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128Supply Chain Forum An International Journal Vol. 12 - N1 - 2011 www.supplychain-forum.com

Green Logistics inTemporary Organizations:

A Paradox?Learnings fromthe Humanitarian Context

Fredrik Eng-LarssonLund University, Sweden

[email protected]

Diego VegaCRET-LOG, Aix-Marseille University, France

[email protected]

It has been argued that long-term environmental initiatives make

organizations more efficient because they strive to reduce resource use in

various ways. In temporary organizations, however, objectives are short-term and are prioritized over other long-term considerations. Thus, how

can green logistics be incorporated into temporary organizations

without compromising short-term objectives? By combining the literature

on temporary and permanent supply networks and green logistics in the

humanitarian context, findings show that five main gaps between green

logistics and disaster relief can be reduced by the application of a

permanent-temporary approach. Further research is suggested for its

application in other temporary contexts.

Keywords: green logistics, temporary organizations, disaster relief, supply

networks

Introduction

In the ever-growing body ofresearch on logistics and theenvironment, it is often argued thatenvironmental initiatives makeorganizations more efficientbecause they strive to reduceresource use in various ways. Eco-driving or improved vehiclerouting, for example, are twogreening initiatives that may quiteeasily be implemented into theorganization and instantly reduceemissions as well as costs. Butalthough many initiatives lead toshort-term financial gains, inbusiness reality, many greeningmeasures demand a more long-term view on strategy andlogistics decisions. Initiatives that

substantially decrease the amountof emissions from the system -- forexample, a change in logisticsnetwork structure -- may be costly

to implement but, on the otherhand, will generate efficiency andeffectiveness gains if seen over alonger period of time. Forpermanent organizations, thisposes no further conflict. However,in temporary organizations such asthe construction industry, new

product development projects, orhumanitarian operations, objectives

such as building, a new product orsaving lives are short term sincetemporary means limited in timeand the raison d'tre of theorganization is prioritized overother long-term considerations.Consequently, the logistics systemof such an organization is designedin line with the temporaryobjectives, with little or nopossibilities of considering long-

term consequences. Thus, it seemsthat simultaneously being greenand being temporary is a paradox.How, then, can green logistics be

Copyright BEM

ISSN print 1625-8312

ISSN online1624-6039

An International JournalSupply ChainForum

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledgethe participants of the HUMLOG Doctoral Seminar on

Supply Chain Management in Disaster Relief(Helsinki, 2009) for previous versions of this research.

We also sincerely appreciate the commentsand suggestions from Professor Nathalie Fabbe-Costes

and the two anonymous reviewers.


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incorporated into temporaryorganizations without compromising

the short-term objectives?

This article seeks to answer thisquestion and form a guide forfuture research on how thesedifferent objectives may be dealtwith in temporary organizations.For this article, the humanitarianrelief sector was chosen as theresearch context, as mosthumanitarian operations andprojects are temporary, and theprimary objective leads the overalldevelopment of the operation. Aframework for green logisticspreviously used in permanentsettings is elaborated on to fit a

temporary context and is then usedto guide the discussion. Potentialconflicts between green andtemporary network objectives areidentified and examples of howthese conflicts have been handledin the humanitarian context aregiven. The article concludes with adiscussion on how the examplesfrom this context can betransferred and generalized toother temporary organizationswhere greening issues seem to be inconflict with the organization'sshort-term objectives.

Green Logistics-A Framework

Logistics activities may affect theenvironment negatively in anumber of ways, locally as well asglobally, with transportation beingthe main source of negative impact(Wu & Dunn, 1995). According toWu and Dunn (1995), impact can besaid to stem from (1) the resourceuse of the activities within the

logistics system and (2) thepollution created by the activities.In the case of transportation, themain impact stems from the use offossil fuels and the emissionsproduced from vehicle movement.

Although logistics may affect theenvironment negatively there are anumber of measures to be taken toreduce resource use and pollution.One could, for example, avoidmovement of goods or switch allgoods transport to electric vehicles(see, e.g. McKinnon, 2003). Thedifficulty of evaluating this andother measures is understanding

how the measures interrelate withone another. For example, awarehouse centralization mayincrease the amount of transportwork (thus increasing the amountof resource use and pollution) andat the same time enable a shift tomore energy-efficient modes oftransportation, which will reducethe amount of resource use andpollution (Kohn & Huge Brodin,2008). In order to be able to judgehow relevent and efficient a certainmeasure might be, one needs aframework in which differentmeasures and their interrelationare illustrated. Further, in order toguide the discussion about how thepossibly conflicting interests of

green and temporary networks maybe dealt with, a framework thatidentifies conflicts and highlightspossible measures is needed.

