8. SERGS PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY,petitioners, vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.,respondent.

[G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000]

PRINCIPLE:

After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.

FACTS

On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for sum of money with an application for a writ of replevin.

On March 6, 1998, judge issued a writ of replevin. On March 24, Sheriff then proceeded to petitioners factory and seized one machinery.

On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.

This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing on the ground that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.

Petitioners went to the CA via an original action for certiorari. CA held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners.

ISSUE

whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin.

RULING: Not meritorious.

Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property in accordance with Article 415 of the Civil Code which numerates immovable or real property as follows:

ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Further, it cannot be the subject of a replevin because Section 3 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only.

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.[16] In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.[17]

Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal.[18] After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

In the case of Tumalad vs Vivencio, the SC held as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.

In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:[21]

12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.

Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.[22] Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal.[23] In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.

9. TERLYNGRACE RIVERA, Petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165895. June 5, 2009

PRINCIPLE

the process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.[38] If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

FACTS

Florencio Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner and several John Does for recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon and with prayer for issuance of writ of replevin and the necessary bond worth P2,400,000.00. In his complaint and affidavit,[4] Vargas claims ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and imported the same directly from Hyun Dae Trading Co.

The equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husbands death despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action.

Summons[7] dated February 24, 2003 was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary on April 28, 2003 at her residence in Paraaque City. But the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon

Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of petitioners redelivery bond. RTC denied petitioners redelivery bond application for failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for redelivery bond within five (5) days from the date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court.

petitioner elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This, too, was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of time. She contends that the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.

ISSUE

What is the effect of a writ of replevin that has been improperly served?

RULING: Petition is meritorious.

The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond.[37] The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the courts order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.[38] If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located.[39] The signature of the receiving party indicates that the writ was received on April 29, 2003 by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the property to be seized was located, and witnessed by Claudio Palatino, respondents caretaker.[40]The sheriffs return,[41] however, peremptorily states that both the writ of replevin and the summons were served upon Rivera. On May 8, 2003, or nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.[42] But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.

The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case.

At the outset, petitioners proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioners filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper service.

10. SPOUSES NORMANDY and RUTH BAUTISTA Complainants, vs. ERNESTO L. SULA, Sheriff IV

A.M. No. P-04-1920. August 17, 2007

PRINCIPLES

Under the Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ ofreplevin to the plaintiff. This is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession and may not be deprived of it without due process.[43] The purpose of the five-day period in Section 6 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter-bond.

FACTS

Ruth Bautista borrowed P300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor (Glor). To secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of Glor.

Despite the repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay her debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Glor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (trial court), a civil case[3] for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.

RTC issued a writ of replevin dated 14 May 2004 and directed Sheriff Ernesto L. Sula o take possession of the vehicle and keep it in his custody for five (5) days. At the expiration of the said period, Sula was directed to deliver, subject to the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, to Glor the said property, provided that legal fees and all the necessary expenses are fully paid.

Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004. On 21 May 2004, Spouses Normandy and Ruth Bautista filed a motion for entry of appearance, urgent setting of hearing, and redelivery of the vehicle to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, Sps Bautista equired the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond.

Because the trial court failed to approve complainants counter-bond within the five-day period provided in Section 6 of Rule 60, Glor, in a letter[10] dated 24 May 2004, asked respondent to deliver the vehicle to her. In a letter[11] dated 26 May 2004, complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section 5, they had required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond; (2) the vehicles delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6; and (3) there was no order from the trial court directing the delivery to Glor.

On 26 May 2004, complainants alleged that respondent approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building asking them to wait for him by the benches at the back of the second floor. There, respondent told them that he was willing to ignore Glors request in exchange for P20,000. With a little hesitation, they offered him P3,000 and promised to give the balance on the following day. Respondent agreed and immediately received the P3,000. On the next day, however, complainants did not give the balance. They asked respondent if he could give them more time to raise the money. Respondent was irked by this.

On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriffs manifestation asking the trial courts guidance on whether he should deliver the vehicle to Glor or keep it in custodia legi.

Without waiting for the trial courts instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriffs return on 28 May 2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor

On 2 and 7 June 2004, complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), respectively, a joint affidavit-complaint[17] against respondent.

