radio and the new colombia

Radio and the New Colombia

Leonard0 Ferreira and Joseph Straubhaar

Colombia has lived under the influence of radio broadcasting for almost sixty years. Its society has been the focus of a permanent struggle among radio networks for greater profits; it is also the target of all kinds of broadcast messages which sometimes intentionally and sometimes accidentally have contributed t o shape Colombian social values.

Not much has been written, however, about radio in Colombia in spite of its 485 radio stations] operating throughout the country with more than 20 million listeners.* There has been extensive research about Radio Sutatenza, the world pioneer in the use of radio against rural illiteracy and social underdevelopment, which has received a great deal of international attention. Otherwise, there have not been major studies assessing the contributions or the implications of this medium to Colombian society. The lack of research is particularly noticeable where commercial radio is ~once rned .~

History of Radio Radio began in 1929 in this Spanish speaking nation, the fourth largest

of South America-approximately the size of Texas and California combined. Broadcasting was preceded by over a decade of two-way “wireless” service. Actually, the first wireless transmission seems to have occurred in 1915 by means of a telegraphic station owned by the multinational Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company. Years later, in 1923, Marconi also set u p the international radio communication station of Morato. The Morato station, located near Bogota, the country’s capital, connected Colombia with the major European cities, the United States and Venez~ela .~

On April 12, 1923 as part of the official ceremony to inaugurate the new telecommunication facility, the Colombian President Pedro Nel Ospina sent radio messages to the American President of the time, Warren Harding, the King of England George V, and Guiglielmo Marconi. In his personal response to the Colombian President, Marconi stated:

Your excellency, Mr. President: This inauguration which places Colombia in wireless communication with the capital of the British Empire and the rest of the world, IS a cause of great complacence for the inventor of this system who has collaborated with getting this young and rich nation closer to the currents of ~ iv i l iza t ion .~

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132 Journal of Popular Culture

These words marked the initiation of Colombia into the world of radiotelegraphy but also represented the consolidation of Marconi’s monopoly over Colombian telecommunication. Marconi became the exclusive supplier of the new two way radio service in Colombia for 20 years, from 1923 to 1943, with the approval of the Colombian government and the supervision of the recently inaugurated Ministry of Posts and Telegraph.6 This twenty-year concession reflected the dominant influence of the world powers over the weak Latin American nations. At that time, Colombia, like other Latin American nations was economically and technologically underdeveloped and heavily dependent, primarily on the United States.

At the dawn of radio in the late 1920s, Colombia had barely reached a total population of eight million inhabitants and Bogota was a city of two hundred and fifty thousand people. During those years, the internal communication difficulties caused by the jagged topography of the Andean mountain range made Colombia a “country of countries.” Aviation had begun in the early 1920s to offer its transportation services to the Colombian elite of the principal cities though SCADTA.7 Still, Colombia by 1930 was, as Tellez remarked:

. . .a country almost completely desintegrated; with antagonistic racial and social groups; with the same means of communication as in the colonial times; with different regional traditional customs; with opposite regional interests; with dangerous religious animosities; and with a persistent and mutual disregard.8

Today, Colombia is a country of approximately twenty-eight million people, almost one third of them concentrated in the main cities of Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Bar ranq~ i l l a .~ The country has to a large extent overcome some but not all of its internal communication and integration difficulties; thanks in part to the activities of radio. Most of the poorest households at least count on a radio set for information and entertainment, and for many Colombians living in the almost uninhabited lowlands which represents three fifths of the country, radio is the only means of contact with civilization.

In the past, one of the greatest contributions of radio was its participation in and practical promotion of the national process of industrialization. The industrial revolution in Colombia, delayed more than a century and a half compared to Europe, emerged as a result of the pressures of the international economy. The Depression of 1929 had reduced the outflow of manufactured products from the industrialized nations which countries like Colombia depended upon. The need for these products forced Colombia to concentrate its efforts on the formation of a less agrarian and a more self-reliant and industrialized domestic economy. Under these conditions, radio became an instrument of great potential as a vehicle to advertise products of both the increasing number of national industries and the foreign manufacturers. As Pareja observed: “Radio was born at the historical point when industry needed a medium to effectively help in the expansion of the national markets”l0

The private and commercial broadcast radio stations began to appear in December of 1929. In less than two years, there were already twelve of them operating in various locations in the country. Their founders were mostly amateur radio operators, some of them educated abroad. They not only transplanted the technology, primarily from the United States, but also borrowed its spirit of

Radio and the New Colombia 133

mercantilism, its organizational formats, its programming patterns and even the trade names. Not unfrequently, the new radio entrepreneurs simply identified their stations with the names of their foreign sponsors.

