WORLD SOCIAL CHANGESeries Editor: Mark Selclcr"r

Penlous Passage: Mankind md the GlobaL Ascendntce of ti4rit.r/Amiya Kumar Bagchi

Water Fronaer: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mckr-'ng llcgiorr,

Edited by Nola Cooke and Li Thna

First Globalization: The Ewasion Excfutnge,

Geoffrey C. Gunn

Istanbul: Between the Global and the LocalEdited by Caglar Keyder

Origlns of the Modem Worll: A Global and Ecological N mratiue

Robert B. Marks

Le auing China : Me dia, Mobility, and'li ansnational ImagnationWanning Sun

Masters of Terror : Indonesia's MiLitary and Violence in East'lfmorEdited by Richarcl Thnter, f)esmond Ball, and Gerry van Klinken

Through the Prism of Slauery : Labor , Capital, and Worl'd EconomlDale W. Tomich

Poliacs and the Past: On RepaiingHistorical' Injustices

Edited by John Torpey

II()WMAN & LITTI,EFTEI.Dlrnr/rrtrtr r Ilrrrr[['r' . Ncu, Vrr/<

The Origins of the Modern \7orld

A Global ond Ecologcal I'larrative from the

Fifteenth to the Twenty-first Century

Second Edition

Roepnr B. Manr<s

PUBLISHERS, INC,. Toronto . Oxftvd

Preface

1of'r. r*l','r ll , 2001. Although the details of how and why nineteen hijackers',f t",rr t l S, tl.rncstic flights slammed them into the world Tiade center in+i. * \',

'r L rrrr,l t he Pentagon in washington, D.c., may never be known, the

* ri ilr! r,rr\('lrr()f()und issues about the nature of the world we live in, Ameri-i ,rrr .rr. nt'rrrt lrrrrg not just for answers to who is responsible for killing nearlyi r\\' t,r',l,lt', brrt f<rr how and why they could hate the United States that,,,,r. lr ( )'rrrrrr bin Laden, leader of al Qaeda, the organization that stands ac-, *,or ,l ,,t nrrsrt'rrninding and financing those acts, has evinced a deep hatredl,'r rlrr' nr,q11'111 world and a desire to resurrect a Muslim empire reminiscent.,1 rr r r rlllttlr (.(' l)tUry giory.

In tlrr' rlrt'heginning of the "clash of civilizations" that some have been;,,"tr, rrrrrll As rhis b..k will make clear, I think not. The reason is that thef,,rrrt r'l('rl('r)tsrf tlrcrnodernworldarenot"civilizations,"butfathernation-r{ rr, I .ur\1 lll,rlrrrl cirpitalism. To be sure, the modern West (the United States,,* l,r,l,',i) lrrs ht'.cfirccl irnmensely from a world organized along the lines of'.rl,trr rr;rrt'rrrrtl rntlrrstriirl capitalism, while others (including many in thel,l rrrr, rr.,rrl,l) llr'c not. Lftrw:rndwhythatparticularwayof organizingtheo,,rl.l ,,rr)(' l() be is thc subjcct of this book, although it was written beforerlr , \ { trl\ r '{ !i1'1r1q'11111c.r I l. Thrrs, I d<t not specifically address the attacks inrl,. l',',ir ,,1 rlrt' rt'xr, lrrrr I rkr bclicve my arguments are highly relevant to1,. l1 lrrl rrr 1,111,,' rlr,,st't,r,elrts into a broader historical context. At the end ofrlrr r.rrr lr.r,,rr I lr,,r'r'

'rlrl,,'rr..lc..l .. ,ftcrw<lrd where I reflect more on the

rr,rr{,,'t \r'l,r.rrrlrt'r'Ilrrrrtl lr.wllrcrrirrtcrial inthisbookhelpstoframeantrrt, rl,tt'l;tttr)il (rl \\'lt ll tlrt.y ttrigltt Irrctttt.

lrf , rlrt'nr,),1('nr rv.r ltl, rlrrs lr, ,,rk lrrrs itsorigirrs. Atthe lgg8pacificCen-'rrrlt t,'lll{r(l)(r',tl llrt Iltttvt'trit1,11 llrt'l':rtilit iriStotkton,(]llifrrlrrrir,scv-

r dk.

Wolto

"Ma

balan

lnls

1400

saga

world

that li

Marks

ment

" 6 Preface

eralofuswerediscussingoverlunchissuesthathadbeenraisedatthevlrlr'.panels. Among tno'" l?;;t'ffi;;e'Andre Gunder Frank and Kettt"

Po*.rur,r, t*o "hol#;;* ;;t work has profoundly influenced m( ' ' i

this book. Gunder f"*ttt"J't'e fact that it often takes decades for the t'

of new research " r"t:;;';;;;Jil scholars to students' and thought r 1'

it would be a great 'dJ;ffi;;;;t" i" 't"r'"

ir-'ese new ideas accessibl' '

witler audien.", .ott"g: ffi;;1h. .d.,.u."d public alike' I conctrrl

but quicklv put the ;'"i:IH ;;; u"n"'" i al"adv had anoth' ' '

search project ol *y agenoa' world history with colleag"'

Jf;*;'l$::;:'l$J:Tist"xf";;;;;o***'lhis1ews'iT:l't,ii:illxx:'y*:*""1*::T':tl"i+$ili#$H'#J,rwas still thinking about trrc quLJLrvr'" " - - . r a brief narrative of the t,' "

""a l".ta.a to spend a few months composrnl

of the modern world ftlt *t t" 'ftat

class' Those months became a yeirr'

;i*;:l':tt.rx$:'#:5-.unintrofuctjl).Y.t:.:ti:"I,"Jil'

.:Y::iiitriii:l:x"f :i*:i.:I*:n**;x'J;:+illdents taking an introductt?l'r::'i:]]i;;";,;,,the

history of the world," ir'ffi;;;:kgro""d k'-'owledge at all about "

ally includes " "ut'"'-tt "iti]iE "ontu"s-had done in the past five ht'r'l'

vears. The problem " 'n"t'tit" result of work by scholats like FranL

Pomeranz demands ";ild;"* "nnt""5a new narrative-one tl"

not centered o" f't"onJn*' naJntt"Aly' I have found in over two dec.'l'

reachins R, iu''' t'r'toiv" 1il1'?' : q;:l j'::

;' ::T;i: T'1*;#'t'l ]reaching Asian hrstort tl":.:'^i:"'^?;"" ;; th"v hurre a framework * r"

"**"t t" the first two weeks oi :htt

tl,'

which to ptace all the ""'" *utt'iul they are learning' That is what I th' " '

our students in world il;;;;;;J"cl too' and that is what I started to \\'1 r!'

narrative of the mnki'.ij"ii;il;;i **ra incorporating the results "r '

( and somewhat iconotl"'tic) scholarship'

The resulting b""b;;;;;' gt't'h'"t does not mean that it is easv t't

n,,*,i i;;;h"r'b':\'::;'lh;.X;ffi ili ffi ' Ji'il.;3'

lTTffi-Tt:i;:ir:-- ;+!* ::n*ru:H,lt"H:'f '[ ',

ink) on anything ""o t""t-ottt'ng' Rather' 'f

i' U""tt off"" 'o

readers tl "

rative of the origins J:;:'#il;;il'hut t huu" put together rtrr rr

and that I present to my students' - ,--1mense debts of gratitude t" '

That does not mean that I do not owe lm

people from whom I ;;;;i;*""cl' and c.ntinue to learn' I have alrea'li '

INTRODUCTION

The Rise of the 'V7est?

