power politics in the wto - public citizen · power politics in the wto preface the world trade...

Power Politicsin the WTO

By Aileen Kwa

Focus on the Global Southc/o CUSRI, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 10330, THAILAND

Tel : 66-2-218 7363/7364/7365/7383 • Fax : 66-2-255 9976E-mail : [email protected] • Web: http://www.focusweb.org

Edited by Alec Bamford

Updated 2nd EditionJanuary 2003

C O N T E N T S

Introduction

Personal accounts by developing countrynegotiators

From Seattle to Doha: real improvements ormere trappings of democarcy?

The story of Doha - reflections of developingcountry delegates

Manufacturing consensus and what it entails

Post-Doha antics: laying the foundations forCancun

Conclusion

7

11

17

21

35

49

57

4Power Politics in the WTO


PREFACE

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has often been portrayed as the pinnacle ofthe multilateral system of global economic governance.

Why it has achieved this reputation is puzzling since it is one of the mostundemocratic organizations around. Formally speaking, the WTO is a one-country,one-vote system. Yet actual decision-making is done by a process called“consensus,” in which the big trading powers impose a consensus arrived at amongthemselves on the rest of the body. In the WTO, formal parliamentary sessionswhere decisions are made in democratic institutions are reserved for speechmaking.Real decisions are made in backrooms by informal caucuses whose members arenot determined by formal rules and votes but by informal agreement amongsignificant players.

This non-transparent, non-accountable system of decision-making is one of theelements that has contributed to the crisis of legitimacy of the WTO. After Seattle,there were expectations that reform of the decision-making process would be atthe top of the WTO agenda. Instead, the organization lurched into the FourthMinisterial Conference of the WTO with its decision-making structure unreformed,and Doha has now become a byword for the perversion of democracy and thethwarting of the will of the majority via intimidation, threat, and bribery on thepart of the strong.

This publication is an effort to throw much-needed light on this sordid process.This much-needed study is based on extensive interviews with developing countrydelegates to the Doha ministerial. This is essential reading for everyone with aninterest in one of the most powerful economic groupings of our time. For bothcritics and partisans of the WTO, it makes a very powerful case that the decision-making process has become the Achilles heel of the organization.

Walden BelloExecutive Director

Focus on the Global South


We are simply asking for fair and equitable rules that wouldtake into account our development needs and allow us toparticipate fully in the trade system. But instead we risk beingpressured once again into accepting rules we don’t need andcan’t afford.

Ambassador Nathan Irumba, Mission of Uganda and Representative of the

Least Developed Countries (LDC) at the WTO.1

This is quite a remarkable statement. Six years after the founding ofthe WTO, and three years after the debacle of the Seattle Ministerial,the representative of the poorest members of the WTO feels it is stillnecessary to ask for ‘fair and equitable rules’.

But the WTO prides itself exactly on being a ‘rules-based’ organization.The argument is that without the rules of the WTO, world trade woulddescend into the anarchy of the jungle. And then, we are told, the poorand the weak would go to the wall.

This image, as we are about to demonstrate, is not true.

This paper will show that at crucial points in the WTO system, theresimply are no rules. Attempts to set ‘fair and equitable’ rules areroutinely rebuffed. Some rules are made up on the spot in a way thatcannot be ‘fair and equitable’. And the rules that do exist are commonlyflouted, not just by the rich and powerful countries, but also by thesupposedly neutral WTO staff.

But there is one respect in which the WTO scenario outlined above isquite true. The poor and the weak are going to the wall. And preciselybecause of the WTO and its rules.

INTRODUCTION


The claim is made not by ideologues with anaxe to grind, not by ivory tower academics,not by people who can be brushed aside asanti-WTO activists. It is made by the peoplebest placed to know, by ambassadors andgovernment officials to the WTO. These arethe people who are supposed to represent theinterests of the weak and the poor. Their ownwords show how the South is marginalized inthe WTO.

Developing countries are reduced to damagecontrol and scrabbling to secure negligiblebenefits. A few with sufficient negotiatingclout are given minor rewards to ensure theircompliance. Most receive nothing, and silentlyacquiesce against their better judgment,condemning themselves to the enlargementof a system that has so far proved to be highlyunbalanced and detrimental to their owninterests. They do this to avoid theconsequences of displeasing the politicallyand economically powerful.

The marginalization of the South in the WTOis a serious concern. The WTO now wieldsexecutive power over 23 separate agreements,from trade related investment measures(TRIMS), to intellectual property rights,agriculture, and industrial goods. The FourthMinisterial Conference at Doha in November2001 put more agreements on the table.Member states are required to change theirnational laws to ensure compliance withWTO agreements. Non-compliance canresult in a country being hauled before theDispute Settlement Body, the WTO’s owncourt of law.This report presents evidence ofthe manipulation and subversion of decision-making and rule-making at the WTO. How isit that less than fair rules are endorsed bydeveloping countries? What is going onbehind the scene that allows this to happen?We show the exact points in the process andthe strategies that allow the will of the majorityto be subverted.

Unless the rules by which the WTO itselfoperates are made fair, developing countriesare unlikely to make progress in bringingmore equity to any of the substantive areas:TRIPS, services, agriculture, nor in the newnegotiations launched at Doha. This was feltkeenly by many countries before the Doha

ministerial. One delegate had this to say atthat time:

It is not a question of substance. Nobodycan say that we have not participated.We have done so, and we have simplybeen ignored. The text [Doha draftdeclaration] does not take our interestsinto account. We will not have a thirddraft, not because we have no time. Thetext came in on Saturday. By Monday,we sent a letter signed by 20 developingcountries to make changes inimplementation. And he [the Chair ofthe General Council, Stuart Harbinson,ambassador of Hong Kong] simplysaid no. We all know why he said that,because our Ministers will have adifficult time. We are in the worstpossible situation, and it is a questionof politics, not a lack of arguments.2

B. L. Das, former Indian Ambassador to theGATT, also describes how developingcountries end up compromising their owninterests:

If [developing country negotiators] feelthat any proposal is not in the interestof their country, they oppose it. Theiropposition is quite firm sometimes, andthey stick to their line almost till the veryend. But finally when intense pressuresare built up in the capitals or if all othercountries have acquiesced in theproposal, they also drop their objectionand remain sullenly silent. Decisionsare taken to which they become partieseven though they had earlier raisedobjections. And in this manner theircountries get bound by the obligationsimposed by the decisions. Theimmediate political cost of withholdingconsensus appears to them to be muchheavier than the burden of theseobligations in the future.3

The strategies used by the powerful to bringabout such an outcome are the topic of thispublication.

The voices of developing country negotiatorsthat appear in this paper are seldom heardby the public. Yet they are the ones that bear


testimony to the decision-making and processproblems at the heart of the trading system.A conscious effort has been made in thisdocument to bring these voices to the fore.Almost thirty interviews were conducted afterthe Doha ministerial for this purpose.4 Mostdelegates, out of fear of repercussions ontheir jobs or pressure on their capitals, havechosen to remain anonymous.

• ---------------------------------------1 Speech delivered on 11 April, Geneva, cited in

South Bulletin 33, 15 April, 2002.2 Quoted in Kwa 2001 ‘Power Politics To Cripple

WTO Ministerial’, 9 November, www.focusweb.org/publications/2001/power-politics-to-cripple-WTO-minesterial.html

3 Das, Bhagirath Lal, ‘Strengthening DevelopingCountries in the WTO, Trade and DevelopmentSeries No. 8, Third World Network, http:www.twnside.org.sg/title.td8.html

4 Many thanks to Fatoumata Jawara for arranging anumber of interviews.


Personal accountsby developing

country negotiators

Chapter

1


In this chapter developing country tradediplomats based in Geneva speak about theirexperience in the WTO, and in particular, thepolitical pressures they are up against. The fearof repercussions for speaking their mind hasmade it necessary for these accounts to remainanonymous. The italics in the quotations areours and are intended to highlight the anti-democratic practices of the WTO.

Country 1

I come from one of the poorest countries inthe world. While it is not classified as leastdeveloped, it has been slowly but surelymarginalised by globalisation. When we beginto learn and understand how the multilateraltrade system works, the first question thatcomes to mind is: how is it that my country ispart of this immense project calledglobalisation? The task becomes morearduous when the sole and simple interestthat our people have - to be able to feed themselves - becomes a utopia. It is especiallydifficult when we see that the dirt-coveredfaces are too weak from hunger to even cry.

We do our best to obtain the benefits thatglobalisation is supposed to bring, such asspecial and differentiated treatment,technology transfer and the desperate searchfor the investment that rarely arrives. We doeverything, including the impossible, to meetthe obligations that multilateralism demandsof us — creating legislation, and evenmechanisms that protect the interests ofothers — but where are our rights?

My task, as well as that of my team, has beennothing more than to seek the benefits for asmall economy within the ‘norms’ of the WorldTrade Organization. However it has not provedpossible. I say this not because we do not havethe negotiating capacity with which to reachour objectives, but to expose the differentstrategies that are used to keep us submergedin underdevelopment. Within the World TradeOrganization there are many developingcountries with different levels of economicactivity, and regrettably, this has been turnedinto one of the most powerful weapons usedby the developed countries: to divide andconquer.

The usual practice is to make promises to adeveloping country so that it will defend theinterests of a developed country, with theresult that the developing countries are pittedagainst each other. Apart from that, developedcountries use pressure tactics, for example,political pressures, threatening to withdrawsome type of tariff preferences and trying todiscredit the people in charge of small countrydelegations in Geneva.

The examples are numerous: there are blacklists of enemy countries, and lists of peoplewhose positions are contrary to their interestsand who therefore— thanks to politicalpressures and the use of personal attacks—are moved away. Is this sovereignty or a newform of colonialism?

Many of the developing countries were notable to deal with the results of the Uruguayround and these imbalances have become thecorner stone of the foundations of a neweconomic system. We see countries that hadnever been active in the organization, now


beginning to present proposals, to speak upand put forward their points of view, to expresstheir interests, all this with the vision to providethe better opportunities for their vulnerableeconomies in the world market. The result ofmuch of this effort was the disaster at Seattle,even though that was not the objective.

September 11th is an act to be lamented by allhumanity, but what gives cause for evengreater regret, are the economic benefits thatwere extracted by the industrialized countriesout of this disaster. I would even venture tosay that if September 11 had not happened,the Doha ministerial declaration would nothave contained even half of its obligations. Wecannot deny that many countries that weremaking a difference in the WTO have beenundermined, and their officials even removed,simply for raising their voices in defence ofthe interests of their countries. Their requestswere simply to have justice, transparencyand a functioning system at the WTO. Theresult is that the WTO - a member-drivenorganization - continues to be governed by bad practices and arbitrary decisions. Theseare being imposed on others as a result of thesupreme power of a few.

As for the institution itself, we have a DirectorGeneral whose only interest is his personalagenda.1 He slavishly lends himself to theinterests of the powerful countries, and is notinterested in the developing world, which hetreats with disdain and contempt. This is clearfrom the threats he has directed at variousrepresentatives of small countries. This is nosecret, its common knowledge for those whomonitor the WTO closely.

What will happen now? At the moment, it isvery difficult to predict the future of the smalleconomies, but what is certain is that we havebeen led in the direction of slow destruction,of our customs, our economies and of thesovereignty of our countries.

Country 2

I arrived in Geneva when the WTO was firstformed. The experiences I have had overthese years, have led me to conclude that thebiggest obstacle developing countries face inachieving true participation in the multilateral

trade system, is not the lack of capacity,knowledge or training, but the lack oftransparency in the processes within the WTO,and the political abuse committed by thedeveloped countries.

At the Singapore ministerial conference, itwas clear that a group of delegations met insecret, and drafted the ministerial declarationwithout the rest of the delegations evenknowing where they were meeting.

Then came the Geneva ministerial conference.At the last moment the United States presenteda proposal for a declaration on ElectronicCommerce, launching a work programme, andintroducing a “standstill”. The majority of thedeveloping countries opposed the proposal.Unfortunately, I could see that little by little,their arms were being twisted, even that ofmy Minister, until only Mexico and Pakistanwere left opposing. Eventually these two alsohad to give way.

The next battle was over the selection of thenew director general in 1999. The first thingthat the developed countries did was to breakthe gentleman’s agreement arrived at when theWTO was being created. There was anunderstanding that after Renato Ruggiero[the first Director General of the WTO], thenew Director General would come from adeveloping country. From the beginningSupachai Panitchpakdi [from Thailand] wasthe favourite of the majority. However, whenthe selection process was narrowed down toMike Moore and Supachai, the pressure puton developing and least developed countries,mainly by the United States, was indescribable.The Chair of the General Council finally endedup presenting Mike Moore as the winner,which caused indignation amongst most ofthe members, who didn’t accept the proposal.The tortuous process of consultations thatfollowed gave developed countries an opening,and they began to put pressures on Capitals,causing several of the small countries that hadoriginally supported Supachai to change sides.Finally, a negotiated solution was achieved:that Mike Moore and Supachai would eachserve for three years. Mike Moore’s candidacynever had the support of majority of themembers, but it did have the support of themost powerful.


Then came the preparations for the Seattleconference, and the desire of the developedcountries to launch a new round, once again,in the face of opposition by the majority ofdeveloping countries.

During the preparations for the conference,the developing countries showed great abilityand organization. The Like Minded Group2

was formed, led by the Indian delegation butincluding developing and least developedcountries from all regions. The Like MindedGroup presented more than 100 proposals onthe problems related to the implementation ofthe WTO Agreements.

I was witness to how the officials of thedeveloped countries communicated with theCapitals of developing and least developedcountries, with the goal to stop the delegationsin Geneva from continuing to speak about‘implementation issues’. The strategy usedby the developed countries is to confuse theCapitals, making them believe that thedelegations in Geneva are acting as theirenemies, which causes some developingcountries that are not very well organized tomodify their positions. These are thenegotiating tactics used by the distinguishedtrade negotiators of the developed countries.

After the failure of Seattle MinisterialConference, a process of building trust beganat the WTO. However, this process consistedof little more than words. In spite of hours ofdiscussion, work, proposals, and reasonspresented by the developing and leastdeveloped countries [on implementationissues], the developed countries didn’t backoff. They held on to their position thateverything had to be resolved through a newround of trade negotiations, something whichmost of the developing countries continued tooppose.

During the preparations for the Conference inQatar, the pressure on the Capitals increased,this time requesting the withdrawal of manyof the Ambassadors in Geneva, who defendedthe interests of their countries, and whoopposed the launching of a new round. Thetruth is that the launch of this new round wouldnever have taken place if it had not been forthe lack of transparency and interference on

the part of the WTO Secretariat, and thepolitical pressures used by the developedcountries - mainly the United States and theEuropean Union.

After Qatar, the pressures remain, and theobjective of the developed countries is now toundermine any possibility of the developingcountries presenting proposals andparticipating effectively in the negotiations.They are trying to destroy the Like Mindedgroup (LMG) which, as a coalition, attemptsto achieve balance in the work of the WTO.The pressures for changes of position and forthe withdrawal of Ambassadors is permanent,and has no apparent logic beyond thearguments that the delegations in Geneva actas the enemies of the multilateral system, ofthe developed countries, and even of peace inthe world. It is indeed incredible that inthe 21st century, and in the context of anorganization in which all are supposedly equal,that arguments like these continue to be used.

