rcss policy studies 7 proliferation of small arms and ... policy studies 7.pdf‘small arms’ in a...

33
RCSS Policy Studies 7 Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh Neila Hussain

Upload: others

Post on 25-Apr-2020

3 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

RCSS Policy Studies 7

Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South Asia:

The Case of Bangladesh

Neila Hussain

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Trends and Sources of Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia : Impact on Politics

Chapter 3: Proliferation of Small Arms in Bangladesh

Chapter 4: Impact of Proliferation of Small Arms on Politics in Bangladesh

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

As we enter the new millennium, the globe is armed to the teeth with myriad of weapons, and at least in number a significant proportion of them is small weaponry. Due to the availability of arms, a great change has taken place globally, regionally and nationally. In the nation-state system, not only are arms linked with external security, but have also disrupted internal security. As one expert observes, wars that were fought until the 20th century were always “counter-state” as against “counter-society”1 However, the scenario has changed today. Findings of a study shows that in 1994, of the 31 major armed conflicts in 27 locations around the world, no ‘classic’ interstate war was waged.2 This study attempts to demonstrate the fact that armed violence are mainly internal on account of a nexus between local politicians and a thriving underworld.

The technology, quality, and use of arms have gone through a sea of change following the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima in 1945. While the devastating effects of the first atomic bomb made the issue of disarmament, arms control and détente more vital for world peace, big powers, nonetheless, continued to spend a lion’s share of their defense budget in nuclear research. With the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union, the western fear of the world being dominated by communism naturally ceased. The Cold War had drained the economies of major powers to the extent that domestic pressures wereforcing governments to concentrate on nuclear disarmament and economic development. However, while global and regional security paradigms were dominated by weapons of mass destruction, a parallel proliferation that continued with greater ease concerned light weapons and small arms.

‘Light weapon’ is used as a generic term to describe all conventional arms that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a lightvehicle. Small arms fall into the sub-category consisting of automatic weapons up to 20 mm, including submachine guns, rifles, carbines and handguns3. Small arms are defined as crew portable weapons andtherefore, their destruction power is very low in intensity compared to that of conventional weapons. Yet, weapons such as revolvers, rifles, explosives and those of similar kind are the means of violence in most of the conflicts of the world. It is a misperception that small arms only include arms that are small in size; rather it now encompasses anti-tank weapons and rocket propelled grenades.

In Jane’s Infantry, it has been noted that small arms embrace “all crewportable direct fire weapons of less than 50 mm and will include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters.”4 Studies on wound ballistics have shown that small caliber weapons with higher muzzle velocity bullets cause large wounds and more tissue damage due to the tumble effect. ‘Small arms’ in a classical military nomenc lature, constitute a major chunk in the panoply of light weapons seen in internal conflicts.5 In the World War II, the caliber of small arms were limited to 12.7 mm. Due to advanced technology that improved theaccuracy, lethality, rates of fire of these man-portable weapons, it is believed that NATO extended its definition in 19836. The Dictionary of Weapons & Military Terms defines small arms as ‘all arms, including

automatic weapons, up to and including those of .60 cal. and shotguns.’ Small-arms ammunitions are all ammunition up to and including those of .60 cal. and all gauges of shotgun shells7.

Adjectives such as ‘small’ and ‘light’, describing weapons barelyreveal their true destructive capability. These weapons are major ineffect, even though minor in physical terms.8 In addition to the traditional guns, modern variations of small arms ranging from home-made bombs to rocket launchers are used extensively. Following are some types of small arms and their firing capacity:Kalashnikov AK-47assault rifle fires away a box of 30 rounds in three seconds flat with each round lethal up to a range of half a kilometer. The American M-16 rifle tears off a person’s arm by a single bullet and was captured by the North Vietnamese after the fall of the government and sold reportedly in the world market. It is reported that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) uses the weapons extensively. The German Heckler & Loch MP5K sub-machine gun weighs only two kg and fires at a rate of 840 rounds per minute. Another popular weapon is the AM 180 that has a cyclic rate of fire of 1500 rounds per minute. The Soviet made RPG 7 preferred by guerrilla and terrorist groups launches 2.25 kg grenades at speeds of almost 1,200 km/hour. The Armbrust 300 is an anti-tank weapon that emerged very recently and unlike other weapons, it is a one-shotdisposable missile that produces no flash, no noise and no smoke.9

During the Cold War, big powers discussed arms control and disarmament to prevent another total war while at the same time supplying weapons to low intensity conflicts. The impact was not small because of the use of small arms and the lack of high-tech weapons. Rather, the prolonged ‘little wars’ in South America sustained themselves because of the availability of small arms and light weapons. The picture has been similar in Asia. Insurgency wars, guerrilla warfare, ethnicconflicts etc. were fought in different parts of the continent.

The issue of small arms can no longer be ignored or given lessimportance. One may, therefore, question the impact of the pervasivephenomenon of small arms proliferation on the society as a whole,specifically on the domestic political process in the developingcountries. Proliferation of small arms in South Asia is no exception. Rather, in the light of current developments, it appears that they have become an indispensable menace in the South Asian societies. In the case of India and Pakistan relations, alongside mutual deep-rootedmistrust and bitterness that have paved the way to nuclear arms race, there are many simmering internal conflicts on both sides that have kept the proliferation of small arms very much alive. The same applies to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka in their fight for autonomy have always been heavily armed. In Bangladesh, arms were used extensively in the war of independence of 1971. Untilrecently an insurgent movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region, in the name of sub-national aspirations and autonomy of a section of the indigenous people has been waging an insurgency campaign against the government. In the case of Bangladesh, the use of arms has spread more widely, to the extent that expressions of any disagreementbetween political parties in power and in the opposition are found to be violent. The frequency of politically motivated violence has increased over the decades with such an ease that can be dangerous for the healthy growth of politics in any modern state system. What is then the link between small arms proliferation and political violence? How does it affect the wider political process itself?

The present study is based on the hypothesis that there is widespread proliferation of small arms in South Asia that have entered into mainstream politics of some of the countries of the region.

The study aims to find answers to how, why, where and when arms have become closely connected with national politics. There have been studies showing the linkage between small arms and conflict and small arms and drug trafficking. But links between small arms and their potentialend-use have remained rather unexplored.

In this study, the term ‘small arms’ refers to the definition given by the Charter of NATO. It also must be noted that throughout the study,‘proliferation of small arms will’ refer to the illegal spread of small arms and light weapons. The term politics will include everything that has affiliation to it, meaning political structure, political culture, politicians, elections, voting rights etc. Although Bangladesh remains the central concern, a general picture of the political impact of small arms proliferation in South Asian countries will be provided in the study withparticular reference to India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka where theproblem of arms proliferation is comparatively acute.

Studies on proliferation of arms have often depended on externalvariables, such as source, productions, types etc. Yet, it is imperative that a social scientist looks one step deeper into the socio-psychological behavior of different personalities and professionals in order toidentify the internal factors that make the use of arms lucrative in a nascent democratic society. Two sets of variables have been analyzed in this study: (a) the inflow and spread of small arms will be identified in this paper as the independent variable; and (b) the structure andpattern of politics in terms of political culture, political norms andbehavior, party political process and more importantly, the process of democratic governance as the dependent variable.

The study is based on primary and secondary information withextensive empirical evidence. In the first place, one local newspaper which is known to give coverage on spread of small arms was systematically scanned for two years on a sampling basis in order to identify the trend/pattern of the flow of arms. The vernacular daily newspaper, The Inqilab was selected for this purpose for the period between June 1994 and June 1996 as this newspaper gives more coverage on the study involved.

To supplement the media information, a field survey was conducted in two places - Dhaka and Sylhet. The interview findings and mediacoverage on the linkage between arms and politics constitute thesignificant part of the study. Some interviews with key opinion-shapers, government officials and student political activists are also reflected.

The paper has been developed into five main chapters. Chapter two discusses the trends and sources of the proliferation of small arms in South Asia, and its impact on politics. Chapter three focuses on the proliferation of small arms in Bangladesh, while chapter four highlights the impact of small arms proliferation on politics in Bangladesh. Chapter five summarises the main arguments and puts forward some recommendations. 1.Prashant Dikshit, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapon” StrategicAnalysis, Vol. XVII, No. 2, May 1994, p.188. 2.Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallesteen defined major armed conflict as prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people during the entire conflict,“Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”, SIPRI Yearbook, 1995.3.Christopher Louise, The Social Impacts of Light Weapons

Availability and Proliferation, Discussion Paper, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995, p.1. 4.Jane’s Infantry. 5.Dikshit, “Internal Conflict and Role of Light Weapons” in Jasjit Singh (ed.)Light Weapons and International Security, 1995, p.41. 6.Jasjit Singh, “Light Weapons and Conflict in Southern Asia” in Ibid, p.51. 7.John Quick, Dictionary of Weapons & Military Terms, New York, p.404. 8.Aaron Karp, “Small Arms: The New Major Weapons”, Ploughshares Monitor, September 1995, p.17.

9.For details on the types of small arms, see, Prashant Dikshit, op. cit., p.190-191.

Trends and Sources of Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia : Impact on Politics At the threshold of the 21st century, the concept of modern warfare needs rethinking. According to Aaron Karp, throughout the presentcentury, images of warfare were dominated by major weapons systems in which war was synonymous with the use of technically sophisticated tanks and aircraft, ships and missiles. However, in the twenty-firstcentury this image may be all but irrelevant. The nature of conflict around the world is changing, and with it, the instruments of human strife.1 Weapons of mass destruction that are still dominating strategic thinking remain in the background, rather the flow of small arms and light weapons is becoming most relevant to the incidents of internal conflicts and the outcome of recent wars..2 In Karp’s words, “no longer is the greatest challenge of arms trade policy the riddle of controlling the trade in major weapons between nations; rather, it is the problem of addressing the flow of small and light arms to fragile governments andsub-state groups.”3 By the end of 1994, of the 49 wars in progress, small arms and light weapons were the primary source of violence in all of them while in 46 of them they were the only means.4 South Asia, home of one fifth of humanity living in seven developing states with fragile ethnic and social structure presents a case in point where proliferation of small arms and spread of internal conflicts with crossborder implication go hand in hand. Against this backdrop, the present chapter provides an overview of the pattern of proliferation of small arms in South Asia and its linkage in general with politicalprocess in the South Asian countries. However, to view the dynamics of small arms proliferation in a broader perspective, sources of small weapons at a general level are outlined.

