reducing launch operation costs: new technologies and practices

7/25/2019 Reducing Launch Operation Costs: New Technologies and Practices

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Reducing Launch Operation Costs: NewTechnologies and Practices

September 1988

NTIS order #PB89-136402


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Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch OperationsCosts:NewTechnologies

andl actices,

OTA TM ISC 28

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-ing Office, September 1988).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88 - 6 0 0 5 39

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)


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Foreword

Reducing the costs and improving the reliability of space transportation are keyto making more effective use of the space environment for commerce, science, explora-tion, and defense. In order to achieve these objectives, the United States needs to givegreater attention to launch and mission operations, the collection of processes and pro-cedures used to ready vehicles and spacecraft for launch and insertion into orbit. Launchoperations make up a significant percentage of launch costs.

The United States already uses or has under development a variety of technologies

that can make launch operations more reliable, efficient, and cost effective. However,as this technical memorandum explains, the United States has spent relatively little ef-fort in applying them to operations. Just as important as cost saving technologies areappropriate management methods, or strategies, to put these technologies to work. Insome cases, OTA has found, cost savings could be achieved by streamlining operationsand reducing the burden of documentation and reporting requirements that have slowlyexpanded over the years.

This memorandum is part of a broader OTA assessment of space transportationrequested by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the SenateCommittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In July, OTA released a com-panion volume, Laun ch Options for the Future: A Buy ers Guide, which explores sev-eral possible options for space transportation systems.

In undertaking this technical memorandum OTA sought the contributions of a broadspectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information,others reviewed drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time andintellectual effort. As with all OTA reports, the content of this technical memorandumis thesarily

. . .

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Advisory Panel on Reducing Launch Operations Costs:New Technologies and Practices

L.M. Granger Morgan, Chai rHead, Department of Engineering and Public Policy

Carnegie-Mellon University

I.M. BernsteinProvost and Academic Vice PresidentIllinois Institute of Technology

Michael A. BertaAssistant Division ManagerSpace and Communications GroupHughes Aircraft Company

Richard E. BrackeenPresidentMartin Marietta Commercial Titan, Inc.

Edward T. GerryPresidentW. J. Schafer Associates, Inc.

Jerry Grey

Director, Science and Technology PolicyAmerican Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics

William H. HeiserConsultant

Otto W. Hoernig, Jr.Vice PresidentContel/American Satellite Corporation

Donald B. JacobsVice President, Space Systems DivisionBoeing Aerospace Company

John LogsdonDirector, Space Policy InstituteGeorge Washington University

Hugh F. Loweth *Consultant

Anthony J. MacinaProgram ManagerIBM Federal Systems Division

George B. MerrickVice PresidentNorth American Space Operations

Rockwell International CorporationAlan ParkerSenior Vice PresidentTechnical Applications, Inc.

Gerard Pie]Chairman EmeritusScientific American

Bryce Poe, IIGeneral, USAF (retired)Consultant

Ben R. Rich

Vice President and General ManagerLockheed Corporation

Sally K. RideProfessor, Center for International Security

and Arms ControlStanford University

Tom RogersPresidentThe Sophron Foundation

Richard G. SmithSenior Vice President

JLC Aerospace CorporationWilliam ZersenProject ManagerSpace Flight SystemsUnited Technologies Corporation

NOTE: OTA appreciates the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The viewexpressed in this OTA report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment. Participation on the advisory panel does not imply endorsement of the report.

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OTA Project Staff on Reducing Launch Operations Costs:New Technologies and Practices

Lionel S. Johns, Assis tant Direc tor , OTAEnergy, Mater ials, and In ternational Security D ivis ion

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Richard DalBello, Project Director

Ray A. Williamson, Pr inc ipal Ana lys t

Eric O. Basques

Michael B. Callahan

Stephen W. Korthals-Altes

Gordon Law

Contractor

Trudy E. Bell

Administrative Staff

Jannie Home Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson


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Workshop on Space Launch Management and Operations, Sept. 10, 1987

Jerry Grey, Cha i rmanDirector, Science and Technology Policy

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Washington, DC

Col. William Anders, USAFWestern Space and Missile

CenterVandenberg Air Force Base, CA

Stewart Baily

Manager,Govt. & Commercial SystemsARINC Research Corp.Annapolis, MD

Hal BeckAssistant Division ChiefMission Planning and Analysis

Johnson Space CenterHouston, TX

Aldo BordanoBranch ChiefGuidance and NavigationJohnson Space CenterHouston, TX

Alan DelunaProgram Manager,Operations IntegrationLockheed Space Operations Co.Titusville, FL

Cort DurocherProgram Manager,Space and Missiles GroupHughes Aircraft Co.Los Angeles, CA

Douglas HeydonPresident, Arianespace, Inc.Washington, DC

James HollopeterManager, ALS OperationsSpace Systems DivisionGeneral DynamicsSan Diego, CA

Lyle HollowayDirector, Florida Test CenterMcDonnell DouglasCape Canaveral, FL

Anthony J. Macina

Program ManagerOnboard Software SystemsIBM Federal Systems DivisionHouston, TX

Allan McCaskillManager,Launch Vehicle ProgramINTELSATWashington, DC

Douglas MorrisAerospace EngineerSpace Systems DivisionNASA Langley Research CenterHampton, VA

Walter J. OverendGeneral ManagerPrograms & Performance

EngineeringDelta Airlines Engineering Dept.Atlanta, GA

J.D. PhillipsDirector,Engineering DevelopmentKennedy Space Center, FL

Acknowledgments

The following organizations generously provided OTA with information and suggestions:

Aerojet Corp. McDonnell Douglas Rowan Companies, Inc.

Aerospace Corp. NASA Headquarters U.S. Air Force Cape Canaveral

Boeing Aerospace Operations Co. NASA Johnson Space Center Air Force StationGeneral Dynamics NASA Kennedy Space Center U.S. Air Force Directorate of

Lockheed Space Operations Co. NASA Langley Research CenterSpace Systems

Martin Marietta NASA Marshall Space Flight CenterU.S. Air Force Space Division

This report has also benefited from the advice of many space transportation experts from the Governmentand the private sector. OTA especially would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance andsupport. The views expressed in this report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of TechnologyAssessment.

Harry BernsteinAerospace Corp.

Darrell BranscomeNASA

William CaseMartin Marietta

John DiBattistaNASA

W.E. FieldsMartin Marietta

Hardie FordKennedy Space Center

John P. FredricksMcDonnell Douglas

John GainesGeneral Dynamics

Charles GunnNASA

David MooreCongressional Budget Office

William StroblGeneral Dynamics

Col. John WormingtonU.S. Air Force

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Related OTA Reports

Civilian Space

Launch Options for the Future: a Buy ers Guide. OTA-ISC-383, July 1988. GPO stock #052-003-01117-4; $5.00.

Commercia l IVew sgather in g From Space. OTA-TM-ISC-40, May 1987. GPO stock #052-O03-O1066-6; $3.00.

Space Stat ions an d th e Law : Selected Legal k sues. OTA-BP-ISC-41, September 1986. GPO stock#052-003-01047-O; $3.75.

l r t terna t ional Cooperat ion a nd Compet i t ion in Civi l ia n Space Act iv i t ies. OTA-ISC-239, July 1985. NTIS ord-er #PB 87-136 842/AS.

U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space. OTA-Th4-STI-27, July 1985. GPO stock #052-O03-O1004-6; $4.50.

Civil ian Spa ce Stat ions an d th e U.S. Futu re in Space. OTA-STI-241, November 1984. GPO stock#052-003-00969-2; $7.50.

Remote Sensing an d th e Priva te Sector: Issues for Discus sion. OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984. NTIS order #PB84-180777.

Saly ut : Soviet Steps Tow ard Perm anent H um an Presence in Space. OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983. GPOstock #052-O03-O0937-4; $4.50.

UNLSPACE 8 2: A Context for Intern at ional Cooperat ion a nd Compet i t ion. OTA-TM-ISC-26, March 1983.NTIS order #PB 83-201848.

Space Science Research in the United States. OTA-TM-STI-19, September 1982. NTIS order #PB 83-166512.

CiviZian Space Policy and Applications. OTA-STI-177, June 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-234444.

Radio frequency Use and Mana gement: impacts From the World Adm in istra t ive Radio Conference of 1979.OTA-CIT-163, January 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-177536.