Many reforms are needed within the WTO inorder to address the issue of lack oftransparency in the process, undue interferenceby the Secretariat, and its bias towards thedeveloped countries. But a change in thethinking of these countries is also needed. Ifthey believe that they will be able to achievebetter trade opportunities by excluding thedeveloping countries from the system throughunderhanded strategies, they are mistaken.What they will ultimately end up with will bemore poverty, migration problems, andviolence in the world; problems that, in theend, will also turn against them. Globalisationshould be a process by which all countriesdevelop, and enjoy economic growth, peaceand progress, and not a mechanism which afew use to increase their wealth at the cost ofthe majority.

Country 3

The multilateral trading system is of criticalimportance to many developing counties. TheWTO agenda has broadened with the adoptionin the Uruguay Round, of agreements in newareas of services, intellectual property rightsand investment that go beyond measures of


the traditional areas of GATT. With thelaunching of a new round of trade negotiationsat Doha, the WTO remit may be broadenedfurther, constraining the policy space ofcountries.

Prior to the Uruguay Round, many countries,especially the LDCs, did not participate fullyin the negotiations - in the exchange ofconcessions - since LDCs were exempt fromGATT disciplines, and were not required tomake reciprocal concessions. But theybenefited from tariff reductions negotiatedamong developed countries and preferentialaccess to markets of developed countries.There were few demands being made onthem, therefore they could not insist very muchon full participation. They were often deridedas “free riders”.

The situation has however changedconsiderably with the Uruguay Round.Developing countries have carried on reformsand taken on obligations required by theWTO. Most members wish to participatefully. They feel they have a greater stake inthe world trading system and a better claimfor participating in the WTO decision-makingprocess.

There is need for a systematic change. On theface of it, decisions are taken by consensus.However, the consensus seems to bedeveloped in the so-called ‘green room’process, which brings together a few self-selected developed and developing countries.There seems as to be no objective basis forselecting participants. As it has evolved, the‘green room’ consultations have involved theQuad countries (US, EU, Japan and Canada),Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,some representation from countries ofeconomies in transition, and from developingcountries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt,Hong Kong (China), India, South Korea,Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa andrepresentatives from the ASEAN countries.Until recently, the LDCs were not invited inthe ‘green room’. As one Ambassador of thegroup pointed out, LDCs may be poor, but theydo not have the poverty of ideas.

The objectives of developing countries havebeen clear, primarily to make the existing

international system respond to, and meettheir development needs. So to assess theeffectiveness of their participation, one canlook at the extent to which, in practice, theWTO effectively responds to and meets thedevelopment needs of these nations.

Another question raised is the nature andscope of the WTO decision-making. As to thenature, WTO decision-making involvesinformal and formal consultations. Thereis more emphasis on informal selectiveconsultations. Consensus is used instead ofvoting, as the means of reaching the finaldecisions. This is despite Article IX of theWTO Agreement, which provides for voting.

The operations and activities of ‘green-rooms’remain the preserve of mostly the developedcountries. On some occasions, somedeveloping and least developed countries maybe invited, according to the convenience of thecircumstances. In these consultations, finalpositions are agreed upon. These are thenadopted in the formal meetings. It often provesdifficult to re-open the debate in formalmeetings, for Chairpersons are invariablyeager to move on after being party to informalconsultations. There are times when someChairmen or officials just go through themotion of consultations to make LDCs happy,but do not take into account their views whenformulating the final compromise positions.Experience so far shows that developedcountries have most often insisted on theirpositions while pressing small developingcountries to give up their positions. In theeuphoria following the conclusion of theUruguay Round, the WTO was held out as amember-driven organization in which thevoice of small developing countries would beequal to that of any developed country. Fiveyears on, every one knows and sees how westill have a long way to go in this regard.

In the Singapore ministerial, a number ofdeveloped countries wanted to initiatenegotiations on the ‘new issues’ (investment,competition, government procurement andtrade facilitation), including labour standards.This move was opposed by developingcountries. However, a small group of ministerswere assembled, and agreed on a compromisethat a study process be established. Without


any debate in the Committee of the Whole andin the plenary, the recommendation wasadopted. Equally, in Doha, developingcountries were opposed to the new issues.But again, a group of ministers in the ‘green-room’ gave their consent. A new round wasagreed upon, which included these very issues.No such far-reaching decisions were agreedon ‘implementation issues’, which were apriority for developing countries.

In some cases there is an attempt to bypassthe Geneva-based delegates and even tocreate a wedge between them and theircapitals. This unfortunately has led manydelegates to remain silent. When a delegatefeels that his career might be at risk, it affectshis performance.

The WTO is a standing negotiating forum. Themany daily meetings are perpetual negotiationsand consultations. It is a heavy schedule, onedrawn up solely on the basis of the staffingand capacity of developed country missionsand capitals. Yet critical decisions are beingtaken in these meetings. Developing countrymissions are invariably understaffed and iflucky have only a couple of persons dealingwith the entire WTO, if not the entire UNsystem. For such missions, it is difficult toparticipate effectively in these decision-making processes under the currentcircumstances. It is necessary to rationalize andreduce to a manageable level, the number ofWTO meetings per week. A possible solutionto redress this is to cut down on the meetingsto reflect the capacity of developing countrymissions.

• ------------------------------1 The interview was given before September 2002. The

Director General referred to is Mike Moore.2 An informal group of developing countries that meet

regularly on WTO issues in Geneva. Members includeCuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India,Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius,Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, andZimbabwe.


Chapter

2From Seattle to Doha:Real improvements or

mere trappings ofdemocarcy?


Formally, one can vote. But in theabsence of a one-country-one-vote, andin the presence of a decision-makingstructure that is based on consensus andan informal decision-making process,I will be ignored if I raised my flag. Youwill be ignored unless you are a majortrading country.

The informality of the process meansthat, in fact, it is a process ofconsultation and discussion behindclosed doors. This means that thosewith clout will carry the most weight.There are few countries that wouldchallenge a decision that has been putforward as a done deal.

At the WTO, the tradition of not takingdecisions based on one-country-one-vote weighs against those who aresmallest and weakest. If we really wantto make a start, one area is to haveelections concerning proceduraldecisions.

(Caribbean delegate)

Decisions of the WTO have an impacton all members and this is why the rules-based multilateral trading systemrequires that the entire membership isgiven an opportunity to effectivelyparticipate.

(Representative of St Lucia)1

The WTO-official line

Former WTO Director General Mike Moorealways presented the WTO as democratic,rules-based and member-driven. At aconference on democracy and free trade, hestated:

The WTO system is built upon the ruleof law and respect for the sovereignequality of nations. Ultimately, it is anopen, rules-based multilateral tradingsystem, built on democratic values. It isthe most democratic international bodyin existence today...The transparencyand inclusiveness - which is to say the‘legitimacy’ of the process helps toexplain why Member governments aremore prepared and more willing toreach agreement when they gathered inDoha...

Opponents of the World TradeOrganisation, who sometimes claim thatthe system is ‘undemocratic’, start froma basic fallacy. The WTO is not imposedon countries... No country is forced tosign our agreements. Each and everyone of the WTO’s rules is negotiatedby member governments and agreedby consensus.2

The rhetoric cracks in Seattle

The supposedly democratic nature of the WTOwas exposed in Seattle in December 1999,when member governments at the ministerialrevolted. The ugly secrets of how theinstitution actually functions became public,


much to the embarrassment of the majors.The African Group, totally exasperated by theirmarginalisation in discussions, issued astatement threatening that they would notbe part of any package they had not beeninvolved in discussing. This was followed bya similar joint communique from the LatinAmerican and the Caribbean countries.3

This was a public relations disaster for thehost country, the United States, and the WTO’sthen Director General, Mike Moore. Thedeveloped countries were quick to placateangry members.

The host, then US Trade Representative,Charlene Barshefsky said:

The process was a rather exclusionaryone... the WTO has outgrown theprocesses appropriate to an earliertime. An increasing and necessary view,generally shared among the members,was that we needed a process which hada degree of internal transparency andinclusion to accommodate a larger andmore diverse membership.4

The UK Trade and Industry Minister, StephenByers, also said:

The WTO will not be able to continuein its present form. There has to befundamental and radical change inorder for it to meet the needs andaspirations of all 134 of its members.5

The false dawn of democracy

After Seattle, the WTO took up these problemswith apparent seriousness The 2000 Chair ofthe General Council, Ambassador Kare Brynof Norway reduced the numbers of green roomconsultations in favour of small groupmeetings with different members, followed by‘informals’ open to all. Ambassador Bryn’sefforts were widely viewed by developingcountries as genuine attempts at greaterdemocracy.

In April 2000, Ambassador Bryn presented adiscussion paper, raising fundamental

questions about the democracy of WTOdecision-making processes and proposingchecks on the abuse of power by influentialmembers.6

But by July 2000, the hopes of a set of bindingrules had faded. All that remained was aChairman’s statement containing ‘guidelines’rather than rules:

1) That Members are advised of the intentionto hold informal consultations;

2) That those Members with an interest in thespecific issue under consideration aregiven the opportunity to make their viewsknown;

3) That no assumption should be made thatone Member represents any other members,except where the members concernedhave agreed on such an arrangement;

4) That the outcome of such consultations isreported back to the full Membershipexpeditiously for consideration.7

Even though many members wanted morework to continue in this area8, nothing concreteemerged. Worse still, these minimal principleswere not applied to future processes.

In the initial phase of preparation for Doha,some delegates in Geneva felt that, the processwas becoming somewhat more inclusive. Thisdoes not mean that there was total transparencyor that negotiators of the politically weakercountries always knew what negotiationswere going on. But delegates of the smalleconomies would be invited to someconsultations, when before they were totallyexcluded. However, the moment the powerfulcountries felt the pressure, the same secretive,non-democratic and exclusive negotiatingpractices re-emerged.

This was clear from the two Mini-Ministerialsheld before the Doha ministerial, in Mexicoin August 2001, and in Singapore in October2001. Only about 20-22 countries were invitedto each meeting. There was a small changefrom previous ‘green room’ practice. The LDCco-ordinator, Tanzania, and the African GroupCoordinator, Nigeria, were present at bothMini-Ministerials. The problem was that nocountry had surrendered negotiating rights to


these representatives, although it was assumedby the influential countries that suchrepresentation was sufficiently inclusive.

Some delegates in Geneva tried to getinvitations, but the WTO Secretariat claimedno responsibility for those meetings, and thehost countries said that they were merelyproviding facilities, and were not in a positionto issue invitations.

The ‘majors’ realized they could notbeat the Geneva process. Developingcountries had built capacity in theGeneva process. Realising that theycould not put their agenda thoughGeneva, they started to have meetingsamongst a small group of Members. Thefirst was in Frankfurt. Those who wereinvited included the Quad (US, EU,Japan and Canada), and othercountries sympathetic to the new round,such as South Africa, Egypt andSingapore. Malaysia and a few otherswho had opposing views were alsoinvited. They did not succeed inFrankfurt. Many countries sent theirGeneva based Ambassadors. Then theymet in Coppet (Switzerland). Again,many Ambassadors (from Geneva) weresent.

The real meeting that changed thingswas the one that was held in Mexico (atthe end of August). After Mexico, peoplestarted to see things differently. It wasagain a selected group. The follow-upto that meeting was in Singapore. Afterthe Singapore meeting, the DG said thatit was not a WTO meeting. However,both the Chair of general council andthe DG were present. They also askedthe Singapore ambassador to give abrief to the entire membership. Andreading in the press, what transpired inSingapore is very close to what was infact agreed in Doha.

This method lacks transparency and isa relic of the GATT, where countries thatwere strong trading nations, cametogether and tried to push their agendaon to others.

(Ambassador Chidyausiku, Zimbabwe)9

• --------------------------------------

1 WTO WT/GC/M/57 14 September 2002 ‘Minutes ofMeeting, 17 and 19 July 2000’.

2 Moore 2002 Speech delivered at the Conference onDemocracy and Free Trade, Qatar, 26 March,2002.

3 December 2 1999 ‘Joint Communique’. TheCommunique states ‘The undersigned LatinAmerican and Caribbean countries, represented bytheir respective ministers to the WTO... attendingthe 3rd WTO Ministerial Meeting... wish to declareas follows: ... To the authorities of the Conferenceand the WTO Director General office, their expressdisagreement with the way in which negotiationsare being conducted at the Ministerial Conference,a way that shows a parallel course of actionbetween a discourse oriented to transparency andthe participation by the delegations, and a processof limited and reserved participation by somemembers which intends to define the scope andextent of the future negotiating round that allmember-countries are to adopt. We are particularlyconcerned over the stated intentions to produce aministerial text at any cost, including themodification of procedures designed to secureparticipation and consensus.’

4 Press briefing, Seattle, 2 December, 1999.5 Guardian News Services, ‘Deadline Set for WTO

Reforms, 10 January, 2000.6 JOB(00)/2551 26 April 2001, ‘General Council:

Internal Transparency and the EffectiveParticipation of all Members. Discussion Paper bythe Chairman’. Paragraph 3 of this paper raises animportant question, ‘While agreeing that decisionsshould only be taken within the formal, open-endedprocesses established within the WTO, would therebe a need to identify means to ensure that smaller,consultative groups are not in any way replacingthe formal decision-making processes of the WTO,nor perceived as substitutes for decisions by thewhole membership?’

7 WTO 2000 WT/GC/M/57 Minutes of Meetings on17 and 19 July.

8 These are reflected in WT/GC/M/57, Minutes ofmeetings on 17 and 19 July 2000.

9 Interview with Aileen Kwa, 22 February, 2002,Geneva. Comments by Chidyausiku in this papercome from this interview.


Chapter

3The story of Doha -reflections of

developing countrydelegates


We have been approached bilaterallyin capitals. We are approached inGeneva. We are made to feel that weare holding up the rescue of the globaleconomy if we don’t agree to a newround here.

This is a view I don’t subscribe to. I don’tthink negotiations will come to fruitionin time to offset any recessionarytendencies in the global economy. Nordo I feel that this is going to be a signalto financial markets. In addition, we feelthat this meeting has no connection withthe fight against terrorism. And all thesethings have been put to us in a way thatif we don’t agree, we are not committedto those goals, which is certainly not thecase.

Dr Richard Bernal,

Jamaican Delegate in Doha1

The battle over new issues

The main fight in the run-up to Doha was theattempt by developed countries to expandthe scope of the WTO to include the so-calledSingapore issues (investment, competition,transparency in government procurement andtrade facilitation). The majority of developingcountries, overburdened by their commitmentsfrom earlier rounds, were not in favour of theseissues.

The outcome of the Doha cannot bede-linked from what happened beforeDoha. LDCs and the African Groupwanted a limited work programme that

we could manage. This was because wedid not have the capacity to understand,to negotiate, and to be able to decidewhether the negotiations pushed to usby certain countries, would actuallylead to development in our countries.