Source of Weapons Procurement (i) The State as the Supplier: According to Jane’s InfantryWeapons, small arms are procured mainly from the developed countries like USA, Russia/former USSR, France, Britain, Germany, China,Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Israel, Singapore, SouthAfrica, Spain, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. In addition, many third world countries manufacture small arms and light weapons on their own with licensing agreements with major suppliers.5However, the traditional art of weapons trade that was confined to state-to-state armstransfer, became complicated after 1945 as government sales were made no longer only of surplus munitions (that were not needed for a country’s own military purpose), but also for arming allies or friendly insurgents. Of the limited information available on sales of small arms, unlike on that of major weapons which is freely available, a study shows that US government’s international sale of selected light weapons included 132,466 M16 rifles, 15,005 M14 rifles, 10,421 grenade launchers, 30,178 M1911.45-cal. pistols, 1.4 million M67 hand grenades, and 211,408 M18A1 anti-personnel mines sold to foreign governments through the State Department between 1980 and 1993. Major customers included Bahrain, El Salvador, Lebanon, andThailand.6The US provided foreign governments with $55.2 billion worth of arms and ammunition under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) between 1950 and 1994 in addition to another $ 6.5b worth of excess military hardware. Of these perhaps 10 to 20 per cent were small arms.7Big powers make covert transfers to friendly insurgents in the form of grants, gifts, and sales and to separatist groups in foreigncountries. In 1975-76 the CIA provided anti-communist insurgents in Angola 622 crew-served mortars, 42,100 anti tank rockets, 20,900 rifles and millions of rounds of ammunitions..8Similarly, the former Soviet Union

and China supplied their respective allies with arms andammunitions, and military assistance including training. During the war in Afghanistan, the Soviets aided Najibullah’s government whilePakistan took arms from China and USA. Thus, in almost all of theon-going conflicts, a major source of supply of arms was made by the governments directly or indirectly. The nature of the transfer and its transparency dimension, depends on the pattern in the transaction, as may be seen below:

State as a Source of Arms Transfer

IState AState B (usually transparent) IIState ANon-State Actors of State B (non-transparent) IIIState AState BNon-State Actors of State C (partially trasparent) IVState AState BNSA in State CNSA in State D (transparency increasingly lost)

(ii) Theft from Government Arsenals: Stealing arms and ammunitions from national storehouses has become a common source of illicit arms procurement. Economic compulsions, political motives, lack of security etc. are often the cause of theft from government warehouses that are stored with modern and improved weapons and ammunitions. The act of stealing and their illegal sales are in most cases made/perpetuated by the storekeepers and the security personnel themselves. During the war in Afghanistan, of the original 900 Stinger SAMS that the US supplied to Pakistan to deliver to the Mujahideen, as many as 560 were untraceable. There were reports that 312 of these were sold in Landi Kotal market in January 1993.9 Cases that reported theft of small arms and light weapons fromstorehouses increased after the break-up of the Soviet Union when law and order had deteriorated in the former communist countries.In Russia and the former Soviet states, poverty, unemployment, frustration and other socioeconomic compulsions forced men in uniform to sell their own weapons to arms traders. (iii) Transnational Criminal Organizations: As the world enters the next century, control over key economic and trade decisions isgradually shifting from state authorities to transnational economicinstitutions. Criminal enterprises are benefiting from the declininginterference of state regulations by operating on a global scale, moving contraband to places where there is market. These have been termed as Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) meaning ‘large andsophisticated entities that operate like multinational corporations.’ It has been assumed that the TCO, with their increased reach andeffectiveness, are better poised to supply arms and ammunitions toinsurgents and separatist groups that depend on illicit purchases to meet their military demand.10 These criminal organizations have closelinkages with a variety of illegal trades such as drug trade, goldsmuggling, arms trade etc. thereby building a strong underworldnetwork. Their power to defy national and international laws stem from the fact that TCOs not only possess money-power, but also very strong linkages with influential individuals including politicians. South Asia is no exception in this connection, as there are many such powerful entities in the region that provide arms to insurgents, terrorist and other criminals.

(iv) The Black Market:Another source of arms procurement is through trade in the black market. The trade is legal when arm dealers including manufacturing firms sell the desired weapons throughofficial channels. However, the trade becomes illegal when sales are made secretly without official registration. Illicit arms transfer has been the common source of arms procurement in recent times. Arms traded in the black markets and even being shipped to foreign countries are cold war phenomena that continue to this day, if not having worsened. All kinds of

small arms and light weapons are found in these black areas and their prices vary from time to time. In South Asia, most of the arms that the insurgents get hold of are purchased from illegal dealers whose sources can range from theft to actual purchase from middle men. In fact, it appears that a gun changes many hands before it gets into those of the end user. Although black markets are supposed to be secret meeting places for the seller and the buyer, they are not always so. In the North Western Frontiers of Pakistan (NWFP), arms are sold openly to locals and foreigners allegedly with the knowledge of the authorities there.

(v) Local Production: Until a few decades ago, armswere mostly imported or smuggled in from foreign countries or arms traders.Gradually the art of making ones own weapons became familiar and more practised. The main incentives for locally producing small arms and light weapons are the following:

(a) Since the end of the Cold War, US’ and Russia’s military aid to insurgents came to a halt. For instance,in the case of South Asia, the withdrawal of former Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the decline of US pipeline of arms to Pakistan compelled local arms markets to develop to meet the demand;

(b) Smuggling weapons into the country were often risky as it had to pass through the ever increasing tight border security. The risk of being caught, on the one hand, and depending too much on the transnational underworld of arms trafficking on the other hand could be reduced if some types were locally produced; and, (c) Locally produced weapons turned out to be cheaper thanimported arms and thus, the demand for home-made arms increased, raising the profit side of the business as well. In Pakistan, counterfeits of imported weapons which are available openly at the Darra’ Bazaar in the North Western Frontier Province have also attracted neighbouring buyers. Hence, it could be observed: firstly, transactions in small armsusually involves many hands; secondly, it is in most cases linked to trade in other commodities, usually contraband and illegal goods; thirdly, the more transactions are linked to illegal goods and made by non-state actors, the less transparent they become.

Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia Detailed data of the quantity and origins of small arms in South Asia are not available. However, it is indisputable knowledge that this region contains a very large number of light weapons acquired both through transfer, trade and local production.11The quantity and quality of arms that have increased the volume of arms available in South Asia is a result of the political and security environment prevailing since the independence of India and Pakistan. There is a further increase after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Historically, the politico-security atmosphere in the aftermath of the Second World War did not escape the South Asian region. The ideological rift between the capitalist and communist bloc led by the USA and the Soviet Union respectively was reflected in this region in the form of proxy wars, arms race, inter-state conflict etc. The instability in South Asia reached its height during the war in Afghanistan in the late 1970s. Although Afghanistan is not usuallyconsidered to be within South Asia, developments in this countrycertainly has an impact on its neighbours. Pakistan’s security, forinstance, was very much affected by the set up of the Soviet backed puppet government of Najibullah in Kabul. Islamabad developed a hot line with Washington that made sure that Pakistan’s army was well equipped with millions of dollars worth of arms. Currently, there are allegations that the spread of small

arms and light weapons in thePakistan-Afghanistan region has reached a saturation point. Over 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles are believed to be available in Karachi alone that are outside government control. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the figure is as high as 3 million. In the NWFP district of Dir, the population in 1992 was 1.2 million when 2 million weapons were reported to be available.12In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, totalnumber of Kalashnikov assault rifles may be as high as 3 million while 13-25 million landmines were assessed in the same region.13

In South Asia, the largest consumers of small arms are the non-state actors comprising of insurgent groups, separatists, terrorists, drugcartels, extortionists and criminals. According to one expert on small arms, this is a global trend in which small arms have diffused throughout the world, into all levels of society rather than proliferated.According to him, proliferation suggests “an increase in thenumber of weapons possessed by certain governments, or in the number of states possessing a particular weapon system.” On the other hand, “diffusion suggests the dispersion of arms within societies, extending not only to governments and state owned entities but also to private armies and militias, insurgent groups, criminal organizations and other non-state actors.14

The weaponry used by the insurgents has improved from 1984onwards. With US support, automatic AK-47 replaced the old British rifles and recoilless guns, heavy machine guns and rockets were flown in from Pakistan to Afghanistan.15Copious quantities of Kalashnikov varieties were found in ample in South Asia such as the AK-47, Type 56, Simonov and Dragunor rifles; RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers with rockets and varieties of machine guns including the Soviet shoulder fired Strela (SAM-7 anti-air craft).The year 1986 marked a turning point when weapons of much greater sophistication started to flow into the region.

There was a significant policy turnaround by the CIA whenweapons other than the Soviet brands were introduced, namely, the American General Dynamics Stinger, The Franco-German anti-tank rocket Milan, Spanish 120 Mar mortars etc. Among the newly introduced weapons, the ‘stinger’ proved to be the most effective. In the Afghan war it was instrumental in changingthe course of the war and thereby accelerating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.17By way of comparison it may be noted that the Soviet origin ‘Strela’ attacked 47 air crafts with 510 firing, while the improved version downed 269aircraft hit by 340.18

Factors Contributing to Illicit Arms Proliferation in South Asia

Conflict and Arms Nexus: The cases of conflicts within the state have outnumbered the number of incidents of inter-state conflicts. These conflicts stem from different kinds of demands by a section of the population, in most cases a minority group, demanding for more autonomy, a separate homeland or attempting to overthrow the government. Inalmost all countries of South Asia there are many examples of insurgency or guerrilla warfare where the insurgents or rebels are in most of the cases, supplied with arms by a foreign country that is sympathetic to their cause or has its national interest at stake. Religious fanaticism and ethno-nationalism have been the main factor behind many conflicts in South Asia. The Hindu-Muslim riots in the aftermath of the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, the boiling crisis in Kashmir and the Punjab crisis in India, in Pakistan the liberation movement by its eastern wing in 1971 that led to the

creation of Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) issue in Bangladesh itself, the Tamilseparatist movement in Sri Lanka etc. are to name only a few examples that highlight the linkage between small arms procurement and conflict in South Asia. The traditional practice to aid insurgents with arms and ammunitions continues even after the Cold War is over. Although thehegemonic tendencies of the super powers are no longer physically present in the region, their pipeline of military assistance continues. Weapons obtained by means of such transactions are popular among rebels because of their relative light weight and simple techniques. Also the price is affordable and in recent years, counterfeit arms are being produced locally, thereby making them easily available in localmarkets. Arms and Drugs Nexus: Another cause for the illicit transfer of arms is the arms and drug nexus in the sub-continent. South Asia is at the crossroads of the famous drug trafficking routes, such as the Golden Triangle. To be more precise this part of the region is flanked by two of the most biggest producers of opium: namely Myanmar in the east and Afghanistan in the west. In Myanmar, according to the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), opium cultivation has increased since 1988, with over 146,600 hectares under cultivation most of which is near the country’s borders with China and Thailand.19The Americans played an important role in Myanmar’s growing opium industry. The US in their support for the Koumintang were believed to ferry weapons and drugs out of the country with the help of the Taiwanese.20