Over the last two decades, severalgreen logistics frameworks havebeen developed within the logisticsliterature (e.g., Aronsson & HugeBrodin, 2006; Beamon, 1999;McKinnon, 2003; McKinnon &

Woodburn, 1996). Many of theseframeworks divide possiblegreening measures into ahierachical structure. Aronssonand Huge Brodin (2006), forexample, borrow from the strategicmanagement literature to classifymeasures into design, structural,tactical, and operational decisionlevels, where each level setsboundaries for the next. Forexample, they argue, high-levelmeasures such as product designor facility location will offset lower-level environmental measures suchas eco-driving or optimal vehiclerouting. That is, no matter how

optimized a certain route might be,it will have to be re-optimizedaccording to new boundaries whenthe consignor-consignee relation isspatially rearranged. All measureshave a different scope, anddepending on the scope, themeasures will have different levelsof impact for other measures withinthe system. Thus, one needs toview the system from a holisticpoint of view, including allhierarchical levels, whendiscussing logistics greeningmeasures (McKinnon, 2003).

A similar structure to that ofAronsson and Huge Brodin (2006)is given by McKinnon and

Woodburn (1996), and in morerecent works (e.g., McKinnon, 2007;Piecyk & McKinnon, 2010), differentmeasures are sorted following suchhierarchy. Using the four levels ofAronsson and Huge Brodin (2006),one can sort different measuresaccording to the measure's scopeand impact in a similar way: On the upper-most level, a

company'sproduct designs couldbe changed so as to reduce theamount of transport workneeded. By changing a product'ssize as well as primary,secondary, and transportationpackaging, companies can oftenrealize substantial savings intransport costs (Wu & Dunn,1995).

When it comes to structuralmeasures, local sourcing, largerand fewer shipments of goods,and local warehousing candecrease environmental impact(Aronsson & Huge Brodin, 2006;Cooper et al., 1991; Wu & Dunn,

1995). Tactical measures concern

management and planning(Aronsson & Huge Brodin, 2006)and generally modal choiceissues are of a tactical character.A shift to more energy efficient,less-polluting modes of transportwill decrease enviromentalimpact from a logistics systemsubstantially (Flodn, 2007; Kohn& Huge Brodin, 2008; McKinnon,2003). Improved planning effortsmay also reduce redundance intransportation resources andthus improve vehicle use anddecrease the negative impact of


How can green

logistics be

incorporated into

temporary

organizations without

compromising the

short-term objectives?


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transportation (Kohn & HugeBrodin, 2008; Piecyk & McKinnon,2010).

Operational measures are theday-to-day decisions regardingcertain shipments and orders,and on this level aspects such asdriving behavior, tire pressure,and vehicle speed have an effecton the performance of the system(Ang-Olsen & Schoeer, 2002).

Although the many measuresmentioned here give a good idea ofwhat could be done to reduceevironmental impact from logistics,a simple hierarchy framework doesnot adequately illustrate howdifferent measures are inter-

related. For this, a simpledecomposition may be used (see,e.g., Kveiborg & Fosgerau, 2007;Woxenius, 2005). From Woxenius(2005) we get the decomposedcomponents (or ratios) depictedin Figure 1. Using this framework,the example of warehousecentralization as given by Kohn andHuge Brodin (2008) may be moreeasily illustrated because it isshown that by relaxing the firstratio and allowing an increase intransport work the other ratioscould be reduced radically. Thistype of framework has been usedextensively within energy research(e.g., Ang & Zhang, 2000). Wechoose to rely on this framework toguide us in the forthcomingdiscussion, as it provides a simpleand holistic overview of possiblemeasures as well as their inter-relation. Green logistics aims atreducing each ratio but, more thananything, the total (see e.g.McKinnon, 2003; Woxenius, 2005).

Permanent andTemporary Organizations

Attention to temporary organizations

has increased in recent years as anemerging organizational form that

integrates diverse and specializedintellectual resources and expertise(DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998; Gann &Salter, 2000; Hobday, 2000; Keegan& Turner, 2002; Lindkvist, 2004).Special task forces, projects,program committees, or actiongroups, among others, areorganized to address particularproblems and make thingshappen (Lundin & Sderholm,1995). According to Packendorf(1995), temporary organizationscan be defined in the same way thatprojects are defined in projectmanagement literature: An organized (collective) course

of action aimed at evoking anon-routine process and/or

completing a non-routine product Has a predetermined point in time

or time-related conditional statewhen the organization and/or itsmission is collectively expectedto cease to exist

Has some kind of performanceevaluation criteria

Is so complex in terms of rolesand number of roles that itrequires conscious organizingefforts (i.e., not spontaneouslyself-organizing)

Similar to other organizations,temporary organizations aredeeply rooted in their context,which enables and inhibits theorganizations' actions, resources,and relations (Hakansson &Snehota, 1995). Productdevelopment, construction,humanitarian operations, tourismand events, among others, arecarried out by temporaryorganizations, generating animportant number of material and

information flows that need to bemanaged under this temporarysetting for the achievement ofpreestablished goals. However,studies exploring the managementof such flows has been limited (seeDubois & Gadde, 2002; Fabbe-

Costes, 2005; Jahre et al., 2009;Modig, 2007) and even less coveredhas been the impact that theseflows have on the environment.