July 20-22, 2001; Genoa, kaly. Leaders of the major industrial countries inthe world-known as the Group of Seven, or G7-met in July 2001 in thisMediterranean seaport city to discuss the world economy. The G7 stated that"sustained economic growth worldwide requires a renewed commitment to

[elobal] free trade. . . . Opening markets globally and strengthening the WorldTiade Organization (\7TO) as the bedrock of multilateral trading is . . . an

economic imperative."' The G7 meeting, like the 1999 WTO meeting inSeattle, attracted thousands of people opposed to both the meeting and its

objectives. Indeed, during those three days in July, 100,000 protestors against

"globalization" came to Genoa, most to hold countermeetings to point outinequities in the global economy, but thousands also marched, considerable

numbers trashed stores and sparred with police, hundreds were arrested, and

one was killed.'We start this brief history of the origins of the modern world with a recent

event because the G7 meetings-which have been going on for the past

twenty-five years and will continue into the foreseeable future-reveal muchabout the nature of the world we live in and raise some very interesting his-torical questions about how our globalized world came to be the way it is. Letus take first the description of the G7 as "major industrialized countries." Thisstatement points to the fact that the world today is composed of soverergn po-

litical units called "countries," and that those G7 countries are industrialized.Indeed, the G7 countries account for two-thirds of all the world's economicoutput and wealth. By implication, the rest of the world is poorer and less, ifat all, industrialized. The world is thus dlvlded between those parts that are

industrialized and those that are not or are trying to become industrialized.Whcn 1",lrcctl in a broird historicirl c()ntext, this G7 fact is exceptionally

-

llt(11,,(rltll,rl ,r,1tll,

ll()l|lr r i r l

ollll, r, I ri r ,,',ll\llll(),twoothef COUn-

The Rise of the West? 0 j

The Rise of the West

i lrc concept of the rise of the west provides both a rationale and a storyline

rlrrrt purports to explain not just the modern world' but why it is defined by

1,' i,,,arily European features, The idea behind it is fairly simple and began to

, ,rl.rg" ,ho.tly uft., the Spanish conquest of the Americas' during the italian

li(.'.issance of the sixteer-rth ..r-tt.r.y. Europeans were quite astounded to see

l',rrr..lrcds of Spanish conquistadors vanquish huge and very wealthy Ameri-

\ ;rlr civilizations, in partic.rlu. th. Aztecs and the Incas. Being ignorant of the

i:r'iln theory of diseases and the cause of the "Great Dying" in Mexico' where

,,,,,r1y 90 percent of the central Mexican population of thirty million suc'

, ',,rrl',".1

to Errropean cliseases such as smallpox and influenza' Europeans first

,rrrribured their superiority to their christian religion. Later, during the En-

lrrll)tcnment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they attributed

rlrt.rr superiority to a Greek heritage of secular, rationalistic, and scientific

r lr,,rrght,Irl the late 1?00s this storyline continues: both the Industrial Revolution

,rn\l the French Revolution of 1789 reinforced the awareness in European

rrrirrtls not just that Europeans were different from the rest of the world, but also

r lr:rr European, r... "p-gressing" rapiilly while the rest of the world appeared

r,,lrc stajnating, that Euiopeans were somehow exceptional-better' even-

rl'r. rhe fest. Nineteenth-century European historians, impressed with what

rrrrrny consiclered to be the universal appeal of the ideals of the French Revolu'

tt\\t\-egalit€, Iibert6., fraternitd (eqttaliiy, liberty' and brotherhood)-looked

1,,,,.k ro the ancient Greeks, their institutions of democracy and republics, and

rlrr.ir r.arionalistic bent toward understanding the natural world in_scientific,

r)()r fcligious,terms. Inthisearlytellingof the"riseof thewest,"thestoryis

s.rrrcwl-rat like a relay race, with the ideas of democracy that arose in Greece

l,rrrsctl off to the Romans, who droppecl the baton (the fall of the Roman Em-

1,i,.. fi,ll,,wed by the so-called Du,p.Ages), but Christianity was then on the

\( (.nc r() pick it up and run with it, creating a distinctive European culture dur-

i,,s lctr.lal times. The ancient Greek heritage was rediscovered in the Renais'

,'rrrcc ("renewal"), elaborated during the Enlightenment' and ultimately

lilllillccl in the French and American revolutions and "the rise of the \yest'"

lltl.rcWestwas..rising,,duringtheeighteenthcenturyduringthenineteenthirs rrsccr.rr was completi. ar tt.lrrd.rrtri"l Revolution of the late eighteenth

,rrr,l errr.ly nineteenth centuries was just beginning, the classical British political

r.( ()l.r()lnisrs-Aclarn Smith, Tlr,,-u, Malthus, and l)avid Ricard<>-developed

Irrr,rllrcr.slfiil)\l l() hc wovcn into the story of the rise of the lVest: the ideas of

,,rr,ilrrlrrt ,1,.r,.1,,1,rr(.rrl irs"l.r,rgr-css,"tl'rcWcstns"progrcssive,"AndAsia(andby

rr 1 ,,1 rlrt' w<trld's economic,l ;rr'r 100 years, the worldr.,r,,, lr..'ltl rnost of the eco-

, . ' ,, . rr), I Jirl)ln. The first ques-

,, l, r,. lr,,r r \.,rrrtl European-styleI'i., ,1,.r',.l,rpcd agrarian em-

,,,,,r1,1'r1,,, ,1,'.rrrlr;rr,il ilnything,todo,1 1 , r"'. r' i,. ' ,, lrl,, 1,,,)t( \t l)ill'tsOf theWOfld,

rrL , tl Lr, : r r trr ", I I rrrr '\nl('li(lr. Like industry,\\ , r, ,r ,l, rrr I rrL, r rl', rl 1,,, ,, lrrrs ltltpeared withinll,'11 ,11,,ltrl'i lr:,, I rrr ,,t rl,, rr,,rl,l rrrr,l itspeoplehavet| 111,'(J,il11' l,('\( |l\ r '1.,, .il1 illl|otttrnt question ad-

lltt t;ttt:l iotr ll rtlr, tlr, r '',rr, l,rrt rrl llrt'worldgotrich

rr)llllllli

1,rr,lrl,\ r ( L ,ll

lllr('lll llr(

lltt l:rttt t

Il:tll(rll ',1

tltt'1r:rsl

lli., llr,l1)1) 1 t., rl..

llCCn .,)ll\lt lrtr( \I

clrcssc,l ltctt , :rr isonly at tltc t'xltcttsc ol 0tltt ts l)( ( ()lilillt: lr( ){ )r( l

Third, iDdustry htrs conlr'r|t'tl gr-t'lrt l)()\\( l ('rr llrr ( i'r roUrrtriesr so great

thattheirleaderscanmeettoscttl'rcr-rrlt'sl,,r lr,,u rlr, urrrlrlttont)myworks.Of course, this is one of the prirne cirlrscs ol llrt l'r,rtr':l: rugrrirrst the G7, the\7TO, and other financial institutions (such ls tlrt' Irrtcrrrrrional MonetaryFund [IMF]). Protestors are in effect asking, "How c,rrrrt'y()u gct to decide therules?" and demanding that other global arrangelnenls bc rrrr.lc.t Nonethe-less, the leaders of the industrial world do make the rules, tr p()wcr that is ex-ercised in part to ensure the continuing wealth and power of theindustrialized world. Altl-rough this power is exercised mostly through global

trade and financial institutions such as the WTO and the IME it is backed bysubstantial military power, sometimes wielded unilaterally by G7 nations(such as the United States) but also by alliances such as the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). When placed in a global historical perspec-

tive, this power is exceptionally interesting, for Westerners have not had thispower for very long.

