possible.

Cooperation mechanisms

4.53 Personnel appointed as CMO HQ staff will be instrumental in cooperating with civil authorities and humanitarian agencies. This may be achieved through:

• inclusion of CMO staff in the planning process from the earliest stages;

• detailed CMO supporting plans;

• clear operational guidance and coordination with the HQ operations branch staff concerning support limitations and task allocation;

• liaison with organisations to promote the commander’s intent and to coordinate activities which may include support to, from and between the military and other agencies; and

• establishment of a civil-military cooperation coordination centre where information and operational updates may be exchanged and combined planning conducted.

4.54 The military is one element in resolving complex emergencies. The basic principle to be applied is that military support to civil elements (HN and humanitarian organisations) should be needs driven based on a ‘demand pull’ rather than a ‘supply push’. CMO should enhance the ability of both civil and military leaders to prioritise, allocate and undertake appropriate activities, with a view of withdrawing military forces as soon as possible to allow a return to normality.17

17 Spence, N (2002) International Peacekeeping. Vol 9 (1): pp 165–171.

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Command in combined and coalition operations

4.55 The nature of PO dictates that the ADF will be required to plan and execute operations in conjunction with foreign forces. These operations are broadly categorised as combined or coalition where:

• combined operations are conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission; and

• coalition operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

4.56 Whilst UN operations are coalition operations by definition, there has been a deliberate distinction made throughout this publication between coalition-led (MNF) and UN-led operations. The level of ADF planning in the formulation of a UN concept of operations will be dependent upon the size of the ADF contribution and the region of the conflict. States of command within an ADF contribution to a UN operation remain extant. Details of the UN C2 structure and terminology is at annex B.

Annexes: A. Administration and Logistics Considerations B. United Nations Command and Control of Military Components

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Annex A to Chapter 4

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ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS1

1. The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) conduct of peace operations will, with few exceptions, be undertaken in areas that are remote from the national support base, therefore adherence to standard administration and logistics planning including early involvement with operational concepts will be critical. Logistics planners should be included in any ADF reconnaissance mission in order to develop a clearer picture of host nation (HN) support capacities, to answer critical logistic information requirements and to coordinate with United Nations (UN) or lead nation (LN) logistics managers.

2. In the planning process, logistics support to the civil-military operations (CMO)/civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) support plan, as well as some flexibility to modify arrangements based on changing circumstances, will be necessary.

3. The list at table 4A-1 below is by no means exhaustive, and reference to the appropriate planning manuals and specialists within each Service and other defence organisations will complete the picture. When operating with a UN or coalition force, it is likely that there will be a variance between Australian standards for logistics support and those of the supporting organisation. Determining these differences early and clearly understanding who is to provide specific support to whom for what period and in what quantities will be a critical tasks for the logistic planning staff.

1 See also Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 1.2—Defence Health; ADDP 4.0—Defence Logistics; ADDP 4.2—Support to Operations; and ADDP 4.4—Movement and Transport.

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Function Remarks and guidance

National support element Size, location, capacity, function, relationship with supported formations/organisations - UN and multinational force (MNF).

Health planning Threat assessment - prevalent disease and precautions, environmental conditions (including chemical, biological, and radiological), food and water standards and inspection, occupational health & safety/safety management, combat related, hospital/surgical requirements, aeromedical evacuation, nearest out-of-theatre support base.

Combat service support or Logistic Directive requirements

Administration and logistic concept and priorities, supported element priorities, limitations that will affect planned operations and contingency planning, exit strategy and recovery procedures. Knowledge of extant HN/bilateral servicing agreements will be invaluable.

Functions Supply, repair/recovery, equipment maintenance, pay and administration, catering, accommodation.

Welfare activities (in theatre and home locations)

Chaplaincy, transport, power reticulation, rest facility, communications, leave and other compassionate related policy.

Support to CMO/CIMIC Engineer construction stores, hard currency for small but immediate impact projects.

Pay To ADF, contractors - including local, security and accountability, cost capture.

Personnel Movement - tracking in/out of theatre, reception - housing (temporary staging areas and ancillary support) visit planning and support requirements, weapon security.

Records Reporting procedures within ADF and to supported (UN or MNF headquarters), honours and awards, occurrence reporting including medical.

Finance ADF cost capture requirements, UN or MNF cost capture for reimbursement.

Memorandum of understanding or agreements with UN partners/coalition

Mutual operations, stores support, cross levelling, cost capture of combined logistic support, combined training activities, provision of common equipment.

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Function Remarks and guidance

Movement (lines of communication)

Identification of supply chain nodes/modes, priorities for movement, in theatre support arrangements, national priorities, use of UN assets.

