public transportation safety board€¦ · corporation. the safety board meets in public session,...

State of New York Department of Transportation

David A. Paterson, Governor

Astrid C. Glynn, Commissioner

2006 ANNUAL REPORT

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Contents

List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................v

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... vii

2008 Safety Board Members ............................................................................................................ ix

Past Safety Board Staff ......................................................................................................................x

2008 Safety Board Staff .................................................................................................................... xi

Letter from the Chairman ..................................................................................................................xiii

The Board’s Year in Review ............................................................................................................... 1

Highlights of 2006 .............................................................................................................................. 2

Signifi cant Accident Cases Presented to the Board in 2006 .............................................................. 6

PTSB Outreach Program ................................................................................................................. 10

Annual Accident Report ................................................................................................................... 13

Bus Accident Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 14

Rail Accident Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 17

Probable Causes of Bus and Rail Accidents .................................................................................... 20

Accident Rate Analysis .................................................................................................................. 24

Bus & Rail Systems Under PTSB Jurisdiction ............................................................................... 28

Defi nitions ...................................................................................................................................... 29

PTSB Safety Awards .........................................................................................................................33

PTSB 2006 Award Recipients ........................................................................................................ 33

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List of TablesTable 1: Bus Accidents by Reporting Criteria .............................................................................. 14

Table 2: Bus Accident Rates by Type .......................................................................................... 16

Table 3: Rail Accidents by Reporting Criteria .............................................................................. 17

Table 4: Rail Accident Rates by Type .......................................................................................... 19

Table 5: Rail Accidents by System ............................................................................................... 19

Table 6: Bus Probable Accident Causes by Type ........................................................................ 20

Table 7: Bus Driver Probable Accident Causes .......................................................................... 21

Table 8: Bus Equipment/Maintenance Probable Accident Causes ............................................. 21

Table 9: Rail Probable Accident Causes ..................................................................................... 22

Table 10: Rail Car Equipment Probable Accident Causes ............................................................ 22

Table 11: Rail Crew Probable Accident Causes ........................................................................... 23

Table 12: Rail Operations Probable Accident Causes .................................................................. 23

Table 13: Rail Track and Signal Probable Accident Causes ......................................................... 23

Table 14: Bus Accident Rates Grouped by Operator Size ............................................................. 25

Table 15: Rail Accident Rates ........................................................................................................ 26

Table 16: Rail Accident Rates ........................................................................................................ 26

Table 17: Rail Accident Rates Excluding Grade Crossing Accidents ............................................. 27

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List of FiguresFigure 1: Bus Accidents Investigated ............................................................................................ 15

Figure 2: Bus Accident Fatalities ................................................................................................... 15

Figure 3: Bus Injuries .................................................................................................................... 15

Figure 4: Rail Accidents Investigated ........................................................................................... 18

Figure 5: Rail Accident Fatalities ................................................................................................... 18

Figure 6: Rail Injuries .................................................................................................................... 18

Figure 7: PTSB Accident Trends ................................................................................................... 24

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2008 SAFETY BOARD MEMBERS

Deborah A. GreenAppointed 2002

John S. DelaneyAppointed 2002

Daniel J. TexeiraAppointed 2005

David Berke, PE Appointed 2004

Astrid C. GlynnCommissioner and

PTSB Chair

Barry KlugerMTA Inspector General

Karen RaeDeputy Commissioner

and PTSB Chair Designee

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2007 PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

PTSB ChairmanAstrid C. Glynn, Commissioner and ChairKaren Rae, Deputy Commissioner and PTSB Chair Designee

Board Members Deborah A. Green 2002John S. Delaney 2002David Berke 2004Daniel J. Texeira 2005Barry Kluger, MTA Inspector General MTA, 2007

Board StaffGary R. McVoy, Ph.D., Director, Operations Division, and Executive Director of PTSBDonald Baker, Director, Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security ServicesRoger Schiera, PTSB General CounselTrish Estella, Secretary

Rail Accident InvestigationsAlbany Offi ceC. Ike Scott, Director, Rail Safety BureauJerry P. Shook, Chief, Rail Safety BureauO.J. Guzman, Sr. Investigator

New York Metro Offi ceRobert Maraldo, Supervising InvestigatorJohn Compitello, InvestigatorJoseph Stiga, InvestigatorJean-Paul Paraskevas, Investigator Bus Accident Investigations - Albany Offi ceG. Mike Smith, Director, Passenger Carrier Safety BureauJohn S. Fabian, Chief InvestigatorMichael Gluskin, InvestigatorPhyllis LaCross, Secretary

New York Metro Offi ceHarry Gerham, InvestigatorMikhail Planker, Investigator

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STATE OF NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

ALBANY, N.Y. 12232http://www.dot.state.ny.us

Astrid C. Glynn David A. Paterson Commissioner Governor

April 1, 2008

The Honorable David A. Paterson, Governor Members of the LegislatureAnd Citizens of New York

Since 1984, the Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) has been charged by the New York State Legislature to improve the safety of New York State’s public transportation system, which has an annual ridership of more than 2-1/2 billion. As public transportation ridership has increased, it has been our challenge to insure that the number of accidents continues to decrease. This has been achieved through our active involvement in investigating bus and rail accidents, performing safety site reviews, providing accident investigation training to the bus industry, and participating in rail safety emergency preparedness exercises.

The purpose of this annual report is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the bus and rail accidents throughout the year. In accordance with Section 217 of the New York State Transportation Law, it is my pleasure to submit the 2006 PTSB Annual Report.

Sincerely,

Astrid C. Glynn PTSB Chair and Commissioner New York State Department of Transportation

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In Memoriam

Walter G. RichPTSB Board Member 1993 - 2007

Walter G. Rich, as a member of the Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) from July 1993-2007, is acknowledged for his dedicated service to the State of New York.

Mr. Rich’s vision, passion and extensive knowledge of the railroad industry greatly strengthened the Board’s activities to improve public transportation safety for the citizens of the State. The PTSB recognizes Mr. Rich for his signifi cant contributions and support.

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The Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) has broad, legislatively mandated powers and duties that enable it to effec-tively improve public transportation safety for transportation systems that receive funds under the State Transit Operating Assistance Pro-gram (STOA).

The PTSB is statutorily responsible for investigating and analyzing serious bus, subway and commuter rail accidents, and recommending actions to be taken to reduce the possibility of similar accidents from occurring. The Board’s powers and duties include:

Establishing accident reporting, investigation and analysis procedures;

Conducting comprehensive accident investigations involving public transportation systems, whether publicly or privately owned;

Taking a proactive role in public safety, by reviewing, approving and monitoring system safety program plans submitted by each transporta-tion system eligible for STOA;

Conducting system safety program plan fi eld audits to ensure that the transportation systems are in compliance with their approved system safety program plans;

Analyzing critical safety issues and concerns;

Recommending the establishment of new safety legisla-tion, rules and regulations, and transportation system procedures, based on fi nd-ings from accident investiga-tions, special studies and comprehensive audits.

Membership on the Safety Board is determined by Section 216 of the Transportation Law. The Board may consist of seven members and a Chairman. Mem-bers of the Board in 2007 were: Astrid C. Glynn, Commissioner New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) and Chair of the Safety Board; David Berke, Licensed Professional Engineer; John S. Delaney, Vice President LeRoy Dedicated Lo-gistics; Deborah A. Green; Barry Kluger, Inspector General, Met-ropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA); and Daniel J. Texeira, Sr. Vice President, Lincoln Brokerage Corporation.

The Safety Board meets in public session, on the third Wednesday of every other month. During 2006, the Board formally met six times.

StaffGary R. McVoy, Ph.D. has

the responsibility for directing staff activities, including: con-ducting accident investigations; reviewing system safety program plans; preparing commuter rail, subway and bus accident reports; monitoring transpor tation opera-tors’ compliance with fi nal Safety Board actions; maintaining Safety Board records; preparing special analytical and research studies; and performing other tasks that are deemed appropriate. The Safety Board’s primary resources are housed within the NYSDOT’s Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security, Passenger Carrier Safety and Rail Safety Bureaus.

Karen Rae is Deputy Commis-sioner of the Policy and Planning Division and serves as the PTSB’s Chair Designee.

Public Transportation Safety Board

The Board’s Year In Review

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Highlights 2006Board Meetings and Recommendations

January 2006

In January, the Board met in New York City and approved 14 rail and bus accident investigation reports and recertifi ed fi ve bus system safety program plans.