Most project managementliterature is based in the asumptionthat temporary organizations arecreated within the boundaries ofmore permanent organizationalforms (Packendorff, 1995; Turner &Mller, 2003). These organizations,often referred to as parents, actas hosts for temporaryorganizations, directly influencingtheir structure and type of work.Modig (2007) proposed that in acontinuum of organizations frompermanent or stationary to

temporary (Figure 2), employmentform, work processes, and resourcenetworks used by temporaryorganizations are influencedby the level of relative dominanceof the parent organization.In this continuum, temporaryorganizations that are heavilyinfluenced by a parent organizationare based on routine operationsand coordination occurs verticallywhile in pure or virtually puretemporary organizations, project

activities are coordinatedhorizontally relying on the skillsand networks of the employees.

When activities to be developped ina project are similar to those inother projects, a more permanent-influenced temporary organizationis expected, following the parentorganization's guidelines and thusreducing uncertainty. However, forunique tasks, flexibility andcreativity are needed and thus pure

temporary organizations are betteradapted because participants arenot restrained by predefined workprocesses, leaving room for the useof their own experiences and skills.Nevertheless, the relation betweenpermanent and temporaryorganizations is far from beingcompletely understood andresearch on this issue is still scant.

One stream of research that hasadressed this issue is logistics,which uses a more holisticperspective to describe andunderstand this phenomenon. Hereindustries that use temporary


Environmental Impact

Output

Tonkm

Output

Vehiclekm

Tonkm

Environmental Impact

Vehiclekm

Figure 1

Simple decomposition illustrating the inter-relation betweentarget ratios for reduced enviromental impact fromtransportation. Adapted from Woxenius (2005).


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organizations to perform specific

tasks can be seen as a looselycoupled system (Weick, 1976, p. 5),in the way that may be a goodsystem for localized adaptationwhere any one element can adjustto and modify a local uniquecontingency without affecting thewhole system and serve asbuffering mechanisms againstunfavourable conditions in theenvironment, so the organization asa whole will not have to respond toeach little change in theenvironment (Dubois & Gadde,

2002, p. 623).

Also, temporary organizations areseen as temporary networks thatare built within a more permanentnetwork. From this perspective, atemporary network is understoodas a temporary projectorganization that relates with oneor more permanent ordinaryorganizations and thus, they can beseen as an adapted version or apart of, for example, a supply chain

of the permanent network (Jahre etal., 2009). These supply chains thattemporary link the differentmembers of a network can eitherstrictly follow the guidelines of anorganization that is the pilot of theproject, as in the constructionindustry or the military, or leaveroom for flexibility and adaptationas in events or film productions(Modig, 2004). For both cases, thenetwork has one or moreorganizations that design andestablish the functioning of the

supply chain in order toaccomplish the goals of thetemporary organization under

different parameters of time, cost,

and environmental performance.This means that actors must adaptto the network and fulfill their roleas a part of the chain. However, inextreme environments where agreat number of actors share araison d'tre (e.g., saving lives in anhumanitarian relief operation) buthave different organizational goalsand ways to achieve them (Long &Wood, 1995), coordinationbecomes a challenge to the reliefrather than a source of support andsome performance parameters

such as environmentalconsiderations are often neglected.

The HumanitarianRelief Context

The ideas of permanent andtemporary organizations are oftendiscussed in the humanitarian reliefcontext (see Jahre & Heigh, 2008;Jahre et al. 2009) and in theconstruction industry (see Dubois& Gadde, 2002). For the purpose of

this article, we will use thehumanitarian relief context toillustrate how the green-temporaryparadox may be handled. In thissection, we will briefly describe thiscontext and the permanent andtemporary aspects of anorganization involved in large-scalehumanitarian relief operations.Disaster can be broadly defined asa serious disruption of thefunctioning of a society, causingwidespread human, material, orenvironmental losses that exceed

the ability of the affected society tocope using only its own resources(UNDP, 1994). Relief, in the other

hand, is defined as the

humanitarian provision of materialaid and emergency medical carenecessary to save human lives inthe period immediately following asudden disaster (UNDP, 1994).Disasters occur often in developingcountries with an inadequateinfrastructure (Long & Wood, 1995)and can be explained according totheir cause (natural or man-made)and the warning time of thedisaster (sudden or slow onset)(van Wassenhove, 2006). A basicdifferentiation of humanitarian

relief activities can be madebetween continuous aid work (e.g.,famine relief, region development,or running a refugee camp) anddisaster relief (Kovcs & Spens,2007).

Phases and logistics activities

within disaster relief

Most authors (Kovcs & Spens,2007; Lee & Zbinden, 2003;van Wassenhove, 2006) identify

three main phases of a disaster:pre-disaster (development,preparation, planning, detection),immediately after the disaster orduring operations (emergency,immediate response, relief), andpost disaster or post operations(recovery, reconstruction,rehabilitation). For this article weare interested in the permanent andtemporary aspects of the disasterrelief logistics, and we willtherefore be relying on thedefinition provided by van

Wassenhove (2006) under whichdisaster relief can be seen as havingtwo distinct phases: disaster


Figure 2

Constrasting organizational forms with respect to employment, work processes, and resourcenetworks (Modig, 2007).


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preparedness and immediateresponse. These phases parallel thethought of a permanent supplynetwork and a temporaryone in which different logisticsactivities are performed. Withinhumanitarian relief, the literaturesuggests a number of activities thatare, or should be, undertaken bylogisticians during these phases. Adescription of these follows.

