Rule 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

1. PCL INDUSTRIES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 147970, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 214

Civil Procedure; Attachment; To sustain an attachment, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. – The Court finds the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to be improper. In Philippine Bank of Communications v. CA, the Court held thus: Petitioner cannot insist that its allegation that private respondent failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the entrusted goods nor return the same is sufficient for attachment to issue. We note that petitioner anchors its application upon Section 1(d), Rule 57. This particular provision was adequately explained in Liberty Insurance Corporation v. CA, as follows – To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Sec 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case (Republic v. Gonzales, 13 SCRA 633). We find an absence of factual allegations as to how the fraud alleged by petitioner was committed. As correctly held by respondent CA, such fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation cannot be inferred from the debtor’s inability to pay or to comply with the obligations.

Same; Same; The bare allegations in the applicant’s affidavit, are insufficient to prove that petitioner was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. The mere fact that petitioner failed to pay its purchases upon falling due and despite several demands made by private respondent, is not enough to warrant the issuance of the harsh provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. – In this case, the bare allegations in the applicant’s affidavit, are insufficient to prove that petitioner was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. The affidavit does not contain statements of other factual circumstances to show that petitioner, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Verily, in this case, the mere fact that petitioner failed to pay its purchases upon falling due and despite several demands made by private respondent, is not enough to warrant the issuance of the harsh provisional remedy of preliminary attachment.

2. MAGALING V. ONG, GR No. 173333, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 152

Remedial Law; Attachments; A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy by virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of the judgment that may be recovered. – The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant’s property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.

Same; Same; Two ways by which a writ of preliminary attachment issued may be dissolved or discharged. – Once the writ of preliminary attachment is issued, the same rule provides for two ways by which it can be dissolved or discharged. First, the writ of preliminary attachment may be discharged upon a security given, i.e., a counter-bond, xxx Second, said provisional remedy must be shown to have been irregularly or improperly issued, xxx.

1

3. PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. V. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 83

Remedial Law; Garnishment; Public Funds; Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment; Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. - Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Under Sec 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of the Act shall be included in the General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, are money belonging to the Government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials. We specifically spoke of the limits in dealing with this fund in Republic v. Villasor (54 SCRA 84 (1973)) when we said: This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided, “The State may not be sued without its consent.” A corollary, not dictated by logic and good sense, from such a basic concept, is the public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.

Same; Attachment; Attachment, a harsh remedy, must be issued only on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the pertinent rules. – Jurisprudence teaches us that the rule on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly in favor of the defendant. Attachment, a harsh remedy, must be issued only on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the pertinent rules. Thus, the applicant’s affidavit must contain statements clearly showing that the ground relied upon for the attachment exists.

4. METRO, INC. V. LARA GIFTS AND DECORS, INC., GR. No. 171741, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 175

Remedial Law; Attachment; Fraud to constitute a ground for attachment. – In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. CA, 222 SCRA 37 (1993), we explained: To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor on contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason that induced the other party into giving consent which would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case.

Same; Same; Applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.Same; Same; Way of dissolving a writ of preliminary attachment; Since the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Sec 12, Ruled 57 of the Rules of Court. – We rule that respondent’s allegation that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted directly with respondents’ foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Sec 12, Ruled 57 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; The rule that “when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is

2

by a counter-bond” is applicable in this case. – The reliance of the CA in the cases of Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA 745 (2001), FCY Construction Group, Inc. v. CA, 347 SCRA 270 (2000), and Liberty Insurance Corporation v. CA 222 SCRA 37 (1993), is proper. The rule that “when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counter-bond” is applicable in this case. It is clear that in respondents’ amended complaint of fraud is not only alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, but it is also the core of respondents’ complaint.

5. DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 93262, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 343

Civil Procedure; Preliminary attachment may be validly applied for and granted before defendant is summoned or is heard from. – Ruled 57 xxx speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter.” The phrase “at the commencement of the action” obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks the “commencement of the action;” and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfilment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts; for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counterclaim, cross claim, third-party claim) and for the TC to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.

Same; writ of attachment may properly issue ex parte. – for the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefore, have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff’s attachment bond.

6. ONATE V. ABROGAR, GR No. 107303, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 659

Civil procedure; Writ of Attachment; Summons; it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously made. – The statement in question has been taken out of context. The full statement reads: it is clear from our pronouncements that a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot binds and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously made.

Same; Same; Same; At the very least, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. – Indeed, as this Court through its First Division has ruled on facts similar to those in these cases, the attachment of properties before the service of summons on the defendant is invalid, even though the court later acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. At the very least, then, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously

3

with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. As the properties of the petitioners were attached by the sheriff before he had served the summons on them, the levies made must be considered void.

Same; Same; Lifting of Attachment; the lifting of an attachment may be resorted to even before any property has been levied on. – The Rules of Court do not require that issuance of the writ be kept secret until it can be enforced. Otherwise in no case may the service of summons on defendant precede the levy on attachment. To the contrary, Rule 57 Sect 13 allows the defendant to move to discharge the attachment even before any attachment is actually levied upon, thus negating any inference that before its enforcement, the issuance of the writ must be kept secret. Rule 57, sec 13 provides: Sec 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. – the party whose property has been attached may also, at any time either before or after the release of the attaché property, or before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued... As this Court pointed out in Davao Light and Power, the lifting of an attachment “may be resorted to even before any property has been levied on.”