Thus, to understand our world we have to understand not just how nation-states ("countries" in the G7 statement) and industry came to shape the mod-ern world, but how and why those European ways of organizing the worldciune to dominate the globe. Explanations abound, but for most of the past

two centuries, the predominant explanation in the \il/est, the United States

incluclccl, h:rs been "the rise of the West." As we will see, recent research has

slrowrr thirt that cxplanation is no krnger persuasive, but because it is probablytlrt'ont'rn()sl fel(lcfs nlry l-,c funiliur with, I will takc some timc cxploring itirr(l I)oir)lrn! orrl its lllrrvs.

r , .trr r r,ll rtrrr \rrr, l(,r, lrrr,) ;rs"lrtrtkwtrt'tl"andttdespotic."ToI r ,,. rr rlr, .. rrrrrr ., ,,1 tlr,. Wt,st rrrr..l tlrc flaws of the East-

: ,,,! ,i, l,r , l,t, ll r, I t,,rl',.( it,.,,1,s, l,rrr crglrteenth-centuryEuro-g, ,r, l, ' | 1,, r, rrr,1 r, , I r'.,r1' rl. rr,.rlrlr,rrr,l!'r)\'('ntlrr)cc of Asiancountries,, 1,,rrll, r lrrrir \ rl,, I r,, ,,t i",rr, ,rnt( ,lr,rrrrlr'll(cclcr:ttedinnineteenth-{ | rrtrr\ I ,rr,,1,, , \\lrll( lrr, lr,,l \.1,r \\,r. ut lrrtr.lllitl ,lt'.'linc, analystslikeSmith,'r,,1 \1,,ltlrrr', l,, rl,rn to r( \{'rt I',,r \ t{ \\ ,,l f lrr'\\"t.:t ;rt rlytlttniC, fOfWafd lOOking,

lrr()l!( \\l\'(, irl)\l lr( (,;rtr,l \'.r.r .t, .l,r1,rl,rlr|,, lj.lr l.r|trtil, lrrrtl despotic.l:r'r'rr KrrrllVlrrrx rrrr,l lrr,,irr, l, lr'r', 1., rlrr rrrost l)()wcrfillcriticsof thenew

cir|it:rlist wolltl ,,r',lt'r, l,, lr, r,,l tlr;rt rrrrrt.tr.r.nll) (('lllrlry European expan-sittnistn w:ls [)riltgitl[ "],',,lil, rr" ll llrt'tt:t ,,1 llrt rr',,r1,1. As fheywrote inTheCommunist Manrf c.s to, Ir r I r I r sl r t'r I r r r I,'i4,'i :

The [European] boLrrgcoistt,lry tlrc rrrltitl ittt|1o1,1'11',,,' ,,1 ;rll instrutnentsof produc-

tion, by the immense ly llcilit:rtt'ri tttc:lns ol c,rnrrr)rn) i( irl i( rr), ,lr;rws all, even the most

backward, nations into civilizltion. Thc chcr1, pr itt.s ol its touunodities are theheavy artillery with which it battcrs clowr-r all ( llrint'sc s,rrlls, wir lr which it forces theunderdeveloped nations' intensely obstinate Irllrcti ol lirrcigrrcrs to capitulate. Itcompels all nations, on pain of extinction, to :rtlopt thc boLrrgcois rnode of produc-tion; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilizatiorr into the ir midst, r.e., tobecome bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world in its own image.r

Of more importance for lTestern conceprualizations of their own historythough, has been Max Weber, a German sociologist who wrote around theturn of the twentieth century. lVhere Weber shared with Marx a fascinarionwith explaining how and why capitalism developed in Europe-and only Eu-rope-\7eber parted with Marx in his explanarion. Instead of focusing as

Marx had on "materialist" explanations, \7eber looked to those aspects of\il/estern values and culture, in particular the rationalism and work ethic thathe associated with Protestantism, as being crucial ro rhe rise of capitalism.But rather than basing his ideas about the rise of the West solely on studies ofthe West, Weber actually investigated Chinese and Indian societies, com-pared them with Europe, and concluded that those two socieries at least, andby implication all otl,rer non-European societies, lacked the cultural valuesnecessary for capitalism. Nonetheless, they too could "modernize," Weberthought, but only by going through a painful process of cultural change, get-ting rid of their cultural "obstacles" to capitalist development.

"The Gap" and Its ExplanationsSince the mid-nineteenth century then, European social theorists have beenawarc of a growing gap between the industrialized countries and the rest of

The Rise of the West? 0 5

tlrc world. Believing both that westem Europeans-and they alone-had un-

l, 't

kcd the secret of modemization,a and that others too could learn, twentieth-r ('r)tury followers of Smith, Marx, and Weber have propounded a "diffusionist"r lrcory of how world history has unfolded. Europeans found out how to get richlirsr by industrializing, Japan and a few other places learned from the Euro-

l)('irns and have caught up, and eventually every other place on the globe willr()(), as long as they identify and eliminate the local institutions and culturaltrrrits that prevent them from becoming modem.

Viewed now from the beginning of the twenty-first century, these ideas ap-

I)('irr to be quite unconvincing, particularly in light of the fact that the gap be-

rwcen the wealthiest and poorest parts of the world continues to groq notslrrink, as "diffusionist" theory would have us believe. However, the fact thatrhcse eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European theorists-Smith,Mirlthus, Ricardo, Marx, and Weber-all accepted the idea of European ex-( cptionalism and sought, as one of their primary intellectual goals, to explainit, is important. These men were the founders of modern social science the-r rry, arid in the twentieth century virtually all of the social sciences, in partic-rrllir sociology and economics, have incorporated the idea of European

cxceptionalism into their basic assumptions. As historians sought to become

nrore "scientific" in the twentieth century by adopting and adapting the in-sights of this social science to historical inquiry, they too became captivatedby the search for the origins and causes of European exceptionalism. But as

rvc will see, Europeans were not exceptional, and one of the most important

lx)ints about the history of the world until about 1800 is the general compa-

rrrbility of Asia with Europe. Nevertheless, the search for answers to "why"Iitrropeans were perceived as exceptional and hence ultimately superior con-

rinues among historians today, even though many now think it is the wrongrltrestion to be asking.

In the post-World War II era, this search has produced an impressive body

,,f scholarship looking for the key to what one economic historian has called"the European miracle."5 These scholars begin with what they see as the factof the rise of the lVest, but propose differing solutions to the questions ofwl-ren and why the "rise" or the "miracle" began. The question of "when" willl'rc c{iscussed first, since in many ways it is relevant to considerations of "why."

Adam Smith saw 1497 and 1498 (the voyages of Columbus to the Americas

rurcl of Vasco da Gama around Africa to India respectively) as the most signifi-crnt events in history. As Smith wrote in TheWealth of Nations (1776): "The,liscovcry of America, and that of the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of( iootl Ilopc, lrr.thc tw() greatesr events recorded in the history of mankind."N,liu\, l(x),::rri llrt'st'lw() (llltcs lrs cnrcial, as hirve several twentieth-century

O

(' O lttr 1"

stlr,'l;rrr\\.11.111"rr r'J, r i',, lL,lrl(,\lt,rlrcsubsequentEu-Io|1';111 (.l.nt rit.rr I r , ,, I , ,l,,trtr.\ in tlte AmeficaS andAsilt rts t1rt 1,11111 r\ , .. I l,r r : ' r. :r I rlr, \\',.:1. Many non-Marxistsh:lvcc,,ltll'rl,,ltl,, r,l, rrl'rr I r 1 ,,, ,rlr ,,1 tlrt,t.xplctitationofoth.ers,"ADir)tonvr'rrtrrr .rrrir''I, Ir, ' lrrr, rrr,lrrrrtt.:rrl haveturnedtheirattentiolt to llrost ir\1,( r r ,'1 I rrr l, r, r r,,r, rlrrr I'rr.rlrtt.lttropeancolonial-ism, beginnirrg u'itlr tlr( rl,rr rr , rr l1 , r I rl,, ',,.rr W,,r.lrl.

