G. BankoffSelective memory and collective forgetting. Historiography and the Philippine centennial of 1898 In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, The PhilippinesHistorical and social studies 157(2001), no: 3, Leiden, 539-560

This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl

GREG BANKOFF

Selective Memory andCollective Forgetting

Historiography and the Philippine Centennialof 1898

The fanfare and extravaganza with which the centennial of the Revolution of1896-1898 was celebrated in the Philippines serves largely to obscure the sur-prising lack of unanimity concerning the significance of the occasion or eventhe purpose of the festivities. Philippine history, more especially the historio-graphy of its colonial period, poses some particular problems in serving asthe basis from which to fashion an identity suitable to the modern citizens ofa nation-state. These problems are not restricted to the Philippines, but thecombination of features is certainly specific to the history of that nation anddifferentiates its historiography from that of others in the region. Attentionhas long been drawn to the unique geographical location and cultural experi-ence of the islands; indeed D.G.E. Hall even omitted the Philippines from thefirst edition of his seminal history of Southeast Asia (Hall 1955). But theseobservations on their own offer no insuperable obstacle to the creation of anational historiography. Far more significant is the lack of appropriate his-torical experiences whose symbolic value make of them suitable rallyingpoints round which a counter-hegemonic and anti-colonial historiographycan coalesce and flourish.1

The history of nations is always presented in the form of a narrative, thefulfilment of a project that stretches back over the centuries along which aremoments of coming to self-awareness that prove to be decisive in the self-manifestation of national personality (Balibar 1991:86; Bhabha 1990:1). Theorigin or starting point from which this national history commences isimbued with special significance and, with the exception of those stateswhich may wish to establish their validity on a radical break with the past(though even here the role of the distant past is often somewhat ambiguous-

1 Material for this article is drawn from Post-colonial national identity in the Philippines;Celebrating the centennial of Independence (Bankoff and Weekley forthcoming).

540 Greg Bankoff

ly depicted),2 there is an attempt to demonstrate longevity, as if pedigreesomehow confers upon a nation-state a greater degree of legitimacy. A clas-sical past, preferably one strewn with the monumental remains of an illustri-ous civilization, or an impressive citadel of more recent regal authority, is auseful referent.3 Thus Borobudur, Angkor Wat, Pagan or Ayuthia and Hue orVientiane have been gainfully evoked as important symbols aiding in theconstruction of a modern sense of national identity in Indonesia, Cambodia,Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. In still other cases, religion or creedhas proved to be just such a medium, as with Islam in Malaysia and Bruneior neo-Confucianism in Singapore.

The 'problem' of Philippine history

Philippine history, unfortunately, provides no such expedient agents: thereare no indigenous monuments, citadels or palaces, nor even a suitable natur-alized creed.4 Worse, what relics of the past there are - some few dozenchurches, forts or bridges - have their origin in the colonial period and,though built with native labour, were constructed at the instigation of the col-onizing power. Moreover, Filipinos are the only peoples of Southeast Asia tohave mainly embraced the religion of their erstwhile overlords: over 80 percent of Filipinos are Catholics, some 90 per cent Christian. A common religionshared between colonizer and colonized deprives a people of a useful me-dium through which to express nationalist sentiment (Renan 1990:10).5 Asmuch by default, then, as by any sense of conviction, this leaves the Revolu-tion of 1896-1898 as the only really 'legitimizing principle' or 'foundationalevent in the history of the nation' (Ileto 1998:195,241), and one, too, that rais-es as many questions about the nature of that national identity as it seem-ingly provides answers for its citizens.

Apart from the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of individual

2 The People's Republic of China has continued to venerate traditional heroic characters suchas Ch'u Yuan, Han Kao-tso, Wu Tse-t'ien and even Confucius (Crozier 1977:4).3 See, for example, Elizabeth Nissan's essay on the changing symbolic value of the sacredcity of Anuradhapura in Sri Lankan historiography (Nissan 1997:23-41).4 Eduardo Gonzalez, a fellow at the Institute for Popular Democracy, holds 'an accident ofgeography' that isolated the archipelago from the mainstream of Asian civilizations responsiblefor this state of affairs and maintains that the entire socio-cultural configuration of thePhilippines was determined 'by a void of compelling dimension' (Gonzalez n.d.:3).5 Christianity played a somewhat analogous role in East Timor under Portuguese colonial-ism, but then Catholicism provided an important nationalist referent during the Indonesianoccupation of the country 1975-1999. Pat Smythe argues that after 400 years of Portuguese colo-nial rule less than 30 per cent of the population were formally registered as Catholic, while 90per cent of the people presently declare that affiliation (Smythe 1998:153-4).

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 541

actions or particular historical incidents, the problem posed by theRevolution is that it does not signify a radical enough break with the past, notindependence but merely a change in colonial regimes. As a consequence, theperiodization of Philippine history is frequently divided along cultural lines:an indigenous period followed by a Spanish and then an American onebefore a different nomenclature is employed. This preoccupation with thecultural distinctiveness of the colonial administrations serves somewhat toobscure the ethnic tensions within the archipelago and confers a false senseof unity upon its peoples. Rather than emphasizing the diversity of the his-torical experience, the focus is on the evolution of the state and manifesta-tions of modernity, both of which are irrevocably associated with colonialrule, despite evidence that such was not the case for significant cultural andethnic communities within the Philippines. Moreover, as the conception ofmodernity is increasingly constructed around notions of democracy and cap-italist competitiveness derived from North American cultural norms, Span-ish colonialism has become typecast and contrasted unfavourably with thatof the United States. The advent of US domination is explained not only as aresult of the decline and decadence of Spain but also as a necessary social,cultural and economic step in the preparation of Filipinos for true nation-hood. That is, while the Spanish period is irredeemably associated with colo-nial oppression, the years of American occupation are much more ambigu-ously portrayed, often being equated with modernization.