For example, in 1930, as a sign of the early “Americanization” of radio, the first private commercial radio station in Colombia, HKF-“La Voz de Bogota” (The Voice of Bogota)-was owned by the “Colombian Radio and Electric Corporation,” not Corporacion Radio Electrica Colombiana. Apparently, introducing the station with a foreign touch, making it seem owned by an American corporation when that was not the case, was a marketing “trick.” It seemed to guarantee a higher quality service than if the owner were merely presented as Colombian. Following a similar stereotype, “Colombia Broadcasting” and “Santander Broadcasting” were founded in 1932 and 1936, respectively. The former would later become “Emisora Nueva Granada,” one of the top three radio stations in Bogota. Sometimes, ties abroad were not just a question of imitation. In fact, “La Voz de la Victor” (The Voice of Victor), a pioneer radio station created in 1933, adopted this name to promote the records of the American company RCA Victor (The station’s director was RCA Victor’s distributor in Colombia). The same occurred with “Emisora Philco” which advertised the radio receivers of the Dutch company Phillips. This practice of identifying the radio stations with the name of their commercial sponsors was prohibited by the government in 1936.’’

Before 1935, it would be probably erroneous to present radio broadcasting as a profitable activity based on considerable commercial revenues and wide coverage, as radio is now. In 1932, radio was a rather incipient enterprise with only one radio set per approximately every 1700 Colombians, whereas in 1977, radio was an established industry with one radio set per every six Colombians.’*

After the mid 1930s, Colombian radio stations started to show some profits to their owners, and since then, radio’s priority has been to become the number one mass medium. The commercial goal is to get a sufficient audience to satisfy the publicity demands of foreign and national advertisers in order to obtain greater profits through commercials. Not surprisingly, radio receivers were one of the items heavily advertised during that decade.

Throughout the 1940s, ’50s and ’ ~ O S , there was a cold war between the press and radio for attracting more and wealthier advertising clients. Later both media started nor only to peacefully coexist but to support each other as they are able to distinguish the quite different nature of their respective audiences and services. There were radio owners who originally financed their stations with their personal or family fortunes. However, most did it by virtue of their business ties with powerful domestic industries or foreign multinationals willing to invest in advertising. Those with neither personal economic resources nor substantial political and business backing, like some of the radio pioneers, in the long run simply disappeared as a result of the strong competition.

Radio Structure and Government Policy As in the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, with the possible exception

of the former British, French and Dutch colonies, radio in Colombia essentially became a private and commercial activity. This was despite the fact that the first radio station in the country, HJN, was created by the government on August

134 Journal of Popular Culture 7 of 1929,'s Katz and Wedell referring to the transfer of the U.S. commercial broadcasting model to South America, stated:

Latin American structures were largely based on the U.S. pattern: free enterprise being encouraged with minimum interference from the government.. . . The majority of South American countries were already within the sphere of influence of the U.S., both politically and economically, when broadcasting technology became commercially available. The South American countries were among the first, after the U.S., to introduce radio broadcasting in a commercial basis.14

The government of Colombia, however, attempted to monopolize radio broadcasting as it had other communication services such as mail (1913), telecommunications (1960) and television (between 1954 and 1957). The most clear example occurred in 1936 when the Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo administration proposed that Congress adopt a public law declaring all radio stations state property. The proposed nationalization provoked strong reactions from the private broadcasters, who accused the government of trying to destroy the industry. Even the print press, the traditional adversary of radio, joined the opposition arguing that the government initiative was unconstitutional and a violation of the freedom of the press.

The Colombian Congress did not pass the law in the same terms proposed by the government but redefined the power of the state to supervise the use of the airwaves. In other words, the government failed to nationalize this medium but gained in power to regulate it.

The present national broadcasting legislation still preserves the philosophy laid out by the 1936 congressional act, which also inspired the Legislative Decree 3418 of 1954, better known as the "Broadcasting Statute" and still in effect. Article One of this statute, for instance, prescribes that "all radioelectric channels that Colombia uses o r is able to use in the field of telecommunications are the exclusive property of the state".I5 During the military government of General Rojas Pinilla (1954-1957), this notion of absolute ownership of the state over the electromagnetic spectrum contributed to maintaining a strict control over the broadcasting media to the extent that television, first introduced to the country on June 13 of 1954, became a state-owned medium. In those days of "La violencia," an internal war between 1948 and 1957 which caused the country more than 300,000 thousand deaths, radio was heavily rensored through provisions like Article Four of the Broadcasting Statute as amended by Decree 2427 of 1956, which reads:

Telecommunication services can not run anything that attempts against the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, its external relations, the reputation of individuals and the due respect for the legitimate authorities.. . .

