rusia china india challanges

7/27/2019 Rusia China India Challanges

1/21


2/21


3/21

Journal of Peace Studies 42 Vol. 17, Issue 2&3, April-September, 2010

Michael Tatu, The great power

Triangle: Washington - Moscow-Peking (Paris: Atlantic Institute,1970), Thomas M. Gottlieb, ChineseForeign Policy Factionalism and theOrigins of the Strategic Triangle((Sante Monica: RAND R. 1902 NA,November 1977), John W. GraverChinas Rapprochement with theUnited States, 1969-71unpub. (AnnArbor Mich, 1979), Banning Garrett,China Policy and the Strategic

Triangle in Kenneth A. Oye, DonaldRotchild, and Robert Lieber, ed. EagleEntangled: US Foreign Policy in theComplex World (London and NewYork, Longman, 1979). To understandthe dynamics of triangularrelationship of great powers whichcould have strategic behavior at boththe levels, i.e., global and regional,compound triangular model is ofgreat help.

According to Martin Wight, theideal characteristics of a triangle atthe state level are three:

The existence of a state system,Three great powers of about equal

strength within the system, each ofwhich possesses enough power todominate the rest of the world in

the absence of the other two, andA situation in which, because of

mutual suspicion, tension, andhostility, no coalition, even atemporary one, can be formed

between any of the two of the three

great powers.

3

Three different systemic patternsof exchange of relationships areconceivable, i.e.,

i.The mnage a trios(household ofthree) consisting of symmetricalamities among all three players,

ii. The romantic t r iangleconsisting of amity between one

pivot player and two wingplayers but enmity between each ofthe latter, and,

iii. And the stable marriage,consisting of amity between two ofthe players and enmity between eachand the third.4

The strategic triangle among theUS, the Soviet Union and Chinaprovided enough raison d etre toformulate and test the model oftriangularity of powers. For TheodoreCaplow China was much weakerthan either of the two superpowers,which were about equal in terms ofstrategic weight. This is the Type 3 ofCaplows eight types of triads.5

Where B = C & A < B

STRATEGIC TRIANGLE AMONG RUSSIA, CHINA AND INDIA:CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

A

CB


4/21


According to Caplow, State A can

strengthen its position by forming acoalition with either B or C and willin turn be welcomed as an ally byeither B or C. And if B forms acoalition with C, and B does not reallyimprove its pre-coalition position inwhich it is equal to C and superior toA. Bs only objective to join C is toprevent the formations of A-Ccoalition. On the other hand, C willhave the same approach as that of B.

C will prefer A for coalition than B.Therefore, there are only two likelycoalitions A-B and A-C. For A, Band C it is essential to make coalition,with either of the two to get successin the competition for power. With thepassage of time, all possiblecoalitions are likely to occur. But inthe terminal situation, the only likelycoalition is between B and C whichwill lead to a dyadic equilibrium afterpartitioning A. A has little chance toform a coalition with either B or C

because, A will easily fall prey to itspartner after the triad becomes adyad.

To understand the dynamics oftriangular relationship, T. Caplow hasevolved several propositions - hisfirst proposition says that the

tendency towards a coalition orcollusion between two of the threepoles and the fear of this tendency ineach pole constitute the maindynamic of the triangle.6

In the triad, A [in the given

diagram] is much weaker and morevulnerable. But its coalition witheither of two superpowers can

benefit far out of proportion to its realstatus. This benefit will be morewhich two great powers are incontention7 to each other. This provesthat the weak poles position in atriangular situation can be improvedgreatly through manipulations. Thiswas applicable in the case of Chinas

position in 60s and 70s, when theSoviet Union and United States weremuch more powerful.

When we apply this proposition tothe proposed triad [i.e. of Russia,China and India], India becomes theweakest pole. But its coalition, eitherwith China or Russia may make itpowerful enough to enjoy someleverage. Here Indias coalition withthe former [China] is least possible,whereas with later it has had verygood strategic relationship.Accordingto T. Caplow there is alsoa negative aspect of a weak power ofa triad the weak pole in a trianglethat contains two strong poles is notonly the most susceptible to theimpact of balance shift in the triangle,

but also able to benefit far out of

proportion to its real power throughtriangulation.8

Below are the various positions inwhich the weak pole may locate its



5/21


positions, [based on Sheldon Stryker

and George Psathas Pachisi triadicgame series of Caplows Type 3triad]. Following could be differentpositions. 9

First SeriesCondition: Any coalition allowedOutcome: Equal frequency of AB, BCand AC coalition.