In terms of preparations, there werethese ‘confessionals’ with the Chair ofthe general council, where you stateyour positions. Many such meetingswere held. We later realized thatsomething was wrong. We reiteratedand submitted the LDC position paper,as well as the Abuja paper (the AfricanGroup position paper). We submittedthese to the Chair and thought that thesewould be taken into considerationwithin the Declaration.

(Ambassador Chidyausiku,

Zimbabwe)

The process leading to Seattle wascumbersome. We never reached anagreement. What it did was to push theformulation of the text till the end. Thisusually happens in Ministerials.

For Doha, they changed the methodo-logy to reduce the chances of failure.They had a Chair produce an outlineand then the first draft. But even beforethe Ministerial, the process wascircumscribed and the Chairman wasin the driver’s seat from the start. Wewent along because we thought theChair was from a developing country.We underestimated the kinds of pressuresto which all Chairs are subjected to.

(South Asian Delegate)


There were many problems for developingcountries in the development of the DraftDeclaration for Doha. One was the way theDraft ignored suggestions from developingcountries ‘by magic’.

We made so many suggestions beforeDoha, but they were ignored. In fact,the suggestions by developing countriesjust fizzled out. We gave texts. We didn’tknow where they went, but they didn’tfind their way to the draft declaration.We were expressing our dissatisfaction,and our disgust. Yet the Chair wentahead, taking the draft to Doha. Wewere shooting, but we didn’t know whowe were shooting at. We ended upnegotiating with the Chair, whereasnegotiations should be amongstMembers.

The onus was left on developingcountries to say, “We don’t want this”.But the other side didn’t have to do thatbecause the job had already been donefor them in the text.

(African delegate)

In the process of negotiations, We wouldobject to a text, but it would still appear.We would state we wanted a text addedin, and still it would not appear. It waslike a magic text.

(South Asian delegate)

We had submitted a number of drafts,in the Like-Minded Group, the AfricanGroup and LDCs. But our positionswere not captured in the draft. Why werewe wasting our time to submit theseposition papers which were not beingtaken into consideration?


Zimbabwe)

Many delegates blamed a consultation processwhere there was the appearance ofparticipation, but no substance.

There were intensive plurilateralconsultations before Doha. In these

consultations, it was as though you werejust talking to the wall. They were so-called ‘open-ended’ meetings. You werejust talking and talking (but not listenedto). The first draft, which came,reflected two positions. The revisedsecond draft did not reflect the positionof the majority. Majority of Membersdid not agree to negotiations onSingapore issues and environment. Andeven areas where they had strongpositions were not appropriatelyreflected.

(Asian delegate)

Big farce is the word I would use. Whatare these consultations meant for?I attended three meetings on tradefacilitation. There were a number ofAfricans, LDCs and Caribbeancountries. While this meeting was takingplace, the Mini-Ministerial in Singaporewas happening. Of those who spoke -about 30 countries, 20-25 said “no”.But it was completely ignored. Butthere were no records. Nobody knowswho said what. Finally it depends onthe DG and the deputy DG who draftsthat paragraph. So the question is thatyou can have innumerable meetings, butwhat does it reflect? Either informalsare followed more frequently byformals, or what is discussed in theinformals is to be recorded.

(Southeast Asian delegate)

Pressures were increased on stand-outcountries.

Pressures were put on Tanzania(representing the LDCs). Even beforethe Zanzibar meeting (LDC meeting inJuly 2001), the Minister was receivingcalls from the major countries,criticising him for the tough stance hewas taking on new issues

(African delegate)

A difference in some developingcountries’ positions started to emergeas Doha approached. This was all part


of the learning process after Seattle.Developed countries were responsiblefor a frenzy of activity going on -bilaterals, regional meetings, andcontact with key leaders. There wasgreater involvement of some Capitalsand key Ministers in the process. Allthis had quite a bit to do with whypositions changed. When Doha camecloser, negotiations were moreconcentrated at Capital level.

There was also the psychological andpublic relations spin on theconsequences of failure. That wastrumpeted all the time in capitals.

(Caribbean delegate).

Just before Doha, ministers from theAfrican countries that are part ofAGOA (the African Growth OpportunityAct) went to Washington. When theycame back, some countries’ views onthe issue of the TRIPS agreement andpublic health had taken a shift towardsthe US position. However, the majorityof the African counties were able tosee that the US wanted to divide thedeveloping countries by giving amoratorium to sub-Saharan Africa onthe implementation of TRIPS. We hadto scuttle that. We saw this as a ploy todivide developing countries. We said no.We have been fighting this as developingcountries, and they should not divide us.


Zimbabwe)

Some of the pressure came from thesupposedly neutral WTO Secretariat itself.

Then came arm-twisting as theministerial approached. This was doneby the US, EU and Director General[Mike Moore]. The DG started callingindividual ambassadors on Saturdaysand Sundays, asking them for theircooperation, because he needed a newround.

(Asian delegate)

The Secretariat was also playing theEU role. Within the Secretariat, it wasnot only the DG. The Secretariat waschampioning a ‘Round’ all throughout.If you wanted to advance your career,you had to be seen as pushing a certainline. Of course you would take the cuefrom the Director General.

(African delegate)

Chairman of the General Council StuartHarbinson released two drafts for Doha. Thefirst had two options in brackets on the newissues, showing that there was disagreement.Even though Members continued to expressthe same position of ‘no new issues’, thesecond draft on 27 October 2001 was a cleantext. That is, the option of no negotiations onnew issues was removed. The text agreed tothe commencement of negotiations by the 5th

Ministerial.

Nigeria issued a statement denouncing thesecond Draft Declaration

Nigeria considers it a serious omissionthat the draft has not projected thecrucial differences in our views. Thisportends that there is no levelplayground in the WTO if one side onlyis heard in arguments and on issues thataffect all our countries.2

As we shall see later, something then happenedto make Nigeria change its opinions on this.

So how could a text that had not been properlyapproved go to the Doha Ministerial?Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabweexplains:

When we had failed to agree on thedocument that had been drafted by theChair of the General Council, thequestion then was how to send adocument that had not been agreedupon by the membership.

Because of the lack of procedures, theSecretariat advised the Chair that hewas able to send it on his ownresponsibility. Stuart Harbinson [theChair] said that he had consulted withlegal advice in the Secretariat, and he


cited the case of Ruggeiro [the firstWTO DG], when he sent a letter toMinisters in Singapore.

But this was in fact false. Even thoughRuggiero had indeed sent a letter on his ownresponsibility to the Ministers, the GeneralCouncil had not been by-passed. There weremany brackets in the draft declaration that wassent to the Singapore Ministerial, and similarlyfor Seattle. Ambassador Chidyausiku again.

We felt that this should not be the case.In 1999 when we sent the draftdeclaration text to Seattle, the Chair ofGeneral Council (Ali Muchumo) hadbrought the text to the General Council,and he got the approval of the GeneralCouncil to transmit the text to Seattle.At that meeting, the representative ofHong Kong (Stuart Harbinson) stressedthat he should accommodate all viewsexpressed, not only what was in thedraft, but what was discussed in theGeneral Council. Two years later, (asChair himself), he ignored that and gavehis understanding to the Ministerswithout brackets. We felt it was anaffront to all the norms of internationalnegotiating procedures. In the UN, theissue of brackets when there is noagreement is standard procedure. Thereare brackets until you agree. This wasdisregarded to give the ministers a cleantext. We felt it was not fair. Ministersare not equally endowed in theunderstanding of the technical issues.But the other side insisted on sendingthis document to ministers withoutbrackets. When the Chairman came tothe General Council, he was told hehad to include the different views thathad been expressed. In the end, thecompromise agreed to was to do acovering letter to the Ministers. This hedid, but it did not meet the concerns ofdeveloping countries.

So rather than a text with options, reflectinggenuine disagreements, what went to Dohawas a clean text, falsely implying agreement,and a very brief cover letter superficiallynoting objections.

Once in Doha, another procedural rabbit waspulled out of the hat - facilitators.

When we got to Doha, the agenda wasnot in place. The Chair of theMinisterial (Minister Kamal of Qatar),suddenly announced there wouldbe facilitators to facilitate thenegotiations on issues and themesthat were problematic. How they chosethe facilitators and themes, nobodyknew, and those facilitators were‘Friends of the New Round’ - Mexico,Singapore, South Africa and Canada.If facilitators are people with a definiteinterest, they would definitely steer themeetings in certain directions, and thesmall consultations held by them werenot inclusive. People had problemsgetting into those consultations. In theselection of facilitators, how were theychosen? Who were they facilitating?


Zimbabwe)

The process itself was strange. Rightafter first plenary, there were facilitatorsthat were chosen without consultationwith members. And even thesefacilitators were partial. I rememberattending one meeting with thefacilitator on agriculture (SingaporeMinister) one evening. He said that thetext transmitted from Geneva wasagreed upon and there was only oneproblem - the ‘phasing out’ of exportsubsidies by EU. He did not meet in anopen-ended session. And his positionwas that the text itself was like a houseof cards, it should not be changed or itwill fall like a house of cards.

(South Asian delegate)

Committee of the Whole (COW)3 plenarymeetings were also seen by some as merely ashow of transparency.

We held COW informal meetings andoccasional meetings with thefacilitators. There was an appearanceof consultations. And that is whereMinisters would make statements. Myquestion is, how much of it would be


taken into account? My reading of thiswas that it was made such to makeMinisters happy, when negotiationswere going to go elsewhere.

(LDC delegate)

In Doha, the spin-doctors had realisedthat in Seattle, Ministers felt ignored,and developing countries were preparedto bite the bullet. In Doha, they createda process, where Ministers could go tothe Committee of the Whole (COW) anddiscuss and raise issues, but nobody wastaking into account what they said. Theywere just venting their frustration. Thatfeeling of being part of the processdented their anger of being uninvolved.But in fact, there was a smaller grouptaking the decisions for the whole.Those managing Doha kept Ministersin a semblance of being involved in theprocess, when they were not, becausewhat was discussed in the Committeeof the Whole was not reflected in theDeclaration. The views, which werecaptured in the Declaration, came frompeople who were pushing onenvironment and ‘new issues’. TheMinisters felt part and parcel of theprocess, but were not involved in realterms.


Zimbabwe)

There were also problems around the issue ofrepresentation. While the big economieswere allowed to represent themselves, for thesmaller economies, at the most criticalmoments, only the representatives of thegroups were included. Yet the African, LDCand ACP countries had not relinquishedtheir negotiating rights to their grouprepresentatives, nor were they consulted onthis issue.

These presumed representatives then cameunder severe attack by the powerful countries.

Key ministers were selected to representgroups - Nigeria for the Africa group,Kenya representing the ACP countries,Tanzania, representing LDCs. Therefore

one cannot really complain that youwere not represented. The problem isthat those particular representativescame under a considerable amount ofpressure. In my view, as a result of thosepressures, rather than to advance theviews for which they were there, at theend, they became more defensive to sellthe views from the other side. Somecouldn’t take the pressure. One or twoeven began advancing the views of theSecretariat.

(African delegate)

The impartiality of the Secretariat was againin question.

The Chairman to the MinisterialConference himself did not knowanything. He was only a ‘yes man’,saying or doing what the DG was tellinghim. The DG would even tell him to givethe floor to somebody and not to givethe floor to somebody. It happened somany times. He would say, ‘Don’t givehim the floor’, with the Chairman’s mikeon.

(Asian delegate)

Pressures mounted as heads of state werecontacted. According to an African delegate,Africa stood together. What broke Africa inthe final two days, was when the US and theEU contacted Presidents and Prime Ministersof some African and Asian countries. As aresult, delegations in Doha receiving calls fromtheir capitals. The US exerted much pressureon the President of Pakistan, who gaveinstructions that the Ambassador softens hisposition. As a result, Pakistan played a meekerrole than they would have otherwise done.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair called IndianPrime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee atmidnight of November 13, 2001, when WTOMembers were in the final stages ofhammering out a Ministerial Declaration.4

Blair: I just wanted to say very briefly that wewould very much like to get the traderound agenda agreed at Doha...I believe


we go 142 out of 143 countries nowsigned up.

Vajpayee: Hmm...HmmBlair: We really need India to do this now.

I hope very much...that you will be ableto find a way through, Sir, becauseotherwise it will be, I think, a great shame,if this round fails as a result of that.

Vajpayee: How many countries have signed?Blair: I am told that now 142 out of 143

countries...can sign upVajpayee: Oh, that is not the situation Mr.

Prime Minister. We are having discussionswith other developing countries and thereis a lot of opposition...

Blair: Then I have been told the wrong thing...but I think... but that’s certainly what Ihave been told sir... I was just going tosay if there is anything at all you cando...at all to solve the issue, we would be,I think, everyone will be extremelygrateful...

Vajpayee: We are trying to do that. But... theCabinet before the Commerce Ministerleft, had given a brief to the CommerceMinister...And he is in Doha... he is tofollow that. But I hope there will be somesolution at the end of the talks.

Blair: I hope so too. That’s all that I wanted tosay to you, Mr. Prime Minister.

The final two days... and nights(November 12th and 13th)

Two major ‘green room’ meetings were held,one on the night of the 12th, and another onthe night of the 13th.

The DG [Mike Moore] told Ministers of theinvited countries that only two membersfrom a delegation could enter the ‘green room’i.e. the Minister and one other. It was nocoincidence that they kept the room small.

We tried to go there [on the night of the12th]. They just took in the AfricanGroup representatives. The otherAfrican countries included were SouthAfrica, Egypt and Botswana.


Zimbabwe)

13th November was supposed to be the last dayof the Ministerial. Many developing countrydelegates are critical of the fact that they werenot party to any decision-making process aboutprolonging the meeting. Unfortunately, by theevening of the 13th, many Ministers anddelegates, who could not change their travelplans, had already left Doha. One LatinAmerican delegate told us that she and herMinister had under-estimated the pressuresthat could be exerted at the last minute. Theyleft on that evening, feeling totally confidentthat the logjam could not be broken.

Back in the Conference Centre, Zimbabwe’sAmbassador and another member of theirdelegation tried again to enter the ‘green room’on the 13th, but were barred.

We tried to get into the ‘green room’during the first session on the 13th

(about 7pm). They would not let us in.The security was provided by theSecretariat. They had a list of peoplewho could go in, and those who couldnot. When we tried to go in we wererefused entry. So when you say thatconsultations are open ended, it is nottrue. These were not. It was a group of‘executive’ countries.

On this final night (13th), my Ministerhad to force himself in. The Chairs ofthe African Group, ACP and LDCscame to report to the bigger group thatevening. It was after that meeting thatmy Minister joined the other Chairsgoing into the ‘green room’. That wasat about 11 pm. He saw how this wasoperating like a mafia. He could notspeak since he was not officially invitedto the consultations. He could notcontribute. He could only give notes tohis colleagues to intervene.

There were only 23 countries present in thecritical ‘green room’ of the 13th, where the finaldeal was sealed. They were: Australia, Brazil,Botswana, Canada, Chile, Egypt, the EU(Pascal Lamy), Guatemala, India, Japan,Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan,Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland,Tanzania, Uruguay, USA, Zimbabwe, Chair ofthe General Council (Hong Kong), and the DG.


While most delegations were only allowed tworepresentatives, the US apparently had five.