The Rojas dictatorship and its broadcast legislation defined telecommunications, including broadcasting, as a public service to be provided directly by the state which the government would lend to the private sector in a temporary fashion for their commercial exploitation.16 Television, for example, is a service for which the state reserves the channels for itself as well as the right to broadcast and control the programming. To do that, the government possesses its own


equipment and studios. Since the government is incapable of producing most of the programming, i t rents television airtime in four year concessions to private programmers and producers for commercial use.17

Radio enjoys more regulatory flexibility than television since the government does not reserve for itself the right to broadcast radio even though it has its own network, the Radiodifusora Nacional de Colombia (National Radiostation of Colombia), previously known as HJN. Private licenses for both AM and FM stations may be obtained for up to five years. Obviously, radio is more controlled than the print press which is practically unregulated in its activity.

The Instituto Nacional de Radio y Television (INRAVISION), a semi- autonomous government agency, together with the Ministry of Communication, are in charge of supervising the activities and programming of commercial Television and radio. INRAVISION, created in 1963, is not only responsible for the state-owned radio network but also produces some educational radio programming for it. The Institute also administers the two national television channels (7 and 9), the regional television channels, the domestic educational channel 11 and the Radiodifusora Nacional.

This considerable power by the government over broadcasting, which in practice is less strict than it looks on paper, coexists with the commercial exploitation of this industry by the private sector. This is what policy makers and broadcasters in Colombia term the mixed system of broadcasting. It is for the most part, privately and domestically owned, commercial and heavily dependent on advertising, the government’s legal power is more potential than actual but the broadcasters’ fear of having the state entities impose their authority is always present.

In 1948, for example, during the “Bogotazo,” a riot occurred after the assassination of the popular leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in downtown Bogota. Several radio stations were taken over by members of the Liberal and leftist movements to call for a national revolt against the Conservative administration of President Mariano Ospina Perez. That week, the government declared the suspension of all radio licenses in an effort to re-establish the public peace and also guarantee the success of the IX Panamerican Conference meeting in Bogota, which created the Organization of American States (OAS). Explaining the government’s measure, Tellez, who personally experienced those critical days as a broadcaster, wrote:

. . .the government suspended all operation licenses of the private broadcast stations, radio news programs and broadcasters, giving only temporary permits while records of each station were being checked as to whether or not re-establish the respective licenses.’*

Following this decision, the government forced the creation of the National Association of Radiobroadcasting (ANRADIO) demanding the obligatory affiliation of all radio stations to the new organization and giving licenses only to those which became ANRADIO affiliates. At the same time, ANRADIO considered as eligible members only the broadcast stations recommended by the Ministry of Communications, effectively discriminating against the anti- government ones.


Similar, frequent censorship maneuvers have taken place throughout the history of broadcasting in Colombia. For example, during the 1970 presidential elections, the government banned all radio information about the partial results to impede public knowledge that the candidate of the opposition was winning. Also, in 1977, the government of President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen prohibited any unofficial information about the one day national strike organized by the Colombian unions. The strike lasted three days and several people were killed, but to inform the public, radio had to wait for the government news releases. These reported the failure of the protest when the nation was actually semi- paralized. 19

Radio Programming The original development of programming on Colombian radio was the

result of personal tastes and individual intuition. Pioneers, like Elias Pellet, inaugurated their broadcast radio stations programming concerts of classical music and folklore. National and foreign musicians were invited to perform live and interpret works of the most famous world composers. At that time, Bogota was a very cultural city that came to be known as the “South American Athens” due to the elite’s devotion for the arts, literature, poetry and music; and radio, in its early days, tried to appeal to these selected audiences of the rich and educated. At this point, radio programming was experimental and unstructured.

With the rapid process of commercialization after the mid 1930s, programming in radio became more popularly oriented in order to draw greater audiences. So the station owners started to broadcast music more appealing to the masses, like boleros and tangos. Ironically, in 1935, the tragic death in an airplane crash in Medellin of the tango’s greatest practitioner, the Argentinian singer Carlos Gardel, marked the initiation of a new genre of radio programming in Colombia: radio news.20 This type of program would later become one of the most profitable and widely accepted in Colombia, to the extent that the major networks have created specialized radio stations for 24-hour continuous news. In television, the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties maintain a strict control of the T V news programs. In radio as well, news is either heavily influenced or controlled by representatives of thedifferent factions of both political organizations. Newspaper and broadcast news have been frequently criticized for their lack of independence and their political biases which presents the information through the filter of political bipartisanship. In 1980, Yamid Amat, the best known radio news director in Colqmbia said in a television forum that radio news, while subject to political pressures, was less politicized than TV news. In this respect he stated:

