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The Origins of the European Union’s Policy on Membership and Democracy Ryan Phillips

Government & International Relations Department, Connecticut College, 270 Mohegan Avenue, New London, CT 06320, USA E-mail: ryan.phillips@conncoll.edu

Abstract Explanations of the European Union’s policy on democracy and membership conditionality are split between a constructivist account that emphasizes democracy as a norm of political legitimacy and a rationalist account that emphasizes member states’ economic and security interests. The existing research, however, has only a weak empirical basis. A systematic consideration of evidence leads to a novel understanding of EU membership conditionality. The main empirical finding is that whereas the constructivist argument holds true when de facto membership criteria were first established in the 1960s, the rationalist argument more closely aligns with the evidence at the end of the Cold War when accession requirements were formally codified as part of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993). To explain why the normative rationale underpinning the EU’s policy on democracy and membership changed over time, I demonstrate the influence of ‘securitization theory’. The core of my explanation that while securitization theory was originally developed to understand the European security environment at the end of the Cold War, it came to change that environment through influencing the EU’s membership policy. Keywords: Copenhagen School, democracy promotion, conditionality, enlargement, European Union, membership, securitization theory Word Count: 8423 * PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S PERMISSION *

Submitted August 30, 2016

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Introduction On October 12, 2012 in the Norwegian capital of Oslo, Thorbjørn Jagland declared, ‘The

Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2012 is to be awarded

to the European Union. The Union and its forerunners have for over six decades contributed to

the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’ (Jagland

2012). In awarding the EU the Nobel Peace Prize, Prime Minister Jagland voiced a common

view of the EU, namely that it has a major force for the advancement of democracy throughout

Europe.

Membership conditionality – that is, the explicit linking of a country’s membership status

to domestic democratic reforms – is frequently cited as the EU’s most potent instrument in the

promotion of democracy. The effectiveness of EU membership conditionality can be overstated

(Pravda 2001; 10; Pridham 2005: 1; Grabbe 2006: 207-208), but researchers have repeatedly

concluded that EU conditionality played a significant role in the democratization of central and

eastern Europe (Pravda 2003; Pridham et al. 1994: 1; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006;

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Indeed, it is frequently asserted that no other

international organization can match the EU’s democratizing influence. The economic and

political benefits of membership are thought to give the EU unparalleled leverage over countries

hoping to join (Dimitrova and Pridham; Pridham 2005, 28; Pravda 2001: 12; Smith 2003).

But why does the EU promote democracy through membership conditionality? Existing

research has focused on the normative rationale for EU membership policy – i.e., the good

democracy promotion is intended to achieve. Existing research is split between a constructivist

explanation that emphasizes the principled basis of the EU’s enlargement policy and a rationalist

view that emphasizes the expected economic and security benefits for EU member states. As I

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discuss below, however, neither explanation is built on strong empirical foundations.

Additionally, neither provides an adequate explanation of why the EU formalized democratic

conditionality at the beginning of the 1990s and not earlier. Based on original archival research,

this contribution seeks to fill these empirical and theoretical gaps.

The paper draws two primary conclusions. First, my empirical research demonstrates that

the EU has become less of a ‘normative power’ over time. Whereas in the early 1960s EU

membership policy was driven by a moral commitment to the intrinsic legitimacy of democracy,

by the 1990s spreading democracy was seen more as a way to ensure regional security and

economic development. This conclusion runs counter to the constructivist view that EU policy

became increasingly infused with ethical considerations at the end of the Cold War, while

affirming the rationalist view on the significance of member states’ interests (Manners 2002).

Second, some scholars have suggested that membership conditionality should be seen as an

evolutionary process that was articulated in an inchoate version at the founding of the European

Economic Community (1957) and was subsequently solidified in a concrete fashion in the early-

1990s (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; Pridham 2005: 5). This narrative is misleading.

Rather, I argue that the adoption of democratic conditionality as part of the Copenhagen Criteria

in 1993 reflected the influence of a new theory of European security that was developed in the

mid-1980s by the Copenhagen School of International Relations. Borrowing from Copenhagen

School usage, I label this theory ‘securitization theory’, though as I detail below I use the term

with a modified meaning. ST does not explain all of the ins and outs of the decision to require

countries to consolidate democracy as a precondition for membership. But what it does explain is

why member state leaders believed that the spread of democracy eastward was essential to

regional security and economic well-being.

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In sum, this contribution sheds new light on the origins of the EU’s membership policy. It

demonstrates that the normative rationale for requiring applicant countries to be democratic

changed over time and explains that change by tracing its origins to ideas developed by the

Copenhagen School.

The overall structure of the paper is organized in a two-step fashion. After some essential

background and discussion of existing literature, I carry out an empirical test of the constructivist

and rationalist theses regarding why the EU promotes democracy through membership

conditionality. After finding that the normative beliefs that informed EU policy changed over

time, I turn to explaining the origins of this change. Section two provides an overview of

political conditionality and the development of the EU’s membership policy as well as reviews

existing research. Section three describes the empirical basis of the paper and the analytical

techniques employed. Section four discusses the empirical findings. Section five explains why

the European Council believed that democracy would advance member states’ economic and

security interests. The final section summarizes the primary findings and discusses some

potential critiques and limitations of the argument.