Most developing countries had been excludedand some of those present were debarred fromspeaking. And then the gloves came off, withthe supposed referee, the WTO DG, takingsides. According to a delegate who was in the‘green room’:

Even though the Chair of theConference (Qatar’s Minister Kamal)was there, it was mainly the DG whowas negotiating on behalf of developedcountries. The Canadian Minister,Pettigrew, was so insolent to the extentof insulting the Minister of India(Murasoli Maran). At one stage, whenPakistan and India were pushing onthe issue of textiles, Pettigrew wasalmost shouting at them, ‘we have givenyou almost everything. You guys areblocking things. You have to bereasonable....

Another delegate confirmed:

At the last night, the pressures weretremendous. It came at the highest level,right from the top in Capital, and it wasspecific. People were being targeted byname. So it was quite brutal.

The Indian Commerce Minister Maranwas insulted by two countries in amost brutal way. And then, the DG[Mike Moore] joined in saying ‘Wehave agreed to the ATC (Agreement onTextiles and Clothing), what more doyou want?’ It was a brutal exercise ofpower.

An Asian delegate adds:

The DG [Mike Moore] also asked theIndian Commerce Minister, why hecould not agree to the text onenvironment. He said, you have to bereasonable. Maran said, ‘When I goback, how can I justify this to mypeople?’ DG said, ‘Well, you have toconvince other people around the table.’

Note that the burden of proof had shiftedfrom those making new proposals to thosenot wanting them.

Since the developing countries (e.g.Nigeria) failed to speak up on thatfinal night, the EU took the chance topush through all their issues. Now theEU argues that all the four issues(investment, competition, tradefacilitation, transparency in governmentprocurement) are part of the singleundertaking.5 In the final ‘green room’,it was only the EU’s position thatprevailed. They kept raising theirambitions, and developing countrieswere not able to stop them on that.

(Asian delegate)

It was widely reported that while Nigeria hadearlier been quite firm in its opposition, itsuddenly went silent in this final meeting,clearly unable to withstand political pressures.

A developed country delegate offered adifferent perspective:

At 6 or 7 am in the morning, the meetingwas still on and we had pulled it alltogether. We asked if we had gotten adeal or not and the Africans (AfricaGroup, ACP, LDC) said they felt theyhad nothing to say to their colleaguesoutside the room because they could notascertain what was agreed upon. Theysaid something like ‘you guys havepulled one on us again’. That was whenthere were pretty tough exchanges.Minister Maran of India was not happywith the situation. There was toughlanguage being used at the end of thenight.

An African delegate, reflecting on the outcomeof that last night said :

They got the deals they wanted becauseof sheer fatigue on our part. They havebig delegations and they can staggerpeople. But for us, we don’t. It is verydifficult to go on negotiating day andnight for several days without sleep.


While developing countries’ delegates insidethe meeting were being negotiated toexhaustion, those outside were left in the dark.

We waited till 9 or 9.30 pm that night.We did not know what was going on andwe finally decided to go back to thehotel. We left a message that when theCOW convenes, to call our hotel. Youare representing a country and it ishumiliating and ridiculous for you tohang around in the corridor. It showsthat there is something wrong withthe process. If you cannot enter, thensomething should be done to give youinformation. Who gave legitimacy to themeeting? Was it decided in the COW toextend the meeting? No, it was only asmall group of people.

Another said:

It was a sad day for us. It was likeSeattle, We were sidelined, except thatthey succeeded in the end. It was all veryquiet and we were taking turns keepingshifts (through the night) and kept goingdownstairs to find out whether anythinghad come out. And we didn’t hearanything till 6 or 7 am. Our Ambassadorwas briefed by another Ambassador.

An EU member state delegate said :

Developing countries find themselvesexcluded because they didn’t speak up(in the earlier consultations). It is notthat we wanted to exclude them.

When pressed about the fact that there werethose who wanted to get into the ‘green room’but could not, he justified the exclusion withthe following:

Everybody wants to be in for the kill,but if you have to do a deal, you mustmake a decision about who the peopleare who really carry an opinion.

The last day (14th November)

In the process before Doha, We had amagical text. In Doha, it got worse.Texts were coming, but were not beinginserted. Then on the last day, we weretold, here is the text.

(South Asian delegate).

The ‘green room’ of the 13th produced anoutcome that was clearly different from theoriginal positions of the Africans and LDCcountries, causing a lot of confusion and angeramongst many. An ACP/LDC/African Groupmeeting took place on the 14th, when the textfrom the ‘green room’ was presented. AnAfrican delegate has written the followingaccount.

A feeling of deep disappointment andbetrayal filled room, which was packedwith African and some Caribbeandelegates. The document in front of themwas much worse than all previousdocuments. Everyone was anxious tohear about what had transpired theprevious night. In the room wereMinisters and Heads of Delegationsfrom Botswana, Dominican Republic,Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Jamaica,Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania andZimbabwe. The Nigerian Minister waschairing the meeting. He started bythanking all the Ministers for theirparticipation in the nightlong gruesomenegotiating process. He then gave thefloor to the South African Minister ofTrade (Alec Erwin) to give explicitinformation on how they came to thiscomplete change of position, especiallyon the new issues.

Minister Erwin said that this was thebest bargain that we could get out ofthis conference. He said thatnegotiations are all about of give andtake. ‘If we are not ready to give awaysomething, issues where we have madesome considerable gains, especially‘implementation’6 might fall away.’ Hesaid he was of the view that the grouphad to make a tough decision and takethe time constraints into consideration.


On ‘new issues’, he explicitly said thatall we have been asking for, since theSingapore ministerial (in 1996), wasmore time to be able to understand theissues and to avoid going intonegotiations immediately. According tohim, the revised document on the tablecaptured these elements completely. Hesaid that the two years prior to the FifthMinisterial Conference would give usenough time to build our capacity andunderstand and analyse the issues atstake.

In addition to that, the fact that the basisof a decision on modalities ofnegotiations were going to be takenby ‘explicit consensus’, was strongenough for us to be able to block thenegotiations at the Fifth MinisterialConference. Those countries that werecarried away by his eloquence clappedat the end of his presentation. Otherswho were familiar with the position ofSouth Africa on ‘new issues’ wereobviously furious, and ready to jump into take the floor.

Among those who found the reviseddraft acceptable were Botswana, Egypt,Kenya, Mauritius, and Tanzania.

When Belize was given the floor, therepresentative of this country demandedto know what really transpired over-night for the group position to movefrom a position against new issues to anew much weaker position. He said thatthe group had made no gains at all buthad lost the battle. Jamaica echoedthe same sentiments. Other countrieswhich supported Belize and Jamaicaincluded Burundi, Cuba, DominicanRepublic, Grenada and Zimbabwe.There were other silent supporters ofthis group, who cheered each time anopposing voice took the floor. However,Alec Erwin and other supporters of thedocument were not ready to give up.Minister Seretse from Botswana, asthe Vice-Chair of the MinisterialConference then took the floor. Sheacknowledged the group’s lack oftechnical capacity at ministerial level,

and she said that this was where thegroup’s heaviest weakness rested. Sheapplauded the technical assistance fromErwin and Egypt’s Minister ButrosGhali, and the fact that delegations werenot intimidated by the challenges theyhad faced. She invited all countries toaccept the document. In his turn,Tanzania’s Minister Simba pointed tothe fact that the present group hadmandated the selected representativesto negotiate on behalf of the group. Thegroup should therefore accept theoutcome.7

Back in plenary last-ditch effort was made toinclude the views of developing countries.According to Ambassador Chidyausiku:

On that final day, in the Committee ofthe Whole, we tried to say that we didnot want negotiations on the ‘newissues’. The first country that raisedthe issue was Barbados. The othercountries included Cuba, India,Jamaica and Zimbabwe.

We said that we wanted an amendmentto the Draft Declaration that wouldeffectively represent the position we hadtaken in the consultations. Otherwise,there would be no consensus. Whenthese objections were raised, theCommittee of the Whole was adjourned.The DG [Mike Moore] was locked upwith the Indians negotiating on how tobreak the impasse, but not the others.Only when they struck an agreementwith India that the Qatar minister wouldgive a clarificatory statement on thelaunching of negotiations on new issues,did they send the Secretariat to advisethe others (who were still opposing thetext). The Secretariat said that it wasnot possible to amend the Declarationat that juncture, and that MinisterKamal would give a note to explain hisinterpretation. We said an explanationwas not enough. We wanted somethingthat was binding. I wanted somethingwritten, which says that this was theagreement of the meeting, rather thanhave an official saying that this was theunderstanding he had.


Kenya said that there were a number ofissues they were not happy with, suchas the issue of the formation of the TradeNegotiating Committee (TNC). We weretold that it was too late. Alec Erwin (Mi-nister from South Africa) said that wecouldn’t start bringing these amend-ments in at the final hour, because itwould unravel all the agreements thatwere struck in the ‘green room’. Our un-derstanding, however, was that nothingis agreed upon until everything is agreed.

The Secretariat also said that it wastoo late to bring in an amendment.

That is how they came up with theexplanation from the Chair on hisunderstanding about the new issues.8

Once the opponents had been bullied intosubmission, it was necessary to manufacturethe appearance of consensus.

You could see that once they thoughtthey had agreement on the final day inthe Committee of the Whole, theyarranged the order of the speakers tomake it seem as though there was aconsensus on the ‘new issues’. Indiaand a few countries wanted to speakon the question of modalities (of the‘new issues’). They arranged speakers,and speakers were given the floorliterally to set the consensus. AlthoughIndia had raised its flag first, 6-7speakers who were in favour ofconsensus were given the floor oneafter another. And when a country hadspoken, somebody would clap. Anumber of countries had intended tospeak up against the status quo (on‘new issues’), but eventually when theysaw how the groundswell wasorganized, they either backed off, ortoned down. In that environment, itwould be seen as though you were awrecker. That is common, anyway, toarrange a certain viewpoint to appearthat it is the dominant viewpoint...

So they orchestrated this speaking orderand put India under great pressure to

compromise. It was as though theywere alone, although they had a lot ofsympathies.

(African delegate).

A frequently asked question after Doha waswhy developing countries agreed to such abad deal. Ambassador Chidyausiku explains:

They said that if you don’t agree to theinclusion of new issues, you don’t getthe TRIPS and Health Declaration andthe ACP-waiver. The other source ofpressure was that no minister wasprepared to be blamed for the failure ofDoha, and standing in the way offighting terrorism. There was so muchpressure during negotiations that theydid not have the guts to say, as far asmy national position is concerned, thisis not in our interest.

Even India felt that they could not afford theprice of sanctions that would have otherwiseresulted. An LDC delegate said :

My perception is that some hadinstructions not to stand in the way.Many were honest enough to say, we canpress, but we were told not to stand inthe way, Kenya and Pakistan, forexample. Some could only go up to acertain point.

Technical assistance was offered to the losers.This supposedly is to compensate for the weakbargaining position of developing countries.But does it address the real problem?Ambassador Chidyausiku:

On the way to Doha, we developingcountries became victims of our ownargument. We said that we couldn’t gointo the new issues, because we don’tunderstand, and we don’t have thecapacity. That was part of the problem,but not the main problem. It is not thatwe can’t negotiate. We can build ournegotiating skills. But are we in aposition to determine that what wenegotiate would be good for ourdevelopment?


Our trading partners were quick tonotice this line of thinking, which isweak. If you cannot negotiate, we willgive you technical assistance. This willgive you capacity to negotiate. That isnot what developing countries want. Itis not just the ability to negotiate.Negotiations can give you opportunitiesbut unless you can take advantage ofthose negotiations, it is pointless.

The countries that are going to give you[technical assistance] are interested ininvestment and competition, where theywant developing countries to beengaged in negotiations. We wanttechnical assistance to address majorobstacles for our trade. What we needis technical assistance to addresssupply-side constraints. We cannot takeadvantage of markets available whenwe are sinking in debt.

We blinked when it came to technicalassistance and that was the problem.

Developing countries also found it hard torisk the possibility of not securing the WTOwaiver for the EU/ACP Cotonou PartnershipAgreement, giving special access to EUmarkets. Ambassador Chidyausiku:

We blinked again, when they said, ifthere is no progress on negotiations,there is no waiver.

Even if there are other areas where wehad problems, we had no moral groundto say that ‘although you have given usthe waiver, we can’t go along.’ So thatbecame a problem, linking the successesof the Doha ministerial conference tothe granting of a WTO waiver. And thosepreferences are only there for five years.

The impact of September 11 onDoha

Post September 11, US Trade RepresentativeZoellick, toured the world, meeting withPresidents and Prime Ministers, with themessage that a new trade round and free trade

would stamp out terrorism. His message wastaken up promptly by two other travelingemissaries, Director General Mike Moore andEU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy.

The fight to launch a new round of trade talksbefore Doha was thus shifted away fromnegotiations primarily carried out in Geneva,to talks with heads of states and trade ministersin the capitals. Launching new trade talks andsecurity issues, before only remotelyconnected, became one and the same cause.

Many developing countries suddenly foundthemselves in too vulnerable a situation tocontinue opposing the US and EU. No matterhow ludicrous the link between a new roundand the fight against terrorism, countries weretiptoeing around the threat of being chargedwith supporting terrorists. The US and EUWTO trade agendas, though starkly self-interested, became a small concession inreturn for continued good political relationsand being part of the new coalition againstterrorism.

Long-time WTO analyst, ChakravarthiRaghavan has suggested (with some humour)that the new round could more accuratelybe called the ‘Bin Laden round’. Onerepresentative from an African country relatedin a personal interview that indeed, duringbilateral negotiations between US anddeveloping countries during Doha, Zoellickwould always reiterate to his counterpartthat calls had already been made to the capitaland that the prime minister or president hadalready assured him that all efforts to helpcombat terrorism would be guaranteed,(including launching a new round).

According to Stuart Harbinson, Chair of theGeneral Council at the time,

There is a certain amount of feeling thatthe events of September 11 were a bitof a threat to the world and to theestablished way of doing things in theworld. And it was important formultilateral institutions, not just theWTO, to be seen to be operatingsuccessfully. So I think that put a bit ofextra pressure on people to have aresult.


It was a positive effect in getting anagreement. I didn’t feel that in Geneva.But some ministers might have beenmore willing to compromise as a resultof that. It wasn’t a tangible thing - justa bit of a feeling.

September 11th was not the only factor that mayhave softened up the opposition to the Doharound. Here we look at selected countries andnote changes in their position and other eventsthat may be significant.

While Pakistan continued opposing a newround, their position on the launch ofinvestment talks seemed to have become morenuanced post September 11. This came at thesame time as intense talks were held on whatWashington termed the ‘one billion dollar plus’aid package to reward Pakistan’s support ofthe US in Afghanistan. The package wasconcluded and signed on November 15, a dayafter the conclusion of the Doha ministerial.President Musharraf was in Washington whilethe ministerial was underway. In addition toofferings by the US, the EU too, offered tomatch their concessions to Pakistan in thearea of textiles. The EU removed all tariffs onapparel, and increased quotas for Pakistanitextiles and clothing by 15 per cent until 2004.9

In addition, Musharraf of course also receivedrecognition and political legitimacy by theinternational community as the legitimateleader of the country.