Television is currently in Colombia the medium where news are more distorted, due to the fact that programs are distributed with an absolute political criterion.. .the interests that count are not informational ones but those of the political group to which the news program is connected.2l

Contributing to its popularity, radio news has with the years shown itself to be a lot more independent, dynamic and informative than television news which more visibly reflect the vested political interests which produce the news

Radio and the New Colombia 137 programs. In reference to the distribution of news programs in television, former presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan has stated that these programs have been not only given to the traditional parties, but to particular political leaders and their friends.** On occasions, the government has tried silence radio new5 which either are too sensationalist or provide too detailed information on sensitive issues. For example, ministerial decrees banning information on the activities of the guerrilla groups have been frequently used.

Also, sports and comedy programming began to appear in the second half of the 1930s. Sports broadcasts became even more profitable and popular than news, particularly with the transmissions of the most important domestic and world events like the bicycle races around Colombia, the national socc-ex tournaments, the soccer World Cups, and the Olympic and Panamerican games. Referring to the social and political implications of this kind of programming, Pareja observed:

. . .there has been an exacerbated fanatism for soccer, cultivated by the mass media and the government as a vehicle of distraction from the real social problems of the country.. . . I t did not take long for the sports transmission to be consolidated as an economic arid programming pillar of the radio stations.23

Other entertainment programming like musical and game shows and radio- nouelas (radio “soap operas”) were successfully introduced during the period of commercialization of the 1930s and 40s. These types of programs had greater doses of foreign influence and again the programs were identified with their commercial sponsors as a regular practice.

For example, in the early 1940s, the “Cadena Azul Bayer” (Bayer Blue Network-sponsored by the German firm Bayer), in one of the first attempts to create networks in Colombia, sponsored expensive musical programs with prominent international and national artists. Similarly, the Argentina-based “Cadena Kresto,” with operations in the principal South American capitals, started to compete with the Bayer network by presenting famous singers like the Mexican Pedro Vargas and the Colombian Carlos Julio Ramirez. These programs did not last long due to their high production costs but they greatly contributed to the popularity of this medium. And the idea of networking had been implanted in the minds of the Colombian radio entrepreneurs.

Many game shows were a clear copy of the American programming, a phenomenon later seen in television. For five years, “Profesores a1 Aire” (Professors on the Air), a Colombian adaptation of the program “Information Please,” drew considerable audiences. The competition created derivations of this program like “Los Catedraticos Informan” (“the Scholars Inform You”) and “Pregunte Usted-Responda Usted” (“You ask-You Answer”). National and foreign sponsors received a great deal of publicity through [his programming gendre of which the most prominent were the Sidney Ross’ “Digalo con Musica” (“Say it with Music”) and “El Hombre Mejoral” (“The Mejoral-an analgesic- Man”), “El Telefonazo LUA” (“The LUA’s Big Call,” an anti-acid product), and the most successful of all, “Coltejer Toca a su Puerta” (“Coltejer knocks a t Your Door,” textile factory). In this last program, a car was sent to the streets covered by a blanket everytime the program was on the air, to knock at the


door of a lucky winner provided that that person in the home selected had the radio station tuned in.

Radio soap-operas started in Colombia in 1938 with the program “Yon- Fu,” a national adaptation of the Cuban radio-novela “Chan-Li-Po.” The new type of serial programming became immediately successful, and since then, it has been an indispensable element for those broadcast stations specialized in entertainment for housewives and maids. Undoubtedly, one of the greatest hits in the history of radio-nouelas in Colombia was “El Derecho de Nacer” (“The Right to Be Born”), written by the Cuban Felix B. Caignet, and played to the Colombian audience in 1950. This program has also been successfully adapted in television. After television began, radio-novelas encountered in tele-novelas their strongest competitor since the audience prefers to watch rather than listen to them. Nonetheless, advertisers and broadcasters still consider radio soaps an economic success.

Commenting on the social role of radio-nouelas, Pareja wrote:

The structure of radio-novelas is generally centered around a love semi-tragedy.. . . In the world of the romantic, sentimental, and tragic radio soaps, it does not show the real world of low salaries, unemployment. . .official repression, workers’ lay-off and conditions of exploitation.24

More specialized programming has been designed during the 1970s and 1980s through better audience research techniques. In this field, the American A.C. Nielsen has become a major actor by determining whether or not a program is successful according to its reports on ratings. One of the types of specialized programming, for instance, has been music to Colombian youth, who soon were targeted by 24-hour American-type broadcast stations.