Background and existing research

Conditionality is one of several policy instruments that the EU employs to promote democracy in

countries around the world (Börzel and Risse 2009). What distinguishes political conditionality

from these other instruments is the use of ‘carrots-and-sticks’ to promote political change.

‘Political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived

benefits to another state (such as aid), to the fulfillment of conditions related to the protection of

human rights and the advancement of democracy’ (Smith 1998: 256). For the sake of simplicity,

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I use the terms ‘political conditionality’, ‘membership conditionality’ and ‘democratic

conditionality’ interchangeably to refer to the EU’s policy of linking membership to democratic

reforms in applicant states.

Democracy promotion did not become a formal, legally codified goal of EU membership

policy until the 1990s (Börzel and Risse 2009; Olsen 2000). Although the preamble to the Treaty

of Rome (1957) stated that an aim of the European Economic Community (EEC) was to

‘strengthen peace and liberty’, democracy was neither a requirement for membership nor was it a

stated goal of the EEC. It was not until the Single European Act (1986) that democracy

promotion was explicitly incorporated into the treaties as a goal of the European Community.

Only in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council did EU member states

formally declare that only countries which possessed a stable democratic regime were eligible

for membership. Following the establishment of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, the European

Commission was entrusted with evaluating the democratic credentials of applicant states and

reporting its findings to the other EU institutions. From 1997, the Commission produced annual

regular reports on the progress of applicant countries in meeting the requirements of

membership.

Though democracy was only formally adopted as an entry requirement in 1993, its

practical application to considerations of membership dates to the 1960s, when the authoritarian

regimes of southern Europe first applied for entry into the EEC (Pridham 2005: 11–22; Smith

1998: 258; Whitehead 1986). Spain applied in 1962, but membership negotiations did not

commence until after the death of General Franco and the beginning of democratic reforms in the

mid-1970s. Greece completed an association agreement with the EEC in 1962, but following the

‘colonel’s coup’ in 1967, relations were frozen until the military regime collapsed in 1974.

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Similarly, negotiations with Portugal did not enter into a steady stream of progression until the

military regime fell in 1974.

Most research on EU membership conditionality has focused on the issue of its

effectiveness. Researchers have addressed whether, under what conditions, how, and to what

extent membership conditionality has supported democratic consolidation (Dimitrova and

Pridham 2004; Grabbe 2002; Grabbe 2006; Haughton 2007; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011;

Noutcheva 2016; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). It is

widely accepted that membership conditionality gives the EU unparalleled influence over states

wanting to join the Union (Pravda 2003: 12).

Given that researchers have repeatedly concluded EU membership conditionality has

made a significant contribution the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe,

one might expect similarly rigorous studies of the origins of EU policy. A review of the existing

literature leads to the conclusion that this is not the case. Further, the research that exists lacks

the empirical rigor or theoretical attention that has been devoted to the study of the effectiveness

of membership conditionality.

Existing research on the origins of EU membership conditionality has focused on the

policy’s normative rationale – i.e., the interest or values it is intended to achieve. While not all

authors adopt the rationalist or constructivist labels, their substantive arguments largely track the

rationalist/constructivist divide in International Relations. Constructivists argue that EU policy is

guided by the belief that liberal democracy is a foundational element of political legitimacy.

Rationalists view the EU’s democratization efforts as a means of achieving member states’

economic and security interests in the region. Less frequently, scholars argue that the EU’s

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policy reflects a mixture of these two views (Pravda 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006;

Torreblanca 2001: 1).

Ian Manners has put forward a particularly influential account of the constructivist view

(2002; 2006a; Manners 2006b; 2008; see also Kreutz 2015; Pridham 2005: 5, 25;

Schimmelfennig 2001: 48; Smith 2003; Weber 1995). According to Manners, the EU is a

‘normative power’ in world politics. Rather than aspiring to the status as a great power, its

primary role is one of ‘shaping conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations’ (2002: 239).

Democracy is a ‘core norm’ of the EU (2002: 242) and a fundamental element of its conception

of political legitimacy. Importantly, the commitment to democracy constrains its relations with

non-EU countries. The EU’s rules on membership reflect the EU’s belief that liberal democracy

is a fundamental element of political legitimacy.

If constructivists view the EU’s policy on membership and democracy as a reflection of

the EU’s cosmopolitan values, rationalists view membership conditionality as a means for

member states to advance their economic and security interests (Börzel and Risse 2009; Laïdi

2008; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Zaki Laïdi (2008: 40) agrees with Manners that the EU

‘seeks the integration of a world order based on the legitimacy of rules’, but criticizes Manners

for idealizing norms (2008: 44). For Laïdi, promoting democracy is a way to weaken state

sovereignty and the threat it poses to regional security without abolishing it. Similarly, according

to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse the EU follows ‘a world cultural script according to which

democracy is good for international security and development’ (Börzel and Risse 2009: 35).

Constructivist and rationalists thus offer competing accounts of the normative rationale

for EU membership policy. As a result, they also tend to hold different interpretations of why EU

democratic promotion took off at the end the Cold War. Both camps recognize that the fall of the

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Soviet empire allowed western states and institutions to seek greater influence over central and

eastern Europe. For constructivists like Geoffrey Pridham (2005: 25-26) the principled

commitment to democracy existed at least since the 1960s, but remained suppressed under the

security logic of the Cold War. The end of the Soviet threat led to a rebalancing of security

interests and the promotion of democracy. Alternatively, rationalists see the collapse of the

Soviet Union as heralding the emergence of new threats to western Europe, namely economic

and social instability in central and eastern Europe and potential spillover effects (Börzel and

Risse 2009: 40–42). Democracy, along with the protection of individual rights and a market

economy, were aimed at ensuring west European interests in the region. Thus in addition to what

values or interests democracy promotion is intended to achieve, rationalists and constructivists

disagree about the timeline for when these beliefs emerged.

