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ADDP 3.18

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OPERATIONS SERIES

ADDP 3.18

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF SPACE Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.18 (Edition 1) is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith.

A.G. HOUSTON, AC, AFC Air Chief Marshal Chief of the Defence Force Department of Defence CANBERRA ACT 2600 8 June 2010

UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2010

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Department of Defence.

Announcement statement—may be announced to the public.

Secondary release statement—may be released to the Australian Government Department of Defence, its contractors and their equivalents in America, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, and other Australian Federal Government Departments and Agencies.

All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914. Defence information may only be released in accordance with the Defence Security Manual and/or Defence Instruction (General) OPS 13-4—Release of Classified Defence Information to Other Countries, as appropriate.

The Commandant of the Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre is the approving authority for the release of Unclassified joint doctrine publications to countries not covered by the secondary release statement.

ADDP 3.18 First Edition 2010

Sponsor: Chief of Joint Operations Headquarters Joint Operations Command

Developer: Director Defence Space Coordinating Office

Publisher: Director Defence Publishing Service Department of Defence CANBERRA ACT 2600


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FOREWORD

1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFP) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of ADF operations. ADDP are pitched at the philosophical and high-application level, and ADFP at the application and procedural level. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing, however it provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.

2. This publication, ADDP 3.18—Operational Employment of Space (Edition 1), serves as the first high level doctrine about the use of space systems by the ADF. It is structured to provide a fundamental knowledge of the space environment and an understanding of the way space permeates the planning and activities of single Service and joint operations.

3. Due to the highly complex nature of the requirements of the operational employment of space, the Defence Space Coordinating Office (DSCO) has played a prominent role during the development of this manual.

4. Principal related publications are:

• ADDP-D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, which outlines the military-strategic doctrine of the ADF;

• ADDP 3.0—Operations (Provisional), which describes operational art and campaigning, and details the relationship between the national strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict for the conduct of a campaign;

• ADDP 5.0—Joint Planning, which facilitates joint planning for operations at the strategic and operational levels; and

• ADDP 6.0—Communications and Information Systems, which provides a foundation for planning, capability development, in service management and the use of communications equipment.


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AMENDMENTS

Proposals for amendment of ADDP 3.18 may be initiated in either of the following ways:

• By Minute to:

SO1 Doctrine Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre RAAF Base WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314 • By directly entering comment into the Joint Doctrine Library (JDL) found

on the Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre (JWDTC) Defence Restricted Network (DRN) website located at http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/JWDTC/. Select JDL via ‘Publications’ on the JWDTC homepage and open either the ADDP or ADFP block as required. Open the relevant publication and utilise the ‘Add Comment’ function at the bottom of the summary page for each publication.

Note: The second option is an addition to encourage feedback from the wider ADF, as well as encouraging use of the JDL in general.

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY The hierarchy of ADDP and ADFP and the latest electronic version of all ADDP and ADFP are available on the JDL found on the JWDTC DRN website located at: http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/JWDTC/.


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CONTENTS Page Foreword iii Amendments v Contents vii List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Paragraph CHAPTER 1 THE SPACE DOMAIN INTRODUCTION 1-2

SPACE AS A DOMAIN 1-3 Space—physical considerations 1-3 Space—legal considerations 1-5 THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE 1-11 SPACE CONTROL 1-12 SPACE EFFECTS 1-13 AUSTRALIAN SPACE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES 1-14

CHAPTER 2 THE MANAGEMENT OF SPACE INTRODUCTION 2-1 AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SPACE COMMUNITY 2-2 DEFENCE SPACE GOVERNANCE 2-4 JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS 2-6 Joint Operations Command 2-6

CHAPTER 3 SPACE-BASED CAPABILITIES

INTRODUCTION 3-1 SATELLITE ORBITS 3-2 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 3-3 SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 3-5 ADF satellite communications services 3-6 Wideband Global Satellite Communications System 3-7 UHF SATCOM 3-8 POSITION. NAVIGATION AND TIMING 3-9 THE UNITED STATES GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 3-10


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UNITED STATES GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS 3-11 Advantages 3-13 Limitations 3-14 Other systems 3-15 Augmentation systems 3-15 GPS signal enhancement 3-15 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONAISSANCE 3-16 REMOTE SENSING SATELLITES 3-16 Space-based surveillance 3-18 Active sensors 3-18 Passive sensors 3-19 Space-based electronic support 3-20 METEOROLOGY 3-21 Commercial weather satellites 3-21 Military weather satellites 3-22

CHAPTER 4 THREATS TO AND FROM SPACE AND ASSURED SPACE SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION 4-1 THREATS FROM SPACE AND CHALLENGES TO ASSURED SPACE SUPPORT 4-3 ASSURED SPACE SUPPORT 4-4 A knowledgable ADF 4-4 Space situational awareness 4-5 Counterspace operations 4-7 Assured Access 4-8

CHAPTER 5 SPACE OPERATIONS INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION 5-1 OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING 5-1 The operational planning process 5-1 SPACE SUPPORT REQUESTS 5-6

Glossary Acronyms and Abbreviations


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LIST OF FIGURES Figures Title Page 1–1 Optus C-1 Communications Satellite 1-12 2–1 Defence space governance 2-4 3–1 Satellite orbits 3-3 3–2 WGS constellation Earth coverage map 3-8 3–3 IS-22 Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications coverage area from 2012 3-9 3–4 Example of Molniya HEO and associated ground track 3-18 3–5 Example of a satellite radar product 3-19 4–1 Contested and congested space 4-2


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LIST OF TABLES Tables Title Page

1–1 Aspects of space control 1-13


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CHAPTER 1

THE SPACE DOMAIN

Executive summary

• The space domain is a different operating domain to the air domain.

• The physical principles governing the operation of vehicles in space are unlike those governing vehicles in the Earth’s atmosphere.

• While the Australian Defence Force (ADF) relies heavily on space-based assets, the environment in which they operate is extremely harsh.

• International law with respect to space is predicated on five international treaties and a number of principles.

• Space power is required to exert space control. Space control is the ability to survey space, the ability to launch, control and occupy space, the ability to protect space-based assets and the ability to deny the use of space to others.

• Although not a space power, Australia relies on the space power of its allies.

A rocket will never be able to leave the Earth’s atmosphere.

New York Times, 1936

The influence of space power upon history is already substantial and growing … it has the potential to yield decisive advantage.

Prof Colin S. Gray, 1998


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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Space as an operating environment has unique characteristics that make it different to air as a medium. The aerodynamic principles which govern the operation of air-breathing vehicles within the Earth’s atmosphere do not apply in the vacuum of space.

1.2 Earth orbiting satellites, or space vehicles, are designed to perform a variety of functions. These include Earth observation, weather monitoring, communications, navigation and a diverse range of military and scientific applications.

1.3 Since the physical laws governing the operation of space vehicles and air-breathing vehicles are as different as the two operating environments themselves, separate doctrine is required for each. An understanding of the context in which the ADF uses space systems and services is essential.

1.4 To remain in orbit around the Earth, a space vehicle must maintain a horizontal velocity which is fast enough to overcome the effects of gravity, otherwise it will re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. While technically feasible, the manoeuvre of space vehicles in orbit is complex and expensive in terms of the limited and non-replenishable on-board fuel supplies. The space vehicle’s mission and the orbit in which it is to operate must therefore be decided during the design process prior to launch.

1.5 The ADF relies on an array of space-derived services and products to provide speed, synchronisation, precision and assurance in the delivery of strategic, operational and tactical outcomes. The most important of these services include satellite communications, position, navigation and timing (PNT), meteorology, environmental monitoring, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

1.6 The operational effectiveness of the ADF is critically dependent on its assured access to space, without which the military capabilities of the ADF would be severely degraded. This reliance on space will continue to increase, particularly as space capabilities become increasingly critical enablers for the ADF’s future Network Centric Warfare (NCW) aspirations. The increased reliance on space will result in a growing demand for allied and commercial space services and products, as well as a growing need for space capabilities that are owned and operated by the Australian Government or Australian industry in support of its own national security objectives.


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1.7 This increasing demand to exploit the advantages of space capabilities is not unique to Australia. A growing number of nations are seeking to develop indigenous space programs, including counter-space programs. These, and increasing access to highly capable commercial systems, will progressively pose a threat to ADF operations and tasks.

SPACE AS A DOMAIN

Space—physical considerations

1.8 General. The ADF recognises seven domains—four physical domains of air, land, maritime and space; and three non-physical domains of the electro-magnetic spectrum, information and time. Operational employment of the space domain impacts all other domains.

1.9 Since the space domain’s physical environment determines the way in which space systems work, variations in the environment will have a significant impact on all space-based capabilities. Given the increasing importance of space systems to the ADF, all ADF personnel should develop an understanding of how this environment affects the systems they operate. This understanding should encompass not just the space-based elements themselves but also include any related terrestrial components that either support or rely on space systems.

1.10 Defining outer space. There is no international consensus on where a nation’s airspace ends and outer space begins. While there is no general agreement, current state practice indicates that the transition between airspace and outer space occurs at a point around 100-110 kilometres (km) above mean sea level (AMSL). This point is also called the Kármán Line, after the man who proposed to define outer space as beginning at 100 km AMSL.

1.11 A more accurate definition of outer space would define its lower limits somewhere between the outermost reach of airborne aircraft and the lower limit at which a spacecraft can sustain orbit without succumbing to atmospheric friction and gravitational pull; the point where aerodynamic lift yields to centrifugal force. This point, however, is not constant, as it often shifts with changes in atmospheric density.

1.12 There are several competing theories concerning where outer space begins. The United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has spent several decades working towards resolving this issue. Nevertheless, there remains no international consensus on a definition, despite the divide of 100-110 km being proposed on several occasions. As there has been considerable state practice indicating the general acceptance


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of this definition, many States agree that there is no compelling need for a formal definition and delimitation of outer space.

1.13 In Australian domestic law, the Space Activities Act defines a ‘space object’ as one launched or attempted to be launched into an area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level, but that definition is limited to the purposes of the Act.

1.14 The outer space domain. Beyond the bounds of the air domain, space is characterised by vacuum, extremes of temperature, high levels of radiation and high velocity particles, both natural and man-made. The vacuum of space is always completely silent and in areas where the sun’s rays are blocked by the Earth, the limited light is provided only by distant stars.

1.15 The space domain is determined substantially by the sun as it emits electromagnetic energy and electrically charged particles as solar wind. As the solar wind approaches Earth, the particles, travelling at speeds of 400 km per second, are slowed and then deflected around the Earth by its magnetic field. The boundary at which deflection occurs is known as the magnetopause and the volume below it as the magnetosphere. Although the magnetosphere is relatively devoid of solar wind, particles do enter it and are largely trapped to form the Van Allen belts. The inner Van Allen Belt (2000 to 5000 km above Earth) contains mostly protons while the outer Van Allen Belt (from 13000 to 19000 km above Earth) contains mostly electrons.

1.16 The solar wind, and its effects, can frequently be exacerbated by the occurrence of solar flares and sun spots which increase electromagnetic radiation (EMR) and amplify the velocity and density of particle streams. The variations occurring in this harsh environment, known as space weather, affect radar, communications and other space systems. Understanding these effects is fundamental to the effective employment of space systems.

1.17 Although each solar event and its impacts are unique, they are made up of the following components:

• Electromagnetic radiation. EMR consists of X-ray, ultraviolet, optical and radio waves, all of which travel to Earth at the speed of light. Increased EMR can occur as the result of solar flares impacting on objects in direct view of the sun and lasts only for the length of the flare (generally tens of minutes). Disruptive energy from solar flares can affect communications, Global Positioning System (GPS) and ISR satellites as well as terrestrial high frequency (HF) communications and radar systems.


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• High energy particles. High energy particles are made up of extremely high velocity ions. Although not all solar flares produce high energy particles, those produced reach Earth within 15 minutes to several hours of a solar flare occurring. High energy particles can affect satellite orientation and impose physical damage on satellites. They can also disrupt all forms of radio communications, including space-based navigation systems such as the GPS.

• Low to medium energy particles. Low to medium energy particles are made up of streams of protons and electrons that arrive at Earth at various times but particularly two or three days after a solar flare. These particles can generate geomagnetic and ionospheric storms which can impact on radar performance, space tracking and radio propagation. They can also lead to differential charging of space craft, causing problems with electronic components. Affecting mainly the dark side of Earth, these effects can last for several days.

1.18 While the sun dominates space weather, high velocity charged particles known as galactic cosmic rays originate from outside the solar system. These ions range from light elements such as hydrogen and helium nuclei, to heavier elements such as iron. Whilst relatively rare, these particles move at close to the speed of light, increasing the severity of their impact on satellites and space operations.

Space—legal considerations

1.19 General. The international legal framework concerning space activities consists of five international treaties, several UN General Assembly resolutions and non-binding legal principles, and numerous bilateral agreements. The development of international law concerning space activities has been fraught with complexity and a lack of consensus. This has resulted in gaps and inconsistencies when determining the types and extent of space activities permitted, regulated or prohibited, especially regarding the use of weapons in space.

1.20 The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. COPUOS is responsible for the development of international space law. However, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly have at various times also considered specific issues including the arms race in outer space.