Second SeriesCondition: A B ProhibitedOutcome: AC Coalition, two out ofthree times.

Third SeriesCondition: BC ProhibitedOutcome: AB and AC Coalitions

Fourth Series

Condition: AB and BC ProhibitedOutcome: AC coalition in every game

The Stryker-Psathas Gameexperiment, illustrates the relativestrength of each pole, especially theweakest pole. Its significance can beinfluenced by the triangular positioneach pole assumes. This is the conceptof a Pivot Power, which according toGerald Segal, is one that has the mostcooperative and least conflictiverelations with the other two membersof the triad and desires to retain it ifnot enhance its cooperativerelationship10 The tertius gaudens,,i.e., the most favourable possibleposition, in the triangle is notreserved only for the weak pole,

because any of the three poles canachieve this position. The veryconcept highlights the leverage ofmanipulation within the triangle.That is why each pole wants to

triangulate itself into a better positionand, whenever possible, tries to getand keep the leverage of the pivot,which is based on competitivewooing by the other two mutually


A

CB

A

CB

A

CB

A

CB


6/21


conflicting poles.11 This proposition

is more relevant and important for thestudy of triangular relationship ingeneral and weak poles position inparticular. This weak pole is moreimportant in the sense that itsposition is more unstable than rest ofthe two poles. Further, it helps tounderstand the China Cardargument that was advanced earlierwhich further helps in theunderstanding of strategic triangle of

three big powers China, Russia andUS and again how thisunderstanding will help tocomprehend the dynamics ofproposed strategic triangle of Russia,India and China.

Taking the clue from thisproposition it is important for theweak pole (here India) to protect itselfand assume the pivotal role in thetriangle. To achieve this objective itwill have to form a coalition witheither of the two poles. Thisformulation not only helps it, inturning unfavorable into thefavorable, but also enhances itspower equation. This strategicmaneuvering was exhibited byChina during the period 1944-1946.When the Communists took over

power in 1949 in China, Zhou Enlaiallegedly asked for US assistance sothat China could function as anintermediary between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union.12

Of course the geopolitical setting

was different compared to theprevailing situation today. However,the states should perform in a varietyof geographic and issue settings.13

External orientation of states isdetermined by several factors.Accordingly to K.J. Holsti, the moreactive a state is in international affairsthe more national role conceptions itspolicy makers will perceive.14 Thisnational role conception and other

factors affect triadic relationship andthus there is restricted strategictriangle. This pattern of restrictedstrategic triangle was visible duringthe 1960s in China.

The strategic triangle is aninherently restricted triangle, withthe degree of its restriction varyingin different situations. The morerestricted the strategic triangle is theless effective the triangulations andthe pivot leverage would be, and theless restricted the strategic triangleis, the more effective the triangul-ation and the pivot leverage would

be.15 So a countrys national roleconception and triangular roleconceptions vary from time to time.This changing role of a pole in thetriangle could be seen in the triad of

Soviet Union, the US and the Chinaduring the 1960s and 70s of the lastcentury. There are phases of sea-sawrelations among the three greatpowers.



7/21


8/21


A, is the weak pole of the triangle

occupied by India. Obviously Chinaand Russia occupying two other poles,i.e., B and C. Taking the help ofCaplows proposition, weak pole willenjoy maximum leverage if it makescoalition either with B or C. Differentcoalition propositions have beendiscussed earlier in this article. In thetriangle there is already very goodrelationship of India {[A] the weakpole) with Russia [B], the most

powerful pole of the triangle. Hereour focus will be on, Sino-Indianrelations (forming one of the threefronts [A-C] of the triangle).