Same; Same; Notice; It is not notice to the defendant that is sought to be avoided but the “time which such hearing would take” because of the possibility that defendant may delay the hearing to be able to dispose of his properties. – it is indeed true that proceedings for the issuance of a writ of attachment are generally ex parte. In Mindanao Savings and Loans Ass’n v. CA it was held that no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of attachment because this “would defeat the objective of the remedy (because) the time which such hearing would take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues.” It is not, however, notice to defendant that is sought to be avoided but the “time which such hearing would take” because of the possibility that defendant may delay the hearing to be able to dispose of his properties. On the contrary there may in fact be a need for a hearing before the writs is issued as where the issue of fraudulent disposal of property is raised. It is not true that there should be no hearing lest a defendant learns of the application for attachment and he removes his properties before the writ can be enforced.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Defendant; to authorize the attachment of property even before jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through the service of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. – on the other hand, to authorize the attachment of property even before the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through the service of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. It is entirely possible that the defendant may not be able to take steps to protect his interests.Same; Same; Same; more important that the need for insuring success in the enforcement of the writ is the need for affirming a principle by insisting on that “most fundamental of all requisites the jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant.” – Nor may sheriff’s failure to abide by the law be excused on the pretext that after all the court later acquired jurisdiction over petitioners. More important than the need for insuring success in the enforcement of the writ is the need for affirming a principle by insisting on that “most fundamental of all requisites – the jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant.” It may be that the same result would follow from requiring that a new writ be served all over again. The symbolic significance of such an act, however, is that it would affirm our commitment to the rule of law.

Same; Same; Same; Such examination is only proper where the property of the person examined has been validly attached. – Since, as already stated, the attachment of petitioners’ properties was invalid, the examination ordered in connection with such attachment must likewise be considered invalid. Under Rule 57, sec 10, as quote above, such examination is only proper where the property of the person examined has been validly attached.

4

7. SILANGAN TEXTILE V. JUDGE, G.R. No. 166719, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 160

Same; Attachment; Attachment is an ancillary remedy, and a writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy, a collateral proceeding, permitted only in connection with a regular action, and as one of its incidents. – Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the same. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. A writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a collateral proceeding, permitted only in connection with a regular action, and as one of its incidents; one of which is provided for present need, or for the occasion; that is, one adapted to meet a particular exigency. On the basis of the preceding discussion and the fact that we find the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-00420 to be in order, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court in the said case must perforce be lifted.

8.SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORPORATION V. HON. JUDGE TRIA-INFANTE, GR No. 144740, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 526

Actions; Provisional Remedies; Attachments; Counter bonds; Counter bonds are mere replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final judgment in the case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the counter sureties ascertainable after the judgment has becomefinal. – Over the years, in a number of cases, we have made certain pronouncements about counter bonds. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in Vanguard Assurance Corp. V. CA, we held: ... After the judgment for the plaintiff has become executor and the execution is “returned unsatisfied,” as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attached and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefore, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond. In Luzon Steel Corporation v. Sia, et. al.: ... Counter bonds posted to obtain the lifting of a writ of attachment is due to these bonds being security for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are thus mere replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final judgment in the case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the counter sureties ascertainable after judgment has become final. ... In Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. De Los Angeles, we ruled: ... Sec 17, Rule 57 of the ROC cannot be construed that an “execution against the debtor be first returned unsatisfied even if the bond were a solidary one, for a procedural may not amend the substantive law expressed in the Civil Code, and further would nullify the express stipulation of the parties that the surety’s obligation should be solidary with that of the defendant. In Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we further held that “the counter bond is intended to secure the payment of ‘any judgment’ that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.”

Surety; A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven and inseparable. – Petitioner does not deny that the contract between it and VIllaluz is one of surety. However, it points out that the kind of surety agreement between them is one that merely waives its right of excussion. This cannot be so. The counter bond itself states that the parties jointly and severally bind themselves to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover against the defendant in the action. A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.

5

Same; Counter bonds; Attachments; Judgments; A mere posting of a counter bond does not automatically discharge the writ of attachment it is only after the hearing and after the judge has ordered the discharge of attachment that the same is properly discharged; Judgment must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part we are not unmindful of our ruling in the case of Belisle Investment and Finance Co., Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., where we held: ... The CA correctly ruled that the mere posting of a counter bond does not automatically discharge that writ attachment. It is only after hearing and after the judge has ordered the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made or a counter bond is executed to the attaching creditor is filed, that the writ of attachment is properly discharged under Sec 12, Rule 57 of the ROC. The ruling in Belisle, at first glance, would suggest an error in the assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals because there was no specific resolution discharging the attachment and approving the counter bond. As above=explaine, however, consideration of our decision in G.R. No. 106214 in its entirety will readily show that this Court has virtually discharged the attachment after all the parties therein have been heard on the matter. xxx Verily, a judgment must be read in its entirety, and it must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part, if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law.

9. INSULAR SAVINGS BANK V. CA, GR No. 123638, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 122

Actions; Attachments; Attachment Bonds; There can be no serious objection to the proposition that the attached property and logically the counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such property should as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditor’s principal claim. – As may be noted, the amount of the counter attachment bond is, under the terms of the afore quoted Sec 12, to be measured against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and without necessarily diminishing the sound discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the attached property – and logically the counter bond necessary to discharge the lien on such property – should as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditor’s principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to be avoided at all times, shall ensue.

Same; Same; Same; A writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages and other unliquidated or contingent claims. – Turning to the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim of respondent, as plaintiff a quo, is in the amount of P25,200,000.00, representing the 3 unfunded checks drawn against, and presented for clearing to, respondent bank. Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claim.

Same; Same; Same; If a portion of a claim is already secured, there is no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter bond – simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been pre-emptively satisfied or secured need not be covered by the counter bond. – As things stood, therefore, respondent’s principal claim against petitioner immediately prior to the filing of the motion to discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. The trial court was fully aware of this reality. Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a counter bond based on the reduced claim of respondent. if a portion of the claim is already secured, we see no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter bond. It may be that a counter bond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, however, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been pre-emptively satisfied or secured need not be covered by the counter bond.

6

Same; Same; Same; unlike the former Sec 12 of Rule 57 of the ROC where the value of the property attached shall be the defining measure in the computation of the discharging counter attachment bond, the present less stringent Sec 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant “makes a cash deposit, or files a counter bond ... in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs.” It bears to stress, as a final consideration, that the certiorari proceedings before the appellate court and the denial of the motion to discharge attachment subject of such proceedings, transpired under the old rules on preliminary attachment which has since been revised. And unlike the former Sec 12 of Rule 57 of the ROC where the value of the property attached shall be the defining measure in the computation of the discharging counter attachment bond, the present less stringent Sec 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant “makes a cash deposit, or files a counter bond ... in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs.” Not being in the nature of a penal statute, the Rules of Court cannot be given retroactive effect.