1.21 Since its inception, COPUOS has concluded five international treaties and five sets of non-binding legal principles governing space-related activities.


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1.22 The five non-binding legal principles are: Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space; Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting; Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space; Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space; and the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries.

1.23 The five treaties concluded are:

• The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Also known as the Outer Space Treaty, this treaty came into force in October 1967. The Outer Space Treaty’s language provided the basic framework for the four other space treaties discussed below and established the basic principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space. Of significance, the Outer Space Treaty states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and that space shall be the province of all mankind. The Treaty prohibits the national appropriation of outer space; requires countries to undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; and states that the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Treaty requires States Parties to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the UN, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. Whilst the Treaty prohibits placing nuclear weapons and WMD in orbit it remains silent regarding conventional weapons and the use of weapons of mass destruction which travel through outer space.

• The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Also referred to as the Rescue Agreement, this treaty came into force in December 1968. As its title suggests, this treaty calls for the rendering of all possible assistance to astronauts and spacecraft in the event of accident, distress or emergency, or unintended landing; the rescue of astronauts if required and possible; and the return of astronauts in the event of emergency or unintended landing on foreign soil.


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• The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Referred to as the Liability Convention, this treaty came into force in September 1972. It expands the liability provisions originally established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The Liability Convention addresses more specifically the issue of compensation for collateral damage caused by space objects on the surface of the Earth, in flight, or elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth.

• The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Effective since September 1976, the Registration Convention requires objects launched into space to be registered by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which the launching State shall maintain. Each launching State is required to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of such a registry, and notification to the Secretary-General shall be made as soon as practicable of certain information carried on its registry.

• The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Open for signatures in 1979 and in force from 1984, the Moon Treaty or Moon Agreement further enunciates the activities allowed by states on the Moon and other celestial bodies. The Moon Treaty states that the Moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful purposes. Additionally, this treaty states that any benefits derived from the Moon’s resources shall be shared equitably amongst all States Parties to the Treaty regardless of whether a signatory to the Treaty was involved in the discovery or cultivation of the resource. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the Moon is prohibited. Likewise it is prohibited to use the Moon to commit any such act. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around the Moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of WMD or place or use such weapons on or in the Moon. Interestingly, while the Outer Space Treaty has over 120 signatories and 98 ratifications, the Moon Treaty has only 17 signatories and 13 ratifications. Although Australia has ratified this Treaty, many of its closest allies, including Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have not.

1.24 Australia is also a signatory to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1973). It is also a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and a participating State in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The latter is an initiative of more than 30 countries, including Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, that restricts the export or transfers of conventional arms, dual-use


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goods and technologies, stability armaments and other products to particular regions or countries in the world if such a transfer would threaten regional or international peace and security. All of these arrangements are designed, in some way, to restrict the weaponisation of space, however only the space treaties provide specific prohibitions in relation to the orbiting, installation, stationing and use of WMD.

1.25 In 1979 Italy brought to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament that the imminence of an arms race in outer space demonstrated the shortcomings of existing treaties, in particular the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The militarisation of outer space has since been a topic of major controversy in a number of bodies of the UN. There has been extensive debate within both COPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament concerning the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Several UN General Assembly resolutions have been passed but to date the resolutions have not resulted in the negotiation of a specific treaty dealing with these issues.

1.26 Most recently, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space in December 2007. This resolution calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; to refrain from actions contrary to that objective; and to adhere to the relevant existing treaties, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation. That resolution was passed by 179 States, including Australia, with the United States against and Israel abstaining.

1.27 Australian domestic legislation. Although Australian domestic legislation barely addresses space, the Australian Space Council Act No 27 1994 (Cth) and the Space Activities Act No 123 1998 (Cth) attempt to bring focus to Australian space aspirations. The Space Activities Act No 123 1998 (Cth) establishes: a regulatory regime for certain space activities carried on either from Australia or by Australian nationals outside Australia; a compensation regime for damage caused to persons or property as a result of certain space activities; and registration requirements for objects launched pursuant to an authorisation under the Act. The Act defines a ‘space object’ as one launched or attempted to be launched into an area beyond the distance of 100 km AMSL. As previously noted, this definition is limited to the purposes of the Act. The establishment of these regimes is motivated by the objective of implementing various Australian obligations under the UN space treaties discussed above, as well as implementing specified space cooperation arrangements. The Act provides the Regulatory Authority with the power to deny a domestic space launch licence for reasons relevant to Australia's national security, foreign policy, or international obligations.


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1.28 Also relevant to space operations are: the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act No 121 1952 (Cth), the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), the Radiocommunications Act No 174 1992 (Cth), the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act No 133 1998 (Cth), and the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act No 44 2005 (Cth).

1.29 Any military operations in Australia (by the ADF or otherwise) that involve the use of space have the potential to be affected by Australian domestic legislation. For example, certain space activities are prohibited by the Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) unless specially authorised. Activities of the Commonwealth (including the ADF) which involve launches or returns of space objects, or operation of a launch facility, will normally not require authorisation since the Act provides the Commonwealth with certain exemptions to the space activities authorisation regime. However, where the Commonwealth conducts space activities in conjunction with other entities, those other entities may require the relevant authorisation under the Act. For example, if a launch was carried out by the Commonwealth and a private company as joint venturers, the Commonwealth would not require an authorisation under the Act, but the private company would require an authorisation, assuming the private company was not acting as agent of the Commonwealth. It is therefore important that legal advice be sought from Defence Legal where ADF force elements are contemplating activities potentially involving use of the space domain.

1.30 Fundamental principles governing the use of outer space. Based on these bodies of international and domestic law, the way space may be used is predicated on the following six fundamental principles:

• WMD may not be permanently stationed in space;

• All nations have the right to use outer space but not to appropriate it;

• There are no international boundaries in outer space, therefore there are no over flight restrictions;

• Space activities will be registered with the UN, although individual states maintain control and remain responsible for their space objects;

• States are responsible for the supervision of private space activities; and

• States remain liable for the damage caused by their space assets.


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1.31 Ongoing legal issues. Despite extensive debate over many decades concerning the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, space has nonetheless become a key component of modern military weapons systems, particularly through the use of space-based communications, PNT and ISR systems. The phrase ‘peaceful purposes’ is generally understood to equate to non-hostile, non-aggressive activities. The conduct of intelligence gathering and early warning from space-based assets, as well as the transmission of communications and navigation signals from space, all constitute peaceful, non-aggressive activities that may be conducted lawfully.

1.32 In addition to applicable national laws, the ADF is bound by those treaties and conventions discussed above to which Australia is a party. The five space treaties, although specifically prohibiting certain actions, are silent in relation to others, most notably the placement of conventional weapons in outer space. The relationship between the treaties, the UN Charter, customary international law and UN General Assembly resolutions also gives rise to some uncertainty concerning the use of outer space for military purposes. This uncertainty together with the complexity of the subject matter has given rise to different interpretations of existing international law which has resulted in some differences in space policy between Australia and its allies.

1.33 The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 requires States not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other WMD and prohibits the establishment of military bases and the testing of any type of weapons on the Moon or other celestial bodies. The Treaty also requires the Moon and other celestial bodies to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. States Parties are required to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, in the interest of maintaining peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.

1.34 The key omission of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 concerns the use of conventional weapons in outer space and the use of WMD other than in orbit. Several attempts have been made to address these gaps and these attempts have led to considerable debate in the UN General Assembly concerning the danger of an arms race in outer space (see paragraphs 1.24 to 1.26). The requirement that outer space activities be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, requires States to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of other States, but also extends the right of self defence under Article 51 of the Charter to the use of outer space. Article 51 of the Charter recognises the inherent right of States to engage in individual or collective self-defence. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, States may exercise the right of self defence through the use of outer space.


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1.35 Article 51 of the UN Charter allows States to use necessary and proportionate force in individual or collective self-defence in response to an armed attack. The law of armed conflict would apply to the conduct of operations in the space domain.

THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE

1.36 The military use of space can be said to be the use of space power, just as the military use of the sea and the air can be said to be the use of sea power and air power. Similarly, space activities may have a dual use both to obtain military advantage and for non-military purposes. Space control provides a unique advantage and can be defined as preserving the ability to use space while denying its use to an adversary.

1.37 Space power provides the means to exert space control and offers a number of benefits:

• Global access and perspective. With the advantage of unlimited over-flight, satellites are unencumbered by geographic boundaries or terrain. From low Earth orbit, the observation area, or swath, is typically a circular shape and may be up to 2,000 km across. Since the swath width increases with altitude, satellites operating in geosynchronous or geostationary orbits, such as the Optus C1 Communications Satellite shown in Figure 1-1, can observe up to a third of the Earth’s surface.

• Persistence. How long a satellite remains in orbit depends on its orbital altitude as atmospheric drag at lower altitudes slows orbiting objects over time until they eventually re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. However, satellites operating beyond about 20,000 km are almost completely free of drag and can therefore be expected to remain in orbit almost indefinitely. At geostationary altitudes of 36,000 km, satellite orbits above the Earth’s equator are synchronised with the rotation of the Earth so they appear to remain stationary relative to a fixed position on Earth, providing persistent observation or coverage of a specific area. However, satellites in lower orbits cannot remain fixed in one place above the Earth because they need to move faster than the Earth rotates in order to remain in orbit. Persistent coverage of a particular geographic area is therefore only achievable by using constellations of satellites having overlapping coverage areas.

• Precision. Space-based PNT systems derive their unprecedented levels of accuracy from on-board atomic clocks. A GPS receiver uses precise time and other information from GPS satellites to accurately resolve the distance to each satellite in view. The position of the


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receiver can then be calculated with a high degree of precision. This precision then translates to unprecedented levels of accuracy in the delivery of weapons, space-based mapping, and to many Earth observation activities, including weather predictions, intelligence collection and communications network and transaction timings.

Figure 1–1: Optus C1 Communications Satellite

SPACE CONTROL

1.38 Space control encompasses the combat and combat support operations required to ensure freedom of action in space for Australia and its allies and, when directed, to deny an adversary freedom of action in space in accordance with international law. It is an essential component in maintaining assured access to space and the effects it provides in terms of information and space-based services. The level of capability sought by a nation in the physical environment (in terms of launch, control and ownership of space assets) is generally a strategic choice while the effects derived from space-based assets have strategic, operational and tactical level implications.

1.39 Table 1–1 illustrates the three aspects of space control: the utilisation of space; the protection of space-based assets; and the ability to negate the


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capabilities of others in space. For a space power, these require the ability to launch, control and occupy space; the ability to survey space and develop a comprehensive space picture; the ability to protect assets or reconfigure damaged assets; and the ability to minimise the effectiveness or deny the use of space to others.

Table 1–1: Aspects of space control

SPACE EFFECTS

1.40 ‘Space effects’ is a general term used to describe effects on or near the surface of the Earth that are brought about or enabled through the use of space systems. Space effects have permeated all aspects of Australian military planning from the strategic to the tactical level of conflict and impact the full range of military operations. Of particular significance to the ADF is the impact on Australia’s ability to either produce or access intelligence products derived from commercial and military Earth observation systems.

1.41 Space power has supported strategic planning since the 1960s but has grown in importance for Australia over the past two decades. ISR satellites have allowed Australia to observe its region in an unencumbered and timely way while the persistence of satellite coverage has allowed it to note long term trends in specific areas of interest. Information from ISR satellites has allowed Government to make informed decisions and shape its responses to a variety of environmental, economic, diplomatic and national security issues.

Aspects of Space Control

Physical Attributes Space Effects

Utilisation of Space Ability to launch and control Ability to occupy space

Access to PNT, ISR, and satellite communications

Surveillance Ability to conduct surveillance Ability to compile pictures

Space situational awareness

Protection of Space

Protection Ability to protect assets Ability to reconfigure assets

Assured access to space capability

Negation of the Capabilities of Others

Ability to negate or destroy the capability of others, actively or passively

Denial of space capability to adversaries


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ISR satellites have also contributed to knowledge of climate change and adverse weather, allowing Governments to plan for or respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

1.42 At the operational and tactical levels of conflict, remote sensing and reconnaissance satellites, combined with other resources, have allowed the collection of high fidelity intelligence. Long term trends have been a product of persistent observation from space. High bandwidth satellite communications systems have allowed reliable, immediate and long range dissemination of information while PNT satellites have allowed the military to accurately track the position of forces (including Blue Force Tracking) involved in an engagement and to accurately direct guided munitions. At the operational and tactical levels, Australian space power is measured by the ability of the ADF to tailor space services to enable specific outcomes and to counter the space capabilities of an adversary.

AUSTRALIAN SPACE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES

1.43 Australia relies on the fabric of international legislation, regulations, treaties and agreements to maintain its unimpeded access to space products and services. It has no launch capability, few space-based assets of its own and it measures its own space power only in terms of guaranteeing its ongoing access to the space products and services it requires. This is achieved by robust access agreements with allies and contracts with commercial providers.

1.44 Australia currently has no space sensors and relies on the space situation awareness compiled by its allies. Equally, not owning the space-based assets on which it relies means that Australia has little input into the protection incorporated into satellites in terms of hardening, redundancy and manoeuvrability. On the other hand, not owning space assets allows it to seek and contract the best solutions available in a very flexible way.