Solar Pow er Sate l l i te System s and Issues. OTA-E-144, August 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-108846.

Military Space

SD]: Technology, Survivab i l i ty , and Softw are. OTA-ISC-353 , May 1988. GPO stock #052-003-01084-4; $12.00.

Ant i-Sate lZite Weapons, Countermeas ures, and Arm s Contro l. OTA-IX-281, September 1985. GPO stock#052-003-01009-7; $6.00.

Ba ZZistic M issile Defense Technologies. OTA-ISC-254, September, 1985. GPO stock #052-003-01008-9; $12.00.

Arm s Control in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984. GPO stock #052-O03-O0952-8; $3.00.

Directed Energy M issi le Defense in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984. GPO stock #052-003-00948-O; $4.50.

NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20401 (202)783-3238; and the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, (703) 487-4650.

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CONTENTS

Page

Chapter I: Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2: Major Issues in Launch and Mission Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Chapter 3: Operations Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Chapter 4: Technologies and Management Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Chapter S: Operations Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix A: Cost-Estimating Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Appendix B: Noneconomic Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Appendix C: Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

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Chapter 1

Executive Summary


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CONTENTS

Page

Box

BoxPage

I-A. Launch Operations Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3


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Chapter 1

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Achieving low-cost, reliable space transporta-

tion is one of the most important space policychallenges facing the United States today. The Na-tions ability to assure timely access to space, toguarantee the general welfare of U.S. civilianspace activities, and to compete effectively withother countries depends on meeting this challengesquarely and thoughtfully.

Ground and mission operations processes arehighly complex and involve a wide variety of tech-nologies. As support functions, they only becomeobvious to the public and to Congress when theyfail to work properly. Because they constitute a

significant percentage of launch costs, reducingthe costs of these operations is crucial to lower-ing the overall costs of space transportation. Im-

could also lead to greater flexibility and respon-siveness to changing conditions in space activities.Yet these relatively mundane processes and proce-

dures seldom receive close scrutiny from the Con-gress, or attention from the policy community.

This technical memorandum is intended to helpCongress understand the launch process and howthe use of advanced technologies and managementtechniques could reduce the costs of launchingpayloads. It does not discuss the management ofpayloads or crews for passenger-carrying vehicles.

The memorandum is part of an assessment ofadvanced launch technologies, which was re-quested by the House Committee on Science,Space, and Technology, and the Senate Commit-

tee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.It derives in part from a workshop held at OTAon September 10, 1987 , which met to discuss is-

proed operations technology and management sues of launch operations technology and man-

Box l-A.Launch Operations Processes

Launch operations includes the procedures necessary for launching payloads to orbit. It does not in-clude the management of payload or crew (for piloted vehicles) on orbit, which are generally consideredmission operations. Launch operations can be divided into the following overlapping steps:

Processing and integration of vehi cle: includes the assembly and testing of the launch vehicle, aswell as the integration of electrical, mechanical, and fluid systems. For reusable, or partially reusa-

ble vehicles, this step also includes testing of refurbished components to assure that their character-istics remain within design specifications.c Processing and integration of pay loads: comprises the assembly, testing, and mechanical and elec-

trical integration of payloads with the launch vehicle. Payloads must also be tested with the vehi-cles mechanical and electrical systems to assure they will not interfere with proper operation ofthe launch vehicle.

Launch m anagement and con t ro l : includes the preparation and testing of the launch pad, the con-trol center, and all of the other facilities critical for launch, as well as the actual launch countdown.During countdown, each critical subsystem must be continually monitored.

. Post lau nch responsib i l i t i es: includes the retrieval, return, and refurbishment of all reusable vehiclecomponents, and the cleanup and post-launch refurbishment of the launch pad. The launch of re-usable, or partially reusable, vehicles introduces an extra layer of complexity to the launch processand involves additional facilities and personnel.

c Logistics: encompasses the provision of spares, and replacement parts, as well as the scheduling of

tasks, personnel, and equipment, which must be coordinated across the entire launch process.

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agement, and from OTA staff research. OTA staffvisited Air Force and National Aeronautics andSpace Administration (NASA) facilities and

gathered additional information from a literaturereview and personal interviews with individualsfrom the major aerospace firms.

1OTA site visits included: Air Force Space Division, Los Angeles;Cape Canaveral Air Force Station; Edwards Air Force Base; John-son Space Center; Kennedy Space Center; Langley Research Cen-

ter; Marshall Space Flight Center; Vandenberg Air Force Base.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Finding 1: Because launch and mission operationsconstitute a sizable fraction of the cost oflaunching payloads to orbit, developing newlaunch vehicles will not, in itself, result in sig-nificant reductions of launch costs. If the UnitedStates wishes to reduce launch costs, systemdesigners and policymakers must give greaterattention to operations.

Because launch and mission operations are re-sponsible for up to 45 percent of the cost of eachlaunch, lowering these costs is crucial to reduc-ing the overall cost of space missions. Prompted

by the needs of the spacecraft community, launchsystem designers have traditionally focused great-er attention on achieving high performance thanon operational simplicity or low cost. Recently,plans for a permanently inhabited space station,more extensive Department of Defense (DoD)space activities, and problems with existing U.S.launch systems have suggested the desirability ofattaining routine, low-cost launch operations.NASA and DoD have funded several studiesaimed at identifying technologies and manage-ment practices capable of reducing the costs oflaunch services.z The results show that a varietyof technologies, either new or in use in other in-dustries, could help to reduce operations costs.They also indicate that important reductions oflaunch costs are unlikely unless launch operationsengineers and facilities managers have a greaterrole in the design of future launch systems. Thedevelopment process should encourage a thor-

2The results of these studies are summarized in the report of theSpace Transportation Architecture Study: U.S. Government, Na-ti onal Space Transportat ion and Support Study 1995-2010, Sum-

mary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of Defenseand National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986.

ough and frequent interchange of information andideas among representatives from operations, lo-gistics, design, and manufacturing. It should alsocontain sufficient incentives for reducing costs.

Finding 2: Technologies capable of reducing therecurring costs of ground and mission opera-tions exist today or are under development ina variety of fields.

These include technologies for:

built-in test equipment;management information systems;automated test and inspection;advanced thermal protection systems;fault-tolerant computers;adaptive guidance, navigation, and flightcontrol;automated handling of launch vehicles andpayloads;computer-aided software development; and

expert computer systems.Some of these technologies could be incorpo-

rated into the design of the launch vehicle. Forexample, built-in test equipment and softwarecould be used to detect faults in vehicle sub-systems, reducing ground operations labor andcost. Other technologies might find applicationin the launch and mission operations facilities. Forexample, management information systems couldsharply reduce the amount of human effort inmaking, distributing, and handling paper sched-ules and information. Such systems could also re-

duce the number of errors experienced, and speedup sign-off procedures.

The amount of money such new technologiescould save, either from building new launch sys-


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terns, or from enhancing existing systems, dependsstrongly on three factors: 1) the demand forlaunch services, 2) the non-recurring costs of tech-nology development and facilities, and 3) savingsachieved in operations. Unless launch demand forthe late 1990s increases sharply over current esti-mates, adopting new technologies could actually

increase the total (life-cycle) cost of space trans-portation.

Finding 3: Dramatic reductions in the costs oflaunch operations (factors of 5 to 10) could beachieved only under highly limited conditions.

Most experts OTA consulted thought that re-ductions in operations costs by five- or ten-fold,as suggested by the Space Transportation Ar-chitecture Study and the Advanced Launch Sys-tem (ALS) program,3 were unobtainable in prac-tice even with proposed new technology and newfacilities. They pointed out that although the large

capacity vehicles contemplated for an ALS mightsave costs by carrying more weight, they wouldnot be efficient for smaller payloads. In addition,new ground facilities (e.g., launch complexes,fabrication and assembly buildings) typically re-quire investments of several hundred million oreven billions of dollars. Such investments seldomlook attractive in the short runthe most rele-vant time period in a stringent budget environ-mentand are therefore seldom adequatelyfunded. Finally, dramatic reductions in cost wouldrequire significant changes in the institutionalmechanisms of launch operations, which would

be very difficult to achieve without considerableinstitutional upheaval.