What is driving the disagreement between constructivists and rationalists? I suspect that

in part it is the result of the theoretical context in which these analyses emerged. The bulk of the

research was carried out in the early to mid-2000s when some prominent scholars suggested that

the main axis of debate in the field of International Relations would be rationalism vs.

constructivism (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein et al. 1998). Convinced that political actors

follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’, constructivists gravitated to the idea that a policy of

democratic conditionality was an example of norm guided behavior. Alternatively, convinced

that actors followed a ‘logic of consequences’, rationalists gravitated to the idea that enlargement

policy must be driven by the self-interests of member states. If this is right, then one implications

of the analysis that follows is a warning about theory-driven research.

Additionally, however, both camps found evidence that supported their theoretical

assumptions. Though perhaps unsurprisingly they rely upon different sources of evidence.

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Manners draws his conclusions about the EU’s normative identity from an analysis of

‘declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions’ produced by the EU or its predecessors

over the past 50 years or ones it signed onto (e.g., the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (2002: 240–241), particular consonant actions (e.g., the pursuit of the abolition of the

death penalty (2002: 245–254), various EU military and police interventions (2006b: 273), and

apparent contrasts with the United States and past histories of European imperialism (2006b:

172–176). By contrast, Börzel and Risse seem to suggest that the fact that the ‘prospect of

membership helped to transform ten former communist countries into consolidated liberal

democracies with functioning market economies in less that 15 years’ speaks for itself. The

stabilizing effect of membership conditionality reflects a stabilizing intent. Laïdi cites the

European Security Strategy document ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (2003) and the

European Defence Agency’s ‘An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and

Capacity Needs”’(2006) as evidence that democracy promotion was part of a broader security

strategy. That is, both constructivists and rationalists selectively draw on evidence that support

their respective theories.

Since there is evidence for both constructivist and rationalist explanations, one might

conclude that this a classic example of mixed motivations? Perhaps, but for scholars who take

this view, the empirical basis is not well researched (Pravda 2003: 9–10; Schimmelfennig et al.

2006: 18; Smith 2003: 33–35). None of the literature reviewed attempts to systematically collect

and analyze the relevant evidence. My view is that conflicting accounts of the origins of the EU

democratic conditionality can be best adjudicated by attempting to do so. In the next section, I

discuss the data sources and analytical techniques used in this study.

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Data sources and analytical approach

Constructivist and rationalist explanations of EU membership conditionality disagree on two

points: (1) whether it reflects a basic belief that democracy is a fundamental element of political

legitimacy or a self-interested belief in the welfare and security benefits of spreading democracy

and (2) whether the value attached to democracy was present from the founding of the European

Communities or is of more recent origin, corresponding to emergent security threats at the end of

the Cold War. On what empirical basis should we assess these claims?

To address these questions, the analysis in section four draws on two sets of documents:

(1) a report produced by the European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA) and accompanying debate

held in the Assembly in the early 1960s and (2) European Council documents for the period

1988-1993. As previously discussed, although democracy did not become a formal requirement

of membership until the early 1990s, it first emerged as a practical requirement in the 1960s.

Previous research has demonstrated the central role the EPA played in establishing a de facto

requirement of democracy for any country seeking membership in the European Communities

(Anaya 2001; Thomas 2006). Daniel Thomas (2006: 1206) concludes that sustained public

criticism by MEPs and civil society groups led member states, including France and Germany, to

drop their initial support for the Franco regime’s application in 1962, thereby establishing an

ongoing precedent for relations with non-democratic states.

Therefore to answer why the EEC began in the 1960s to require states seeking entry into

the Community to be democratic requires accounting for the beliefs of MEPs at the time. In

1961, the Assembly issued the ‘Report on the Political and Institutional aspects of Membership

or Association for the Community’.1 Drafted by Willi Birkelbach (Socialist-FRG) as the Political

Affairs Committee’s rapporteur, the Report is conventionally known as ‘the Birkelbach Report’.

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Subsequently, a parliamentary debate on the report was held in January 1962. The analysis in

section four is based on the report and the parliamentary debate.

At the end of the Cold War, enlargement policy was firmly in the hands of the member

states and decided collectively in the European Council (Schimmelfennig 2003; Smith 1999;

Torreblanca 2001). Thus it is important to understanding the collective reasoning of the

European Council during this period. The second set of documents analyzed were the

‘Conclusions of the Presidency’ and associated annexes issued at European Council summits

from 1988 through 1993. I also included a select number of other documents, all of which were

cited in the Conclusions of the Presidency and judged to be particularly relevant to understanding

the views of the European Council. The period of 1988 to 1993 period was selected because it

covers the beginning of the revolutions in central and eastern Europe to the declaration of the

Copenhagen Criteria for membership.

These two sets of documents, then, allow us to understand the reasoning of the principal

actors during two crucial periods in the development of the EU’s membership policy. They also

allow us to see whether the purpose of the democratic requirement changed over time.