1.45 While Australia currently has no capability to destroy the space-based assets of potential adversaries, the elements of ground-based infrastructure which support all space systems remain vulnerable to maritime, land and air operations. Identification of adversary ground-based infrastructure critical to the operation and support of adversary space systems will therefore play a key role in ADF counter-space operations.


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CHAPTER 2

THE MANAGEMENT OF SPACE

Executive summary

• Although Australia has a long history of space involvement, it has developed few space capabilities of its own.

• While there is no single body coordinating Australian space usage, various Government departments do have space responsibilities.

• Within the Department of Defence there is a structure designed to coordinate space capabilities across the organisation.

• A process exists within Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) to provide space derived services and products for operations.

INTRODUCTION

2.1 Australia has a long history of involvement with space, although this involvement has been shaped by the absence of a national or Defence space vision. After the Second World War, Australia hosted United Kingdom (UK) missile trials at Woomera and during the 1960s agreed to the establishment of several jointly run allied space facilities. Australia has also constantly provided the critical ground stations required in support of the United States (US) manned space missions.

2.2 While a sophisticated and increasingly heavy user of space capabilities, Australia does not directly control many of the assets upon which it relies. This approach allows a high level of flexibility and an ability to tailor space support quickly but it also means that Australia relies heavily on the veracity of commercial contracts and allied arrangements for assured access. This vulnerability to the denial of space services is an area of significant concern.

2.3 Although highly reliant on space for its military and commercial well being, Australia has no overall body responsible for the coordination of space usage and policy.


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AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SPACE COMMUNITY

2.4 Australia uses engagement in space-related activities to support its national strategic, economic and social outcomes. Australia, as a nation, is a sophisticated user of space derived services to support such areas as communications and broadcasting, environmental and natural resource management, weather forecasting, and navigation and timing. Space infrastructure, science, research and related technologies procured by Defence, other government departments (OGD) or within private industry contribute significantly to Australia’s national security – not only to military and Defence objectives, but also to border security, anti-terrorism and security of telecommunications.

2.5 Australia’s national space domain is one within which both private and government institutions use available space-derived services to create outcomes. Our nation’s space engagement is therefore user and market driven, with a key objective being to obtain secure and assured economic access to the benefits of using space. Both Australian OGD and the private sector secure access to the benefits of space by participating in a range of international cooperative arrangements and by purchasing products and services in the domestic and global market place. Defence uses its strategic alliance relationships, together with purchasing specific commercially available space-derived services, such as satellite communications and commercial imagery, to obtain and apply the benefits of space to its military activities.

2.6 As a result of Australia’s national approach to space, the Government’s space-related activities and objectives are implemented across a range of Government agencies, with the following Departments being involved:

• The Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (DIISR) is charged with exercising prime responsibility and coordination of civil space issues including space education;

• The Department of Defence is responsible for military and national security aspects of space;

• The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) leads and coordinates Australia’s space science effort;

• The Attorney-General’s Department regulates the application of international space law across whole-of-Government and whole-of-nation space engagement, as well as representing our national interest in the development of space law in international forums;


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• The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) provides space-derived meteorology services;

• Geoscience Australia leads and coordinates the use of space-derived natural resource management and civil navigation and timing;

• The Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts uses space-derived services to support management of the environment; and

• The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy manages and regulates our national use of space communications.

2.7 Australian Government Space Forum.1 The primary role of the Australian Government Space Forum, in which Defence participates through the involvement of the Strategic Policy Division of the Strategy Executive, is information sharing about the space-related policies, programs and activities of Australian Government Departments. The forum is consultative, has no executive authority and does not supplant the space policy and program development and delivery authority vested in individual Departments. While the forum provides a mechanism for enhancing information exchange and communication about space activities and policies, it has no power to proactively coordinate Government space activity. In performing its role, the forum:

• manages the dissemination of information about Australian Government space-related policies, programs and activities;

• identifies issues that would benefit from a collaborative approach amongst Australian Government Departments;

• provides an initial point of contact for domestic and international queries about Australian Government space activities; and

1 As at February 2008, the Australian Government Space Forum’s membership comprised DIISR; CSIRO; the Australian Research Council; Geoscience Australia; Office of Spatial Data Management; Department of Defence; Broadcasting Division of Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy; Australian Communications and Media Authority; Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government; International Organisations and Legal Division of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Emergency Management Australia; Public International Law Branch of Attorney-General's Department; Office of International Law; Bureau of Rural Sciences; Corporate Strategies Division of Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts; IPS Radio and Space Services; and the Bureau of Meteorology.


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• acts as a source of expertise or referral about space related matters upon which Government Departments can draw as required.

DEFENCE SPACE GOVERNANCE

2.8 General. ADF space capabilities are provided from a variety of sources, are managed across a range of Departments and are applied at various levels within the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO). The Defence Space Coordination Plan outlines the governance arrangement which specifies the following responsibilities and relationships.

Figure 2–1: Defence space governance

2.9 Defence Space Council. The purpose of the Defence Space Council (DSC) is to oversee Defence space governance and coordination while also providing a forum for the primary Defence space stakeholders to discuss space-related issues. The DSC is the peak body addressing space-related issues that extend beyond the recognised responsibilities of service chiefs and group heads as capability managers (CM)/coordinating capability


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managers (CCM). The DSC has the authority to resolve issues that do not require amendment to major capability proposals. Issues may arise from superior committee outcomes, be raised by Council members from within their own areas of responsibility or be directed from the CM/CCM through the Defence Space Coordination Group (DSCG). DSC meetings are timed to coincide with other senior governance council meetings, such as the ISR Council meeting, and should be convened at least annually.

2.10 The DSC is co-chaired by the Chief of the Air Force (CAF) and Deputy Secretary Strategy Executive. This arrangement reflects the complementary nature of the coordinating capability management and strategic policy development roles.

2.11 Defence Space Coordination Group. The DSCG is responsible for coordination, sponsorship and monitoring of space tasks in accordance with DSC direction. The Chair of the DSCG is responsible for ensuring DSC directives and tasks are assigned to the appropriate action officer. The group is composed of one-star representatives for each of the space outputs.

2.12 Capability specific working groups. The working level coordination and implementation of space related capabilities are achieved by working groups designed specifically for key space capabilities. These working groups, formed at the O4/O5 level, draw upon representatives from agencies directly involved in the development of these capabilities. Issues that cannot be resolved at this level are elevated to the DSCG.

2.13 Defence Space Coordinating Office. The Defence Space Coordinating Office (DSCO) has the role of coordinating the Defence space enterprise and providing secretariat support to the DSC and DSCG. This includes coordination of space strategic planning. Although primarily set at the output level, it also includes involvement in the development of space expertise, guidance, engagement, and concept exploration and exploitation.

2.14 Coordinating capability manager for space. Space is an environment through and from which operational effects may be delivered. In the future this may also include effects into and within space. CAF is responsible for overseeing the coordination of the capability aspects for the space environment.

2.15 Capability manager. CAF is also the capability manager (CM) for the following specific areas of space capabilities:

• Space-based position, navigation and timing. As the CM for space-based position, navigation and timing (PNT), CAF is


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responsible for facilitating ADF access to PNT services, principally through the US GPS constellation.

• Space-related warfare. As the CM for space-related warfare (SW), CAF has a range of responsibilities, including space situational awareness (SSA) and counterspace capabilities (including navigation warfare).

• Environmental awareness. As the CM for environmental awareness, CAF is responsible for generating an awareness of space weather amongst operators and users of space-based assets.

JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS

2.16 By their nature, Space operations support a range of customers over vast areas of the Earth. Additionally, the effects generated by space capabilities can be applied from the tactical to strategic level. The command and control of these assets must therefore be able to support both the tactical commander and the wider strategic requirements of the ADO.

2.17 Given that many of the space capabilities the ADF relies upon are not under its direct command and control, much of the space effort within the ADF is focussed on developing sound, proactive interfaces with US space authorities. Regardless of the type of space support required, operational planning starts with the joint staff in the Joint Operations Command (JOC).2

Joint Operations Command

2.18 The Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) commands HQJOC, which plans, controls and conducts campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force. CJOPS is supported by an integrated joint staff that is responsible for the following in respect to space:

• The coordination and planning of space activities in support of operational requirements;

• The coordination of the provision of integrated space effects to subordinate joint task forces (JTF) and units operating in a theatre; and

2 For additional information about the common joint staff system, see: Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1—Command and Control.


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• The provision of inputs to the space capability development process, which ensure future operations have access to appropriate space effects.

2.19 Space responsibilities within JOC reside in the joint staff, which provides the linkage between the needs of a JTF and the service providers of space products. Elements of the joint staff directly responsible for aspects of the operational employment of space are outlined below.

• J2 Intelligence. The role of the J2 is the provision of space-derived intelligence support to CJOPS, HQJOC, subordinate units and units operating in the theatre. As such, the J2 is responsible for requesting strategic intelligence agencies, for example Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), to provide ISR products and intelligence and these agencies, in turn, submit the request for information to the appropriate US space authority.

• J3 Operations. The role of the J3 is the conduct of operations and the coordination of real-time support to units operating in theatre. In the area of space, the J3 is substantially responsible for the provision of space situational awareness support to the commander, including the status and location of friendly and adversary space assets, the provision of satellite vulnerability reports (SATVULREP) and the provision of GPS dilution of precision reports.

• J5 Plans. The role of the J5 is the conduct of deliberate and immediate planning, supported by the component planning staffs. With respect to space support, the J5 is responsible for integrating space considerations into the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP); this is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 5.

• J6 Communications and information systems. The role of the J6 is the provision of communications support to operations. The J6 is the conduit for coordination and tasking of satellite communications capabilities.

2.20 Air and Space Operations Centre. The JOC Air and Space Operations Centre (AOC) is responsible for the planning, coordination and direction of ADF air and space operations.

2.21 Joint Space Cell. Due to limited numbers of space personnel within the ADF, the space staff in HQJOC is concentrated in the Joint Space Cell (JSC). The JSC acts as the Space advisor to CJOPS, and provides specialist support to the joint staff areas listed above.


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2.22 Joint Task Force(s). Force assigned units will be formed by CJOPS into JTF in order to conduct specific missions and tasks. Staff functions within a JTF will be dependent on the nature of these tasks, and the resources assigned. The commander of a JTF is responsible for ensuring that appropriate space support is requested of HQJOC to enable mission accomplishment.


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CHAPTER 3

SPACE-BASED CAPABILITIES

Executive summary

• Satellites operate in one of several orbits: low Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO) or geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). Some satellites operate in highly elliptical orbits (HEO).

• The space craft mission, laws of orbital motion and the technical capabilities of the space craft and the sensor it carries determine the type of orbit.

• The capabilities of space-based assets of direct relevance to military operations fall into four broad categories: satellite communications (SATCOM); position, navigation and timing (PNT); intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and meteorology.

The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.

Colonel Ardant du Picq (d. 1870), Battle Studies, 1880

INTRODUCTION

3.1 The operation of vehicles in the space domain is driven by the laws of orbital motion, which involve high space vehicle velocities in fixed orbital planes. These fixed orbital planes result in predictable satellite trajectories. (The minimum altitude at which a circular orbit can be maintained above Earth is about 150 km). This also makes for a unique operating environment for the placement and manoeuvre of space assets.

3.2 While space vehicles can be used for a large range of tasks, the most relevant military capabilities provided by space-based assets fall into the following four categories:

• Satellite communications;

• Position, navigation and timing;


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• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and

• Meteorology.

SATELLITE ORBITS

3.3 General. Space vehicles operate in one of four orbits: LEO; MEO; GEO; or HEO. These are described in the following paragraphs.

3.4 Low Earth orbits. LEO extend from about 150 to 1,500 km above the Earth’s surface. Because of the proximity to Earth, satellites operating in LEO are subject to the effects of atmospheric drag and are therefore short life platforms (days to years, depending on orbital altitude). LEO satellite orbits are generally inclined at an angle to the equator and complete eight to sixteen orbits of Earth every 24 hours. LEO is the operating environment of photographic reconnaissance and similar satellites.

3.5 Medium Earth orbits. MEO extend from about 1,500 to 20,000 km above the Earth’s surface. Well above the Earth’s atmosphere, satellites in MEO are free of atmospheric drag and so remain in orbit for long periods (years to many decades). MEO satellites may be inclined at any angle to the equator. Orbital period and inclination is dictated by mission design with MEO satellites such as the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellations typically completing two orbits of Earth in each 24 hour period from an orbital altitude of 20,200 km.

3.6 Geostationary Earth orbits. GEO occur at approximately 35,600 km above Earth. At this altitude, satellite orbits have a period of 24 hours, and are termed geosynchronous. Geosynchronous orbits with zero degrees inclination to the equator appear to an observer to be stationary above the same geographic point on the Earth’s surface and satellites in this orbit are therefore known as geostationary satellites. Satellites at inclinations above zero degrees with respect to the equator appear to move north and south across the equator as the Earth rotates beneath it. At this altitude there is little degradation in the orbit of the satellite and so satellites can remain in orbit almost indefinitely. GEO is the operating environment for most communications and some surveillance and weather satellites.