Sino-Indian RelationsIn spite of immense potential for

growth their relationship has notdeveloped well. Indias faith inChina was shattered in 1962. Nehrusidealism could not match Maosrealism. Nehrus moral approach tosolve the problems facing thecountry and the world as a whole hadlittle meaning for Mao/Zhou.However, despite this hiatus in theapproaches, they have moved onsince the mid 1980s and contributeda lot to each other and to the world.There is immense possibility offurther improvement in theirrelationship. The proposed triangle(which was proposed by the formerpremier of Russia Primakov in 1999)of Russia-China-India would

certainly provide ideal platform to

both these countries to forge a viablerelationship.

The post liberation history ofChina-Indian relation has beenthat of friendship, setbacks andnormalization.18 India was thefirst country in the non-communist bloc to recognizeChina and establish diplomaticrelat ions in 1950. Both the

countries in their initial yearsrelationship expressed commonconcern and understanding onmajor international issues. Theytried to cooperate and coordinateon various diplomatic fronts.However, the relationship wascordial only between 1949-59;turned hostile thereafter until thewar in 1962 and has struggledever since to regain the earlierwarmth. The 1970s werecharacterized by a few falteringefforts to restore the relationship;the 1980s saw the establishmentof a regular inter-governmentalcontacts; these began to bear fruitin the 1990s in the form of confidence building measures(CBMs).19 However, despite thefact that there has been a surge in

economic relat ionship withbilateral trade expected to touch$60 billion by the end of 2010,there has been a s lump in

bi la te ra l rel at ion ship in rec en t



9/21


years with China looking at India-US relations more suspiciouslythan ever.

Sino-Indian relations took a majorforward step, when then IndianPrime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visitedChina in 1988. It was the first visit bythe head of government from Indiain three decades. Deng Xiaoping thethen Chairman of Chinas. CentralMilitary Commission in a meeting

with Rajiv Gandhi remarked, Let usforget the unpleasant phase in ourpast relations and do everything withan eye on the future.20 In mid-1989the Tiananmen Square incident tookplace, but India maintained a studiedsilence on the issue in regard torepression and human rights andfurther Indian reticence on Tibetimproved Sino-Indian relationship.The Chinese Premier Mr. Le Peng inresponse to Indias positive posturetowards China, during his visit toSouth Asian countries of Bangladesh,Nepal and Pakistan reisted frompassing anti-India remarks.21 The

Joint Working Group (JWG), whichwas formed during the visit of RajeevGandhi to China to solve the borderdisputes, has since then met severaltimes and worked rather smoothly.

On a return visit to India in 1991,Chinese Prime Minister Le Peng said,I consider his visit as a wise and boldstep, I profoundly cherish hismemories.22 The Peoples Daily

called the visit of Li Peng, a milestone

in the development of Sino-Indianrelations.23

Jiang Zemin, the then ChinesePresident who visited India in 1996remarked- though we still havesome outstanding problem leftoverfrom history but I can say for surethat our common interests far outweigh our differences as neither ofus poses a threat to the other.24

During his visit many agreementswere signed covering various issues,like - checking drug trafficking,efforts on confidence buildingmeasures (CBMS), improvingmaritime transport etc. But the mostsignificant part of the agreement wascontained in this agreement -neither side shall use its militarycapabilities against the other side.This was like a virtual no warpact.25 The post-cold war contextprovided the context for betterrelationship between the twocountries.

The two sides tried their best todispel negative perceptions abouteach other for almost two decades.Nothing demonstrated the seachange in their attitude more

dramatically than the then DefenceMinister, George Fernandes visit toChina and the red carpet treatmentaccorded to him. A far cry from April1998, when Mr. Fernandes became



10/21


the symbol of unfriendliness or fromMay that year when India justified,in letters to the U.S. and others, theconduct of nuclear tests because ofthe China factor. The approach theyadvocated thereafter was to de-emphasise differences and to stress and to build upon common viewsand positions generated throughconsultation mechanisms on

boundary, security, counter-terrorismand foreign policy planning and

other issues.26 The then ChineseVice-Premier Qian Qichen told thethen Indian foreign secretary K.Raghunath China and India canmake important contribution ingiving shape to a multi-polarsystem.27

Former Prime Minister Atal BehariVajpayees visit (22 to 27 June, 2003)promised to take bilateral relationsforward. It was noted that thesustained economic and socialdevelopment in the two countries,representing one third of humanityis vital for ensuring peace, stabilityand prosperity not only in Asia butalso in the whole world.28 Theirfriendship and cooperation meets theneed to29 :

promote the socio-economic

development and prosperity ofboth India and China;maintain peace and stabilityregionally and globally;strengthen multiplicity at the

international level; and

enhance the positive factors ofglobalization.