This study adopts an interpretive approach (Bevir 2011; Bevir and Rhodes 2004: 15–44).

Although it draws upon the particular techniques of content and discourse analysis, my

interpretivism should be understood as a philosophical position rather than as a commitment to a

particular method. My approach is interpretivist in the sense that it places at the center of its

analysis the beliefs of actors, rather than material or ideational structures or quasi-structures. The

particular belief that I attempt to account for is the normative belief that democracy should be a

requirement for EEC/EU membership.

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In an interpretive framework, particular beliefs are understood and explained when they

are placed within the web of beliefs to which they belong and which give them coherence and

meaning. An actor’s web of beliefs can be reconstructed both synchronically and diachronically.

I use the techniques of content and discourse analysis to develop synchronic explanations of the

normative beliefs of MEPs and the European Council. Through the analysis of primary

documents, these techniques allow me to demonstrate how the Parliament and the Council’s

normative ideas regarding democracy and membership fit together to form a coherent policy.

Content analysis was used to code the documents analyzed for their explicit views expressed

about membership and democracy (Krippendorff 2013).2 Discourse analysis was employed to

account for tacit or implied views (Milliken 1999). The latter was especially useful in

understanding the Parliament’s justification for the democratic criterion because MEPs did not

explicitly state why democracy should be a requirement. The justification was implied from

other ideas expressed in the documents.

In addition to a synchronic explanation of prominent actors’ beliefs, I also reconstruct

their beliefs historically by pointing to their contingent origins. This is the focus of section five. I

argue that we can explain the value the European Council attached to democracy by reference to

the rise of ‘securitization theory’. By tracing the origins of the normative beliefs that

underpinned the EU’s policy of political conditionality, I explain why the European Council

could think that promoting democracy also advanced its economic and security interests.

In the next section, I summarize the key findings from my analysis of Assembly and

Council documents before turning to explaining why the normative rationale for democracy

changed over time.

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Discussion of empirical findings

In this section I describe the major differences between how the Parliamentary Assembly and the

European Council understood the relationship between democracy, membership and the

purposes or character of the EEC across the two periods of interest. My primary conclusion is

that whereas in the 1960s the Parliamentary Assembly stressed the moral significance of

democracy, at the end of the Cold War the European Council linked democracy to regional

security and economic welfare in addition to a concern for political legitimacy.

The view of the European Parliamentary Assembly in the early 1960s

The Report and five of the ten MEPs who addressed the Assembly explicitly affirmed

that membership was only open to democratic states.3 No speaker opposed the democratic

requirement. According to the Report, ‘The political regime of a country seeking to join the

Community cannot be treated with indifference’. It continues,

Guaranteeing the existence of a democratic form of state, within the meaning of a liberal political organization, is a condition for membership. States whose governments have no democratic legitimacy and whose people do not participate in government decisions directly or by freely elected representatives, cannot be admitted into the circle of people that form the European Communities. (1961: II.3.24–25)

Similarly, speaking as President of the Christian Democrat Party Group, Jean Duvieusart stated

that Birkelbach was ‘quite right to stress’ that the Community could only form a union with

states that were ‘animated by the political philosophy of democracy’ (European Parliamentary

Assembly 1962: 62).

Other than the section of the Report quoted above, no other parts of the Report nor the

MEPs who spoke on behalf of democracy explicitly addressed why the nature of a country’s

domestic political regime was relevant to the consideration of its inclusion in the Community.

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How then should we best account for why MEPs repeatedly opposed closer relations with non-

democratic states? The argument advanced here is that opposition to including authoritarian

states as members is best explained by the widely expressed belief that the Community formed a

‘moral community’. I present it as the most plausible account given what is contained in the

Report and said in the debates.

Evidence in the Report and debate for the belief that the Community does and should

have a moral nature is found in two primary areas: 1) statements regarding the purpose of the

Community and 2) a repeated contrast of the Community’s goals and nature with those of a

‘simple economic association’. First, the idea that the six member states formed a moral

community is evident in repeated claims that a central priority of the Community was to further

European unity and solidarity as well as statements that the Community should prioritize

association agreements with colonies or former colonies. The Report as well as nine out of ten

speakers stated that the goal of the Community was unity and solidarity amongst European

peoples. According to Emilio Battista (It/Christian Democrat), ‘The main purpose of our

Communities is not to solve problems of an economic nature but to achieve political unity’

(1962: 92). Seven of the ten speakers singled our supporting overseas countries and territories as

a priority. For instance, Jean Duvieusart (Bel/President of Christian Democratic Group) stated

that the Community should show a ‘special desire for solidarity’ with ‘the black nations’ of

Africa (1962: 61). The member states had formed a moral community in the sense that they

would act with due regard and care for the legitimate interests and values of others both within

and outside the Community.