3.7 Highly elliptical orbits. While the paragraphs above describe the common orbits, there are significant variations. The most recognised of these is the HEO. This orbit takes advantage of the satellite’s apogee (highest point in orbit) and perigee (lowest point in orbit) to increase the dwell time over particular areas of the world. One of the better known HEO orbits is the Molniya orbit. Designed to ensure the satellite spends its greatest amount of time in the northern hemisphere, it is inclined at 63.4 degrees to the equator


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and has an apogee of 46,000 km and a perigee of 400 km. This geometry keeps it in the northern hemisphere for 90 percent of the time (see Figure 3-4).

3.8 Figure 3–1 depicts the relative altitudes of three of the four most common orbit types.

Figure 3–1: Satellite orbits

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.9 General. Space vehicles can operate anywhere from 150 km to 36,000 km above the surface of the Earth with an angle of inclination to the equator of 0º to 180º. While this results in a theoretically infinite number of possible orbits, not all are practical or useful. A ‘trade space’ exists between the mission requirements, the laws of physics and the practical limits of technology, which forces a compromise amongst the three. Mission success is therefore dependent on a number of operational considerations, the most significant of which are described briefly in the following paragraphs.

3.10 Orbital altitude. For ISR missions, sensor resolution is directly proportional to orbital altitude – it increases as the sensor gets closer to the subject of interest. Conversely, the further away the space vehicle is, the more of the Earth it can see but the lower the resolution. LEO are generally well suited to ISR missions whereas the higher orbits of geostationary satellites are better suited to communications missions. The operating altitude for the space vehicle is determined during mission design and can generally not be changed after launch.


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3.11 System architecture. Consideration should also be given to the system architecture that supports the collection and delivery of information. Once information has been collected, it must be down-linked to a ground station. This often requires a number of globally dispersed ground stations as part of the sensor network, in order to ensure the timely delivery of information to the end user. If multiple ground stations are not provided, the satellite needs to be able to store collected information until its next pass over the controlling ground station, which may be many days. This constraint also means that satellites cannot be dynamically re-tasked.

3.12 Angle of inclination. The orbital angle of inclination to the equator will determine how much of the Earth’s surface is observed by the sensor as the Earth rotates beneath it. An angle of inclination of zero degrees will result in the space vehicle orbiting above the equator while an angle of 90 degrees will result in an orbit about the poles.

3.13 Sensor resolution. Sensor resolution is most often described in terms of spatial, spectral, temporal and radiometric.

• Spatial resolution is a measure of the smallest distance at which two objects can be determined to be separate and is usually specified in metres or centimetres (cm). This metric is a function of both the orbital altitude and of the sensor technology employed.

• Spectral resolution is a measure of the number of discrete wavelengths within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) that a specific sensor is capable of discerning. This metric is a function of the sensor technology employed and is used in discriminating between objects based on their reflective properties.

• Temporal resolution is a measure of the frequency with which a sensor passes over the same geographic location. Temporal resolution is most often described as ‘revisit time’ and is a function of a number of design considerations such as orbital altitude, velocity, and sensor swath width.

• Radiometric resolution is a measure of the ability of a sensor to record different levels of brightness and is specified in terms of ‘bits’ of data. For example, a sensor capable of eight bit resolution would be able to record 28, or 256, discrete levels of colour. Radiometric resolution is largely a function of the technology employed.


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SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

Communications dominate war; broadly considered they are the most important element in strategy, political or military.

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia, 1900

If intercommunication between events in front and ideas behind are not maintained, then two battles will be fought—a mythical headquarters battle and an actual frontline one.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller, quoted in George Marshall (Ed.), Infantry in Battle, 1939

3.14 The ADF requires a range of communications systems to command and control (C2) forces, to deliver administrative services and to provide other essential functions. For units in fixed locations, these services are largely delivered by national and military-strategic communications networks that have access to wide bandwidth communications infrastructure. When at sea or deployed on operations and exercises, radio and satellite communications networks become the primary means of delivering these services.

3.15 Radio communications are limited and depend on a variety of factors including operating frequency, atmospherics, geography and time of day. Higher frequency communications (ultra-high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF)) provide line of sight (LOS) (short range) communications while lower frequencies such as low frequency (LF) and very low frequency (VLF), used for maritime C2, as well as high frequency (HF), provide longer range, global communications. Higher frequency communications support large bandwidths or higher data rates resulting in the transfer of a larger amount of information per unit of time while lower frequencies support comparatively low data rates. Lower frequencies are therefore not suitable for many modern communications applications that need to exchange large amounts of information almost instantly.

3.16 One way to achieve both high data rates and long ranges is to use higher frequencies but gain range by relaying these carriers through satellites. As this technology has evolved, SATCOM systems have become


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the dominant means of reliably transporting large amounts of information over long distances.

3.17 Over the last 10 to 15 years, civil and military demands for ever increasing communications bandwidth and seamless connectivity over great distances have driven the commercial development of SATCOM technology. During this period the ADF has begun moving towards becoming a network enabled force, a move that is underpinned by the communications grid, in turn enabled by a network of SATCOM systems. Allied military and commercial SATCOM systems therefore underpin the ability of Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to command the nation’s forces at ranges beyond the LOS.

3.18 In developing access to SATCOM, the ADF has, in the past, relied heavily on UHF SATCOM for C2 and on other narrow bandwidth systems such as the International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT), the Defence Mobile Communications Network (DMCN) and Iridium satellite phones to support voice and low rate data transfer. Wide bandwidth systems such as the C-, X-, Ku- and Ka-bands have also been progressively introduced for delivery of other forms of communications traffic, including email and web access.

3.19 This increasing access to all bandwidths means that the ADF is able to maintain real time communications across its organisation regardless of the bandwidth required or the availability of military satellite systems in particular regions. Access to a wide range of bands is also important to mitigate phenomena such as rain fade which can degrade and, in some bandwidths, completely block higher frequency communications signals.

3.20 Few of the systems used by the ADF are owned or controlled by the Australian Government or Australian industry and access to them is guaranteed only by the memoranda or contracts under which the services are provided. This means Australia has little control over the configuration of the systems and many remain vulnerable to electronic attack methods such as jamming. The ADF’s dependence on satellite systems over which it has little control, particularly commercial systems, has therefore represented a significant vulnerability. This historical vulnerability is changing rapidly with the deployment of the AS/US wideband global satellite communications system (WGS) and further developments in ADF access to UHF SATCOM services, both of which are discussed later in this chapter.

ADF satellite communications services

3.21 Access to space services is provided through a number of space service networks. For ADF operations and exercises, access to satellite communications networks is managed by the Defence Strategic


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Communications Branch (DSCB) in the Defence Network Operations Centre (DNOC).

3.22 Communications satellite services are delivered in three ways: by using ADF owned assets, through partnerships with allies and through commercial leases.

• ADF satellite services. The ADF Satellite Communications Capability (ADFSCC) is a Defence owned payload on board the Optus C1 satellite and includes the terrestrial infrastructure for the control and management of the Defence payload. The ADFSCC provides Defence with SATCOM services in the UHF, X- and Ka- frequency bands.

• Allied satellite access. In certain circumstances, both the US and UK provide the ADF access to some satellite services, particularly UHF SATCOM services. Defence Strategic Communications Branch (Satellite Operations) (DSCB (SATOPS)) is responsible for liaising with allies to gain access to these specific services.

• Commercial lease. In circumstances where the ADF is unable to provide satellite access through either an ADF owned space segment or through alternate arrangements with its allies, DSCB procures a commercial lease through service providers such as Optus. Despite the vulnerability of commercial satellites, they are typically used to support expeditionary operations in regions not covered by an existing allied military satellite. Since companies such as Optus do not necessarily own communications satellites with global coverage, the ADF’s principle commercial service provider may be asked to broker the necessary services through a third party satellite communications service provider. Commercial leases have therefore been the dominant means by which the ADF has provided wide bandwidth satellite communications services to deployed forces. This situation has begun to change since 2008 with the introduction of the WGS capability.

Wideband Global Satellite Communications System

3.23 In 2007, the ADF embarked on a partnership with the US for the acquisition and deployment of a constellation of six military communication satellites known as WGS. Under the terms of the memorandum of understanding (MOU), Australia provided funding to purchase the sixth satellite in the constellation and a share of the necessary satellite system control infrastructure. Under this arrangement, the ADF also contributes to manpower positions in the US and other related positions in Australia.


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3.24 This communications satellite constellation will provide the ADF with guaranteed access to approximately 10% of the total global communications capacity of the constellation in the X- and Ka-bands. The use of X- and Ka-bands will allow the ADF to rationalise the number of disparate deployable wide band terminal types currently in service and reduce the training, maintenance and operating costs associated with these systems.

3.25 WGS coverage for the full constellation of six satellites is shown in Figure 3–2. Notably, four of the six satellites are visible from Australia and these provide an inherently high level of redundancy for Australia’s Primary Operating Environment.

Figure 3–2: WGS constellation Earth coverage map

UHF SATCOM

3.26 Narrow band, low data rate UHF SATCOM services are an essential part of the ADF’s C2 mechanism and demand for channels has always remained high. However, UHF SATCOM channels have always been a scarce resource due to the limited number of UHF satellites available in Australia’s areas of interest as well as the cost of leasing channels commercially. In 2009, the ADF signed a contract with Intelsat to host an ADF owned UHF communications satellite payload aboard a satellite to be placed into a geostationary orbit over the Indian Ocean region (IOR). Planned to enter service in 2012, the Intelsat satellite (IS-22) will provide the ADF with a number of 25 kilohertz (kHz) decremented assigned multiple access (DAMA), or integrated waveform channels which will be managed by the DSCB on behalf of Defence. Figure 3–3 illustrates the planned coverage area to be provided by IS-22.


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Figure 3–3: IS-22 Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications coverage area from 2012

3.27 Once in service, IS-22 will replace existing services provided by the LEASAT 5, SKYNET 5B and US military UHF follow-on satellites currently accessed through an AS/US Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The UHF payload on the Optus C1 satellite which currently provides coverage from eastern India to the middle of the Pacific Ocean is expected to remain in service until the end of the service life of the satellite around 2020. Combined, IS-22 and Optus C1 will provide the ADF with a significant UHF capability for the next decade and beyond.

POSITION, NAVIGATION AND TIMING

The Global Positioning System, originally developed for military PNT services, has become the international standard. A 29 March 1996 Presidential Decision Directive committed to supplying GPS signals without charge to the world for civil uses without degrading its accuracy. This decision, and the continuing worldwide adoption of GPS for civil uses, made the system an essential international utility.

Peter L. Hays, Spacepower for a New Millennium, 2000


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3.28 The GNSS provides position, navigation, velocity and timing (PNVT) information derived from several purpose built satellite navigation systems. These services are often referred to as PNT in the Australian context, or more fully as PNVT or PVT in the US context. GNSS includes the US Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging (NAVSTAR) Global Positioning System (GPS), the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) and in the future, may include China’s Compass, the European Union’s Galileo, Japan’s Quasi-zenith Satellite System and the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System. GPS and GLONASS are currently operational but were developed independently of each other during the latter stages of the Cold War and were not designed to be interoperable.

3.29 In the civilian context, satellite-based PNT services are used in civil aviation, maritime operations, mobile telephone systems, surface transport, oil and gas exploration, precision agriculture, fisheries, survey and leisure activities. PNT services derived from GNSS impact on almost every aspect of modern life.

3.30 In the military context, satellite-based PNT services provide precise positioning information for use by receivers which can be either hand held or embedded in equipment such as the guidance systems found in precision guided munitions (PGM). In addition to aiding ground based positioning and navigation, PNT information is a critical enabler for the precise delivery of aircraft munitions, naval gunfire, artillery and all forms of guided weapons, such as the 155mm PGM used by the Australian Army.

THE UNITED STATES GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

3.31 The US NAVSTAR GPS is the only fully operational navigation satellite constellation within the GNSS and the only system that currently provides the accuracy and resistance to electronic interference required by the ADF. It is also the system used by the majority of commercial receivers and most Western armed forces.

3.32 As originally designed, the GPS constellation used 24 satellites with this configuration resulting in between four and seven GPS satellites being visible at any one time from anywhere on the surface of Earth. The recent requirement to improve accuracy over specific geographic areas has resulted in the constellation being increased to 32 satellites.

3.33 The NAVSTAR GPS PNT is the only system authorised by the ADF for operational use. In combination with user terminal units, it supports strategic, operational, and tactical missions by providing the ADF with essential and precise three-dimensional position information and a highly accurate time reference.


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3.34 In conducting military operations, it is essential that PNT services be available with the highest possible confidence. Any information that makes reference to time must be able to provide that time in terms of the standard temporal reference, defined by Universal Time Coordinated, as maintained by the US Naval Observatory master clock, which is the standard for all military systems.

3.35 GPS satellites broadcast navigation information on a continuous basis. The transmission has two levels of service — a standard positioning service (SPS) and a precise positioning service (PPS). The positioning code in each permits very precise matching of receiver-generated and satellite-generated waveforms, hence, precise measurement of the distance to each satellite.

• SPS, which utilises the coarse acquisition code, is the unencrypted civilian positioning and timing service that is available to all GPS users.