And then there are the events of the Revolution itself, fraught with allkinds of compromises, betrayals and questionable decisions that make of itat times a less than epic struggle and its course far from glorious. Nor doeshistory throw up an all-encompassing national figure to whom the attributesof a founding father can unequivocally be attributed. Jose Rizal most closelyapproximates this role, but his attitude towards the revolutionary strugglewas ambiguous and his image has been somewhat compromised, whetherfairly or unfairly, by the taint of US colonizers, who found in the figure of thereformist doctor a suitable exemplar upon which to fix the aspirations of anewly vanquished people. The other main contenders, Andres Bonifacio andEmilio Aguinaldo, are equally problematic: the former, despite his un-doubted idealism, proved incompetent, and the latter, despite his compet-ence, proved too pragmatic and is held responsible for the execution ofBonifacio and the signing of the truce of Biak-na-bato.6 The acrimonious

6 Bonifacio was court-martialed and sentenced to death on the charge of sedition in May1897. Though the sentence was subsequently commuted to indefinite exile and imprisonment,he and his brother were nonetheless executed on 10 May. The truce of Biak-na-bato was signedin November 1897 in which the Spanish paid the sum of 400,000 pesos in return for the surren-der of rebel arms and the exile of Aguinaldo and other members of the Revolutionary Commit-tee to Hong Kong.

542 Greg Bankojf

debate in recent years over the validity of the historical evidence and thenature of their respective characters discounts either from serving as a unify-ing national role model (Ileto 1998:203-37; Churchill 1997; May 1997).

Then there is the question of participation among the different ethnicgroups of the archipelago: not every Filipino can derive his descent fromforefathers who fought in the Revolution. Significant national minorities,Muslims in the south, the tribal peoples of the Cordillera and ethnic Chinese,did not really participate in the events of 1896-1898. A modern state appar-atus that seeks to normalize its people into an undifferentiated body of citi-zens by imbuing specific historical events with nationalist symbolism mayunwittingly call attention to notions of difference based on ethnic, regional orreligious origins that have often served as the foundations upon which colo-nial rule was established. Such symbols, in fact, may only reinforce contem-porary struggles for separate identities (Chatterjee 1993:33) and may evenlead to the construction of counter-ethnicities and to demands for counter-states based on counter-nationalisms (Appadurai 1993:415). In the finalanalysis the Philippine Revolution was a failure, marking not the birth of anation (in anything more than a symbolic sense) but an ensuing period ofcolonial rule that endured for another 48 years. More than any other aspectof the Revolution, it was this lack of success that problematized the celebra-tion of the centennial of national independence in 1998.

The imperative to produce 'a people' that are 'nationals' is mainly the prod-uct of the late 19th- and early 20th-century nation-state. According to EtienneBalibar, this is a process that involves converting the external frontiers of astate into the 'internal frontiers' of self-ascription. But tensions inevitably arisebetween the concept of an 'ideal nation' and the notion of fictive ethnicity thatseeks to make of the population a natural community as much in the past asin the present and future (Balibar 1991:92-6). Philippine history in general andthe Revolution of 1896-1898 in particular pose certain problems in the pro-duction of a fictive national ethnicity. The ability of the colonial state, moreespecially the American regime, to enumerate the peoples of the archipelagonot only established clear limits or boundaries to the national estate but alsodivided them into discrete communities. Both Spaniard and American viewedPhilippine society as a 'melange of communities'; they were unable to coun-tenance the idea that subject peoples could constitute a single political com-munity or nation as did 'advanced western peoples' (Chatterjee 1993:223-4).The national successor to the colonial state has proved unable to convince Fili-pinos that they constitute a single cultural community or to merge them intoa larger more modern political identity. Seeking recourse in the Revolution of1896-1898 as the foundational event in the history of the nation only reinforcesthe ethnic divisions within society and ensures that modern politics 'continuesto run along channels excavated by colonial discourse' (Chatterjee 1993:224).

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 543

The politics of patronage

As Partha Chatterjee writes, the mode of recalling the past, the power of re-presenting oneself 'is nothing other than political power itself' (1993:76). Theability of a mainly Tagalog and Christian Manila-based ruling class to extendtheir patronage back through time, to fashion the past by creating an 'officialhistory', allows them to determine the values to be attached to the revolu-tionary experience and so to define the terms upon which modern nation-alism is constructed. While there is a measure of dissension as to the particu-lars of this definition and how various historical incidents should berepresented or importance accorded to specific individuals, there is little realdispute over what constitutes the basis of this national identity - democracyand competitive economic development. However, neither the sense ofdemocracy nor the manner of development is precisely what they are madeout to be: the first is tainted by oligarchy, the second is often far from deregu-lated market-driven decision making, despite the rhetoric. What is importantfor this official view of the past is that these values are established as the pre-vailing credentials and that the historical record is made to conform to theirdictates. So the Revolution of 1896-1898 has to be interpreted in such a waythat it promotes democracy and establishes the preconditions for economicdevelopment. At the same time, separate or local histories need to be incor-porated within the larger nationalist account so as to present them as part ofthe 'natural past' of the archipelago, one whose boundaries match those ofthe modern nation-state.

While the democracy that is expounded by this Manila-based elite is mod-elled on the Western democratic tradition, it is not participatory but olig-archic in form. It narrowly defines the concept of freedom as a politicalprocess that effectively makes an electorate decide between two contendingfactions of the elite for leadership.7 Establishing the past democratic creden-tials of the nation thereby takes on added importance as a means of legit-imizing the present governing institutions and, indirectly, those who controlthem. Accordingly, the Revolution is presented not simply as a struggle tocast off colonial bondage but as the principal event in the evolution of ademocratic tradition from which all subsequent developments can be traced.The Revolution heralded the birth of 'the Filipino nation as a land of free-dom-loving people' (Centennial celebration 1997:12), a state of mind, which,according to President Ramos, could only be realized through 'the logic ofdemocracy' (Maragay 1998:1). Moreover, as the first democratic republic inAsia, the Philippines is credited with becoming the 'father of independence'

7 This notion of democracy is not that necessarily favoured by the great majority of poor orless educated Filipinos (Canieso-Doronila 1997:70).

544 Greg Bankoff

to the rest of Asia and, in turn, inspiring freedom in Africa (RP 1998:5).8

Not only does the Revolution establish the Philippines' credentials amongdeveloping nations, but it also permits the struggle to be seen in a somewhatdifferent light: not as defeat on the battlefield and ensuing colonial bondagebut as the commencement of a process of constitutional tutelage under USadministration. In fact, the history of the hundred years following 1898 arerecast along these lines. Thus, despite the proclamation of the first republicunder the authoritarian leadership of General Emilio Aguinaldo, Filipinos'did not linger too long in a dictatorship' but immediately sought 'constitu-tional legitimacy'. The four decades of US colonialism only channelled thestruggle for freedom into the parliamentary arena where it achieved politicalfruition in 1946. It was this democratic tradition that was mainly responsiblefor the economic success of the Philippines during the 1960s. If developmentsubsequently lagged behind the other emerging nations of Asia in the 1970sand 1980s, this, too, is blamed on 'the detour toward authoritarianism from1972-86' {Celebration 1998). But the spirit of a freedom-loving people is im-possible to suppress for long and the 'aberration' of the Marcos years wassoon swept away by the EDSA9 Revolution, whose 'people power' restoredFilipino history to its true course and 'indirectly set the stage for freedom inRussia and Eastern Europe' (RP 1998:5). Martial law not only legitimized the1986 Constitution and its presidents as the restorers of democracy, but it alsoserved to discredit 'the Asian values model' to which was attributed the 'cul-tural camouflage' for disguising dictatorship {Celebration 1998). The proof ofall this is held to be manifest in the smooth transition of power from FidelRamos to Joseph Estrada in 1998, that proved to the world how deeply Fili-pinos 'value the ideals and practice of constitutional democracy' (Maragay1998:2; Raymundo 1998:6).

