Russia, China and Pakistan: An Emerging

New Axis?

Regional realities are shifting fast, with some significant ramifications for India.

By Joy Mitra

August 18, 2015

In geopolitics, strategic realities can change with surprising speed, and even before countries

realize it decisive shifts occur that shape the future for the years to come. That seems to be the

case with traditional Cold War rivals Russia and Pakistan, which have of late seen a gradual

warming of ties. Traditionally an ally of India and hitherto supportive of India’s stance on

Kashmir, Russia has shown clear signs of cozying up to Pakistan.

Having earlier lifted its self-imposed arms embargo on Pakistan, in November 2014 Russia

signed a landmark “military cooperation” agreement with Pakistan, which spoke about

“exchanging information on politico-military issues, strengthening collaboration in the defense

and counter-terrorism sectors, sharing similar views on developments in Afghanistan and doing

business with each other.” There have been reports that Pakistan may purchase Mi-35 combat

helicopters apart from directly importing the Klimov RD-93 engines from Russia rather than via

China for its JF-17 multi-role fighters. This could also mean a significant role for Russian

equipment and spares in future development of the fighter. In addition, Russian state-owned firm

Rostekh Corporation is planning to build a 680 mile gas pipeline in Pakistan in 2017 at an

estimated cost of $2.5 billion.

The mutual overtures between Russia and Pakistan are part of a greater shift in international

relations. In Europe, Russia is embroiled in a showdown with the West over Ukraine, with

Moscow’s military adventure in Crimea being followed by Western sanctions. In the Asia-

Pacific, China’s encroachments in the South China Sea has inflamed tensions with other Asia-

Pacific countries allied with the U.S. These developments have forced Russia and China to look

for allies, which explains the bonhomie between the two powers of late. Some analysts question

whether a partnership motivated by external factors could lead to an alliance of countries that

formerly distrusted each other. But the old adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” fits

perfectly well here; the single most important factor that overrides all others is their concurrent

perception of the U.S. and its “policy of containment” towards them. China needs allies to

change the world order and it begins with Asia.

The China-Pakistan link is well known and is the most formidable leg of the Russia-China-

Pakistan triangle. China has been a traditional ally of Pakistan and has historically supported it

against its arch rival India both in terms of military equipment and diplomacy. Chinese have

been involved in building nuclear reactors for Pakistan; Pakistan is the largest importer of

Chinese manufactured defense equipment, is involved in co-production and co-development of

JF-17 fighter jets and now is slated to buy almost eight Chinese’s S20 or Yuan-class diesel-

electric submarines (SSK). China has also significantly invested in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and

in the Karakoram corridor. The imperative here is not just for China but for Pakistan as well. The

burgeoning relationship between the U.S. and India, with their extensive trade ties and

cooperation on strategic issues of mutual concern in the sphere of defense technology and

equipment, does unnerve Pakistan from time to time. Since Pakistan’s failed misadventure in the

Kargil heights, it has lost the support of successive U.S. administrations on the Kashmir issue

and its own relationship with the U.S. has been rocky.

It is from here that the congruence of interests between the three states of Pakistan, China and

Russia stems. For China and Russia, the U.S. is an anathema, which must dethroned from its

hegemonic position for their own security. Pakistan has enough of an incentive to be a willing

partner in an Asian security architecture that is shaped by China. With India having diversified

its military suppliers to include countries like the U.S. and Israel, Russia no longer sees any

impediment to establishing a strategic relationship with Pakistan. In the future one could see

signs of integration between the three states, as their abilities complement each other: Russia is

an alternate source for Western military technology and energy supplier, China is economically

more potent than the other two, with considerable foreign exchange reserves looking to invest

and in need of energy supplies, Pakistan despite its structural problems is a growing economy

with young population in need of both of both energy supplies and defense equipment. Already

importing equipment from China, Pakistan will have access to Russian technology, which was in

fact the source for many Chinese products as well. Sanctions-hit Russia will have a new market

for its defense equipment, although this may well in the future see some competition between

Russia and China. It is possible that Russia will continue to arm India along with China and now

Pakistan. Both EU and US have followed the strategy of supplying defense equipment to both

India and Pakistan. But Russia arming Pakistan is still significant because that implies that

Russia will no longer give preferential treatment to its historical friend India.

It is true India is still economically too big to be overlooked and Russia has an interest in

preserving its relationship with India. But India has estranged security ties with China and

Pakistan, and with Russia drawing ever closer to China, its divergence of interest with India in

the world order it perceives is growing more apparent. The Russia-Pakistan-China triumvirate is

a reality in the offing and has a far greater convergence of security objectives in Asia than a

similar Russia-China-India grouping (also subsumed within BRICS). It is important to note here

that the Chinese economy is visibly slowing and this could lead to some internal turmoil, the

Russian economy may very well see further contraction, while that of Pakistan, albeit showing

signs of improvement, is external aid dependent and beset by internal security concerns.

Aggression on the part of this triumvirate to deflect attention from internal problems cannot be

ruled out. The strategic ramifications will be for India as much as they will be the U.S. and other

countries in the region. As the contours of the alliances in Asia harden, India will have to shed its

reluctance to take a firmer stand in Asia and work more closely with the U.S. and Japan.