During the meeting, the Board expressed concern that seven of the 11 bus cases presented to the Board involved fi res. Various suggestions were considered to re-solve the problem, including a heat shield around the turbo and other high-temperature components, or the use of nonfl ammable hydraulic fl uids. The Board asked to have a report created regarding bus fi re trends and include information on latest technology to address the problem.

Board staff updated the Board on the New York City Transit Ventila-tion Plant status. Staff pointed out the signifi cance of the overall downward trend in fi res across the system. Short-term recommenda-tions are all completed and long-term recommendations are being progressed. It was further reported that 63 percent of the tracks are now being cleaned weekly with the remaining 37 percent be-ing cleaned biweekly. Additional manpower was hired to clean the wide areas between stations, with 71 wide areas cleaned during the previous two months. Eleven fewer Ventilation Plants were reported out of service this month, com-pared to last month.

The Board stated that along with the more concentrated efforts to pick up debris along the tracks, it was equally imperative to remove the trash from the pickup bins on the platforms. The Board asked

that people be more diligent in throwing out their trash in the proper place; to make sure the bin is cleaned up; and usable trash bins are made available at all times. It was noted that the Met-ropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) was running four additional trash pickup trains to accomplish this.

March 2006In March, the Board met in Albany and approved 15 rail and bus ac-cident investigation reports and recertifi ed fi ve bus system safety program plans.

At the meeting, staff furnished the bus fi re report that was requested by the Board. The probable cause for the 126 bus fi res for the last 10 years are as follows: electrical 58, equipment 32, undetermined cause 25, hydraulic systems 11. The fl eet age for the vehicles in which the fi res occurred is as follows: 1 to 2 years: 24, 3 to 5 years: 27, 6 to 10 years: 50.

During the review of rail accidents, the Board questioned the elapsed time element surrounding post-accident alcohol and drug testing. Staff reported that protocol was to only enter times when prob-lems existed, but to relieve any suspicion of delays in testing, it was agreed to present the actual elapsed time in all future cases.

The Board’s General Council reported the Utica Transit Authority had petitioned the Oneida County Supreme Court for dissolution and the transfer of most assets and operations to Centro of Oneida, Inc. pursuant to Section 67 of the Transportation Law.

General Council acknowledged that the NYSDOT staff supports the petition. General Council also stated that accountability of staff and the operations of the property will be preserved. General Coun-cil is coordinating with the staff of the Attorney General’s Offi ce to properly fulfi ll the State’s proce-dural obligations for the successful completion of the process.

May 2006In May, the Board met in New York City and approved 19 rail and bus accident investigation reports and recertifi ed three bus system safety program plans.

Staff reported a lowered out-of-service rate for Tompkins County Area Transit (TCAT) since the last report. The Board requested site audits and continued monitoring their progress. The NYSDOT motor vehicle inspectors will actively work with TCAT management to ensure continued positive trends.

July 2006In July, the Board met in Bingham-ton and approved 10 rail and bus accident investigation reports and recertifi ed one bus system safety program plan.

Staff reported attendance at the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Compliance Workshop in St. Louis, MO. Each state’s over-sight program was reviewed for compliance of more than 250 items required by the revised rule on state oversight. Additionally, as part of the Compliance Work-shop, staff was asked to complete a Fatigue Management Survey. Staff reported the survey was needed to obtain additional infor-

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mation on the work scheduling and fatigue management practices at rail transit agencies and to sup-port FTA’s ability to respond to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). This recommen-dation requires transit agencies, through the system safety program and hazard management process, to ensure that the time off between daily tours of duty, including regular and overtime assignments, allows train operators to obtain at least eight hours of uninterrupted sleep.

Following up on the Board’s recom-mendation, meetings were held with members of the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) Signal Depart-ment and NYSDOT Grade Cross-ing Safety Bureau to discuss the establishment of a quiet zone in the Port of Washington Branch and to improve safety at the Stewart Av-enue grade crossing in Beth Page, NY, where there have been several pedestrian accidents.

Staff reported that the Offi ce of the State Comptroller (OSC) recently conducted an audit on safety issues at LIRR and Metro-North Railroad (MNR) grade crossings and it’s report. Initial review indi-cates that problems outlined in the report are primarily those associ-ated with enforcement of current motor vehicle laws and that the railroads are doing a respectable job in promoting grade crossing safety. The railroads have agreed to implement some of the OSC recommendations and to study the others for further action.

Board Staff reported that discus-sions were beginning on the Bus Accident Investigation Training For Identifying Safety Hazards (BAIT-FISH) recertifi cation program that will be used for advanced accident investigation techniques. This program is for those carriers who have already obtained introduction and basic level certifi cation. It was also reported that the school bus industry has inquired about this outreach program.

September 2006In September, the Board met in New York City and approved eight rail and bus accident investigation reports and recertifi ed four bus sys-tem safety program plans.The Board was briefed on the unfortunate death of a young lady that occurred on August 5, 2006, at the LIRR’s Woodside Station. The fatality occurred after the young lady fell between the car door and the platform edge in the area commonly referred to as the “Gap.” Subsequently, the Commissioner was petitioned by New York State Senator Dean Skelos to have the PTSB look into the gap issue on all MTA commuter lines in New York. In mid August, staff commenced a special study, (PTSB Special Study #11), that reviewed the Gap issue on both the LIRR and MNR rail lines. Staff stated that while the Au-gust 5 accident investigation would be completed by the next meeting, the Special Study was likely not to be completed until early 2007. Staff also reported that once the data is analyzed, compiled and fi nal-ized, recommendations, if any, will be made. If recommendations are made, they will be drafted, shared with the property involved for re-sponse and then presented for the Board’s approval. It was also noted that the study is being carried out in conjunction with a parallel effort by the NTSB and with the full coop-eration of the LIRR and MNR.

November 2006In November, the Board met in Al-bany and approved 18 rail and bus accident investigation reports and recertifi ed fi ve bus system safety program plans.

During the meeting, the Board reviewed a bus accident report in which a Sport Utility Vehicle and an MTA New York City bus col-lided at an intersection in Brooklyn NY. The report indicated the bus brakes were not in compliance and the Board questioned why

the noncompliant brakes were not detected during regular preventive maintenance inspection (PM). Staff responded that when the brake linings were checked during the regular PM cycle they were correct, it wasn’t until the brake system was disassembled, during post-accident inspection, that the brake drums were found to be worn beyond service limits.The post-accident type of inspection is not performed under the general PM inspection.

Staff reported that the bus/pedes-trian committee was researching up-to-date data to provide a draft report on recent bus/pedestrian accidents to refl ect a change in the types of bus/pedestrian accidents, from right side rear wheel to left side front wheel. Since the last Board meeting in September, there have been additional pedestrian fatalities that involved the right rear and left front wheels. During the Fall Conference (Oct 4-6, 2006)of the NYSDOT Passenger Carrier Conference, participants requested an industry committee be selected to review the high incidence of bus/pedestrian accidents in an attempt to provide recommendations to pre-vent reoccurrences of these types of accidents.

BUS AND RAIL TRANSIT SYSTEM SAFETY SITE REVIEWS

The periodic review of bus and rail transit systems’ safety programs is an essential element of the Board’s safety oversight program. The reviews consist of the staff visiting selected transit property offi ces, depots, terminals and/or shops to review operating procedures to ensure adherence to system safety program plans and to identify safety defi ciencies. The reviews al-low the Board to work cooperatively with the transit providers to en-hance passenger safety, to identify safety issues and to develop ac-tions to correct safety defi ciencies.

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Bus staff conducted reviews at the Tompkins County Area Transit Sys-tem and Broome County Transpor-tation System.

SUPPORT OF STATE AND NA-TIONAL SAFETY INITIA TIVES AND ORGANIZATIONSEmergency Response Drills

On Thursday, January 26, 2006, the staff attended a terrorism semi-nar hosted by U.S. Department of Homeland Security in Queens, N.Y. The seminar addressed the in-crease in terrorist activity worldwide and the planning and expertise that the terrorist organizations possess in carrying out their criminal acts. On Tuesday, February 7, 2006, the PTSB staff attended a table top domestic preparedness exer-cise `hosted by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Interagency Counter-terrorism Task Force. The exercise involved a terrorist attack against the transpor-tation infrastructure in the County of Nassau and presented the opportu-nity to evaluate multi-jurisdictional emergency responses to a terror-ist attack launched against public transportation.In addition to attending emer-gency response drills, the staff also participated in 11 emergency response committee meetings and post-incident analysis meetings to discuss the results of the Emer-gency Response Drills.