Hand in hand with democracy goes 'faith' in economic growth. Indeed,the two 'must come together and work together'; Filipinos express a naturaldesire 'to be free and to prosper' (Maragay 1998:1; Raymundo 1998:1).Development, however, remains more of a future promise than a presentreality, the greener valley that lies just over the other side of the hill or theother side of the millennium {Run-up 1997:8). Nevertheless, it is just as integ-ral to the construction of a sense of national identity as democracy, ultimatelyproviding the raison d'etre to justify the entire oligarchic structure of politicalpower in the country. According to President Ramos, only democracy canlead 'to sustained economic growth and social progress' (Maragay 1998:1).

8 Speech made by Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jose de Venecia, at a Centennialflag-raising ceremony on 12 June 1998 at the Andres Bonifacio monument along EDSA inCaloocan City.9 EDSA is the abbreviation of Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue, the main ring-road aroundManila and named after the first Filipino member of the Spanish Royal Academy in Madrid.

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 545

Just as a century ago the Revolution offered 'a beacon to the peoples of Asiaand the whole world', so today the Philippines offers 'a model of develop-ment' based on 'freedom of enterprise' (Beacon to the world 1998).

However, it is not simply economic growth as such but the underlyingassumption of a competitive deregulated market that demonstrates its effi-cacy as a development model. And its success is something that can be meas-ured. The Philippine economy grew by seven per cent in 1996, up from oneper cent in 1994, and employment rose to 91.7 per cent of the workforce (DeVenecia 1997:5). So the Centennial was not only a celebration of political free-dom and democratic values, but of economic freedom and competitivenessin the market place. Just as 1998 commemorated the birth of the Philippinenation after more than three centuries of Spanish colonial rule, so the yearalso signalled the 'historic exit' of the Philippine economy after more thanthree decades of 'constraints' imposed by the International Monetary Fund.10

'In a very real sense, today the Filipino is not only politically free but eco-nomically free, after 35 years of IMF tutelage and control', declared SpeakerDe Venecia (1998). Moreover, the initial ability of the Philippines to betterwithstand the financial turmoil that swept through East Asia in 1997 waslargely attributed to the 'freewheeling' nature of Philippine democracy, whichprecisely combined the qualities of these freedoms (Raymundo 1998:l).n

The ability of a Manila-based elite to exert their patronage over the pastand to project on history an interpretation that mainly reflects their image ofnational identity depends to a large extent on their ability to manipulate themedia. This is an endeavour of no small order in a country where the mediaare relatively independent, to the extent that they are privately owned andoperated, and characterized by a multiplicity of outlets. The press alone com-prises 25 or so national daily newspapers divided between the more seriousEnglish-language broadsheets and the more popular tabloid press in the ver-nacular, all engaged in fierce competition for readership and advertising rev-enue. In the absence of more direct means of control, media releases on thevarious commemorative events were disseminated by a specially establishedmedia bureau, the Centennial Information Center (CIC). At the height of itsactivities in the weeks immediately preceding the June 12 celebrations, theCIC issued as many as seven press releases a day on the activities of theNational Centennial Commission (NCC), the principal government co-ordinating agency. As the Center's director, Jesus Matubis, himself a televi-

10 An event achieved on 27 March 1998 with the passage through Congress of the Compre-hensive Tax Reform Package and the Oil Deregulation Law.11 The economy's subsequent poor performance in contrast to the recovery evident in manyof its neighbours is largely blamed on the highly personalistic and idiosyncratic decisions of thesince deposed President Estrada.

546 Greg Bankoff

sion executive at Channel 4, explains: 'We didn't have access to the publicexcept through the newspapers, the radio and TV programmes. That's whyour main target, really our primary target, was not the people but the media.'(Matubis 1998)

However, to successfully disseminate information on the Centennial, theCIC had first to package its product in such a way as to 'entice' the media tocarry its releases. Matubis described the role of his agency as one of 'trans-forming' Philippine history into what he termed 'chewable chunks', simpli-fied episodes that might more readily be appreciated by the public (Matubis1998). In the process of contextualizing history for the short temporal con-straints of the modern media (colour slide, 30-second radio break or 60-sec-ond television spot), the Revolution was often reduced to a visual image withlittle or no explanatory commentary: the emotional or stirring moment likethe raising of the flag in victory at Alapan, the proclamation of independenceat Kawit, the signing of the Malolos Constitution, which could so easily bemade to engender the desired feeling or 'message'. Matubis was adamantthat 'politics' was not a factor determining the emphasis placed on the pre-sentation of the historical material, but his denial only reveals the probablebias of those among the elite who made such decisions:

Question: 'Do you think the political administration influenced what was cele-brated?'Matubis: 'No, no. I didn't think that happened. What I think the NCC was reallyfocused on was that the Centennial was celebrated properly and I am happy tonote, so far as the Commission members were concerned, and they representedthe spectrum of the community, because you had members of the administration,members of the opposition, you had members of the academe, all sectors wererepresented in the NCC, I do not think that politics entered into why we shouldemphasize this, why we should not emphasize that. There was no such thing,okay? I think the Commission was neutral in that sense.' (Matubis 1998)12

The resultant media coverage of the Centennial stressed the values of ademocratic heritage and the promise of a competitive economic future. Thesequalities of national identity were celebrated as the principal distinguishingcharacteristics of the Filipino and were assumed to underlie the nation's dis-tinctiveness from its Asian neighbours. Whether these views were generallyaccepted by the majority of people as the basis of their sense of citizenship isdifficult to gauge. The Centennial had to compete for space in the media withnational and local elections in 1998, which deprived the event of mass cover-

12 The other sectors included corporate managers, army generals and 'women leaders'. Laterrepresentatives of the Tribal and Muslim communities were added, but whether they 'con-tributed a lot to the Commission is a different thing [...] but at least in terms of the structure,there was a voice' (Tan 1998).