To avoid thc pos:il,l, { rnl,.rr r r,! rrr,r,rrl rrr', tlrt' risc oftheWesttoitS COlOnial Vel)tttr('s, iln\l rr,,t rr rrrll r, r,r ltr( ., lll( lr 1,ost WOrld Waf IIscholarshiponthcoligirr:,,1 llr, ',, ,,t rl,, \\, r1,,,., l,,,,kt.tl fartherbackinEuropean histrtry, irr s,rrrt. (,r..( . ,r | ,r I r, l r rl,, Nl itltllc Ages in theeleventh and twelfth ce llluli(.\, (,r \, I r rrlr, r r,, llrt. ,urr it,nt Greeks, for fac-torsthatcouldonlyhctttrlilrrrt,.,l t,,111,,,1'( ,i\\rr(.\(r.lrli,,rrlrl development.Factorsthathavebeen irlcrrtilir',1, rrr ,,l,lrrr,'rr r,,rlr, r rrlrrrrrl valuesdiscussedby Weber, include envirorrrrrt'rrt;rl .rrt.., (rt rrr1,,,r rlr. t lrrrr:rlcs promote hardwork, or poor soils stimrrllrtc rrgr ir rrlr,rr,rl rr'r1,,\,rtr,'rr), tt.c.lrrltlogical ones(plows,stirrups,orreadingglrrssr.s), 1,,,lirr,,rl r,,rlrr,,rr,,rr,..(lgrrdalismleadingtoabsolutemonarchsandthcnnlrti()r) \l;rl(.\irrr(irlr,.,.r,,rlvirrgtechnologyofwar), demographic ones (smali firnrilit's I)r( )nr, )l( t ;r1,11111 rr,.t.rrrnulation), andin the minds of several historians, courlrinrrri.rrs rrl ;rll ,,r s,,nre 6f these.i

The implication of this body ctf scholrrrslrrl, rs tlr;rr l rrr,,1,t'lx)ssessed someunique characteristics that allowed it-rrnrl orrly rr ro rr11y,i",',-rir. first, andhence gave it the moral auth.rity and tlrc p()r,('r l(),lillrrsc "modernity"around the globe where cultural, political, ()r cc()r)()n)i( ",,l.,stircles" preventedmodern development from occurring inrligc.,rrrsly. I Ir.rrt t', this storyline pur-ports to explain, justify, and defend thc risc,f rlre Wcsr ro gkrbal domrnance.Just how wrongheaded this theory is will bcconre t'lt'rrrcl irs the industrial su-periorityof much of Asia to that of Errrol.rc, rrr lc'lsr l)ri()r to about 1750, is re-vealed in the course of this book.

Before turning to the question .f why all this rnilrrers, let me first say a Gwwords about geographic units used in this bo.k. In the paragraph above, I men-tioned a comparison between "Asia" and "Europe," implying both that theseunits are comparable, and that they have some kind of unity that distinguisheseach one from the other. That assumption is problematic, mostly for Asia, be-cause of the immense variety of societies it includes, ranging from China andJapan in East Asia, through the nomadic peoples of central Asia, to India inthe south, and the Muslim lvest Asia (Mlddle East). Even Europe has little co-herence if it is taken to include everything from Portugal to Russia. Moreover,until very late in our story (at least until 1850 or so), Asia contained abour rwo-thirtls .f thc world's population and was larger than Europe in virtually every rc-

The Rise of the Westl 6 7

.1,t , t. Tir that extent, Europe and Asia were not comparable. Furthermore, one

' 'l t lrc uxrst important points I make in this book is that underscanding the ori-r ,r I r: ( )f the modern world requires taking a global view, first of how the vast con-

trrr..'rrt of Eurasia, coupled with Africa, interrelated, and then after 1500, howtlr,' Ncw \Uorld fit into the story. Finally, even the geographic terms "China,""Irr,lia," and "England" or "France" conceal much variation within their bor-,l,'rs -{ifferent peoples, many languages or dialects, and vast differences in,r, ,rlth and power. Nevertheless, I will use these geographic terms to begin lo-, ,rting the story but readers should be aware that generalizations based on large

r'(()graphic units will not be true at all times and places within the places

",,nrcd, and that in reality what was truly comparable occurred in parcs of

t l r ina, parts of England or the Netherlands, and parts of India.l{caders may be wondering why the issue of the rise of the West matters.

lrr,lecd, why even study history? The brief response is because our under-''trrrrtlings of the past-who we are, where we came from, why we are here-rrrlorrn our definitions of who we are in the present and have realrrrrplications and applicability for actions taken by us or in our name to shape

t I r t' future. The ideas developed by the story of the rise of the West to explaint lrt' nature of the world we live in, especially the values of marketplace capi-rrrlisrn and democratic institutions, are thought to have originated uniquelyrlithin Western civilization, yet to have universal applicability-to be"l',,od," not just for the West, but for everybody. Following that assumption,tlrt' solution to virtually all problems in the world today, at least according totl.S. and European political leaders (e.g., the G7), is the adoption of free

rrrrrkets.s Thus, to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the com-urrrnist leaders of China, to the leaders of Mexico, Nigeria, and Indonesia,lTcstern leaders have said that the answer to any and all problems they face

is "More democracy and free markets." The idea is that the institutions andvrrlrres that supposedly propelled the rise of the West are universal, and can-irrrlccd, must-be adopted throughout the world. That is a political agenda.

But what if this way of looking at the making of the modern world-ther isc of the West and the spread of its system on the basis of its supposed cul-trrrirl superiority to the rest of the world-is wrong? That is the possibilityrrriscd by a new body of scholarship, especially over the past twenty years.

No longer do all historians picture the world as merely a continuation ofunivcrsal and necessary trends that began centuries ago in Europe. Whatnriury are seeing instead is a world in which population, industry, and agricul-trrr;rl productivity were centered in Asia until 1750 or 1800. The Europeanrr',rr.ltl ol irrrlrrst rirrl cll.rit:rlism and nation*states is thus both quite recent and,tt,'r','ttll lr,t Irrrtt l,,ttg, 1lt,t,,*1t, rcmltins tfiebigqttestion of long-standing

5 O I.rr,,,lrr,rr,,r,

ltistoritlrl lr('nrl lr\.oll)1i \.r r l,rr,,l , rr rr.r\ l,.rr,. 1,;111111,11 apictureof theriscol tlicwt'sr ovi'r tlrr.r,rrr'rrrrr,,rr, r,rrr rlr, r,rrr(.lrl\,,r Asiitnstrengthandec()n()rlricvitlrlityllt'rrt1,1111rrrr,rt! l,,,rr rl,r,,rrr,lrrrrrr(.;rjrilin.Artistscallthisconcept()f ()hcr)lrintir)!r .1,,,1',;11,', rlrr,,rrllr rr,,1r,1l;rr l)irilltirlgorpartsof itpentimentct. As tltis lrt,,,li irrl,,rrrir r,, .lrL,\\, tlrr. 1r,,r(.\\,(. l,r'k irttheworldandits past thrttr-rgh il ncw liul)1, tlr,. 1,1, trrrr.,, 1,,111r1r,,1 ,r (rr' .lir)6s by the rise ofthe West will revcrl lrnollrt.r, rn(l tirtlrr,r ,lrll,.r,,rl l)irn(.I.n, trnclerlying. To seeit, though, we will havc lo lrt'girr rlr,.,i,lurr1 .r11 l,;r(,r (.r)lrir.'crspectives.e

Euroct'nl risrrr

One critic has said that the itlca tlrrrt "tlrt'Wr.sr lrrr s.rrrr..urlique historicaladvantage, some special quality 01 rltt.t.,,r....rrllult.oJ q.111,j11yltmcnt or mind orspirit, which gave this human c()lnllrur)ily r l)(.n1i1r(,r)t ssl)criority over allother communities" is a myth-the niytlr .r l:rrr..t.t,rrrr-isur.,,, Another hasseen Eurocentrism as an ideorogy, ()r ii (rist()ft i.rr.f rr)r,tr-.th, used by theWest to mask its global dominance," ancl still rrn.thcr tlccurs it a ,,theoreticalmodel," one explanation among several f.r h.w thc w.rltr w.rks.,2 In this sec-tion, we will examine two aspects of what critics call Eur.ccntrisrn: first, whatit is; and second, the extent to which it can be seen as ."..,r'r*, u -uth, an ide-ology, a theory, or a masrer narratlve.