Rail Site Safety Inspections

Board staff conducted fi ve site safety inspections at various Metro politan and upstate rail transit systems. The inspections included visits to rail properties’ construction sites, rights-of-way, railroad bridges and maintenance facilities. The rail in-spections were a proactive means for staff to address incidents such as debris collisions and reports of motor vehicles hitting railroad bridges along with identifying defi ciencies

relative to each property’s safety program plan.

State Safety OversightIn addition to attending two confer-ences on State oversight issues, Board staff conducted three over-sight safety reviews of the MTA NYCT during the year.

Bus Operator Safe Driving Competitions

Board staff participated as judges at Bus Operator Safe Driving Competitions at MTA Long Island Bus, Westchester County and the Statewide New York Public Transit Association’s Compe tition held at the New York State Fairgrounds in Syracuse. As judges, the staff rated bus operators’ safety tech-niques, including defensive driving skills, steering control and mirror usage.

Rural Transportation Assis-tance Conference

Board staff attended the Rural Transportation Assistance Preven-tion conference held in Syracuse and provided a presentation on the use of accident investigation techniques. Areas covered in detail included accident response, driver training, retraining and prevent-ability rating. The PTSB BAITFISH program was also highlighted.The Board continued to play a role in the development of national guidelines regarding the develop-ment of bus system safety pro-gram plans for all states to con-sider adopting.

Bus/Pedestrian Right Side Accident Task Force

Board staff initiated the Task Force in 2003 to share knowledge with industry peers by develop-ing counter-measures to reduce bus pedestrian accidents. The task force is comprised of indi-viduals from the bus industry, bus manufacturers and government safety oversight agencies. The task force discussed training, view

obstructions and black box and camera technology. Three sub-committees analyzed the areas of human factors, bus design and product design. In 2004, the task force modifi ed the overall scope of the committee to look at accident causes relative to crushing injuries from any wheel of the bus (instead of right rear specifi cally).

NYSDOT Bus Safety Conference

In October, staff served as panel moderators at the NYSDOT Annual Passenger Carrier Safety Conference held in Saratoga Springs. At the conference, staff provided presentations on top-ics such as wheelchair equipped vehicles, inspection procedures, preventive maintenance and safe-driving philosophies.

The Rural Transportation As-sistance Program Bus Safety Committee

In 2006, staff attended the Ameri-can Public Transportation Associa-tion Bus Safety Conference, held in Nashville, TN, to discuss the current safety issues affecting tran-sit systems throughout the US and Canada. Issues included determi-nation of pedestrian/bus accident causation, safety awards, emer-gency preparedness and response and bus standards development.

Professional Development

The Board staff is continually en-hancing its professional skills and personal development by attending safety conferences and training courses. During 2006, the rail staff attended seven training courses relating to track safety, fi re preven-tion, security training, accident investigation and State oversight.The Bus staff attended accident reconstruction and 19-A Recertifi -cation training.

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NYSDOT/PTSB: Emergency Preparedness Drills

As safety and security of the traveling public is paramount, the PTSB is constantly attending or participating in Emer-gency Preparedness meetings, drills and/or simulation exercises. These activities may involve multiple emergency response organizations and departments such as EMT organizations and local Fire Departments, police agencies and their SWAT teams, the FBI, TSI, Homeland Security and the State’s transit and commuter lines.

Drills are held in various locations with an emphasis in the metropolitan area where the potential for terrorist at-tacks are considered greatest. After each drill, a follow-up debriefi ng meeting is held to analyze the effectiveness of the planning phases and the drill/exercise. These meetings are conducted on a monthly basis and simulations are performed at various times of the year.

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Jerry Shook and John Fabian

Signifi cant Accident Cases Presented to the Board in 2006

On July 9, 2005, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Hampton Jitney bus #81 was traveling west on Montauk Highway and approaching the intersection with Steven Hands Path. The driver of a minivan failed to stop at the stop sign on Steven Hands Path and attempted to turn left onto eastbound Montauk Highway, entering into the path of the bus. The bus driver braked and steered right in an attempt to avoid a collision, but the left front of the bus col-lided with the left side of the minivan. The driver of the minivan was killed instantly. There were no other reported injuries to the 16 bus passengers. The bus sustained extensive damage from the collision and the minivan was destroyed. The bus driver was issued two traffi c tickets for underinfl ated right tag axle tire and log book not cur-rent.

In the vicinity of the accident site, Montauk highway is a 22-foot-wide two-way east/west roadway divided by a double yellow barrier marking into one travel lane in each direction. At the intersection with Steven Hands Path, the travel lanes are sepa-rated by a painted channelizing median (see photo, view of in-tersection facing east) that is 11 feet wide at its’ broadest point. There is also a dedicated left turn lane onto Steven Hands Path for eastbound traffi c. Steven Hands Path is a 24-foot-wide two-way north/south roadway that forms a “T” type intersection with Montauk Highway. The intersection is controlled by a stop sign for traffi c traveling south on Steven Hands Path. The posted speed limit for traffi c on Montauk Highway is 40 miles per hour. There are no sight restrictions for any vehicles at the intersec-tion.

There were no safety or recurring defects noted in the 45 days prior to the accident. The bus passed decelerom-eter tests performed on the bus’ braking systems at the accident scene by the Suffolk County Police Department Highway Patrol Bureau, Motor Carrier Safety Section. When the Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) staff inspected the bus on July 11, 2005, the bus was deemed unsafe to drive at that time due to damage incurred in the accident. Therefore, no decelerometer tests were performed at that time. However, physical inspection of the braking systems showed no defects.

The bus driver was hired by Hampton Jitney on June 2, 2003, and successfully completed it’s Bus Operator Training Program. A review of the driver=s Department of Motor Vehicles records for the past three years showed no violations, convictions or suspensions. New York State Vehicle & Traffi c Law, Article 19-A records were reviewed and found to be com-plete, in order and up-to-date. A review of the driver=s Hampton Jitney accident record for the past three years showed two non-preventable collision accidents (08/11/03, 10/25/03). Post-acci-dent drug and alcohol tests performed on the bus driver upon his release from the accident scene, approximately 4 hours and 15 minutes from the time of the accident, were negative.

In an interview, that bus driver indicated that he had reported for duty at about 8:30 a.m., made relief of another driver and

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left the garage at 9:00 a.m. After a short trip, the driver said that he had a layover of about an hour and departed for New York City at about 10:50 a.m. The bus driver said that he was traveling east in heavy traffi c on Montauk Highway and approaching the intersection with Steven Hands Path when a minivan entered the path of his bus. He indicated that he braked and steered to the right but could not avoid colliding with the minivan. The driver said that he was traveling at or below the posted speed limit and was about 2 to 2 ½ bus lengths behind the vehicle in front of his bus when the minivan entered his path.

The only witness statement obtained by the police indicated that the minivan had slowed, not stopped, at the stop sign on southbound Steven Hands Path and had then turned left onto eastbound Montauk Highway, enter-ing the path of the bus where the collision occurred.

The bus driver received tickets for an underinfl ated right rear tag axle tire and for log book violations [failure to have the log book current for duty status on the day of the accident and violations of the 80/70 hour rule (total hours of service), the 10-hour rule (driving) and the 15-hour rule (daily total hours of service)]. The PTSB staff re-view of the bus driver’s log book for the period 06/27/05 to 07/08/05 showed four 80/70 hour rule violations, one 15-hour rule violation and three 10-hour rule violations.

The PTSB staff found that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the minivan driver to stop at the stop sign on Steven Hands path.

An August 2006 accident at the Long Island Rail Road’s Woodside Station raised a broader public concern with the hazards presented by station platform gaps. The accident was investigated by staff of the PTSB and a report on its fi ndings was issued on November 20, 2006.

The PTSB investigation revealed that on the afternoon of the accident, the young woman was part of a group of approximately 18 to 20 acquaintances who were all traveling to New York City to attend a concert and that the young woman and about 12 friends drank alcohol for approximately 45 minutes prior to boarding the 3:09 p.m. train at Merrick Station. The group transferred at Jamaica to train #6113 which consisted of 10 M-7 coach cars and arrived at Woodside Station at approximately 3:52 p.m., (about three minutes behind schedule).