On the opposite flank, Afghanistan was another nexus for drugs and arms. Similar to the Myanmar case, here too the opium industry grew in response to the need for sustaining the war against the Najibullah government by the Mujahideen rebels. In 1994, Afghanistan remained the second largest opium producer in the world according to USestimates.21Gradually, the drug operation spread in neighbouringcountries especially in Pakistan. Drug money was used for purchase of arms. In fact, there are reports that suggest that drug money was institutionalized by banks such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in which the founder of the Bank, Aga Hasan Abedi was found guilty for laundering the massive profits from drug operations and was suspected to have funded Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.22

The drug trade and arms proliferation are inter-linked for manyreasons. Of these, the two noticeable causes are the need for security and the need for new markets. From the security angle, the drug dealers need protection to move the bulk of the contraband item from one place to another, and thus, build-up their own army. The other obvious reason is the profit motive in which the drug lords need to expand their market from time to time. In the case of Myanmar and Afghanistan, we see how cleverly the drug lords have created a market for narcotics: first, by financing the separatists and other disgruntled people with arms in return for which the poor rebels engaged in poppy cultivation; secondly, by ensuring a market for the end product by increasing drug consumption in those and neighbouring area even when the war is over.

Crime and Small Arms Nexus: Demand for arms does not remain confined to insurgents and drug cartels alone. In recent times arms are bought by large criminal gangs that engage in activities that range from a simple theft to extortion. In South Asia, socio-economic backwardness is one of the prime causes for the increase in crime. Poverty,unemployment, illiteracy, inadequate housing, are to name a few of the factors that are directly or indirectly responsible for the youth to be drawn into the world of crime. With time, the improvised, primitive weapons are being gradually replaced by small arms to demonstrate their muscle-power over their victims. While

cases of crime may appear to be looked upon as individual incidents, at the broader perspective there is a large underworld network operating by a powerful group making profits from selling and sometimes even renting out weapons to criminals. Thus, the demand for weapons by the criminals and theavailability of small arms bring the two closer.

Arms and Politics Nexus: The relation between arms and politics in South Asia should no longer be regarded as a trivial problem. Theproblem exists and is a major threat to the internal security and development of a state. For too long the linkage between arms and politics has remained under wraps while the nexus between arms and drugs, arms and insurgencies, arms and terrorism were given prominence. Yet, in recent times, political crime is increasing in almost all South Asian countries. Politicians directly or indirectly support and sponsor terrorism, engage in criminal offenses including manslaughter in order to achieve political gains, to take revenge or annihilate adversaries. Hence, the demand for arms arises among political parties to the extent that in some of the South Asian countries, politicians are alleged to have their own armed cadres. While the subject of linkage betweenpolitics and arms will be dealt in greater detail later on, it is sufficient to say at this stage that political motive is one reason for small arms procurement in South Asia.

Arms and Profit Nexus: The commercial aspect of the arms trade was formerly restricted to arms transfer made by the state and by arms manufacturing firms. But the trade over the years has become wider and more complex. In the initial years following 1945, states made profits by selling weapons from their stockpiles to their allies and later tonon-state actors. With time the huge profit lured individuals into the business of arms trade. The trade becomes more profitable because of its clandestine nature and also because it could be linked to the clandestine trades such as gold, narcotics and other banned items. In the form of barter trade, a group of influential people such as the Mafia were creating new markets for their products. Myanmar is a case in point. The rebels in Burma produced opium and sold to warlords whosupplied them with arms in return. Socio-economic disparities were also compulsions for the unemployed youth to be lured into this business.

Nature of Politics in South Asia

South Asia is one of the most diverse regions of the world. Itsdiversity in language, culture and religion not only crosses borders but also exists within national boundaries. As a result of its heterogeneous characteristics, one of the greatest challenge for the South Asian statesmen is to maintain peace within and outside the country. But, such a task is rendered very difficult due to the internal and external variables that influence South Asian politics.

South Asian politics is to a large extent Indo-centric. Almost all the countries of South Asia have at least one common border with India. Sri Lanka and Maldives are exceptions but their geographical proximity to India puts them in a position similar to the rest of the South Asian countries. As a result of the geographical reality, India is the cornerstone of not only the foreign policies but also the domestic politics of all the South Asian countries. Moreover, inter-state relations between South Asian countries are asymmetric in the sense that unequal power relationship exists between the countries. India is big in terms ofpopulation, military power and

GNP. India’s neighbours have atendency to perceive India as their source of threat to security, while India considers its neighbours as an integral part of its own security system.23India’s interference into the internal affairs of its neighbours does not make their sense of ‘India-phobia’ unfounded. India’s support which included alleged military assistance to the Tamil Separatists in Sri lanka and the Shantibahini in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) are only a few examples of Indian interference in domestic affairs of its neighbours.

All South Asian countries (excepting Bhutan) are in their nascent stage of democracy with the exception of India, which has a longer history of democracy. Although Pakistan emerged as a nation-state at around the same time as India, it was not until recently that democracy was ushered in with the holding of free and fair elections. 23 out of 38 years of her independent life, Pakistan has spent under direct or indirect military rule24. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal soon followed suit in their run for democracy. In Nepal the King was forced by popular demand to introduce parliamentary system after which he remains as a mere symbol as the Head of State of Nepal. In Bangladesh, popular uprising in 1990 ended the long nine years of dictatorship that wasfollowed by free and fair elections in the country. Yet, due to longautocratic rule in almost all the South Asian countries, democraticfoundations are still weak. Basic democratic institutions such as the Parliament or the Judiciary system as well as basic democratic rights such as freedom of speech, human rights etc., are yet to be established in order for political systems to operate smoothly.

The South Asian countries, except for Bhutan and Nepal, werecolonies of the European powers. Each gained independence afterpopular upsurge that stemmed not from the grassroot level, rather from a section of people who received education from the West and belonged to the elite class. As a result, the political structure, political beliefsystems, political culture etc. in this part of the world are elite-based, creating a wide gap between rulers and the masses.

Internal conflicts are perhaps the most distinctive feature of South Asia, which is likely to remain for a long time. Separatist or secessionist movements are a common phenomena that have their roots in ethnic, religious, or racial differences. The majority rule over the minority has created a complex set of problems in this part of the world that finds expression in intra-state strife. In fact, religion, caste and language have had vast serious and at times sinistrous potentialities of politicization. In India, the Punjab crisis, the Kashmir issue, the insurgencies in the Northeastern flank of India have all plagued the country for the last several years. In Pakistan, the case is similar with the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), and the crisis in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka caused by the minority Tamils against the majority Sinhalese over a separate homeland for the former has led to a civil war in the island state for over a decade now. In Bangladesh, though the scale was much smaller, the impact was not different. The tribal insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts that started with the demand for more autonomy culminated in the demand for aJummaland. Unrest in the CHT had cost the lives of innocent people, not to mention the deterioration of law and order situation there.

Politicization of religion has occasionally been the primary cause for riots and political violence among Hindus and Muslims in theIndian subcontinent. In a multi-religious region like South Asia, any sort or religious extremism is detrimental to its stability. The political philosophies of

the BJP in India or the Islamic fundamentalism inPakistan and Bangladesh have raised questions as to whether their roles help divide rather than unite the people in their respective countries.

In this complex South Asian politicalsetting the infusion of small arms and light weapons has rendered ‘politics’ apolitical, commercial and above all violent.

The Role of Small Arms in South Asia Politics

In South Asian politics, arms have played an intricate role, more so in domestic politics than in their inter-state relations. Since 1947, four regular wars took place in which the military of more than one state participated. (Pakistan-India in 1947, China-India in 1962, Pakistan-India in 1965 and Pakistan-India in 1971) However, the number ofirregular type of wars have been much higher.25A great number of the weaponry used in these wars are small arms and light weapons. These arms have a direct relation to the internal instability of the countries as they are used as the main instrument of violence. In other words, it is possible that if there had been the absence of arms, the issue of contention would have remained confined to peaceful demonstrations or other approaches of non-violence. However, as it appears in the case of South Asia, any kind of political dissent between state and non-state actors finds expression in the form of violence in which small arms are the main instrument.

From newspaper reports of arms frequently seized from non-state actors such as insurgents, it is apparent that these low-cost weapons have become an indispensable part of South Asian political scenario. Thus, the nexus between arms and politics lies in the potential power that such instruments have in order to serve the interest of state and non-state actors. The extent and nature of the insurgencies and guerrilla warfare in South Asia are a direct result of proliferation of arms. Political demands such as more autonomy, a separate home-state etc. could have never sustained for so long had there been no proliferation of small arms and light weapons in such a massive scale.

Linkages between sub-state groups and arms across boundaries are common. Reports of arms seized in one country for the political use of rebels of another country are well-known. For instance in 1997, one consignment of sophisticated arms reportedly for the Naga rebels in India was harled at Cox’s. Bazaar.26Continuation of the war in Afghanistan exemplified the role of light weapons. An estimated $ 6 billion worth of arms were reported to have been pushed through the pipeline of Afghanistan. The arms came from China, Egypt and Israel and South Africa27. Weapons acquisition through donation procurement or appropriation is critical for a military capability and capacity to oppose the state. Often a militant group will attempt to procure small arms,gradually shifting towards light weapons and increasingly towards more sophisticated armaments.28

Due to the easy proliferation of arms in South Asia, politics has become prone to violence. However, a dangerous dimension to it was added with the advent of terrorism, drug trafficking and guerrillawarfare aimed directly to destabilize regimes and erode the power of the state. The conventional inhibitions of not targeting the helpless seemed to disappear. The Kashmir issue, the MQM, CHT and so on are all intra-state conflicts where non-state actors destabilize the State. In the case of India, its internal troubles with insurgents carry potential force of destabilization.