• PPS is a more accurate military positioning, velocity, and timing service available to authorised encrypted users (US and Australian military and some other allies) on a worldwide basis with limited anti-jam capabilities. Access to PPS is controlled by use of cryptography (encryption keys loaded in the terminal units). Importantly for the ADF, resistance to either intended or unintended interference is only achieved if the GPS receiver is keyed with the appropriate cryptographic key. In the unkeyed state, military GPS receivers are likely to be no more accurate than a commercial receiver and they function particularly poorly in a jamming environment. It is therefore mandatory for ADF receivers to be loaded and operated with the cryptographic key.

UNITED STATES GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

3.36 The inherent precision of the US GPS allows precise site surveys, target acquisition and location. GPS establishes a ‘common reference grid’ within the operational area, enables a ‘common time’, helps establish ‘common direction’, and facilitates synchronised operations. GPS supports military operations across the full spectrum of maritime, land, air and space domains, as described in the following paragraphs.

3.37 Maritime operations. Some of the benefits of using GPS during the conduct of maritime operations include:


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• Ships and submarines can precisely plot their position, thereby allowing safe port operations and navigation through restricted waters.

• Coastlines can be accurately surveyed by using a combination of laser range finding and highly accurate position information.

• Mines can be laid and precisely plotted for friendly force avoidance and safe, efficient retrieval.

• Rendezvous at sea, sea rescue, and other operations that require precise tracking can be facilitated using space-based PNT support.

3.38 Land operations. Some of the benefits of using GPS during the conduct of land operations include:

• Mine fields and obstacles can be accurately surveyed, emplaced, and recorded.

• The accuracy of artillery fire is improved through precise gun emplacement, precision gun laying, precision observer location, a reduction in adversary target location error, and precision guided artillery and mortar rounds.

• Armoured units can travel closed down and still maintain highly accurate positional awareness.

• Exact location and navigation information helps logistic support by expediting resupply efforts. The precise information also supports the timely and efficient evacuation of wounded personnel to medical facilities.

• It enables battlefield applications such as Blue Force Tracker.

• It enables all weather air support.

3.39 Air operations. Some of the benefits of using GPS during the conduct of air operations include:

• Information on PNT enhances airdrop, air refueling, search and rescue, reconnaissance, terminal approach and recovery, low-level navigation, targeting, and precision weapons delivery.


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• Air corridors for friendly operations can be set with greater accuracy, and aircraft have a greater capability to safely follow these corridors.

• Non-traditional ISR and dynamic targeting enables near-real-time reallocation of air assets.

3.40 Space operations. The GPS navigation service provides exact positioning to other satellites to enable their ‘position autonomy’. The same service enables ‘orbital rendezvous’ between space systems (e.g., space docking for the space shuttle). It also provides precise time to communications satellites and to systems in geostationary Earth orbit. New launch vehicles rely upon GPS position and derived velocity information to aid in determining altitude orientation.

Advantages

3.41 Use of the GPS constellation has several advantages.

• Accuracy. The GPS constellation provides a continuous global service. Accuracy of the service is provided through a combination of the type of receiver used, the number of satellites in view, and the geometric configuration of those satellites.

• Accessibility. GPS equipment is passive, therefore it is capable of providing continuous real-time information. Any authorised user with a keyed PPS receiver has access to the most precise PNT information. However, commercial user equipment cannot receive and process the PPS information and is limited to the SPS signal, making it inherently less accurate and particularly vulnerable in a navigation warfare environment.

• Graceful Degradation. Each GPS satellite can store information on board for up to 60 days. In the event the GPS constellation cannot be updated, accuracy will gradually degrade. The rate of degradation is very slow in the first few days but increases with time. This allows GPS to be used for several days even if the update capabilities are interrupted.

• Common Grid. The default navigation grid used by the GPS is the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84). WGS-84 can be easily converted to any grid reference in the user’s receiver.

• Jamming. Space-based navigation systems (such as GPS) are resistant to some types of jamming. The use of GPS encryption (like


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the more robust military code) and specialised antennas/filters, as well as the correct placement of GPS receivers on various platforms, improves jamming resistance. Tactical measures may be employed by users to decrease vulnerability from ground-based jamming (such as placing a hand-held receiver below ground level in a weapon pit or slightly below an open hatch in an armoured vehicle).

• Anti-spoofing. With the precise capability provided by the GPS, a logical concern is that an adversary could generate false signals to mislead an authorised user with respect to position or timing information. Anti-spoofing technology is designed to mitigate receiver confusion that could be caused by intentionally misleading transmissions.

Limitations

3.42 The GPS constellation also has several inherent limitations.

• Adversary exploitation. Adversary exploitation of the SPS can reduce the military advantage. Commercial GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming, particularly from purpose built ground-based or airborne jammers.

• Jamming. Jamming GPS can adversely affect civil and emergency services operations, as well as military operations within a geographic area. The stronger the jammer is, the larger the affected area. Commanders should include the potential for adversary GPS jamming operations into their electronic warfare plan and should further ensure users remain proficient in the more traditional means of navigation. Consideration should also be given to friendly interference, which is mitigated via the joint restricted frequency list.

• Required signals. Signals from at least four satellites are required to build a three-dimensional position and navigation picture (only one signal is needed for timing). Units relying on hand-held GPS receivers in areas of dense vegetation or steep terrain may have diminished GPS capabilities due to the lack of LOS reception of GPS signals.

• Reception. GPS navigation signals are affected by ionospheric scintillation, tropospheric errors, and signal multipath reception issues. Receivers capable of two frequency reception minimise errors.

• Effect on other systems. Denial of the GPS navigation signal may have a direct negative impact on systems that have nothing to do with


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navigation. This is particularly true for communications systems that rely on GPS timing.

Other systems

3.43 Although the European Union’s Galileo may be used in the future, other PNT systems within the GNSS are not currently used by the ADF. However, this may change in later decades as the total number of satellites planned within the GNSS will result in a global constellation of at least 75 satellites being available to provide unprecedented levels of accuracy for receivers capable of decoding more than one type of navigation and timing signal.

Augmentation systems

3.44 As stand-alone systems, navigation satellites do not necessarily provide the levels of accuracy, integrity or availability required for some applications and a number of augmentation systems have been developed. One such system, known as differential GPS (DGPS), uses Earth stations that have precisely surveyed positions. As they receive signals from GPS satellites, they are compared with the values they should be receiving and the differences are used to calculate corrections. The corrections are then transmitted locally to GPS receivers via a terrestrial radio network or alternately via geostationary satellites. In the case of the US GPS, position accuracy can be improved from 16 metres to less than 1 metre using DGPS. While there are a number of augmentations systems used globally, the fixed nature of the required infrastructure means that augmentation systems are generally not suitable for rapid deployment in support of military operations.

GPS signal enhancement

3.45 The more recently deployed GPS satellites have a feature called adaptive power control, which allows the energy from the satellite to be increased in a particular geographic area if the tactical situation requires it. Circumstances which may require such action include the presence of enemy jamming or high levels of solar radiation, such as solar flares, both of which interfere with GPS operations. Should a planned operation be considered sufficiently important to warrant such action, GPS signal enhancement may be requested for a specific period of the operation.


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INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

If nothing else had come out of it [the space program] except the knowledge we’ve gained from space photography, it would be worth ten times what the whole program has cost.

US President Lyndon B. Johnson

One who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes, cannot manoeuvre the army.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, circa 400-320 BC

3.46 The Australian Government depends on international and allied space-based ISR systems to develop a response to critical incidents. Once committed to a course of action involving the military, operational planners and the ADF rely on ISR information for detailed planning. At the strategic or operational level, ISR information may be long-lived and change little over short periods of time, while at the tactical level it may change in seconds to minutes. Importantly, it is the speed of collection, processing and dissemination of this information which allows ADF and allied forces to observe, orient, decide and act more quickly than the enemy. Much of the information on which the ADF depends is derived from the exploitation of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) collected by space-based sensors through a process known as remote sensing.

3.47 EMR can be emitted by the Earth or objects operating on or near it. Energy from the sun can also be reflected back into space by the surface of the Earth or objects on or near it. This energy can then be collected by remote sensing satellites and exploited to produce actionable intelligence. In this and the following section, remote sensing is used exclusively to refer to the employment of space-based sensors to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum for the purpose of collecting information about the surface of the Earth or objects operating on or near it.

REMOTE SENSING SATELLITES

3.48 Remote sensing satellites can be operated from any orbit depending largely on the nature of the information the satellite is designed to collect and


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the payload it is carrying. The sensor design itself is the product of a complex interplay between the customer requirements for detail, persistence and speed of product delivery, and the laws of physics which govern orbital mechanics, sensor resolution and performance. The sensor payload on any satellite is therefore the best achievable compromise and each is optimised for a particular application.

3.49 Fundamental to the performance of a remote sensing satellite is the altitude at which it operates. Sensing satellites operate in the following orbits:

• LEO. Most commercial and military ISR satellites operate from LEO because the closer the sensor is to the subject of interest, the higher the spatial resolution and target revisit rate. High resolution imaging satellites such as IKONOS, Quick Bird and Geo Eye all operate from LEO, as do a number of Earth science and radar satellites. While satellites operating in LEO typically provide the highest resolution information, this advantage must be traded off against the expected life of the satellite and the amount of time available for sensing a target as it passes over any one point on the surface of the Earth.

• MEO. MEO are used by ISR, weather and other Earth observation satellites, where the data requirements do not require the high resolution of LEO systems. Due to the higher altitudes, satellites operating in MEO have a greater field of view and therefore lend themselves better to ISR coverage of large geographic areas. Specific examples may include infra-red (IR) sensors that search for and identify forest fires or the hot exhaust plumes from missiles and rockets.

• HEO. The primary advantage of the HEO is the long dwell time on the approach to and descent from apogee, which maximises the amount of time spent observing a specific area of Earth. While the Molniya is the best known example of a HEO, elliptical and highly elliptical orbits can be constructed to optimise observation time over virtually any part of Earth. This type of orbit has specific Earth science applications such as monitoring near Earth radiation levels, terrestrial and space weather and environmental monitoring. It also has particular applicability for ISR missions such as imaging and electronic intercept. Figure 3–4 shows an example of a ground trace produced by a satellite in a HEO.


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Figure 3–4: Example of Molniya highly elliptical orbit and associated ground track

• GEO. While GEO is dominated by communications satellites, it also supports weather, Earth science, space science and ISR satellites. For ISR applications the primary advantage of this orbit is the persistence afforded space sensors over a specific geographic area as well as the wide field of view. This is traded off against sensor resolution and sensitivity.

Space-based surveillance

3.50 Space-based surveillance is achieved by remotely sensing the Earth environment and therefore typically employs commercial remote sensing technologies as the foundation for military applications. The exception to this is in the application of highly sensitive receivers to intercept terrestrial communications systems operating in the radio frequency (RF) band.

Active sensors

3.51 Remote sensing systems can be either active or passive. While there are a number of active remote sensing technologies, only radar is of particular relevance to the military for use from space. Radar can be used and analysed to reveal information such as the size, location, height, density, speed and direction of movement. Since radar operates in the non-visible part of the EMS, it is often able to reveal information about a subject that is not evident in traditional black and white or colour photography. Radar has particular military applications in the detection of aircraft, ships and ship wakes, vehicles, and the all weather mapping of terrain. Space-based sensors operating in higher orbits can also be used to observe and collect


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information about both friendly and adversary sensors operating in lower orbits that may pass within their fields of view.

3.52 Since radar systems supply their own energy for remote sensing, they can operate at any time of day or night, in all weather conditions and can see through battlefield obscurants such as smoke. Figure 3–5 shows an example of the image quality typical of a modern space-based radar.

Figure 3–5: Example of a satellite radar product

Passive sensors

3.53 Passive remote sensing systems rely entirely on the energy reflected by or emanating naturally from the subject of interest. Space-based passive sensors are therefore affected by terrestrial weather (rain, clouds, dust storms, fog, etc). This can frequently result in passive sensors being unable to collect information over the area of interest—a significant constraint when used for developing intelligence products for time-sensitive tactical applications.

3.54 Space-based passive sensors generally fit into one of three categories: electro-optic; IR; and electronic.


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• Electro-optic sensors. Electro-optic sensors use an optical system such as a telescope to form an image at the focal plane which is then stored digitally. Older sensors typical of the Cold War era used photographic film whereas modern sensors use an electrical storage medium such as a charge-coupled device (CCD). Examples include modern CCD-type cameras which operate in the visible part of the spectrum as well as IR sensors or detectors which capture EMR outside the optical part of the spectrum.

• Infra-red. The IR part of the spectrum occupies wavelengths extending from just outside the red part of the visible spectrum at 1.1 micrometres (µm) up to about 15 µm. This part of the IR spectrum is again broken down into near IR (NIR, 0.7 µm to 1.1 µm), mid or short-wave IR (MIR, 1.1 µm to 3 µm) and thermal IR (TIR, 3 µm to 15 µm). In general, the cooler the target, the longer the wavelength emitted. Therefore, IR sensors need to be designed specifically to match the characteristics of the target sought. Thermal IR (TIR) sensors are an example of a class of space-based sensor that detect heat against the Earth's background from such sources as missile booster plumes, oil field fires and large bush fires. These sensors prove very useful in providing early warning of strategic and tactical missile launches.