Second, the Report and a number of speakers contrasted the Community with the idea

that it formed a ‘simple economic association’ (Birkelbach 1961: V.88). The nature of an

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economic association is depicted as differing from the Community in one significant respect: in

an economic association states pursue their economic interests without regard for the valid and

vital interests of others. By contrast, in the Community only certain interests were legitimate and

states must pursue their valid interests in ways that take into account the effects on the interests

of other states and their peoples. The Report states that a country that mistakenly believes that

the Community is a simple economic association ‘considers only its own situation and only the

real or imagined trade disadvantages it may suffer as a result of the implementation of the

common customs tariff of the Community’ (Birkelbach 1961: IV.1.88). Similarly, Emilio

Battista, the chair of the Political Affairs Committee and member of the Christian Democrat

Party Group stated,

[W]e cannot think only of creating business relations. We are not here to do business, we are here to do something much more important: we are here to ensure a happier future of peace and tranquility in Europe, improving economic opportunities in order to raise the living standard of the populations of our countries. I believe there is an absolutely fundamental principle that must be believed in order to enter the Community…. They [i.e., applicant states] must also have a commitment to adhere to the political spirit that animates the European Community. (1962: 93)

In sum, the commonly expressed view in the Report and the speeches is that the

Community is a moral community, not just an economic one. It is a moral community because it

is founded on a set of common set of moral aims and values, which include achieving the vital

and legitimate interests of its members and enhancing European and extra-European unity and

solidarity. Given the Community’s moral nature, only democratic states were considered

acceptable members.

The views of the European Council in the late 1980s/early 1990s

Of the twenty European Council documents analyzed, eighteen of the twenty documents

(90 per cent) stated the Community supported – symbolically, materially or both – democracy or

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democratization efforts in other countries. Similar to the earlier period, political legitimacy

remained a justification for why states should be democratic. In the eighteen documents in which

democracy is addressed, five linked democracy to the Community’s moral character (28 per

cent). It is striking to note, however, that there were no statements about democracy contributing

to political legitimacy after 1990. Democratic legitimacy was discussed in five documents up to

and including the Charter of Paris (November 1990), but did not appear in any of the documents

analyzed after this date.

Running alongside and then replacing the belief that democracy is central to political

legitimacy were two other ideas that were absent in the Birkelbach Report and debate: (1)

democracy and security, peace and stability are interlined, and (2) economic development and

democracy are mutually supporting. Fifteen of the eighteen documents that addressed democracy

(83 per cent), linked democracy to security. In four of the documents (22 per cent), peace and

stability are portrayed as contributing to democracy. For instance, the proposed ‘Stability Pact’

to address the status of territorial borders and the treatment of minorities in Hungary, Poland and

Czechoslovakia is said to be a ‘staple component of joint action to promote stability,

reinforcement of the democratic process and the development of regional co-operation in Central

and Eastern Europe’ (The European Council 1993: 24). But in fourteen of the documents (78 per

cent) democracy is portrayed as contributing to peace, security and stability. At the 1988

Rhodes’ summit, for instance, the heads of state and government issued the ‘Declaration of the

European Council on the International Role of the European Community’, stating,

The European Community and its member states are determined to play an active role in the preservation of international peace and security and in the solution of regional conflicts, in conformity with the United Nations Charter. Europe can not [sic] but actively demonstrate its solidarity to the great and spreading movement for democracy and full support for the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. (1988)

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In the Declaration, the Community’s support for the ongoing political reforms in the CEE

countries is justified in terms of regional peace and security. Repeated in across European

Council documents was the belief that democratization would contribute to regional peace and

stability in Europe.

A second new theme was the linking of economic development to democracy. Fourteen

documents (78 per cent) stated that economic development and democracy were conjoined.

Frequently, the relationship was portrayed as recursive and symbiotic. For instance, the

Presidency conclusions for the 1992 Lisbon European Council stated, ‘A political consensus is

growing around the fundamental relationship between pluralistic democracy, respect for human

rights and development’ (1992: 24). The relationship between democracy and economic

development was also portrayed in more directed ways. Democracy was said to contribute to

economic development in seven of the documents (39 per cent). Appearing somewhat more

frequently was the belief that economic development contributed to democracy (11 documents or

61 per cent). But repeated across European Council documents was the idea that economic

progress and democracy stood in a symbiotic relationship.

Summary

In comparing the views of the European Council during late 1980s and early 1990s to the

views of the Parliamentary Assembly in the early 1960s, a significant shift is evident: the value

or purpose attached to democracy changed. In the latter period, the concern for political

legitimacy is not absent, but gaining in prominence is the belief that democracy is linked with

security, peace and stability as well as economic development. Table 1 summarizes these

differences.

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Table 1. The value of democracy 1961-62 (n=11) 1988-93 (n=18) Political legitimacy

6 (55%)

5 (28%)

Economic development

0 (0%)

7 (39%)

Peace, security, and stability

0 (0%)

15 (83%)

How do these conclusions compare to the constructivist and rationalist accounts? First,

the constructivist thesis that EU membership policy was driven by the belief that democracy was

elemental to political legitimacy was more accurate in the 1960s when the Parliamentary

Assembly was influential than in the 1980s and 90s when the heads of state and government

were making decisions about enlargement. While the concern for political legitimacy did not

entirely disappear in the latter period, the emphasis on the security and welfare benefits of

democracy increased in prominence. As noted previously, no reference to political legitimacy

and democracy appears in European Council documents after 1990. The Copenhagen Criteria

were declared in 1993. Secondly, the evidence supports the rationalist explanation of EU

membership policy and the emphasis on security and economic welfare interests at the end of the

Cold War. How should we explain this change in the normative rationale for the EU’s policy on

democracy and membership?