Exchanging greetings on theoccasion of the 50thanniversary of thePanchsheel, the then IndianPresident, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, thePrime Minister Manmohan Singh,and their Chinese counterparts, Hu

Jintao and Wen Jiabao, noted that thefive-point principles had promoted

aspirations in the two countries to co-exist and prosper in peace andharmony.30 Both reiterated theirstrong desire to strengthen bilateralties. India has ever since expressedits commitment to address alloutstanding issues with China infair, reasonable and mutually-acceptable manner while Beijingsaid putting aside differences formutual benefits was in the interest of

both countries.31 The then IndianPetroleum Minister Mani ShankarAiyar on the eve of his visit to China,had also expressed his optimism forfurther strengthening ties betweenthe two countries particularly in thefield of hydrocarbon sector.32 In thespirit of the China-India FriendshipYear, the two giant neighboursengaged each other intensively in

strategic dialogue.33

In themeetings of NSG on waiver on Inddiafollowing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal,China adopted creative diplomacyafter a phase of little bit uncertainty



11/21


and ambiguity, which suggested that

china wants to engage herself withIndia more positively and with anopen mind.34 However, since then(late 2008) China has upped its anteon India and has tried to provokeIndia on several occasions. It hasrevived its territorial claims onArunachal Pradesh (since 2006 buthas been more vocal since 2008) andeven gone to extent of granting visato people from Kashmir on stapled

visa (July 2010).35 This has triggereda major diplomatic row and clearlyindicating Chinas increasingsensitivity to Indo-US relations.However, the top leadership hasshown signs of maturity and areperhaps trying to normalize bilateralrelations in spite of such diplomaticreverses. On October 30, 2010, forexample, the two leaders met on thesidelines of the 13th ASEAN PlusThree Summit meeting in Hanoi andasked their officials to work theirway through all difficult issues.They also instructed their SpecialRepresentatives to address the borderissue with a sense of urgency. TheNational Security Advisor pointedlyreferred to the volume of top levelcommunication between the twocountries and said that it was their

10th meeting in six years where theytook a broad view of the strategicsignificance of India-China ties. TheChinese media also said that both thecountries were willing to work

together on major global issues36 to

protect the interests of developingnations including reforms of theinternational financial system,climate change, energy, food security,prevention of natural disasters andrelief efforts and counter-terrorism.37

India-China relations hold greatpromise, and beckon both to rise tothe challenges before them in arapidly evolving world situation.While the scope for competition and

cooperation exists side by side, thechoice, of whether to makecompetition or cooperation thedominant theme of India-Chinadiscourse, depends on the leadershipof the two countries. And as thingssuggest, it is too early to suggest thatsuch Chinese pinpricking wouldaggravate their relationsprogressively.

Sino-Russian RelationsIt is important to start this section with

a question: Do Sino-Russo relationswork as catalyst in the formulation ofRussia-India-China strategic triangle?Sino-Russian/Soviet relations arecharacterized by ups and downs. In1950 they signed the Treaty ofFriendship and had a honeymoonperiod for a decade. However, by thelate 1950s, the differences in nationalinterests and ideologies emerged,leading to serious disputes in the early1960s, which developed into acute



12/21


conflicts and border clashes in 1969.38

So during the 1960s, and till late 1970s,Soviet Union regarded China as one ofits main rivals and stationedapproximately one million troops andone-third of its SS-20 intermediaterange ballistic missile along the Sino-Soviet border, threatening to make asurgical first strike on Chinas nuclear

bases. In these circumstances Chinawas forced to improve its militarystrength. Such face-to-face military

threat between these two countriescreated lot of tension. But its futility wassoon realized by them and they startedthe process of normalizationimmediately after the end of the coldwar. Mikhail Gorbachevs historic visitto China in May 1989, symbolized theend of three decades of Sino-Sovietschism, normalized internationalrelations between the former USSR andChina and effectively restored party-to-party relations. Chinas calculativeand favourable response to Sovietovertures represented a shift in policyfrom strategic cooperation with the UStowards a posture of equidistance from

both the superpowers.39

Sino-Russian friendshipunderwent further changes in thenew emerging world order. The April