OCA found that respondent erred when he released the vehicle to Glor without waiting for the trial courts instructions on who had a better right over the vehicle. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be held liable for grave abuse of authority and fined P4,000. The OCA recommended that the charges for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sheriff properly delivered the property to Glor.

RULING: No.

In this case, plaintiff/applicant had posted a replevin bond duly approved by the court. Nevertheless, one of the elements upon which the property subject of replevin may be delivered to the plaintiff/applicant is lacking. There appears to be no court order issued yet for the release of the aforementioned property to the plaintiff/applicant. The order dated 12 May 2004 issued by the court only directed respondent to take into his custody the subject motor vehicle. Further, respondent filed a manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondents justification that the release of the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevinbond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight.

It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject property. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.

Moreover, under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due process.

The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. Considering that there was no court order to release the property to the applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their counter[-]bond within the five (5) day period required by the Rules, respondent should have been more circumspect in releasing the property to the plaintiff/applicant. By hastily deciding to release the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the courts order, respondent patently abused his authority.

Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value of the vehicle and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is delivered to Glor. Put differently:

If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both requirements as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned being mandatory. x x x

Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevinedby filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiffs affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6.[42]

Under Section 6, the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only under the following instances:

1. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants do not object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon;

2. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial court affirms its approval of Glors bond or approves a new bond; or

3. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected to and found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.

In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the vehicle. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, complainants filed their urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond and, on 21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion and change the same with an omnibus motion. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of the five-day period. Later, the trial court approved complainants counter-bond. Thus, respondent committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor.

Under the Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ ofreplevin to the plaintiff. This is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession and may not be deprived of it without due process.[43] The purpose of the five-day period in Section 6 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter-bond.

In Sebastian v. Valino,[45] this Court held that:

Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counter[-]bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court).

The prerogatives of sheriffs do not include the discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the property. Even when placed in a difficult situation, they are not called to exercise their own discretion.

11. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and NENITA P. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PREMIERE INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents.

G.R. No. 131283. October 7, 1999]

PRINCIPLE

A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City may be served and enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.

FACTS

petitioners] purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the private respondent, the International Corporate Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines, and the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the financing institution

Bank filed a complaint for sum of money with replevin before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City.

petitioners contested the jurisdiction of the MeTC since the claim was more than P200,000 and venue considering that the principal office of the respondent bank [was] in Makati, while their residence [was] in Quezon City. Petitioners also filed a motion for the redelivery of the chattel.

Petitioners alleged that When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Replevin on November 28, 1997, the monthly installments were almost fully paid; [they] would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997. They could not have been considered in default at the time the complaint was filed, considering that: (a) they attempted many times to pay the bank their installments for the months of August, September, October, 1996, and up to the time of the filing of the case, they ha[d] not received any statement of delinquency as mandated by R.A. No. 3165, otherwise known as the Truth in Lending Act.

Metc denied the petitioners motion. It held that Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the amount of the chattel.In this respect, defendants failed to exercise his right.

CA affirmed the lower court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City had jurisdiction over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed P200,000 exclusive of interest, damages and attorneys fees. The basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90; hence, the MTC had jurisdiction.

The appellate court further held that the objection to the impropriety of the venue should have been raised in a motion to dismiss before the filing of a responsive pleading. The said issue, however, was raised for the first time only in petitioners Answer.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be validly executed anywhere in Metro Manila because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the establishment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila with eighty-two (82) branches. Therefore, any branch in this case, Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay -- could issue writs and processes that could validly be served and executed anywhere within Metro Manila.

ISSUE

(1) May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the city? (2) Did the MTC have jurisdiction over the Complaint? (3) Were petitioners entitled to the redelivery of the subject vehicle?

RULING: Petition has no merit

First Issue: Territorial Enforcement of the Writ of Replevin

Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:

3. Writs and processes. ---

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.[10]

Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item a of the above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.

Second Issue: MTCs Jurisdiction Over the Complaint

Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in excess of P200,000 and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. This argument has no legal and factual basis. The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as shown in respondent banks Complaint, is the collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of the vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case. After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel mortgage that had been used to secure petitioners loan. In any case, private respondents are entitled only to the amount owed them. Under Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property shall be used primarily to pay the costs of the sale, the obligation that has been secured and other subsequent obligations; and the balance will be turned over to the mortgagors, herein petitioners.