For example, as series of riots in 1948-49, 1950, 1955, 1961 and 1971-72 witnessed the violent outburst of Assamese linguistic nationalism.29

In almost all South Asian countries political violence is a common phenomenon. Armed clash between non-state and state actors following protest, strikes, demonstration etc. is an oft-practiced art of politics in this region. Armed conflicts could have been short-lived and less violenthad small arms not entered the scenario as it has in recent times. As a result of its easy proliferation, conflicts are able to sustain in spite of military response by the government. In the case of CHT, the Shantibahini were a few in number in comparison to the troopsdeployed in their area. Yet, for the last 20 years or so they fought against the state. Such continuity is only possible due to the availability of small arms and light weapons. The same applies to the Tamils, the Kashmiri militants, the rebels in the Northeastern state of India. In contrast, when the flow of arms ceases totally or partially, the conflict is less likely to sustain with the same vigor and might, as it so happened in the case of Afganistan’s Mujahideens.

South Asian countries are in their nascent stage of democracy. In any democratic country, accountable and transparent institutions areprerequisites for the proper functioning of the state. There appears to be the absence of confidence between the State and its citizens. The fusion of light weapons and small arms into the political process has brought a setback for the development of democracy in South Asia. The basic characteristic of democracy is forming a government through free and fair elections. Even that right has been abused in many countries of South Asia. Vote-rigging, threats to election candidates, voting under threat of personal safety etc. are the result of proliferation of small arms among political parties. According to one author, “the electoral system has been perverted by money and muscle-power to serve the interest of the rich and powerful, apart from feudal, communal and caste elements.”30During the recent Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, the state police apparently had compiled a report in which 75 criminal gangs operating in the state were enlisted. 55 of them were said to have linkswith political parties and leaders of at least a dozen gangs were found to be MLAs or MPs. The Samajwadi Party patronized 25 gangs,Congress 13, BSP 8, BJP and Congress (Tewari) seven each31. Moreover automatic Rifles of the AK varieties had been distributed in Uttar Pradesh by the Bihar Coal Mafia to influence the voters.32Although the police knew which criminal gangs had procured these arms, they were unable to take action against them because every gang enjoys politicalpatronage.”33

Politics in some of the South Asian countries have established an uderworld network that links organized crime, drugs trafficking, arms smuggling and money laundering. A form of money laundering called Hawala funds was supposedly given to Hindu fundamentalists who were responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid, and also to theMuslims who organized the Bombay bomb blasts. Hawala money was said to be given to the Kashmiri secessionists and to politicians.34As a result, reports claim that, “crime syndicates have taken law into their own hands ... developing an extensive network and contact with thebureaucratic government functionaries at the local levels, politicians. Network of the Mafia is virtually running a parallel government,pushing the state apparatus into irrelevance”.35

The arms-politics-drugs nexus is also a common phenomenon that has dangerous fall-outs for the society. Opium is produced in 10 out of 29 provinces in Afghanistan. Of the ten, eight are under

the control of the Taliban producing 2,214 metric ton of opium - roughly 96% of total annual output in Afghanistan. The drugs are trafficked out to Western Europe and America through Pakistan, India and Central Asian Republics. And in return, huge quantities of small arms and light weapons aretrafficked in.

The casualties of death and injury are perhaps the most disturbing & distressing side of South Asian politics. Firing, bombing, killing are the after-effects of armed politics. According to one author, people died mostly in civil wars and intra-state conflicts and the weapons employed there were found to be in the category of small arms and minor weapons. Reports show that in 1990 as many as 16 ongoing conflicts and wars had claimed 2632,000 civilian lives.37In the 1980s, the proportion of civilian deaths rose to 74% of the total deaths in armed conflicts and in 1990 it appears to be close to 90%.38The war in Afghanistan is said to have cost nearly 500,000 lives and still there is little prospect of stability. The weapons have percolated to drug Mafia to maintain entire armies. A number of 560 stinger SAMS still remain unaccounted for posing a great threat to aviation activities.39Ethnic and communalviolence in India since early 1980s reached their highest since independence. Between 1983–1986, around 10,000 people were killed invarious separatist, ethnic and religious violence.40 According to the Human Rights Watch Arms Project, militancy in the Indian border region took a gian’s leap in the late 1980s, with a sudden upsurge in weapons both in Kashmir and Punjab. Where there had been 12 gauge shotguns and a few Stens, the influx of sophisticated weapons resulted in a dramatic increase in instances of violence on the unarmed civilian population. Seizures began to rise to 398 in 1988, to none two years earlier.41 Weapons that were captured in Jammu and Kashmir regions were found to be ‘identical’ to those identical provided by the ISI to theAfghan Mujahideen. Again, identical weapons of the Afghan war were seen in Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Azerbaijan.42As a result of this unrelenting cycle we already have nearly 60 million variants of Kalashnikov rifles distributed worldwide with a fair share in the hands of the undersirable.43

Conclusion It appears that proliferation of small arms into South Asian politics has social, economic and political implications that may threaten the internal and external security of an individual country. In a nutshell, small arms are a threat to national security as a whole and also cause a direct threat to individual. The long term impact of armed politics is harmful to political development. The use or the threat to use force has deep-rooted sociological implications that can hamper an individual’s perception of politics and political development. In the region that gave birth to politics of non-violence, it is a tragedy to witness Mahatma Gandhi’s political philosophy uprooted only to be replaced by destructive politics such as riots, terrorism, political killings etc. The traditional conflicts waged by sub-state groups such as the Kashmirimilitants, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Shantibahini in the CHT initially received sympathy. But theirruthlessness have turned public opinion against them. The problem is nowhere more acute than in the case ofBangladesh where arms are not confined to the CHT or the Shantibahinis. A country that is one of the most homogeneous entities in South Asia is nevertheless a victim of the fusion between arms and politics. In the following chapter, an overview of the proliferation of small arms in Bangladesh is discussed.

44.Dikshit, J. Singh (ed.), op. cit., p.46.

Proliferation of Small Arms in Bangladesh

There is very little accuracy in the data on the quantum of small arms in Bangladesh. According to the former HoAbdul Matin Choudhury, the number of illegal weapons in Bangladesh is a little more than one hundred thousaneven one percent of the arms has been recovered, and those that were, were usually ones that were old and rustedmodern weapons were rarely recovered.1However, three years before the Minister’s statement, in 1993 former InGeneral of Police said, that at that time illegal guns were in the possession of one million people.2 One study shoaround 100,000–133,000 arms are in illegal possession and two million criminals have access to those arms, givicirculation ratio of 1:15. In Dhaka alone there are allegedly 15 to 20 thousand arms. In thischapter, an attempt wishow the source and types of arms proliferation in Bangladesh. In this connection, newspapers for a two-year perJune 96) were monitored in order to find more information on the spread of small arms in Bangladesh, the types and the routes fromwhich they enter the country. Sources of Arms Procurement Legacies of the Liberation War The source of arms flow into Bangladesh can be traced back to the Liberation WDuring that time, there were internal andexternal sources of arms supply. The Cold War was at its height and althseparation of Pakistan was an internal affair, it received regional and international attention. There were those cosupported the separation, and those who opposed it. Accordingly, arms flowed in. Very little is known on the subproliferation of period, but it can be largely assumed that military assistance were given by interested blocs to bogovernment to suppress the movement, and also to the freedom fighters who fought against Pakistan in 1971 to lBangladesh, known as the Mukti Bahini, to carry it on. In fact, during the liberation struggle, not only did the freehave resource to arms but even pro Pakistan armed volunteers (known as the razakars) were raised and given armregime to counter the freedom fighters.3

After the victory i.e.’ in the immediate post-independence months, one of the greatest challenge for the then PrimSheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League government came from the thousands of armed freedom fighters who different factions including supporters of the Awami League. Despite Mujib’s repeated pleas, a largenumber of tfighters did not surrender their arms. As a result, armed factional fights became rampant and seriously taxed the ngovernment’s limited coercive capability.4The various factions of the Mukti Bahini numberd between 100,000–2men,5thelargest and most powerful single faction was that of Kader Siddiqui.6On January 17, Sheikh Mujib callesurrender of arms within ten days of time and reiterated that power does not come from the barrel of the gun bur from the people.7However, only 50,000 arms were surrendered.8 Thus, of the many sources of illicit weapons proBangladesh, a noticeable chunk came from those who had not returned the weapons in the post-independence yeafter repeated announcements by the then Awami League government to do so.

External Source

External source of arms procurement has played a significant role in the illicit proliferation of small arms amongactors in Bangladesh. The external sources are mainly of three types: (a) aforeign government that gives arms to insurgents, (b) International arms dealers (c) Individuals/insurgents who sympathize withinsurgents of another coglaring example of external aid to non-state actors in Bangladesh is the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)the Shanti Bahini, the armed wing of the politicalplatform of the hill people demanding autonomy, were able to sfight for autonomy because of their continuous supply of arms from neighbouring India. Aside from insurgents, ostateactors, including political and non-political persons or groups receive supplies of sophisticated weapons fromsources that may come from as far away as Europe and America. A survey of 100 people from different backgrou

taken. Asked about the source of the major bulk of small arms, 50% opined that arms come from neighbouringco

Illicit arms procurement through smuggling

Smuggling of arms into Bangladesh is a major source of illicitproliferation of arms. The transit points are the lanport and sometimes the airports. Bangladesh has a long sea belt to the south and three sides of its land border is sIndia. As it happens, border check-points are slack, intentionally or unintentionally. There is a supposedly unwritof trade between Bangladesh and Indian businessmen. Arms flow in from India while mostly Japanese and Koregoods are sent from Bangladesh for India. There are allegations that some customs officers, border security forceforces are involved in such illegal activities.9There is guestimation that almost one third of the arms in Bangladeoutside the country. The former Home Minister said in the Parliament that 423 smuggled illegal arms had been rethe police in 1994 of which many came from India.10Arms are smuggled in from Myanmar and Pakistan as well

Local arms: home-made, factory-made

In recent years, more and more arms and explosives are being made locally. There are 1000 illegal arms factoriesBangladesh which are running with foreign spare parts, foreign catalogue, etc. According to the police, they have11,000 arms, 500 spareparts for making arms and 5,000 rounds of bullets in the last seven years.11There are aroufactories in the capital and all are floating i.e. easily transportable or movable.12To make a local two-bore pistol, maximum 5000 Taka13(Bangladesh currency). However, the resale value, depending on the place and time, can g25,000 Taka.According to the survey made by the researcher, 35% of the respondents said these arms were localMonitoring of the localnewspapers revealed that most of the arms factories that were unearthed were located in gKushtia, Comilla, Maheshkhali, Chadpur, Cox’s Bazaar, Bogura, Feni and in some of the areas in Dhaka includinPallabi and Gulshan. These factories are actually mobile meaning that the machinery set up in abandoned houseshouses can be dismantled once the mission is over or at the knowledge of a possible police raid.