Such reductions would require high launch de-mand, a new generation of launch vehicles andground facilities designed to accommodate rapidturn around, and payloads of uniform design andorbital characteristics. In theory, it would be pos-sible to create new advanced-technology launchsystems, such as those proposed for the ALS pro-gram. These launch systems would be most ben-eficial for launching many payloads with similartechnical and orbital characteristics, such as com-

ponents of a space-based missile defense system,or perhaps fuel to send humans to and from Mars.Absent a decision to deploy SDI, or to increasesharply spending on civilian payloads, the num-

ber and diversity of payloads NASA and DoDnow plan to launch through the late 1990s do notmeet the conditions necessary for dramatic cost

reductions.Thus, under these conditions, the discounted

l ife-cycle costthe total of recurring and non-recurring costs, appropriately discountedoflaunching known or currently projected payloadsprobably can be reduced only marginally by de-veloping completely new launch systems. In addi-tion, because a revolutionary launch design suchas envisioned for ALS would involve new designapproaches and some new technologies,

4the tech-

nological and economic risks would be higherthan for an evolutionary approach.

Finding 4: If the Federal Government wishes toinvest in new operations technologies, it shouldhave clear long-term goals and a well-definedplan for developing and incorporating newtechnologies in space transportation operations.Such a plan must be buttressed by data fromnew and more reliable cost models.

NASA and the Air Force are funding researchon new technologies for launch systems. NASAsCivil Space Technology Initiative (CSTI) is pur-suing research on a number of technologies, in-cluding autonomous systems and robotics, that

could improve some launch procedures and mighteven lead to cost savings. NASA and the Air Forceare collaborating on research in the AdvancedLaunch Systems Focused Technology Program,which may contribute to reducing the costs oflaunch and mission operations. Yet these researchprograms devote only a small percentage of their

budget to space transportation operations. Inaddition, no well-organized or well-funded planexists to app ly the technologies developed in theseprograms to launch operations procedures, or tocoordinate research being carried out through theexisting technology R&D programs.

3See especially U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Launch Opt ions for the Future: A Buyers Guide, OTA- ISC-383(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988),for an extensive discussion of launch system costs and capabilities.

4U. S. Government, National Space Transportation and SupportStudy 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, De-partment of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration, May 1986.


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In fiscal year 1989, NASA plans to start an Ad-vanced Operations Effectiveness Initiative, whichwould develop and carry out a plan for insertingthe results of technology R&D into launch andmission operations. However, NASA is allocat-ing only $5 million to this initiative in the 1989

budget, an amount that will have a very smalleffect on reducing launch and mission operationscosts.

To complicate matters, the current restrictivebudgetary environment makes it difficult to spendmoney now on research and facilities that migh tsave money later. To respond to this suite of tech-nical, institutional, and budgetary challenges, theUnited States needs a coherent long-term plan fordeveloping and incorporating new operationstechnologies into existing and future launch sys-tems. A technology development plan should in-clude work in all development phases:

broad technology exploration (basic re-search),

focused research leading to a demonstration,and

implementation to support specific appli-cations.

Such a plan should be part of a more comprehen-sive National Strategic Launch Technology Planthat would develop and insert new technologiesinto U.S. launch systems.

Instituting a long-term research, development,

and technology application plan will be extremelydifficult for three reasons. First, policymakers inCongress and the Administration have been un-able to agree on overall long-term goals for thepublicly funded U.S. space program. Operationsprocedures optimized for our current level ofspace activities would differ substantially fromthose designed to deploy space-based defenses ormount a mission carrying humans to Mars.

Second, current ground and mission operationsare partially controlled or influenced by the tech-nologies and management requirements from a

dozen or so different research centers, hundredsof technical projects, and thousands of individ-uals in NASA, DoD, and the aerospace industry.The Administrations latest space policy statementdirects NASA and DoD to cooperate in pursuing

new launch and launch support concepts aimedat improving cost-effectiveness, responsiveness,capability, reliability, availability, maintainabil-ity, and flexibility.s This directive could providethe impulse for developing a national research anddevelopment plan. However, the institutionalstructure and will to focus the efforts of these in-terested parties on the common purpose of reduc-ing operations costs does not presently exist. UntilCongress and the Administration reach agreementon specific national space policy goals, develop-ing an effective, detailed, multi-year plan for de-veloping and incorporating new technologies intospace transportation operations will be extremelydifficult. Encouraging NASA and DoD to reduceoperations costs substantially may require mak-ing major institutional changes to these agencies,or developing a new agency for operations.

Finally, the lack of objective, verifiable cost esti-mation models makes it difficult to determine

which technologies are worth pursuing or whichshould be discarded. Credible, objective opera-tions cost methodssimilar to those of the air-line and other commercial industriesshould bedeveloped, which would allow the Governmentto estimate the total cost of incorporating a newtechnology or management practice and the sav-ings it could generate. Current models haveproven inadequate, in part because data on pre-vious launch operations experience have neither

been collected in an organized way nor properlymaintained. Without adequate historical data touse as a benchmark, cost estimation involves toomuch guesswork. Congress may wish to directNASA and DoD, or some independent agency,to collect the necessary historical data and to de-velop better cost estimating methods for spacetransportation systems.

Finding 5: Although making evolutionary im-provements to exizting launch systems mayprove difficult and expensive, such improve-ments could reduce the cost of existing launchand mission operations.

Because launch vehicles and their ground sup-port facilities are highly integrated and interdepen-dent, it is difficult and expensive to incorporate

Presidential Directive on National Space Policy, White HouseOffice of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Feb. 11, 1988.


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new cost or time saving technologies. Neverthe-less, experts consulted by OTA agreed that itwould be possible to reduce operations costs byimproving vehicle subsystems such as onboardavionics, and many ground-based support activ-ities such as payload handling and fuel loading,through redesign, automation, and standardiza-

tion. Technologies pursued for new launch sys-tems may have application to existing systems andvice-versa.

Finding 6: It will be difficult to improve the waythe United States manages its launch operationswithout making significant changes to the in-stitutions currently responsible for those oper-ations.

Current U.S. space management practices re-sult from a launch operations philosophy that em-phasizes long-lived, expensive payloads, high-performance launchers, very high reliability, and

low launch rates. The Soviet Union, on the otherhandboth by choice and as a result of its limitedtechnology basehas in the past relied on rela-tively inexpensive short-lived satellites, reason-ably reliable vehicles, and very high launch rates.As a result, the Soviet launch infrastructure ismore resilient than its U.S. counterpart, al-though not necessarily more effective at accom-plishing national goals.

The United States is now in the difficult posi-tion of attempting to retain its high-technology,high-performance approach to payloads and ve-

hicles while attaining Soviet-style routine, lowercost access to space. This goal is probably un-attainable unless the U.S. Government substan-tially alters the way it conducts space transpor-tation operations. Such an alteration wouldrequire significant changes to the institutionalstructure and culture of NASA and DoD.

Congress could direct the Air Force and NASAto:

turn launch operations for all new launchsystems over to the private sector;establish operations divisions fully independ-

ent of launcher development, including de-velopment of a Shuttle or an ALS; orpurchase launch services, rather than vehi-cles, from the private sector for existing ELVlaunch systems.

One way to manage the institutional challengeis to maintain separate institutions for launch ve-hicle development and operations by turning overoperation of new launch systems to the privatesector. Under such an arrangement, the launchcompany would assume control of launch oper-ations after the systems were developed and

would provide launchservices

to the Governmenton a contractual basis. In order to further reduc-tions of cost, the company would also be en-couraged to market its services to other payloadcustomers, either from the United States orabroad. The European Space Agency (ESA) andArianespace have demonstrated that such an ar-rangement can be highly effective. ESA fundeddevelopment of the Ariane launch system underthe management of the French space agency,CNES. Arianespace, S. A., a French corporation,which manages the Ariane operation and marketsthe Ariane launcher worldwide, set requirements

for a successful commercial venture.

Although the European model may not be fullyapplicable to U.S. conditions, Congress must findways to give space transportation operations ex-tra visibility and clout so they will not be con-sidered a costly afterthought. Congress coulddirect NASA and the Air Force to establish oper-ations divisions fully independent of each agency'slaunch development organization, with the chargeof operating launchers on the basis of increasedefficiency and reduced costs. This would requireconsiderable congressional oversight to assure that

the agencies carried out the will of Congress.

NASA and DoD could also reduce operationscosts by purchasing all expendable launch serv-ices, rather than launch vehicles, from the privatesector for existing systems. Recent Administra-tion policy directs the civilian agencies, includ-ing NASA, to purchase expendable launch serv-ices from private companies. However, the policyallows considerable latitude for DoD to continueits current practice of involving Air Force person-nel deeply in the launch process.