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 547

age except in the last few weeks preceding the anniversary of the actualproclamation of independence.13 But it also had to contend with a generallylow level of historical consciousness among the population. As a conse-quence, public speakers often had to resort to high levels of hyperbole inorder to excite a sense of nationalism. However, as the eminent Filipino his-torian Onofre Corpuz notes, such rhetoric 'does not penetrate to the guts ofour people and the message from an independence day oration dies outbefore the echoes have faded away in Manila's polluted air' (Corpuz 1998:4).

Selective memory and collective forgetting

Eric Hobsbawm draws attention to the manner in which institutions pur-posely set about 'inventing traditions' - sets of practices of a ritual or sym-bolic nature that inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour throughrepetition, which claim to be old but are often of quite recent origin - as if theappearance of continuity with the past establishes legitimacy and confersupon that body a sense of authenticity (Hobsbawm 1983:1-14). But remem-brance is not the only instrument at the command of a state that may employcommemoration more as a cloak to obscure than to recall the past. In fact, for-getting may be just as potent a collective act in creating a sense of groupidentity as the more frequently assigned role of shared memory. Nor arethese social processes mutually exclusive: both may be at work within thesame extended community at the same time among different sectors orclasses. These processes of selective memory and collective forgetting areparticularly evident in the official historiography of the Philippine centennialcelebrations. Certain key dates or figures were chosen for commemorationand others were quietly overlooked, while little reference was made to thecentral role played by the United States in overthrowing the First Republic orto the subsequent Philippine-American War.

A central issue in this respect is what Independence Day on 12 June actu-ally commemorates. First there is the question of substituting the currentdate for 4 July, a change made by President Macapagal in 1962 as an act ofnational assertion in the face of continuing US influence in the Philippinesafter 1946. Regardless of whether his motives were more political than na-tionalist, his action necessitated finding a historical substitute to serve as anappropriate alternative.14 The decision to commemorate General Aguinaldo's

13 A notable exception was the Philippine Daily Inquirer, which commenced a 100-day count-down to the 12 June celebrations with a daily column of historical vignettes written by AmbethOcampo.14 President Macapagal's decision (Proclamation 28 of 12 May 1962) was made in the contextof public indignation at the US Congress's rejection of a bill authorizing an additional appro-

548 • Greg Bankoff

1898 proclamation of independence seems to have been determined partly asa consequence of the spontaneous popular celebrations that took place atKawit each year, and partly as the result of a concerted campaign by thePhilippine Historical Association (PHA) to have such a change of datemade.15 Subsequently, however, both the historical significance and thenationalist credentials of the event have become the subject of considerablepublic debate. It is argued that 12 June represents nothing more than the de-claration of a dictatorial government, one, moreover, proclaimed under theprotectorate of the United States. It also gives a misleading notion of inde-pendence, since no foreign power accorded it diplomatic recognition. Finally,if it does mark any centennial, it is that of the past hundred years of ilustrado(oligarchic) hegemony over the nation's political structures (Constantino1998).

Instead, alternative dates have been proposed that celebrate events moretruly representative of popular nationalist consciousness. One is the outbreakof revolution in 1896 and another is the inauguration of the Philippine Re-public at Malolos on 23 January 1899. The first occasion commemorates theKatipunan and gives greater prominence to the actions of Andres Bonifacioand the masses with which he is closely identified. It heralds a chain ofevents that ultimately led to the defeat of Spanish colonialism through theendurance and self-sacrifice of thousands of ordinary people. The secondincident symbolizes the brief moment of unity when Filipinos of all socialbackgrounds stood together to declare to the world their sovereign determin-ation to be free and to be a nation. The NCC, however, chose to pass overboth these dates, reasoning that either one would only underscore the extentto which the Revolution is presently misrepresented or has been betrayed inthe past. Just as today's descendants of the ilustrados (many of them holdingdirectorates in the very same commission) transformed 1896 into the muchless controversial centenary of Jose Rizal's martyrdom, so their erstwhileforefathers had quickly abandoned their pro-independence stance to becomethe eager collaborators of American colonialists (Constantino 1998). It is this'distortion1 of history that helps explain the 'confusion' over the Centennial'ssignificance and is said to be behind the disappointing lack of popular enthu-

priation of US$73 million in war payments to the Philippines, a cut that was later restored. Therewere also more practical difficulties in sharing a national day with the United States, as foreigndiplomats would inevitably choose to attend the functions held at American rather thanPhilippine embassies (Manalo 1998:2).15 The PHA's campaign included a series of public seminars and a resolution petitioning thePresident and Congress for the adoption of this change made on 24 March 1960. ProfessorGabriel Fabella is credited with initiating this movement by publishing an article entitled'Philippine Independence, June 12th or July 4th in the Sunday Times Magazine on 1 July 1956(Historian's Role 1998:1, 6).

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 549

siasm shown towards the celebrations (No need 1998:2).Another aspect of this selective memory manifests itself in the intense

partisan rivalry between the supporters of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio for his-torical prominence as revolutionary heroes. On one level this is simply a dis-pute between the family descendants of one man or the other, and as such itcan be dismissed as inter-elite rivalry, a re-enactment of the Magdalo -Magdiwang division16 intensified by a century of familial resentment (Quezon1997). But, on a deeper level of symbolism, it does represent a more profounddivision within society between the haves and have-nots, between oligarchyand proletariat, which lends itself very readily to class analysis in a societythat is still experiencing an active communist insurgency. President Ramos'sdenial of a petition to have Bonifacio declared the first president of thePhilippines and accord him a state burial in July 1994 (Gonzalez 1996:24), theabsence of a single paper on his life or significance during the officially spon-sored three-day international conference convened at the historic ManilaHotel in 1996,17 and the number of Aguinaldo family descendants appointedas members of the NCC only confirmed suspicions that there was a concert-ed attempt during the Centennial to play down the importance of the moreradical nature of the revolution.18