1997 summit meeting highlighted thedesire to demonstrate to theinternational community (primarilythe US) the correlation between thegeopolitical postures of the two

nations, as represented in the Joint

Declaration on a Multipolar Worldand the Emerging New InternationalOrder of 23 April 1997.40 In the 1997Joint declaration on multipolar worldand the formation of a newinternational order, then Russianpresident Boris Yeltsin and hisChinese counterpart Jiang Zeminannounced their commitment todevelop a partnership for thepurpose of strategic interaction in the

twenty-first century. The statementwas widely seen not only as achallenge to Americanhegemonism, but also asconfirmation of the qualitatively newrelationship that had emerged

between Moscow and Beijing afterthe end of the Cold War.41 Thenegative legacy of historicalirredentism, civilization prejudicesengagement and positive-sumcooperation, based on sharedpolitical, security and economicinterests.

The development of therelationship with China is arguablythe greatest Russian foreign policysuccess of the post-Soviet period.During the presidency of BorisYeltsin, when Russias international

status and influence were in declineon nearly all fronts, the strategicpartnership with Beijing representeda notable exception to the rule.42

Under Vladimir Putin the gains of the



13/21


1990s have been consolidated, and

there is genuine substance to theofficial claim that relations are at anall-time high,43 particularly after thesigning of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship andCooperation in July 2001. 44 Thepositives are evident across the

board. First, the two countries havenear-identical views regarding thedesired structure of the post-Cold Warinternational order. Both emphasised

the primacy of the UN in globaldecision-making and the precedenceof national sovereignty over Westernconceptions of humanitarianintervention and limitedsovereignty. They aspire for amultipolar world in which a fewgreat powers the United States,Russia, Western Europe, China, India,and Japan make the big decision.This vision is the modern-daysuccessor of the Concert of Europe inthe early nineteenth century, anddiametrically opposed to the unipolarorder associated with a hegemonicAmerica.

Moscow and Beijing also sharemany security interests and threatperceptions, from an attachment togeopolitical concepts such as spheres

of influence and the balance of powerto a common view of the post-9/11international security agenda.45 Theyhave adopted similar positions on thewar against terror, the non-

proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), andinternational conflict management inthe context of Iraq and also Iran.46

They are supportive of each otherssecurity concerns; while Moscow hasreciprocated Chinese efforts tosuppress separatism in Xinjiang andTibet and has given its unequivocalsupport to the One China policytowards Taiwan. Both of them have amajor stake in ensuring peace and

stability in the Korean peninsula.

The Sino-Russian rapprochementis basically a function of the changing

balance of power in world politics,enabling the two countries to act inparallel ways rather than as allies.Their efforts to develop a strategicpartnership seek to counter the USline of preserving a unipolarinternational system and seek theestablishment of multipolarity with

both countries playing the mostindependent roles possible. Theobjective action by China and Russiaare concurrent self-determination,independent influence and separate

bargaining positions rather than aclose military and political alliance47

So there is every possibility to foreseea friendly relationship between

Russia and China. However, there areareas where they do differ, andoverall Russias China policy alsosometime reflects largercontradictions and paradoxes in



14/21


Moscows approach to international

affairs, particularly seeing China asa threat.

India-Russia relationsIndia-Russia relationship has

always been special. Starting on alack-lustre note with Stalins policyof maintaining equidistance fromIndia and Pakistan, the former USSRchanged its policy towards Indiaduring the leadership ofKhrushchev (1953-64). Therelationship prospered significantlyduring the leadership of Brezhnev(1964-82). It became cold and frostyafter the break-up of the SovietUnion. But not before long, Russiarealised the importance of India inparticular [and Third World ingeneral]. In May 1992, the thenRussian State Secretary, GennadyBurbulis, in an interview on the eveof a visit to India was forced to acceptthat Russias relationship with Indiahad to be different from its relationswith other countries of the region andpreferred to describe them asrelations of spiritual pragmatism.48When Yevgeny Premakov wasappointed as the Prime Minister ofRussia, he also laid emphasis on hiscountrys multi-faceted ties withIndia. The Indo-Russian FriendshipTreaty of 1971 was renewed in 1998,when Russian President Boris Yeltsinvisited India. During his visit two

countries signed a new 20-year

Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.