Finding 7: In addition to new technologies, adopt-ing new management practices and designphilosophies could increase the efficiency andreduce the cost of ground operations.


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Management strategy may often be more im-portant than new technology for achieving lowcost

launches. Cost-reducing strategies include:

reduce documentation and oversight,create better incentives for lowering costs,provide adequate spares to reduce cannibali-zation of parts,

develop and use computerized managementinformation systems, anduse an improved integrate/transfer/launchphilosophy.

Some management strategies could be enhancedthrough the appropriate use of technology. Forexample, OTA workshop participants pointed outthat operations costs will never fall significantlyunless ways are found to reduce the time con-sumed by human documentation and oversight.In many cases, automated procedures would re-duce the need for certain documentation, and

certainly shrink the necessary manpower to main-tain it. However, reducing the amount of over-sight significantly will be much more difficult.Since the Titan and Shuttle losses of 1985 and1986, the number of Government personnel re-sponsible for contractor oversight has increased.

Also needed are incentives to encourage loweroperations costs. The current institutional man-agement structure tends to penalize launch fail-ure, but is poorly structured to reward the lower-ing of launch costs or increases in launch rate.However, the Strategic Defense Initiative Orga-nization found in a recent project6 that it was ableto cut overall project costs in half by incorporatingsimple, common-sense management techniquessuch as reducing Government oversight, delegat-ing authority to those closest to the technical prob-lem, maintaining short schedules, and paying em-ployees bonuses for meeting deadlines. Althoughthe team was able to achieve some of its opera-tions cost savings as a result of a concentrated,narrow effort that would be difficult to maintainfor routine launches, the project nevertheless dem-onstrated that a management philosophy that in-cludes incentives for launch managers and tech-

nicians can play a significant role in reducing thecost of launch operations.

bThe Delta 180 experiment. See ch. 2, I ssues, for a discussion.

Vehicle design can also play a crucial part inthe ability to reduce launch and mission opera-tions costs. The accessibility of critical parts, theweight and size of components, and the abilityto change out modules quickly all affect the speedand effectiveness of operations. Several designprinciples are particularly important. One should:

engage all major segments of launch team inlaunch system design process;design for simplicity of operation as well asperformance; anddesign for accessibility, modularity, and sim-plicity of operation.

For example, considering all elements of thelaunch system, including the operations infra-structure and operations management, as a col-lection of highly interactive parts will allow sys-tem designers to anticipate potential operationsand maintenance problems and provide for them

before the system is built. As was discovered withthe Space Shuttle main engines, certain sub-systems may pose unexpected maintenance prob-lems. All major subsystems should be designedto be readily accessible, and, as much as possiblewithin weight and size constraints, should also beof modular design in order to reduce maintenanceand integration costs.

Many concepts for improved launch operationstend to shift costs from operations to other stagesin the launch services process, such as payloadprocessing. For example, requiring payloads to

provide their own internal power, rather thanrelying on a source in the launcher, may reduceground operations costs, but could also increasethe cost of preparing payloads. In altering thestructure of space transportation operations, suchchanges in procedure or technology should notmerely send problems elsewhere.

Finding 8: Unless the Government can stimulatethe innovative capacity of the private sector,private sector contributions to reducing thecosts of space transportation operations willcontinue to be quite limited.

Almost all of the recent effort in improvinglaunch operations has been instigated by NASAand the Air Force in connection with the Space


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9

Transportation Architecture and the AdvancedLaunch System studies.g Private sector initiatives,such as competitive bidding for components, andintroducing some new technologies, show whatcan be done in a modest way to reduce costs.However, these efforts are still relatively limitedand reflect the tenuous nature of the U.S. com-

mercial launch industry.The Government could use the talents of the

private sector most effectively, and in the proc-ess encourage a more competitive industry, bypurchasing the services of expendable launchersrather than vehicle systems, and by offering strongincentives for decreasing costs. Although it istheoretically possible for the Government to pur-chase services for piloted launchers, such as theSpace Shuttle, private industry is unlikely to of-fer such services in the near future because thetechnologies of reusable vehicles are still imma-

ture and the costs of change are great.Congress could also enhance the development

of new operations technologies and assist privatesector competitiveness by funding an operationstest center composed of a mock launch pad andfacilities. Such a center should be specifically de-signed to enable tests of new technologies for in-corporation into existing and new launch systems.The ability to try out new operations technologieson a working launch pad is limited. A center

U.S. Government, Nat ional Space Transportat ion and SupportStudy 1995-2020, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, De-partment of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration, May 1986.

8The results of seven contractor reports for phase I of these studieshave not yet been released. ALS phase II studies are scheduled to

begin in August 1988.

would give the private sector the opportunity totry out new operations technologies free from thedemands of routine operations. Such a centercould be a government-owned, contractor-oper-ated facility. Alternatively it could be partiallyfunded by the private sector, and operated by aconsortium of Government agencies, private sec-

tor companies, and universities.Finding 9: For certain aspects of launch opera-

tions, the broad operational experience of theairlines and the methods they employ to main-tain efficiency may provide a useful model forspace operations.

Although airline operations face different tech-nical and managerial constraints than space launchoperations, certain airline methods used in logis-tics, maintenance, task scheduling, and otherground operations categories could make launchoperations more efficient and cost-effective.

The following airline practices could be of par-ticular interest for space transportation oper-ations:

involve operations personnel in designchanges;develop detailed operations cost estimationmodels;stand down to trace and repair failures onlywhen the evidence points to a generic fail-ure of consequence;design for fault tolerance;design for maintainability;

encourage competitive pricing;maintain strong training programs; anduse automatic built-in checkout of subsys-tems between flights.

84-755 - 88 - 2 : QL 3


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Chapter 2

Major Issues in Launchand Mission Operations


19/96

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Major Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Issue A: Can New Technologies and Management Strategies ReduceOperations Costs?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1ssue B: Is the United States Devoting Adequate Attention To Reducing theCosts of Space Transportation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Issue C: What Factors Impede the Introduction of New Technologies andManagement Strategies in Launch and Mission Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Issue D: What Impediments To Reducing Operations Costs Are Unique tothe Space Shuttle?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Issue E: What Can the Operational Experience of the Airlines Contribute toSpace Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Issue F: Does the United States Possess Adequate Techniques To Judge theRelative Benefit of Improvements in Launch and Mission OperationsProcedures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Issue G: Are the Near-Term Launch Systems Under Study by NASA and theAir Force Likely To Generate Major Reductions of Launch OperationsCosts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Issue H: How Do Concerns for Launch System Reliability Affect LaunchOperations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

BoxesBox Page

2-A. Required Changes to Other Shuttle Subsystems If Shuttle Main EnginesAre Altered Significantly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2-B. The Delta Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

FiguresFigure Page

2-I. Shuttle Recurring Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132-2. Titan IV Estimated Cost per Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132-3. Delta 180 Project Schedule Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152-4. Cost of Achieving Extremely High Reliability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

TablesTable Page

2-1. Cost Reduction Factors for the Delta 180 Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162-2. Approaches to Low-Cost Launch Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172-3. Civil Space Technology Initiative Funding.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182-4. Advanced Launch System Focused Technology Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192-5. Steps in the Changeout of Defective Parts in the Shuttle Orbiter When

Replacement Spares Are Unavailable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22


20/96

Chapter 2

Major Issues in Launch

and Mission Operations

INTRODUCTION

Launch and mission operations constitute a sig-nificant fraction of the cost of launching payloadsto orbit. For example, prior to the loss of Chal-lenger, Shuttle operations costs, including missionoperations, accounted for about 46 percent of thecost of a flight. Of that, ground operations to-taled at least 24 percent (fig. 2-l). Projected life-cycle costs of the Shuttle suggest that some 86 per-cent of the total can be attributed to the recur-ring costs of launch and mission operations.1

Because of recently mandated safety-related mod-ifications, recurring costs are likely to be higherwhen the Shuttle flights resume. For todays ex-pendable launch vehicles (ELVs), operations costsare generally a smaller percentage of the total, inlarge part because these vehicles do not containreusable components and do not carry humans.However, they are still significant. For example,in the Titan series, launch operations costs canreach about 20 percent of total costs per flight (fig.2-2).