Electoral2 Voter registration and change of address prior to deployment, provision for postal ballots, voting in person at an external voting location (a ‘pre-poll’ declaration vote), deployment of Australian Electoral Commission officials or deployment of an ADF pre-poll voting team to operate mobile polling booths.

Table 4A-1: Administration and logistics checklist

2 Refer Defence Instruction (General) Administration 52–1––Elections and voting by members of the Australian Defence Force.

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Annex B to Chapter 4

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UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT1

Introduction

1. Through the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) has been confronted with many systems and procedural difficulties directly related to how it exercises command and control (C2) of military forces placed at its disposal for the prosecution of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR).

2. In the field, it is essential that effective command relationships be implemented among the troop contributing nations (TCN) and the UN. In his 1994 review of UN Peacekeeping Operations2, the then Secretary-General (SG) noted that the UN will not exercise full command of Member States’ armed forces, but the command exercised was akin to ‘operational command’.3 This is not widely supported by Member States, who are more willing to place their armed forces under the operational control (OPCON) of the UN.

3. However, it is essential for the smooth conduct of operations, mission attainment and security of the UN force that should any TCN wish to impose limitations on what their forces can do, this must be made known at the commencement of detailed planning.

4. Once deployed, it is common practice that if any planning will impact on national contingents, then the head of mission (HOM)/force commander (FC) will consult with the commander of that national contingent.

1 Derived from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (17 Oct 2001).

2 Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all the aspects––Command and Control of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. A/49/681 (21 Nov 1994).

3 See Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.1—Command & Control, for a treatment of ADF command and control arrangements and terminology for operations.

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5. Instructions by national authorities. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Command and Control paper notes that TCN governments will maintain their administrative channel of communications with their contingents, commanders and personnel on operational matters.4 They must not, however, issue any instructions to their military personnel contrary to UN policies and the implementation of its mandated tasks.5

6. United Nations chain of command. The chain of command in UN6 peacekeeping operations is as follows:

a. United Nations Security Council. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for the overall political direction of the peacekeeping operation. It authorises the mandate of the mission through a UNSC resolution.

b. Secretary-General. The Secretary General (SG) is responsible for the executive direction and control of the mission. Member States transfer ‘Operational Authority’ over their military forces and personnel to the UN. This authority is vested in the SG, who exercises it on behalf of the UNSC.

c. Under-Secretary-General. The Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping Operations is accountable to the SG. On behalf of the SG, the USG directs and controls UN peacekeeping operations; formulates policies for peacekeeping operations and operational guidelines based on UNSC mandates; prepares reports for the SG to the UNSC on each peacekeeping operation, with observations and recommendations; and advises the SG on all matters related to the planning, establishment and conduct of UN peacekeeping missions.

4 Refer to ADDP 00.1 for a treatment of ADF national command and theatre command.

5 DPKO Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (17 Oct 2001).

6 Refer to annex A to chapter 2 for the UN structure, annex B for the Secretariat, and annex C for DPKO structure.

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d. Military adviser. The Military Adviser (MILAD) is the senior UN uniformed person in UN Headquarters (HQ), New York. The MILAD is accountable to the USG and advises him on military matters, reporting through the Assistant Secretaries-General for the Office of Operations and the Office of Mission Support.

e. Head of mission. The Head of Mission (HOM) is responsible, through the USG for Peacekeeping Operations, for the implementation of the mission mandate. The HOM exercises ‘operational authority’, in the field on behalf of the SG.

f. Force commander. The FC, when not also fulfilling the responsibilities of HOM, reports to the HOM. The FC exercises OPCON over all military personnel, including UN Military Observers (UNMO), in the mission area. The FC may delegate OPCON of UNMO to the Chief Military Observer (CMO). The FC establishes an operational chain of command in the field, as follows:

(1) For military units/contingents. Deputy FC; sector commander(s); national contingent commanders; battalion commanders; company commanders.

(2) For United Nations Military Observers. CMO; sector commanders/senior military observers; military observer team leaders; military observers.

g. Chief Military Observer. If the CMO is also the head of the military component, they report directly to the HOM. The CMO exercises operational control over all UNMO. The CMO establishes the operational chain of command in the field, to include the Deputy CMO, sector commanders/senior military observers, UNMO team leaders and UNMO.

7. United Nations command and control terminology. UN command authorities are defined below.

a. United Nations operational authority. Operational authority over forces and personnel assigned to the UN involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:

(1) a specific mandate of the UNSC;

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(2) an agreed period of time (with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the TCN to provide adequate prior notification); and

(3) a specific geographic area (the mission area).