Collective forgetfulness, on the other hand, is particularly evident in theabsence of any but the most fleeting of references to either the more than fourdecades of US colonialism or the Philippine-American War, a conflict thatcost the lives of over 600,000 Filipinos and involved 126,000 American sol-diers, three-quarters of the US army. Renato Constantino, former universityprofessor and author of the influential history of the islands, The Past Re-visited, argues that the relatively scant attention paid to the anniversary of theinauguration of the Philippine Republic in 1899 is an attempt to downplaythe embarrassing fact that it owes its destruction to American aggression andcolonial expansion. Any commemoration that might bring into sharp reliefthe Filipino experience of the war would 'put in perspective the real begin-nings of Philippine-American relations' and place 'the very notion of nationalindependence into question' (Constantino 1998). Indeed, President Ramos'sreticence to acknowledge America's colonial role was noted, and whenpressed to make a comment, he described Philippine-American relations as

16 The rival Katipunan councils that controlled the province of Cavite.17 The theme of the conference was The Philippine Revolution and Beyond and was a lavishaffair that included over 90 speakers from 23 countries. An entire day was devoted to papers onRizal. Conference contributions have subsequently been published in a two volume edition(Ordonez 1998).18 A public declaration made by both families at the unveiling of a new monument to Boni-facio in Manila to put an end to their animosity while calling for unity received no official ormedia attention (Quezon 1998).

550 Greg Bankoff

'bittersweet'. On a rare public occasion when he made reference to the lesswell-known heroes of the war, leaders such as Generals Macario Sakay andJulian Miguel Malvar, the former of whom was subsequently hanged by theAmericans as a bandolero (bandit),19 he carefully qualified this recognition bydevoting three of seven paragraphs to a eulogy on the special relationshipwith the United States. After only a few years of fighting and bloodshed, heremarked in his Centennial address, 'our two countries realized that theycould be allies and brothers in the name of freedom' (Mercene 1998:1, 8).

An issue that has the potential of unravelling this careful fabric of pur-poseful oversight and selective remembrance and forcing a more balancedaccount of Philippine-American relations into the public arena is that of thebells of Balangiga, a small coastal town on the Visayan island of Samar. Thereon the morning of 28 September 1901, townsfolk and men from GeneralVicente Lukban's guerrilla army suddenly fell upon Company C of the USArmy's 9th Infantry Regiment as they were eating breakfast, killing 45 andwounding a further 22 soldiers. The action, condemned by the Americans asa 'treacherous massacre' in which men dressed as women and carrying thecoffins of children had smuggled rifles into the church the previous night,prompted a swift reprisal. A punitive force sacked the town, killing thosewhom they found, and carrying away as booty two church bells with whichthe signal to attack had apparently been sounded. The bells were subse-quently shipped back to the United States where they presently grace theparade ground at Warren Air Force Base (formerly Fort Russell) in Cheyenne,Wyoming, all but forgotten relics of a little-remembered war.20 But, in thisinstance, the bells have not been forgotten in the Philippines, where attemptsto have them returned began as early as 1912 and have continued ever since,most recently with a request for their restoration in time for the 12 June cele-brations.21 However, the resolute opposition of the American Legion, the USveterans' organization, has ensured that all such claims have so far remainedunheeded.

Much more success has crowned the campaign to have Washingtonchange its official nomenclature concerning the Philippine Revolution andthe Philippine-American War. Filipinos have long complained of the

19 Any Filipino resistance fighter who refused to surrender was classified as a bandit after thepassage of the Bandolerismo Act by the US Philippine Commission in 1902 and consequentlysubject to execution or 20 years imprisonment. For the histories of some of the most notable ofthese leaders, see Orlino Ochosa (1995).20 The history of the Philippine-American War is reputedly not taught in US schools (De LaCruz 1998).21 Among the eminent people who have petitioned for the bells' return are the historian, Fr.Horacio de la Costa (1958) and former President Fidel Ramos (1993-1994 and again in 1997) (DeLa Cruz 1998; Silva 1997).

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 551

American custom of labelling the two together as the Philippine Insurrection,with its implication that the revolutionaries were simply bandoleros engagedin brigandage and not freedom fighters seeking to liberate their country fromthe yoke of foreign rule. Senate President Bias Ople even authored a resolu-tion (SR348) calling on President Estrada to commence diplomatic initiativesto have the American government correct its texts so as to recognize theevents as 'a genuine war of independence on the same moral plane as theAmerican Revolution against the British crown and the French Revolutionagainst the ancien regime in France' (Atencio 1999a). Others have called formuch more drastic gestures.22 More militant voices vowed to collect five mil-lion signatures demanding that the US apologize for the alleged war crimesand atrocities committed by its troops, who they claimed killed more Fili-pinos during the first two days of the war than had died at the hands of theentire Spanish army during the more than 300 years of colonial rule (Atencio1999b)! While no apology has so far been forthcoming, the Library of Con-gress has amended the subject headings of its catalogues accordingly (Ople1999).23 Cynics may find in this timely consciousness of political correctness(one hundred years after the events in question) some connection with con-sideration of the Republic of the Philippines-United States Visiting ForcesAgreement, which required a two-thirds (16-vote) majority to be ratified by

the Senate (Casayuran 1999).Politics aside, what is being postulated here is a revision of Philippine his-

tory that is, at the same time, more stridently nationalist and also far moreradical. Often these positions mutually reinforce one another, but there is atendency for the former to subsume the latter. Aguinaldo was both a mem-ber of the bourgeoisie and a stooge propped up by foreign powers; the revo-lution was both lost and betrayed; and the Centennial, as presently consti-tuted, is nothing more than a celebration of 'the coming of the Americans tothe Philippines', according to academics such as Zeus Salazar24 (Santillan1995:1). While xenophobia is never very far from the terminology of theextreme nationalists, these criticisms of the official history do challenge theoligarchic nature of power structures in the contemporary Philippines andquestion the extent to which Filipinos exercise real democratic choice.Moreover, by casting doubt on the democratic credentials of the present state,

22 These come from specifically youth and cause-orientated groups such as the BagongAlyansang Makabayan a n d the Sentenaryo ng Sambayanan.23 As the librarian, James H. Billington, advised in his letter of 11 February 1999: 'As par t ofour regular subject review process, our Cataloging Policy Office investigated the terminologyused for these events. Based on these findings, the Library reversed the two relevant subjectheadings to Phil ippine History - Revolution 1896-1899 and Phil ippine History - Phil ippineAmerican War'.24 Professor of European History and Anthropology at the University of the Phil ippines.