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Shuttle GroundOperations Efficiencies/Technologies Study, Kennedy

spacec~rlt~r

NAS1O-11344, May 4, 1987.

Figure 21 .Shuttle Recurring Cost(percent per flight)

Operations

Flight 1 0 Y

Ops 7

16 550/0

Launch ops

O~erations costsHardware

(percent of total recurring costs)

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Attempts to reduce operations costs must copewith the complexity of launch and mission oper-ations, and the relative lack of policy attentionthey have received over the years. Workshop par-ticipants and others who contributed to this study2

identified the following primary issues that shouldbe addressed in developing a sound Federal pol-icy toward reducing costs and increasing efficiencyof launch and mission operations.

The many interim reports related to the Space TransportationArchitecture Study and the Advanced Launch System effort pro-

vided much of the initial information for OTAs effort. In addition,the study team interviewed officials from the Air Force, NASA, andprivate industry.

Figure 2-2.-Titan IVEstimatad

Cost per Flight(in millions)

64%

Hardwarea

$83

16% \20%

Warrtwre costs based on annual buy rote of WyrbGowrnment~ts include propellant r~go SUpp@ mcemtwes Aerospace Corfx3-

ratlon support, etcSOURCE: Aerospace Corp

13


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14

MAJOR ISSUES

ISSUE A: Can New Technologies and Manage-ment Strategies Reduce Operations Costs?

Existing Systems

Evolutionary improvements to existing launch

systems appear to provide opportunities for mak-ing modest, but meaningful, reductions in groundand mission operations costs. Reducing operationscosts for existing launch systems generally meansreducing the size of operations staffs and short-ening the time it takes to prepare and launch avehicle. Vehicle subsystems, such as avionics, andmany ground-based support facilities can be im-proved through redesign, automation, and stand-ardization.3

It is extremely costly to shorten vehicle turn-around and processing substantially by making

incremental upgrades of the vehicle, because ve-hicle subsystems are highly integrated and inter-dependent. As a result, altering one subsystemoften requires changing others. For example, evensmall alterations of the orbiter outer structure mayrequire significant changes of parts of the ther-mal protection system. Box 2-A presents a list ofchanges that could be required in other systemsif the design of the Shuttle main engines werematerially altered. Such changes would involvemultiple NASA centers and contractors, and re-quire considerable coordination.

Commercial launch companies are investing inperformance improvements and exploring waysto reduce launch operations costs. For example,General Dynamics has developed a new avionicspackage for the Atlas-Centaur that reduces theweight of the avionics package and increases itsreliability. It also includes self-testing proceduresthat will reduce operations costs slightly. Otherlaunch companies are exploring similar ways ofreducing costs of the launcher and launch oper-ations.

Because changes in the design of vehicle sub-systems often have a direct effect on ground oper-

ations or mission operations procedures, it is im-

3National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Shuttle GroundOperations Efficiencies/Technology Study, KSC Report NASIO-11344 Boeing Aerospace Operations Co., May 4, 1987.

Box 2-A.Required Changes to Other ShuttleSubsystems If Shuttle Main Engines Are

Altered Significantly

Main Engine Contro l ler (computer) hard w are

and softwa re.

Engine interface Unit H ard w aredevice thatcouples the main engine controller computerto the General Purpose Computer network.

Flight Sof tw are App l ica t ions executing in theGeneral Purpose Computer Complex.

The Pulse Code Modulat ion Ma ster Unit d ata

access programs and te lemet ry fo rmatsdevice that receives data from the main enginefor telemetry to Earth.

Var ious Ground Checkou t hard w are and so ft -w are a t K!Kespecially the Launch Process-ing System applications software.

c Mission Control Center softwareused f o r

monitoring of engine performance duringlaunch.

Main Engine Environment Modelsused inthe following simulation and test facilities:Software Production FacilityShuttle Mission SimulatorShuttle Avionics Integration FacilityVarious flight design engineering simulators

portant for design engineers to work closely withoperations personnel to establish the best way toproceed in making changes appropriate to oper-ations and maintenance processes. Whether par-

ticular changes will result in net reductions in life-cycle costs will depend on a variety of economic,technical, and managerial factors. Chapter 4 dis-cusses these factors for several specific cases.

Although new technology or design changesmay lead to reduced costs, management changesmay be more important. For example, a recentStrategic Defense Initiative Organization experi-ment called the Delta 180 Project used new man-agement techniques to achieve reduced projectcosts. Project managers found that decreasing theburden of oversight and review, and delegating

authority to those closest to the technical prob-lems, resulted in meeting a tight launch scheduleand reducing overall costs.4 Maintaining a short

4Department of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/ Ki-netic Energy Office, Delta 180 Final Report, vol. 5, March 1987.


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15

schedule (fig. 2-3) reduced overheadentire project by about 50 percent.was achieved by giving contractors

costs of theIn part thiscash incen-

tives to achieve the demanding project schedule.Company employees shared in bonuses paid tothe company for meeting deadlines, which gavethem strong incentives to increase productivity.

Table 2-1 lists the major factors that led to lowercosts and shorter project schedules for the Delta180 project. Although the team was able to achievesome of its cost savings as a result of a focused,narrow effort, which would be difficult to main-tain for routine launches, the project neverthelessdemonstrated that management philosophy canplay a significant role in reducing the costs oflaunch operations.

Today launch system planners are focusingdirectly on reducing the labor and attendant costsof launch operations. Historically, the chief means

of reducing operations costs, relative to achievedlift capacity, is to increase vehicle performance.Over the years, NASA, the Air Force, and thelaunch vehicle manufacturers have made incre-mental improvements to launch system perform-ance and reliability that have also led to opera-tions cost savings. For example, in its early flights

in the 1960s, the Delta was able to launch only100 lbs. to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO).Today, the Delta can launch over 2,800 lbs. toGTO. Launch operations costs are now about 10

5The Space Shuttle presents a counter example. Because of thedesire to improve the safety of Shuttle crews and payloads, the pay-load capacity of the Shuttle has actually decreased over the years.Originally designed to carry about 65,000 bs. to low Earth orbit(at 160 nautical miles), the Shuttles payload capacity is now onlyabout 48,000 lbs.bThese costs include only contractor personnel and other recur-

ring costs directly attributed to the launch. They do not include main-tenance and other general costs associated with the launch pad.

Figure23.

Delta 180 Project Schedule Reductions

r

Contract startto launch

55% reduct ion

and fabri~ation*-

On standto launch*

20\0 reduction

I 1 I, I 1 I Io 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Months

Typical Delta schedule

Represents design and fabrication of the PASessentiaily a new third stage. Includes the PAS which doubles requirements of a normal Delta launch.

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon


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16

Table 2=1.Cost Reduction Factors for theDelta 180 Project

Given program autonomyminimum programmanagement and reporting

Short statements of work2 pages Organized in terms of working groups responsible for

specific tasksgiven autonomy to solve problemswithin working groups

Within working groups, contractors worked as anintegrated team from the beginningclose contactamong all team members, open discussion

SOURCE: Department of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/KineticEnergy Office, Delta 1S0 Final Report, vol. 5, March 1987.

percent of the total costs per flight. Performanceimprovements to the Delta7 (designated a DeltaII) should increase its lift capacity to 4,000 lbs.to GTO, but are not expected to alter significantlythe complexity or the cost of ground operations,though the cost of the vehicle has certainly in-creased. s Hence, should the per flight costs di-rectly attributable to operations remain constant,operations costs of the Delta II per pound 9 coulddecrease by about 40 percent compared to the cur-rent Delta launcher.10 11 Historically it has takenabout 150 resident McDonnell Douglas personnelat Cape Canaveral to perform the launch vehicleprocessing activity at a 6-launch-per-year rate.This includes all administrative functions, groundsupport equipment operation and sustaining,cedure preparations, payload integrationlaunch vehicle processing through launch.

pro-and

7McDonnell Douglas is making these improvements in connec-tion with the Air Force MLV program. The first Delta II launch isexpected in 1989.

Lyle J. Holloway, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., 1987.9This example illustrates one kind of savings possible as vehicles

are improved. However, for many purposes, figuri ~ costs of launch-ing payloads on a per pound basis may not be appropriate. Thelife-cycle cost of a launch system for a given collection of payloadsover the years is often a more appropriate measure. See U.S. Con-gress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options fo rheFuture: A Buyer sGuide, OTA ISC 383 (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, July 1988).