10. TORRES V. SATSATIN, GR No. 166759, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 453

Remedial Law; Attachment; Definition of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. – A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.

Same; Same; Surety Bonds; In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all requisites for its approval are met otherwise the bond should be rejected. – In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Same; Same; In provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. – In provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.

Same; Same; Three stages involved in the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment; For the initial stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. – In Cuartero v. CA, 212 SCRA 260 (1992), this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involved three stages; first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

Same; Same; the preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons n the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case; Subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.—Assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of

7

summons upon them, such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.

11. LIM, JR. V. LAZARO, GR No. 185734, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 547

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Preliminary Attachment; By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. – By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57, is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.

12. OLIB V. PASTORAL, GR No. 81120, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 692

Attachment defined; Nature of. – Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.

Same; Same; Where the main action is appealed, the attachment is also considered appealed. – The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate case independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.Same; Same; Rule that the bond is not deemed extinguished by reason of non-payment of the premium on the attachment bond. – Coming now to the argument that the attachment was automatically lifted because of the non-payment of the premium on the attachment bond, the Court feels it is time again to correct a common misimpression. The rule is that the bond is not deemed extinguished by reason alone of such non-payment.

Same; Same; The order of attachment is considered discharged only when the judgment has already become final and executory and not when it is still on appeal; Reason. – Finally, on the correct interpretation of Rule 57, Section 19, of the ROC, we hold that the order of attachment is considered discharged only where the judgment has already become final and executory and not when it is still on appeal. The obvious reason is that, except in a few specified cases, execution pending appeal is not allowed.

8

13. TRADERS ROYAL BANK V. IAC, L-66321, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 141

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third Party Claim; Remedy of a person who claims to be an owner or property levied upon by attachment is to file a third party claim with the sheriff and if attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond, to file a separate and independent action. – The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who claims to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third-party claim with the sheriff, and if the attaching creditor posts am indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim (Abiera v. CA). And this precisely was the remedy resorted to by private respondent La Tondena when it filed the vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Injunction; General rule that a court cannot interfere by injunction with the judgment of a court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant injunctive relief, applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved; Reason and purpose of the rule. – Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in this case where no third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolved upon the proper appellate court. The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention, as a means of protecting claimant’s right in an attachment proceeding, not exclusive, but suppletory to the right to bring an independent suit; Denial or dismissal of third party claim to levied property, not a bar to a subsequent independent action to establish claimant’s right. – We cannot sustain the petitioner’s view. Suffice it to state that intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimant’s right in an attachment proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring am independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the order denying his original third-party claim.

RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1. FILIPINO METALS VS. SECRETARY OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, G.R. NO. 157498, JULY 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 616

Remedial Law; Injunction; No court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax.—In the recent case of Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation, this Court intimated, but only by way of obiter dictum, that the imposition of safeguard measures should not be enjoined as that would be tantamount to enjoining the collection of taxes. Verily, as early as Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, the Court rejected judicial control over collection of taxes. That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy deeply entrenched in our tax system. Thus, no court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax.

Same; Same; When the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought, the court should issue a writ of preliminary injunction.—We have ruled that when the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought, the court should issue a writ of preliminary injunction.

9

Same; Same; A law need not be declared unconstitutional first before a preliminary injunction against its enforcement may be granted.—Respondents tenaciously argue that Rep. Act No. 8800 enjoys the presumption of validity and constitutionality until proven otherwise. True, but for the purpose of issuing a provisional remedy, strictly speaking, this contention lacks relevance. Obviously, a law need not be declared unconstitutional first before a preliminary injunction against its enforcement may be granted. Needless to stress, the moment a law is nullified for being unconstitutional, it ceases to exist. Thus, a writ of injunction would then become superfluous.

Same; Same; Requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction; To be entitled to the writ, petitioners are only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.—Only two requisites are necessary for a preliminary injunction to issue: (1) the existence of a right to be protected and (2) the facts, against which the injunction is to be directed violate said right. While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction need not be conclusive or complete. The evidence need only give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction, pending the decision of the case on the merits. Thus, to be entitled to the writ, petitioners are only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.

2. EQUITABLE PCIB VS. HON. APURILLO, G.R. NO. 168746, NOVEMBER 5, 2009, 605 SCRA 30

Remedial Law; Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action; The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations; Issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court.—A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. Moreover, the rule is well entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the right of a party in a pending case rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, such that the act amounts to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of certiorari or prohibition.

Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence.—A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated. There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. The trial court needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest.

Same; Same; The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard.—The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment on the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be

10

avoided for, otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

3. CASTRO VS. DELA CRUZ, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 190122, JANUARY 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 187

Remedial Law; Preliminary Injunction; The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.—For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable right to it must be proven by the party seeking it. The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.

Same; Same; For the nullification of an injunctive writ, there must be a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—Indeed, the rule is well-entrenched that for grave abuse of discretion to exist as a valid ground for the nullification of an injunctive writ, there must be a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Or the power must be exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

4. RUALO VS. PITARGUE, G.R. NO. 140284, JANUARY 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 121

Injunctions; To be entitled to an injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right.—For respondents to be entitled to an injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right. We note that respondents employed the shotgun approach in their petition before the trial court to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. Pitargue sued as a taxpayer fearing possible misappropriation of public funds. Vasquez, who received an RTAO reassigning him, raised violation of his constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due process. Perez sued as a BIR employee fearing a violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due process by a probable inclusion in the RTAOs. Let us examine whether their allegations are sufficient for the issuance of an injunctive writ.

Same; A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.—A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.

Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.—Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court did not maintain the status quo but restored the situation before the status quo, that is, the situation before the issuance of the RTAOs. In effect, the trial court accepted respondents’ premise about an unlawful reorganization and prejudged the constitutionality of the questioned issuances (EO 430, RMO 57-97 and RTAO 28-97 and 1-98 to 35-98).