Upon arrival at Woodside Station, the doors opened and the group began to exit car #7548. However, before the young woman exited, the doors started to close. As one of the group stepped off the train, she turned around to speak with another girl and saw the door begin to close and the young woman grab the door with both hands in an attempt to prevent it from closing. Two additional acquaintances also saw the young woman grab the doors to prevent them from closing and, when the doors reopened, saw the young woman apparently lose her balance and fall forward. The conductor of train #6113 was operating the door control panel from the third car in the train and initiated the closing of the doors. As the doors were closing, the conductor saw a young woman banging on the outside of car #7548, so she reopened the doors. When the doors reopened, the conductor saw a young woman exit out of car #7548 and fall between the train and the platform to the roadbed. The conductor called the Movement Bureau and requested third rail power off on Main Line track #3 in Woodside and that police and EMS respond. A passenger aboard car #7548 saw the young woman fall and pulled the passenger emergency brake at approximately 3:53 p.m. The young woman’s acquaintances and railroad personnel immediately gathered about her telling her not to move and that they would get her out. An acquaintance reached down and held the young woman’s hand.

At approximately 3:54 p.m., eastbound Port Washington train #6464 was arriving at the Woodside Station on Port Washington Branch track #2 for a scheduled station stop. At approximately the same time, the young woman pulled away from the acquaintance’s hand and crawled under the platform toward the Port Washington Branch #2 track side of the platform. Train #6464 was decelerating in preparation for a normal stop when the engineer saw the young woman emerge from under the platform onto the track directly in front of his train. The engineer applied the train’s brakes in emergency but was unable to stop before striking the young woman. Train #6464 was traveling at a recorded speed of 30 miles per hour when its brakes were applied. Train #6464 stopped with the fi rst four cars along the eastbound Port Washington platform with the young woman under the second car.

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After being informed that the train had just struck someone, the conductor of train #6464 called the Movement Bureau and requested that third rail power be removed from Port Washington Branch track #2. Meanwhile, the Collector from train #6464 climbed down to the roadbed to aid and to comfort the young woman. FDNY and EMS arrived on the scene at approximately 4:05 p.m. and began treating the young woman. The young woman was removed from the roadbed by EMS personnel at 4:15 p.m. and transported to the Bellevue Hospital Trauma Center where she expired at 6:51 p.m.

The PTSB staff found that the most probable cause of this accident was the young woman’s actions that posi-tioned her in the path of an oncoming train. Contributing to the cause of this accident was the young woman’s alcohol-impaired condition. Based on the specifi cs of this accident, the PTSB made no recommendations; however, it reserved the right to possibly make recommendations upon the completion of a systemwide study of the gap issue.

In conjunction with the investigation of the August accident, the PTSB initiated a Special Study of the hazards presented by station platform gaps on both the LIRR and MNR. Staff issued interim recommendations followed by additional recommendations intended to address several objectives, including:

Provide an understanding of railroad engineering and operating factors that result in the need for station platform gaps, based on current national and local standards and practice in the commuter railroad industry; Gather data on the size and nature of platform gaps along stations of the LIRR and Metro North and re- late that information to accident / incident data; through a review of recent (fi ve-year) station platform gap accidents and incidents provide a better understanding of their nature and possible contributing factors, with a particular focus on those incidents resulting in the most serious injuries; Look beyond the borders of New York State at other commuter railroad operations in North America and elsewhere to identify strategies employed by the industry to mitigate or to reduce the number of station platform gap-related accidents and incidents; Review current LIRR and Metro North operating practices, including signage, customer service announcements and passenger assistance offered; and fi nally, Where appropriate, make recommendations to both railroads regarding strategies they can pursue to reduce or to eliminate the hazards created by station platform gaps.

The PTSB believes that gaps present a potential hazard and can occasionally lead to serious injury. However gaps are necessary to avoid collisions between a train and the platform. It is every passenger railroad’s respon-sibility to manage safety risks to its riders. While the LIRR and Metro North both have active risk management and system safety programs, PTSB Staff believe there is an opportunity to revisit and to improve those pro-grams.

Signifi cantly changing the possible risk presented to customers may take years to achieve. It is important that railroads prioritize efforts to focus on those strategies and locations that will have the quickest and greatest impact. Focus should be placed on locations with the highest volume of incidents and those that present the largest gaps – platforms on curves. Priority should be also given to evaluating those strategies that might have the greatest systemwide impact.

The PTSB staff recommends an incremental approach to managing and to reducing this risk associated with gaps. It is predicated on, but not limited to, establishing a goal over time to present customers with a more uniform environment with regard to gaps. The end goal would be to have a system whose gaps are nominally smaller and more uniform. The areas of emphasis and the content of the incremental effort is outlined below and should include, but not be limited to:

Development of a general public and passenger awareness protocol, including:

Signs – Adopt a uniform pictographic message to warn passengers of the danger presented by gaps that deploy both inside and outside cars in the immediate vicinity of car doors.

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Visual cues – Highlight gaps visually to remind and call passengers attention to specifi c gaps (e.g., LED lights, stenciled markings on cars and/or platforms, etc.)

Pamphlets – Explain the danger in greater detail and highlight the need for parents with small children to pay particular attention. Recognize the ethnic diversity of the population served in the area and consider multilingual approaches.

Announcements – Reinforce other awareness strategies with periodic announcements and reminders from conductors and other railroad personnel.

Customer participation – Solicit input form customers on how best to craft the message and otherwise deal with gap issues.

Strengthening of inspection and accident investigation protocols to en-sure continued focus on the potential hazards and delivery of promised strategies.

Inspections and Measurements - Periodically inspect and measure platform clearances and equipment features that affect the gaps passengers’ experience.

Data collection - Improve data collection on gap and other passenger incidents to continue learning about what causes them.

Program evaluation – Periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the railroad’s risk management program for gaps.

Development of an engineering and operational plan that minimizes gaps and their variability.

Engineering – Review present standards for track, platforms and equipment.

Short-term mitigation strategies (e.g., track realignment, equipment modifi cation or platform adjust ments such as edging).

Test the use of special technologies (e.g., platform extenders, platform rubbing board, and retract able steps/platforms) that can become part of a future design strategy.

Long-term investment strategies – Reduce gaps and their variability as part of equipment, station and track rehabilitation and replacement cycles.

Operational – Review present operating practices to better manage passenger risk in negotiating gaps.

Train Operations – Control access to train doors where gaps are widest (e.g., ends of fl ared plat forms)

Crowd control – Review crowd control practices at high-volume stations and transfer points as well as at stations serving special events. It is anticipated that a response to this mitigation program will be developed and implemented in 2007.

Page 9

NYSDOT/PTSB OUTREACH PROGRAM: UpdateJohn Fabian

BAITFISH: Bus Accident Investigation Training For Identifying Safety Hazards

The NYSDOT/PTSB staff outreach training effort known as “BAITFISH” has been presented across New York State to several hundred participants in a modular format of three classes as described below:

CLASS ONE:Accident Management and Investigation:

In phase one, this class will prepare the participants on what to expect when a call comes over the radio from a bus operator who says “I’ve had an accident, what do I do?” The students learn how to be prepared ahead of an incident with proper in-house procedures and a well-trained support staff. The class also addresses how to respond to the scene of an accident and gather the necessary “evidential facts.” A fi eld exercise leaves participants with the practical knowledge on how to develop a useful scene diagram. Phase two (Bus Accident Investigation) builds upon the fi rst class. Students learn two sides of an investigation: 1. The technical aspects requiring the use of proven accident investigation formulas to arrive at speed es-timates; and 2. The “incident management” process, which demands control of the accident scene to reduce injuries and unnecessary claims. Once again, students are exposed to outside practical exercises to verify the formulas taught in the morning session are valid. In addition, they gain personal experience in proper measuring techniques in determining grade, super-elevation, radius of curve, lengths of tire marks and other typical accident scene dimensions. Skid tests and drag-test techniques are also discussed.

CLASS TWO:The Determination of Accident Preventability

Over time, the bus industry has changed in many ways, but the process used to determine the preventability of an accident has been around for many years. Students are instructed on the theories behind a solid preventabil-ity program, and later challenged to put those theories to the test. There is heavy emphasis on the information-gathering efforts necessary to prepare for the rating of an incident. Finally, when a “preventable” determination has been reached, the process must include accurate countermeasures to reduce the reoccurrence of similar incidents in the future.

CLASS THREE:Hazard Assessment and Mitigation (Trend Analysis)

The last class in the series, the Hazard Assessment and Mitigation class will educate students on developing a sound, reasonable and effective system safety program. The importance of a technical accident investigation pro-gram, trend analysis, sound hiring practices, use of observation rides and a reasonable disciplinary program are discussed. Classmates are encouraged to share both proven techniques and “war stories” to benefi t the learning curve of all participants.

Page 10

2006 BAITFISH Program Highlights

Every PTSB jurisdictional bus property shall be required by January 1, 2008, to be certifi cated in the BAITFISH program (or equivalent).