552 Greg Bankoff

they also effectively contest whether it can create the conditions necessary forsustained economic development.25

Apart from the nationalist and radical critiques, there are a multiplicity ofother dissenting voices in the contemporary Philippines that dispute the offi-cial history of the Centennial. The Roman Catholic clergy, feminists and eth-nic minorities, each in their own way, also challenge the construction ofnational identity based on an oligarchic concept of democracy and a deregu-lated market economy (Bankoff and Weekley forthcoming:Chapter 4). How-ever, their failure to sustain a meaningful public debate on these issues is notsimply due to their disunity of purpose or vision. Nor can it be blamed solelyon their inability to create an alternative rendition of the past that has realmeaning to the majority of Filipinos and that dispels all hint of patronage.While these are certainly factors, the root cause of their lack of success maylie in something much deeper. As Conrado de Quiros writes in his recentobituary of Renato Constantino, the Philippines is a country with an almostdesperate need to forget, one that 'lives almost exclusively in the present, thepast gliding by like water against an aimless boat, leaving no markers behind'(Quiros 1999). The degree to which the Centennial actually challenged thisnotion of a forgotten past and a continuous present was perhaps indicated bythe indifferent opinion polls and the limited public impact of the extensive

25 The lack of real economic development in the Philippines is blamed on a heady mixture ofcolonial exploitation and the financial mismanagement of the Marcos years. Colonialism is heldresponsible for initially retarding agricultural growth in the 17th century, then restricting itsexpansion to a few export commodities (notably sugar, tobacco, abaca and coconut) during thelate 19th century, before creating dependence on a single market with the passing of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 that abolished tariffs between the Philippine and American marketsthrough a system of quotas that regulated the amount of Philippine agricultural produce enter-ing the US. (On the economic distortions created by colonialism in the Philippines, see Fast andRichardson 1983.) The financial mismanagement under the martial law regime of PresidentMarcos, especially the extensive international borrowing to fund non-revenue generating invest-ments and the granting of guarantees to favoured corporations that subsequently failed (so-called crony capitalism), saddled the economy with a large foreign debt. The country's totaloverseas loans rose from US$2.6 billion in 1975 to US$26 billion by 1984 (Oviedo 1998:23). Thelegacy of both colonialism and debt is seen as having seriously distorted the Philippine's econ-omy and of hampering the ability of post-1986 administrations to take any significant measuresto relieve the extreme poverty that still afflicts many millions of Filipinos. Nor are these condi-tions seen as unrelated: both past colonialism and present debt tie the country to foreign mas-ters, many of whom are the very same colonialists of old. Criticism is levelled at multilateralfunding agencies, large foreign multinationals and government policies in favour of economicderegulation that perpetuate this historic chain of oppression'. A notable example of oppositionto foreign economic dominance was the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998 (RA 8479), which permit-ted the three foreign oil companies (Shell, Caltex and Petron) to set their own prices, a conditionof the IMF to end its economic restrictions on the Philippines. The companies were subsequentlyaccused of failing to pass on substantial falls in the monthly landed cost of crude to customers(Not free 1998).

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 553

commemorations. As one pundit aptly said, 'unity in diversity may actuallybe nothing more than dissension tamed by a show' (First hundred 1998).

Genealogical amnesia and the social function of history

The notion that the purposeful forgetting of the past may be part of an activeprocess of creating new, shared identities has been previously noted amongethnic groups within Southeast Asia. Placing more importance on creatingkinship ties in the future and of ignoring divergent ancestral descent hasbeen referred to as 'genealogical amnesia' among the Balinese (Geertz andGeertz 1964) and as 'structural amnesia' among the Iban (Freeman 1961:208).hi the Philippines, similar practices have been recorded in the Visayas(Dumont 1992:146-7) and among the Buid of Mindoro (Gibson 1986:88). Theemphasis instead is on expanding horizontal relationships in the present andfuture that may serve to enhance an individual's life chances, with littleregard for a past that confers no comparable benefits. Unsurprisingly, thepractice is found to be more prevalent among commoners (Geertz and Geertz1964), though O.W. Wolters argues that the relative unimportance of lineagein determining claims to status is characteristic of Southeast Asian cultures asa whole (Wolters 1982:5, 9). In her study of migrant communities on theisland of Langkawi, Janet Carsten describes the importance of kinship tiesand how these are 'wide' rather then 'deep', 'stretching outwards, followingdegrees of "siblingship" rather than backwards into the past'. She suggeststhat there is a historical relationship between the constant population flux inmaritime Southeast Asia, the personalistic form in which authority has beenexercised, and the energy and ease with which new kinship ties are forged inmigrant communities (Carsten 1995:326-9). While these concepts have so farbeen applied mainly to small-scale societies, their significance for the nation-state can also be considered.

The concept of citizenship in the Philippines has been found to be prob-lematic, with few people, apart from politicians and government function-aries, identifying in any real sense with the idea of the nation. Instead, citi-zenship is more frequently described in terms of belonging to communities,both local and large, that express national affiliation as expanding concentriccircles of horizontal social ties in which identification 'with the family or clanlay closest to the heart and identification with the Filipino, farthest away'(Diokno 1997:19-20). This dichotomy between the abstraction of nation andsense of community largely replicates class divisions between elite and therest of the population within the wider society and is reflected in their dif-fering perceptions of the past.

Elites are concerned with lineage and descent. They look to the past to

554 Greg Bankoff

validate their position in the present. In particular, they prefer occasions thatcommemorate a history in which their forebears played a significant role, asthis serves to remind people why they currently occupy privileged positionsin society. They especially operate on a national scale, as the scope of theirinterests is commensurate with the widest possible socio-economic and polit-ical unit available, the Republic of the Philippines. (Some, of course, havesupra-national interests.) The future they favour is one that is a continuationof the past, an enduring history. For them, the Centennial offered a perfectscenario for celebrating history in such a manner that it propelled them intopublic notice and linked them to the heroes of a revolutionary past, whichwas itself presented as the origin of the nation-state. The majority of thepopulation, on the other hand, are largely indifferent to family backgroundand ancestry. Many, in fact, are recent rural-urban migrants and think morein terms of extended kinship relations. Their concerns are less national andmore oriented towards the local, the sphere they better understand and inwhich they mainly operate. They find few occasions in the past worth com-memorating and little or nothing of the past worth celebrating. History isbest forgotten; their prospects in society depend on a future made moresecure by expanding their horizontal social connections, often through ritualor fictive ties of siblingship. The Centennial, therefore, meant little in termsof national symbolism and was only significant in so far as it promised abetter future, a future, moreover, that was distinct from a history redolentwith past injustices and exploitation. The apparent eagerness with whichmany public commemorations such as the 12 June parade were greetedshould not be confused with pride in the past as presently constructed, butmore as enthusiasm for a grand occasion on which to have a fiesta at some-one else's expense.

