runway incursion severity categorization (risc) model
DESCRIPTION
Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model. Category A. Available Reaction Time. Evasive or Corrective Action. Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle. Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Presented to: International Civil Aviation Organization
By: LaGretta Bowser
Date: September 2005
Federal AviationAdministration
Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC)Model
2Federal AviationAdministration
Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Current FAA Runway Incursion Severity CategoriesOperational dimensions affecting runway incursion severity:
EnvironmentalConditions
Speed ofAircraft and/or
Vehicle
Proximity ofAircraft and/or
Vehicle
Increasing Severity
Category D
Little or no chance of
collision, but meets
the definition of a
runway incursion.
AvailableReaction
Time
Evasive orCorrective
Action
Category C
Separation decreases, but there is ample time and distance to avoid a potential collision.
Category B
Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision.
Category A
Separation decreases
and participants take
extreme action to
narrowly avoid a
collision, or the event
results in a collision.
3Federal AviationAdministration
Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Proposed Severity Categories• “A” = A very serious incident in which a collision
was narrowly avoided.
• “B” = An incident in which separation decreases and there is significant potential for collision, which may result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision.
• “C” = A minor incident characterized by ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision.
• “D” = Insufficient information, inconclusive or conflicting evidence precludes severity assessment
4Federal AviationAdministration
Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Background• The categorization of the severity of runway
incursions is a tool to help represent risk in the system.
• Risk = probability of an event x severity of the outcome
• In order to be defensible, ratings need to be valid and reliable.– Valid = an “A” is really an “A”– Reliable = an “A” is always an “A”
• Inter-rater: An “A” for Peter is an “A” for Paul• Over time: An “A” today is an “A” tomorrow
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Components of the Model
• A rating is assigned based on the closest proximity (CP) and the factors that contribute to the variability of that proximity (probability of a collision).– CP - both horizontal and vertical - is measured at the
end of the conflict OR the point at which all parties are aware of the situation and have the aircraft under control at taxi speed or less.
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Components of the Model (continued)
• Assumptions– Some scenarios are more serious at the same CP
than others (e.g, head-on is worse than tail-chase) – There are factors that increase the variability of the
response and resulting CP, for example:• Actions with short response time• Larger aircraft (more variable stopping distance)• Contaminated runways
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Benefits of the Model
• Rankings are reliable – same event will result in the same rating every time.– Reliable ratings are necessary to have confidence in
trends of system performance.
• Counts of types of scenarios (e.g., crossing in front of a takeoff, landovers) is automatic.
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
How the Model Works• Rater is asked a series of questions and
selects answers to classify the event as a scenario– For example, what was the aircraft doing? (taking
off, landing, taxiing, stopped)• If taking off, did the aircraft takeoff or abort takeoff?
– What did the other aircraft or vehicle do? (For example, crossed runway, crossed hold short line, etc)
• Rater enters additional information about the event into three categories: visibility, avoidance maneuver, human error.
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Information Selected by the Rater
• Ceiling and Visibility, RVR, Day/Night• Aircraft type• Types of human error – pilot error,
controller error, communication error• Avoidance maneuvers
(initiated/commanded)• Characteristics of avoidance maneuver (for
example, point at which go-around was initiated)
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Aircraft Type
• Aircraft Type = FAA weight categories– S = less than 12,500 lbs– S+ = 12,500 – 40, 999 lbs– L = 41,000 – 254,999– H = or greater than 255,000
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Avoidance Maneuver Categories
• Early rotation on takeoff (as reported by pilot)
• Aborted takeoff (reported distance rolled)• Swerve (reported or observed)• Hard/maximum braking (reported or
observed)• Go-around (point at which GAR was
initiated/commanded)
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Examples of Error Categories - (Degree of Control)
• Controller unaware of (or forgot about) aircraft or vehicle.
• Controller forgot runway was closed.• Controller misidentified aircraft and
issued instruction to wrong aircraft.• Pilot took off/landed on wrong runway.• Wrong aircraft accepted a clearance.
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Examples of Communication Factors• Total communication failure (e.g., stuck mike)• One or more party (e.g., vehicle) not on
frequency• Completely blocked transmission• Partially-blocked (stepped-on) transmission • Controller unable to contact aircraft • Pilot unable to contact controller
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
ExampleInput: • C-150 crossed hold short lines (but did not enter
runway) with another aircraft (C-150) taking off. • Aircraft taking off rotated normally after passing
through the intersection (no avoidance maneuver).
• Closest horizontal proximity = 100’ as aircraft passed through the intersection
• Visibility: 10 miles - day• Error: Pilot read back “hold short” instruction
correctly but then crossed the hold short lines.
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Example
• Output:– Rating = 1.0 = “D”
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Example of Most Common ScenariosN = 906
SITUATION OF CROSSING/POTENTIAL CROSSING IN FRONT OF A LANDING : 406 (44%)
Landing a/c went around 282 (70%) The taxiing aircraft crossed the hold-short line, and the landing aircraft went around. 93 The taxiing aircraft entered the runway, and the landing aircraft went around. 136 The taxiing aircraft crossed the runway, and the landing aircraft went around. 53
Landing a/c landed – touched down after intersection 13 The taxiing aircraft crossed the hold-short line, and the landing aircraft landed after the intersection. 7 The taxiing aircraft entered the runway, and the landing aircraft landed after the intersection. 3 The taxiing aircraft crossed the runway, and the landing aircraft landed after the intersection. 3
Landing a/c landed – touched down before intersection 111 The taxiing aircraft crossed the hold-short line, and the landing aircraft landed before the intersection. 35 The taxiing aircraft entered the runway, and the landing aircraft landed before the intersection. 29 The taxiing aircraft crossed the runway, and the landing aircraft landed before the intersection. 47
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Runway Incursion Severity Categorization (RISC) Model September 2005
Example of Most Common Scenarios (continued)N = 906
SITUATION OF CROSSING/POTENTIAL CROSSING IN FRONT OF A TAKEOFF : 242 (27%)
Aircraft took off – rotated before the intersection 112 The taxiing aircraft crossed the hold-short line, and the takeoff rotated before the intersection. 37 The taxiing aircraft entered the runway, and the takeoff rotated before the intersection. 33 The taxiing aircraft crossed the runway, and the takeoff rotated before the intersection. 42
Aircraft took off – rotated after the intersection 51 The taxiing aircraft crossed the hold-short line, and the takeoff rotated after the intersection. 17 The taxiing aircraft entered the runway, and the takeoff rotated after the intersection. 2 The taxiing aircraft crossed the runway, and the takeoff rotated after the intersection. 32
Aircraft aborted take off 78 (33%) The taxiing aircraft crossed the hold-short line, and the takeoff aborted. 36 The taxiing aircraft entered the runway, and the takeoff aborted. 42 The taxiing aircraft crossed the runway, and the takeoff aborted. 1