Seized/stolen from police station

In Bangladesh, small arms are frequently stolen from policestations or from warehouses of the armed forces. Forone incident, seven rifles and 65 round of bullets were stolen from the police station in Khulna on August 11, 19later, the terrorists left them behind in the paddy fields of Paikgacha, Khulna.14There wasanother report stating thduring 1989 to 1991, 1,27,154 bullets of rifles were from the arms warehouse of the ChittagongMetropolitan Polanother incident six SLR and 11,000bullets were stolen from the storage of the district police from 1989-93, and the blackmarket.1512% of the respondents of thesurvey for this study said that the police was the major source ofprocurement. The Black Market The black market is a major source for arms procurement in Bangladesh. Availafrom highly sophisticated foreign arms to locally produced inexpensive ones. There are a few well-known areas iwhere one can purchase directly or from an agent. Prices of small arms in the black markets in Bangladesh Taka ‘Saddam pistols’: 40,000-50,000; Italian 9 mm bore pistols: 50,000-80,000; 22 mm bore pistols: 30,000; 7.65 mm60,000; Chinese rifle: 80,000; British 303 cut rifle:25,000.Licensed arms dealers Licensed arms dealers also conproliferation of small arms in Bangladesh. Although it is the government that issues licenses, due to rampant corrcountry, influence and money canpurchase licenses to import arms that are often sold in the black market. Accorthen Leader of the Opposition Sheikh Hasina, (incumbent Prime Minister) 10,000 licensed arms are missing in Bangladesh.16 Most of the shooting clubs in Bangladesh import guns and bullets with the permission of the goverHowever, a large portion of these arms is sold to agents that often have links with armed terrorists. The State alsopermission to the private sector to import arms through the state owned organization known a Trading CorporatioBangladesh (TCB). However, the system is also misused and many of such weapons also end up in the black ma

Illicit Arms Proliferation As mentioned earlier, air, land and sea routes are used for the proliferation of small arms in Bangladesh. It is alsointernational smuggling groups use the India-Bangladesh route extensively for the business. The most frequentlyborders by the underworldnetwork of smugglers are the country’s south-west borders of Shatkhira, Bhadiali, MaKeragachi, Hijoldi, Borali; Jessor’s Shikarpur, Mashila, Jenidah, Mahehpur; Chuadanga (Jibonnagar) Meherpur Kushtia (Daulutpur).18

The international airport in Dhaka is emerging as an oft-used route for smugglers to bring arms and ammunitioncountry. There are allegations that smugglers collaborate with corrupt custom officers of the Dhaka Airport. Amocontraband items, they manage to bring in innumerable illicit weapons. Among the sea ports, consignments of illoccasionally seized at the Chittagong and Khulna ports. Not always are they meant for the local market. In fact, iknown that the Chittagong port is used as a major transit point to ship illegal arms from one place to another.

It was not long before when the tools for criminal activities or other purposes were limited to indigenous weapondagger, and an air gun. Today, the varieties of arms available in Bangladesh are astounding. Although compared Asian countries, the volume of sophisticated light weapons available in Bangladesh is still low, it will not take loBangladesh becomes a potential market for high-tech light weapons, as its air, sea and land routes are increasinglfor such transshipment. Newspaper reports reveal the following types of arms found in Bangladesh: US-made revpipeguns, German made revolver, Chinese sub-machine gun, Belgium made shutter gun, air gun, foreign made hmade pipe gun, pistol, revolver, Pakistani made revolver, rifle, cut-gun, SLR, two bore gun, cut rifle, one bore gugun. Indian made gun, Induan made shutter gun, two-bore rifle, shutter gun, 303 rifle, 7.62 SLR, automatic revolrevolver, locally made shutter gun, Italian made pistol, SSG, stengun, 22 bore pistol, 32 bore pistol,imported SBB

Who Uses Small Arms and Why?

In order to seek an answer to the above question, the writer carried out anopinion poll. 62% of the respondents sprofessional criminals and gangsters were the major users of small arms, 24% said they were students, 22% accustudents, while 22% said that youth who are drug-addicts and delinquent resort to arms. The users can be broadlytwo groups - the ‘criminal’ and ‘terrorist’, whether acting on his own or belonging to a particular gang or an armenjoys political patronage. There is, however, another kind of users who use arms to local enemies. This can be otowns and villages where the cause of conflicts are related to land ownership and family feuds. When citing possfor resorting to arms: 64% believed, free flow of money is the main incentive for procuring arms. A second reasothem is adventurism. However, all respondents opined that the root cause for resorting to arms were political instsocio-economic backwardness. Field studies show that in Bangladesh from July 1994 to June 1995, the highest nincidents of armed conflicts took place in Dhaka (239) followed by Khulna (129). In one year, the figure rose to respectively. The rise of armed violence rose significantly in Chittagong division from 1994/95 to 1995/96 whereofreported violence increased from 58 to 116. Bangladesh is an underdeveloped country with one of the world’scapita income. A large section of the youth are unemployed while majority are under-employed, giving their frusenoughjustification to be lured into crime. While the socio-economic compulsions are understandable, the politicbecoming a matter of growing concern. Details of the linkage between politics and theproliferation of small armson Bangladesh politics will be discussed at some length in the next chapter.

Division-wise Incidents of Reported

Armed Violence in Bangladesh DivisionJuly ‘94 June ‘95July ‘95-June ‘96Increase Dhaka239422193 Khulna12915627 Chittagong5811658 Rajshahi436623Sylhet28335 Barisal11: The Inquilab (a vernacular Bangladeshi daily newspaper). 1.The Daily Inquilab, 15 January 1996.2.Dainik Janat1993. 3.Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, University Press Limited 1987, p.58. 4.Ibid.,p.663. 5.Ibid., p.66. 6.Ibid., p.58. Kader Siddiqui of Taingail district was the head of the Kader Bahini, a faction of frwho fought against Pakistan in 1971. 7.Cited in Jahan, p.68. 8.Ibid, p.58. 9.Bhorer Kagoj, 8 March 1994. 10.The BaObserver, 11 September 1995. 11.Cited in BIISS journal from a paper presented at the Pugwash Conference,organBritish American Security Information Council, 1995. 12.Bhorer Kagoj, October 7, 1996. 13.Bhorer Kagoj, 8 Mar1994. 14.Robbar, 1 September 1996. 15.Janakanta, 9 August 1996. 16.Shangbad, 25 October 1995. 17.Janakanta, 91996. 18.The Inquilab, 14 September 1995.

Impact of Proliferation of Small Arms on Politics in Bangladesh

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to assess the impact of proliferation of small arms on politics in Bangladesh. First, an overall picture of bangladesh politics will be outlined, then the linkage between small arms and Bangladesh politics will be discussed. Overview of Politics in Bangladesh Although democracy was the driving spirit behind independence of Bangladesh, it did not take long for “negativism, intolerance, violence and above all autocratic tendency” to become invariable contents of Bangladesh political activity.1 From the very beginning there was atendency to concentrate power and authority in the dominant party and its charismatic leader.2Parliamentary democracy of the Westminster model was soon replaced by the presidential system. Democratic rights such as multi-party system, freedom of speech, free and fair elections etc. too were replaced with more authoritarian leadership in the form of military rule. One after another coups took place, replacing the regime in power each time with military personnel. In the coup of August 15, 1975 in which a handful of junior officers with the help of two battalions of armoured corps killed Sheikh Mujib, the first indication of their overt intention to take over political role was felt. This was followed by a series of coups andcounter coups until May 30, 1981 in which Ziaur Rahman himself was killed. General Ershad came to power and ruled ‘single-handedly’ for another nine years. In the history of Bangladesh, 9 out of 20 years were ruled directly by the military while four years with men in uniform in the background.3 The presidential system along with the autocratic style ofgovernance came to an end in the wake of the popular mass uprising in 1990. Under a caretaker government, free and fair elections were held for the first time in which Bangladesh National Party (BNP) emerged as the victorious party. All major parties reached a consensus thatparliamentary form of democracy will be restored. Hence, in 1991 Bangladesh’s constitution was amended and the Westminster-style of governance was restored ending 16 years of executive presidency.4 In 1996, again under a caretaker government, the next election took place in which the Awami League received the highest number of seats. It may be mentioned here that before the dissolution of the Sixth Parliament, the then ruling government incorporated into the Constitution a provision which authorized all elections from then on to be held under a caretaker government. Bangladesh has a multi-party system, the four major parties being the Awami League (AL), the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), Jatiyo Party (JP) and Jamaat-e-Islam (JI). The political parties differ in terms of ideology and party mainfesto. However, personal charisma appears to play a dominant role in attracting popular support, sometimesoverriding party manifesto. Sheikh Mujib and Awami League, Ziaur Rahman and BNP, and General Ershad and Jatiyo Party are synonymous. In fact, according to one eminent political scientist, Sheikh Mujib wanted to run the country with charisma rather than being interested in institution-building. Hence the trend in the post - 1971 period saw the emerging political system in Bangladesh depending more on anindividual than on institutions.5As a result, from the onset Bangladesh started with institutions. Bilateral relationship rather than institutional relationship was on the basis of decision-making.6 People’s participation in the politics of Bangladesh is still notsatisfactory. One of the main reasons for that is the almost non-existent communication between the voters and the politician, except duringelection campaign when the latter promises to solve all problems if elected. The problem

is even more acute in the rural areas wherepolitical consciousness is poor. As one analyst put it: Hitherto political parties in Bangladesh appear to be mainly constituted by the old vested groups and an added recipe i.e. the touts and so-called cadres. The parties are urban-based having very feeble presence in the ruralsociety. Speculatively, the touts are the strength in rural areas and cadres in urban areas. The result is, the rural masses are not politically conscious even after a quarter century of gaining freedom and they are kept tactfully aloof from representation in the politics of the country.7 Bangladesh politics has been prone to violence. In fact the very birth of Bangladesh stems from violence between state and non-state forces. Unfortunately, the role of violence did not cease with the creation of Bangladesh. In the post-independence history of the country, the use of force to attain political gains is believed to have started from the armed forces of the country. The coup in 1975 that killed the father of the nation was once again repeated in 1981 when Ziaur Rahman was killed. His successor whose nine-year rule was characterized by dictatorship was again a military man. Raising and strengthening the army have been the response not only to perceived external threats but also to political opposition to the ruling elite dominated by civil-military oligarchy.8 As a fall-out, prolonged military rule appeared to have increased therelevance of violence in Bangladeshi politics. Violent clashes between the politically opposed forces are daily occurrences in this country.9(See table) Violence also entered Bangladesh politics through ideological route. In the initial years,the concept of revolution appeared to be partyideology of some political parties. For example, the Jatiy Samajtantrik Dal preached socialist revolutionary politics and called for a class struggle against the exploiting classes by the revolutionary politics. Its supporters were workers, peasants and other deprived sections of the society. Another political party working from underground, embarked on militant politics known as the Sarbohara party led by one lateengineer, Sriraj Sikder. In the meantime, thugs and goons received the patronization and blessings of the state and have been skillfully used against the politics of the opposition.10This trend continues till this day. In the movement of 1990, to counter the vehement mass upsurge waged by the opposition parties, dreaded hooligans were freed from the jails to kill the students participating in the agitational programmes, which culminated in the death of Dr. Milon in Dhaka University.11