The essence of Eurocentrism, according to the critics, is not merely that itviews history from a European point of ,ul.w (th. ,,centrism,, purrj_i, i, .ro,jLrst one of many ethnocentric views of the worrd. A merery.rh.ro."r-rrri. p".-spective recognizes that there are many different peoples and cultures in theworld, but that mine is better becau-se it arises from my people

"rrd .ult,r...They are mine, better, and not yours. Eurocentrism also emphasizes the supe-ri.rity of \il/estem culture-all that is good, progressive, and innovative starts..ly in Europe-but it also sees th"t pu.k"g.

"s h"rrrng universal applicabir-

rty: it is not peculiar and limited to Europe, but has ,pr"."d to ".r.o-p"r, th"globe by the twentieth century.

oring a bit deeper, critics say, Eurocentric views of the world see Europe aslr.r.g thc only active thaper

of worrd history, its "fountainhead,, if you wilr.l:rrrtpc.cts; the rest of the world responds. Europe has,,agency,,; the..rt oftlrc'"vorld is passive. Europe makes hirto.y; the rest of the world has none un-t rl it is lrr.trgl'rt int. contact with Europe. Europe is the center; the rest of the

:1.'' j'l 'l

its pcripherv. Europeans alone are capable of initiating lhu.,*. o.rur,,lr.r'lu:lrlion; thc rcst <tf the world is not.( )11 ;1 111'q'n1'1. 1t'vc'l yct, ,cc.rcring to critics, Eurocentrism is not just a belief

r ' r lrr rr'rrr ( )r' r)r(' ('rrr srr't'1i1r1i1y .f Europe, but is "a matter of . . . schorar-

The Rise of the West? S 9

'.1rr1''"' (i.e., of established "fact"). It is not a "bias," but a way of establishingrr lr;rr is true and what is false. To that extent, Eurocentrism is a way of know-rnrl tlrrrt establishes the criteria for what its practitioners deem to be "theLri ts." It ls thus apcvadigm, a set of assumptions about how the world works,tlr;rr generates questions that can then be answered by ferreting out "thel.r, ls."l4

l;inally, Eurocentric ideas about the world and how it came to be the wayrr rs ure deeply held by Americans. lndeed, American history is often pre-rt'rrtcd as the pinnacle, the purest and best expression, of Western civiliza-tron. pLl..t.an and even world history are most often presented from a

lrurocentric point of view, whether or not students or faculty recognize it.Mostly, it is assumed to be "true." The situation is like that faced by Keanul{ccves in the movie The Mauix, or Jim Carrey in The Truman Shoql. Those()r) the inside really do not have an independent way of knowing whethertlrcy are inside a matrix or an encapsulated TV stage unless they can get al,,ok at it from the outside. Collecting more facts would not suffice, since allt hc facts on the inside tend to confirm the reality, the truth, of the matrix oneis in. Some facts that are collected might not fit, but mostly those are simply,liscarded or ignored as being 2n663less-accidents, if you will. The same is

lruc of Eurocentrism. If Eurocentric ideas, if the rise of the !7est, are wrong,lrow would we know it? The way to know is by getting outside of that way oft'xplaining how the world came to be the way it is and thinking about otherways of understanding the big changes that have shaped our world.

Readers may sense a paradox here. On the one hand, I started by pointingor-rt that key features of the modern world are European in origin, and that Ithink an historical approach can explain how and why industry the nation-state, and the gap between the wealthy and the poor define our world. On theother hand, I have just rejected the usual Eurocentric explanations of the ori-gins of the modern world. How can there be a non-Eurocentric explanationof a world that has European featuresl In short, we can do that by broadeningthe storyline to include parts of the world that have thus far been excluded oroverlooked-we can begin and end the story elsewhere.'5 'When we do that,we will see that only a new, global storyline-one not centered on Europe-will suffice to explain the origins of the modern world.

Stories and Historical Narratives

For historians, constructing a narrative-a story with a beginning, a middle,rrr.rtl an cnd is ccntral to how we know what we know, how we determineu,lrrrt rsrrrrr':rl,.rrr rlrt'|lrst.rt'ThcriseoftheV7estisastory-tobesure,astory

lr' 0

,,1 ',,,,,,oltrrl lltt\(trtrrrr rl,rr 1r I , rr,rrrl,,t s(,lectingwhatis

.1ll(l \\'l),tl t\ t)ill. t,lr.,,,rrrt t, tl | | .r Lr l, , , ti,, ||11. 1yf the WeSt in-It'f11'r ,,, tlrt.r'tlr,r irr..t,,rr, ,l , l,,l r l,rl ri,, r,rr ril 1.,1,,,r.t., it is more thanjtrstlrrt.tlrt'rSl.1r, 111 rl,r.rtr\,, rt I r ,rr r, I rir, rrir,. ,,.rtlflll)dschemafor()rgallizillgllr. itrlt.rl,r(,l,tt()rr

',,lrrrrlrr, , tl, I r., rrr.t.|illgStOfieSabo'torigit'rs," us Itislolirrrrs,,\1,g,1,.;,r, I lrrrrt rrr.i I r, | 1 rir rl

Sothc()lllywilylolll'1..,trrl(.tltlr, rr , ,,1 rlr, \\, I r..\\r()t.rgist()constructanalternativclt:lrfltiv,t',rl lr,,s tlr,.rr,,r],l,.rrrrr t, l,r tlr(.\\.,lyit is: wehavetoget outside of thc'isc-.r-tlrt \\rr,rr ,rrrr\ r,, ,11,,, ,, \\rlr .r(t,rrnplish threethings. First, it will provit[.rrn rrrtlt.;](.nrl(.rrt \\,r\ t,, r,.ll rr l,r, lr 1.,;1165, if any, ofthe rise-of-the-'s7esr p:rratligrr t.rlr r,t. Ir,1,r ,rrr,r rr l,r, r, rr,.,., 1 t,, be rejected.Second,itwillhelpreaderstocritit.rrlll ,.r,,,,,,,rr.tlrr.rr ,r\\rr:rssun)ptionsaboutnowtheworldworks.Andthird, it u,rllriir\(,tlr(.rr,,r(,,,(.r(.1 ri issrrcof howweknow what we know about thc wor.ltl rrn,l il: lri:r,rrr. llr;rt is rlrc task of thisbrief history' In the remainder of tliis irrrr,rlrrr lr,,rr, I rrrrrrr r. skctch out theelernents of that alternative narrat ivc.

I need first to introduce three additionrl r,,rrtt.l,rr: llr.st.trf lrist.rical con-tingency, of accident, and of conjuncture. \(/c stirrt \vrl lr r l)(. r,k,,, of conflngency.one very powerful implication of the storyli^c .f. th. r ist. t rr rhc west, thoughit is seldom made explicit, is that the way the world trr'rerr ()rl w.s the only waypossible' Because of the historicar advantages enjoycti by Etrrr4rcans, possiblysince the fall of the Roman Empire o. .rr". u, far back :rs the clreeks or ro Eu-ropean genetics' this interpretation implies that the rise of the lvest was rn-evitable.lt might have taken some twists and rurns, had sorne fits and srarts, butsooner or later the West would rise above all other parts of the world.

Although we will also have to dear with the poriti.ur, ..o.ro-r., and mir-itary dominance of Europe and its offshoots (e.g., the United states) fur thepast 200 years' there is no reason to think that that dominance was inevitable.r, for that matter, that its dominance will continue. Indeed, it appears in-cvitable only because that storyrine was centered on Europe. But o.r." nlrroader, global perspective is adopted, the dominance of the west not onlylrirl''pc.s later in tirne, probably a, r"t. as r750-1800 and perhaps not untiltlrc carly nineteenth century, but it also becomes clearer thui it *a, contirgrnt.rr rrhcr developments that happened independentry elsewhere inthe world.M.sr importanr, the economic engine driving global trade-and with it.xr'llrlrgcs of ideas, new food crops, and -".r.,f".trr..d goods-was in Asia.i'r"lrrrhly as c:rrly as 1000 c.r., china's economic and popuration growth stim-rrl;rrt',1 rlrc cr.rtire Eurasian continent; another surge came after about 1400;rrr,l l;rsrt'tl rrrtil IBOO or so. Asia was the source of u h.rg. demand for silver t.l" r'1' 1111' r't'.r).rrrics .f china ancr India growing anci also the worrtl,s grearcst

The Rise of the lVest? @ 11

\{)urce of manufactured goods (especially textiles and porcelain) and spices.