According to Pakistani sources, however, theUS has inflated the package, which may onlyamount to US$146 million per year for 3 years.An analyst said, ‘Washington is inflating thefigures to impress the Pakistani people’. ThePakistan minister in fact publicly announcedthat he was extremely disappointed with theoutcome of the package.

Many developing countries that were opposedto a new round were extremely disappointedby Malaysia’s silence in Doha. Malaysianofficials up until August had been one of themost articulate countries speaking up againstnew issues. Yet, by October, it was reported inthe international press that Minister Rafidahsupported an opt-in opt-out investmentagreement (the EU’s attempt to get a fullinvestment agreement in through the back

door). One source who was present in the‘green room’ said that Minister Rafida wasvery much on the side of developed countriesand ‘implored the Africans to go along withthe deal.’ It is not clear what Malaysiareceived, but some package was indeed doledout to them. Since September 11, they havealso been cooperating closely with the US onthe ‘war against terrorism’ in Southeast Asia.

Due in large part to Pakistan and Malaysia’sreticence post-September 11, the Like MindedGroup (LMG) 10 arrived in Doha in a muchweaker position. While some members, suchas India, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Jamaica,Dominican Republic were still opposing anew round, the LMG was not able to hold aunited position in this area.

The other country that played a significant rolein the outcome of Doha was Nigeria,representative of the African Group in Doha.Their position pre-Doha, and even duringDoha, underwent a 180-degree shift on thefinal day of the ministerial. Did September11 play a role here? Perhaps, although ties werealready close between the US and PresidentObasanjo, which no doubt would haveconstrained Nigeria’s ability to resist USpressures. Nigeria receives more aid from theUS than any other Sub-Saharan country. Ithas also been receiving aid from USAID torestructure the military. After September 11,the country experienced ethnic clashesbetween Muslims and Christians in someareas, and US military presence in the NigerDelta region increased (in order to guard theinterests of US oil companies).

Like Nigeria and Kenya, Tanzania, as arepresentative of the LDCs were alsopressured. Entering the ministerial, Tanzaniarepresented a united position on ‘no newissues’, yet on 14th November in theCommittee of the Whole, Tanzania said thatthey had a ‘sense of happiness’11 with theoutcome of the Doha Development Agenda.A week after Doha, the World Bank and IMFagreed to debt service relief for Tanzaniafor US$3 billion under the Heavily IndebtedPoor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

A couple of Caribbean countries - Barbadosand Jamaica - tried hard to stalemate the final


package. They probably went as far as theycould go, without blocking the consensus. TheCaribbean countries were in a much weakenedpolitical position after September 11. Theireconomies were hard hit by the significantdrop in tourism, particularly from the US andEU. Just before Doha, an IMF aid package washanded to them to help them cope with thefall-out in the tourism sector. The war onterrorism, anti-money laundering and thenarcotics trade are likely to have influencedhow far these countries could go in theiropposition at Doha.

India’s commerce minister Murasoli Maranfought a brave fight to the end. Unfortunately,the accusation of supporting terrorism if theycontinued opposing the new round may havecontributed to India’s decision finally to backdown when they found in the last ‘green room’that they were indeed alone in that group. Theywould also have had to bear the brunt of thepolitical / trade costs had they held up thetalks, very likely in the form of trade sanctionsby the majors. This was perceived to be toocostly domestically.

Indonesia came under pressure from Japanregarding accepting negotiations ininvestment. The week before Doha, Japanmade a bilateral agreement with Jakartaoffering investment. This was made oncondition that Jakarta agrees to an investmentagreement at the Ministerial.

• ---------------------------1 Christian Aid Press Release, 11 November, 2001.

Part of the text was used in an article in theGuardian, ‘Developed world accused of bully-boytactics at WTO’, 12 November 2001.

2 WT/GC/W/454; 2 November, 2001 ‘Nigeria’sReaction to the Revised Ministerial Text’, 29October, 2001.

3 Plenary meetings convened at WTO Ministerialscomposed of the entire membership.

4 Hindustan Times, 7th December, 2001.5 The single undertaking means that all the different

agreements have to be negotiated and adopted as asingle package. In the earlier draft of the 13th, the ‘new issues’ were not part of the ‘single-undertaking’. However, the EU post-Doha has beenarguing that in the final text that was adopted, thenew issues are a part of the ‘single undertaking’since the declaration refers to‘negotiations’. Many developing countries disagree

with EU’s interpretation, given the Chairman’sclarification made at the closing session of theMinisterial. Minister Kamal said,‘I would like to note that some delegations haverequested clarification concerning Paragraphs20.23,26 and 27 of the draft declaration. Let mesay that with respect to the reference to an ‘explicitconsensus’ being needed, in these paragraphs, fora decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of theministerial conference, my understanding is that, atthat session, a decision would indeed need to betaken by explicit consensus, before negotiations ontrade and investment and trade and competitionpolicy, transparency in government procurement,and trade facilitation could proceed. ‘In my view,this would also give each member the right to takea position on modalities that would preventnegotiations from proceeding after the FifthSession of the ministerial conference until thatmember is prepared to join in an explicitconsensus.’

6 Implementation issues refer to developingcountries’ proposals on bringing equity to theAgreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round.In fact the give-and-take here did not come outequal. All that the developing countries won atDoha on implementation was in ‘best endeavour’language, therefore it is non-binding, anddependent on the good will of the developedcountries, which a year on, has still notmaterialised. For example, the July and December2002 deadlines for agreement on strengtheningSpecial and Differential Treatment provisions fordeveloping countries have not been met.

7 Seatini internal files, 2002.8 See footnote above on Chairman’s Clarification.9 Textiles makes up over 60% of all exports from

Pakistan. Pakistan exports to the EU amounted to2.3 billion Euros in 2000. The expansion of quotaswould boost Pakistani exports to Europe by US$ 1billion over the next four years. The removal oftariffs would eliminate duties to the tune of US$150 million a year (Corporate Logo, 17 October2001, BBC News, 22 October 2001).

10 An informal group of developing countries thatmeet regularly on WTO issues in Geneva. Membersinclude Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya,Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

11 Notes from Maud Johansson, Member of theSwedish delegation.


Chapter

4Manufacturingconsensus andwhat it entails


Is consensus decision-making reallydemocratic?

Article IX.1 of the Marrakesh Agreementestablishing the WTO says:

The WTO shall continue the practice ofdecision-making by consensus followedunder GATT 1947. Except as otherwiseprovided, where a decision cannot bearrived at by consensus, the matter atissue shall be decided by voting.

Decision-making at the WTO is carried outusing the rule of ‘consensus’. While voting isendorsed, this rarely took place in the life ofthe GATT, and has never happened at theWTO.

In theory, consensus means that a singlemember, no matter who, is able to object to,and hold up a decision on any issue. Thistheoretical understanding is also used by theSecretariat and the influential countries asevidence of the WTO’s democratic nature.

In practice, consensus is assumed when thereis no formal objection to a decision by anyMember present at the meeting. It does notmean active agreement, merely the absence ofobjection. Silence is therefore taken to meanconsent. Consensus decision-making can bedemocratic if and only if countries are free tovoice their dissent. In practice, the powerpolitics at play in the WTO means that dissentby any one country in a formal meeting, andthe consequent blocking of consensus, is rare.

As one Southeast Asian delegate observes:

Many developing countries think thatconsensus is good, because we cansingularly say no. But in reality, this isused against developing countries. Onlythe US or EU can say no. No singledeveloping country, or even a smallgroup, can say no.

Another Caribbean delegate had this to say:

A formal decision-making processwhich is based on consensus, and whichhas no strict rules of procedure,becomes slightly vague at the edges. Itrequires superhuman conviction of oneof the members to oppose what themajor countries want. It is easy to thinkthat decision-making by consensusallows anyone to prevent a decisionfrom being made. But actually that isnot what it effectively means.

The process of manufacturingconsensus

Decision-making essentially takes place in‘concentric circles’. First, the US and the EUcome together to decide on a common position.The circle is then expanded to Japan andCanada. They make up the ‘Quad’. After this,the circle is enlarged to include otherdeveloped countries, followed by friendlydeveloping countries (e.g. South Africa, Chile,Singapore etc). This group is sometimesknown as ‘Friends of the Chair’. And finally,other influential developing countries, such asIndia and Malaysia are brought on board, since


they carry weight, and it would be impossiblefor the ‘majors’ to leave them out. China, anew member, also falls into this category. Themajority of developing countries never makeit into this circle of decision-making.1

This is achieved through informal meetings.Since Seattle, there has been more awarenessof the need to include more countries thanthe usual 20 -30 members. However, thechoice of which countries to include is leftentirely to the Chair. The Secretariat is oftenenlisted to help in this task, even though theSecretariat should be neutral. There are norules binding the Chair. Members are invitedfor consultations. Those not invited wouldnot even be informed and even if they did findout and wanted to join the meeting they maywell find themselves stopped at the door.

This is how texts suddenly ‘appear fromnowhere’ before important meetings, sinceconsultations have been taking place withoutthe knowledge or inclusion of many countries.When the Chair is sufficiently confident thathis/her compromise package (supposedlycoming out of the informal consultations) willnot be openly objected to by the majority,informal general council meetings (of theentire membership) are convened. If objectionsremain strong, the decision goes back intoinformal consultations. Finally, a formalGeneral Council meeting is convened and thedecision is taken there by consensus i.e. nomember present objects.

So, although the decisions of the WTO affectthe lives of people in all member states, theprocess of decision-making is quite arbitraryand dependent on the Chair and those countriesthat have influence over her/him (usually theQUAD).

This process of manufacturing consensusrequires the developed countries to ensure thatwhen the final package is brought to the largermembership, the ground has already beenprepared so that no matter how unhappy themajority is, no single country will formallyreject the package.

This is achieved by an elaborate mixture ofstrategies of marginalisation, influence-peddling and even outright coercion, made

possible by the huge differences in powerbetween the players. We will here look moreclosely at 3 strategies.1) Institutional and procedural deficiencies

that marginalise the majority2) Use of bilateral threats to silence deve-

loping country negotiators3) The bias of the WTO Secretariat.

Section I

Institutional and proceduraldeficiencies that marginalise themajority

A significant number of delegationsexperience outright exclusion from con-sultations, or are included only on some issuesand not others.

Bulgaria, for example, took strong objectionto their exclusion from the process of selectingthe Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC)Chair. Their statement is evidence of the extentof non-transparency.

The representative of Bulgaria,referring to the Chairman’s statement(which appointed Mike Moore, theDirector General as the Chair of theTNC), said that he had received thedocument in the informal meeting justprior to the present meeting, and hisdelegation had not been involved in itspreparation...

His delegation had made it clear that itwished to be involved in the informalconsultations on the negotiatingstructure and other aspects, but it hadbeen excluded from those consultationsand its views were not reflected. Thestate of internal transparency in theorganisation needed to be improved.The problem of transparency in thenegotiations needed to be dealt with ina much more specific way through theadoption of clear and explicit rules.2


One African delegate, exasperated with thesystem said:

There are some developing countrieswho are involved in the consultationson all issues. They invite us only forsome issues, but they invite anothercountry to all. That is unfair. Theyshould ask who is interested in thisissue, and when I raise my flag, I get aticket.

The non-existence of binding rules on theconduct and role of the Chair has given theChair enormous powers. Experience hasshown that arming the Chair with such a broadspace works against the interests of developingcountries. The Chair essentially has the abilityto decide whether or not to consider allpositions equally, or to give prominence to oneor two positions over others.3 This may dependon the personality, or ideological leanings ofthe Chair, or it may be affected by the pressuresexerted on him/her.

One developing country delegate relates hisexperience:

In a situation where so many decisionsare taken informally, and differentweights are given to the views ofdifferent players, and the Chair followsthese unwritten rules, it is much harderto get your input to the text than someplayers. There are no rules, which saythat all inputs submitted in writing mustbe distributed and reproduced. So youhave to work twice as hard to get yourinput into the draft as another member.

In a revealing statement about the need for theChair to be fair to all sides, the Philippinessaid:

The TNC Chairman should not interferein these substantive discussions inone way or another, nor should he resortto so-called ‘Friends of the Chair’ostensibly to facilitate or promoteconsensus.4

Another delegate from Africa, obviously waryabout the extent of powers the Chair can‘arbitrarily’ exercise said:

Harbinson’s consultations werecentered on the positions of the bigplayers. He is somebody who says heis consulting and building consensus.It is like the same person being theaccountant and the auditor. You areeverything. Even if there is a mistake,you are auditing the books and youdon’t see it. A number of countries madenoise that they were not being consultedon the selection of Chairs for thenegotiating groups in the TNC. Theremust be more transparency in theconsultations. Maybe you make a table- you consulted 50 countries, and whattheir positions are. You have to showeveryone the results of the consultations.Right now, only Harbinson can tell youwhat he did. There is no proof that hehas consulted with delegations, andthere is no proof that they have agreed.So the real decisions may have beenmade by very few. We have to have asystem that we can monitor.

Regarding the selection for the Chairof the General Council (for 2002,Canadian Ambassador Sergio Marchi),Harbinson came to the African groupto say that most members expressedreservations, but we don’t have anybodyelse for the job. This is the best we have.When it is a one-man show, it dependson what the man wants, not what thegroup wants.

Given the critical role of the Chair, the Majorshave tightly controlled the procedures bywhich Chairs are chosen. A well-knownexample is the way the names of the facilitatorschosen during the Doha Ministerial seemedto have ‘popped up out of nowhere.’

The lack of rules keeps the decision-makingprocess vague and serves the interests of thepowerful. One delegate echoes this sentiment:

Power is best exercised in a situationof uncertainty and unpredictability. Andthat is why the rules are so vague. Onedirection the institution can take is tobegin to chip away at the proceduralvagueness and uncertainties.


When we spoke with Stuart Harbinson abouthow he, as Chair, pulled through the Dohapreparations with so many countries objectingto the introduction of new issues, he had thisto say:

If you operate that way and put out aChairman’s draft, you have to be rathersure that you have got a right feel of thesituation, and are putting out a positionthat the majority would at least tolerate.If you don’t do that, you are in serioustrouble.

The key word here is ‘tolerate’. Consensusnow seems to mean that you ‘tolerate’decisions, not agree to them.

Even though Ambassador Kare Brynrecommended in July 2000 that open-endedsmall group consultations should be annou-nced and open to all, ‘small group informals’are regularly held without announcement. Itis therefore difficult for delegates to find outwhat consultations are taking place, where andbetween whom. This system works againstthose who are already resource-strapped andhave to spend time and effort simply trying tofind out what is going on.

Small group meetings are usually justifiedwith the claim that they are open-ended, andno final decision is made at them. The finalproposal is presented to the entire membership,and a decision is taken when members whoare opposed can, in theory, object.

One Egyptian delegate has pointed out thatthere is a stark difference between decision-making and “decision-taking” that is not beingacknowledged.5 In reality rights are given toan exclusive group to make decisions, whilethe majority is only brought in at the end, toaccept or reject the final decision.