*These performance improvements will be accomplished by im-proved solid rocket booster engines and an improved main engine.

Concurrently, the Delta launch crew efficiency has also im-proved, resulting in a higher percentage of launch successes, andthe potential for a higher launch rate (box 2-B). Delta has improvedits launch success rate over the years from 93 percent 170 out of182 launches) in the 1960s to nearly 98 percent in recent years (onefailure in 48 launches since 1977).

New Launch Systems

Several recent studiesz have suggested thatstarting fresh and designing to cost rather thanfor performance would lead to significant reduc-tions in the costs of launch operations. Thesestudies identified several approaches to system de-sign. The OTA workshop generated its own list

of design goals (table 2-2). The discussion in chap-ter 4 elaborates on these goals, and lists a num-

ber of technologies that would serve them.

NASA and the Air Force are working on a va-riety of new launch system designs. In particu-lar, they are collaborating on a major study ofan Advanced Launch System (ALS), whose goalsare to increase the payload capacity per launch

by a factor of 3 or 4 and to reduce the cost perpound of launching payloads to space by an or-der of magnitude.13 Although a clean sheet ofpaper approach to launch system design offers

potential benefits in reducing life-cycle costs, italso increases the technical and cost risk of launchsystem manufacturing and operations. In addi-tion, the non-recurring investment in new facil-ities, and research and development, will offsetpart of the savings in recurring costs anticipatedfrom such changes.14 Thus it is necessary to ad-dress the entire set of launch procedures, includ-ing aircraft, trains, barges, and other auxiliaryfacilities, which function as a single integratedsystem.

ISSUE B: Is the United States Devoting Adequate

Attention To Reducing the Costs of Space Trans-portation Operations?

Both NASA and the Air Force are funding re-search on new technologies for launch systems.Yet only a small percentage of this research isdevoted to development of technologies for spacetransportation operations and only part of thisis directed toward improving existing operations.

U.S. Government, Nat ional Space Transportat ion and SupportStudy 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, De-partment of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Admin-

istration, May 1986; Advance Launch System Phase I Study brief-ings, 1987, 1988.13 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch

Opt ions for t he Future: A Buyers Guide, OTA- ISC-383 (Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), ch. 5.

141 bid., ch. 7.


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17

Box 2-B.The Delta Experience

The following illustrates one companys experience in providing launch services to the Government.

Minimal oversight. Part of the key to lowering launch operations costs is to keep the number of Govern-ment personnel devoted to overseeing contractor preparations as small as possible. Responsibility formanagement of the Delta program has recently shifted to DoD. When under the management of NASA,McDonnell Douglas main customer for Delta launches was the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

(GSFC), whose primary mission is the preparation and launch of NASAs scientific payloads. GSFC em-ployed 15 to 20 engineers to oversee the Delta launch operations. The GSFC team was kept deliberatelysmall, to avoid the temptation to over-manage McDonnell Douglas launch preparations. McDonnellDouglas attempted to discuss launch problems and resolve them with GSFC immediately. GSFC person-nel worked with the contractors internal documentation, and if a Government or military specificationor procedure showed greater risk in cost than it was likely to return in increased reliability it was dis-carded or tailored. Documentation requirements were kept to a minimum.

Self-suffi ciency. McDonnell Douglas has minimized the number of associate contractors or subcontra-ctors with their own independent documentation procedures and systems necessary to work on the vehi-cle or facility. In addition, the Delta team prepares the vehicle on the basis of a single Launch Prepara-tion Document, which includes inputs from all departments. It gives all requirements for assembly andtest of the vehicle, traceability and accountability of all flight and non-flight hardware, and of all testand operational requirements. Daily meetings near launch time with all the technicians, inspectors, testengineers, managers, and the customer for the launch, enables significant problems to surface. This re-sults in a single, informed team with a common objective.

Mindset toward economy. Although the Delta has always been operated on a budget typical of smallscientific or commercial payloads, in the late 1970s McDonnell Douglas began to explore new ways toeconomize on the Delta when it became apparent that Government use of all ELVS was to be phasedout after the Space Shuttle became operational. McDonnell Douglas funded (with RCA) the develop-ment of upgraded Castor IV strap-on solid rockets, which increased Delta payload capacity 50 percent,and also found ways to economize on launch operations procedures. Although each individual step hasbeen small, over time, such steps have made the entire set of procedures more cost effective.

SOURCE: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Corporation.

Table 2-2.Approaches to LowCost Launch Design prove some launch procedures and might even

Include all segments of the launch team (includingmanagers) in the design of a new launch system

Reduce launch system complexity Increase maintainability

Increase subsystem accessibilityDesign for modularityInclude autonomous, high-reliability flight control

and guidance systemsBuild in testing procedures, for mechanical and fluid

systems, as well as for electronic systems Make payloads independent of launcher, with stan-

dardized interfaces

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19SS.

Through its Office of Aeronautics and Space Tech-nology, NASA has funded a Civil Space Tech-nology Initiative (CSTI), which is pursuing re-search on a number of technologies, includingautonomous systems and robotics~that could im~

lead to cost savings (table 2-3).

As part of the CSTI, all the NASA centers areinvolved to some extent in the Systems Auton-omy Technology Program, which has been de-signed to develop and demonstrate the feasibil-ity of using intelligent autonomous systems inthe U.S. civilian space program, and to enhanceNASAs in-house capabilities in designing and ap-plying autonomous systems. Some of these sys-tems, if successful, will have direct applicationsfor launch and mission operations. For example,the Systems Autonomy Technology Program is

developing an online expert system to assist flightcontrollers in monitoring and managing SpaceShuttle communications. It is also developing thehardware and software for autonomous diagnos-tics and control for the KSC Launch Processing


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18

System. Both systems would increase the relia-bility and capability of mission and launch oper-ations and could eventually lead to reductions inthe number of personnel necessary for these tasks.

The CSTI is designed to demonstrate the feasi-bility of selected technologies. However, withouta clear and focused plan for choosing which tech-nologies are needed for launch and mission oper-ations, and inserting them into existing proce-dures, they may not be applied effectively. TheNASA Office of Space Flight is planning an Ad-vanced Operations Effectiveness Initiative, to be-gin in fiscal year 1989, that would provide plansfor inserting new technology into launch and mis-sion operations. Though funded at only $5 mil-lion per year, this initiative should play an im-portant role in improving operations procedures,because it can verify, validate, and demonstratetechnologies developed under the CSTI. In thelong run, it could also lead to lower operationscosts. Congress could consider funding this pro-gram at a higher level.

Through the Focused Technology Program,funded within the Advanced Launch System pro-gram, NASA and the Air Force are working to-gether on research crucial to reducing operationscosts. Some of these technologies may also con-tribute to improving the efficiencies of existingsystems (table 2-4).

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of1958 gave NASA the responsibility of the pres-

ervation of the role of the United States as a leaderin aeronautical and space scienceogy. 15 Its role as a research and

15 Natjona] Aeronautics and Space Act, Sec.

2451.

and technol-development

102(5), 24 U.S.C.

Table 2-3.Civil Space Technology Initiative Funding(in miiiions)

Program area FY 88 FY 89 (requested)

Automation and robotics ... .$25.1 $25.9Propulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.8 46.7Vehicle (aeroassist flight

experiment). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.0 28.0

Information technology . . . . . 16.5 17.1Large structures and control. 22.0 25.1Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8 14.0

Total ... ... ... ... ... ... .$1 15.2 $156.8

Technologies of importance to launch and mission operations.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(R&D) organization is firmly imbedded in its in-stitutional culture. The Air Force is mission ori-ented; its launch systems organization is thereforeorganized to respond to the special transportationneeds of the DoD payload community. Both orga-nizations have developed different institutionalcultures applying different operational approaches,

which occasionally lead to costly friction in pro-grams of mutual interest. For example, in the areaof launch vehicle R&D development, the two or -ganizations continue to compete for funding andfor program lead. Yet, especially in this era ofbudget stringency, the Air Force and NASA mustwork together more effectively on research to im-prove existing systems and develop the next-gen-eration launch systems.

ISSUE C: What Factors Impede the Introductionof New Technologies and Management Strat-egies in Launch and Mission Operations?