, \ lso very significant in our narrative will be the beginning of Islam and thelxprrrlsi6n, from the seventh to the seventeenth centuries, of Islamic empiresu,t.stward into the Mediterranean Sea and eastward into the Indian C)cean as

l:rr ls Indonesia. \il/here Asia attracted the attention and interest of traders1r,,rri all over Eurasia, the Islamic empire blocked direct European access totlrc riches of Asia, stimulating a desire among Europeans to find new sea

r ( )r rt cs to the Indian Ocean and China.ljven Columbus's "discovery" of the Americas and Vasco da Gama's sailing

',r',,rrnd Africa to get to the Indian C)cean would not have done much for Eu-r( )l)urn fortunes had they not found both vast quantities of silver in the NewWorld with which to buy Asian goods and a supply of African slaves to workNcw World plantations after European diseases killed off most of the NativeAnrcrican population. As we will see, the creation of the institutions ands( )rlrces of wealth and power in a few advanced parts of Europe, enabling these

:rrcirs to establish dominance over the rest of the world, was contingent upontlrcse, and other, developments.

As late as 1750, as parts of Europe approached the levels of developmentrr',rched in key areas of Asia, all of these most developed parts of Eurasia-l:rrrope as well as Asia-began butting up against environmental limits to fur-tlrcr growth, except in England, where easily accessible coal deposits enabledrlrc Rritish to escape from these constraints by indr-rstrialization based on thel r('w sources of steam power. In the early 1 B00s this new power source was putto rnilitary use, and then-and only then-did the scale tip against Asians, and,li..l Europeans, led first by the British, move toward establishing clear global

, k rrninance. The point is that the rise of the STest was not inevitable, br-rt was

lrighly contingent. The world we live in might have been different; there is

rrothing in the past-unless you adopt the rise-of-the-!7est construct-that in-(licirtes that the worid had to become one dominated by Western institutions.

Moreover, if the rise of the \il/est were not inevitable but instead contin-gcrrt, that would mean that the future too is contingent, and that is why itr)rrtters what our view of the past is. If nothing anybody could have doneworrlcl have changed the outcome of history, then nothing we can do noc.{., canslrirl-rc r'rur future: we are trapped in a further elaboration and extension of tharwhich cxists in the present, unless some huge accident of history pushes us inrr rliffcrent direction. On the one hand, if history-and our view of it-is con-lingcnt, then the actions that we take in the here and now do indeed havetlrt' l,ossibility of changing the world. \7e are not trapped, but rather we (and

I trrkc rhrrt t() nlcirn all the l,eoples in the world, not just Americans or thoseirr tlrt' Wr''t ) ,.

'rrr lirrvc lgclrcy. If thc pust cotrld have been different, then so

It[()() ('rl rrrt lrtrrrtt'. r\t ttrt' ",,,111;11r,(.lrr,

, rr,r llrt ,,rJr,.t Jrrtttr, r]oes not mean-];:1,]:::1":;l:.':.1:"""""" r1r'' ,,,' 1,ri, , ,r, ; , 'i,1,,,.,;,.';;,anaccident,

That cr.cs,.',,iili;,',ll],i',,,,,),,,,;,, i,,(,,,, , rr ,. r,,,,,k uirr rnakeclear.lo

Let me give two cx,rrr.ll,5 rlrrrt r'rll 1,,.,1 r'li rrrr 'l" rr"t f 1;11t1lgn, for they do.

tural societies, which is wlr,rt ,,,,,., ,,, \' \( rr' ( \l Irr( r rlr tlrt'l',rtok. Inagricul-

mate changes coul.i h,rv. rr,.,,,,,;,, ,,,,,, l': :l ".,,,,1 rr'rr rrrrlil

'cry recently, cli-

;T::J:?:jffi*;1:. x;,;,ii;, :, I i:, :f i,,; ;'l I ir,:ilT:Ji:#j:

oftheecono-y.p;oo,conditio.s,src.lrrr,\(l\(rrr( 'rrr'lstirttrrllttirrgthegrorlhduring,h",.,,".,,""nth-century;,.,;,..

l.:l liil..,f ,:l

l:i,ll:;'m:i:im*lrXlTil:||r|j} i*'Although 't"".'..' ' t'""", ',r,, ,,',li'".'i ,lnu".urr"r, r.on.,unpredictabl.

";#;:1ff,:;l;i:latc,rtt t i'|'l'rtt'

"' 'r'" fr,,,,l',"nse of being

Another ,,accidenr,, i, i.p."""i r. ,ir.,

il:::Tf *ril!in'""' a"p" i'.'..ffi ,i il; i ; I I ll ll ii Ii fi fi i::::",':":

$"'. ;;i ;;:,;,',ffi:j:::':'rXt II.J: : : 1 1, I

c r i v c,r i,,t "

*ru accidentalknew how to use them, and some were far

ttl wh.'rc Pc.|lc both needed andthe Dutch nor the

:h;"+, lJ """*i": ;1,? :i*i:ffi'J:ifh,ix;:l:the need to developa corlirdurtry f" J"ooru energy ro slrstain their economicAiil*lili,i""1tl.,."o"r,rs

near the ".."r'rL, needed them. This was one rea-

or e,it,i.,,';ffiil,Tffi;;'I'i"'|; :f1"".'th....'tu.l'i;;J while thatcoa I depos i ts, u... i".ur"d. rrr. **ir;"'ffi

, llff iff r :T;:i[:i:l!,l'nfffiil*li6*n* *kmxl: n' a drama,ic impac,

t {n:":l;,'$f ":1 :fffi **:{;:, *.,rre happens when severar

with one "rroth.r, ...ur,.,* a unique hirtori..,ifll"l

in ways that interactway to think about th.,n",'"."-"ffi $I":i*:lf :nl:H:|1ffi *i"m:"'"::;i:il1:t'ries' In chi.", fo.

"xample, the decision ,."lltt th:t li::q their own his-

rr)cnt to use silver as tl're basis for their the early 1400s by the govern-

;i;il,lifff::,,J:il:.jil::I;.,iffi ;:i:lT'.T[.#;:ffi ffi ;',i,,,,,u","d;;;il;.:ffi :i:il,*:ffi"Jk\;_,:n*i*;nffi :;( lrrrrcsc dernand for it. As aresurr, rtr"".^n"."a into china (and India), and'\si:rr silks' spices' and porcerair'r, nor.Jrr-rro Europe and the New wrrrd, ir_r_

rtrsrr'rrti'g the first age of grobaltr"rt.",rrr"", was a conjuncture: thi.gs lrr'-

The Rise of the West? 6 13

rrc'ing in different parts of the world for reasons having to do with rocal cir-r'urnstances that then became globally importanr.conjunctures can arso occur within a given region when several otherwisei.dependent developments reach criticall points and interact with one an-rlher' For instance, the development of nation*states as the dominant form

' rl political organization in Europe happened for reasons quite independent oftlr.se leading to industrialization. No.r.th.r.sr, when ,rr. ,*, L"verged intlrc nineteenth century-came together to produc"

" .orl.,r.ture-a verylr.werful global force deveroped, particularly when the *" or"",a.a the ba-'i. f.rr military preeminence.