Base program (anticipated):

Certifi cation will extend for a 4-year term;

Certifi cation represents a person successfully completing all courses (including acceptable substitu-tions) every four years;

Testing out of Class 1 is allowed if an approved accident investigation course is successfully com-pleted within the previous 48 months (proof of completion required);

Certifi cated comprehensive accident investigation course/class (TSI, IPTM, NATMI, etc) attended within one year (proof of grade required) will be an acceptable substitution for Class 1 requirements;

Classes 2 and 3 must be taken by all PTSB jurisdictional properties unless equivalent outside course is approved as substitute (currently none exist);

List of acceptable courses for substitution/equivalency updated semiannually;

Passing grades for testing purposes will be 70 percent;

If a certifi ed trainer leaves a company’s employment, immediate notice shall be provided by the com-pany, and a “good faith” plan must be provided to obtain recertifi cation by the company in a reason-able time frame;

No consortiums will be allowed to meet requirements;

Consideration will be given for exemption to companies operating fi ve or less vehicles for Class 1 only, which can substantiate a partnership with a neighboring certifi ed company. Classes 2 and 3 must be attended by all systems; and

Courses will be offered throughout the year and will be taught by selected bus industry trainers throughout the State.

Page 11

Tony LainoJitney Transportation Program

Brookhaven

Dave MixCentro

Syracuse

Felicia Jones MTA-New York City Transit

Dick StoutChautauqua Area Rural Transit

Jamestown

Bruce RubinMV Transportation

New York City

Mike ArmstrongMTA Bus Company

Joe AversanoUlster County Area Transit

Kingston

Diane Bergquist Ulster County Area Transit

Kingston

Jim DelaPena MTA-New York City Transit Dawn Campbell

MTA-New York City Transit

Pete Cassells Liberty Lines, Inc

Yonkers

Train-the-trainer programThe NYSDOT/PTSB is grateful for those individuals who have voluntarily joined “Team BAITFISH” as class in-structors and are providing a high level of experience and expertise from the transit community to the classroom. The program has been successful due to the efforts of the transit systems and industry representatives.

TEAM BAITFISH Industry Trainers:

Page 12

The Safety Board is responsi-ble for commuter rail, subway and transit bus accident investigations. All accidents that meet the acci-dent criteria stated below must be immediately reported by the trans-portation systems to the Board. Accidents meeting the PTSB crite-ria represent just a small portion, perhaps as low as one percent of all accidents and safety related incidents encountered by the properties annually. The purpose of the PTSB investigations is to assess the most serious accidents to ensure transit system have ap-propriate procedures and policies to avoid similar accidents from occurring in the future.

Notifi cation of Bus Accidents

Every public transpor-tation bus system subject to the Safety Board must give the Safety Board notice of the following oc-currences:

all accidents that result in a fatality;

all accidents that result in fi ve or more injuries that require medical attention; and

all accidents caused by mechanical failure, including, but not limited to, all fi res that occur in revenue service that require passenger evacuation and/or response by the police or fi re departments.

Notifi cation of Rail Accidents

Each public transportation system operating a commuter rail, light rail or subway system must give the Safety Board notice of the following accidents:

all collisions and derailments (except those minor incidents resulting from shifting cars and making up trains in yards);

all accidents at grade crossings;

all accidents that result in a fatality;

all accidents that result in two or more injuries that require medical attention; and

all emergency passenger evacuations.

Annual Accident Report

Investigation ProcessThe accident investigation

process begins with the system no-tifying the PTSB of an accident that meets the reporting criteria. This results in dispatching investigators to the accident scene for a compre-hensive and detailed examination of the environmental and human factors. Analysis of the factors develops fi ndings, conclusions and recommendations that are issued to the affected transportation sys-tems to reduce the probability of future accidents.

The recommendations specifi -cally address actions to be implemented by the transit systems to correct safety defi ciencies and to improve safety. The transit systems’ respons-es to the recommenda-tions are reviewed and closely monitored by the PTSB to ensure that they are properly executed.

Accident fi gures and rates in this annual report may vary from previous reports. The variances are due to

the changes in the reportability of certain accidents types.

Bus accident investigation reports that have been processed by the Safety Board during formal meetings are analyzed to identify trends and special problems. In 2006, the Safety Board investigat-ed 76 bus accidents that met the Board’s reporting criteria.

Accident Investigation Procedures

Page 13

Table 1 depicts the number of accidents meeting the fatal, multiple injury, and mechanical failure reporting criteria accident types for 2006.

Bus Accident Analysis

Page 14

Table 12006 BUS ACCIDENTS BY REPORTING CRITERIA

FATAL MULTIPLE INJURY MECHANICAL FAILURE

Accident Type

Number of

Accidents Accident Type

Number of

Accidents Accident Type

Number of

AccidentsPedestrian at Intersection 1 Angled Collisions 14 Fire 20

Angled Collisions 1 Hit Other in Rear 4 Hit Other in Rear 6

Head On 1 Sideswipe 1 Wheel Off 3

Pedestrian 9 Other Vehicle Hit Bus in Rear 2 Passenger 2

Motorcycle 2 Head On 3 Angled Collisions 0Hit Other in Rear 1 Hit Stationary Object 1 Hit Stationary Object 1

Miscellaneous 0 Sideswipe 0Enter/Leave Bus 2 Door Interlock 1

Miscellaneous 1

Total 15 Total 27 Total 34

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figures 1 through 3 depict the average number of bus accidents, fatalities and injuries for the years 2000 through 2006. Data is calculated by using fi ve-year moving averages. Five-year moving averages simply measure the average accident rate over a fi ve-year time frame. Bus accidents, fatalities and injuries have shown a general decline over the last fi ve years.

Page 15

Bus Accidents Investigated

78

80

84

80 80

81

79

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Bus Fatalities

13

15 1617 16

15

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Bus Injuries

323345

379404

463465481

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Table 2 is the distribution of bus accidents investigated by accident type for the years 2000 through 2006. Calcu-lations are based on fi ve-year moving averages.

Page 16

Table 22006 BUS ACCIDENTS BY REPORTING CRITERIA

Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Accident Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CollisionsAngled Collisions 22.20 24.00 24.60 21.20 20.00 19.00 17.20Other Vehicle Hit Bus in Rear 8.60 8.40 8.40 8.80 8.60 7.60 6.40

Hit Other in Rear 7.80 7.40 9.40 9.00 8.00 8.60 9.40Pedestrian 4.60 4.40 4.40 4.60 4.00 3.80 4.80Head On 4.40 3.80 4.20 3.80 4.00 3.80 3.80Sideswipe 3.40 3.00 3.00 2.40 2.00 2.40 2.00Hit Stationary Object 2.80 3.40 2.40 2.40 2.00 1.80 1.40Bicycle 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.80 1.60 1.60 1.20Enter/Leave Bus Stop 1.40 1.40 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 .80Motorcycle 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.40 .80

Subtotal 56.6 56.80 58.80 55.00 51.20 49.40 47.80Fire 7.60 9.00 11.40 13.20 18.20 22.60 24.60Passenger 3.80 3.60 3.40 3..00 2.40 2.00 1.80Miscellaneous 4.60 4.80 4.60 3.60 2.80 1.80 .80Out Of Control 4.00 3.80 3.60 2.80 2.40 1.80 1.20Door Interlock 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.40Roll Away 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Wheel Off 0.40 0.40 1.00 1.40 1.80 2.20 2.60

Rail accident investigation reports that have been processed by the Safety Board during formal meetings are analyzed to identify trends and special problems. In 2006, the Safety Board investi-gated 27 rail accidents that met the Board’s criteria.

Table 3 depicts the number of accidents meeting the collision, derailment, evacuation, highway grade crossing, multiple injury and passenger fatality accident types.

Rail Accident Analysis

Page 17

Table 32006 RAIL ACCIDENTS BY REPORTING CRITERIA

COLLISION DERAILMENT EVACUATION

Accident TypeNumber

of Accidents

Accident TypeNumber

of Accidents

Accident TypeNumber

of Accidents

Improper Operation of Equipment

2 Equipment Mainte-nance Defi ciency

2 Unsafe Actions 1

Improper Procedure Used 1 Track Component Defi ciency

1 Fire/Smoke 1

Hit Material on Track 1Track Component Defi ciency 1

Non Passenger Fatality 2

TOTALS 6 3 3

HIGHWAY GRADE CROSSING MULTIPLE INJURY PASSENGER FATALITY

Accident TypeNumber

ofAccidents

Accident TypeNumber

ofAccidents

Accident TypeNumber

ofAccidents

Unsafe Actions 7 Improper Operation of Equipment

1 Passenger Fell From Train 2

Ignored Warning Devices 1

Suicide 2

Other 2

TOTALS 12 1 2

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figures 4 through 6 depict the fi ve-year moving average for rail accidents, fatalities and injuries for the years 2000 through 2006. Although rail accidents investigated have been trending down, fatalities and injuries have remained relatively constant.