Same; The grant of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on the part of the petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.—The trial court’s ruling was a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it

11

assumed the proposition which the respondents here were bound to prove. Moreover, the trial court’s grant of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on their part constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

5. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. WONG, G.R. NO. 150280, APRIL 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 361

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Preliminary Injunction; The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court.—The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. No manifest abuse has been shown on the part of respondent Judge de Castro, when he in fact granted preliminary injunction to serve the purpose for which it was created, which was to preserve status quo.

6. TAYAG VS. LACSON, G.R. NO. 134971, MARCH 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 282

Remedial Law; Injunction; While generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the trial court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion.—A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things ante litem and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. While generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the trial court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion.

Same; Same; Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.—For the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner was burdened to establish the following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests. It is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.

7. G.G. SPORTSWEAR VS. BDO, GR. NO. 184434, FEBRUARY 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 47

Remedial Law; Injunction; Test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is whether the facts show a need for equity to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity.—The test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is whether the facts show a need for equity to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity. In general, a higher court will not set aside the trial courts grant or denial of an application for preliminary injunction unless it gravely abused its discretion as when it lacks jurisdiction over the action, ignores relevant considerations that stick out of the parties pleadings, sees the facts with a blurred lens, ignores what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or simply acts in random fashion.

Same; Same; Injunction may be issued only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the main relief he asks in his complaint.—Injunction may be issued only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the main relief he asks in his complaint. This means that the plaintiff’s allegations should show clearly that he has a cause of action. This means that he enjoys some right and that

12

the defendant has violated it. And, where the defendant is heard on the application for injunction, the trial court must consider, too, the weight of his opposition.

Same; Same; The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.—What is more, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Here, since there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani cannot claim that the irreparable damage they wanted to prevent by their application for preliminary injunction is the loss of their properties to auction sale. Their real injury, if it turns out that the right to foreclose belongs to PIO rather than to BDO, is payment of the proceeds of the auction sale to the wrong party rather than to their creditor. But this kind of injury is purely monetary and is compensable by an appropriate judgment against BDO. It is not in any sense an irreparable injury.

8. BORJA VS. SALCEDO, A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1746 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 10-1225-RTJ), SEPTEMBER 26, 2003, 412 SCRA 110

Civil Procedure; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; Temporary Restraining Orders; Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides for the procedure to be followed in the issuance of temporary restraining orders.—Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides: 1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel; 2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle; 3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge; 4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all applications for TRO. Same; Same; Same; Same; The holding of a summary hearing prior to the issuance of a temporary restraining order is mandatory.—The holding of a summary hearing prior to the issuance of a temporary restraining order is mandatory, in view of the requirement that the application for a temporary restraining order shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. In other words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed with. A TRO can be issued ex parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. The executive judge is then required to summon the parties to a conference, during which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the expiry of the seventy-two hours, the presiding judge to whom the case was raffled shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be held. (Emphasis supplied)

13

9. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADM. VS. VILLANUEVA, G.R. NO. 168203, MARCH 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 659

Remedial Law; Injunction; Temporary Restraining Order; If no action is taken of the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend the same; The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court.—As to the issue of whether the temporary restraining order issued by the RTC remained valid even if it was beyond the 20-day period provided under the Rules of Court, it is settled that under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order within a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend the same. The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court.

10. OVERSEAS WORKERS VS. CHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 169802, JUNE 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 451

Actions; Injunctions; Words and Phrases; A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.—Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence.—A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete. It must also be stressed that it does not necessarily proceed that when a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, a final injunction will follow.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.—The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court. Thus, the rule is, the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, unless the court commits grave abuse of discretion. In Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, this Court pronounced that grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious

14

and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is clear that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. However, as earlier stated, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, such that the act amounts to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of certiorari or prohibition.

Same; Same; Same; The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy.—A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome, the sole objective of which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.

Same; Same; Same; A judge commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction where, in granting the writ of preliminary injunction, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, he did not maintain the status quo but, rather, effectively restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect disposing the issue of the main case without trial on the merits.—We hold that the RTC, in granting the assailed writ of preliminary injunction, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the RTC did not maintain the status quo when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rather, it effectively restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect, disposing the issue of the main case without trial on the merits. What was preserved by the RTC was the state of affairs before the issuance of Resolution No. 001, which approved the structure of the OWWA, and the subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its passing. The RTC forgot that what is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ cannot be effectuated to establish new relations between the parties.

Injunctions; Injunction will not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished or consummated.—Finally, as aptly pointed out by the OSG, the acts sought to be prohibited had been accomplished. Injunction will not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished or consummated. The wheels of OWWAs reorganization started to run upon the approval by the Board of Trustees of its Resolution No. 001 entitled, Approving the Structure of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Subsequently, a series of issuances which approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the agency was issued by the DBM, the OWWA Administrator, and by the DOLE. Resolution No. 001 has already been implemented. Case law has it that a writ of preliminary injunction will not issue if the act sought to be enjoined is a fait accompli.

11. POWER SITES VS. UNITED NEON, G.R. NO. 163406, NOVEMBER 24, 2009, 605 SCRA 196

Remedial Law; Preliminary Injunction; Requisites Before a Court Grants Injunctive Relief.—Before a court grants injunctive relief, the following must be demonstrated: that complainant is entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of complainants rights, the

15

probability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation as relief. Otherwise, there is no basis for the issuance of a writ of injunction.

Same; Same; A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended; Standard is even higher in the case of preliminary mandatory injunction.—A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. While the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. The standard is even higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction, which should only be granted—x x x in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation x x x.

Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable.—It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no irreparable injury as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely, immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients and the cost of the billboard which is a considerable amount of money is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona, 5 SCRA 126 (1962).

Same; Same; The writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused.—Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat, the writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.

12. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. PIER 8 ARRASTRE, G.R. NO. 147861, NOVEMBER 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 426

Remedial Law; Injunction; Requisites to Justify an Injunctive Relief.—The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (a) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) the act against which injunction is to be directed as a violation of such right. A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Tolerance is not the surest footing on which a right in esse can be established. In fact, we have already held in Pernito Arrastre Services v. Mendoza that PPA may legally oust arrastre and stevedoring operators even when the latter had been conferred with holdover permits should the exigencies of public interest so require.—PASSI admits that its contract has expired and that it is merely occupying and operating at Pier 8 in a holdover capacity. Thus, PASSIs rights over Pier 8 arise not from contractual relations with the PPA, or a statutory grant of authority, but merely by the tolerance of the PPA. Tolerance is not the surest footing on which a right in esse can be established. In fact, we have already held in Pernito Arrastre Services v. Mendoza that PPA may legally oust arrastre and stevedoring operators even when the latter had been conferred with holdover permits should the exigencies of public interest

16

so require.

Same; Same; P.D. No. 1818; P.D. No. 1818 deprives the courts of jurisdiction to issue any preliminary injunction or temporary retraining order on essential government projects, including arrastre and stevedoring operations.—Even if PASSI had been able to establish a basis upon which a preliminary injunction could be issued under Rule 58 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, the application of P.D. No. 1818 would override the right to an injunctive remedy. P.D. No. 1818 deprives the courts of jurisdiction to issue any preliminary injunction or temporary retraining order on essential government projects, including arrastre and stevedoring operations.

Same; Same; Same; there are only two exceptional circumstances which warrant the non-observance of P.D. No. 1818.—Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals paid no heed to established jurisprudence that there are only two exceptional circumstances which warrant the non-observance of P.D. No. 1818, namely: (1) where there is clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government authority or private person being enjoined, and (2) where the effect of the non-issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to "stave off implementation of a government project.

Same; Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.—The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. Otherwise, there would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to prove. Indeed, a complaint for injunctive relief must be construed strictly against the pleader, especially when the factual grounds relied upon are mere suppositions which definitely cannot militate against the exercise of police power by the regulatory body charged with the duty to supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate, and provide such facilities or services as are necessary in the ports....

Same; Same; The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court.—The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court. In the resolution of the Rule 65 petition assailing the RTCs orders, the Court of Appeals should have determined if the assailed issuances were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. It did not. All that it ascribed to the RTC is error.

Same; Same; Injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of great injury where there is no commensurate remedy in damages.—We have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is clear from the foregoing discussions that the Order issued by the Manila RTC, Branch 12, was nothing of the sort. On the contrary, its ruling on the application of P.D. No. 1818 exhibited the exercise of its sound discretion. Injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of great injury where there is no commensurate remedy in damages.

13. PACIS VS. COMELEC, NO. L-29026, AUGUST 22, 1969, 29 SCRA 24

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; When to file a motion for assessment of damages upon bond.— The reglementary period within which to file the appropriate motion for assessment and award of damages upon an injunction for recovery of damages may be filed after the judgment has become final and executory.

17

Same; Same; Restraining orders; History.— The practice of issuing restraining orders (used here in its generic term as referring to all types of "status quo" orders) started as a common-law equitable relief in the English courts to preserve the status quo of a case pending the final determination of the relative rights of the parties. Since these orders cause damages to the restrained party if his rights were later affirmed — more than what would be occasioned him as an ordinary party litigant if no restraining order were issued — a system by which he was recompensed evolved.

Same; Same; Preliminary Injunction; Good faith as defense against a claim for damages for the issuance of an injunction.— The statutory undertaking of the bond is that it shall answer for all damages which the party to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction "if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto." 3 Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. Too, it is axiomatic that probable cause is necessary before an injunction may be ordered, and if good faith were tenable as a defense, it would rule out practically all relief from actual damages sustained as a result of an injunction.

Same; Same; Same; Amount of recoverable damages is limited to bond.— There is nothing in the Rules of Court which allows recovery of damages other than upon the bond pledged by the party suing for an injunction. Section 9, Rule 58, limits recovery only upon the bond.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the bond is insufficient; Remedy of aggrieved party.— Where the bond is insufficient in amount, the law expressly gives the party affected the recourse of excepting thereto and provides for the dissolution of the injunction if "a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith."

14. SOLID BUILDERS, INC. VS. CHINA BANKING CORP., G.R. NO. 179665, APRIL 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 101

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts; At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of Equity,” we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction.—This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank, 682 SCRA 194 (2012): A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned. At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of Equity,” we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; “in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.”

Same; Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be

18

protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.—A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.25 In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.

Same; Same; Same; The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.—Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.—Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. As this Court stated in Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation: [A]ll is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.

15. SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 174788, APRIL 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 166

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.—A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there must exist "a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right."80 As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear." Lacking a clear legal right, the provisional remedy should not have been issued, all the more because the factual support for issuing the writ had not been established. In giving injunctive relief, courts cannot reverse the burden of proof, for to do so "would assume the proposition which the petitioner is inceptively duty bound to prove." This concern is not a mere technicality, but lies at the heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law requires a cause of action.

16. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. DE CHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 172206, JULY 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 399

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Preliminary Injunction; Essential Requisites for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.—Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to

19

issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases.

17. FACURA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NOS. 166495, 184129, 184263, FEBRUARY 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427

Remedial Law; Ombudsman; Injunction; Execution; The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executor pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.—The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.

Same; Same; Same; Same; This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than one month’s salary.—Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than one month’s salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the government service is immediately executory pending appeal.

18. HERNANDEZ VS. NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 145328, MARCH 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 166

Civil Procedure; Injunctions; Temporary Restraining Orders; Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1818; Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects.—Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this particular law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.—While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and

20

involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

Same; Same; Same; Same; For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant.—For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.—What Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land.

19. SABALONES VS. CA, G.R. NO. 106169, FEBRUARY 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 79

Marriage; Legal Separation; Property Relations; Conjugal Properties; Administration of conjugal properties; Injunction; The province of injunction is to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed.—The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff. As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief against future acts which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated."