Linkage between Politics and Small Arms

Since the inception of Bangladesh, politics and political actorsaspiring for power have had a close relationship with the concept of force. Over the years, the nature of actors have changed and the use of violence hold a strong footage in the country’s politics. From the post-independence years to the months before the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, some outlawed parties such as the Sarbaharaparty were set to destabilize the regime. From the 1975 coup to the time of General Hussain Mohammad Ershad coming to power, different sections of the army used force to consolidate and later legitimize power. During the dictatorship of General Ershad, mainstream political parties of Bangladesh resorted to force through their students’ wings to oust his government. Although their mission was successful with the fall of the General Ershad regime in1990 and the introduction of parliamentary democracy, yet the price that the nation had to pay was high. The unity that political parties showed by forming a coalition movement against the autocratic government, soon showed signs of tension building up between the parties after the fall of General Ershad. Suspicion,mistrust, hatred and rivalry, enabled small arms to conveniently find a permanent place in Bangladesh politics. The only irony lay in the fact that these parties were neither outlaws nor autocrats, but parties who had the people’s support and

whom the people wanted to elect to power.

If one scans any daily paper of Bangladesh, news of campusviolence by the students’ wings of major political parties, vote rigging and violence by armed cadres during election period, theft, murdercommitted by terrorist who happen to be party activist and so on,suggest that close linkage between arms and politics exists in Bangladesh. For example, there was a report in the newspapers of an oposition leader who allegedly paid for a rocket launcher12. The proliferation of small arms has caused Bangladesh politics to be based on muscle-power, money and influence. The objective for using small arms in politics can range from so-called political idealism to personal gain. According to an octogenarian political leader, ‘the state is seen as a vehicle for personal gain.’13

According to the field survey, 100% of the respondents answered positively to the question as to whether arms were used in politics. The immediate question one faces is : why is there a need for arms in politics especially when Bangladesh has a representative government and the constitution has all the provisions of a democratic system? How does politics and small arms complement each other? What is theimpact on Bangladesh politics as a result of its linkage with small arms?

The history of the country shows that the use of force to gain power has been part of its political game even before the birth of this nation. The use of explosives began in this part of South Asia in the 1960s for political reasons. In the 1970s it gained momentum and it was in the 1980s that its use became widespread, From 1975 to 1981, the student wings of major political parties started to use various weapons.14However, with the power aspirations of the present political parties, arms have diffused into the political system to the extent that it is difficult to separate politics and arms from each other. Unlike its other South Asian neighbours, insurgency related terrorism in Bangladesh remains largely localized. Bangladesh is different from Sri Lanka, for example, where insurgencies have taken the form of urban terrorism. The LTTE tries to make its presence felt by bombing buildings or even by political killings, as the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1985 shows. Similar situation prevails elsewhere in South Asia, where ethnicity has been the major cause for political instability. While Bangladesh does not suffer from such terrorist problems, it has its own kind of challenges.

Major political parties in Bangladesh have alleged connections with the underworld network of arms. This is evident from the hired goons political parties keep, and most importantly, from their respectivestudents’ wings that have armed cadres. According to one list that was compiled by the police, among the persons who are suspected to have illegal arms in their possession, names of influential political leaders and activists figure prominently.15

Political parties refuse to ban student politics simply becauseeducational institutions are used as a stage for proxy war of the Bangladeshi politicians. Major political parties have their own student wings that comprise of students, ex-students, and hired hooligans. The Chatra League is the student wing of Awami League, that of BNP is Chatra Dal, while Shibir is the student wing of Jamaat-i-Islam. The traditional concept of student politics has undergone radical change, largely due to the penetration of small arms into the political scenario. In the history of Bengal, students have played a glorious role in national politics. During the Language Movement of 1952

when the Pakistan government decided to make Urdu the official language of Pakistan, the main opposition came from the student front. During the War of Liberation, the students once again united to fight for independence. Unfortunately, the role of student politics has undergone drastic change. In recent times, student politics and terrorism have become synonymous. Politically active students who perhaps had commendable academicbackground when they were first admitted into unive rsities or colleges have distanced themselves from their studies. An interview with one former student activist of the Dhaka University reveals the following: Students do not always have the option to entering politics, especially for those who must live in the hostel. To avail a room in the already overpopulated hostels, affiliation with a political group, not merit, as in the old days, is necessary. Their promise to arrange a room has to be paid back in terms of becoming a student activist of that political party. In return to their favour, the students find themselves compelled to be actively involved in student politics such as attending party meetings, bringing out processions etc. gradually more time is spent on politics than studies. The young man who was in the top merit list in the Higher Secondary Exams, managed to receive a second class in the Honours examination.16

The student leaders have ‘godfathers’ who supposedly supply them with arms, the godfathers, among others, are politicians who want to strengthen their respective political parties or personal interest through muscle-power. Student leaders, in turn, givearms to student activist for whom it is supposed to be a tool of both offense and defense. In an interview with a daily newspaper, a student activist confided that an ‘elder brother’ (meaning godfather) gave him a gun after he received death threats from the rival party.17There are different compulsions for luring students into politics. Political idealism, economic compulsions, adventurisome or social status are perhaps some of the incentives for youth between the age of 18 and 25 years to be attracted to student politics. According to a survey taken for this study, 14% of the respondents answered that political idealism worked most when the students make the decision to enter politics, while 65% said financial gains, and 27% said adventurism were the main compulsions.

Political leaders pamper student politics to the extent that thesestudent leaders and activists are portrayed as heroes. One of the reasons for the party leaders to give them so much leverage stems from their need not to alienate the student bodies as they largely depend on their votes and muscle-power to come to and remain in power. For instance, it is widely believed that the fall of General Ershad was possible due to the students’ collective effortand loss of his power base amongstudent leaders. Perhaps nowhere in South Asia are the studentorganizations as important to national political parties as is in the case of Bangladesh.

The so-called godfathers who finance armed cadres are allegedly arms dealers, or professional criminals havingpolitical links. With the change of regimes, these armed cadres change their masters. While some of them are arrested and taken under custody the main groups and their leaders remain beyond the law enforcing agencies. They have their own private forces that are known by their leaders, such as, Sweden Aslam Group, Joseph group, Hasmat group, and so on. When out of power, Bangladeshi political parties have developed a trend to call for general strikes (Hartals) when public transportation and all other day to day activities are forcibly brought to a closure. During such strikes violence caused by firearms and hand made bombs and explosives in the streets have become a regular practice.

The Impact of the Linkage between Small Arms and Politics In Bangladesh, mainstream politics is directly and indirectly affected by the wide proliferation of small arms. Political stability, intra-party rivalry, national and local elections, student politics are to name but a few examples in which overt and covert violence take place. But most importantly, their impact on politics has had spill-over effect on the socioeconomic life to the extent that as a result of the proliferation of small arms into mainstream politics, nation-building process is being largely effected. Following are some of the areas where arms have had negative impact on Bangladesh politics. Violence during and before elections: Due to the presence of small arms in the political environment, vote-rigging in national and local elections has become inevitable. Pre-election violence range from forcing local people to vote a preferred candidate, and also at times threatening rival candidates to withdraw his nomination. Violence is used frequently. The Magura incident is an example of how far suchincidence of alleged vote-rigging can lead the nation to. In the Magura by-elections in 1994, in which the then ruling party won, the opposition claimed that the election had been rigged by thugs and goons of the ruling party. The dispute between the ruling and opposition parties as to whether the Magura by-election was free and fair took a moreserious turn when the opposition boycotted the Parliament, calling hartals and ultimately declaring ‘non-cooperation’ with the government, and finally, demanding the government to step down before completing its five-year term. The field study showed that when the oppositionboycotted the 1996 February election, incidents of armed violencebetween political groups were the highest in the first six months of that year. There were around 62 incidents of armed violence. Of these, 40 were political. In February alone, 28 people were killed, 1100 were injured and 40 were arrested. In contrast in the June 1996 election that was held under a caretaker government, of the 56 reported incidents of armed violence were political17.

Armed politics destabilizes the regime:When an elected party forms a government, its main responsibility is to maintain order and stability in the country through smooth operation of its administration. But the task is challenged when anti-state forces set out to disrupt the normal activities of nation-building. In the case of Bangladesh, for the past several years the politics of hartals, strikes, non-cooperation, and other forms of non-cooperation and agitational politics have attempted to make the regime inoperative. On such occasions generally small arms are used. Even the armed cadres of the ruling party (whichever party may be in power) are found either to initiate or respond through armed violence. The proliferation of small arms has been catalyst in complicating political process in Bangladesh to the extent that every sector of the society is hostage to it, directly or indirectly. Political power, coupled with muscle power and financial strength, have created a political environment in which the cause of healthy democracy, economic prosperity and social welfare are the worst victims. In other words, the prolonged use of small arms in politics is a major deterrent towards affectivefunctioning of the political, social and economic order.