Disaster preparedness

During this phase, populations andhumanitarian organizations takemeasures to prevent and effectivelyrespond to future disasters. Forinternational organizations this

include decisions regardingproduct design (Tomasini & vanWassenhove, 2009), physicalnetwork design (Balcik & Beamon,2008), and inventory strategiessuch as decisions regarding pre-positioning of relief items inwarehouses or cargo ships(Beamon & Kotleba, 2006; Thomas,2003; Tomasini & van Wassenhove,2009; van Wassenhove, 2006). Thisphase also includes forecastingactivities (Kovcs & Spens, 2007;Tomasini & van Wassenhove, 2009),the set-up of collaborativerelationships with partners(Tomasini & van Wassenhove,2009), and the establishment of pre-negotiated agreements withsuppliers, locally as well asinternationally (Kovcs & Spens,2007; Tomasini & van Wassenhove,2009; van Wassenhove, 2006).

Immediate response

During this phase, affected peopleare evacuated and relief items arebrought in. Activities are heavilyconstrained by time and the initialdemand assessment (Beamon &Balcik, 2008; Kovcs & Spens, 2007;Thomas, 2003) should ideally becarried out within the first 24 hours(Thomas, 2003). To fulfill theidentified demand, supplymanagement and purchasing isinitiated (Beamon & Balcik, 2008;Kovcs & Spens, 2007; Thomas,2003), activities that are obstructedby the donations of unsoliciteditems such as drugs past theirexpiry date (OCHA & UNEP, 2007)

or even rotten food (Chandes &Pach, 2009). The response phasemust also handle the actualfulfillment, which includesdecisions regarding last-miledistribution, that is, mode choice,vehicle routing, and fleetmanagement (Beamon & Balcik,2008; Kovcs & Spens, 2007;Martinez et al., 2009; zdamar etal., 2004), as well asinterorganizational coordination soas not to duplicate efforts (vanWassenhove, 2006). Therefore,there are certain activitiesundertaken before the disasterstrikes and certain activitiesundertaken after. These activitiesare all ruled by differentconstraints on availableinformation, lead times, andresources. But the phases are alsolinked together because more

organizations are realizing thatthey have to work hard in betweendisasters in order to respondeffectively once the disaster strikes(van Wassenhove, 2006). Acollection of these differentlogistics activities is shown inTable 1.

Although there are similaritiesbetween commercial andhumanitarian supply chains, thereare also a number of criticaldifferences. The activitiesdescribed previously are oftenfound in a commercial setting butduring disaster relief they areundertaken in very specialconditions. Balcik and Beamon

(2008) specifically point out thefollowing characteristics ofdisasters: Unpredictability of demand in

terms of timing, location, type,and size

Suddenly occurring demand invery large amounts and shortlead times for a wide variety ofsupplies

High stakes associated withadequate and timely delivery

Lack of resources (supply, people,technology, transportationcapacity, and money)

Consequently, there is a problem ofsuccessfully matching supply anddemand and at the same time leadtime requirements are high.According to van Wassenhove(2006) and Thomas (2003) manydecisions are ad hoc, with low


Disaster preparedness Immediate response

Logistics activities Product designPhysical network design

Inventory strategy

Forecasting

Collaboration with partners

Pre-negotiated agreements with suppliers

Demand assessment

Supply management

Purchasing

Inter-organizational coordination

Distribution

Table 1Main logistics activities during the two phases of disaster relief


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degrees of inter-organizationalcooperation and coordination,leading to duplication of efforts andredundancies and thus lower use oflogistics resources (Ding-Kuo et al.,2006).

Environmental impact from

disaster relief logistics

According to Wu and Dunn (1995),environmental impact fromlogistics is primarily driven bytransportation. Other activities,such as material handling, willindeed affect the environment butmainly indirectly through thedecisions regarding packaging andhandling that have impact on theamount of transportation needed

within the system (Wu & Dunn,1995). Within disaster logistics, alldecisions and activities in thepreparedness phase as well as inthe response phase will have animpact on the amount oftransportation eventually neededto fulfill the end beneficiary'srequirements.

Environmental impact fromdisaster logistics has not beenwidely researched in the past. The

United Nations EnvironmentalProgram (UNEP) has addressed theissue, but most of the discussion isheld on a practitioner level (Barrettet al., 2007; Gilbert, 2008; Irish Aid,2009), with most of the focus onoperational issues, for example,vehicle maintenance (OCHA &UNEP, 2007) or environmentalassessments during operations(UNEP, 2008). Although it is arguedby some authors (e.g., Kohn & HugeBrodin, 2008) that these issuesmust be addressed from a holistic

perspective, decisions of strategicor tactical character are rarelyconsidered. Since most funding is

earmarked for the disasterresponse phase (Gustavsson, 2003;Jahre & Heigh, 2008; Oloruntuba &Gray, 2006), this is no surprise.