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Twin requirements of a valid injunction.—The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

21

20. ULANG VS. CA, G.R. NO. 99299, AUGUST 26, 1993, 225 SCRA 637

Injunction; Execution; What writ of injunction protects.—Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. The complainant's right or title, moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of suits to establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by injunction where the complainant's title or right is doubtful or disputed. The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being mere damnum absque injuria.

Same; Same; Injunction will not lie to defeat execution of final judgment so as to take property out of successful party’s possession.—Records show that on 28 August 1990, respondent Sheriff succeeded in evicting petitioner from the premises and placed private respondent in possession thereof. Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari before public respondent on 28 September 1990, or one (1) month after his eviction from the premises. We find such act to be a mere ruse to prevent the enforcement of the final judgment in AC-G.R. CV No. 01089 (Civil Case No. 2380-0) which is the case for recovery of possession filed by Valentina Salazar against Roberto Ulang. A mandatory injunction will not lie to take the property out of control of the party in possession. The respondent court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

21. DECANO VS. EDU, NO. L-30070, AUGUST 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 410

Courts; Jurisdiction; Public Officers; Land Transportation; Mandamus; Injunction; Where the annulment of the dismissal of an employee is the cause of action and mandamus and injunction form mere corollary remedies thereto, a Court of First Instance of Pangasinan has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and injunction against an officer of the Land Transportation Commission even if the latter holds office in Quezon City.—Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely coronary remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the services of respondent was a fait accompli and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The injunction is question, consequently, must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's order by his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial court's jurisdictional district.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, etc, et al., 10 where the issue is the correctness of a national official's decision, the provincial courts of first instance have equal jurisdiction with the Manila courts to review decisions of national officials, as otherwise litigants of ted means would practically be denied access to the courts of the localities where the reside and where the questioned acts are sought to be enforced.

22. VERZOSA VS. CA, G.R. NOS. 119511-13, NOVEMBER 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 100

Remedial Law; Injunctions; Requisites before an injunctive writ may be issued.— An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established: (1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; (3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

22

Same; Same; Private respondent had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.—The undisputed owner of the property which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon learning of the scheduled foreclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that a restraining order be issued to restrain such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court. In other words, she had title to and possession of the property and she claimed to have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

Same; Same; The “status quo” is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.— The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Amendments; For purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original, complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand.—In Ruymann, the Court held that "an amendment to a complaint which introduces a new or different cause of action, making a new or different demand, is equivalent to a fresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations continues to run until the amendment is filed." In the said case, a complaint for injunction was amended to include a larger tract of land which had not been included in the original suit. The Court held that "the suit will be deemed to have been commenced upon the date of amendment, in determining whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession to the portion of the tract of land not included in the original complaint (Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Oregon 244)." It is clear therein that the Complaint was amended to include a new or different cause of action or demand; hence, it was as if a new complaint was filed. It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. In other words, for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint. In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original, complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading.—Hence, it has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before service of amendment." It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading.

Same; Same; Same; The Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original complaint.—In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa. In the same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the Amended Complaints therein alleged new causes of action. Similarly unavailing is petitioners' contention that the injunctive writ was applied retroactively and, hence, violative of Ruymann and other subsequent cases. To repeat, Ruymann was wrongly applied by petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint herein, the present suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint.

23

Same; Same; Generally consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction.—Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, "where the acts are performed after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed to perform the acts sought to be restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the injunction will not lie because he has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after the beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril." It has been held that "[t]he general rule of law is that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and before the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper."

Same; Same; Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril.—In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. "If one in the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus outwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. . . . Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril."

23. TAY CHUN SUY VS. CA, G.R. NO. 93640, JANUARY 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151

Courts; Injunctions; Rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved.—At any rate, our ruling in Santos v. Bayhon should put to rest petitioner's doubt as to the jurisdiction of the trial court — The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 142). When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. (emphasis supplied)

24. BPI VS. HONTANOSAS, G.R. NO. 157163, JUNE 25, 2014

AC No. 07-99 was issued as a guideline for lower court judges in the issuance of TROs and writs of preliminary injunctions to prevent the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs, viz:

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 June 25, 1999

TO: ALL JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS RE: EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

Despite well-entrenched jurisprudence and circulars regarding exercise of judiciousness and care in the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO) or grant of writs ofpreliminary injunction, reports or complaints on abuses committed by trial judges in connection therewith persist. Some even intimated thatirregularities, including corruption, might have influenced the issuance ofthe

24

TRO or the writ of preliminary injunction.

No less than the President of the Philippines has requested this Court to issue a circular reminding judges to respect P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits the issuance of TROs in cases involving implementation of government infrastructure projects. The Office of the President has likewise brought to the attention of this Court orders of judges releasing imported articles under seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs.

Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for considerations other than the strict merits of the case.

Judges should bear in mind that in Garcia v. Burgos(291 SCRA 546, 571-572 [1998]), this Court explicitly stated:

Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "[n]o court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project . . . of the government, . . . to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project . . . or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation." At the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the foregoing statutory provision expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of an infrastructure project.

Their attention is further invited to Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November 1994 by the OCA OIC Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, on the subject "Strict Observance of Section 1 of P.D. 1818 Envisioned by Circular No. 13-93 dated March 5, 1993, and Circular No. 20-92 dated March 24, 1992.

Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v. Natividad(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992] that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught."

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.

STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.

AC No. 07-99 was irrelevant herein, however, because Civil Case No. CEB-26468 did not involve the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the petitioner’s urging that respondent Judge be held administratively liable for violating AC No. 07-99 was misplaced.

However, the RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 27 It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

25

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., the Court restated the nature and concept of a writ of preliminary injunction, as follows:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment ordinal order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Under the circumstances averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that they had not fully paid their obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements.

It is true that the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on applications for the injunctive writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for the writ more often than not involve a factual determination that is not the function of the appellate courts; and that the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing courts in injunctive matters ought not to be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse. Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that

26

is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law. Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of preliminary injunction is issued upon the satisfaction of two requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie; and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. According to Saulog v. Court of Appeals, the applicant must have a sufficient interest or right to be protected, but it is enough that:-

x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint x x x.