The attention wr, a r o ur .*p r u.,

", iol tff ;l$?:lflf,'J ii" il: Ti*:il, :ffi::H:ilw.rld will involve several causes, .ro, iur, one. Monocausal explanations aretr. simple to take ".::"?, of th..omplexity of peopl",.o.l.tiir, and histor-ic.l change. we shourd thus not rook for ,,rhe,,

cause of the Industrial Revo-Irrtion, for it will not be there. Instead, we will find a comprex of factors thatgo a long way toward explaining the Industrial Revolution. I say ,,a long way,,hccause we have to leave open the possibility that as we learn more or as ourpcrspective changes, we might see the shortcomings of the explanation of_f r:red here.

so the narrative in this book about how the modern worrd came to be_-the world of industrial capitalism, u ,ur,.- of nation-states and lnterstarew,rs, and a growing gap between th. ri.he.t and the pooresr in our world_will be one that has contingency, accidents, and conjunctures. The worrdc.uld have been a very differen, fru.". Until about zoo u""., "go,

rhe mostsrrccessful way people found to trganize themselves ""a i, p?-o,. ,t-r"growth of their numbers was in raige land-based empire, ir-, ,iriu, Africa,t'e Middle East, and the Americar."n"itrr-r., fo. u r.ri., of .o.,iirg"r.r.r,rrccidents, and conjuncrures, we might stiil be living t" "

*..ii^.ragrariancrnpires.

Besides a plot, or a storyline, though, a narrative has a beginning, a middle,rr.rl an end, the choices of which tigirrl""iiu affect the story that is tord. we^,ve

chosen to begin our story withiow ,h. -od.r., world came to be around1400. The reason for beginning around 1400 is that it predates the circumnav-igrrti'r.f the gl.be in the mid-r500s and hence ailows us to examine the world"(l irs tlynamics prior to the first time a truly globarly connecred worrd became

"ssilrlc' Thc rnicltile ()f rhe srory revorves u.ou.ra th" b.ginni; ;;1. hdus-tri;rl l{cv.lrrri.r i' 1750.-rBO0 wirh an.rfl".,"tin., of why the most decisive('\'('t)rs lrrrl'|1'111'..1 flrst rrr Ilritrrirr rrntr not crriwrrcrc ir-r the worlcl. In the first edi-It.tt,l lltis lt'r"k' lltt'st')r'\r ('r)(l('(l:rr)rl)rl lt)i)1) 111'1.111151'tlrlrr is wlrt,lr iarlrrstri,l

ir O l

, r1,rt lt r,r ,t j,rr,rrrL,,r rr,,/. ri,

1., rr(,lrrliyr-.lrlrrrrrrtc.l onaglobalscale.Thisedi_,r ,lr rlrr. trvcntieth century.

,r, , , ,l',;' "', L ,' l.l' ,,;ll]_:::;;:::"#:;:i,liilIiff!i.,rT;ii:'', ",',, l,',1 , l, 'r tlrt wt'st. But does i;-";i why should

rr,. ,,,r, ,r rr r1, ,, ),,,1",'l],,,';]:.,T*::.:TT1"il,'rl...:ll:l:,Jl.irst, rlrt.,r1111li rL r\ ttl,. r, ,,1 rlr,.Wt,sl rnaybemisleadingorwronginIrrnrl:rnrt,rrrrrl rr,rr , ( \,r ri, r I 1,rr rrl ir lrrrrybecorrect.FoaJ*"mpl",one

;ilr:":ll;], il',:l: '' ' "r " ' 'r 'r' *' ' "' 'lrt''lltrestion orwhat caused "rhe

had. Thc,,r*,,,,,.,,,'.]],, . ;1,,', ';, i,l, lll,.:';;;i;';i iJlf;:::inTilimid-frurtecrrth ct'rrlrr')j, \ ,r(rr\ i (,ir()rrr( ir.(r cnvironmentar pressuresprompteclEur.'c:r.f:rrrrilit.sr.l11 q,,r 1rr,.,r1,,,r,.1,1,,",1,,;r;;;;ilyrir..F"...children [reant fannu-rg lrrrrrilit,s , ,,rrl,l I

sendingEurope or-r-rrr'"ru t. lrrr,,irrtrrrs,,,,"""r l() ilccllmulate capital, thus

riage," "..o.,1i,-,g to a rece'r h.isr.r.y, ,,r,r ir1l:l: l';1,: : ],1::'.'",::j..::Tn:,T"T-arated them from the rest of the wori.ll, in|rl,irrrrrts.,,,,,

Although t, -"u *..:T^. *", y:r, E,,.,f",,,, lx.rrsirr)rs clicl lrcl.r.ve that way,thereby freeing themserves fram "instinctive patte rrrs ,f lrchrrvi.r,, (i.e., un-regulated childbearing) that suppor.Jiy-.ora.,rrnetl .rhcr

'c.ples ro over-population and poverty, it simply is not true that Eurt4rcan peirsanrs wereunique i'r this behavior. A .".ent work on china sh.ws that rural familiesthsls 1ee-2nd probably for. a rot r""g..-ri-ited farniry size, although themethods used differed.r. In this ir,rrt"rl. nt,rne, one prop has been removedfrom underneath the,claTn

-of ,h" ";i;;;ess of Europeans ancr the reasonsfor their "rise." Indeecl, scholars ;;;ry h;;e shown that virtually every fac-tor rhat its prop.nents have idenrifiei'w;lt ,n. ,,European

miracle,,can befound in other parts of the worrcrt;i ,rr", trl',r-, y ,-"* nor unique ro Europe,and hence cannot be invoked to .*pl"ln ih" ,ir. of the \West,This narrative also is r,rr-Eu.o..rtric because much of it wilr be devotedto showing the ways in which ort-r". p".* oi the world were either more ad-vanced or ar leasr equivalent to the-,.''or, d"*lop"a p".,r" oili."o", nrr..many cenruries, ar reSst until about 1800. This rrl"r. ..rra'rroll"r,. u...,written without the vasr amount of scholarship published in English on Asia,Africa' and Latin America, whrch provrdes the basis for a no;,Eurocentrcnarrative' \7e are thus fortunar. ,o ,'ru l0nger be depentlent for our under-standing of the world on the acciclent ,t-,n, io* of what has been wri*en inthe past 200 years has been by and

"rou, Eu.opeans exploring their own his-tory' As one critic put ir, untir recentry hirtori"r-r., have been like the dru.k

The Rise of thc Westl & $

' rr,lcl the streetlight trying to find his lost car keys: when asked by a police of-

tr{ {'r \,vhy he was looking there, he said, "Because this is where the light is."i , rr11111211g1t scholars recently have begun to shine a lot of hght on other parts

t t lrc world, so we do not have to fumble around in the dark. We now know, ,,, ',rgh about the rest of the world to question the master narrative of the rise

' ,l rlrc West and to begin constructing another, non-Eurocentric narrative.ll lhe concept of the rise of the West cannot adequately explain why the

\\'r'sl and its institutions became the dominant force in the world over the

;',r'r 200 years, still less the sustained rise of East Asia over the past four,1,', rrtlcs,t' then continued use of it does indeed perpetuate a mythokrgy. Somerrrl t lrologies may well be harmless, at least when they are recognized as such,,,' rvhcn we find Greek or Native American stories about the constellations, I r rrrrning. But when a mythology perpetuates the idea that one group of peo.

l,l,' is superior, has been for centuries if not millennia, and that all others are

t lrrrs in various ways inferior, as the ideas inherent in the rise of the West do,r lrt'n the mythology does violence to others and should be abandoned.

l'he Elements of a Non-Eurocentric Narrativeliir.st, we have to take the entire world as our unit of analysis, rather than par-t ir trlur countries or even regions (e.g., "Europe," "East Asia").2r We will havetlre opportunity to discuss developments in particular nations and empires,l)ul llways in a global context. For instance, we will see that whilc the Indus-rlirl Revolution started in Britain (and even there, in just a paft), it was notl','. luse of English ph-rck, inventiveness, or politics, but rather because ofll,,hal developments that included India, China, and the New \Uorld,,,lonies. In other words, the Inclustrial Revcllution was historically contin-lt('nt on global forces.