The rationalization for small group meetingsis always “efficiency”. A Kenyan delegatehad this to say:

Developing countries consider thatefforts should be made to ensure that ‘juridical equality’, which the rule(consensus decision-making and one-country-one-vote) aims to ensure, is

translated into practice, by providingopportunity to all members toparticipate in the work of variousCouncils and Committees throughoutall the stages. It has been suggested thatthis form of inclusive participation inthe decision making process might affectefficiency, but I personally believe thatdemocracy should not be sacrificed atthe altar of efficiency.6

Opposing views are not taken seriously. OneAfrican delegate said:

Sometimes when you have consultations,you can see that the guy is just goingthrough the motions, and your views arenot going to be reflected.

Another delegate said:

By the time you are consulted, they havealready done consultations with the bigcountries. The truth is that you arefighting against the proposal alreadyagreed by the big guys and the personwho is doing consultations is defendingthat proposal. I have seen people sayI want this 15 times— the same thing—but Chairs do not pay attention. If thisis not something already agreed beforethat meeting, you can be sure that youcannot get it.

This view is echoed by a Southeast Asiandelegate:

The real decisions are not made even in‘green rooms’. We get called to ‘greenrooms’ in ‘consultations’. The realdecisions are made during cocktailparties and dinners. Those [greenrooms] are trappings of democracy andconsultations.

A surprising amount of WTO business isconducted in an ‘informal’ mode, off therecord. This adds ambiguity to the process andprovides unnecessary space for the ‘majors’to influence interpretations of theseambiguities to suit their concerns.


As one Geneva-based ambassador explains:

The real difficulties are addressedinformally without records and theformal meetings are mere rubberstamps. So it is difficult to find recordsthat cover an issue and give a sense ofhistory of the issue and the realsubstantive differences that membersmay have had, because all of that hashappened in informal mode. Someonecoming in 10 years from now will haveno idea of the history of an issue. Allyou have are little minutes of the formalmeetings.

This is very important because when mysuccessors come, they will have nothingfrom the past that can help them tounderstand the present. It is veryimportant institutionally. But the WTOhas a preponderance of informalmeetings. There are a huge number ofthem.

Developing countries suffer from acute staffshortages that limit participation. In 2000,24 countries had no permanent presence inGeneva. The average delegation of adeveloping country is 3.5 compared to thedeveloped countries average of 7.47. Even this3.5 figure is misleading, since most developingcountry delegations not only cover WTO, buta range of international organizations inGeneva. For WTO alone, there are easily 40-50 meetings to be covered in a week.

Even the most active and articulate delegationsare severely short of staff. Their expertise isin no way comparable to that available indeveloped countries. In addition, developedcountries obtain detailed information fromtheir corporate lobbyists. As a result, theyknow the economies of their trading partners,often even better than government negotiatorsof those countries.

This asymmetry gets accentuated even furtherwhen the agenda is set at such a pace that evensome developed countries can barely keep up.Developing countries just fall by the wayside,or are simply unable to participate in all thedebates affecting their interests.

A South Asian delegate says: ‘Efficiency ispursued at the expense of democracy when itsuits the big powers.’

Unnecessarily short decision-makingtimeframes disallow democratic consultationsat a national level. For example, at the DohaMinisterial, the final Draft Declaration waspresented to the Membership on the morningof the 14th November, and adopted later thatafternoon. Many elements, such as the text onenvironment, were new.

Real democracy means consulting not onlywith the trade ministry or government incapitals, but a broad range of stakeholders.When efficiency is prioritized beforedemocracy, special interests can prevail overthe interests of the majority. This may be therich countries over the poor, or an elite in richcountries over the rest of their population.

The representative of Bulgaria highlightedthis problem after Seattle.

The two key factors were informationand time. The purpose of informalconsultations should be to givedelegations sufficient informationabout the proposals made, includingdrafts tabled, and an opportunity tointeract and exchange views with otherMembers. There should be sufficienttime to enable Members to identify theirinterests and formulate their positions.Each proposed draft decision shouldbe tabled sufficiently in advance sothat Delegations could contact theirCapitals and a process of coordinationwith domestic agencies andconstituencies could be undertaken.

One of the most important lessons,which Members could draw fromSeattle, was to avoid last minuteproposals agreed between somemembers in exclusive small groupmeetings. The present time-frame for thesubmission of proposals twelve hoursbefore the respective meeting wasinadequate for a transparent andinclusive decision-making process.


One LDC delegate, recounting her experienceat a WTO meeting on LDCs and the Proposalon the Integrated Framework, said,

We (LDCs) said we haven’t studied it(the proposal presented by theSecretariat). But it was adopted. Iwanted to make changes, but we weretold there is no time. There is apropensity by the Secretariat tointroduce things just there and expectyou to endorse it. But when it concernsdeveloped countries’ interests, they say,‘we have to refer to Capital. We havejust received it today.’ They are rushingus. They want to make sure that things,which are not in our interest, are pushedthrough quickly. But on their part, theywant more time.

Delegates returning from the Doha Ministerial,pointed out that developing country Ministersare at a grave disadvantage.

One delegate said:

I’m not satisfied with Ministers beinginvolved every two years. I think thatexcept for the ‘Lamys’ (EU tradecommissioner) and the ‘Zoellicks’ (UStrade representative), there is no realengagement with the WTO except everytwo years when they are almost beingparachuted into the process. How doyou exercise your Ministerial oversightin a judicious manner, when you don’tknow how this organization works?They don’t know how the Secretariat iscomposed, how decisions are made.If we are going to involve Ministersin a fair manner, there must be on-going engagement with the institution.I do believe we are at a seriousdisadvantage. You have a small groupthat are intimately involved, and alarger group of Ministers that are pulledin occasionally, but have little or noknowledge.

The lack of knowledge of how the institutionreally functions also puts Geneva-baseddelegates in a weak position to counterpressures put on their Ministers. An Africandelegate said:

Even on the issue of instituting a TradeNegotiating Committee, there was a lotof Capital representation. It is difficultto get your Minister to understand.You cannot give him all the facts... it isdifficult to tell your Minister that heis on the wrong track and he isundermining his own negotiatingposition.

Yet another delegate, relating his failedattempt to stop his minister from agreeing tothe Doha package, said:

Our biggest problem is our Ministers.When you advise them, they don’tunderstand. Just before the documentwas adopted, I pointed out to myMinister the number of areas that arebeing subject to negotiations. Therewere about 16. How do you expect meto handle all this? And you are cominghere to agree to establish othersubsidiary negotiating groups. How doyou expect us to cover that when wearen’t able to follow even the regularmeetings?

Section II

Bilateral pressures, self-censorship andcoercion

The most effective exercise of power:self-censorship

Pressures by the powerful countries areexerted, either in Geneva, or in Capitals, onthose countries that resist, to lay the groundfor ‘consensus’. These pressures inevitablytake place under the tightest cloak of secrecy.Those exerting these pressures would certainlynot want a broader constituency to find outabout their backroom threats. Those beingthreatened would also be too fearful to speakand risk worse reprisals. Others who cave inunder pressures would also not want their owndomestic constituencies to find out exactlywhat they gave in on, and the paltry deals theymay have received.


Secrecy therefore characterises this aspectof negotiations, so that the very existence,extent and effect of these pressures areseldom brought up, when one talks aboutdecision-making. This can be termed as the‘subterranean’8 component of tradenegotiations, as opposed to the ‘official’ reality(decision-making by consensus, consultationsetc). These subterranean deals are a crucial, ifnot the most critical, component of decision-making at the WTO. Bilateral pressures areused to quell resistance so that the finalpackage presented to the membership isaccepted.

Fear of reprisals, whether explicit or not, leadsto self-censorship. The powerful exert littleor even no public effort; yet, to a large extent,they control the behaviour of others.

Self-censorship, the inability to voiceobjections, puts in serious doubt thedemocratic principles of WTO decision-making. According to one analyst:

Many developing countries point outthat they often fear the consequences ofexpressing their objections publicly,and hence choose the alternative ofremaining silent. As the absence ofobjection is seen as consensus,developing countries end up giving into decisions that they actually haveproblems with. If a similar situationwere present in a domestic politicalsystem, i.e. people were too intimidatedto exercise their vote or express theiropinions, it is doubtful if the systemwould be classified as a democracy... ifconsensus is reached because somecountries are too afraid to express theirdissidence, how democratic is decision-making by consensus?9

A delegate from an LDC, referring to this fear,and therefore the inability to take a strongposition in negotiations said:

Why do you think we performed this wayin the last two years on TRIPS [notraising any major objections]? If the USphones my Capital, they will not say,there is this boy, he is trying to changeTRIPS for the interests of his country.

They will say, there is this boy workingagainst the interests of the US, he isinfringing on the good relationshipbetween US and....

The political changes after September 11increased this climate of fear. In February2002, one delegate said:

Everybody is really cautious about thepolitical atmosphere in the world. Asyou can see, they are using the eventsof September 11 in a really rotten way,to put pressure on us. Everybody isafraid in so many ways. Nobody wantsto come out and risk their necks. It is areally, really difficult situation.

If self-censorship does not work and countriesare prepared to speak up for their own interests,pressure will be applied in a variety of ways.

Often, pressure is exerted in Capitals. Themissions of either the EU or the US usuallyplay a key role, sending the message to theirhost countries about the line they need to toeto protect EU or US interests. One delegatesaid that the US Ambassador in his Capitalvisits Minister after Minister, delivering thesame message about the country’s position onWTO issues, which the US is unhappy about.Before Doha, several countries received lettersfrom the resident US ambassador in theirCapitals outlining the type of positions theywould like the country to take in order toensure the ‘success’ of the talks.

One delegate relates how such pressure tacticsare played out:

The US ambassador in my countryaddressed a seminar. ‘It is in our interestto enact intellectual propertylegislation. It will send the right signalto investors.’ When he meets a TradeMinister, he will say, ‘you must reformyour custom procedures; you mustsupport an investment agreement’.When he says investment, my Ministerwill jump. Nobody goes beyond, into thenext stage. On the surface, it is easy tosell some of these ideas to Ministers. Ifthey say, you have a longer time-frameto implement, we will give you technical


assistance since we recognize yourstage of development, my Minister willsay, what is wrong? Then we will notlook at whether the agreement isinherently balanced or biased in favourof the developed world. It happened inthe Uruguay round. This is going tohappen.

Another delegate lamented that there are fourpowers in her country. They are the judicial,legislative, and executive powers and theembassy of the US.

Key Ministers are earmarked by the Quad tobreak the ranks of developing countries. Thiswas an important strategy of Mike Moore andthe US and EU in their preparation for Doha.In Africa, for example, four countries and theirMinisters were systematically courted andquite successfully roped in: South Africa inthe South, Egypt in the North, Kenya in theEast, and Nigeria in the West.

A wedge is driven between negotiators inGeneva and their Ministers, considerablyweakening the ability of countries to hold onto a negotiating position. One delegateexplained the preference of the Majors to lobbyat the Ministerial level in Capitals, and theresultant division that this causes:

There is a Geneva-Capital divide. Thebig countries recognize that Genevanegotiators know the complex issues,and the nuances, so they have foundit effective to bypass us and go fordecision-makers at other levels whowon’t see the complexities and nuances.

Another delegate explains how Capitals arebrought in:

If they see that you are serious aboutan issue then they will call the big guysand send a complaint (about you) toCapital. That is the way it works.

This strategy of lobbying Ministers continuedeven after Doha. According to one delegate,it was a Friday (in January 2002) when theissue of giving the Chair of the TNC to MikeMoore was heatedly discussed with manydelegations raising objections. However, by

the following Monday, only four countrieswere left. Most of the others had receivedinstructions from Capital not to stand in theway. One delegate told a group of his friendsthat he could not appear publicly to be seen asstanding in the way of Mike Moore.

During the Agriculture negotiations in early2002, a developing country trade negotiatoron agriculture was told by his US counterpartin Geneva that he would not be the one thatthe US would deal with, but that the US willdeal directly with his Capital.

Negotiators who refuse to buckle-down comeunder immense personal pressure. If theofficial remains consistently ‘difficult’ theMajors, such as Washington, then pressure thecapital to remove the official. One delegatefeeling the heat of such pressures lamented:

These are dishonest practices. Howcan we negotiate like that?

On 1 February, 2002, the trade journal‘Inside US Trade’ reported that the US TradeRepresentative was even singling out specificAmbassadors.

US trade representative Robert Zoellick,speaking to a business group onJanuary 31, took note of Pakistan’s rolein the Geneva fight (TNC structure), butattributed it to its Ambassador MunirAkram not the Pakistani governmentas a whole. “The TNC process has had‘some stumbles due to our good friendsin Pakistan, where the Ambassadorclearly doesn’t pay attention to thepeople [in the Capital],” Zoellick said.

Other Ambassadors and delegates have alsocome under attack, and have been removedfrom Geneva. The Egyptian ambassador,Fayza Aboulnaga, for example, did not returnto Geneva after the Doha Ministerial. She waspromoted to the position of Junior Minister.The talk in Geneva, however, is that she wasremoved for the positions she held. A CentralAmerican Ambassador lost his job after Doha.It is commonly known that several otherAmbassadors are now walking the tightrope.The strategy seems to be one of making thesenegotiators the ‘enemies’ of their own people.


Loans or preferential trade access are heldhostage to whether or not a country continuesto keep their ambassador in Geneva.

Although the Secretariat is supposed to beneutral, the previous Director General MikeMoore himself played a role in threatening‘stubborn’ delegates in Doha. In one suchinstance, Moore asked the official if he wantedto be consulted or terminated.

Those in the line of fire find themselvesspending an inordinate and wasteful amountof time accounting to their Capitals why theyare taking the positions they do in thenegotiations. The very real threat to their jobsand careers has the palpable effect of toningdown what these officials are willing to say innegotiations.

Many developing countries are dependent onthe EU or the US for a significant proportionof their export market and fear that bilateraltrade relations will be affected.

Small countries like us will be justcaught in between. We cannot take thefloor and oppose. We will never do that.There will be a lot of repercussion: 35%of our exports go to the US. Of textiles,60% goes to the US, so we just have tokeep our mouths shut.

US trade representative staff, for example,plays a key role in one way or another tothreaten countries. According to leakeddocuments from Washington, the Ambassadorof a developing country related the threats hehad received from the US trade representativeas follows:

During the course of the meeting...several comments (were made) on (our)position in Geneva with regards to theWTO issues, such as export subsidies,textiles and clothing, and access tomedicines under TRIPS...At one pointduring the conversation, ...[it wasexpressed] that the USTR was in theprocess of defining a list of thosecountries that were friends of the UnitedStates and those that were not, and (ourcountry) at this point, most certainly,was not on the list of friendly countries.

It was made emphatically clear to usthat any USTR support in other areasof mutual interest would be subject toour support in Geneva.

In another case, a letter by US traderepresentative Zoellick to a developing countryAmbassador just three days before the DohaMinisterial stated:

My deputy in Geneva, AmbassadorLinnet Deily, is working hard to leadsuccessful talks. We have beendiscouraged that (your country) has soconsistently, and so vocally, adoptedpositions counter to those of the UnitedStates. We would very much appreciatethe cooperation of your team there (inDoha) in helping move forward issuesof common interest.