49

Russian President Vladimir Putinsvisit to India October 2-5, 2000provided a great impetus to the

bilateral ties. This treaty covers awhole gamut of issues from economy,environment and terrorism to globalsecurity concerns.

The then Russian PresidentVladimir Putin during his visit to

India in December 2002 alsoreiterated Russian commitment to

boost the bilateral relat ions. Thestatement of Andrei Belyaninov,head of the Rosobo-ronexport StateCompany, which handles 90 per centof Russias arms export, alsoindicated the importance of strategicpartnership with India. He said thatIndia is, Russias sole strategicpartner in the region and we followour Presidents strict guidelines tohave no defense intervention withPakistan whatsoever.50 Jointproduction of Brahmos Missile andKundankulam Nuclear Projectsymbolise techno-strategiccooperation both countries areenjoying.51 So there remains theimmense possibility that Russian-Indian relations will go from strength

to strength in the years and decadesto come. This is more optimistic andalso realistic keeping in mind theinternational order which is comingup after the end of the cold war.



15/21


Trilateralism toTriangularity: Prospectsand Challenges

There are several factors that maypush these three countries towardstrilateral cooperation; there are atleast four, according to a Chinesescholar.52 All of them advocate amulti-polar world and theestablishment of just and fair newinternational order. Two, all the threecountries need to develop theireconomy and develop closeeconomic cooperation amongthemselves, because their economiesare complementary to one another.Three, Russia has a special positionamong the three and can play animportant role in convertingtrilateralism into triangularity, i.e., itis a traditional ally and partner ofIndia and also has close ties withChina. Four, the three countries havemade efforts to come together andcooperation among them, even if it isin its infancy now, has gained strongmomentum and is moving on rightdirection.

When Chinese President Hu Jintaovisited Russia in March 2007, he andhis Russian counterpart, VladimirPutin, in their joint declaration, calledfor expanding trilateral cooperationwith India as such interaction wouldenhance mutually beneficialeconomic cooperation among the

three nations, strengthen their

coordination in facing newchallenges and threats, especiallythat of international terrorism andcontribute to the cause of promotingpeace and stability in Asia andthroughout the world.53

After examining the potentialitiesand possibilities of cooperationamong the three players of thestrategic triangle, one finds that there

are a number of areas in whichcooperation is realistic and easy. Butthere are some bilateral issues whichcould throw a spanner into the processof triangle-formation. Moreover, theevolving US grand strategy to containand balance China may continue tocreate confusion in the minds of theleaders in these three countries andadd to the mutual suspicions despitetheir desire for cooperation andfriendship.

As strategic triangle consists ofthree poles, problems are required to

be seen on all the fronts which maycreate obstacles in the formation ofstrategic triangle. Indo-Russian frontis moving satisfactorily and is well-tested. It has stood the test of time.However, in recent years, especially

after the improvement in Indo-USrelationship and Indias bid todiversify its defence acquisitionprocess, there is a palpable strain inIndia-Russian relationship. Sino-



16/21


Russian front is manageable;

however, there is a history ofvicissitudes in their relationship dueto border disputes, ideological clash,fight for dominance etc. But the

biggest challenge could come fromthe mistrust prevailing on the Sino-Indian front. However efforts are onfrom both the sides to shed theprevious differences and moveforward to start a fresh beginning.The mutual suspicion between India

and China, Chinas aversion toalliances, their desire for a closeworking relationship with the USseparately, and the fact that Russiahas little to offer in tangible, materialterms to them beyond what theyalready receive, have impeded theformation of this triangle.54