• Electronic sensors. Electronic sensors use a non-optical means of sensing or collecting electromagnetic radiation which falls outside the optical wavelengths. A radio receiver using some form of antenna, including parabolic reflectors, is an example of a non-optical electronic sensor used to collect EMR in the RF part of the spectrum. An example application is for space-based electronic support (ES), a sub-set of electronic warfare.

Space-based electronic support

3.55 In the ISR context, ES relates to the use of space-based sensors to collect EMR emitted by communications and other electronic equipment to provide a variety of intelligence products, depending on the source (such as signals intelligence, which consists of communications intelligence and electronic intelligence). At the tactical level, space-based ES can provide information on friendly, enemy, neutral or unknown equipment and personnel in the battle-space by analysing the RF portion of the EMS.

3.56 Since RF energy travels in straight lines, all forms of radio communications radiate energy into space and can therefore be exploited by foreign SIGINT satellites. Unencrypted communications systems such as commercial two-way radios used on bases, as well as cellular phone


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networks may consequently provide a wealth of information about ADF equipment, personnel and plans to foreign intelligence services.

METEOROLOGY

3.57 Terrestrial weather products play an important role in the planning and conduct of operations. They provide information such as tidal heights to support amphibious operations, cloud cover to support observation and air support missions, weather forecasts to support mobility and wind speed and direction predictions to support the use of tactical obscurants. A large element of modern meteorological data comes from space systems.

Commercial weather satellites

3.58 Much of the meteorological data used by the ADF comes from the civil weather satellites that constitute the World Weather Watch System. This system includes the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration Polar Operational Environmental Satellites (POES) and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) Meteorological Operational satellite program (MetOp) satellites.

3.59 Weather satellites operate in either geostationary orbit or in low Earth, polar, or sun-synchronous orbits (about 850 km above Earth). GEO satellites, such as the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES), remain at the same position relative to Earth while the polar orbiters cross the equator twice each day. These satellites are equipped with a range of sensors, as illustrated by the POES satellites, which carry the following:

• High resolution radiometer. This instrument detects energy in the visible and IR portions of the EMS and is used to measure reflected solar energy. The radiometer is able to detect and discriminate between cloud, snow and ice.

• Infrared radiation sounder. The radiation sounder uses multispectral data to determine the vertical temperature profile from the Earth’s surface to about 40 kilometres (km) in altitude. The instrument is also used to measure the sea surface temperature, total atmospheric ozone levels, perceptible water, cloud height and coverage and surface radiance.

• Microwave sounding unit. This instrument measures scene radiance in the microwave spectrum to produce precipitation and surface measurements including snow cover, sea ice conditions and soil moisture.


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• Microwave humidity sounder. This is a relatively new instrument which is able to measure atmospheric humidity, cloud liquid content and precipitation rates.

• Solar backscatter ultraviolet radiometer. This radiometer measures solar irradiance and Earth radiance (backscattered solar energy) to determine the global ozone concentration, the vertical distribution of ozone, the long term spectral irradiance and photochemical processes underway in the ozone layer.

• Space environment monitor. This monitor measures the Earth’s radiation belts and the flux of charged particles in the area of the satellite. It also provides indications of solar terrestrial phenomena as well as warnings of solar wind occurrences.

3.60 These weather satellites are also used to receive and relay the distress signals transmitted by emergency position indicating radio beacons.

Military weather satellites

3.61 Because of the need to tailor weather predictions for some operations, the US has developed the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Designed to provide specialist data and analyse areas not necessarily well covered by commercial systems, the DMSP 5D-3 satellite operates as a sun-synchronous, retrograde, polar orbiter. With an inclination of 98.75 degrees, the satellite crosses the equator at the same local sun time each day. Data from this system can be accessed by the ADF.

3.62 The 5D-3 satellite is equipped with the following sensors:

• Operational linescan system. The operational linescan system (OLS) is the primary sensor for providing visual and IR imagery. OLS is a sophisticated cloud imager consisting of an oscillating scan radiometer and data processing and storage capability. It is designed to collect, process and disseminate real time weather data to tactical sites and store 40 minutes of detailed data for later transmission to Earth.

• Other sensors include:

– a microwave temperature sounder, designed to compile atmospheric temperature profiles from Earth’s surface to an altitude of 30 kms;


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– a microwave water vapour profiler, designed to measure water vapour mass in seven layers and relative humidity in six layers;

– an ionospheric plasma drift and scintillation monitor that measures ion and electron temperatures, densities and plasma irregularities;

– a precipitating particle spectrometer that detects and analyses electrons and ions that precipitate into the ionosphere to produce auroral displays;

– a gamma ray detector;

– a triaxial fluxgate magnetometer that measures the geomagnetic fluctuations that effect HF communications;

– ultraviolet limb and spectrographic imagers; and

– a laser threat warning sensor.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE – OPERATION DESERT STORM

Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and in response the US launched Operation DESERT STORM. Designed to retake Kuwait, DESERT STORM became the first ‘hot war’ in which space systems permeated almost every aspect of the campaign.

During the period of the war, three communications satellites supported 1300 simultaneous transmissions and provided direct communications between the US and 128 tactical headquarters in the field. One communications satellite was repositioned from above the Pacific to a geostationary orbit above Saudi Arabia.

The GPS constellation provided navigation data to almost every unit in the field (although many initially arrived without GPS receivers) and aided in the highly accurate delivery of precision guided munitions. Geostationary meteorological satellites provided the ‘big picture’ weather with a network of three satellites from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program providing data on regional weather patterns, including dust storms and rain.

Information on Iraqi forces came from a variety of space systems. Photo reconnaissance came from KH-11s, or Keyhole satellites. Operating in highly elliptical orbits, these satellites have a resolution of 15 cm at their perigee of


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250 km. Unable to operate at night or see through cloud and smoke, the Keyhole system was supplemented by the Lacrosse radar satellites with a resolution of three metres and by infra red satellites capable of detecting the heat plumes from Scud missiles as soon as these were launched.

Signals intelligence was provided from the geostationary Chalet and Magnum satellites and from the low altitude White Cloud Naval Ocean Surveillance System. White Cloud was particularly useful in locating the Iraqi air defence radars.

The Iraqis also enjoyed some access to space derived products, at least until the war started. Imaging was provided to Saddam Hussein from the French Landsat and SPOT systems.


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CHAPTER 4

THREATS TO AND FROM SPACE AND ASSURED SPACE SUPPORT

Executive summary

• In 2007 China shot down one of its own satellites, demonstrating the vulnerability of all space systems operating from low Earth orbits (LEO).

• As the Australian Defence Force (ADF) becomes increasingly dependent on space derived products and services, its assured access to space becomes increasingly critical.

• Threats to space-based capabilities can be characterised as threats to the space segment, the link segment or the terrestrial segment.

• Assured access to space derived products and services requires a knowledgeable Defence Force, space situation awareness and the ability to employ either active or passive counter measures.

• As Australia’s access to space is primarily through third parties, assured access must be considered a relative term dependent upon the operating environment at the time and the ability to secure third party support.

INTRODUCTION

4.1 The barriers to accessing space, which have for several decades endowed the Western world with an asymmetric space advantage, are disappearing because of the diffusion of space technology, knowledge and expertise. This trend means that space-based capabilities are becoming increasingly accessible to potential adversaries, an issue which was highlighted in January 2007 when China shot down one of its own aging weather satellites at an altitude of 800 km using a transportable ground-based missile. As well as being vulnerable to the space-based capabilities available to other states, the ADF’s own dependence on space has made it particularly vulnerable to space denial.

4.2 These two trends have led to an increasingly congested and contested space domain which impacts on assured access to space systems and the provision of space services. An integral aspect of meeting ADF


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needs and expectations for space support is therefore the means to protect its access to space-based capabilities whilst being able to disrupt and deny an adversary its access to space systems. In doing so, the ADF must also ensure that it does not assume that the types of space support currently available will be ever present; equipment and skills in the traditional alternatives to space-based services should be retained.

4.3 Figure 4–1 illustrates the extent to which the lower Earth orbits are becoming increasingly congested with both operational and defunct satellites, as well as trackable orbital debris down to 10 cm in size. China’s January 2007 destruction of one of its weather satellites created potentially millions of new pieces of orbital debris, and a collision in February 2009 between a Russian communications satellite and a privately-owned Iridium telecommunications satellite created possibly thousands more. While the volume of actual space is vast, the population of orbital objects increases annually with increasing risks to many of the services on which Australia depends.

Figure 4–1: Contested and congested space


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THREATS FROM SPACE AND CHALLENGES TO ASSURED SPACE SUPPORT

4.4 Threats from adversary space systems. Most of the benefits of space are available to a growing number of states and commercial operators, who are fielding increasingly advanced space capabilities. While the majority of these systems are focused on communications, increasingly sophisticated remote sensing systems (for terrestrial imaging and meteorology), using high resolution passive and active sensors, are also being deployed. These systems enable an increasingly accurate, hyperspectral observation of any part of the Earth’s surface on a regular basis. As a consequence, Australia’s national territory and deployed forces are increasingly subjected to surveillance from space.

4.5 Threats to friendly space systems. The development and proliferation of counterspace capabilities will increasingly impact on ADF utilisation of space. While neither Australia nor the ADF have dedicated space assets, Defence is heavily dependent upon allied and commercial space support which, if targeted, will adversely affect its warfighting effectiveness. This risk can be mitigated through the use of multiple layers of redundancy whereby the ADF attempts to acquire information or services from a number of sources.

4.6 There are various mechanisms by which an adversary can degrade ones space capability. These range from the simple and passive, such as use of camouflage, to the complex and active, such as directed energy weapons (DEW). These systems produce effects ranging from temporary and reversible to destructive and permanent. Vulnerabilities of spaced based capabilities include the following:

• Space segment. The vulnerability of space assets is characterised by their inherent predictability. While they are difficult to physically interdict, there is increased effort being placed upon development of kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and non-kinetic capabilities such as DEW and jamming. Passive measures such as camouflage, concealment and deception are also increasingly practiced to reduce the effectiveness of on-orbit sensors.

• Link segment. The link segment remains vulnerable to up-link and down-link jamming. Jamming capabilities and techniques are widely available.

• Terrestrial segment. The terrestrial segment consists of the ground infrastructure and associated services or support mechanisms critical to the functioning of the space system. Conventional and special


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forces (SF) attacks against the terrestrial segment remain the most significant threat to the provision of space services.

ASSURED SPACE SUPPORT

4.7 The growing dependence of the ADF on space systems, the increasing number of foreign space systems and the counterspace developments underscore a growing threat to national security. In response to these trends, the space support construct for managing assured space support is built upon four key elements:

• a knowledgeable ADF;

• space situation awareness (SSA);

• counterspace operations; and

• Assured access.

A knowledgeable ADF

4.8 The ‘human dimension’ is one of the central reinforcing themes of development of a space-aware culture within the ADF. Accordingly, the effective management of Defence’s growing space dependency and mitigation of associated vulnerabilities will be founded on robust space knowledge and awareness across the Defence organisation, in which the development of an ongoing education program is the critical enabler. Where essential indigenous training is not available, the ADF educates specialists in niche areas of space systems or technology through attendance at overseas training courses. These can be of short duration, lasting only a few weeks, to several years in duration, where study at the Master Degree level may be required.

4.9 Space-related education, both general and subject specific, is also available through a number of indigenous training and awareness courses. Awareness courses provide a broad understanding of the space domain in general while emphasising the dependency of the ADF. Awareness courses are available throughout the year with attendance open to all ranks. Wherever possible, indigenous courses should be used as the start point for educating Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) personnel about space.


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Space situation awareness

4.10 SSA provides decision makers with timely and actionable information that enables the maintenance of a friendly force space advantage. In this context, SSA is defined as the requisite current and predictive knowledge of space events, threats, activities, conditions and space systems status, capabilities, constraints and employment to enable commanders, decision-makers, planners and operators to gain and maintain freedom of action in space across the spectrum of conflict.

4.11 The requirement for improved monitoring and management of the space domain is being driven by the growing number of active and inactive man made objects in space, along with associated space debris and natural material. The requirement is also being driven by increased utilisation of space and a greater demand for specific orbital planes in both LEO and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). Access to, utilisation of and disposal of satellites from these orbits will require increasingly careful monitoring and management to avoid disruption, degradation and loss of space services.

4.12 SSA supports the following activities:

• Space object monitoring. Space object monitoring is the surveillance of the space domain to identify and track all detectable space objects. In 2008, the international satellite catalogue comprised some 12,000 objects greater than 10 cm in size. This was a small fraction of all space objects and debris.

• Space threat identification. Space threat identification is the identification and characterisation of all space threats, including ASAT systems.