An African country delegate even said thatpressure to support a ‘new round’ was put onthem using the threat of withholding entryvisas to the US.

Developing countries also fear withdrawal ofpreferential trade relations.

One African country delegate, who was clearlyunhappy with the outcome of Doha, was askedwhat prevented his country from blockingthe final consensus.

Well, we have preferential arrangementswith the EU on beef and sugar. Theywould have removed that. There isnothing worse than being poor.

Kenya, in 2001, wanted to legislatecompulsory licensing laws domestically, andwas told by the US, that if they do so, theywould be not be in a position to enjoy benefitsassociated with respect to being a memberof the list of countries eligible for the AfricanGrowth Opportunity Act (AGOA).

An LDC delegate offered this perspective:

The kind of intimidation that Africa isundergoing... all these things depend onyour level of development and poverty,and how much you get from the otherguy. The main one (tool to intimidate),


which is used, is preferences.10 That isthe main tool of coercion. As long asAfrican countries continue to depend onthese big countries, the relationship willbe lopsided.

To an Asian delegate:

It is a weapon used by the developedcountries to control the rest of us. “Youbetter behave, otherwise you are out ofthis”, they say. When that happens, onesees one’s interest only. Why should Irock the boat? GSP is never binding andis voluntary. They may provide it if theywant to. But they are not compelled.They can also change them overnightbecause they are non-binding. What elseis the 30111 for?

Aid and investment may also come underthreat. An African LDC trade negotiator says:

Aid for some countries makes up 40 or50 per cent of their budget, so that thethreat that aid is cut is extremelyserious. Therefore while I might brushthis threat aside, my Finance Ministerwould not. As long as we are dependenton aid support, it makes us veryvulnerable.

Section III

WTO secretariat bias

Article VI.4 of the agreementestablishing the WTO states,

The responsibilities of the directorgeneral and of the staff of the Secretariatshall be exclusively international incharacter. In the discharge of theirduties, the Director-General and thestaff of the Secretariat shall not seekor accept instructions from anygovernment or any other authorityexternal to the WTO. They shall refrainfrom any action which might adverselyreflect on their position as internationalofficials.

Unfortunately, there is a clear institutional biastowards the positions taken by the developedcountries. As a result, there is a significantamount of mistrust of the Secretariat, on thepart of developing country delegates.

One delegate returning from Doha had this tosay about the Secretariat:

When the big guys come together, it isalmost impossible for the developingcountries to resist that kind of combinedpressure. But it is not only the big guys.The entire brain power of the Secre-tariat was used to engineer the outcomeof Doha.

The Secretariat is predominantly from thedeveloped countries. Of 512.5 posts, 410.5 areoccupied by individuals from developedcountries. Some developed countries andmembers of the Secretariat justify thecomposition as historical, from the days whenthe organization did not have as manydeveloping country members. But there is noclear policy, for example, to rectify the currentimbalance by giving priority to applicants forjobs from developing countries. There is alsothe ideological leanings of the professionalsemployed, that is, neo-liberal economists.12

The institutional bias of WTO staff is seen intheir support for one particular means -increased trade liberalization - rather than ofthe ultimate goal as stated in the very firstpreambular paragraph of the MarrakeshAgreement Establishing the WTO:

Recognizing that their relations in thefield of trade and economic endeavorshould be conducted with a view toraising standards of living, ensuring fullemployment and a large and steadilygrowing volume of real income andeffective demand ...

Many in the WTO Secretariat do not seem toaccept that there are cases where tradeliberalization will not achieve these goals, northe right of countries to decide when this maybe the case.

One person holding a high rank within theSecretariat had this to say about theSecretariat’s ‘neutrality’:


When you say neutral, we need to askon what? We are not neutral withregards to liberalisation versusprotectionism. We do not believe in theintroduction of new subsidies forexample, or things that are antitheticalto the agreements that the Secretariatis supervising here. If you are talkingabout neutral with regards to theposition of countries on the introductionof new issues, e.g. labour standards, yes.But when it comes to the objectives inour mandate, then I would say we arenot neutral.

Vinod Rege, a retired senior officer of theGATT Secretariat, and currently a consultantin the Commonwealth Secretariat makes theseobservations:

The US and the EU exercise, at present,overall hegemony over the activities inall these three organisations (WTO,IMF and World Bank).

WTO officials take pride in saying thatthey are the only internationalbureaucrats who remain true to the oathto remain neutral which all personsjoining the international civil servicehave to take. They express no views andtake no sides. They only prepare factualpapers that provide the basis fordiscussions and reports reflecting themain points made in the discussions.The responsibility for taking views liesentirely with the Member States actingjointly in the meetings of either thecouncil or the committees.

This, of course, is a fiction; it ispromoted because it suits the interestsof both the Secretariat and the MemberStates. In practice... because of it beinga Secretariat of a negotiating body aswell as a body responsible for thesettlement of disputes, the officials tendto be more cautious and circumspect inexpressing opinions and weigh carefullythe possible reactions of member statesin expressing opinions on subjects onwhich differences of views exist amongmember states.13

The higher management wouldgenerally discourage publication by theSecretariat of any papers that expressviews that go against the negotiatingpositions of the major players. Theofficials themselves may be reluctant todo so, because they fear that this mayaffect their long-term career prospects.Further, the experience has shown, thatif any official persists in pursuingapproaches, that in their view are in theinterest of countries with weakerbargaining positions, but not favouredby the major players, the latter build uppressures through complaints to thehigher management and require themto shift to other assignments.14

In recent times, the Secretariat has movedbeyond caution and circumspection. The roleof Director General Mike Moore in canvassingfor a new round before Doha, and after that,on pressing for negotiations in the New Issues,angered many developing countries.

Moore wrote in the Financial Times (18February 2002) that it would be in the bestinterest of developing countries to accept rulesin foreign investment, competition, andtransparency in government procurement. Inthe eyes of many, this was blatantly taking aposition that should be left to members and itfurther discredited him. Many also said thathe played a major role negotiating on behalfof the EU, in the most critical moments inDoha.

According to certain sources, Moore alsopoliticised appointments within the Secretariat.For example, Chiedu Osakwe was promotedto the position of Director of the TechnicalAssistance division in June 2001, accordingto some sources, for his strong support ofMoore during the time of the election of theDirector General.A bias in WTO technical assistance and adviceis also perceived. WTO analyst, A. Narlikar,in her study on decision-making processes atthe WTO came to this conclusion:

The limited technical assistanceprogrammes and legal advice by theWTO has already attracted criticismfrom developing countries on the


grounds that it is biased and attemptsto redefine their priorities irrespectiveof the ‘real’ needs of the governments.15

Minutes of meetings are inaccurate. OneAfrican delegate says, ‘they write what theywant you to say, rather than what you actuallysaid’.

The Secretariat is overly involved in thedrafting of negotiating texts. That they doprovide the drafts is well known. ‘Inside USTrade’ reported:

Secretariat official Evan Rogerson, whoplayed a major role in drafting theMinisterial Declaration laying out thenew agenda will head up a newdivision.16

• -------------------------------1 ‘Circles of consensus’ is explained by Drahos, P,

drawing on the example of the negotiations of theTRIPS Agreement, in ‘Developing Countries andInternational Intellectual Property Standard-setting’, Paper presented at the Commission onIntellectual Property Rights, 2002.

2 WTO, TN/C/M/1, 14 February, 2002, TradeNegotiating Committee, Minutes of Meeting 28January and 1 February, 2002.

3 Narlikar A. 2001 ‘WTO Decision-making andDeveloping Countries’, South Centre TRADEWorking Papers 11, November.

4 Minutes of Meeting, Trade Negotiations Committee28 Jan and 1 February, 2002, TN/C/M/1, 14February, 2002.

5 Ramadan A, Presentation at a GermanwatchConference, Bonn, October 2000.

6 N.Ndirangu 2000 ‘Participation in the WTODecision-making Process for DevelopingCountries’, Paper presented at a GermanwatchConference, October, Bonn.

7 Narlikar, A. 2001 ‘WTO Decision-making andDeveloping Countries’, South Centre TRADEWorking Papers 11, November.

8 This idea has been borrowed from Yash Tandon,SEATINI


10 The General system of Preferences (GSP) allowsdeveloping countries easier access to rich countrymarkets. However, this access by developedcountries is non-binding and subject to change. It

is used as instrument of control in negotiations.11 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides the

United States with the authority to enforce tradeagreements, resolve trade disputes and openforeign markets to U.S. goods and services. The“special 301” allows the US to determine whetherpolicies and practices of foreign countries denyadequate and effective protection of intellectualproperty rights, or what US deems as fair andequitable market access for U.S. persons who relyon intellectual property protection. Various listscategorising countries are created: priority foreigncountry, priority watch list etc. GSP can beterminated or trade sanctions imposed when acountry is deemed guilty.


13 Rege, V 1998 ‘Developing Countries andNegotiations in the WTO’, Third World Economics,No. 191, 16-31 August.

14 Rege, V 2000 ‘WTO Procedures for DecisionMaking: Experience of Their Operation andSuggestions for Improvement, Background Paper,Commonwealth Secretariat, 21 January.


16 Inside US Trade 2001 ‘Moore Reorganises WTO inDivision Overseeing New Talks’, December 21.


Chapter

5Post-Doha antics:Laying the

foundations forCancun


Upon their return to Geneva after Doha,delegates discovered the same charade ofdemocratic process that they had seen in Dohaand in the run-up to Doha.

The trade negotiations committee(whether you want it or not)1

The first issue was the proposal to establish aTrade Negotiations Committee (TNC) tooversee negotiations of the Doha round, andthen to have then DG Mike Moore as its chair.

The position of many countries was that theTNC was unnecessary. Although the GATThad a TNC, the Marrakesh Agreement givesto the WTO General Council (which the GATTnever had) the authority to make decisions onnegotiations in between ministerials. Havinga TNC while the General Council existstherefore seems redundant, and a waste ofprecious meeting and staff time.

Ambassador Akram of Pakistan explains:

After the WTO was established, wecreated the WTO General Council,which is basically entrusted with all thetasks that are supposed to be conductedby a TNC. A number of us had felt therewas in fact no need for a TNC and thatnegotiations should be conducted withinthe existing structure. But, once again,developed countries felt that the TNCshould be created and they were able tocarry the day.2

As for the DG serving as chair, the developingcountries position was clear. AmabssadorChidyausiku of Zimbabwe:

It is wrong to have the DG as TNC head.The Secretariat should not take part inthe politics of negotiations. It should beneutral, and should service all membersequally. It should not promote certainviews or positions held by some in themembership.3

The LDCs also opposed this idea. Theybelieved that it caused a conflict of interestand would force them to negotiate with theSecretariat. Tanzania spoke on behalf of LDCs:

Chairs and Vice-Chairs should beGeneva-based representatives in orderto exercise Membership control and touphold the Member-driven principle.The Secretariat should provide supportservices and should not be involved inthe negotiations.4

While these countries, the Like Minded Group(LMG), the LDCs and the majority of theAfrican Group supported the approach ofhaving a Geneva-based Ambassador fill theTNC post, it was clear from public statementsby EU Commissioner Lamy and others thatthe Quad (US, EU, Japan and Canada)supported the current DG to Chair the TNC.Harbinson was asked to consult with theMembership for a decision by the first TNCmeeting scheduled for 28 January.


The result was predictable:

It is not good to hear that: Africasupports a certain position on the issueof the TNC Chair (opposing the DG asTNC Chair), and this is also the sameposition taken by the ACP countries andthe LDCs, some Asians say yes andsome no, and then it is concluded thatthe majority of opinion supports the DG.That doesn’t build confidence.

(Caribbean delegate)

The same strategies that were employed to pullthrough the Doha outcome came into useagain. Many developing country negotiatorsreceived calls from their Capitals, instructingthem not to stand in the way.

One African delegate related that he had beencontacted by his Capital, saying the MikeMoore was soon visiting them. They shouldtherefore not be obstructionists and join in‘the consensus’.

The ambassador of Zimbabwe, Chidyausiku:

The DG was able to get in touch withtheir Ministers, and colleagues gotinstructions not to stand in the way. If it(Chairing the TNC) is a ceremonialposition and there is nothing ofsubstance in somebody being Chair ofTNC, why would someone go to extentof lobbying in capitals?5

Amongst others, the Capitals of Egypt,Honduras and Sri Lanka were influencedheavily during this process.

The green room made a re-appearance. Threedays before the decision had to be taken,Canada and Brazil pulled together a‘green room’ meeting at the Canadian mission.About 25 countries were present.6 Strangelyenough, the Director General, too, showed up.

One delegate who was not invited to thismeeting commented later:

The Canadians were having here aMini-Ministerial. There is concern thatwhat they started in the pre-Doha

process, such as having these mini-ministerials, they are trying toinstitutionalize. Mike Moore has openlysaid that it worked (for Doha) - mini-ministerials and facilitators. Oneproblem is that they bypass the Genevaprocess. Another is that, increasingly,this group is identified as a de factoexecutive committee of the WTO, amanagement committee.

The ranks of the LMG were also beingbroken. The ASEAN and Asian countrieswere particularly vulnerable, given that Dr.Supachai Panitchpakdi (from Thailand) wasto be the next Director General. ASEAN wastherefore in support of the DG as TNC Chairex-officio. Ambassador Chidyausiku:

We came up with a compromise: TNCChair would be DG ex-officio, withrules that would bind the Chair of theTNC and how he could conduct himself.We also said that it would be a one-timearrangement that would end withSupachai’s tenure. It is not a precedent.It helped us that China was with us.When China and developing countrieshave a point to put across, they cannotignore it. We welcome China’s entry intothe WTO.

Even as the fight over TNC Chair was takingplace, many developing countries wereconcerned about the ‘flexibility’ in proceduralmatters that had characterised Doha. Aninformal paper, floated by India in January,noted that ‘Ambiguity works to thedisadvantage of developing countries’.

Jamaica remained convinced that clearrules and transparent guidelines wouldcontribute to efficiency through clarityand predictability. Too much flexibilityand too much vagueness would becounterproductive.

(Ambassador Ransford Smith,

Jamaica)7

In order to address these serious institutionaldeficiencies, a group of nine LMG countries8

in a communication to the General Council,addressed the systemic problems of non-transparency and non-inclusiveness.9


• The TNC should be subordinate andaccountable to the General Council.

• Selection of Chairs must be doneformally with ‘explicit consensus’.

• There should be general procedures fora balanced makeup of TNC Chairs.

• Chairs should be filled from Geneva-based ambassadors (i.e. not the DG/Secretariat).

• Neutrality should be the central featureof the Chair.

• Accurate minutes should be releasedwithin 10 days of a TNC meeting.

• All drafting should be done in openmeetings, and negotiating texts beavailable at least two weeks in advanceof a decision, to enable delegations toreceive feedback from their Capitals.

• All disagreements must be reflected inbracketed text.

Although these are fundamental requirementsfor the proper functioning of an internationalorganisation, there was intense resistance bysome developed countries. The US, forexample, felt that this would ‘bog down’ thenegotiations and put the negotiating processin a ‘straight jacket’. Australia said,

The necessary progress (on the DohaMandate) would be impossible if, forexample, there were proceduralrequirements that minutes had to beprepared before another meeting couldbe held, or that no groups could meetsimultaneously.