ConclusionsHowever, these are only small

impediments in the broader politicaland strategic concerns all these threenations are having in the newemerging world order. Beijingconference during 16-17 June 2005and subsequent summit level andhigh level meetings of these threecountries have strengthened theconcept of trilateralism. There aresome of the recent developmentswhich have infused new hopes intothe process of the triangle-formation. They are together pushingfor a multi-polar world. India, China

and Russia have decided to expand

their cooperation on global issuesranging from combatinginternational terrorism and restoringstability in the volatile Af-Pak regionto climate change and reform.55

Moreover, Sino-Indian bilateralrelations have been there on theweaker side of the triangle. However,

both the countries have now agreedto strengthen bilateral relations andthis may provide a fillip to the

process as well. Their cooperativeapproach at the regional levelorganization like SCO [SanghaiCooperation Organisation] and BRIC[Brazil, Russia, India and China]have the potential to influence globalpolitical configuration too, hintingtowards growing confidence in thetrilateral cooperation of the three.

The purpose of the triangularity isto build a multi-polar world, a goalshared by all the three countries.They are also firm supporters of theFive Principles of PeacefulCoexistence. As Putin had saidearlier, the three countries are united

by their desire to resolve regionalproblems in a way acceptable to allsides. We therefore think that thereare good prospects for work together

in a trilateral format.56

They areunited in their thinking that, thestrengthening of trilateralcooperation does not imply anydiminution of national autonomy or



17/21


References

1. Dr. Subhash Kapila, Russia- India China Strategic Triangle

Contours Emerge: An Estimated Analysis , paper no.1424,presented at the Conference of South Asia Analysis Group on 21June 2005

2. Min Chen, A Critique of the Existing Triangular Literature, KoreaJournal of International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, (Summer 1989) pp.283-323.

3 Martin Wight, Systems of States(London: Leicester Press, 1977),p.174.

4 Lowell, Dittmer, The Strategic Triangle: A Elementary Game -

Theoretical Analysis, World Politics, vol. 33, no. 4, July 1981, pp.485-515

5 Theodore, Caplow, Further Development of a Theory of aCoalitions in the Triad, American Journal of Society, vol. 64, no. 3,March 1959, pp. 490-491

6 Min Chen, The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts; Lessonsfrom Indochina Wars, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder,1992).

7 George, S immel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans, ed. and

introd by Kurt H. Wolff, New York Press, 1950 , p.157.8 Min Chen, n. 2

9. Sheldon Stryker and George Psathas, Research on Coalitions in


of the national identity. On the

contrary, constructive interactionmust become a guarantee for the fulldevelopment of the most valuablequalities and genius of all threepeoples.57 Considering themagnitude of the resources [both-

human and material] involved in this

triangularity, it has the potential tosignificantly and dynamicallyinfluence the depth, direction anddimension of geo-politics and geo-strategy both at regional and globallevels.


18/21


the Triad: Findings Problems, and Strategy, Sociometry,

23 September, 1960, p-217-23010. Gerald Segel, The Great Power Triangle (London: Macmillan,

1982), p.6.

11. Min Chen, n. 2, p.5.

12 O.E. Clubb, The Far East in Foreign Relations of the United States,1949, vol. 8 (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1978), pp.357-359.

13 Min Chen, A Critique of the Existing Triangle Literature, KoreanJourna l of Internati onal Affa ir s, vol. 20 , no . 2, (S ummer 1989 ),

pp.283-323.

14 K.J. Holsti, National Role Conceptions in the Study of ForeignPolicy, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 3, September1970, pp. 233-309.

15 Min Chen, n.2., p. 7.

16. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London:Frank Press, 1981), p. 180.

17. Ibid, p. 129.

18. B.R. Deepak, India-China Relations in the First Half of the 20thCentury, (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation) , p. 16.

19. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of Indias ForeignPolicy (New Delhi: OUP, 1994), p. 65.

20. Quoted by Wang Hongyu, Present Sino-Indian Relation andProspects for Development, China and South Asian Relations inthe 1990 (Chengdu: Sichuan Peoples Publishing House, 1995),pp.131-32

21. Dietur Braun, Asian Power India: A New Equation, AussinPolitik, vol. 41 1990, p.179

22. Renmin Ribao, Peoples Daily, 12 December 1991.

23. Ibid, 17 December 1991.



19/21


24 The Times of India, 29 November 1996

25 The Times of India, 30 November 1996.

26 The Hindu, 16 June 2003, New Delhi

27 The Times of India, 28 April 1999.

28 The Hindu, 25 June 2003

29.Declaration on Principles for Relations and ComprehensiveCooperation Between India and China during Prime Minister AtalBehari Vajpayees to China in June 2003, Strategic Digest, vol. 33,no. 7, July 2003, IDSA, New Delhi, p. 543.