Returning to the two aspects ofenvironmental impact as proposedby Wu and Dunn (1995), disasterrelief logistics affect theenvironment in several ways.Within relief logistics, fossil fuelsare consumed by vehicles toprovide the people in need withtents, food, clothes, and otheritems. During this delivery, airtransport, truck fleets, andwarehousing activities all produceair pollution, noise, waste oil, andworn-out parts (Gilbert, 2008;OCHA & UNEP, 2007). At the start, it

is speed at any cost and often in adeteriorated environment. Thismeans that goods may have to beflown in and distributed by airdrops, despite that this is anexpensive and environmentallyharmful solution (van Wassenhove,2006). The operations also generatesubstantial amounts of wastethrough packaging, constructionmaterials, and general waste(Gilbert, 2008). The donations ofunsolicited items is also a majorhurdle, causing capacityconstraints, driving environmentalimpact, and not adding value to theend beneficiary. In terms of scale,the impact from disaster relieflogistics is close to that of a largecommercial logistics provider, withthe fleet sizes of, for example, WFPequal to the size of TNT (vanWassenhove, 2006).

There are many otherenvironmental effects caused byhumanitarian aid. Nonetheless

important, these generally falloutside of the logistics realm.Problems include deforestation,

over-fishing, and excessivepumping of groundwater (Gilbert,2008; Kelly, 2004; OCHA & UNEP,2007; UNHCR, 2000). Betterlogistics practices may, however,decrease the impact of theseactivities although this falls outsideof the scope of this article. Themain effects are summarized inTable 2.

Towards Greener Logistics inTemporary Networks-ExamplesFrom the HumanitarianContext

Considering the previousdiscussion and the previouslypresented ideas on how to make alogistics system more green (see

section 2), it is evident that anumber of gaps exist between agreen utopia and the logisticsactivities of humanitarian aidoperations. According to theliterature, in a green logisticssystem, facilities should begeographically close andshipments few and fully utilized byenergy-efficient modes oftransportation (see, e.g. McKinnon,2003). In a disaster situation, this isnot the case. Constraints oninformation, time, funds, andavailable resources create acontext in which environmentalconsiderations are given abackseat. Using the frameworkdepicted in Figure 1, it is possible toidentify these gaps. However, anumber of minor adjustments willhave to be made in order to fit theframework to temporary settings.

In a permanent commercial setting,output is generally measured interms of financial figures and/or

number of units sold. Fortemporary-based industries, suchas construction, new product


Resource use

Pollution

Land Fossil fuels Waste oil, spare parts, packaging material, wasteWater

Waste oil

Air

GHG, CO, NOx, SOx, HC, lead, particles

Table 2

Environmental impact of disaster relief logistics


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development, or events, themeasurement is in terms of theachievement of the task within adefined time bracket (Lundin &Sderholm, 1995), for example, thebuilding finished, the productcreated, or the event held. In a

humanitarian system, this is notalways the case because theobjective of such a system is to"meet the end beneficiary'srequirements" (Thomas, 2003, p. 3).The problem, however, is that whatis delivered is not always what isneeded (see, e.g., Edmonson, 2005).By delivering unsolicited items, thehumanitarian logistics system isutilized, causing environmentalimpact without meeting the endbeneficiary's requirements. Due tothis, the output of Figure 1 isseparated into "delivered relief"and "needed relief". The newframework (see Figure 3) may now

guide us in finding the gapsbetween green best practices andrelief logistics.

The actual impact is primarilydriven by the last ratio (Vehicleimpact), describing environmental

impact per vehicle kilometer. Thischaracteristic can be targeteddirectly only by measuresregarding propulsion technology orvehicle maintenance; a logisticsmeasure on this level is, forexample, the decision to use moreenergy-efficient means oftransportation such as rail-boundtransport modes. There are,however, many other measuressuggested in the literature thatcould reduce the environmentalimpact of logistics. These belong toany or some of the next levels anddeal with utilization and thetransport work needed to deliver

the aid. In a relief situation, though,it is not the delivery of aid that isthe output on which to measureperformance. Returning to thedefinition by Thomas (2003),humanitarian logistics is aboutfulfilling the need of the end

beneficiary and therefore themismatch between supply anddemand must be included in theframework. The gaps are presentedin Table 3.

Relying on the previouslypresented literature, the frameworkis further developed, proposingpossible measures to respond tothe need of closing the gaps. Also,illustrations from the humanitariancontext are presented as examplesto show how certain measures arebeing already applied in somehumanitarian organizations.