It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised only where the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases reasonably free from doubt. For, truly, a preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts. As a preventive remedy, injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. As an ancillary and preventive remedy, it may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights during the pendency of the principal action, and for no other purpose. Such relief will accordingly protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision; it will further serve to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper relief after a trial on the merits. Verily, its essential function is to preserve the status quo between the parties until the merits of the case can be heard.

Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. But the respondents failed to establish the irreparable injury they would suffer should the writ of preliminary injunction not be issued. They principally feared the loss of their possession and ownership of the mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a criminal prosecution for the post-dated checks they issued. But such fear of potential loss of possession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction. "An injury is considered irreparable," according to Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation,

x x x if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

The injury being feared by the herein respondents is not of such nature. Ultimately, the amount to which the mortgagee-bank shall be entitled will be determined by the disposition of the trial court in the main issue of the case. We have explained in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ Mark Trading, Inc. that all is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling

27

price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.

As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction – whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including: (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) when the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted.

Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted lightly or precipitately because it is a limitation upon the freedom of the defendant's action. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it, for no power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction.

25. DELA PAZ VS. ADIONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1857 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 02-1477-RTJ), NOVEMBER 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 480

Actions; Injunction; Injunction can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined.—The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that the same can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined. It is also provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may be issued effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party sought to be enjoined.

Same; Same; The authority of a judge to issue a writ of injunction is limited only to and operative only within his province or district and any such writ issued in contravention of such limitation is void.—Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a check in the amount of P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial jurisdiction of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and operative only within his respective provinces or districts. Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent can only enforce his orders within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.

28

26. DFA VS. FALCON, G.R. NO. 176657, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 644

Remedial Law; Injunction; Infrastructure Projects; National Government Projects; No court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a "national government project" unless the matter is one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act complained of is enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.—It is indubitable that no court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a "national government project" unless the matter is one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act complained of is enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.

Same; Same; Same; The trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the e-Passport Project.—Republic Act No. 9285 is a general law applicable to all matters and controversies to be resolved through alternative dispute resolution methods. This law allows a Regional Trial Court to grant interim or provisional relief, including preliminary injunction, to parties in an arbitration case prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. This general statute, however, must give way to a special law governing national government projects, Republic Act No. 8975 which prohibits courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction in cases involving national government projects. However, as discussed above, the prohibition in Republic Act No. 8975 is inoperative in this case, since petitioners failed to prove that the e-Passport Project is national government project as defined therein. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the e-Passport Project.

Same; Same; To be entitled to injunctive relief the party seeking such relief must be able to show grave, irreparable injury that is not capable of compensation.—Time and again, this Court has held that to be entitled to injunctive relief the party seeking such relief must be able to show grave, irreparable injury that is not capable of compensation.

Same; Same; An injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.—We reiterated this point in Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, where we likewise opined: Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Moreover, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.

Same; Damages; When injury considered irreparable.—An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages.

Rule 59 RECEIVERSHIP

1. DOLAR V. SUNDIAN, L-27631, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 616

Civil Law; Property; Receivership; When relief by way of receivership is essentially equitable in nature. – Ordinarily, a receiver cannot be put on property which is already in custody, of the law under process from another court of competent jurisdiction; and there cannot be more than one receiver over the same property... A court of equity has power to appoint a receiver of property

29

which is already in the hand of an executor or administrator, but such power should be exercised with caution, and a receiver should not be appointed to take assets out of the hands of legally appointed representatives except in cases of manifest danger of loss or destruction of, or material injury to, assets... Also, a receiver will be appointed when the executor or administrator has been guilty of misconduct, waste, or misuse of assets, and there is real danger of loss; and conversely, a receiver will not be appointed to take assets from the custody of an executor or administrator unless there is manifest danger of loss or destruction of, or material injury to, the assets and a receivership is clearly necessary to protect and preserve the property.

Same; When Piece of property is considered part of deceased’s estate subject to settlement. – Where a piece of property which originally is a part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by an heir of the deceased having a valid claim thereto, and said piece of property is, by mistake, subsequently inventories or considered part of the deceased’s estate subject to settlement, and, thereafter, with the authority and approval of the probate court is sold once more to another person, a receiver of the property so sold may, during the pendency of a motion to set aside the second sale, be appointed by the court when its sound judgment the grant of such temporary relief is reasonably necessary to secure and protect the rights of its real owner against any danger of loss or material injury to him arising from the use and enjoyment thereof by another who manifestly cannot acquire any right of dominion thereon because the approving surrogate court had already lost jurisdiction to authorize the further sale of such property to another person.

2. VIVARES V. REYES, GR No. 155408, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 80

Remedial Law; Civil Law; Receivership; He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it. – Petitioners miserably failed to adduce clear, convincing, and hard evidence to show the alleged fraud in the transfers and the antedating of said transfers. The fact that the transfers were dated prior to the demise of the Torcuato on May 12, 1992 does not necessarily mean the transfers were attended by fraud. He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it.

Same; Same; Same; Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme situations. – Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme situations. As early as 1914, the Court already enunciated the doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochuico & Co., that courts must use utmost circumspection in allowing receivership, thus: The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.

3. TANTANO V. ESPINA-CABOVERDE, GR No. 203585, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 508

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Receivership; Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme situations.- We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme situations. The doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochuico & Co., is instructive: The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.

30

Same; Same; Same; Being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage. – Sec 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing instances not covered by the other grounds enumerated under said section. However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for its in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.

Same; Same; Same; Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: 1) WON the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and 2) WON the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from those as those of the person requesting for receivership. – Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: 1) WON the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and 2) WON the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from those as those of the person requesting for receivership. Moreover, this court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases.

Same; Same; Same; A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation. – This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation. Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of such property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.

Same; Same; Same; Section 2 of Rule 59, Rules of Court is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. - Section 2 of Rule 59, is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word “shall” denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec 2, Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.

Rule 60 REPLEVIN

1. SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS V. CA, GR No. 110048, November 19, 1998, 318 SCRA 493

Mortgages; Replevin; An applicant for replevin must show that he “is the owner of the property

31

claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.” Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specified property is so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property.