30 The Hindu, 28 June 2004.

31 Ibid.

32. The Hindu, 12 January, 2006

33 Frontline,February 24,vol.23, no.3,2006

34 Frontline, , vol.25, no.20 ,10 October 2008,

35 China started the practice of issuing the stapled visas sicne 2008to people from Arunachal Pradesh and the issue created a major

row in July 2010 when Beijing wanted to give such a visa to IndiasNorthern Area Commander Lt Gen BS Jaswal, who was supposed totravel to China for a high level defence exchange programme. Inresponse to the Chinese provocation, India suspended Lt Gen

Jaswal s travel and made it clear that such programmes would beon pause till China reverts to its earlier position on Jammu andKashmir.

36 The Hindu, 30 October 2010, at http://www.hindu.com/2010/10/30/stories/2010103063870100.htm

37 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/31/

c_13583574_4.htm

38 Chen Qimao, Sino-Russian relations after the break-up of theSoviet Union. in ed. Gennady Chufrin. Russia and Asia: The

http://www.hindu.com/2010/10/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/31/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/31/http://www.hindu.com/2010/10/


20/21


Emerging Security Agenda. SIPRI, OUP, 1999.

39 Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of Indias ForeignPolicy (New Delhi: OUP, 1994), p.65.

40 Yu Savenkov, Moscow and Peking Call for Friendship, Izvestiya,24 April 1997, p. 3.

41 Sherman W. Garnett, Limited partnership, in Sherman W.Garnett, ed., Rapprochement or rivalry? Russia-China Relations ina changing Asia (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2000), p.1.

42 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian Foreign

Policy (London and Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Blackwell, 2003), p.26.

43 Vladmir, Putin cited in China-Russia Closer Than Ever, BBCnews report, 27 May 2003, http://news.bbc.co/uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/2938618.stm.

44 Joint declaration of Putin and Hu Jintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003,http://www.In.mid.ru/ brp_4.nsf . and see also VladimirMyashikov, Strategic Interaction between Russia and China: A

basis for Development of Bi lateral Cooperation, China Report, vol.

38, Jan-March 2002 (For details see Rossikay gazette , 17 July 2001.45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Yuri V. Tsyganov,Russia and China: What is in the pipeline ed.Gennady Chufrin, Russia and Asia, the Emerging Security Agenda,SIPRI, OUP, 1999, p. 306.

48 National Herald, 6 May 1992, New Delhi.

49 Indo-Russian Relat ions, 10 Aug. 1998, URL.http/

www.indianembassy.ru/

50. Vladimir Radyuhin, Putin Will Bring Defence Package forIndia, The Hindu, 28 August 2002. New Delhi

http://news.bbc.co/uk/l/hi/world/http://www.in.mid.ru/http://www.indianembassy.ru/http://www.in.mid.ru/http://news.bbc.co/uk/l/hi/world/


21/21


51. Tatyana Sinitsyna , Kundankulam Nuclear Plant: Not Only A

Construction Site But Also A University , The Hindu, 7 June 2008,New Delhi.

52. K.K. Katyal , Beijing-Moscow- New Delhi Trialogue , The Hindu,22 September 2003, New Delhi.

53. Harsh V Pant, Russia, China and India: The strategic triangle,international relations and security network,ISN 19 April, 2007 alsoat http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/

54. Lionel Martin, Russia and India: A Strong Partnership or Waning

Friendship? Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 1 no. 129 November16, 2004 Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Middle East

55.The Times of India28 October, 2009

56. Douglas Rachel, Nuclear Power Tops Putins Agenda in IndiaEIR International ,9 February ,2009

57. K.K. Katyal , Beijing-Moscow- New Delhi Trialogue, The Hindu,22 September 2003, New Delhi.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/

rusia china india challanges

Documents