UN operational authority does not include personnel matters (such as pay and allowances). Whilst national contingents are responsible for the discipline of their force, the UN is responsible for the good conduct of all military personnel.

b. United Nations operational control.7 Operational control (OPCON) is the authority granted to a UN military commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or combination), to deploy units and or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units/personnel. UN OPCON includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent, as required by the operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by UN Headquarters. It does not include the responsibility for personnel administration.

c. United Nations tactical control.8 Tactical control (TACON) is the detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish mission or tasks assigned. As required by the operational necessities, the FC may delegate TACON of the forces assigned to the UN peacekeeping operation to his subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

d. United Nations logistics support. The logistics support (LOGSPT) of units and personnel placed under the Operational Authority of the UN and OPCON of the FC/CMO is a joint responsibility of the TCN government and the UN. LOGSPT includes supply, maintenance, transportation and

7 The ADF definition of OPCON is given in the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG) available on the DRN at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/

8 The ADF definition of TACON is given in the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG) available on the DRN at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/

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medical support. These functions are mutually coordinated and performed by the UN and the TCN government, and are included in the mission-specific memorandum of understanding.

e. Administrative control. Administrative control (ADMCON) is the authority over subordinate or other organisations, within national contingents, in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. ADMCON is a national responsibility given to national contingent commanders in peacekeeping operations.

8. Transfer of authority. The transfer of authority between national contingents and military personnel to the UN-designated commander must be completed before these forces come under control of the UN. This process may take place when personnel arrive in the mission area, or it may be transferred immediately prior to deployment from home locations. The exact timing for this transfer will be decided during the negotiations between the UN and national authorities.

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GLOSSARY

The source for approved Australian Defence Force glossary (terms and definitions) and acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication is the Australian Defence Glossary, available on the Defence Restricted Network at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administration (ADMIN) The provision and implementation of regulations and procedures related to the management of an organisation in support of the accomplishment of its mission.

administrative control (ADCON) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

area of limitation (AOL) A defined area where specific limitations apply to the strength and fortifications of disputing or belligerent forces. Note: Normally, upper limits are established for the number and type of formations, tanks, anti-aircraft weapons, artillery, and other weapons systems in the area of limitation.

area of operations (AO) An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

area of responsibility (AOR) The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.

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armed conflict Conflict between States, or between a State and organised, disciplined and uniformed groups within a State such as an organised resistance movement, in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims.

asylum seeker A person who invokes the protection of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees before the national authorities of a State and claims persecution to gain official refugee status in that country.

Australian support area A part of the Australian continent which provides the manpower, civil and military resources and materials required to raise, train, mobilise, deploy and sustain forces.

belligerent In time of crisis or war, an individual, entity, military force or state engaged in conflict.

buffer zone (BZ) A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone is formed to create an area of separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Also called 'area of separation' in some United Nations operations.

cargo Commodities and supplies in transit.

chain of command The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

civil actor A non-military person, including those from the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-government organisations and agencies.

civil administration (CA) An interim administration established by a foreign government, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, and which exercises executive, legislative and judicial authority which is normally

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the function of the local government until an indigenous civil government can be established.

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

civil-military operation (CMO) An operation conducted in support of military operations or in times of emergency aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of a military force or civil operation and reducing the negative aspects of military operations on civilians.

coalition operation An operation conducted by military forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

combat air patrol (CAP) An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets.

combatant An organised armed force, group or unit, except medical service and religious personnel, who is under the command of a party to a conflict and is subject to an internal disciplinary system.

combined operation An operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

command The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Notes: 1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. 2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

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command and control (C2) The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

conflict A politico-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organised political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. Note: It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory.

conflict prevention A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

contingency plan (CONPLAN) A plan for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility.

control The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

convoy escort An escort to protect a convoy of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured.

course of action (COA) A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to accomplishment of, the mission. Note: It is initially stated in broad terms with the details determined during staff war-gaming.

cross-servicing That servicing performed by one service or national element for other services or national elements and for which the other services or national elements may be charged.

deployment The movement of forces within areas of operations.

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detention The act of holding in custody for lawful purposes such as prosecution, maintenance of public safety, or pursuant to legal order.

doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

end state 1. The military end state is the set of desired conditions beyond which the use of military force is no longer required to achieve national objectives. 2. The national end state is the set of desired conditions, incorporating the elements of national power that will achieve the national objectives.

establishment An installation, together with its personnel and equipment, organised as an operating entity.

evacuation The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities.

force element (FE) A component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.

force multiplier A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.

force structure Relates to the type of force required including personnel, equipment, facilities and military doctrine to achieve the level of capability necessary to conduct operations effectively. Notes: 1. In the medium-term to the long-term, military capability will vary due to changes in force generated by the capability development progress. 2. In the short-term, force structure is the more constant component of military capability and the level of capability available for operations is determined by the Defence's management preparedness of the current force.