I Iowever, taking a global perspective does not imply that the world has al-n,,rys been an interconnected one with a single center from which develop-rrt'nt nnd progress spread to less-developed regions. lnstead, it makes muchnr()rc sense to think of the world in 1400 as having been composed of severalrcgional systems, or in other words to have been "polycentric,"'a each with,lenscly populated and industrially advanced cores supplied from their own

l,t'r'iphcrics. Although trade and cultural exchanges did mean that most oftlrt' worltl regions interacted, or overlapped, on the margins (with the excep-tion of the regional systems in the Americas, which interacted with one an.rrt lrcr, but not until 1492 with Eurasia-Africa), what happened in thesercgiorrs wils m()re a result of dynamics specific to that place.

Thc rrssunrl',tions fhat thc u,orld in 1400 was polycentric and large parts oflrrrrrrsi;r \\'( r( ljr,,rr,lly,torrr|lrrlrblc in tcrrls of lcvcls of .leveloprncnt help us

il

lr, O lrrlrilrlrrrrrorr

rrrrtlcntlrncl lrow lr rrrrrclr t.r)()r(, ilrl(,!lrlrr.,l rvorltl ct:lme about, and how and whylTcsrcmcrs urrirnatcry.,,,r," ,.',r,,,i,,;; ,;. ';;

Trrc imprication of rhe Eurocen-tric model is that devcloprncrr, ,,,r,t ,u,,jr.,routwarc{ no.n ,h"r.j ,,, cnc()mr)r.ss rrrt. rt.sl ,': llr'*'nor,"d in Europe and spread

therestofrh.,,JJ;;;.:,:j;).:::l:"](\' r'r trrc,world: Europeans acted, and

, rn. this ";;;u*, ff :l1l:::: ili; ll,lli', H,,,,m:*ffi*lifii,i:+i'J,fiT,^l f;;i:**fi:""i"" ,,n.r".,,o.,a no'

"l'd whv the

we will t.r- tr* rnd why china ,l"u.l,rn,tf t"ndi.g developments in Asia.

rhat i t .,"ut"d u r',i, r d;;;;;;il':l;::: [;* ::il:51ff f;,j;china and flooding the world market riir, ch,.,"re manufa*ures. we wi'also investigate other commodities ""d ;;." 1 1,

",p".r iii; f"; ;T, hu", ( u.*oiil",,,,fl|,,i",i .l:ll},

ni i::lk:ties)' and co*on textiles, rll oirhi.i^ri"." r,rr, p.odu."d (and producedmore efffciently) in Darrs of rhe,"ril;;il;;han Europe.^.

This book will emphasize fr,r,".,."i' .",Ch i n a a nd I n d i a ; u J rl 1 r,.., il;;. :;;.r,'"fit :1:::' :: ;:*"Jl;Tl::'jEurocentric picrure of how the riorld ;";; be the way it is.

The Rise of the Westl O n7 . As examples of these various theses, see David S. Landes, The wealth and poverty of

Nrrrirrns: \vhy Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New york: w. \7. Norton, l99g) andI lu' Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change anA Indwtial Develnpment in Western Eu-rr\t1 lTsyn 1750 to the Presenr (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1969); Lynn White,It , Medieotal Relgion andTechnology: Colb.cted Essays (Berkeley: University of califomial'rc's, 1978); Alfred crosby, The Measwe of Reality: euantification andv/estem Sociery,I 'l5Q -1699 (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1997); Geoffrey parker, The Militmylltvilurion: Militmy lnnovation and the Rise d the west 1500-1g00, 2d ed. (cambridee:t l;rrrrbridge University Press, 1999).

lJ. As U.s. President George w. Bush put it, intemational free trade is ,,a moral im-|t'rrrtive" that will "build freedom in the world, progress in our hemisphere and enduringI'rrsperiry in the United States." Quored in the Neu., ymkTimes, Mav g, 2001, nationalr',lrtion, p. A7.

9. For a review of three recent books on this topic see David D. Buck, ,,was It pluck,'r l-Lrck that Made the west Grow Rich?"/ownalof tx/vrldHiscory (Fall z0o0):413-430.

10. J. M. Blaut, The Colnnizer's Model of the Worl"d: Geogaphic Diffusionism anA Ewo-r r'rrtric Hisfory (New York: Guilford Press, 1993), 1.

I L Samir Amrn, Ewocenrrism (New York: Monthly Review press, 19g9), vii.lz. Andre Gunder Frank, Reorient: Glabal Economy in the AsianAge (Berkeley: Uni-

vcrsity of Califomia Press, 1998), 32.I 3. Blaut, The ColoniTer's Model of the \X/orLd, 8-9.I 4. The idea of scientific paradigms and the exploration of the conditions under which

rlrt'y might change was firsr developed by Thomas Kuhn in a classic work, The strrctwe of\, itvific Ret,olurioru, 2d enlarged ed. (chicago: University of chicago press, l9z0). Kuhn,sItntnary example was the Copemican revolution, that is, the change from a view of the so-l,rr system with the earth at the center (the view then supported by the catholic church),trr.11g *i,1-t the sun at the center. Although Kuhn discussed',paradigms" and paradigm

'lriiis only with respect to science, the idea has been extended to the way social sciencetr'( )rks tOO.

| 5. Some might object that even this approach remains mired in Eurocentrism because of't'r'cral unexamined assumptions about the very concepts being used, the objects being iden-t rliccl trs in need of explanation, and even history as a method, all of which some claim arerrrrl'licitly Eurocentric- For exiimple, some have questioned whether states and industrial

';rlritalism are really all that important to be explained, raising instead the possibility that( )t lrrr aspects of our world might be more important to explore, such as our very concepts of'r'll, b.cly, sexuality, place, causation, and story and they have proposed new ,,postmodem,,

rnctlroclokrgies of "deconstruction" or "discourse communities" and their ,,privileged ian-llrrrgr''' which confers "power," to explore them. This is an extremely complicated topic, butt lr.se wishing a sensible inrroduction might stan with Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Mar-1g;rrr.t Jrrc.lr, TeilingtheTruthaboutHiscmy (New york: \7. W. Nonon, 1994).

l(r. Not rrll storics rtrc "truc." Some are invented by the author: they are fiction (like( j,,l,liL,tks iu)rl rl)('1-lrrt'c Ilcrrrs, or tlrc I-l:rrry pomcr books). While both history and fic-Itirtl 1i1 1 r'1,',' \l.tl{ ". \\'l) rl ,lt'titt;lrrislrt'r lrisl()ry lir)ll) fitliolr is tlr:rt ltrstoriltl f:rcrs arc rruc.

Notes

"r,,'l7;o7fffi 31',1' o.o'o of Seven Leaders," Juty 20,2001 (www.usinfo.state.gov/

Kingdom, ".d ;" ;;,;THTi,:[":,,Ti:',lli].i: ""*"1"

r,"r; ;;r;, rhe Unitedsomerimes called the ,,G8,,,or

rh. "Ciol;;;.r;r:" to join the G7 in 1998, so now ir is

2. Michael Hardr and^Ant.". N.rii ,,po"-in" a.r.rr"r, in Genoa .Vant,,,Newyc,rk

*i.ft*J:lljl;3ff1;*m3, ;J:: or,his an,c,e ."."i"'i"* a, www

r*i;" fi.l]iff ;HTl:"' r"g"t'' ri' c ommuni st Manrlesro (Ne w york: washington

4. Philip D. Currin has sen.;hl,, r^r:- r . ,

.:::l:.. p.od,ctiuity ",ll;'"fr:.1:.1"#::;?:*,*"ation"

as the drive to achieve highWorld and the tVest: The I1e1,"r1ae.,cJil;:tilti*t;*i;d.;;fi ,fi ,"fri't:3*'i,i,il;$,."{#:ilril:,i.:[:.lJ}]"'5i?i::Hlif,:'r'S:J,".i.:ed a rist.r'i,, ,,',"-""",io b" ,,,"od-

5. The term is takencambridge University 0..::Tn;l)r*k

bv E' L' Jones' TAe European Miracte(cambridge:6' Especially the British economic historian patrick o,Brien. see his articre ,,Euro-

fiil;;:"# |;rlt5:'n'" C.*"u,""".i"" periphery,, Econo^ic Hi,n y R,,