• Satellite vulnerability. Satellite vulnerability (SATVUL) denotes the identification of windows of threat from remote sensing systems. At the tactical level, SATVUL enables knowledge of potential enemy threat systems that are likely to be operating overhead for any geographic location at any point in time or for any period. Knowledge of the overhead threat from enemy sensors, such as electronic warfare intercept, imaging sensors or radar sensors, is used to shape the activities of force elements. For example, an adversary infrared imaging sensor may be capable of detecting the heat from armoured vehicle engines. Knowledge of this, along with the time of overflight of the adversary sensor, may allow the manoeuvre commander to better plan the timing of any offensive, or to conduct some form of deception operation to mislead the end users of the sensor information. Information of this nature is distributed to subordinate units in the form


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of a Satellite Vulnerability Report (SATVULREP) by the Space Cell in Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC).

• Launch deconfliction. Launch deconfliction is required to ensure the avoidance of space debris during the launch of manned and unmanned space systems. The growing amount of space debris is becoming a significant threat to safe launches.

• Conjunction analysis. Conjunction analysis is conducted to avoid on-orbit collisions. The amount of material in a variety of orbits is significantly increasing the risk of on-orbit collision.

• Re-entry monitoring. This is the monitoring of space objects re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere.

• Attribution. Attribution describes the process by which accidental and deliberate interference with space systems is directly linked with the cause.

4.13 A SSA system is made up of three core layers as follows:

• Sensor layer. The sensor layer encompasses surveillance of space sensors, their associated infrastructure and conduits to/from a centralised control element. Space sensors comprise passive and active systems that are capable of detecting, tracking and characterising space objects in the regions from LEO to GEO.

• Fusion layer. The fusion layer integrates outputs from surveillance of space sensors to produce an integrated space surveillance picture. This is also integrated with other information, including space-related intelligence and space weather predictions, to aid space object identification, capability and intent. This information, once fused, provides the recognised space picture.

• Decision superiority layer. The decision superiority layer provides the recognised space picture to decision-makers and command staff in a timely and actionable manner to inform risk assessment and determine response options. This layer is embedded within existing C2 structures and forms a key component of the overall common operating picture for informing planning and operations processes.


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Counterspace operations

4.14 Counterspace operations provide the means to maintain freedom of operations in space. Counterspace capabilities particularly provide an important deterrent effect against harmful interference with, or an armed attack on, friendly space systems. As States and non-State actors become more dependent on space capabilities, counterspace operations have the ability to produce effects that will directly and indirectly impact on a potential aggressor’s warfighting effectiveness and will to wage conflict at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

4.15 Counterspace operations are characterised by defensive and offensive operations underpinned by robust SSA.

• Defensive counterspace operations. Defensive counterspace operations (DCS) aim to protect and preserve the friendly space advantage from deception, disruption, denial, degradation or destruction. This is achieved through passive and active measures, which aim to protect, preserve, recover and re-constitute space-related capabilities before, during and after an aggressor’s interference or armed attack. Demonstrated DCS capabilities can convince adversaries that harmful interference with or an armed attack on an Australian or friendly space system may be ineffective and/or counter-productive. Indicative DCS means include:

– Camouflage and concealment;

– Hardening of space systems;

– Communications discipline;

– Physical protection of terrestrial facilities; and

– Targeting of an aggressor’s counterspace capabilities with non-kinetic force, kinetic force, or a combination thereof.

• Offensive counterspace operations. Offensive counterspace operations (OCS) aims to preclude an aggressor from exploiting space to their advantage. This is achieved through active measures that aim to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy an agressor’s space capability. All elements of the agressor’s space system (on-orbit, link and ground segments) may be targeted using a combination of non-kinetic or kinetic means which may be temporary, permanent and/or reversible in effect. Indicative OCS means include:


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– Deception;

– Kinetic interceptors;

– Electromagnetic interference;

– Directed energy systems; and

– Cyber operations.

Assured Access

4.16 Major powers achieve assured access to space by construction and launching of their own satellite systems and the ground infrastructure needed to enable the systems capabilities. The ADF does not currently have access to indigenous satellite constellations and must acquire access to both commercial and other states’ space capabilities. The availability of this third party support is a variable dependant on many factors and must be a central planning consideration in investment in ADF capabilities, including the ground infrastructure to access these capabilities.


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CHAPTER 5

SPACE OPERATIONS INTEGRATION

Executive summary

• Space capabilities support the development of operational concepts and plans for terrestrial operations and provide space support to operations.

• Operational and tactical space support requests for specific products or services are processed through the chain of command to Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQ JOC).

INTRODUCTION

5.1 Space-based capabilities support military operations at all levels across the battlespace. To ensure that scarce space-based assets are allocated effectively, HQ JOC is responsible for planning the support that augments and optimises the impact of space effects in any operation. The participation of HQ JOC frees individual commanders and units to focus on the outcomes of an operation rather than the tools required to define the environment. Space support should be inextricably linked to the joint task force commander’s overall and subordinate plans and should support the commander’s stated mission and objectives.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

The operational planning process

5.2 Space capabilities affect operations across the battlespace and can be provided to a range of operational and tactical commanders and units. The majority of space planning will, however, be conducted at the operational level of conflict.

5.3 Planning for the provision of space-based products and services involves a range of capabilities, agencies and processes. While the focus of subordinate units will be on the delivery of outcomes, space planning at the operational level must include coherent space plans that enable continued access to space-derived capabilities while denying an adversary the same level of freedom. Much of the space planning will be detailed in subordinate


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plans such as the communications and information systems plan or the intelligence collection plan.

5.4 Responsibility for space-based products and services resides in several elements of Defence and relies on the space assets of others. Space planning, in the Australian context, is therefore focussed less on command and control and more on the procurement of tailored space product. Space planning therefore aims to:

• support the development of operational concepts and plans for terrestrial operations, taking account of allied and adversary space capabilities; and

• coordinate the provision of space support to operations, detailing the processes in annexes to the operation order or as elements of the subordinate plans.

5.5 Operational planning within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) can be deliberate or immediate.1

• Deliberate planning. Deliberate planning is the process for developing considered military strategic guidance for the employment of the ADF in support of the national strategy. The deliberate planning process generally considers events that may occur in the longer term. It relies on assumption-based planning using current strategic guidance and analysis of possible future strategic environments. Space support input to deliberate planning is based on assumptions about future availability of friendly and adversary capabilities, future space weather conditions and the predictions of space-based asset coverage times over the expected operating areas. The deliberate planning process involving adversary space systems includes a detailed qualitative and quantitative network analysis of both space-based and terrestrial components, including any anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. Since satellite systems are typically slow to change, the product of any analysis should be reasonably enduring.

• Immediate planning. Immediate planning is situation specific and is based on current and developing events. Immediate planning generally considers events within a 72 hour time frame and is flexible enough to incorporate changing circumstances. This level of planning may be informed by the products of deliberate planning, with

1 For further information about operational planning within the ADF, see: Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0—Joint Planning (Provisional).


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assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds. This will include current knowledge of space capabilities, weather (terrestrial and space) and more refined assessments of space support to the operating area.

5.6 Joint military appreciation process. Operational planning (deliberate and immediate) should include the variables associated with the space domain. The joint military appreciation process (JMAP) is the ADF method of operational planning, which is designed to draw all aspects of activity planning into a coherent plan. The JMAP is detailed in Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process.

5.7 Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) is the intelligence process conducted in parallel with the JMAP, which aims to deliver the requisite understanding of the environment and the adversary to the planning process, in order that appropriate decisions are made. The JIPB should review the existing space domain and if necessary, update the target network analysis.

5.8 The purpose of the JMAP is to use a decision making tool to conduct planning to develop a range of options or courses of action (COA). When developing friendly COA (as part of the JMAP) and adversary COA (as part of the JIPB), the review of the space elements should include the ability of the ADF to access space support and it’s offensive and defensive counterspace options. Areas for consideration include the following:

• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Planners should determine the types of space-based ISR assets available and the data these produce. Temporal resolution/revisit rate and sensor technology will determine how these space-based capabilities can support a particular COA. These assessments will be performed from within the joint intelligence and component intelligence staffs, with reference to the Defence intelligence services.

• Satellite communications. The ability for space-based communications to support a given COA may determine the feasibility of the intended COA. Coverage areas, available bandwidth, operating frequencies and location of ground stations are all considerations. These planning aspects will normally be performed by the communications staff.

• Space-based position, navigation and timing. Predictions on global positioning system (GPS) availability and dilution of precision (DOP) calculations for specific phases of an operation may shape the best times for activities to occur. These predictions and calculations


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will normally be made by the space cell within the Air and Space Operations Centre.

5.9 In developing the assessed threat COA options, a detailed understanding of an adversary’s space capabilities should be developed by the joint and component intelligence staffs, in concert with the Defence intelligence services. In doing so, the process should consider critical capabilities including the following:

• ISR capabilities. The appreciation should establish the space-based military and commercial ISR capabilities available to an adversary, including a detailed network analysis that encompasses the terrestrial infrastructure, to assist in developing an understanding of potential critical vulnerabilities.

• Satellite communications. The appreciation should identify to what extent the expeditionary operations of the adversary are reliant on reach-back communications. These may be provided by satellite, radio or landline. Where satellite communications systems are identified, the analysis should also identify critical terrestrial infrastructure, including that of third parties.

• Space-based position, navigation and timing. The appreciation should identify the level of dependence an adversary has on space-based position, navigation and timing (PNT) services and its vulnerability to interference. Although such services are widely used, unprotected systems may be vulnerable to attack.

• Counterspace capabilities. The assessment should also include an appreciation of an adversary’s ability to deny the ADF access to space. This should include the ability of an adversary to:

– Interfere with satellite communications, thus limiting the area of operations of critical capabilities such as wide band communications systems, narrow band command and control (C2) links and unmanned aerial vehicles;

– Interfere with space-based PNT signals, thus reinforcing the need for effective protective measures, and an acknowledgement in operational planning that particular systems may lose accuracy;


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– Interfere with space-based ISR assets, thus interfering with intelligence and reconnaissance collection and undermining the JIPB process at the operational planning stage; and

– Conduct space-based ISR.

5.10 Concept of operations. The development of a concept of operations (CONOPS) is normally undertaken by HQ JOC and is led by the planning branch. Space planning staff input (from the joint space cell) is required at each stage of the production of the CONOPS using the JMAP. Subsequent to CONOPS approval, the joint staff produce the required operation order (OPORD) or operation instruction (OPINST). Each supporting plan, including the space components, is developed as an annex to the OPORD/OPINST.

5.11 The purpose of the space components of the annexes is to ensure that space capabilities are effectively tasked, coordinated and prioritised in support of the operations plan. In order to do this, the space components will address both force enhancement and space-related warfare aspects. Areas for potential inclusion are as follows:

• Tasking and coordination flows. When operating within the Australian theatre, joint task forces (JTF) will normally request tactical space support through the chain of command. When deployed, however, JTF may be operating within the theatre (or command chain) of a coalition partner. In such circumstances, the processes through which subordinate units request and receive tactical space support may be altered.

• Space situational awareness. Provision of satellite vulnerability reports (SATVULREP), both to JOC staff and subordinate units, are required to support operations security (OPSEC) measures. Provision of space weather prediction and reporting, both to space operators and the recipients of space support, are also required. Tasking processes for internal and external service providers (eg. the Ionospheric Prediction Service) may be required.

• Space-based position, navigation and timing. The performance of systems such as GPS can be modelled with a high degree of accuracy to allow for the prediction of performance at a given time and location. Additionally, GPS accuracy for any geographic area can be tailored or optimised for key phases of an operation. All requests for GPS accuracy predictions or enhanced operational support are processed through the chain of command to the Space Cell in HQ JOC. The Space Cell will then staff the request directly to the US Joint Space Operations Centre (JSPOC) for action.


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5.12 Space input to specific supporting plans. Although space may impact on a variety of supporting plans, the following plans will all include space components:

• Communications plan. Satellite communications are the primary means of providing wideband and C2 communications services to deployed forces. As such, assignment of space-based communications assets will normally be conducted through the communications and information systems (CIS) plan. The employment of Communications and Information Systems is detailed in ADDP 6.0—Communications and Information Systems (Provisional).

• Electronic warfare plan. Elements of electronic warfare (EW) provide an opportunity to track adversary movements and collect intelligence passively and at long range, including the use of space assets. The process of planning is to develop an EW plan for all operations. The space input to EW planning is provided through the intelligence community.

• Collection plan. The collection of ISR data is centrally coordinated and tasked to ensure that the priority of the commander’s information needs are maintained, and are satisfied by the most appropriate asset. Space-based ISR assets may be one of a range of potential collectors. The tasking and coordination of these assets will therefore remain within the ISR Collection plan.

SPACE SUPPORT REQUESTS

5.13 Once the supporting plans are promulgated, specific task requests from the JTF will be processed in order to meet the JTF’s mission requirements. For many of the areas where support is requested, space assets will be one of many means to satisfy the request; JTF requests will therefore normally be framed in terms of the effect that is required. The process for the submission of support requests will be dependent on the type of support, and the supporting agencies involved.

5.14 Satellite communications. Requests for modifications to the promulgated CIS plan will be effected through the communications chain. For JTF operations under HQ JOC, the JTF communications staff will pass requests to the J6. If changes to satellite communications are required, this will then be coordinated by the communications staff and DSCB in the Defence Network Operations Centre (DNOC).