The Copenhagen School, securitization theory and democracy promotion

At the beginning of the 1990s the European Council emphasized the economic and security

benefits of democracy promotion. But why did the European Council believe that promoting

democracy in non-member states through conditionality would achieve their security and

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economic interests? The claim I advance is that the views of the European Council were

influenced by ‘securitization theory’

Beginning in the mid-1980s, a group of researchers associated with the Centre for Peace

and Conflict Research in Copenhagen (later to be renamed the Conflict and Peace Research

Institute - COPRI) began to produce a number of works aimed at reformulating the field of

security studies (Guzzini and Jung 2004; Huysmans 1998). Important contributors included

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Egbert Jahn, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and

Jaap de Wilde. ‘The Copenhagen School’ (CS), as it came to be called (McSweeney 1996),

developed a theory of European security that synthesized ideas from peace research, neorealism,

German security studies, interdependence theory, security communities, W.B. Gallie’s

conceptual analysis, and J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory. Amongst IR scholars, the CS is perhaps

best known for providing an analytical framework for studying security issues (Buzan et al.

1998). But the contribution of the CS to the study and practice of international security includes

ideas such as the non-military aspects of security, regional security complex and security sectors.

Within the field of International Relations, the term ‘securitization theory’ refers to a

specific analytical framework for understanding how an issue becomes a security problem or

issue (Buzan et al. 1998). I use the term here more broadly to refer to analyses that shifted

attention away from a focus on the military security of the state to the idea of societal security. In

this section, I explain why theorists of securitization broke from the dominant realist paradigm to

develop a theory of societal security. Then I explain how democracy relates to societal security.

Securitization theory (ST) did not reject the realism of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and

Kenneth Waltz outright (Buzan 1983).4 In fact, the distribution of military and economic

capabilities remained a core concern. Securitization theory, however, embedded traditional

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realist preoccupations like the distribution of power and the intentions of leaders within a broader

security framework. This framework was developed out of three important criticisms of realism.

First, theorists and practitioners of realism placed an undue focus on military power as

the object and source of state security; the state was primarily metaphysical or ideational rather

than physical. Under certain conditions, superior military forces could protect the political

independence of a state’s governing institutions and its territorial integrity (i.e., sovereignty), but

the state was at its core an idea or an organizing ideology held in common by a group of people

(Buzan 1983: 38–43). The security of any particular state depended to a large extent on how

widely and firmly a particular society accepted the idea of the state. A strong state was one in

which there was general agreement amongst the population (nation) about the purposes of the

state and its legitimacy. Realism’s focus on the material capabilities of the state mistook the

outer expression of the state (governing institutions and territory) with its core (a common idea).

The second criticism was that realism’s policy prescriptions were self-defeating. Given

the dynamics of the security dilemma and the destructiveness of modern weapons technology,

the traditional realist focus on power tended to be self-defeating. Amongst developed states with

developed militaries, national security was put in jeopardy by losing or even fighting a war

(Buzan et al. 1990: 5). Avoiding war rather than winning a war were necessary for achieving

physical security.

And third, the focus on great powers obscured the regional basis of state security

concerns. The growing density of interactions in the political, economic, environmental and

societal sectors and the absence of superpower confrontation, meant Europe had developed into a

regional security complex. Although the borders of Europe were somewhat ambiguous and

developing (Buzan et al. 1990: 5; Wæver 1989: 287–299), the region formed a security complex

21

in the sense that the primary security concerns of European states were linked together

sufficiently closely such that their national securities could not realistically be considered apart

from one another (Buzan 1983: 106). The organizational stability of European states, their

systems of government and legitimating ideologies required meeting both internal and external

challenges to accepted forms of government and policy goals. Achieving and maintaining

acceptable levels of economic welfare, maintaining a societal culture within acceptable levels of

change, and sustaining a local and planetary biosphere necessary for human enterprises depended

on the policies of other states and external societal actors. In general, the intensity and density of

transborder interactions in Europe put into doubt the effectiveness of individual state-centered

national security policies.

In place of the realist view that threats to national security could be met through adequate

military capabilities and that state security could be achieved unilaterally, securitization theory

emphasized that security was multidimensional, effective state policy required international

cooperation and the scope of European security concerns were primarily regional rather than

global. These differences are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Realism vs. Securitization theory Realism Securitization theory Core object of security

Sovereignty

Idea of the State/Identity of

Society Sector(s) of security

Military dominant

Multidimensional and

interconnected Scope

International

Regional

Policy

Balance/Seek hegemony

Cooperate

22

How did democracy fit into ST’s view of security? Effectively promoting democracy in

third-states satisfied four primary security goals: (1) it insulated Western democracies from

ideological challengers, (2) it undermined the ideological source of military confrontation, (3) it

ensured societal security in Western Europe, and (4) it established a necessary condition for

building a robust international society organized around common norms and institutions.

First, democracy was both an object and instrument of societal security. In fact, the two

cannot be neatly separated because securing democracy in western Europe was one justification

for promoting democracy in central and eastern Europe. Since security consists a society’s ability

to maintain the independence of their life and their identity, for the countries of western Europe

democracy was constitutive of their security. West European political security consisted in the

stability of democratic forms of government and the ideologies that underpin them (Buzan et al.