Page 18

Rail Accidents Investigated

29293129

3233

39

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Rail Fatalities

88

655

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Rail Injuries

9493

109

90

6370

80

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Table 5 depicts the average number of rail accidents investigated by system for the years 2000 through 2006. Calculations are based on fi ve-year moving averages.

Table 4 is the distribution of rail accidents investigated by accident type for the years 2000 through 2006. Calculations are based on fi ve-year moving averages.

Page 19

Table 42006 Rail Accident Rates by Type


Accident Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Unsafe Actions 8.80 8.20 7.40 6.80 7.20 7.40 7.60 Ignored Warning Devices 5.60 4.60 4.20 3.60 3.60 4.00 3.40 Human Factor Improper Operation of Equipment 4.00 2.80 3.80 3.60 4.20 4.20 4.20

Hit Material on Track 3.60 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.20 2.60 2.00 Track Component Defi ciency 4.60 4.60 2.40 2.20 2.20 1.00 1.00 Fire/Smoke 2.20 1.40 1.40 1.20 0.80 1.00 1.00 Passenger Fell From Train 2.00 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.60 0.80 1.20 Human Factor Improper Procedures Used 1.20 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.60 1.60 1.40

Track Maintenance Defi ciency 1.20 0.60 1.20 1.00 1.20 1.20 1.20

Equipment Component Defi ciency 0.60 1.60 1.40 1.40 1.80 1.60 0.60

Non-Passenger Fatality 1.40 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.80 0.80 1.20

Loss of Power 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.60 0.60 Equipment Maintenance Defi ciency 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00

Suicide 0.60 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.20

Mechanical Failure of Other Vehicle 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 Other 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.60 1.00

Passenger Drag-Related Injury/Fatality 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Table 5 Rail Accidents by SystemBased on Five-Year Moving Average

Average Number of Rail Accidents 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

MTA Long Island Railroad 16.60 14.40 12.20 12.20 14.20 14.60 14.40 MTA Metro-North Commuter Railroad 5.20 4.00 3.80 3.00 3.80 3.20 3.40

MTA New York City Transit 11.00 10.20 9.40 8.60 8.40 7.60 7.00

MTA Staten Island Railway 1.20 .80 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.00 1.00 New Jersey Transit 1.80 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00

Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 3.00 2.60 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.00 2.00

The primary probable cause of an accident is the action or factor that directly facilitates the initial event of an accident. For example, if a maintenance department failed to properly repair the steering housing unit of a bus and the unit failed and the bus had a collision, the maintenance department’s actions would constitute the initial event.

Probable Causes of Bus and Rail Accidents

The primary probable cause of an accident is either associated with the transit systems or factors not directly related to the transit systems (termed “other”). Approximately 99 percent of ac-cident cases approved or adopted by the Board identifi ed the primary probable cause. If the Board identi-fi ed both the transit system and factors external to a transit system (other) as the primary probable

cause, the probable cause was categorized as transit system. Defi nitions of bus and rail transit system and other causes can be found on pages 29 through 32.

Table 6 depicts the average rate of probable accident causes for the period 2000 through 2006 using a fi ve-year moving average.

Page 20

Table 6Bus Probable Accident Causes


Transit System 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Average for the 7-year period

Bus Driver 18.00 17.20 17.60 17.00 14.60 16.00 16.80 16.74Bus Equipment/Maintenance 11.80 13.40 15.20 17.60 22.00 26.40 27.80 19.17

Other 1.40 2.40 3.20 3.00 3.20 3.00 2.60 2.69

Transit System 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Average for the 7-year period

Other Vehicle 41.00 40.40 41.40 36.20 34.40 29.60 27.80 35.83Passenger 2.60 4.20 4.20 3.60 1.80 1.60 0.00 2.57Pedestrian, Bicyclist 2.60 1.40 1.00 1.60 2.00 2.00 2.60 1.89Miscellaneous 0.40 0.20 0.60 0.40 1.40 1.60 1.60 0.89

Table 8 is a breakdown of equipment and maintenance causes.

Table 7 is a breakdown of bus driver causes.

Page 21

Table 72006 Bus Driver Probable Accident Causes


Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Average for the 7-Year Period

Failure to Drive Defensively 12.40 12.40 13.20 12.60 10.60 11.20 11.40 11.91Improper Use of Equipment 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.31

Inattentiveness 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.20 1.20 2.00 2.80 1.14

Use of Drugs/Alcohol 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.17Failure to Perform Pre-trip Inspection 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Fatigue 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.14Other 4.60 4.20 2.80 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.00 3.03

Table 8Bus Equipment/Maintenance Probable

Accident CausesBased on Five-Year Moving Average

Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


Electrical Systems 3.40 4.20 5.00 7.00 8.60 11.80 13.80 7.69Other 4.40 4.40 5.40 5.40 7.80 8.80 8.20 6.34

Wheels 1.00 1.20 1.60 1.80 2.40 2.40 2.20 1.80

Steering 0.80 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.60 2.00 1.40 1.40Brakes 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.40 1.40 1.60 1.60 1.23Rear Door Interlocking Systems 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.46Wheelchair 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.43

Table 9 is the average rate of rail accidents caused by the transit systems or others.

Table 10 is the average rate of rail car equipment causes.

Page 22

Table 9Rail Probable Accident Causes


Transit Systems: 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


Track/Signals 7.80 6.80 5.20 4.80 4.60 3.40 3.40 5.14Crew 4.60 3.20 3.20 3.40 4.20 4.20 4.20 3.86Car Equipment 2.40 2.40 2.60 2.60 3.00 2.60 2.00 2.51Operations 1.20 1.80 2.00 2.00 2.20 2.20 1.60 1.86

Other Vehicle 11.40 9.60 10.20 9.00 9.20 8.20 8.80 9.49Miscellaneous 5.20 6.20 4.20 3.60 2.20 1.20 1.00 3.23Pedestrian 3.20 2.40 2.60 2.60 4.40 6.00 6.00 3.89Passenger 3.00 2.00 1.60 1.20 1.60 1.40 1.80 1.80

Table 10Rail Car Equipment

Probable Accident Causes by ComponentBased on Five-Year Moving Average

Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


Trucks 0.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.60 1.40 0.80 1.26Other 0.60 0.60 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.86

Propulsion Unit 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.40

Total 2.51

Table 11 is the average rate of crew (motorman, conductor, others) causes.

Table 12 is the average rate of operation causes.

Table 13 is the average rate of track and signal causes.

Page 23

Table 11Rail Crew Probable Accident Causes


Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


Human Failure - Operating Procedures 3.00 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.20 2.80 2.40 2.86

Human Failure - Inattentiveness 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.60 0.46Human Failure - Operating Rules 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.80 1.20 0.49Human Failure - Other 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06

Table 13Rail Track and Signal Probable Accident Causes


Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


Track Component Defi ciency 2.80 2.00 1.20 2.00 2.20 1.60 1.80 1.94Track Component Failure 2.40 3.00 3.00 1.60 1.40 0.80 0.40 1.80Signal Component Defi ciency 0.80 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.00 0.77Track or Signal Other 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.40Signal Component Failure 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20

Table 12Rail Operations Probable Accident Causes


Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


Improper Procedures 1.00 1.60 2.00 1.80 2.00 2.00 1.40 1.69Other 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17Crowd Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Figure 7PTSB Accident Trends

113 115 109 110 109 108117

79807980 84 8078

33 32 3039

29 2939

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

200620

00

Bus & Rail Bus Rail

Figure 7 depicts the bus and rail accident trend since 2000 based on fi ve-year moving average.

Accident Rate Analysis

Page 24

Tables 14 through 17 depict bus and rail accident rates for the years 2000 through 2006. The rates are fi ve-year moving averages based on the ratio of the number of criteria accidents reported to 100 million Revenue Vehicle miles, 100 million Passengers and 100 million Train Miles. A very large property has 1,000 or more buses, large property 200-999, medium property 25-199 and small property 1-24 buses. A list of properties under the jurisdiction of PTSB can be found on page 27.