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5.15 ISR support. Support to meet the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) will be submitted through the promulgated intelligence chain for prioritisation and satisfaction. At the operational level, these CCIR will be assessed by the J2 against all other requests received. Requests which can best be met by space-based assets will then be passed to the Defence intelligence agencies for integration into their processes. Reporting will be passed to the J2, then to the JTF Intelligence staff.

5.16 Satellite vulnerability reporting. As mission planning within the JTF progresses, updates from the JTF, in concert with real-time space situational awareness, will enable an understanding of the vulnerability of the JTF activities to observation. Additional requests from the JTF for particular aspects of the operation may be useful for further refining tactical planning. This may include specific times and locations, or the vulnerability of particular assets to observation. For example, a surveillance asset (e.g. radar) may have a small physical presence, but be extremely vulnerable to intercept by a satellite ELINT collector. Satellite Vulnerability (SATVUL) Requests will normally be passed to the AOC within HQ JOC, where the Space Cell will perform vulnerability assessments and issue reporting.

5.17 GPS augmentation. Specific events in a JTF plan may require different levels of GPS performance, or may need to be adjusted to meet those periods when performance is maximised. Requests from the JTF to the AOC Space Cell for GPS signal enhancement will be passed directly to the JSPOC for action.

5.18 Weather. The prediction of weather relies heavily on inputs from satellites and weather reports and long range predictions can be tailored to meet the requirements for particular areas or operations. Requests for enhanced weather forecasting should be passed to HQ JOC and will be provided by either the Australian Bureau of Meteorology or via the Meteorology and Oceanographic Centre (METOC).


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GLOSSARY

The source for approved Australian Defence Force terms, definitions, acronyms and abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Restricted Network at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

adaptive power control (APC) A feature of modern global positioning system satellites that allows energy radiated from a satellite’s communications antennas to be controlled.

adversary A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.

Australian Defence Force satellite communications capability (ADFSCC)

The Department of Defence-owned payload on the Optus C1 satellite.

airspace The zone next to the earth consisting of atmosphere capable of sustaining flight.

anti-satellite (ASAT) Generally used to describe kinetic weapons, the capability to temporarily or permanently incapacitate or destroy a satellite using hard-kill and soft-kill options.

anti-terrorism (AT) All defensive and preventive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism. Note: Such measures include protective and deterrent measures aimed at preventing an attack or reducing its effect(s).

area of interest The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.


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Australian Government Space Forum A forum charged with ensuring that space-related policies are shared across all Australian government agencies.

camouflage The use of natural or artificial material on personnel, objects or tactical positions with the aim of confusing, misleading or evading the enemy.

campaign A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.

combat support (CS) Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements.

command and control (C2) The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) The United Nations committee responsible for drafting the various international treaties covering the use of space.

communications intelligence (COMINT) Intelligence derived from electromagnetic communications and communication systems by other than intended recipients or users.

concept of operations (CONOPS) A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission.

coordinating capability manager space The manager responsible for coordinating the capability aspects of the space environment.

course of action (COA) A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to accomplishment of, the mission. Note: It is initially stated in broad terms with the details determined during staff war-gaming.


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deception Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

Defence Space Coordinating Office (DSCO) The Tri-service office responsible for supporting the Chief of Air Force role as Defence coordinating capability manager for space.

Defence Space Coordination Group (DSCG) The body responsible for the coordination, sponsorship and monitoring of space tasks as directed by the Defence Space Council.

Defence Space Council (DSC) The peak Australian Defence Force body addressing space issues that extend beyond the individual Service Chiefs.

differential global positioning system (DGPS) A supplementary navigation method used to improve significantly the accuracy and integrity of the stand-alone global positioning system signal.

directed energy weapon (DEW) A system using directed energy primarily as a direct means to damage or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel.

doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. Note: It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

early warning Early notification of the launch or approach of unknown weapons or weapons carriers.

electromagnetic radiation (EMR) Radiation made up of oscillating electric and magnetic fields, propagated with the speed of light. Note: Includes gamma radiation; X-rays; ultraviolet, visible and infra-red radiation; and radar and radio waves.

electronic intelligence (ELINT) Intelligence derived from electromagnetic non-communications transmissions by other than intended recipients or users.


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electronic support (ES) That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, record and analyse radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiations in support of military operations. Note: Electronic support provides a source of electronic warfare information required to conduct electronic attack, electronic protection, threat detection, warning, avoidance, target acquisition and homing.

electronic warfare (EW) Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

force element (FE) A component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.

geostationary earth orbit (GEO) An orbit at 35,600 kilometres above earth, with an inclination of zero degrees and a period of 24 hours. Note: In such an orbit, satellites appear to be stationary above the earth’s surface.

geosynchronous orbit An orbit at approximately 35,600 kilometres above earth, with an inclination above zero degrees and a period of 24 hours. Note: In such an orbit, satellites appear to move north and south across the equator as the earth rotates beneath it.

global navigation satellite system (GNSS) The global collection of independently operated navigation satellite systems.

global positioning system (GPS) A satellite constellation that provides highly accurate position, velocity and time navigation information to users.

highly elliptical orbit (HEO) An orbit designed to allow satellites long dwell times above particular areas of the earth. Note: Long dwell times occur at the apogee of the satellite; short dwell times occur at the perigee.


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identification The process of attaining an accurate characterisation of a detected entity by any act or means so that high confidence real-time decisions, including weapons engagement, can be made.

improvised explosive device (IED) A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. Note: It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components.

information Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence.

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) An activity that synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. Note: This is an integrated intelligence branch and operations branch function.

joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate.

Joint Operations Command (JOC) Plans, controls and conducts campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force.

joint staff A staff formed of two or more of the Services of the same country.

joint task force (JTF) A force composed of assigned or attached elements of two or more Services established for the purpose of carrying out a specific task or mission.

level of conflict Describes the level for the planning and command of operations. Note: The three levels are strategic, operational and tactical.


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low earth orbit (LEO) An orbit from about 120 to 1,500 kilometres above the earth.

low-to-medium energy particles Particles made up of streams of protons and electrons.

measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) Scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, to facilitate the latter's measurement and identification.

medium earth orbit (MEO) An orbit that extends from about 1,500 to 20,000 kilometres above the earth’s surface.

meteorology The study dealing with the phenomena of the atmosphere including the physics, chemistry, and dynamics extending to the effects of the atmosphere on the earth's surface and the oceans.

offensive counter-space (OCS) The process of negating a space capability or asset by active means.

operation A designated military activity using lethal and/or nonlethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes in accordance with national legal obligations and constraints.

operational art The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns, operations and battles.

operational level of conflict The level of conflict concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. Note: It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.


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other government department (OGD) Encompasses all non-Australian Defence Force Federal, State, Territory and local government departments, agencies and authorities, which include police and emergency services, and includes both Australian and host nation departments. Note: The use of the term ‘other government department’ will refer to both unless prefixed with either Australian or the host nation.

precision The systemic outcome that is achieved through high-fidelity sensors.

persistence The systematic outcome that is achieved through the combination of physical presence and carefully planned operations.

persistent surveillance A collection strategy that emphasises the ability of some collection systems to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, characterise, identify, track, target and possibly provide battle damage assessment and retargeting in near or real time. Note: Persistent surveillance facilitates the prediction of an adversary's behaviour and the formulation and execution of pre-emptive activities to deter or forestall anticipated adversary courses of action.

perspective The area likely to be covered by a satellite and its sensors.

polar operational environmental satellites (POES) Meteorological satellites operating in polar orbit.

position, navigation and timing (PNT) The ability to accurately determine location, velocity and time. Note: Most current capabilities rely on space-based position, navigation and timing from the global navigation satellite system.

precise positioning service (PPS) The coded military function of global positioning system that provides a higher level of accuracy and security.

precision-guided munition (PGM) A weapon that uses a seeker to detect electromagnetic energy reflected from a target or uses global positioning system data to strike a target.


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radar A radio detection device that provides information on range, azimuth, and/or elevation of objects.

search and rescue (SAR) The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.

signals intelligence (SIGINT) The generic term used to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.

space control Freedom of action in space for Australia and its allies and, when directed, the denial of an adversary's freedom of action in space using combat, combat support and combat service support operations. Note: The space control mission area includes: a. surveillance of space; b. protection of Australian and friendly space systems;

c. prevention of an adversary's ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to Australian national security interests; d. negation of space systems and services used for purposes hostile to Australian national security interests; and e. directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications and intelligence.

space power The total strength of a nation's capabilities to conduct and influence activities to, in, through and from space to achieve its objectives.

space-related warfare Space, or space-related, activities conducted in support of terrestrial warfighting. Note: These activities include space situation awareness, and defensive and offensive counter-space.

space situation awareness (SSA) Knowledge of the space environment that includes the location of space vehicles, debris (human-made and natural) and space weather. Note: It also includes knowledge of the capabilities and aspirations of other space users.


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space systems All of the devices and organisations forming the space network. Note: These consist of: spacecraft; mission packages; ground stations; data links among spacecraft, mission or user terminals, which may include initial reception, processing, and exploitation; launch systems; and directly related supporting infrastructure, including space surveillance and battle management and/or command, control, communications and computers.

space warfare (SW) The conduct of war in and through space.

space weather The conditions and phenomena in space and specifically in the near-earth environment that may affect space assets or space operations. Notes: 1. Space weather may impact spacecraft and ground-based systems. 2. Space weather is influenced by phenomena such as solar flare activity, ionospheric variability, energetic particle events, and geophysical events.

special forces (SF) Specifically selected military personnel, trained in a broad range of basic and specialist skill, who are organised, equipped and trained to conduct special operations, and can be employed to achieve strategic, operational or tactical level objectives across the operational continuum.

spectrum of conflict The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war.

spoofing The creation of false signals to confuse or debilitate electronic systems.

staff The body of military professionals who support a commander in his or her estimation of a situation, and in formulating and executing subsequent plans, orders and activities.

standard positioning service (SPS) One of two levels of service provided by the global positioning system, the standard positioning system normally offers users a horizontal accuracy of 100 metres or better with a 95 percent probability.


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strategic level of conflict That level of war which is concerned with the art and science of employing national power.

tactical level of conflict The planning and conduct of battle and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

target acquisition The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

terrestrial environment The earth's land area, including its man-made and natural surface and sub-surface features, and its interfaces and interactions with the atmosphere and the oceans.

theatre A designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. Note: A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operations.

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.

warfighting Government directed use of military force to pursue specific national objectives.

weapon of mass destruction (WMD) A weapon that is capable of a high order of destruction and of being used in such a manner as to destroy people, infrastructure or other resources on a large scale.

weapon system A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.


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wideband global satellite communications system (WGS) A constellation of wide bandwidth communications satellites that provide Australia and the United States of America with worldwide communications coverage.


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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADDP Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADF Australian Defence Force ADFP Australian Defence Force Publication ADFSCC Australian Defence Force satellite communications capability AMSL above mean sea level AOC air operations centre APC adaptive power control ASAT anti-satellite AT anti-terrorism BFT blue force tracking BOM Bureau of Meteorology C2 command and control CCIR commander’s critical information requirement CCM coordinating capability manager CJOPS Chief of Joint Operations CM capability manager COA course of action COMINT communications intelligence CONOPS concept of operations COP common operational picture COPUOS Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research

Organisation DAMA decremented assigned multiple access DCS defensive counter-space DEW directed energy weapon DMCN Defence mobile communications network DMSP Defence meteorological satellite program DNOC Defence Network Operations Centre DNSA Defence Network Support Agency DOP dilution of precision DSC Defence Space Council DSCG Defence Space Coordination Group DSCO Defence Space Coordinating Office DGPS differential global positioning system ELINT electronic intelligence EM electromagnetic EMP electromagnetic pulse EMR electromagnetic radiation


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EMS electromagnetic spectrum ES electronic support GEO geostationary earth orbit GNSS global navigation satellite system GPS global positioning system HEO highly elliptical orbit HF high frequency IED improvised explosive device INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite IPS ionospheric prediction service IR infra-red ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JMAP joint military appreciation process JOC Joint Operations Command JSC joint space cell JSOP joint space operation plan JSTO joint space task order JTF joint task force LEO low earth orbit LF low frequency LOS line of sight MASINT measurement and signature intelligence MEO medium earth orbit NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NAVWAR navigation warfare NCW network-centric warfare OCS offensive counter-space OGD other government department OLS operational line-scan system OPINST operation instruction OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order OPSEC operations security PGM precision-guided munition PNT position, navigation and timing PNVT position, navigation, velocity and timing POES polar operational environmental satellite


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PPS precise positioning service QZSS quasi-zenith satellite system RF radio frequency SA situation awareness SAT satellite SATCOM satellite communications SATVUL satellite vulnerability SATVULREP satellite vulnerability report SF special forces SIGINT signals intelligence SOD space operations directive SPS standard positioning service SSA space situation awareness SW space warfare TIR thermal infra-red UAV unmanned aerial vehicle UHF ultra high frequency UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly US United States USA United States of America USSPACECOM United States Space Command VHF very high frequency VLF very low frequency WGS wideband global satellite communications system WMD weapon of mass destruction


operations series addp 3.18 operational ......addp 3.18 edition 1 operations series addp 3.18...

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