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health and medical support A set of actions which contribute to the preparation and preservation of the human potential by full and coherent care.

host nation (HN) A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes.

humanitarian assistance (HA) Support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid.

information Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence.

information operations (IO) The coordination of information effects to influence the decision making and actions of a target audience and to protect and enhance our own decision making and actions in support of National interests.

intelligence The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

intergovernmental organisation (IGO) An organisation created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the African Union.

internally displaced person (IDP) A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-

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made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border.

international organisation (IO) An organisation established by intergovernmental agreement and operating at the international level.

law of armed conflict (LOAC) The international law regulating the conduct of States and combatants engaged in armed hostilities.

lead agency May be designated to take the lead in policy making, planning and information sharing, and acting as the main point of contact for other UN agencies, the military and political components, non-government organisations, and for the parties to the conflict. Note: it may also allocate tasks and coordinate activity, but it does not have any command responsibility or overall authority.

lead nation (LN) The nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation.

lethal The method of attack which is intended to cause physical damage to personnel, material, or capabilities.

liaison That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

line of demarcation A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone or area of limitation. A line of demarcation may also be used to define the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or withdrawal has been completed.

line of operation (LOO) Describes how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the enemy's centre of gravity.

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logistics The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel; b. transport of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; d. acquisition or furnishing of services; and e. medical and health service support.

maintenance All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.

manifest A document specifying in detail the passengers or items carried for a specific destination.

material handling equipment (MHE) Mechanical devices for handling of supplies with greater ease and economy.

measure of effectiveness (MOE) A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective or creation of an effect.

military government ordinance An enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

military occupation A condition in which territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force.

mission A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

movement The activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or stocks as part of a military operation, and requires the supporting capabilities of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, and movement control and support functions.

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multinational (MN) Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners.

national contingent A national force of one or more Services including civilian personnel, under the command of a single national commander, which is committed to UN or other internationally organised operation.

natural disaster An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause.

neutral In identification, the designation given to a track, object or entity whose characteristics, behaviour, origin or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces.

non-government organisation (NGO) A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests.

offensive operation A military operation conducted for the purpose of seizing or retaining the initiative.

operation A designated military activity using lethal and/or nonlethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes in accordance with national legal obligations and constraints.

operational command (OPCOM) The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary, and may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

operational control (OPCON) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of

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components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

operational level of conflict The level of conflict concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. Note: It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

operation order (OPORD) A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

operation plan (OPLAN) A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

operations security (OPSEC) The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.

peacebuilding (PB) A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and - when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations.

peace enforcement (PE) A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially.

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peacekeeping (PK) A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by a peace support force is normally limited to self-defence.

peacemaking (PM) A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

peace operation (PO) A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

peace support operation (PSO) An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations.

permissive environment An operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

preventive deployment The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities.

preventive diplomacy Action to prevent disputes from developing between parties or to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

private volunteer organisation (PVO) An organisation, other than a recognised non-government organisation, that is involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid and services within the area of operations.

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public information (PI) Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.

refugee Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

risk Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.

rules of engagement (ROE) Directives that set out the circumstances and limitations within which commanders may apply military force to achieve military objectives in support of Government policy, and guide the application of force, but in doing so they neither inhibit nor replace the command function.

security The measures necessary to achieve protection against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorised disclosure.

staff The body of military professionals who support a commander in his or her estimation of a situation, and in formulating and executing subsequent plans, orders and activities.

sustainment The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective.

tactical control (TACON) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

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tactical level of conflict The planning and conduct of battle and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

task An action or activity (derived from an analysis of the mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual or organisation to provide a capability.

training A planned process to inculcate and modify attitude, knowledge or skill behaviour through a learning experience to achieve effective performance in an activity or range of activities.

weapon system A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADDP Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADF Australian Defence Force ADFP Australian Defence Force Publication AO area of operations ARF Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations C2 command and control CIMIC civil-military cooperation CIVPOL civilian police CMO chief military observer CMO civil-military operations CONOPS concept of operations DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations ECOSOC Economic and Social Council EU European Union FC force commander FP force protection FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement HA humanitarian assistance HN host nation HOM head of mission HQ headquarters ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice INTERFET International Force East Timor IO information operations LN lead nation MILAD military adviser MILOB military observer MN multinational MNF multinational force NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO non-government organisation

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OPCON operational control PB peace building PE peace enforcement PO peace operations PK peacekeeping PKO peacekeeping operations PM peace making PSO peace support operations PVO private volunteer organisation ROE rules of engagement SOFA status of forces agreement SOMA status of mission agreement SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General TCN troop contributing nation UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia, 1991 UNCI United Nations Commission for Indonesia, 1949–1951 UNEF United Nations Emergency Force UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNGOC United Nations Good Offices Commission (Indonesia), 1947–

1949 UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMO United Nations military observer UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force, 1992–1995 UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Secretary General UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1992–1993 US United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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