In this respect, radio seems to have been partially responsible for introducing undesireable social values among the new generations such as an increased “Americanization” of their life styles. Radio programming itself and advertising are often blamed for the social distortions and anxieties among youth, as well as for raising their consumer expectations, most of them impossible to fulfill under the present socio-economic circumstances of the country.

The small efforts made by the commercial radio stations in terms of a more pro-social programming are primarily connected to education for the illiterate rural and urban population. The inadequacy of these efforts has with the years increased the criticism against this medium. In partial response, some radio stations began to include agricultural programming addressed to the Colombian peasants, but still the stations were strongly tied to the economic goal of looking for potential consumers of the products advertised.

Commercial radio has nonetheless shown a great sense of responsibility and solidarity in cases of national emergency, as for example, after the 1983 earthquake which partially destroyed the city of Popayan. Commercial radio broadcast stations contributed to alleviate the crisis, coordinating rescue operations, organizing fund raising activities, helping families to locate their relatives, etc. The radio stations responded similarly during one of the most recent world catastrophies, the Nevado del Ruiz’s volcano eruption, that took nearly 25,000 lives in November of 1985.


Except in its first years, educational and cultural programming has not constituted a priority for commercial radio in Colombia, although the stations themselves might argue that every program is to some extent both educational and cultural. Although Decree 3418 of 1954 mandated that all broadcast radio stations are obligated to orient their programming to the diffusion and build up of culture,25 the stations have given little attention to this type of programming with one notable exception: “HJCK, El Mundo en Bogota” (HJCK, The World in Bogota). HJCK was founded in 1950 as a commercial and cultural broadcast station despite its competitors’ pessimism. With classical music programming and cultural themes mainly targeted to intellectuals and the more educated population of the capital, HJCK has completed close to four decades of operation with considerable financial stability.

Other non-profit cultural radio stations existed by the time HJCK was created. Most of them were sponsored by either universities or religious communities. For example, the Universidad de Antioquia and the Universidad Bolivariana have radio stations in Medellin, and a Catholic order has “Emisora Mariana” in Bogota.

Certainly the most important educational and cultural broadcast radio station in the history of the country has been Radio Sutatenza. It was started in 1947 by Monsignor Jose Joaquin Salcedo, at that time curate at Sutatenza, which is a village located ninety miles from Bogota in the valley of Tenza. This area had a population of approximately 100,000 peasants, eighty percent illiterate. On May 25 of 1948, the Ministry of Communications granted Radio Sutatenza a license as a shortwave rural radiophonic school for adult education. Soon after, in 1949, it was authorized to increase its power from 250 watts to 1000 watts, and in October of that same year, the government approved the creation of Accion Cultural Popular (ACPO) as an institution for improving rural literacy at the national level.

By 1974, Radio Sutatenza already had three 50 kw shortwave transmitters in Bogota and five medium-wave stations in Bogota (250kw), Barranquilla (10 kw), Cali (120 kw), Medellin (120kw) and Magangue ( 120kw).26 Today, ACPO is one of Colombia’s largest radio networks serving over twenty thousand radio schools and thousands of Colombians, mostly illiterate, each year.

A radio school is a group of adults who belong to the same neighborhood and who have decided to study together. Explaining how radio schools work, Juan Diaz-Bordenave wrote:

The group usually has from six to ten members; sometimes it consists of one family. Thry are usually brought together by an auxiliary, a helper who volunteers to organize the radio school. The auxiliary has little or no special training and is not paid. He may have been through a radio school himself. He gets the group together, finds a way to obtain use of a radio, and locates a meeting place (usually a student’s home). He serves as group leader until and unless other leadership emerges. He usually listens along with the students and learns with them. The students meet, listen together to the lesson broadcast, talk it over, and practice if this is called for. Usually each radio school receives one set o f text books, which is used by all students.27

140 journal of Popular Culture ACPO’s radiophonic schools have received government sponsorship by means

of Law 141 of 1961, which gave ACPO the status of a tax exempted non-profit organization partially supported with public funds. They also obtained UNESCO’s technical assistance in 1951. Monsignor Salcedo explained the initiative to the United Nations in 1948, and since then, Radio Sutatenza has been internationally recognized as the pioneer in using radio for rural education.

ACPO’s main objectives are to motivate the Colombian peasants to reach higher levels of development; to encourage human progress in terms of a physical, intellectual and spiritual improvement of the rural population; and to promote rural integration, community development and greater productivity.28 The radio schools offered three levels of instruction: First, a basic course primarily for teaching literacy; then, a two-year progressive course for literate populations with a few years of formal education, and finally, a three-year complementary course for more advanced students.