Democratic culture fails to develop:One of the long term effects resulting from the widespread use of small arms in politics is reflected in democratic practice. Constitutionally, Bangladesh is a democratic country with parliamentary system of governance. The political system including the governance of the country should be based on democratic principles practiced by both the ruling and the opposition parties. One way of assessing this would be to see the behavior of political leaders and politicians within and outside their respective parties. It is striking that there is very

little democratic practice within the parties. As to the inter-party behaviour of politicians and party leaders, the parliament can be used as a witness to assess the quality of the democratic culture in Bangladesh. Since the 1990 elections, what role has the parliament played and how effective has it been? In finding the answers to these queries, one sees that most of the parliamentary sessions since 1990 were boycotted by the opposition. Rather, the political parties appear to have chosen the streets as the venue for giving their stance on national issues in lieu of the Shangshad, the parliament. It has become acommon practice for the opposition parties to settle political differences by resorting to undemocratic means such as calling nation-widegeneral strikes or hartals. To make the hartal successful, armed cadres come to their assistance and thus the link between arms and politics is further strengthened. Obviously, in the midst of hartal culture and street-politics, a democratic political culture is difficult to grow.

Student politics and violence have become synonymous:Educational institutions are perhaps the worst hit resulting from the linkage between arms and politics. According to the field survey, 27% of the respondents ranked universities and colleges as the most affected sectors of armed politics. Politics in the educational institutes has led to political and socioeconomic repercussions. Due to the linkage between arms and politics, student politics fails to attract many students and remainsconfined to a minority section of the student community. The long term impact of student politics in universities and colleges has been asyndrome known as ‘brain-drain’. Due to chronic terrorism in thecollege and university campus, students with merit prefer to go abroad for higher studies. Most Bangladeshi students are even going to neighbouring countries such as India to avoid late completion of higher education. Although the actual number of student activists is still small, their access to arms on the one hand, and the political patronage they receive on the other, enable them to hold the entire campus hostage.

The triangular relationship among students, arms and politics has resulted in the practice of occupying student hostels, referred to as halls, by student political activist for the last 20 years. This is a way to show each party’s muscle power to its opponent. Hall occupation whichinvariably results in gun-firing with the opponents cost the lives of many in the Dhaka University. Violence is such a part of life in student hostels that in the waiting rooms, instead of finding parents or relatives of the students, one will find armed cadres.18

In the name of student politics, activists engage in different kinds of activities within and outside the campus that have very little concern for student welfare. Owing to the linkage of political influence and availability of arms, one finds the emergence of preferential treatmentstowards powerful students, specially in the way they get to occupydormitories if they were members of a particular student wing of apolitical party. Such possession is a symbol of strength for a student and his party. Moreover, each hall issued for the storage of illegal arms. Yet, the main political parties in Bangladesh remain silent on the issue of banning student politics.

As mentioned earlier, student-politics is not confined to the campus boundaries. Its influence has extended over the years beyond theeducation centres and proliferated into the society. Social Crimes such as theft, murder, location and rent seeking etc. were earlier regarded as the misdeeds of unemployed, frustrated, or illiterate youth. While these criteria still exist,student activists are a new addition to the classification of social criminals in Bangladesh.

Spill-Over Effect of Small Arms Proliferation in politics

The spread of small arms in Bangladesh politics has gradually led to the diffusion of arms in society. As a result, the nation-buildingprocess of the country is constantly facing challenges, In an environment of political instability, economic stagnancy, low literacy rare and high population, the diffusion of small arms has worsened the prospect of development. The strong linkage between small arms and politics in Bangladesh has had far-reaching effect on the economy, law and order and even foreign relations. For instance, smuggling of arms along with other contraband items has destabilized the economy. The illicit trade also promotes other social evils such as corruption leading to misuse of the limited resource that the country has. If foreignpolicy is an extension of domestic policy, then this area is also being severely affected by politics of destruction. Nowhere is it more evident as in the case of foreign investment. Party interest prevails over national interest in a field where such action is detrimental to the image and progress of an aid-dependent developing country. The image of the country to donor countries has been tarnished to the extent than at donor meetings,political stability is the dominant theme. Impact on the law and order situation has been pernicious. According to the survey, 45% of the respondents thought that the law and order situation of the society has deteriorated by the infusion of small arms in politics. According to official sources, during the period from 1989 to 1993, the number of crimes rose to 329,604.19In 1995 in Dhaka city alone, around 100 open gunfire exchanges among armed groups took place.20In the monitoring of newspaper from July 1995 to 1996, total news item of arms related incident were 941, of these, 252 werepolitical while 689 were non-political. The number of deaths were 287; and number of persons injured were 5294; while number of persons arrested were 4440.

Arms are possessed by terrorist, miscreants and political activists. According to a source, most of the sophisticated arms are in the hands of “activists of four political parties who have separate hideouts atdifferent places in the city of Chittagong.” The hide-outs are CityCollege area, Chittagong Medical hostel and Chittagong Collegehostel. Leaders of these political parties finance the purchase of the illegal arms by their activists. In exchange for huge sum of money, the illegal arms are purchased from the Shanti Bahini and the Rohingya insurgents in Myanmar.21Thus, the law and order as a result of ‘armed’ politics has been affected in two ways:

(1) Directly when law and order situation deteriorates due topolitical violence during strikes, hartals, campus violence and so on;

(2) Indirectly, crimes such as theft, murder, extortion, rent-seeking etc., committed by the armed cadres who have political patronage.

The impact of the proliferation of small arms in Bangladesh politics appears to be profound. In a country where parliamentary democracy has been constitutionally established, allowing present pattern ofstudent politics in the universities can only mean a tacit support toviolence and terrorism. In a poverty-stricken third world country like Bangladesh, the democratic process mingling with party-orientedstudent politics canonly lead to opening doors to rent-seeking, muscle power, and terrorism.22

As the finding of a study shows, arms have become an integral part of South Asian politics. In

Bangladesh, a new dimension has been added with the mainstream political parties maintaining armed cadres to help individuals take to power and retain their positions. The result of the field work shows that politically motivated violence is on the rise and constitute a major portion of the total number of violence caused by arms. Unless a third force driven by the silent majority, the media, the academia, the NGOs challenge the existing politics of the country,democracy that is already limping, cannot develop in Bangladesh.

Reported Incidents of Armed Violence in Bangladesh CauseJuly’94 -AverageJuly ’95 -AverageIncrease June’95per monthJune ’96per month Political179132522173 Non-Political5013968957188 Total6805294178261 Source : The figures have been compiled from news items on armed violence that were reported in The Inquilab. 1.Iftekharuzzaman & Mahbuber Rahman, “Transition to Democracy in Bangladesh: Issues and Outlook,” BIISS Journal, Vol. 12. No. 1. 1991, p.96. 2.Ibid., p.108. 3.Emajuddin Ahmed, “Military and Democracy,” presented at the South Asian Political Science Conference on Democracy in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects, Nepal, 1992, p.17. 4.Far Eastern Economic Review, Yearbook, 1997, p.86. 5.Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, University PressLimited, 1987, p.117. 6.Ibid. 7.Abdul Latif Molla, “Political Legacy - Denial of Proletariat Interest,” The Daily Star, December 11, 1996. 8.Iftekharuzzaman, “Good Governance and Reduction of Defence Spending in South Asia: Developmental and Security goals “paper presented in the InternationalSeminar on Governance and Development : South Asia in the Twenty-FirstCentury, organized by BIISS, December 21 - 23, 1996, p.10. 9.Talukder Maniruzzaman, “Arms Transfer, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, December 1992, p.747. 10.Monirul Islam Khan, “Violence in Bangladesh Society; Fallout on Democratic Transition,” in Iftekharuzzuman and A.K.M. Abdus Sabur (eds), Bangladesh, Society, Polity and Economy, Protgoti Prokashoni, Dhaka 1993, p.9. 11.Ibid. 12.The Daily Star, 27 August 1997. 13.Cited in Md. Asadullah Khan’s “Terrorism: How Long Should the SocietySuffer?”, The Daily Star, 27 October, 1997. 14.Bhorer Kagoj, 10 March 1994. 15.Janakantha, 10 August 1996. 16.Interview with one former student leader. 17.Bhorer Kagoj, op.cit. 18.Janakantha29 August 1996. 19.Inquilab, 10 January 1996. 20.Ibid. 21.The Daily Star, 11 January 1997. 22.M. Shahiduzzaman, “Student Politics,”Bhorer Kagoj, 10 September 1996.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Perspectives Unlike some of the other major challenges facing South Asia (nuclear proliferation, inter-state rivalry, internal conflicts), the problem proliferation of small arms and light weapons until recently received very little attention in the literature on security, least, on politics. Only very recently, the problem of the abundant, uncontrollable supply of small arms and light weapons in conflict-prone areas such as South Asia has raised alarm among the politicians, world leaders, policy-makers and academicians who are now emphasizing the urgent need to curb the growing menace of small arms in international security. The political, economic, social, and security sectors have been contaminated with the virus of small arms, raising concern as to how to control the spread, especially due to the clandestine nature of the trade of small arms in South Asia. Controlling the transfer also becomes difficult once small arms and light weapons have entered the free-flowing transient supply and demand markets of the international arms trade. The case of the militarization of Afghanistan can be best illustrated here. After the Soviet invasion in 1979, the US pipeline of arms was established in the mid 1980s to aid the Afghan Mujahidin insurgency campaign, weapons have ever since accumulated in the North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan, and reached as far as Bombay and the State of Bihar in India.1 As the finding of the study revealed, the technology of small arms are being widely diffused day by day, making its usability easier, weight lighter, and the cost lower. The main clients of the technologically upgraded varieties of small arms are usually the military, the police & paramilitary forces of states that regard the small arms as standard equipment.2However, because of the light weight, low cost and high tech, the demand for small arms and light weapons has diffused profoundly into each and every segment of society. The improved technology has further pushed children into warfare. In 1988, there were around 200,000 child soldiers under the age of 15 years fully participating in conflicts all around the world. According to historian John Kegam, the introduction of small caliber weapons has changed modern warfare. The most available weapons, the AK-47, an estimated 55 million of which were sold since its introduction into the Soviet Army in 1947, can be dismantled and reassembled by a child of 10 years, while a semi-automatic gun may weigh no more than a new-born baby. As one academician says, “The marriage of technology, firepower and convenience has facilitated the non discriminatory use of immensely powerful weapons and has put military hardware into the hand of civilian constituencies.”3 The impact of the use of small arms in politics can be felt greatly on the law and order situation of a country. The breakdown of law and order as a result of small arms proliferation has given rise to gun-related criminal violence in the developed and underdeveloped countries. But what is more important is the emerging trend of individuals to keep guns for personal safety. Gun-related violent crimes in the United States rose by 55% between 1978 and 1992, while killings by teenagers under the age of 18 rose by 124% between 1986 and 1991.4Although in most cases such crimes are linked with the drug underworld, at the end of the day, it is the society that is being affected. Incidentally, accidents and sometimes crimes by those who keep guns for personal safety as well by their immediate family members are on the rise.