Existing launch and mission operations are ex-tremely complicated, and have unique require-ments for technology, facilities, and management.For example, operations procedures may neces-sitate airplane runways; test facilities for a widevariety of equipment; massive, environmentallycontrolled buildings for launcher assembly andcheckout; and fixed and mobile launch pads. Lo-gistics, including the provisions of parts and sup-plies, contributes its own complexities. Eachfacility adds additional complexity and distinc-tive management requirements. In addition, the

Government is both financially and institution-ally invested in existing operations procedures.The following factors make it difficult to reduceoperations costs significantly for existing launchsystems:

Investment in Existing Infrastructure.TheUnited States has already invested billions of dol-lars in facilities at Kennedy Space Center (KSC),

Johnson Space Center (JSC), Cape Canaveral, andVandenberg.

From a near-term budget perspective, it is eas-ier to justify refurbishing old facilities than to

build totally new ones because the short term costsare often lower. However, existing facilities thatwere built for earlier launch programs require con-tinued modernization and repair, and the result-ing inefficiencies become part of the work flow


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19

Table 2-4.Advanced Launch System Focused Technology Program (in millions of 1988 dollars)

Year

1987188 1989 1990 1991 1992

Propulsion:Engine definition/demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 12.00 $ 6 .0 0 $ 16.50 $30.10 $ 31.40LOX/LH2 engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LOX/LHc engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Propulsion subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Solid rocket booster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Propulsion facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Avionics/Software: Adaptive guidance, navigation and control . . . Multi-path redundant avionics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Expert systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electromechanical actuators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Flight simulation lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Structures/Materiais:Cryogenic tank(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Booster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NDE for SRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Structural certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aerothermodynamics/Fiight mechanics: Precision recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Multi-body ascent CFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Aero data base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Base heating codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Groundandfiight operations/Manufacturing: Ground operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Health monitoring demo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ManTech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17.6032.90

0.50

7.0024.0094.00

26.8016.30

1.40

12.0034.0096.50

45.6032.904.50

15.0020.00134.50

18.2028.60

5.60

15.507.00105.00

9.6011.504.00

17.502.0076.00

6.1010.303.506.502.00

28.40

6.400.000.000.002.508.90

7.000.000,000.003.00

10.00

4.000.000.000.003.007.00

5.000.000.000.003.008.00

15.006.002.005.70

28.70

15.006.004,00

10.0035.00

19.008.004.003.00

34.00

12.0011.002.001.00

26.00

14.003.001.008.00

26.00

2.500.500.500.504.00

4.000,000.000.004.00

5.000.000.000.005.00

5.000.000.000.005.00

2.000.000.000.002.00

14.104.004.50

22.60

7.004.635.20

16.83

13.005.167.22

25.38

12.004.635.70

22.33

7.003.584.03

14.61

Grand total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $175.00 $154.93 $209.88 $173.33 $126.61Technologiesof importance in launch and mwslon operations

SOURCE: U.S. Alr Force.

and extend throughout the life of theprogram.

16

For example, because the Vehicle Assembly Build-ing, used for attaching the Shuttle orbiter to theexternal tank and solid rocket boosters, was origi-nally built for the Saturn 5 program, it does nothave the optimum size and shape for the Shuttle,which leads to longer and more complicated ve-hicle assembly. Thus, the long-term costs maybegreater than if a new, more appropriate, facilitywere built.17

On the other hand, any investments in new fa-cilities, such as a new launch complex, must alsobe weighed against the expected savings to begained over the expected life of the launch sys-tem. If the up-front costs are great enough, theycould outweigh the total operational costs for cur-rent systems, even if some reductions in opera-tions costs are achieved. However, because facil-ities become obsolete and equipment wears outover time, and must be replaced, opportunitieswill arise for making program changes in thecourse of replacing outdated facilities. Programchanges that require either major alterations, or

replacement of otherwise usable launch facilities,may lead to greater life-cycle costs. Because theyinvolve projects requiring considerable manpower,the construction and geographical placement of

1bNationa] Aeronautics and Space Administration, Shuttle

Ground Operations Efficiencies/Technology Study, KSC ReportNAS1O-11344, Boeing Aerospace Operations Co., May 4, 1987, p. 4.

IT]n addition, many replacement parts required for certain Shut-

tle test or training systems are no longer being manufactured andmust be custom built or refurbished by NASA.


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new facilities may also face political constraintsthat affect life-cycle costs.

Old Systems That Need Upgrading.Becausethe United States decided in the early 1980s tophase out ELVS and depend solely on the Shuttlefor launch services, needed improvements to theefficiencies of ELV launch fleets and facilities were

not made. Many of these improvements, includ-ing performance upgrades, lighter and more ca-pable avionics packages, and higher performance,safer solid rocket motors, are being made todayas part of the Air Forces competitive ELV pur-chases.

Because certain parts of the Shuttle system arenow more than a decade old, they need to be up-graded as well. For example, both the Shuttlesflight computers and the Shuttle processing sys-tem computers are being replaced. These changesare unlikely to lead to cheaper operations, though

they will increase the capability of the Shuttle sys-tem and may contribute to greater reliability.

Excessive Documentation, Oversight, and Paper-work.As one workshop participant charged, itis the Governments excessive oversight and docu-mentation that have kept the cost of space launchmanagement and operations outrageously high. Both the Government and the contractor incurhigh costs from extra oversight personnel andfrom reporting requirements such as the Cost andSchedule Reporting System (C/SCSC). Althoughthis system can provide useful information for re-ducing costs, it must be tailored to the programand its true cost to administer must be carefullyweighed against its advantages. 18

Excessive Government oversight and reportingrequirements generally develop incrementally asa response to real problems of quality control, aconcern for safety, and the desire to complete highcost projects successfully. Over time these smallincrements of personnel or paper build to thepoint that they impede efficient operations, limitcontractor flexibility, and add unnecessary costs.

Chapter 4 discusses several technological op-

tions for reducing the paperwork burden through18C@cesy~tems

an d

@eratjonsCostReduction and CostCredi

bilityWorkshop Executive Summary Wasl vDC NationalSecurity Industrial Association, January 1987), p. 2-5.

installation of automated systems. It also exam-ines the inefficiencies introduced by excessive over-sight of contractors during the launch process.

Uniqueness of Launch Pad and Other Facilities.Current U.S. facilities are often unique to a givenlaunch system, and therefore different facilitiescannot be shared. It may be possible to design fu-

ture launch pads to accommodate several differ-ent launch vehicles in order to save on facilitiescosts. For example, the Aerospace Corporationhas explored the potential of using a universallaunch complex, which would be designed witha universal launch stand, a universal mobilelaunch platform, and a modular assembly integra-tion building.

19 A modular integration building,in which a variety of vehicle designs can be as-sembled and integrated, is particularly important.However, such designs would represent a majorchange in the way the United States manages itslaunch operations and would require strong in-

teraction between launch vehicle designers andfacilities planners. These changes in operationsprocedures would also mark a step toward estab-lishing launch operations that functioned morelike airline operations.

Lack of Sufficient Incentives for LoweringCosts.The current institutional and manage-ment structure provides few incentives for reduc-ing costs of launching the Shuttle or ELVS forGovernment payloads. The system does not haveincentives built in for achieving low-cost, success-ful launches, observed one workshop participant.

There is the incentive not to fail, but not the in-centive to lower costs. Several participants notedthat NASA lacked the administrative structure fortracking funds and responsibilities by item to re-ward managers directly for reducing costs and in-creasing efficiency. Participants also pointed tothe fact that although it is possible to fashion in-centives for top-level management, it is difficultto make suitable incentives transfer down to theguys who do the work on the launch pad.

A recent study echoed these points and foundthat contractors generally have little incentive to

reduce costs because their profit/cash flow isU.S. Air Force, Strategic Defense Initiative Launch Site Con-

siderations, Report No. TOR-0084A 5460-04 )-1 (Los Angeles, CA:Air Force Space Division, July 1985).


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reduced when they perform under budget. Inaddition, the program officers do not have anincentive to reduce spending below the program

budgeted amount.2

ISSUE D: What Impediments To Reducing Oper-ations Costs Are Unique to the Space Shuttle?