Same; Same; In default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee is thereby constituted as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor, enabling such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner. – “There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them.” Thus, in default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee is thereby constituted as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor, enabling such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner. That the defendant is not privy to the chattel mortgage should be inconsequential. By the fact that the object of replevin is traced to his possession, one properly can be a defendant in an action for replevin. It is here assumed that the plaintiff right to possess the thing is not or cannot be disputed.

Same; Same; Foreclosure; The conditions essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. – In a suit of replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin in this case has been resorted to in order to pave the way for the foreclosure of what is covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor.

Same; Same; Same; An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin. – Since the mortgagee’s right of possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor’s default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

2. VDA DE DANAO V. GINETE, AM No. MTJ-03-1474, January 21, 2003, 395 SCRA 542

Same; Same; Actions; Replevin; Requisites. – In the present case, contrary to the elementary rules on replevin, respondent improperly ordered the seizure of a vehicle under custodial egis in another court, a higher one at that. Sec 2 of Rule 60 clearly requires that certain facts must be alleged in the application for replevin, as follows: “Sec 2 Affidavit and Bond. – The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: xxx xxx xxx “c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodial egis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody”; Under the foregoing provision, the plaintiff must show, by affidavit, that the subject property has not been 1) distrained, 2) taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, 3) seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or 4) placed under custodial egis.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Basic is the rule that property already placed under legal custody may not be a proper subject of replevin. – The records reveal that Fermin Asilum, the plaintiff in

32

the replevin case, concealed from the MTC the fact that he was involved in a pending suit and that the property he wanted to recover had been seized by authorities earlier in realtion to that criminal case. This circumstance was, however, disclosed by the defendants in their answer. Notwithstanding the disclosure, respondent issued the Writ of Seizure – a manifest and gross error on his part. Since they are duty bound to administer the law and to be diligent in ascertaining the facts. Basic is the rule that property already placed under legal custody may not be the proper subject of replevin. This principle applies especially when a court coordinate or, as int his case, of superior jurisdiction has already established its authority over the property. A contrary ruling would be tantamount to subverting a doctrine steadfastly adhered to, the main purposes of which are to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts are permitted to interfere with one another’s lawful orders.

3. SMART V. ASTORGA, GR No. 148132, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 434

Actions; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; Words and Phrases; Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels; The term may refer either to the action itself; for the recovery of personality, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.—Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from on who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit on having right to possession to recover property in specie from one from who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with me with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained b y the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of action.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Labor Law; An employer’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor but a civil, dispute; A dispute which involves the relationship of a debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.—Contrary to the CA,s ratiocination , the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its direction in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

4. RIVERA V. VARGAS, GR No. 165895, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 89

Actions; Replevin; Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief; The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.—Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief. It ay refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and to hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.

Same; Same; A person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down I the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. –Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature.

33

When n attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the adverse party. Be it noted, however, that a motion to squash the writ of replevin goes to the technical regularity of procedure, and not to the merits of the case in the principal action.Same; Same; Same; Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. – Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

Same; Same; A trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personality on the basis of a writ that was improperly served. – The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all the requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court. The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case.

5. AGNER V. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC., GR No. 182963, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 89

Remedial law; Writ of replevin. Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

Remedial law; Burden of proof. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed. Respondent’s possession of the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage strongly buttresses its claim that the obligation has not been extinguished.

6. NORTHERN MOTORS V. HERRERA, L-32674, February 22, 1973, 49 SCRA 392

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; The mortgagee in a chattel mortgage has a right to the possession of the property mortgaged upon breach of the mortgage contract by the mortgagor. – There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgage, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. We explained that when the debtor defaults, and the creditor desires to foreclose the mortgaged chattel, he must necessarily take the mortgaged property in his hands, but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the creditor must institute an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to sale contemplated under Sec 14 of Act no. 1508. The right of the mortgagee to have possession of the mortgaged chattel after the condition of the mortgage is breached must be therefore

34

deemed to be well settled.

Same; Same; Same; the plaintiff is not required to allege the intervention of a public officer in his attempt to obtain possession of the mortgaged property from the defendant. – The rules do not require that in an action for replevin, the plaintiff should allege that the “mortgagee has asked or directed a public officer to foreclose the mortgage and that the mortgagor has refused to surrender the mortgaged chattel to such public officer.Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and practice; In an action for replevin, the court should consider both the complaint and its annexes. – In determining the sufficiency of the application for writ if replevin, the allegations thereof and the recitals of the documents appended thereto and made part thereof should be considered.

Rule 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

1. LAM V. CHUA, GR No. 131286, March 18, 2004, 426 SCRA 176

Civil Law; Support; Provisional Character; Judgment for support does not become final. - … Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.

Same; Same; Evidence; It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. - It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity ore resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.

2. DE ASIS V. CA, GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 176

Parent and child; Support; Compromise Agreements; Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. –The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil code, the law in point, reads: Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can be transmitted to the third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. x x x Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.

Same; Same; Same; To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. –The raison d’etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated thus: “ The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. x x x To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy.

Same; Same; Same; An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. –The manifestation sent in by respondent’s mother in the first case, which

35

acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it as it served to vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent’s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; A former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil status of persons and future support cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. –Neither are we persuaded by petitioner’s theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula comes to fore. x x x It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon an compromise. Acknowledgement, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of a compromise. (pars. 1 & 4 , Art. 2035, Civil Code.) Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.”

3. CALDERON V. ROXAS, GR No. 185595, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 330

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; “Interlocutory Order” and “Final Order,” Distinguished. – This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows: xxx A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of theevidence presented at trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.” Xxx Converseley, on order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviouskly indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

Same; Provisional Remedies; Support Pendente Lite; The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendete lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order. – The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendet lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment orfinal order. On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and administration of common property.

36

Same; Civil Procedure; Interlocutory Orders; An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be doneto resolve the merits of the case. – The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suiit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be doneto resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed orders.

Same; provisional Remedies; Provisional remedies are writs and proceses available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. – Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The subject orders on the amtter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

37