It is this dichotomy between elites' and majority views of the past andtheir perception of history that may account for the relatively mixed surveyfindings on Centennial awareness among different sectors of the population.While popular consciousness of the commemorations rose significantly from47 per cent in September 1996, to 55 per cent in June 1997, to 78 per cent byApril 1998, these figures varied substantially between regions and amongsocio-economic groups. Thus Centennial awareness was greatest in Metro-Manila (97 per cent) and Luzon (84 per cent) but much lower in the Visayas(68 per cent) and Mindanao (63 per cent). The differences were even morestriking among certain sectors of the population. According to the April 1998survey, 93 per cent of persons classified as belonging to ABC-class demo-graphic profiles were conscious of the Centennial as compared to only 63 percent for those with an E class profile. And awareness declined rapidly at thelocal level: only 35 per cent of those in the Visayas and 23 per cent in MetroManila were conscious of actual events being staged in their own neigh-

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 555

bourhoods (Cadelina, Garcia and Reyes 1998:1, 6).26 Similar low levels ofawareness were found among schoolchildren whose consciousness of citi-zenship still remained at only 49 per cent in 1998 despite the incorporation ofCentennial topics emphasizing civic culture, values, geography and historyinto the educational curricula since 1996 (Torres 1998:2).

This desire by the majority of Filipinos to collectively forget the past, tosuccumb to genealogical amnesia, was put to a severe test in 1998 with thecontroversy surrounding the then president-elect Estrada's resolution to per-mit the re-interment of Ferdinand Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng MgaBayani, the cemetery reserved for the nation's heroes. There was vociferousopposition to the proposal among certain sectors of society and an open let-ter addressed to Joseph Estrada signed by Corazon Aquino, Cardinal Sin, ex-Senate President Jovy Salonga and 'dozens of other eminentoes [sic] repre-senting a highly impressive and distinguished cross-section of Philippinesociety'. The Marcos dictatorship, it was claimed, had committed crimesagainst the Filipino people - colossal plunder, gross human rights abuses,widespread acts of terrorism, brutal salvaging27 and indiscriminate hamlet-ing' - that could not be forgiven without public repentance, restitution andthe administration of justice (Benigno 1998). In contrast, the words withwhich the president-elect chose to announce his decision were highly reveal-ing: 'We will bury Marcos's body and bury the past with him' (Bengco andGarcia 1998:1). As a populist president, Estrada's views may have been morein tune with public opinion and popular ideas about the past, even the moreimmediate past, which has already consigned martial law to 'history' andlargely cloaks Marcos in the forgetfulness of genealogical amnesia. Certainlysome considered such to be the case (Jurado 1998:15-B).28

What, then, is the social function of history in the contemporary Philip-pines? It should not be understood as simply a hegemonic discourse or nar-rative of absolute domination. That is far too banal an interpretation. Ofcourse, there are counter-discourses, counter-narratives - between elites,among the left, the religious, the feminist and ethnic minorities - but thesenarratives are not simply counterpoised to that of the hegemonic. Again, that

26 The corresponding statistics for Luzon and Mindanao were 40 per cent and 44 per centrespectively. I can offer no explanation for this relatively higher latter figure based on currentinformation. These percentages were based on the number of people actually aware of theCentennial and not the total population.27 The euphemism used in the Philippines for the murder of political opponents by membersof officially sponsored assassination gangs.28 Jurado argued that whatever his other actions Marcos was still a former president and warhero of Bataan, that the Libingan grounds were not as sacred as some make out ('not all heroesare buried there, and not all those buried there are heroes'), and concluded that: 'only the vocalminority is making noises against your plan to bury the Marcos issue. The majority of peopleare behind you'.

556 Greg Bankoff

would be too crude an analysis. There is space, indeed there is even placemade for such manifestations of resistance. Both, in fact, contribute to shap-ing a Philippine historiography as a series of synchronic narratives by whichthe past is given shape and from which a mutually acceptable definition ofnational identity may eventually evolve. However, the 'space' and the 'place'have so far always been determined by the elites on their own terms.Accordingly, selective memory and collective forgetting do not stand somuch in opposition to one another but are rather more in the nature of mutu-ally reinforcing discourses.

REFERENCES

Appadurai, Arjun1993 'Patriotism and its future', Public Culture 5-3:411-29.Atencio, Joel1999a 'Ople', Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb.com.ph/main/9902/ 05fm01c.asp.1999b 'Fil-Am war centennial today', Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb. com.

ph/main/9902/ 04fm01d.asp.

Balibar, Etienne1991 'The nation form; History and ideology', in: Etienne Balibar and

Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, nation, class; Ambiguous identities, pp.86-106. London/New York: Verso.

Bankoff, Greg and Kathleen Weekleyforthcoming Post-colonial national identity in the Philippines; Celebrating the centennial

ofindepence. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate/Gower.Beacon to the world1998 'The Centennial; A beacon to the world', Manila Bulletin, http://www.

mb.com.ph/1998/JUN98/12jml0.htm.

Bengco, Regina and Janet Garcia N

1998 'Libingan burial is final; Erap', Malaya 17-144:1, 8.Benigno, Teddy1998 'Today; The Centennial a cause reborn; Erap urged to reconsider',

Philippine Star, 12 June.Bhabha, Homi1990 'Introduction; Narrating the nation', in: Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and

narration, pp.1-7. London/New York: Routledge.Cadelina, Minnie, Janet Garcia and Victor Reyes1998 'Who says Centennial awareness is low?', Malaya 17-143:1, 6.Canieso-Doronila, Maria Luisa1997 'An overview of Filipino perspectives on democracy and citizenship',

in: Maria Serena Diokno (ed.), Democracy and citizenship in Filipinopolitical culture. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center.

Carsten, Janet1995 "The politics of forgetting; Migration, kinship and memory on the

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 557

periphery of the Southeast Asian state', Journal of the Royal Anthro-pological Institute 1-2:317-35.