The complexity of Shuttle and payload proc-essing, and crew training, require substantial an-nual investment in personnel and facilities. Thefollowing points illustrate the most important im-pediments to reducing the costs of Shuttle launchand mission operations:

Shuttle still in development. Although NASAdeclared the Shuttle system operational af-ter the fourth flight, it has as yet not achievedtrue operational status.21 Because the Shut-tle is still undergoing major design changes,it requires a larger launch operations staff

than an operational

22

system. For example,NASA employs about 5000 engineers atKSC, Marshall Space Flight Center, and JSCwho work on Shuttle systems. They havestrong incentives to implement changes forincreasing safety and performance, many ofwhich increase the time and cost of prepar-ing Shuttle for flight. On the other hand,there are few incentives for increasing oper-ations efficiency and reducing costs.

Safety requirements. Because the Shuttlecarries human crews, and because it is ahighly visible symbol of American techno-

logical prowess, safety issues receive un-usually great attention. As a result of the in-vestigation of Shuttle subsystems followingthe loss of Challenger and its crew in Janu-ary, 1986, the Shuttle system is now under-going many major safety-related changes,23

which have led to considerable system re-

Space Systems and Operat ions Cost Reducti on and Cost Credi-

bil i ty Work shop: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: NationalSecurity Industrial Association, January 1987), p. 2-2.

Z] George E. Mue]]er Panel discussion, Space Systemsproductivity

and Manufact uri ng Conference W (El Segundo, CA: AerospaceCorp., August 1987), pp. 232-235.

The

term operational irnp]iesthat the vehicle in question iscapable of being launched routinely on a well-defined schedule witha minimum of unplanned delays.

23 Ma jor alterations include improvements

to the SRBSmodifi

cations of theSSMES,

and installation of an escape hatch in theorbiter.

design. These changes have also increased thetime and complexity of launch operations.Prior to the loss of Challenger, NASA hadreduced the turnaround time necessary toprepare the Shuttle orbiter for flight to about55 workdays (three shifts a day) .24 NASA ex-pects orbiter turnaround for the first fewflights to equal about 150 workdays, decreas-ing to an average 75 workdays only after 4years of additional experience.25 However,judging from the experience in preparing Dis-covery for the first reflight of the Shuttlesince the Challenger explosion, this sort ofturnaround may be extremely difficult toachieve.Lack of spares; cannibalizat ion of orbiter

par ts . The Shuttle program has had a con-tinuing problem maintaining a sufficientstock of major spare parts and subsystems.For example, 45 out of 300 replacement parts

needed for Challenger on mission 51-L hadto be removed from Discovery.2b This hassignificantly impeded the ability of launchcrews to refurbish and test Shuttle orbiters

between flights. Each time a part must betaken from one orbiter to substitute for adefective part in another, the amount of la-bor required more than doubles (table 2-5).In addition, the process increases the chancesof damaging either the part or the subsystemfrom which it is removed. Although NASAhas improved its stock of spares for the Shut-tle, the budget allocated for spares continues

to be a target for reductions. NASA runs acontinuing risk of having to cannibalize partsfrom one orbiter to process another.Complexity of the Shutt le systems.TheShuttle was a revolutionary step in launchsystems, and was not designed for opera-tional simplicity. As with experimental air-craft, many of its systems are highly com-plex, and made up of a multitude of parts

Z4This does not include time the orbiter spends in the Vehicle As-

sembly Building and on the launch pad.Z5Charles R. Gunn, Space Shuttle Operations Experience, pa-

per presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronauti-cal Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987.

ZbReport

of the presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle

Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1986).


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Table 2-5.Steps in the Changeout of DefectiveParts in the Shuttle Orbiter When Replacement

Spares Are Unavailable

A part is needed for orbiter A. It is not in the parts inventory,but is available in orbiter B, which is not scheduled to fly forseveral months. The following steps are necessa~:+

+

+

+

+

Document steps of part% removal from orbiter B.Remove part from orbiter B. (It takes longer to

remove a part from an orbiter than to take it from

storage.)Document installation in orbiter A.install the part in orbiter A.Test part in orbiter A.Document installation of replacement part in orbiter B.instaii replacement part in orbiter B.Test replacement part in orbiter B.

+ = Addition to standard procedure.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 198S.

that need to be inspected or repaired.27 Forexample, each of the solid rocket boosters(SRBS), one of the simpler Shuttle elements,contains about 75,000 parts and components.

Of these, about 5,000 are removed, in-spected, and replaced or refurbished aftereach Shuttle flight. A design that required in-specting and handling of fewer parts wouldrequire fewer launch personnel. However,the costs of redesign, testing, and acceptanceof such a simplified design must be taken intoaccount.

The thermal protection system, composedof over 31,000 fragile tiles, requires carefulinspection and repair, an extremely labor in-tensive operation. Although only about sotiles now need replacing because of damageafter each flight, all of them must be in-spected. 28 Not only must they be inspectedfor damage, they must also be tested foradherence to the vehicle, and the gaps be-tween tiles carefully measured to assure suffi-cient space for thermal expansion upon reen-try. (See ch. 4, box 4-A for a description of

ZTGeorge E. Mueller, Panel on Productivity Issues for Space andLaunch Systems, Space Systems Productivi ty and M anufacturi ngConference

W (El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corporation, 1987),pp. 232-35.

zeonly a few ti]es are interchangeable; most areunique three

dimensional shapes that are fitted to the curved surfaces of the or -biter. Charles R. Gunn, Space Shuttle Operations Experience, pa-per presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronauti-cal Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987, p. 2.

a semi-automated system for inspecting andreplacing the TPS. )

Finally, the Shuttle orbiter has about250 ,000 electrical connections which must betested for continuity. Each time one of the8,000 connectors is disconnected or removed,there is a chance that one or more pins will

be damaged or will otherwise fail to recon-

nect properly.

ISSUE E: What Can the Operational Experienceof the Airlines Contribute to Space Operations?

Although the technical and managerial con-straints on airlines operations are quite differentthan for launch vehicles, certain of their meth-ods used in logistics, maintenance, task schedul-ing, and other ground operations categories mayprovide a useful model for making launch oper-ations more efficient and cost-effective. Becauseof the extreme volatility of launch propellants and

a relatively low launch rate, other airlines meth-ods may not be applicable to launch or missionoperations. Chapter 4 discusses the specific ap-plications of airline operations practices to spaceoperations. Many of these lessons are being ap-plied in the Advanced Launch System program(see

ch. 4). The airlines:

. . . begin cost con ta inm ent program at p la n-n ing sta ge. 29 New aircraft design takes into

account operational requirements such assupport equipment, logistics flow, and facil-ity design, as well as payload characteristics

and route structure, in the early planningstages.. . . involve operat ions p ersonn el in d esignchanges. As one workshop participant ob-served, the chief objective of the airlines isto move a seat from A to B as quickly andefficiently as possible. Safety is a primarygoal, but increased efficiency is a basic re-quirement for making any design change.Increases in efficiency must outweigh anyshortcomings brought about by incorporat-ing such a design change in the entire system.

Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credi-bility Workshop, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: NationalSecurity Industrial Association, January 1987), pp. 2-18-2-19.


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. . . have developed deta i led cost est imat in gre lat ionship s for operat ions. When an aircraftmanufacturer suggests improved equipmentfor an aircraft subsystem, the airline can gen-erally estimate the recurring and non-recurring costs and any potential savings to

be gained. The airlines also have an exten-

sive historical database to assist them in test-ing the accuracy of their own cost estimationmodels.. . . s tand down to tr ace and r epair fail ur esonl y when th e evi dence poin ts to a generi cfailure. Generally the airlines continue fly-ing when one aircraft has crashed unless thereis clear initial evidence of a generic fault inthe aircraft model. For example, in the No-vember, 1987 crash of a DC9 in a Denversnowstorm, other DC9s continued to fly.However, in the 1979 crash of a DC1O in Chi-cago, the entire DC1O fleet was grounded be-

cause there was early evidence that the wingmounting of one of the engines had failed,and safety officials were concerned thatgeneric structural faults might have causedthe failure.. . . insist on aircraft designed for fault tol-erance. Commercial aircraft are designed tobe robust enough to fly even when they haveknown faults. Airlines, with thousands offlights per day, have developed a minimum-equipment list a list of vital operationsequipment that is absolutely mandatory forflight; if any of this equipment malfunctions

on pre-flight check-out, the plane is groundeduntil the problem is fixed. The existence ofsuch a list means that an aircraft can fly withknown faults as long as they are not on theminimum equipment list.

. . design air craft for mai ntai nabi l i ty. Com-mercial