Page 25

Table 14Bus Accident Rates


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Very Large1,000+ buses Very Large Property Average Accident Rate 47.20 51.00 53.00 48.800 47.40 48.80 47.80

Very Large Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 8.05 7.82 7.66 6.83 6.55 3.51 5.33

Very Large Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 51.68 55.67 57.57 52.33 50.17 25.01 37.84

Large200-999 Buses Large Property Average Accident Rate 19.80 18.00 18.20 17.60 19.00 17.60 18.00

Large Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 14.33 12.82 12.50 11.91 11.86 7.86 9.50

Large Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 31.71 27.85 27.64 26.05 26.98 15.75 16.77

Medium25-199 Buses Medium Property Average Accident Rate 10.00 9.40 11.20 11.60 10.40 10.60 10.20

Medium Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 20.76 19.17 21.09 20.79 17.29 9.02 15.11

Medium Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 25.60 23.36 26.25 25.85 21.95 10.66 19.06

Small1-24 Buses Small Property Average Accident Rate 1.20 1.40 1.40 1.80 2.80 3.40 3.20

Small Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 10.98 13.55 15.05 19.46 33.62 28.78 34.56

Small Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 6.09 6.53 6.34 7.98 12.32 9.91 11.76

Table 15 Rail Accidents Rates


System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006Per 100 Million Revenue Vehicle Miles

New Jersey Transit 129.53 101.06 72.61 73.47 73.85 59.58 74.28MTA New York City Transit 3.48 3.21 2.92 2.65 2.57 2.27 2.08

MTA Staten Island Railroad 58.71 36.73 64.68 64.63 55.32 46.61 46.51

Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 339.69 297.85 368.72 353.53 333.31 242.40 251.34 Per 100 Million Passengers

System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006New Jersey Transit 135.42 104.66 63.67 44.49 42.29 27.64 32.70MTA New York City Transit 0.93 0.82 0.71 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.49MTA Staten Island Railroad 27.73 20.54 37.24 37.56 32.51 27.64 25.43Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 75.47 67.61 84.89 80.40 74.89 55.07 55.03

Table 16Rail Accidents Rates


Per 100 Million Revenue Vehicle Miles

System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

MTA Long Island Rail Road 28.62 24.61 21.86 20.86 24.22 25.08 24.44MTA Metro-North Railroad 15.33 11.49 10.30 7.73 9.82 8.26 8.66

Per 100 Million Passengers

System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006MTA Long Island Rail Road 21.11 17.61 15.14 14.24 16.88 17.84 17.77MTA Metro-North Railroad 11.36 8.52 7.73 5.89 7.50 6.32 6.66

Per 100 Million Train Miles


Table 17Rail Accidents Rates Excluding

Grade Crossing AccidentsBased on Five-Year Moving Average

System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Per 100 Million Revenue Vehicle Miles

MTA Long Island Rail Road 16.40 13.86 10.07 9.39 12.44 11.36 10.22MTA Metro-North Railroad 9.33 6.84 6.46 4.61 5.62 4.57 5.48

Per 100 Million Passengers


Per 100 Million Train Miles


Systems Under PTSB Jurisdiction

BusSmall 1 - 24 busesAmsterdam Transit SystemArrow Bus Line, Inc.Blue Line, TheBluebird/Olean/BOA BusBluebird CoachBornscheuer Bus ServiceBuffalo Motor CoachCapitol BusChautauqua Area Rural-CARTSChenango ValleyCity of CorningClarkstown Mini-TransClinton Area Rural Transit Educational Bus -E.B.T. (Bornscheuer Bus Co Inc)Ellicottville TransportationFranklin County AssociationGadaboutGlen Cove Bus DivisionGloversville Transit SystemGoshen-Chester Dial-A-BusGreater Glens Falls TransitHighlands Dial-A-BusHornell Area TransitHudson Minibus, City OfHuntington Area Rapid TransitInter-County Motor CoachInternational Bus Service, Inc.Kaser Bus ServiceKingston CitibusKiryas Joel, Village OfLaidlaw TransitLake Placid SightseeingLake Placid VillageLester Lines IncLong Beach Bus DivisionMadison TransitMechanicville, City OfMiddletown Transit CorpMonroe Bus CorporationMonroe Dial-A-Bus, Town OfMontgomery-Crawford D-A-BNetzach Transportation, Inc.New Windsor-Cornwall D-A-BNewburgh Dial-A-Bus, Town OfNewburgh-Beacon Bus CorpNiagara Falls Coach LinesOneonta Public Transit

Ontario Transit LinesOrange County ParatransitORDAOrleans Transit ServicePassenger Bus Pat Zanchelli, Inc.Patchoque, Village OfPine Hill-Kingston BusPort Chester-Rye TransitPort Jervis Dial-A-BusProgressive Transportation ServicePTLA Enterprises, Inc. Putnam County TransitRoethel Coach LinesRome VIP TransportationSchoharie CountySeneca Transit ServiceSpring Valley, Village Of Steuben County TransitSuffolk County ParatransitSullivan County TransportationSunrise Coach Lines, Inc.SUNY at Fredonia Student AssocThousand Island Bus Lines (Laforty)Tioga County TransitTown of Hunter TrolleyTown of KeeneTrans-Hudson ServiceTRIPST-Tran BusSystem/PTSUlster County Rural TransitWallkill Dial-A-Bus, Town OfWarwick Dial-A-Bus, Town OfWatertown, City Bus SystemWestchester Paratransit

Medium 25 – 199 busesAdirondack Transit Lines, Inc.Birnie Bus ServiceBrown Coach, Inc.CBS Lines, Inc.Chemung County Transit SystemCommand Bus Company, Inc.Dutchess County Mass TransitFullington Trailways

Hudson Transit Lines, Inc.Jamaica Buses, Inc.Leisure Lines - Hudson Transit, Inc.Liberty Lines Express, Inc.Liberty Lines Transit, Inc.Monsey-New Square Bus TrailsNew York Bus Tours, Inc.Oswego County Opportunities Rockland Transit Coaches Inc Suffolk Bus Corporation T-CATTransport of Rockland/TOR Upstate Transit Utica Transit AuthorityYankee Trails

Large 200 – 999 buses

Atlantic ParaTransit, IncBroome County TransitCapital District Transportation Auth.CENTROGreen Bus Lines, Inc.Laidlaw Transit, Inc.Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth.Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth.Queens Surface CorporationRochester-Genesee Regional Trans Auth.Triboro Coach Corporation

Very Large 1,000 + buses

Greyhound Lines, Inc.MTA New York City TransitNew Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc

RailMTA Long Island Rail RoadMTA Metro-North RailroadMTA New York City Transit Auth.MTA Staten Island RailwayNew Jersey TransitNiagara Frontier Transportation Authority

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including the rim, bearings, seals, lugs and other anchor assemblies, and tires.

Steering: The failure or defi ciency of any steering compo-nents, including, but not limited to, steering box, steering wheel and column, idler arm, pitman arm, radius rods, ball joints, pinions and knuckles, power steering pumps and belts, etc.

Brakes: The failure or defi -ciency of a bus component(s) that mechanically slows or stops a bus (includes air system, drums, disc, and brake pedal).

Electrical System: The failure or defi ciency of a bus component(s) that is associated with electrical systems or units, except for those electrical com-ponents relating to the rear door interlocks.

Rear Door Interlocking System: The failure or defi ciency of a bus component(s) that com-prises the system that will apply the brakes of a bus when the rear door of a bus is opened.

Wheelchair: The failure or de-fi ciency of the bus system that lifts or raises wheelchair passengers from curb level to bus fl oor level.

Other (tires, suspension,...): The failure or defi ciency of any bus component(s) except for those components associated with brakes, electrical systems, rear door interlocking, steering, wheels, and wheelchair lifts.

Bus Other CausesOther Vehicle: The improper

action(s) of a vehicle other than the bus.

Pedestrian Bicyclist: Im-proper actions of a pedestrian or bicyclist that lead to accident involvement.

Passenger: The improper action(s) of a person who travels on a bus or is attempting to board or exit a bus.

Miscellaneous: Refers to events such as weather or acts of God.

Bus Probable Cause Defi nitions

Bus Driver Failure to Perform Pretrip

Inspection: Failure of a bus driver to inspect the safety condition of a bus before using the bus in pas-senger service.

Improper Use of Equipment: Failure of a bus driver to properly utilize bus equipment, such as rear door interlocks and wheelchair lifts.

Use of Drugs/Alcohol: Use of illegal drugs or use of alcoholic beverages while operating a bus or the improper use of prescription drugs that have an adverse affect on driver’s ability to operate a bus.

Bus Driver Inattentiveness: Driving while distracted, either visually (improper scanning) or mentally (use of cell phone, radio, conversation, etc) and being diverted from performing required duties.