Third Issue: Redelivery of Subject Vehicle

Petitioners assail the MTCs refusal to release the seized vehicle despite a Managers Check in the amount of P69,168 they issued for the redelivery of the vehicle within five days from its seizure.

This argument is devoid of merit. As observed by the trial court, petitioners failed to comply with the requisites for the redelivery of the vehicle seized:

Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the amount of the chattel. In this respect[,] defendants failed to exercise his right.[16]

Indeed, a careful perusal of the records shows that petitioners failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by Section 5 and 6 Rule 60 of the Rules of Court in effect at the time:

In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they issued a check for only P69,168 for the purpose of covering the advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount was insufficient to cover even just the required redelivery bond alone, which should be in an amount double that of the chattel. Hence, the MTCs refusal to grant petitioners Motion for redelivery was correct, and the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding it.

12. G.R. No. 127261 September 7, 2001

VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUN BARTOLOME+ and SUSAN BARTOLOME and DOMINADOR V. IBAJAN+, respondents.

Principle

Since the obligation of the surety cannot be extended by implication, it follows that the surety cannot be held liable to the intervenor when the relationship and obligation of the surety is limited to the defendants specified in the contract of surety.

Facts

On February 2, 1993, the spouses Danilo Ibajan and Mila Ambe Ibajan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Bian a complaint against spouses Jun and Susan Bartolome, for replevin to recover from them the possession of an Isuzu jeepney, with damages.

On February 8, 1993, plaintiffs filed a replevin bond through petitioner Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation. RTC granted the writ of replevin. The contract of surety provided thus:

"WHEREFORE, we, sps. Danilo Ibajan and Mila Ibajan and the VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORP., of Cebu, Cebu, with branch office at Manila, jointly and severally bind ourselves in the sum of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) for the return of the property to the defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to the defendant of such sum as he/she may recover from the plaintiff in the action."3

On May 3, 1993, Dominador V. Ibajan, father of plaintiff Danilo Ibajan, filed with the trial court a motion for leave of court to intervene, stating that he has a right superior to the plaintiffs over the ownership and possession of the subject vehicle.

On June 1, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to intervene.

On August 8, 1993, the trial court issued an order granting the motion to quash the writ of replevin and ordering plaintiff Mila Ibajan to return the subject jeepney to the intervenor Dominador Ibajan.5

RTC issued a writ of replevin in favour of Dominador Ibajan but it was returned unsatisfied. Thereafter, Dominador filed a motion for application for judgement against plaintiffs bond. RTC ordered Mila Ibajan and Visayan Surety to pay Dominador P150,000. Both parties appealed but it was denied by the RTC. Visayan Surety then appealed before the CA which affirmed the RTC. Visayan Surety then appealed before the SC. Respondent Dominador Ibajan asserts that as intervenor, he assumed the personality of the original defendants in relation to the plaintiffs bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Petitioner Visayan Surety contends that it is not liable to the intervenor, Dominador Ibajan, because the intervention of the intervenor makes him a party to the suit, but not a beneficiary to the plaintiffs bond. The intervenor was not a party to the contract of surety, hence, he was not bound by the contract.

Issue

whether the surety is liable to an intervenor on a replevin bond posted by petitioner in favor of respondents.Ruling: Petition is meritorious. An intervenor is a person, not originally impleaded in a proceeding, who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.14It is a basic principle in law that contracts can bind only the parties who had entered into it; it cannot favor or prejudice a third person.15Contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.16A contract of surety is an agreement where a party called the surety guarantees the performance by another party called the principal or obligor of an obligation or undertaking in favor of a third person called the obligee.17Specifically, suretyship is a contractual relation resulting from an agreement whereby one person, the surety, engages to be answerable for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, known as the principal.18The obligation of a surety cannot be extended by implication beyond its specified limits.19"When a surety executes a bond, it does not guarantee that the plaintiffs cause of action is meritorious, and that it will be responsible for all the costs that may be adjudicated against its principal in case the action fails. The extent of a suretys liability is determined only by the clause of the contract of suretyship."20A contract of surety is not presumed; it cannot extend to more than what is stipulated.21Since the obligation of the surety cannot be extended by implication, it follows that the surety cannot be held liable to the intervenor when the relationship and obligation of the surety is limited to the defendants specified in the contract of surety.