1990: 4). The existence of an ideological competitor to western democracy in the form of Soviet-

style state socialism posed an ongoing threat to the stability of democratic political organization

in western Europe (Buzan 1983: 76–78). State socialism was the non-democratic competitor for

the political loyalty of society. Supporting democratization was a way of shoring up the

ideological certainty of democratic capitalism.

Second, the military confrontation of the Cold War was at its essence an ideological

confrontation (Buzan 1983). This belief follows directly from the view of the state as primarily

ideational. Since the essence of a state is an ideology – a set of commonly held beliefs amongst

the population about its purposes and sources of legitimacy – the mobilization of military forces

during the Cold War was fundamentally oriented by the goal of protecting different legitimating

ideas about the political economies of western and eastern states. Accordingly, the primary cause

23

of military confrontation – and the physical insecurity that it induced – could be eliminated

through the ideological re-alignment of the former Soviet bloc. Establishing a democratic region

of states would be an effective means of ensuring against a new Cold War (Buzan et al. 1990:

192–196).

Third, successful democratization in central and eastern Europe would address societal

insecurity in the East and West alike. To the extent that the end of the Cold War meant that

traditional military and ideological threats were on the wane, western worries about losing or

fighting a war with the Soviet Union or the penetration of communism appeared increasingly

unlikely. The traditional objects of state sovereignty were no longer in serious doubt: political

independence and territorial control. The principal focus of insecurity in Europe was society

itself. Societal security is achieved through ensuring the sustainability of language, culture,

religious and national identity, and customs with acceptable levels of change (Heisler and

Layton-Henry 1993: 150–152; Wæver 1993: 23–24). For those countries newly emerging from

state socialism, the primary vulnerability to society was the potent combination of nationalism

and economic distress (Buzan 1993a: 2–5). The presence of large numbers of ethnic minorities

and the rise of xenophobic nationalism at a time of massive economic change and reorganization

raised the likelihood of political violence, economic chaos and social fragmentation. Societal

fragmentation in the East threatened societal security in the West. One particular worry was that

the eruption of aggressive nationalism and/or economic collapse could result in the mass influx

of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers to western Europe. The arrival of large numbers of

non-nationals would have destabilizing societal effects by disrupting valued forms of life and

threaten the ability of receiving societies to maintain their essential character. The conflict in the

former Yugoslavia provided ample evidence of this thesis.

24

The solution to societal insecurity in the East (and thus also in the West) lay in addressing

low levels of sociopolitical cohesion. The main problem identified was to develop acceptable

forms of government and stable developing economies (Buzan 1993a: 4). Establishing a

democratic constitution was a way of solving tensions between different ethnic and national

communities and ensuring against the possibility that the state itself would be used to suppress

ethno-national groups (Buzan 1993b: 49–51). Typical elements of western democracy –

government by law, public order, non-violence, non-discrimination, adequate police-protection,

constitutional government, separation of powers, human rights, minority protection,

participation, and the possibility of peacefully changing governments – provided strategies for

ensuring that ethno-national groups did not pose a serious threat to each other or the state to

particular ethno-national groups. Democracy was the form of government most suited for

establishing stable political legitimacy, and the successful transition to a market economy would

deliver economic security.

Finally, the effective management of national military, political, economic, societal, and

environmental concerns depended on the development of a mature international society which

would support the type of cooperative schemes necessary to address various sources of insecurity

(Buzan 1983: 95–101; Buzan et al. 1990: 26–27). Central to the conflict during the Cold War

was the unwillingness of states to recognize and accept the legitimacy of non-allies. The source

of illegitimacy for the West and the East was each other’s fundamentally different organizing

principles – democratic capitalism vs. authoritarian state socialism. Differences in domestic

societal orders gave rise to different principles for organizing international life. To the extent that

order existed in the international system during the Cold War, it was primarily the result of

deference to power rather than the existence of shared norms, rules or conventions for the

25

conduct of their relations. Because of interdependence, state-centered policy responses in the

post-Cold War era were inadequate to address the security concerns of states and societies.

Achieving and maintaining acceptable levels of economic welfare (i.e., economic security), for

instance, depended on establishing durable open markets and fair terms of competition. A strong

international society with common rules and norms of behavior could only be built on the basis

of mutual recognition and acceptance. This could only be achieved by establishing democratic

capitalist states.

In sum, ST s emphasized the metaphysical rather than physical foundations of the state.

This basic difference led to a reformulation of what constituted security for the state and society

and how it could be achieved. For ST, security was primarily regional rather than international or

global in focus: the problems of security lay within Europe. Democracy was promoted as a way

of avoiding militarized ideological confrontation, avoiding intercommunal conflicts and mass

migration, and establishing common values and principles upon which international cooperation

could be based.

The argument I am advancing is that the European Council drew upon ST when it

formulated its policy of democratic conditionality at the end of the Cold War. One can see the

influence of ST is in the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels Summit in 1993, the same year

that the Copenhagen Criteria were defined:

Foreign and security policy covers all aspects of security. European security will in particular be directed at reducing risks and uncertainties which might endanger the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union and its Member States, their democratic character, their economic stability and the stability of neighbouring regions. (The European Council 1993: 2)

As previously discussed, statements like this one were not unique. Thirty-nine per cent of

European Council documents stated democracy contributed to economic development and 83 per

26

cent of documents stated that democratization would contribute to peace, security and stability.

We can explain the European Council’s normative rationale for membership conditionality in

light of the way ST framed the benefits of democracy.