=

Demand /

Supply

Match

Environmental ImpactNeeded Relief

Delivered ReliefNeeded Relief

TonkmDelivered Relief

VehiclekmTonkm

Environmental ImpactVehiclekm

Volume &

Distance

Vehicle

Utilization

Vehicle

Impact

Figure 3

Expansion of the framework in Figure 1 to include the supply and demand matching problems oftemporary networks

Ratio Best practice greenlogistics

Disaster relief Closing the gap

Delivered relief perneeded relief

Lean and according toplan

Ad-hoc, fire-fighting , andhandling of unsolicited

items and duplication ofefforts

Better matching of supplyand demand

Ton kms per deliveredrelief

Few tons shipped Heavy and voluminousitems

Reduce transport volumes

Ton kms per deliveredrelief

Short transport distances Varies depending on pre-positioning and sourcingstrategies (and

possibilities)

Reduce transport distances

Vehicle km per ton km High Vehicle f il l rate Low utilizat ion due to lackof coordination between

agencies

Increase Vehicle fill rate

Environmental impactper vehicle km

Less polluting modes oftransport

Rapid transport due to timepressure

Decrease vehicle impact

Table 3

Comparing best practice green logistics to disaster relief logistics to identify gaps that needto be targeted to reduce environmental impact from disaster relief logistics


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Methodology

For each one of the proposedmeasures for reducing the gapbetween green logistics literature

and the humanitarian context anillustration is presented. Theseillustrations, all from second-handdata sources, are used as examplesto show how in the humanitariansector certain measures contributeto the decrease of environmentalimpact from a permanent-to-temporary perspective. Moreover,all the examples have beenintentionally taken from officialdocumentation from differentNGOs and not from case studies,avoiding the bias that the research

could possibly give. An analysis ofthe proposed measures ispresented in the main text and eachillustration is found in a separatebox.

Matching supply and demand

Although a disaster relief supplychain cannot be perfectly plannedbeforehand, there are certainmeasures that can be taken in thepermanent network in order to

reduce the mismatch betweensupply and demand when thetemporary network is activated.The problem may be seen astwofold, as the matching may beimproved either through morethorough knowledge of what isactually needed and/or betteraccuracy in the fulfillment of thisneed. For the needs assessment, anenhancement of informationmanagement has been suggested asa possible solution to theinadequacies in demand

forecasting and assessment(Thomas, 2003).

But no matter how accurately thisdemand is assessed, the rightsupplies will have to be delivered inorder to improve efficiency andenvironmental performance. Asindicated in the literature review,this is a major hurdle forinternational organizationsbecause unsolicited supplies oftenare donated and consume space

and transport resources. In part itis a last-mile issue and thus atemporary network problem, butaction can also be taken from the

permanent setting. For example, inorder to deal with unsolicited itemsafter Hurricane Katrina, the U.S.Marines decided to move much ofthe sorting of donations to a centralwarehouse, only approving thedelivery of sorted palletsprepackaged to fulfill the identifieddemand of a certain area(Edmonson, 2005). By havingroutines for similar response phaseprocesses readily available in theorganizations they may be moreeasily implemented when thetemporary network is established.

Illustration 1-The Humanitarian

Information Center

The Inter-Agency Standing

Committee (IASC), a forum forinter-agency coordination betweenthe United Nations (UN) agenciesand non-UN humanitarian partners,created the HumanitarianInformation Center (HIC), whichsupports the humanitariancommunity in the systematic andstandardized collection, processingand dissemination of informationwith the aim of improvingcoordination, situational understan-

ding and decision making(p. 3).The HIC is also seen as aknowledge broker, compilinginformation into a single productbased on inputs from multipleorganizations and/or facilitatingaccess to products produced byother organizations, making themavailable in electronic and printedmedia tailored to specific fieldconditions, with particularconsideration given to humanitarian

communities' access to theInternet. Source: IASC (2008).

Reduce transport volume

Reduction of environmental impactfrom logistics can also be dealt withby decreasing transport volumes,for example, reducing weight andvolume of the delivered supplieswithout compromising the abilityto fulfill end beneficiary needs. Inorder to achieve this, productdesign and the use of standardsmust be considered from theconception phase in the permanent

network for a better integration ofthe participants in the temporarynetwork and a better deployment ofthe latter. By implementing changes

for a specific need in the permanentsetting, for example, thirstrequirements in the temporarysetting can be fulfilled with a low-weight supply, in this case usingwater purification tablets instead ofbottles of water. An examination ofevery supply delivered will findbetter and more environmentallyefficient ways of fulfilling everyidentified need.

Illustration 2-The Shelter Kit

In order provide shelter to peopleright after a disaster, theInternational Federation of RedCross and Red Crescent Societies(IFRC) created a shelter kit. Insteadof sending heavy and voluminous

tents, the IFRC decided to ship pre-packaged shelter kits includingnails, plastic sheets, and the toolsnecessary to provide shelter andstart rebuilding homes. The shelterkit is approximately four times lessexpensive than the standard familytent sent otherwise, and with theuse of the kit, less transport work isnecessary while reconstruction isinitiated earlier. Source: IFRC(2008).

Reduce transport distances

The third identified gap concernsthe transport distances covered byeach delivered item. This numbermay be decreased by rearrangingthe geographical source of the itemand the subsequent nodes andlinks that the item has to flowthrough. Strategic decisions mustbe made on the permanent settingfor the design of the physicalnetwork. The less distance acertain item needs to travel, the

cheaper transport means can beemployed and thus, the less thenegative impact on theenvironment. An importantelement of disaster response isincreasing preparedness by pre-positioning goods (see Oloruntuba& Gray, 2006), but this initiativemust be taken on a permanentbasis. A risk/gain-sharingmechanism for excess warehousecapacity could be developed tooptimize global system

performance while sharing therisks of underutilization of thepermanent network in thepreparedness phase. Similar



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contracts have been developed forcommercial supply chains as ameans to share risks and benefitsassociated with unused facilitycapacity (e.g., Agrell et al., 2004).