Bus Driver Other: Failure of a bus driver other than failure to drive defensivley (speeding, fol-lowing too closely, improper mirror use, etc), such as medical, incapa-ciatation, etc.

Bus Driver Fatigue: Driving with improper rest resulting in loss of driving skills and performance.

Bus Driver Improper use of Equipment: Failure of a bus driver to properly utilize bus equipment such as drivers seat belt, rear door interlock, wheelchair lifts, etc.

Bus EquipmentWheels: The failure or defi -

ciency of any wheel component

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Car EquipmentBody: Failure of a compo-

nent of a rail car, except for those relating to the propulsion units or trucks. Body components would include lighting, doors, frame and draft gear.

Propulsion unit: Failure of the power unit of a car.

Trucks: Failure of the wheel and braking unit of a car.

CrewHuman Failure – Operating

Rules: A train crews’ failure to ad-here to established or posted rules, such as the train operator failing to stop a train short of a restricted signal.

Human Failure – Operat-ing Procedures: A train crews’ failure to adhere to established procedures, such as crews’ failure to properly observe or react to a fl agperson’s instructions.

Human Failure–Inattentive-ness: A train crews’ failure to be as alert as expected, such as failure to notice the position of a switch.

OperationsCrowd Control: Failure of man-

agement to have established safety procedures to effectively handle or control large numbers of passen-gers at one site or location.

Improper Procedures: Failure of management to have estab-lished procedures (excludes crowd control procedures).

Track and SignalSignal Component Defi -

ciency: The inadequacy of a signal component to function to its intend-ed specifi cations; for example, a cable being worn or a sticky relay.

Signal Component Fail-ure: The complete failure of a signal component, such as a short circuit.

Track Component Defi ciency: The inadequacy of a track com-ponent to function to its intended specifi cations, for example, a rail being worn.

Track Component Fail-ure: The complete failure of a track component, such as a broken rail.

Rail Other CausesMiscellaneous: The improper ac-tion of a vandal or trespasser or other factors

Other Vehicle: The improper ac-

Rail Probable Cause Defi nitions

tion of a vehicle (includes bicycles) that causes an accident, in most instances “other vehicle” refers to motor vehicles crossing highway grade crossings.

Passenger: The improper action of a person who travels by rail or who is attempting to board or exit a rail car.

Pedestrian: The improper action of a person who travels by foot.

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Angled CollisionsDefi nition: Collisions between two vehicles approaching on sepa-rate roadways or other paths that intersect.

Bicycle Defi nition Accidents involving a bicyclist and a transit bus.

Door Interlock Defi nition: Accidents resulting in the movement of a transit bus while a passenger door is open or an ac-cident caused by the failure of the door interlock system.

Enter/Leave Bus Stop Defi nition: Accidents involving a transit bus entering or leaving a passenger loading-discharging zone.

Fire Defi nition: Any fi re that occurs on a transit bus while it is in revenue service.

Head OnDefi nition: Collision accidents between a transit bus and a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction on the same roadway (including contra-fl ow lanes). If the accident occurs at an intersection and the vehicles approach each other from 180 degrees in the opposite direc-tion, it is termed Head On.

Hit Other In Rear Defi nition: Accidents where a tran-sit bus collides with the rear of another moving or standing vehicle (including anothertransit bus).

Hit Stationary Object Defi nition: Accidents where a transit bus collides with any fi xed object.

Miscellaneous Defi nition: Accidents that did not meet the characteristics of another accident type.

Motorcycle Defi nition: Accidents involving a motorcycle and a transit bus.

Other Vehicle Hit Bus in Rear Defi nition: Accidents where a moving or standing transit bus is impacted in the rear by another vehicle (excluding a transit bus).

Out of Control Defi nition: Accidents where a transit bus driver fails to control the operation of a bus while it is in motion.

Passenger Defi nition: Accidents involving the injury or fatality of passengers within the interior of a transit bus.

Pedestrian Intersection Defi nition: Accidents involving the injury or fatality of a pedestrian as a result of the pedestrian coming into contact with the exterior of a transit bus.

Roll Away Unattended Defi nition: Accidents where an unattended transit bus rolls or travels from a stopped position.

Sideswipe Defi nition: Accidents where vehicle side contact is made between a transit bus and another vehicle.

Wheel Off Defi nition: Accidents where a bus wheel separates from the bus as a result of a mechanical failure.

Bus Accident Type Defi nitions

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Equipment Component Defi ciencyDefi nition: Accidents caused as a result of component failures, such as brake riggings dropping, wheels shattering, and wheels overheating.

Equipment Mainte-nance Defi ciency Defi nition: Accidents caused by improperly maintained equipment, such as allowing for worn wheels to be in service.

Fire/Smoke Defi nition: Accidents caused by fi re and/or smoke.

Ignored Warning Device(s)Defi nition: Accidents caused by the public’s failure to obey and com-ply with warning devices, such as grade crossing gates and fl ashing grade crossing warning lights.

Improper Operation of Equipment Defi nition: Accidents caused as a result of human error in the opera-tion of a train.

Improper Procedures UsedDefi nition: Accidents caused by hu-man error in following established procedures.

Loss of Power Defi nition: Accidents caused by a loss of or the inability of a train to take traction power, which in most circumstances results in an evacuation of passengers.

Material on Track Defi nition: Accidents caused as a result of striking materials or objects on or near the tracks.

Mechanical Failure of Other VehicleDefi nition: Accidents caused by another vehicle experiencingmechanical problems, such as an automobile stalling on a grade crossing.

Non-Passenger Fatality Defi nition: Accidents caused by a non-passenger, includes trespassers.

Passenger Drag Related Injury or Fatality Defi nition: Accidents caused by a passenger and/or the passen-ger’s possessions being caught or trapped in a closed door or door-way of a train.

Passenger Fell from Train Defi nition: Accidents caused by passengers falling from trains,

such as falling between cars or from vestibule areas.

Suicide Defi nition: Self-induced death caused by a non passenger.

Track Component Defi ciency Defi nition: Accidents caused by a track component failure, such as broken rails, deteriorated crossties and missing track bolts or spikes.

Track Maintenance Defi ciency Defi nition: Accidents caused by improperly maintained track components such as switches, rail crossties and ballast.

Undetermined Defi nition: Accidents for which no cause can be determined.

Unsafe Practice(s) Defi nition: Accidents that are caused by unsafe practices or actions by the public, such as standing too close to the tracks or jogging on right-of-ways.

OtherDefi nition: Cause does not meet one of the types list, would include contractor error.

Rail Accident Type Defi nitions

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The Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) Awards were initiated in l996 to recognize public transit systems and individuals in New York State who have dem-onstrated excellence in safety.

The PTSB award categories are:

Transit Safety - Systems efforts have lead to a reduction in accidents

Transit System Safety - System has a proactive safety program that includes exemplary practices.

Leadership - An individual, entity or transit system’s efforts have im-proved the safety of a transit system and/or improved safety in the public transportation industry.

The awards are open to all bus and rail systems that receive State Transit Operat-ing Assistance or to individuals involved in public transit safety in New York State. The awards are sponsored in conjunction with the Bus Association of New York and the New York State Public Transit Association.

Award selections are approved by the PTSB based on recommendations from the PTSB Awards Selection Committee. The committee is responsible for reviewing and evaluating all award applications. The committee consists of representatives from the industry and the New York State Department of Transportation. Current industry committee members represent Liberty Lines Transit and Niagara Frontier Transpor-tation Authority.

The PTSB commends the 2006 award recipient for their efforts to improve safety for the riding public and for implementing safety initiatives to make New York State a leader in public transportation safety.

PTSB Safety Awards

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Public Transportation Safety Board2006 Safety Award

RecipientSenator Norman J. Levy Safety Award

Presented to

MTA Long Island Railroad

Grade Crossing Education Program for Excellence in Transit System Safety

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Contributing Staff

Bus Safety Annual Highlights, Photographs, Accident Data and Analysis: John Fabian of the Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security

Passenger Carrier Safety Bureau.

Rail Safety Annual Highlights, Photographs, Accident Data and Analysis: Jerry Shook and O. J. Guzman of the Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security

Rail Safety Bureau

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Notifi cation of Unsafe Conditions

If you would like additional information about the PTSB or wish to report an unsafe public transportation condition involving buses, subways, commuter railroads or light rail sys-tems, please write to:

Executive Director

Public Transportation Safety Board

50 Wolf Road, POD 53

Albany, New York 12232

Or you can phone the PTSB directly:

Upstate New York (518) 457-6512New York City Metropolitan Area (718) 482-4570

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public transportation safety board€¦ · corporation. the safety board meets in public session,...

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