ACPO also produces entertainment and news programming in order to keep the station competitive with other commercial radio stations, specifically now that Radio Sutatenza has commercialized. In fact, since 1980, Radio Sutatenza has been authorized by the government to accept advertising revenues even though it was licensed as a non-commercial, cultural radio station. The opposition from the other private commercial radio stations to this change in status was strong and partially successful, since Radio Sutatenza lost its privileges as a non profit cultural station.

Accion Cultural Popular (Popular Cultural Action) publishes the largest rural newspaper which also happens to be the most widely read weekly newspaper in Colombia, El Campesino (70,000 copies). As part of its infrastructure, ACPO owns a printing press with a capacity of u p to 10,500 books per hour, in which approximately 600,000 textbooks and more than 300,000 books for general reading are published ann~a l ly .2~

Similar radio educational programs have been undertaken in Venezuela (ACUDE) and Honduras (AVANCE) following ACPO’s project design and utilizing radio broadcasts, tapes, records and audiovisuals in conjunction with newspapers, low cost texts and other printed materials.30

According to Reynaldo Pareja, Radio Sutatenza emerged at a time when the government needed help to “pacify” the countryside, seriously affected by the 1948-1957 “violencia.” In his opinion, Sutatenza’s project to offer basic and integral education for Colombian peasants, framed by the traditional doctrines of the Catholic Church, was oriented to give them:

a vision of themselves and of the world in which both the personal and social conflicts have relation neither with the struggle of classes, nor with the economic or political factors controlled and manipulated by the ruling elite.3‘

Finally, it is important to mention that Radio Sutatenza has received economic assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and at one point, programming from both the United States Information Service (USIS) and the Voice of America. Also, the Simon Bolivar Foundation with offices in New York has become an essential instrument to obtain funds from organizations like the American Express, the Chase Manhattan International, Pepsico, Rockefeller Brothers, General Mills, H. J. Heinz Co., and


Xerox foundations among others.32 While these contacts and funding sources do not invalidate ACPO’s work, they raise questions among many Colombians.

Networks and Economic Control The idea of broadcast networking was introduced in Colombia in the late

1940s. In 1937, in Medellin, the first experiments with simultaneous broadcasts using short-wave linkages began with programs such as the “Alfombra Magica” (“The Magic Carpet”) and the “Cadena Bedout” (“The Bedout Network”). Three years later, in Bogota, the already mentioned “Cadena Azul Bayer” and the continental “Cadena Kresto” started their musical programming. Usually these 30 minute-programs, were simultaneously transmitted by more than twenty stations throughout the country at least once a week. The “Cadena Bolivar,” based in Medellin and using only Colombian artists, joined the competition in 1941. All of these initial network attempts failed soon for lack of sufficient economic support, as a consequence of the financial stress that World War I1 imposed on their foreign and domestic sponsors.

During the world war and as part of the propaganda activities against the Nazi Germany, Colombian broadcast stations had been either producing their own propaganda or retransmitting programs sponsored by the U.S. Office of Inter-American Affairs. Apparently with the encouragement of the American government, CBS president William Paley started to visit the Latin American countries with the purpose of creating the “Cadena de las Americas” (“The Americas Network”). In 1941 Paley came to Colombia and his negotiations turned out to be a complete failure. The largest Colombian radio stations refused to join the proposed network, agreeing to rebroadcast only paid programming. A few smaller stations became affiliates of the American network allowing some Colombian broadcasters to be trained in the U.S.

To compete with CBS’s overseas operations, NBC also proposed the creation of its “Cadena Panamericana” (“The Panamerican Network”). In Colombia, NBC also had negative results and during the next few years both American networks slowly disappeared from this country.

With the technical advantages offered by FM links, a trend toward network broadcasting began in the mid 1940s. A merger of the two most important radio stations, “Emisoras Nuevo Mundo” of Bogota and “La Voz de Antioquia” of Medellin, created the “Primera Cadena Radial Co1ombiana”-CARACOL (“First Colombian Broadcasting Network”). CARACOL was set u p with the financial support of the powerful Lopez family, the former Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, and his son, also former President, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen.