Illustration 3-The United Nations

Humanitarian Response Depot

The World Food Program (WFP)established its first United NationsHumanitarian Response Depot(UNhrd) in Italy in 2000, aiming fora more rapid deployment ofphysical and/or virtual stocks andcost-savings in transporting themost urgently needed humanitarianaid to the disaster locations. Sincethen, four more hubs have beenstrategically established in

Panama, Ghana, Dubai, andMalaysia, creating a global networkof HRDs, facilitating the WFP'scapacity to meet its goal ofresponding to four concurrentlarge-scale emergencies byreducing distances between theaffected area and the stock ofemergency items. Furthermore, theWFP is offering to UN agencies,international organizations, andgovernmental and non-governmental organizations the useof the emergency responsefacilities and associated supportservices at no-cost or a cost-recovery basis. Source: WFP (2006).

Also, IFRC has implemented threeRegional Logistics Units (RLU) inPanama, Dubai, and Kuala Lumpurand a logistics resource andmobilization department (LRMD) inGeneva, building its ownpermanent network for a betterresponse in the temporary setting(Jahre & Heigh, 2008) and a shorter

distance to cover.

Increase vehicle fill rate

Gap four deals with vehicleutilization, which if reduced willdecrease the environmental impactfrom the whole logistics system. Itwas concluded by van Wassenhove(2006) that the low degree ofcoordination and collaborationbetween different agencies iscausing duplication of efforts and

redundancies. Capacity utilizationis a problem (Ding-Kuo et al., 2006)and increasing utilization throughincreased planning, tracking, and

auditing of the supplies deliveredwill improve environmentalperformance and response.

Illustration 4-The Logistics Cluster

Tracking Tool

The logistics cluster, one of thenine clusters created by theIASC to strengthen system-widepreparedness and technicalcapacity to respond tohumanitarian emergencies, ensuresthat there is predictable leadershipand accountability in all the mainsectors or areas of humanitarianresponse (IASC, 2006) by creatingthe logistics cluster tracking tool(LCTT), a small Microsoft Accessdatabase application designed

mainly to test ideas, elicit usercomments, and propose screendesigns. As a prototype for therelief item tracking application(RITA), the LCTT is a trackingsystem that records and reportstracking information and thusprovides better customer serviceto beneficiaries and clients,improves communication betweenhubs and the center, and allowssummarized reporting of goodsthat have been transported. Toincrease vehicle utilization, theLCTT works with lowesttransportable units (LTU) andbundles. For transport andhandling optimization, a policy ofnot less than one LTU per bundleis used, for example 10 boxes perpallet (a box is the LTU and a palletis the bundle), 50 bales per pallet (abale is the LTU and a pallet is thebundle), 600 bales per 20' container(a bale is the LTU and a 20'container is the bundle). The RITAis currently under development

and will allow commodity trackingto take place across multiple sites;it will be available over the Internetfor the humanitarian community.Source: WFP (2009).

Decrease vehicle impact

The last identified gap is the actualvehicle impact. At this level,activities related to the actualdistribution are the only onesaffecting the performance and most

actions aimed at reducing thisimpact need to be taken on anoperational level within thetemporary network. Typical

initiatives that will have an impacton the ratio are driving habits,vehicle maintenance, fuel, andengine technology. However,actions could be taken in thepermanent network to createopportunities for the temporarynetwork to reduce this ratiowithout conflict with other goals.By investing in newer and cleanervehicles to be used for thedistribution, negative environmental

impact will be reduced. Becausethis is primarily an issue that canbe dealt with in between disasters,these issues should be handled bythe permanent supply network.

Illustration 5-Eco-driving

The Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) andthe United Nations (UN), as apart of the United NationsEnvironmental Program (UNEP),have proposed essential guidancefor humanitarian actors in order toreduce environmental impact inrelief and recovery operations. Oneof the 10 points issued istransportation. Through well-maintained vehicles and eco-friendly driving techniques, airpollution and fuel consumption canbe reduced. Moreover, theutilization of cleaner fuels and fuel-efficient vehicles will minimizecarbon emissions. Finally, waste oilshould be stored in plastic drumsand properly disposed of or takenback to its source. These initiatives,similar to many others such asgreen procurement, will reduce theimpact that transportation has onhumanitarian operations. Source:OCHA and UNEP (2007).

Discussion and Perspectives

In this article we have illustrated apossible approach for temporaryorganizations to become greener intheir logistics activities. This hasbeen done in two ways. First, wedemonstrated how a frameworkfrom the green logistics literature(Figure 1) may be used to identifygaps between best practice greenlogistics and the logistics practicesof a temporary organization (Table3). Next we illustrated through anumber of mini-cases how theidentified gaps have been closed bydifferent organizations in the



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humanitarian sector. Although themini-cases illustrate differentinitiatives by different decisionmakers during the preparednessphase, they all point to somegeneral actions that may beundertaken in order to close thegaps. As shown in the introductionof this article, there seems tobe a conflict between greenconsiderations and logisticspractices for temporaryorganizations. The illustrationsshow that in order to address thisconflict, environmental issues mustbe included prior to thedevelopment of the operation,specifically to plan for a greenresponse and then perform an

efficient response and not the otherway around. This means thatinstead of addressing the conflictduring the development of theoperation, it is possible to avoid itthrough green planning duringthe preparedness phase. Theapplication of this approach maybe useful in any temporary setting.