Casayuran, Mario1999 'RP told of US moves to correct war records', Manila Bulletin, http://mb.

com.ph/main/9902/Ufm01h.asp.Celebration1998 'A celebration of constitutional democracy', Philippine Daily Inquirer,

http://www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/junl2/opinion/doro.htm.Centennial celebration1997 "The Centennial celebration of the first republic in Asia; The Biak-na-

Bato Republic', Manila Bulletin 299-2:12.Chatterjee, Partha1993 The nation and its fragments; Colonial and postcolonial histories. Princeton,

New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Churchill, Bernardita Reyes (ed.)1997 Determining the truth; The story of Andres Bonifacio. Manila: The Manila

Studies Association, The National Commission for Culture and theArts Committee on Historical Research, The Philippine NationalHistorical Society.

Constantino, Renato1975 The Philippines; A past revisited. Quezon City: Tala.1998 'Centennial dissent', Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb. com.ph/1998/

}UN98/03jmlla.htm.

Corpus, Onofre1998 'Keeping the spirit of 1986 alive', in: J.A. De La Cruz,"The Morning

After', Malaya, 13 June.Crozier, Ralph1977 Koxinga and Chinese nationalism; History, myth, and the hero. Cambridge,

Massachusetts: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.Cruz, Pennie Azarcon de la1998 'Bringing back the bells of Balangiga', Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://

www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/junl2/opinion/lifestyle/lif_2.htm.Diokno, Maria1997 'Becoming a Filipino citizen; Perspectives on citizenship and democra-

cy', in: Maria Serena Diokno (ed.), Democracy and citizenship in Filipinopolitical culture, pp. 17-39. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center.

Dumont, Jean-Paul1992 Visayan vignettes; Ethnographic traces of a Philippine island. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.Fast, Jonathan and Jim Richardson1983 Roots of dependency; Political and economic revolution in 19th-century

Philippines. Quezon City: Foundation For Nationalist Studies.First hundred1998 "The first hundred years', Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://www.inquir-

er.net/issues/jun98/junl2/opinion/aec.htm.

558 Greg Bankoff

Freeman, J.D.1961 'On the concept of the kindred', Journal of the Royal Anthropological

Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 91:192-220.Geertz, Hildred and Clifford Geertz1964 'Teknonymy in Bali; Parenthood, age grading and genealogical amne-

sia', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 94:94-108.Gibson, T.1986 Sacrifice and sharing in the Philippine highlands; Religion and society among

the Buid ofMindoro. London: Athlone Press.Gonzalez, Eduardon.d. Is globalization a threat to the nationalist imagination in the Philippines?

Quezon City: Institute For Popular Democracy and Philippine CenterFor Policy Studies.

Gonzalez, Mia1996 'Bonifacio as the "First Philippine President'", Today 733-10:24.Hall, D.G.E.1955 A history of South-East Asia. London: Macmillan.Historian's role1998 'Historian's role in change to June 12 Bared', Philippine Journal 11-116:1,

6.Hobsbawm, Eric1983 'Introduction; Inventing traditions', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence

Ranger (eds), The invention of tradition, pp. 1-14. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Ileto, Reynaldo1998 Filipinos and their Revolution; Event, discourse, and historiography.

Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.Jurado, Emil1998 'Marcos burial critics a small minority', Manila Standard 12-120:15-B.Manalo, Armando1998 'From July 4 to June 12', Philippine Journal 11-116:2.

Maragay, Fel1998 'We have arrived', Manila Standard 12-120:1, 2.Matubis, Jesus1998 'Interview with Jesus Matubis, Director of the Philippine Centennial

Commission's Information Center Media Bureau', Channel 4, VisayasAvenue, Quezon City, 2 July.

May, Glenn1997 Inventing a hero: The posthumous re-creation of Andres Bonifacio. Quezon

City: New Day.Mercene, R.1998 'US focus in Centennial message', Today 1608:1, 8.Nissan, Elizabeth1997 'History in the making; Anuradhapura and the Sinhala Buddhist

nation', in: H.L. Senevirame (ed.), Identity, consciousness and the past;

Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 559

Forging of caste and community in India and Sri Lanka. Delhi: OxfordUniversity Press.

No need1998 'No need to twist history', Philippine Journal 11-117:2.

Not free1998 'We're still not free from foreign oppressors', Philippine Daily Inquirer,

http://www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/iunI5/opinion/nealc.htm.

Ochosa, Orlino1995 'Bandoleros'; Outlawed guerrillas of the Philippine-American War 1903-

1907. Quezon City: New Day.

Ople, Bias1999 'US Library of Congress restores Filipino dignity', Manila Bulletin,

http://www.mb.com.ph/oped/blas/990216.asp.Ordonez, Elmer (ed.)1998 The Philippine Revolution and beyond. Manila: National Centennial

Commission/National Commission for Culture and the Arts.Oviedo, Sheila1998 'A hobbled economy's hundred-year dependence', Today 1608:23.Quezon, Manuel1997 'Centennial; Who cares?', Philippine Free Press 89-35 (30 August).1998 'Truly a flag of history', Today 1608:17, 22.Quiros, Conrado de1999 'Dumaan Ako Kay Constantino (conclusion)', Philippine Daily Inquirer,

http://www.inquirer.net/issues/sep99/sep01/opinion/qui.htm.Raymundo, Dulce1998 'Reduce rich-poor gap, Ramos urges', Philippine Journal 11-117:1,6.Renan, Ernest1990 'What is a nation?', in: Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and narration, pp. 8-

22. London/New York: Routledge.

RP1998 'RP "1st Democracy in Asia" - JdV, Philippine journal 11-117.Run-up1997 'Run-up to the Centennial', Philippine Daily Inquirer 12-185:8.Santillan, Cecilia1995 'The Philippine Centennial; 1896 or 1898?', Business World 9-93:1,11.Silva, John1997 'Filipinos must make noise to have Balangiga bells returned', Philippine

Daily Inquirer 13-14:D10.Smythe, Pat1998 "The Catholic Church in East Timor', in: Torben Retboll (ed.), East

Timor; Occupation and resistance, pp. 153-73. Copenhagen: InternationalWork Group For Indigenous Affairs. [IWGIA-Document 89.]

Tan, Samuel1998 Interview with Dr Samuel Tan, Director of the National Historical

Institute and Commissioner of the National Centennial Committee',National Historical Institute, Ermita, Manila, 7 July.

560 Greg Bankoff

Torres, Estrella1998 'Awareness on history doubles', Today 1608:2.Venecia, Jose' de1997 'Building Blocks for the Future', Malaya 16-149:5.1998 'Centennial messages, economic freedom', Manila Bulletin, http://zvww.

tnb.com.phll998lJUN98H2jm01c.htm.

Wolters, O.W.1982 History, culture, and region in Southeast Asian perspective. Singapore:

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.