Conclusion In June 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit, the European Council, announced that ten countries of

former communist Europe were eligible to join the EU. At the meeting, the leaders of the twelve

member states declared that countries wishing to join the Union would have to ‘achieve stability

of institutions guaranteeing democracy’. With a short declaration, a political system long thought

by many to be the essence of anarchy and injustice was embraced as a cornerstone for a stable,

prosperous and peaceful Europe.

This paper has addressed why the EU promotes democracy through membership

conditionality. My analysis of the evidence concludes that EU policy was inspired by different

normative beliefs. In the 1960s, MEPs emphasized the moral desirability of democracy. In the

late 1980s/early 1990s, the European Council focused greater attention on the regional security

and economic benefits of democracy. This conclusion complicates the constructivist view that

the EU has increasingly become a ‘normative power’ over time and adds weight to the rationalist

view that the promotion of democracy through membership conditionality was intended to

advance the security and economic interests of EU member states and their citizens.

But why did member state leaders think that spreading democracy would actually

contribute to regional security and economic well-being? My explanation is that EU leaders

came to accept central tenets of ‘securitization theory’ (ST), a theory of security whose origins

are in the mid-1980s and the work of members of the Copenhagen School of International

27

Relations. Most importantly, ST claims that advancing democracy throughout Europe

ameliorates ideological confrontation, reduces the likelihood of intercommunal conflicts and

mass migration, and establishes common values and principles that can serve as the basis of

international cooperation.

What are some potential limitations of this research? I will briefly discuss three. First, my

empirical and theoretical claims rely upon the soundness of the archival research. One potential

worry is that I rely upon publicly accessible documents and that political actors have various

incentives to hide their true beliefs (Moravcsik 1998). On the one hand, I think further research

would be useful for either supporting or impugning the conclusions I draw. There are, however,

two considerations that support the findings. The first is that they cohere with existing research

that has concluded that member states’ economic and security interests drove EU policy on

enlargement (Grabbe 2002: 251; Higashino 2004; Hyde-Price 2006: 226–227; Schimmelfennig

2001; Torreblanca 2001). Additionally, leaders did not have an obvious incentive to misrepresent

their views. My argument is not that EU leaders were driven by an idealistic commitment to

democracy. Rather they stated that democracy promotion was good because it benefitted their

countries. They were not hiding self-interests behind a façade of idealism.

A second potential criticism is that my identification of securitization theory as the origin

of the normative rationale of EU membership policy at the end of the Cold War is too

speculative. The criticism might be that to demonstrate ideational influence, one should

demonstrate personnel and institutional links. I agree that demonstrating such links would be an

improvement. However, there are two features of my explanation that give me confidence in its

essential correctness. The first is the issue of timing. Major works on securitization theory began

to appear right before or during the revolutions in central and eastern Europe, including Barry

28

Buzan’s People, States, Fear (1983) and Buzan et al.’s The European Security Order Recast :

Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (1990). The second consideration is one of coherence. The

ideas articulated by the Copenhagen School closely fit statements made by the European

Council. Signficant descrepancies would suggest different ideational origins.

There is, however, one clear limitation of this research. As noted throughout, the focus of

this paper has been the normative rationale for the EU’s policy on democracy and membership

conditionality. That is, I have addressed the purpose, interests or values conditionality is intended

to achieve. The reason for this focus is that it tracks the debate in existing research. What I have

not addressed is why the EU adopted conditionality as a particular technique or technology of

government. As Karen Smith has noted, the shift to a policy of conditionality at the end of the

Cold War marked a significant change in Community policy toward central and eastern Europe.

She states that conditionality was ‘a reverse of the Community’s position during the Cold War,

when trade with communist Europe was a “carrot”, but the Community hesitated before using it

as a “stick”’ (Smith 1999: 43–44). One might describe this as a change from a policy of détente

to conditionality and a reversal in policy orientation. Conditionality promises future benefits in

return for present reforms, whereas détente – in addition to hoping to stabilize East-West

relations in the present – provided immediate benefits with the hope of future reforms. What the

change to conditionality signaled therefore was the advent of a new empirical theory of

democratization, a different set of causal beliefs about how democracy comes about. This

change has not been researched in this contribution, but should be an object of further research

[NB].

                                                                                                               1 There is no official English translation of the Report. The original report was translated into the four official languages of the Communities: German, French, Dutch and Italian. Community documents were not widely circulated in English until the UK joined in 1973. The discussion of the Report and associated debates are based on my translation from the French.

29

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     2 Coding instructions and a list of documents analyzed can be provided upon request. 3 In addition to 10 MEPs, one member of the Euratom Commission and two members of the EEC Commission spoke in the Assembly. Six of the MEPs were members of the Socialist Party Group, two members of the Christian Democratic Group and one member of the Liberal and Allied Group. Mr. Duvieusart is introduced in the transcript of the debate as speaking in his capacity as President of the Christian Democratic Group and on their behalf. This probably explains why no other member of his party spoke, other than Mr. Battista who spoke in his role as Chairman of the Political Committee. There is one other speaker – Jarrosson – whose nationality, party affiliation and gender could not be identified. Mostly likely s/he was one of the few MEPs not aligned with any of the three party groups and thus her or his presence was less well documented. 4 To a lesser extent, peace studies also formed a chief rival (Buzan 1983: 1).

30

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