As of 1975, CARACOL, one of the three largest radio networks in Colombia, had 44 stations which it owned and operated, and 22 affiliated broadcast stations. Its radio stations are distributed in five internal chains. The first one, also known as “Cadena Fundamental or Basica” (Fundamental or Basic Network), is formed by 19 broadcast stations located in the principal cities that simultaneously transmit radio-novelas, news, and sports. The second chain, “Cadena Deportiva” (Sports Network), includes 31 radio stations in smaller cities which transmit sports and music. The third chain, with 11 radio stations in the principal cities, broadcasts music, news, social service announcements and the time. It is known as “Cadena Radio-Reloj” (Radio-Clock Network). The fourth chain, dedicated to Colombian

142 Journal of Popular Culture youth, transmits soft rock and “pop” music. This network known as “Radiovision” was created in 1974. And finally, “Caracol Estereo,” the fifth chain, broadcasts easy listening music using frequency modulated (FM) in the principal cities.33

In contrast to the data above, as of 1984, according to figures of the Ministry of Communications, CARACOL appeared to control only 51 radio stations, 43 AM and 8 FM, which corresponds to 10.5% of the total broadcast stations of the country. The increasing number of independent radio stations (54 new stations from 1976 to 1984) has reduced the percentage of network controlled broadcast stations, but the principal ones of major audience are in the hands of networks like CARACOL.34 Of the major three networks, CARACOL seems to control fewer radio stations but the biggest audience, approximately 25% of the total.

CARACOL network, also one of the three major television programming companies with PUNCH and RTI (popularly known as the “Pool”), is owned by the Lopez family, the Ospina family (family of the former President Mariano Ospina Perez, a traditional political adversary of the Lopez family), German Montoya (president of Chrysler Colmotores), the Sanz de Santamaria and Navas Santamaria families, and other minor investors. CARACOL is associated with the powerful “Suramericana” and “Santodomingo” groups, domestic investors who also control newspapers, magazines and advertising agencies in the media area in addition to influential advertisers.35

In 1949, as a result of an internal dispute among domestic industries in obtaining airtime for their programs, a new radio network emerged. RCN, “Radio Cadena Nacional” (National Radio Network), became CARACOL’s principal competitor and now the biggest Colombian radio chain in terms of the number of stations affiliated. RCN, which also has television programs, controls a total of 59 AM and 10 FM broadcast stations (14.2% of the radio stations in the country).sC As of 1976, 22 of these stations were owned and operated while the remaining were affiliates.37

This network is 90% owned by the “Postobon-Lux Group,” a domestic economic organization dominated by the investor Carlos Ardila Lule. This group not only extends its power to the newspaper area but also partially owns the newer medium-size radio network, “Cadena Super.” Since RCN belongs to the Postobon-Lux enterprises, the number one producer of soft drinks in the country, the network possesses an abundant and secure flow of advertising revenues.98

In 1953, in Cali, Bernardo Tobon de la Roche created TODELAR. This radio network is the second in number of broadcast stations controlled, but it does not operate as a television progiammer like its other two major counterparts. TODELAR controls 58 AM and 6 FM broadcast stations which correspond to 13.1% of the total stations in operation.39

TODELAR became strong in 1967 when it merged with “Union-Radio,” a Bogota-based radio network. As of 1974, TODELAR had 16 owned and operated broadcast stations. This network is connected to the economic group of the “Valle del Cauca” which also controls newspapers and printing houses in Western Colombia as well as important national industries.

In 1958, to oppose the increasing absorption of smaller networks by CARACOL and RCN, Bernardo Tobon de la Roche created FEDERADIO, a


radio association formed by independent broadcast stations and TODELAR affiliates which started to compete with ANRADIO.

Today, there are smaller radio networks trying to compete with CARACOL, RCN and TODELAR. One of them is the “Cadena Super,” mostly owned by the Pava family, which in 1984 had 26 AM and 3 FM broadcast stations. Others are the even smaller “Grupo Radial Colombiano” (Radio Colombian Group) and OLIMPICA with 18 and 1 1 AM and FM broadcast stations, respectively. Finally, there are some very small radio chains that have not been absorbed yet, with no more than seven, mostly AM broadcast stations, like the “Coral” and “Colibri” networks.

In sum, the Colombia of the 80s presents a well established radio industry which mirrors the evolution of the American broadcast media. Radio is a cultural industry that has greatly contributed to build a new Colombia, more socially integrated and informed, but aiso more open to cultural alienation and consumerism.

Like much of Latin America, Colombia belongs to that group of countries where privately-owned radio systems, mostly controlled by networks, are the rule. In fact, Colombia is more dominated by networks than most other Latin American countries. Of the 485 radio stations, 270 (55.6%) are network-owned and educational broadcast organizations are the exception. Commercial radio stations tend to be concentrated in the major cities rather than in the more provincial and remote zones.40

Notes

[Ministerio de Comunicaciones-Division de Radio, “Estaciones de Radiodifusion Autorizadas” (Ministry of Communications-Radio Division, Authorized Radio broadcast Stations), February 29, 1984, taken from Departmento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica-DANE (National Administrative Department of Statistics), Colombia 85 (Bogota, DANE, 1985), p. 241.