Research in temporary organiza-tions has shown that thesediffer from more permanentorganizational forms in varyingways; time, team, and taskrequirements are the mostcommonly identified differences(Lundin & Sderholm, 1995;Packendorf, 1995, Turner & Mller,2003). Long-term considerations inthese organizations are oftenneglected because time is limitedfrom the beginning, the team isephemeral, and the taskoverwhelms the whole organizationbecause it is the meaning for thecreation of the temporary

organization. Performance in theseorganizations is measured by theachievement of the task within thepre-established time frame andbudget, and other considerationssuch as the environmental impactmay often be in conflict with theobjectives the organization is setup to reach. This is particularlyvisible in the humanitarian context,in which temporary organizationswith temporary logistics networksare set up to deliver aid in the eventof a disaster. The delivery of aidmust be done in a cost-efficientmanner, and environmentalconcerns are given a backseat

because lives need to be saved. Theresponse is carried out with little orno attention to environmentalconcerns and thus a negativeimpact on the local and globalenvironment is the result. In orderto come to terms with theseproblems, greening issues need tobe dealt with before disaster reliefis activated in a more stable andpermanent network from which thetemporary network is established.In the humanitarian context, thismeans that less environmentallyharmful solutions-which are to beused in the response phase-need tobe considered in the preparednessphase so that when the permanent-to-temporary transition takes

place, the temporary network is setup to perform its operations withas little negative environmentalimpact as possible. This involvesstrategic as well as tacticaland operational considerations.However, to measure the environm-ental impact of humanitarian reliefoperations is not an easy task and itis even harder when products' lifecycles are taken into account. Mostattention to logistics environmentalimpact is focused on specificactivities such as transportationand thus most models andframeworks towards greenerlogistics may appear extremelysimplified. A possible solution tothis, as we argue in the article, is tohave a wider perspective of theimpact and the causes of such. Ifsolutions are conceived from thefirst phase of a product's life cycle,such decisions will have a positiveand increasing impact on the otherphases, including the recyclingor reutilization of materials.

Albeit, this is only possible ifenvironmental considerations aretaken into account before thetemporary work is activated.

The humanitarian sector could be,to a certain degree, ahead of othertemporary contexts acknowledgingthe importance of a preparednessphase by attesting that the betterone is prepared the more effectivethe response (van Wassenhove,2006, p. 480) and thus, long-termconsiderations can be appliedunder the permanent-to-temporaryperspective. Moreover, someinitiatives that include the design of

the products that are to be sentto the different humanitarianoperations are already beingtested. These include size,materials, packaging, andrecycling/reutilization amongothers, which will lead to amore efficient transportation andthus to a more environmentallyresponsible logistics system. Thissame logic can be applied to othercontexts in which temporarynetworks are set up to perform aspecific task. In construction forexample, most projects can beconsidered as a temporary projectnetwork created from a permanentnetwork of organizations that worktogether along different

construction projects (Dubois &Gadde, 2002). Here, eachorganization has specific resourcesthat may be required in a specificproject and thus mobilized to thetemporary network. Strategiesregarding to the environment canbe created from the permanentorganizations network and appliedin the temporary setting, forexample, the use of eco-friendlymaterials, green technologies forconstruction and transportation,and so on.

Perspectives of research on thistopic may include the use of a less-simplified framework of logisticsenvironmental impact, as thepurpose of this research is toinitiate a discussion on how long-term environmental considerationscan be taken into account intemporary settings. Also, theevidence, if any, of environmentalconsiderations in other temporarysettings may contribute to the

tuning up of a framework thatincludes wider aspects of theenvironmental impact of logistics.Empirical data that support and/orimprove the proposed framework isencouraged from humanitarian andcommercial contexts. To conclude,the key is to keep a holistic view, asadvocated by Aronsson and HugeBrodin (2006), and moveenvironmental considerations intothe permanent network. Inaddressing the environment in thehigher level decisions, lessconcern needs to be taken in thetemporary network with a greenertemporary network as the result.



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About the authors

Fredrik Eng-Larsson is a PhD Candidate atthe Department of Industrial Managementand Logistics, Lund University. His mainresearch interest is within Green Logisticsand the relationship between logisticsdecision making and freight transportemissions. He holds a M.Sc. in IndustrialEngineering from Lund University, Faculty ofEngineering.

Diego Vegais a PhD Candidate at the Centrede Recherche sur le Transport et laLogistique (CRET-LOG), Aix-MarseilleUniversity. His current research interestsinclude humanitarian and disaster relieflogistics, project-based logistics andtemporary organizations. He holds a M.Sc. inLogistics and Strategy from Aix-MarseilleUniversity, CRET-LOG.

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