Findings of the survey The study focused on the proliferation of small arms in South Asia and its impact on the region’s

politics, with particular reference to Bangladesh. The study made an attempt to reveal the easy availability of small arms in the region. The spread can be traced back largely to the Afghanistan war in which superpowers supplied respective parties to the conflict with weaponry, of which small arms comprised a major portion. Gradually, these arms proliferated to other conflict areas of South Asia. But the demand for arms did not remain confined to ins urgencies and guerrilla warfare, rather it extended to organized criminal gangs, drug lords, and an even newer addition was to a class of politicians. In fact, these non-state actors are again inter-linked directly or indirectly. As a result, arms change many hands, and in the long run, trace of its origin or its destination becomes obscure. In the case of Bangladesh small arms are increasingly becoming a menace. One major cause for the spread of small arms in Bangladesh was the insurgency against the government by the hill people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). But the conflict remained localized and while the problem continued it was the mainstream politics that was being severely affected by the proliferation of small arms. Compared to other south Asian countries, Bangladesh is unique in this regard. In Bangladesh, it is not an individual politician but segments or fractions within political parties as a whole that give tacit support to terrorism, political violence, political crime etc. In most cases, the godfather is an influential person who has close connection with the party leaders. There are various sources of arms procurement in Bangladesh. The study revealed the following sources : arms smuggled into the country and sold in black markets; clandestine floating arms factories; theft from government arsenals; licensed dealers who take advantage of the privilege to import arms. The study shows that the compulsions for the users are either political or socio-economic, or both. The country’s political system has unofficially justified the use of arms for political gains. Political parties have their own armed cadres who range from professional thugs and goons to college-going students. National universities in all the major cities are held hostage to one or more armed student wings of the country’s political parties. Open gun-firing followed by casualties, closure of universities and colleges for indefinite period, occupation of dormitories, rent-seeking and extortion by student activists and terrorists are norms and not exceptions. The impact of the small arms proliferation on Bangladesh politics has been multi-dimensional. The hartal culture, campus violence, vote rigging, inter and intra-group armed clashes, decline of law and order, fights for business deals, extortion, rent-seeking and so on are closely if not inseparably linked with politics. Without political commitment, which has so far been limited to lip service alone, the task of controlling proliferation will be difficult, if not impossible. As the study has shown, the political elite of Bangladesh patronizes political violence directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, which in turn encourages the transient supply of arms. Small arms will continue to be an integral part of Bangladeshi politics unless the demand for them among politicians ceases.

Controlling Small Arms Proliferation The next concern with this regard is related to the control of the spread of small arms. Christopher Louise suggested two ways of approaching the question of stemming the proliferation of light weapons and small arms. The first of these involves policy directives aimed at establishing legislation that would stop or curb the supply of weapons; the second approach is to look at the causes of weapons proliferation and consequently on the demand side of the light weapons equation.5 He has also suggested controlling the import of ammunition as another way of controlling the spread. Since ammunitions are not produced in developing countries, he argues that the supply of ammunition be tied with conditionalities of aid, where aid is used as a lever to restrain laissez-faire approaches to ammunition exports.6 Aaron Karp suggests that the first step

to control this trade is to treat small and light arms with the seriousness they deserve. According to him, violence around the world is fed not by major arms but by small and light weapons. In giving an extreme example, he says that Chinese exports of automatic rifles fuel violence from Somalia to Kashmir to the streets of the United States.7The other problem is that while there are regulations relating to the exports of small arms, few countries apply them on the misperception that they are inconsequential. Jasjit Singh, in his call for the obvious and urgent need for controlling the spread of small arms believes that focusing only on the weapons-transfers and spread in an isolated manner is not enough and should be avoided. Rather, an examination of the ideas and belief systems of the users are necessary. In other words, he looks for a more political approach rather than a commercial approach to the issue of small arms and light weapons.8 In the meanwhile, countries have woken up to the urgent need to control the spread by taking a few initiatives at the national, regional, and international level controlling smuggling of illicit products through air, sea and land borders; cooperating with neighbours on the issue, raising the issue at regional and international forums such as the United Nations. Arms recovery programmes are undertaken where not only the police forces search for illegal arms but also voluntary surrender is encouraged. At the academic level awareness of the much-too-long-ignored issue has been initiated. The increased role of the media also needs to be appreciated. In the age of advanced communication and information, television, journals, newspapers and the internet are playing a constructive role in highlighting the impact of arms proliferation on societies.

Controlling Spread of Arms in Bangladesh

The ill-effects of small arms on politics of Bangladesh was recognized soon after the independence of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s call for voluntarily surrendering arms was to ensure that the arms do not diffuse into society, and thereby distribute law and order in the country. But the exercise was incomplete as many of the freedom fighters retained their weapons. In recent times, successive governments have taken different steps to control the spread in the following ways: Custom-checking at border including air and sea ports for contraband items: The import of arms without license into the country is considered illegal in Bangladesh. Thus, any attempt to do so, would be regarded as a crime and the concerned person or persons may be arrested on criminal charges. There are frequent news of men being caught at the air port and land borders carrying arms illegally. Arms recovery programmes: Governments have initiated arms recovery programmes, especially before elections, to ensure that law and order situation prevails including no vote-rigging in pollingcentres, or any kind of political violence. During both the past caretaker governments of 1990 and 1996, a deadline was given to recover arms from persons who illicitly possess them. During those times, some clandestine arms manufacturing factories were also unearthed by police. Voluntary surrender scheme: Along with the arms recovery programs, voluntary surrender of arms is encouraged. In return, money and the promise not to arrest the volunteer are ensured. This scheme was put in action prior to election and even though the number of surrendering arms voluntarily was small, yet the step was a big one. For some, it may be an opportunity to start a new life without violence. In spite of applying different methods to stop illicit spread of small arms in the country, no government has been successful in controlling it significantly. There are different explanations but the main reason for recovery measures to fail is the lack of political will and commitment that continue to give leverage to ‘godfathers’ to keep up their underworld network very much active. Politicization of

administration, political support to student-cum-terrorist, corruption in enforcement agencies are to name but a few of the obstacle to a successful halt to arms proliferation. To make arms recovery programs effective, political commitment is essential. Only if there is determination on the part of the political parties to isolate arms from politics, can the authority initiate effective arms recovery from other sectors. Following are some of the recommended measures that may be taken into consideration for the government for effective arms recovery: Law enforcing agencies must be above politics: The law and order situation existing in the country needs to be urgently improved. For that, the police administrative power and the judiciary power have to be above party politics. For that matter, reforms in the judiciary system, which is in the agenda of the present government must be undertaken. Both sectors have to be given the authority to deal with criminals, irrespective of party affiliation or influence. Ban on politics in educational institutions: There must be a total ban on student politics. The education system must undergo major reorganization so that an environment prevails where it is impossible for students to lose valuable time in politics. Putting the entire blame on the students for polluting the education centres of the country would not do justice. Teachers are as much to blame as the students, if not more. Those who are involved in politics are as ambitious to hold a powerful post in the campus, such as the provost of a hall. There are enough allegations about teachers inspiring young students to be part of the game of campus politics. Employment generation programme: Economic benefits are a necessity if there is to be a society free of social crimes committed under political umbrella. A large number of small arms are used for these purposes. Realistically speaking, for an underdeveloped country like Bangladesh it will not be possible to remove all social evils. But the intensity of the problem is so widespread and acute, that no government in power can turn a blind eye to it. Employment generation should receive maximum attention of the State. Unless the youth can be rehabilitated into society with proper jobs and decent living, it will be quite impossible to reduce crimes. Foreign investment and joint collaboration will definitely create jobs, and thus different incentives have been given to foreign and local investors. But, unfortunately most incentives remain confined only to lip service, as the investors complain about rampant corruption and bureaucratic red tapism. To worsen the investment climate, the politics of hartal and non-cooperation has further tarnished the image of the country. Thus, unless there is more political tolerance among the political parties, it will be difficult to attract and keep the foreign investors in the country. Mobilization of public awareness : Constructive role and objective reporting by the media should be ensured in the order to raise awareness in society of the existing problem of armed politics. It is alarming how the society has come to accept arms as part and parcel of Bangladesh politics. Unless the silent majority wakes up and raise their voices collectively against the crime the trade of small arms will continue to flourish. In recent years some of the newspapers are giving objective reporting on issues related to politics and the illicit arms nexus. For this particular study, for instance, newspapers have been helpful in terms of reports on crimes. However, there needs to be more analytical studies showing the close linkage between arms and politics. Most newspapers hardly cover political crimes and those that do, are biased and often influenced by one or the other political party. Inventory and data-base: Finally, there needs to be an elaborate inventory by the Government on the arms that are entering the country. Till to this day, we do not know the accurate figure of illegal weapons in the country. An inventory on the machines that are used for the purpose of manufacturing arms will also be helpful. Moreover, the inventory needs to be done frequently and systematically in order to identify a missing object immediately after the loss. One of the findings of the study was that, theft from government arsenals are common

practice in Bangladesh. Also, the State should create a data base for all information and reports related to arms. Since the problem of small arms is not only a local threat to security, rather a transnational one, as the study has shown, a data base will help create expertise and share information with neighbours and beyond. Finally, as the finding of the study shows, arms have become an integral part of South Asian politics. In Bangladesh, new dimension has been added with the mainstream political parties maintaining armed cadres to either come to power or to remain in power. Arms are procured by plitical parties mainly to consolidate their power base that is empowered with money and influence. The study has clearly shown that politically motivated violence is on the rise and constitutes a major portion of the total number of violence caused by arms. Unless a third force emerges from the silent majority, the media, the academia and the NGOs to question the nature of governance, quality of leadership, role of the opposition and so on, Bangladesh politics will continue to bank on force and not reason.

Ms. Neila Husain is a Research Fellow of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). She completed her undergraduate studies in International Relations fromUniversityof Dhaka in 1991 and later her MA in International Relations in 1993. She joined the BIISS in 1994. Areas of her research interest include non-military threats to national security, and politics and governance. She is currently conducting research on the illegal spread of small arms in South Asia with particular reference to Bangladesh. Among other subjects that she is currently working on are: Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms in Bangladesh Impact on Societal Security; Small Arms, Youth Force, and Extortion in Bangladesh: Socio-Economic and Political Nexus; and Globalization ofTerrorism: Illegal Weapons and Narcotic Trade.