WHEREFORE,the CourtREVERSESand sets aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 49094. The Court rules that petitioner Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation is not liable under the replevin bond to the intervenor, respondent Dominador V. Ibajan.1wphi1.ntRULE 61. 13. G.R. No. L-43794 August 9, 1935LUIS FRANCISCO,petitioner,vs. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and EUGENIO LEOPOLDO FRANCISCO, represented by his natural mother and curatorad litem,ROSARIO GOMEZ,respondents.

PRINCIPLE

There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.FACTS

Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curatorad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is the latters acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support.

Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenios birth.

Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension,pendente lite of P30 per month. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status as petitioners son

RULING

Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and wife, (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of relationship.

In the present case the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardianad litem, who alleges that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status of a son and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such a status. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as defendant in case No. 47238, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly support,pendente lite.

The writ prayed for is granted and the order of the respondent judge of May 2, 1935, ordering the herein petitioner as defendant in case No. 47238 to pay the plaintiff in that case the sum of P30 monthly, as support,pendente lite, is hereby declared null and void, without costs.14. G.R. No. L-996 October 13, 1902LUIS R. YANGCO,petitioner,vs.WILLIAM J. ROHDE, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,respondent.

PRINCIPLEThere is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues for divorce or separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law; in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation a fact in issue and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal presumption. The civil status of marriage being denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being issue, it is difficult to see how any effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.FACTS

Petitioner Luis Yangco filed writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, alleging that complaint had been filed by Victorina Obin against the petitioner praying that she be declared the lawful wife of the said Yangco, and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of the suit. Complaint was filed before Respondent Judge Rohde, of the CFI of Manila, who then overruled the demurrer filed by the petitioner, stating he is of the opinion that petitioners marriage with Victorina is valid although Judge Rohde expressed his opinion that the question of the alleged marriage is not clear no free from doubt.

Respondent then ordered petitioner to pay the plaintiff, in advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after the 11th of March last past, and to pay on the 1st day of August following all accrued allowances, in addition to the allowance for the said month, amounting to the sum of 1,500 pesos.

Petitioner claims that he would be unable to earn back the sum hes being compelled to imburse, and that hes been deprived of right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. He prays to reverse respondents judgement, and to prohibit respondent from compelling him to pay Victorina the said sum. Respondent files a demurer on the following ground: (1) That this court is without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action; (2) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Rohde correctly held that Victorina Obin is entitled allowance of alimony pendent lite

RULING: Petition is meritorious.

Under article 1591 of the old Code any person believing himself entitled to that provisional alimony or support was required to file with the complaint documents proving conclusively the title by virtue of which the same was sued for. If the title was based upon a right created by law, it was necessary to present the documents establishing the bond of relationship between the plaintiff and defendant or the circumstances which gave a right to the alimony, such evidence to be completed by the testimony of witnesses if necessary. The judge, under article 1592, could not admit the complaint unless the documents referred to in the preceding article were submitted. It is evident from this that under the provisions of the law then in force a suit for alimony could not prosper upon the mere opinion of the judge expressed, not in a final judgment causing status, but in an interlocutory order which has no other purpose than to facilitate the continuance of the trial.

The necessity of founding the action for support or alimony on a title, and a title supported by documentary evidence, is a consequence of the precepts of article 143 of the Civil Code cited by the respondent judge himself. In this article the right to support is granted (1) to spousesinter se; (2) to legitimate descendants and ascendantsinter se; (3) to parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. In all these cases in is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support the civil status of marriage or that of relationship.

In the present case the action for the support or alimony is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse that is, a marriage, without which one has no right to the title to husband or wife. Marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means established by the former laws (art. 53).

This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues for divorce or separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law; in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation a fact in issue and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal presumption. The civil status of marriage being denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being issue, it is difficult to see how any effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. It is evident that there is of necessity a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status of marriage and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such status of marriage. Any other view would render useless all the legal effects which flow from the authority ofres adjudicata.

The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights to alimony to awife. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter. Thereforemandamusis the proper remedy upon the facts related.