*No accurate data on the potential audience for radio in Colombia is available. In his book, Historia de la Radio en Colombia (The History of Radio in Colombia), Reynaldo Pareja accepted 20 million listeners as a reasonable estimate for 1977 (pp. 11 and 128). However, this figure seems to be low when population growth and the recent greater availability of less expensive radio receivers are taken into account. (Hisloria de la Radio en Colombia, Bogota, Servicio Colombiano de Comunicacion Social, 1984).

SWith the exception of Pareja’s book, cited above, and Cincuenta AEos de Radiodifusi6n Colombiana (Fifty Years of Radio Broadcasting in Colombia), by Hernando Tellez (Bogota, Editorial Bedout, S.A., 1974).

4Elker Buitrago, Manual del Derecho de Ins Comunicaciones en Colombia (Manual o f Communications Law in Colombia, Bogota, Editorial Colombiana Ltda., 1980), p. 386.

5Tellez, p. 9 (Translated by the authors). ‘jLaw 31 of 1923. 7Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aereos (Colombo-German Society of Air

Transportation), founded on September 26, 1919. SCADTA later became Colombia’s romrnerrial airline, AVIANCA, which is believed to be the first commercial airline on the continent. Joaquin Paredes, Colombia a1 Dia (Bogota, Plaza & Janes Editores Colombia, Ltda., 1984), p. 283.

STellez, p. 17.


gThere is no truly precise information about the total population of Colombia. The advertising supplement, “Colombia: A Nation on the Move,” published by the New York Times i n 1981, estimated the population at 27.7 million for 1980. As far as the main cities are concerned, preliminary data from the XX Population Census held in October 1985, reported that the metropolitan areas of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla have altogether a population of 8,393,654 inhabitants. Information on the total country’s population has not been released yet.

“JPareja, p. 25. IIIbid., p. 36. QPareja, p. 21 and Elihu Katz and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World,

I3Day of celebration of the Battle of Boyaca on August 7 of 1819, which marked the

‘4Katz and Wedell, pp. 45 and 70. ‘5Decree 3418 of 1954 reprinted in Gregorio Rodriguez, Regimen Legal de las

Comunicaciones en Colombia (Legal Regimen of Communications in Colombia, Bogota, Editorial Temis, 1978), pp. 5-13.

‘GBuitrago, pp. 420 and 589. *?Buitrago, p. 601 and Law 42 of 1985. IaTellez, p. 92 (Translated by the authors). lgPareja, pp. 163-64. ZQTellez, pp. 31-32. ZIGerman Castro-Caycedo, L a Teleuisioiz en Negro (Television in Black, Bogota,

Editorial Hispana, 1980), pp. 183-84 (Translated by the authors). **El Tiempo, Septiembre, 1984, p. 4-B. ZsPareja, pp. 81-82 and 124 (Translated by the authors). Z4Ibid., pp. 80-81 (Translated by the authors). 25Art. 24, Decree 3418 of 1956, reprinted in Rodriguez, pp. 5-13. 26Tellez, pp. 119-20. 27Juan E. Diaz-Bordenave, Communicat ion and Rural Development, (Paris, UNESCO,

ZEIbid., p. 28. 29Diaz-Bordenave, p. 29 and Simon Bolivar Foundation, Inc., 198411985 Report,

SoSimon Bolivar Foundation, Inc., p. 7-1 1. S’Pareja, p. 88. W m o n Bolivar Foundation, Inc., p. 17. 33Pareja, p. 32. 34Ministerio de Comunicaciones-Division de Radio (Ministry of Communications-

35Julio Silva, Lo5 Verdaderos DueAos del Pazs (The Actual Owners of the Country,

36Ministerio de Comunicaciones-Division de Radio (Ministry of Communications-

STareja, p. 112. SaSilva, p. 278 and Pareja, p. 143-44. SgMinisterio de Comunicaciones-Division de Radio (Ministry of Communications-

4QIbid.

(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977), Table A. 4.

independence of Colombia from the Spanish Crown.

1977), p. 29.

(Bogota, Editorial Andes, 1986), p. 10.

Radio Division), February 29, 1984). Taken from DANE, p. 541.

Bogota, Fondo Editorial Suramerica Ltda., 1978), p. 278 and Pareja, p. 143.

Radio Division), February 29, 1984, taken from DANE, p. 542.

Radio Division), February 29, 1984, taken from DANE, p. 542.

Leonard0 Ferreira is a doctoral student in the Telecommunications Department at Michigan State University and Joseph D. Straubhaar is Director of Graduate Studies, for the Department of Telecommunication at Michigan State University and author of “The Development o f the telenouela as the Pre-Eminent Form of Popular Culture in Brazil,” Studies in Lat in American Popular Culture, 1 (1982), 138-50.

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