What was the outcome of this battle?

The results of the process were not bindingguidelines for negotiations, but rather a set of‘Principles and Practices’ delivered as a‘Chairman’s Statement’ ‘that should be (kept)in mind’. One of these principles was thatMembers should ‘build on the best practicesestablished over the past two years’ in theWTO with regards to internal transparency.

This reference to non-existent ‘best practices’was quickly challenged by Bulgaria:

In the section on transparency andprocess, the second bullet referred toestablished best practices. Such

practices had never been establishedand this delegation could not agree toan institutionalisation of something,which had never been agreed upon,through the back door...The problem oftransparency in the negotiations neededto be dealt with in a much more specificway through the adoption of clear andexplicit rules.10

China threatened to stall negotiations if theissue of accurate negotiating texts was notaddressed appropriately. Developing countrieswanted explicit language to forbid Chairsfrom submitting texts in their ‘personalcapacity’ and to require that differences bereflected in the actual negotiating texts. Inthe end, developing countries got thefollowing language, ‘In their regular reportingto overseeing bodies, Chairpersons shouldreflect consensus, or where this is not possible,different positions on issues.’

The DG was appointed, ex-officio, as TNCChair, but as ‘an exceptional arrangement’.Appointments to WTO bodies should normallybe made from among representatives of WTOmembers’.

Within two and half weeks of being electedas the new TNC Chair, under principles andpractices that ‘Chairpersons should beimpartial and objective’, Mike Moore wasbreaking the rules.

The Financial Times reported ‘Mike Moore,Director-General of the World TradeOrganization, has urged developing countriesto support proposals for WTO rules oncompetition and investment, telling them it isin their own economic interest.’ Even theFinancial Times reporter wrote that ‘It isunusual for a WTO Director-General to take apublic position on such politically contentiousquestions.’11

The agriculture chair

And then seasoned observers of the WTO weretreated to a reprise of this rule-breaking. Inthe TNC, the Secretariat had bulldozed its wayinto Members’ territory. Again, this is nowbeing repeated in the agriculture negotiations.


Stuart Harbinson, WTO Ambassador of HongKong, and Chair of the General Council in2001, whose ‘magical’ clean text for Doha hadomitted the objections of many developingcountries, found himself appointed chair of theagriculture negotiations, the most politicallysensitive issue at the WTO in February 2002.(It was not too difficult for the big powers topull through this appointment, since StuartHarbinson himself, in the last days of hisGeneral Council chairmanship, was the oneholding the consultations appointing thechairpersons of various committees, includingagriculture.)

In June 2002, it was announced that DrSupachai, incoming Director General of theWTO from 1 September, had appointedHarbinson as chef de cabinet in the DirectorGeneral’s office. From 10 September,Harbinson took leave from his governmentposition and assumed his new post in theSecretariat, yet he has not relinquished hisposition as Chair of Agriculture.

In national terms, this is the equivalent of theMP chairing an important parliamentarycommittee joining the civil service. Which inmost countries you are perfectly free to do, aslong as you give up your parliamentary seat.

Recall that the appointment of DG MikeMoore as Chair of the TNC was ‘anexceptional arrangement’. An exceptionalarrangement that was repeated within months.

Those who want to see agriculture talks movedalong and concluded (in their favour), areall for Harbinson staying on as Chair ofAgriculture. Some of the reasons cited havebeen that he is after all ‘neutral’, and therefore,even if he is a Secretariat staff, it can beexcused since his ‘neutrality’ would not createa conflict of interest.

The big powers - US and EU - and the CairnsGroup of agricultural exporting countries didnot want a change of Chair in agriculture sinceintensive talks in the Agriculture Committeewere planned for the ensuing six months.Changing the chair would set back thetimetable significantly.

Hong Kong’s South China Morning Postcarried an article with Harbinson describinghis own style of ‘compromise’ as follows:

The whole thing is to construct abalance of interests in which everybodygives something and everybody getssomething....12

Many developing country officials in Genevaare uneasy with this situation. They havegiven a lot and got very little. They also donot want to see a repetition of Doha where theirposition on ‘no new issues’ were ignored inthe Harbinson negotiating text. For them,this is also setting a dangerous precedentof involving Secretariat staff directly innegotiations.

Several delegations have raised theirconcerns privately with Dr Supachai. At leastone other country has also formally written aletter to the Chair of the General Council,stating its displeasure at such an arrangement.It was also the understanding of variousmembers within the African Group that thegroup had taken a decision to write a formalletter to the General Council, but unfortunatelyno follow-up materialized, as key members ofthe Group were approached by the powerfulmembers.

As one African diplomat privately explained:

Some countries whom we thought wereour friends are no longer with us on this.They have come under bilateral pressure.

Another developing country delegate,explaining why the issue is under wrapssaid:

I get the impression that no one iswilling to be the spoiler. The majorpowers see such a high stake in this.Many developing countries are stillfeeling the post-September 11 threat,that ‘you are with us, or you are againstus.


Supachai appears to have done nothing on thiscritical process issue. His stand, when hestepped into his position as DG, was that hewould remove Harbinson as agriculture chairif the membership so indicated. Manydeveloping country delegations have no desireto embarrass the newly appointed DirectorGeneral, well aware of the hard battle they hadto fight three years ago to get him into the DGposition. They are instead eager to maintain agood working relationship with him. This hasbeen one reason (of several reasons outlinedearlier) why they have preferred to keep thingsat the informal level, speaking to him about iton the quiet.

Unfortunately, Supachai is either deaf to theseconcerns, or, is himself walking a politicaltightrope in his current position. Alreadybefore the assumption of his position, themajors had declared their displeasure at someof the comments he had made about the WTOwhile he was DG in waiting.

Laying the foundations forCancun: manufacturing anotherDoha ‘success’?

Despite the fact that Cancun is a whole yearahead, the influential members of the WTOhave already started their work in ensuring arepeat of their success. The same raft of anti-democratic practices are being put in place:

i) Harbinson in the lead, ready toproduce unbracketed texts indicatingthat a consensus exists when theremay be none, and texts which arereleased ‘on his own responsibility’;

ii) Mini-ministerials and Green Roommeetings of about 23 countries whichexclude the majority;

iii) ‘flexibility’ in process, i.e. breakingof procedural rules in order tomanufacture a consensus;

iv) accurately timed and well-planneddoses of bilateral pressures. Thisincludes the post September 11 ‘withus or against us’ threats;

v) breaking down the coalition ofdeveloping countries and isolating‘hard liners’ such as India.

Already countries are wondering if theirpositions in agriculture (predicted to be thesticking point in the coming Fifth Ministerial)will be reflected in the agriculture modalitiespaper that Supachai’s Chef de CabinetHarbinson, will be releasing and revisingbetween December 2002 and March 2003. Inanticipation of his pre-Doha antics, somecountries like India have already warned DGSupachai that they will not accept a repeat ofthe Doha text. However, politically weakercountries are not so confident that they willbe able to stand up against the tide.

One African ambassador, when asked whycountries have not been more proactive inspeaking out against the breach of rules (ofHarbinson as Secretariat chairing a negotiatingbody), said that many countries do indeed seethis issue as being highly problematic.However, no one seems to want to be the‘spoiler’. Countries are remaining quiet out offear that they could be punished by theinfluential countries if they stepped ‘out ofline’.

Mini-ministerials come in useful in terms ofgetting ministers of a core group of countriesin line, by making bilateral deals on the side.This has the effect of marginalizing those thatare excluded. The package is then presentedto the majority marginalized countries on atake-it-or-leave it basis, with the underlyingthreat that any country opposing such aconsensus package will pay heavily (in termsof termination of preferential tradingarrangements etc). De facto, these mini-ministerials mean that a small group ofMembers, without authorisation, takesleadership of the institution (similar to anexecutive council). In this light, such meetingsare illegitimate.

A mini-ministerial has already been plannedon November 14-15 in Sydney. Only 24countries have been invited. The line-up ofcountries is rather significant. The ‘strident’voices of any weight are of course included,such as India. Also included are representativesof African countries that for some years nowhave been under the influence of the majors,and have been groomed to break the AfricanGroup coalition at strategic points. It is verysignificant that Pakistan has not been invited,


an illustration of their weakened role sinceSeptember 11 and the removal of their well-known, out-spoken Geneva ambassador,Munir Akram earlier this year.

Of the African countries on the Sydneyinvitation list, it is common knowldege thatSouth Africa and also Egypt (to a large extent)sings the tune of the US and EU. Kenya andNigeria have also been frequently accosted bythe US. In Doha, Kenya was leading the ACPcountries and its Minister Biwott was the oneresponsible for putting the ACP waiver on thetable, clearly after having been manipulatedby bilateral deals with the influential members.

Breaking the procedural rules was a majorfactor leading to Doha’s outcome. Vaguenessof procedures provided developed countriesthe space to manipulate the negotiating processin order to suit their interests.

The proposals for greater transparency fromthe Like Minded Group (LMG) in May havemet with a riposte from a grouping of 8countries - Australia, Canada, Hong KongChina, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand,Singapore and Switzerland. Their view is:

In a member-driven organizationprocesses need to be kept flexible. Weneed to avoid rigidities.

Prescriptive and detailed approaches tothe preparatory processes areinappropriate and will not create thebest circumstances for consensus toemerge in the Cancun meeting.

In processes of this sort much dependson members’ level of ambition and theforce with which they pursue individualobjectives. Ultimately consensus willbe achievable only if members areprepared to moderate these objectivesand take a wider view of what theirinterests require. Restraint andflexibility will be essential.13

According to this view the ‘rules-based’organization operates best with no rules.

Bilateral pressures are being applied. USmissions based in the developing countrieshave been selling its agriculture position toofficials of these countries. For example, ElSalvador, who was part of the ‘DevelopmentBox’ coalition of countries (asking forprotection of their agricultural sector),announced in the market access agriculturesession in early September that they supportedthe position of the United States advocatingdrastic tariff reductions.

Pressures on delegates have continued. Thedetermined Ambassador of the DominicanRepublic Federico Cuello was removed atthe end of August 2002 because of his activerole in the Like Minded Group Coalition.Likewise, the outspoken Ambassador ofPakistan was also given a promotion and sentto New York in the middle of 2002.

The divide and rule strategy, breaking thecoalition of developing countries, is being usedto make such coalitions impotent, in particular,the Like Minded Group14 and the AfricanGroup. A Ministerial meeting of the LikeMinded Group planned for mid-September didnot materialise as some Ministers wereapproached and persuaded not to attend. Onecritical issue on that agenda was the topic ofHarbinson and the breach of rules.

• -----------------------------1 Many thanks to Shefali Sharma of the Institute for

Agriculture and Trade Policy, for her contributionsto this section.

2 South Bulletin 29, 15 February, 2002, SouthCentre.

3 Interview with Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku,22 February 2002, Geneva.

4 WTO 2001 WT/GC/M/72 ‘Minutes of GeneralCouncil Meeting, 19-20 December.

5 Interview with Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku,22 February 2002, Geneva.

6 Those present included EC, US, Japan,Switzerland, Australia, Hungary, Uruguay, CostaRica, Chile, Argentina, Egypt, South Africa,Uganda, Kenya, Jamaica, Korea, Singapore, Indiaand Pakistan.


7 WTO 2002 TN/C/M/1, ‘Minutes of TNC Meetings,28 January and 1 February, 2002’.

8 These were Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,Honduras, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe.

9 The paper was entitled: ‘Establishment of theTrade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and RelatedIssues’, December 21, 2001.

10 WTO TN/C/M/1, Minutes of TNC Meetings 28January and February 1, 2002.

11 Financial Times February 18, 2002, ‘Moore SpeaksOut on WTO Rules’, by Guy de Jonquieres. Seealso Mike Moore’s Personal View, ‘DevelopmentNeeds More than Trade’, Financial Times,February 18, 2002.

12 South China Morning Post 29 April 2002‘Freedom’s Quiet Advocate: entrepot role givesHong Kong’s man in Geneva pivotal position inglobal trade body’.

13 WT/GC/W/477, 28 June 2002 ‘Preparatory Processin Geneva and Negotiating Process at MinisterialConferences’.

14 The Like Minded Group includes India, Pakistan,Sri Lanka, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras,Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mauritius,Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.


Chapter

6Conclusion


The anti-democratic decision-makingprocesses of the WTO result in highlyimbalanced trade rules which are damagingthe economies of the developing world.Beneath all the gestures to bring in developingcountries from the cold, the real agenda is atthe fore - to provide corporations of thedeveloped countries access to markets of thedeveloping world by dismantling not onlytariff structures but also domestic regulationsthat impede foreign corporations.

In terms of the substantive issues, the DohaDevelopment Agenda emerging out of theFourth Ministerial Conference was a skillfulpublic relations exercise, which unfortunatelyis a major step in the wrong direction fordeveloping countries.

This failure to address the needs and interestsof the developing world is clear a year afterDoha. The promises made to the South haveremained undelivered as deadlines on issuesof importance to the South have all passed.

The TRIPS and Public Health Declaration wasthe ‘trophy’ developing countries broughtback from Doha. It is a political declarationstating that ‘The TRIPS Agreement does notand should not prevent members from takingmeasures to protect public health’, henceallowing countries to take action to provideaffordable generic drugs.

Unfortunately in the year since Doha, theDeclaration has been severely watered downby the US, EU and Japan1. These countries,led by the US, are adamant about limiting thescope of diseases covered by the Declaration.The deadline of end 2002 to find a solution

for developing countries without manufacturingcapacity to be able to access affordable drugshas also been missed.

In summing up the results of a year of intensenegotiations, the Indian AmbassadorK.M.Chandrasekhar said,

We sometimes wondered whether theCouncil was discussing how to facilitateaccess to drugs at affordable prices topoor people or how to restrict the scopeand ambit of the intended solution.Commercial interests appeared to havebecome predominant

The whole world is waiting expectantlyfor the outcome of the exercise in whichwe are presently engaged. It will bedifficult to justify why this organizationcould not rise to the occasion andsatisfactorily respond to the crises beingfaced in several parts of the world onaccount of public health problems of thekind described in the Doha Declaration.At stake are the hopes of millions ofpeople to get access to medicines ataffordable prices.2

The promise in Doha that developingcountries’ priority issues - implementation andSpecial and Differential Treatment - would bedealt with on a fast track with decisionstaken by July and December 2002 have alsonot materialized. Developed countries haveremained completely intransigent in thenegotiations. It is clear that there is no politicalwill to right the imbalances of the UruguayRound, or to address the development needsof the majority.


Two working groups mooted by developingcountries were also formed in Doha: one onTrade, Debt and Finance and the other onTransfer of Technology. The suggestions bydeveloped countries as well as the WTOSecretariat during the year are tantamount toa tasteless joke pulled on developing countries.The EU, keenly supported by the Secretariat,has suggested that the Trade, Debt and Financeworking group should explore issues aroundthe establishment of a multilateral frameworkagreement on investment and competition.

Even as the promises made to developingcountries remain unfulfilled, developedcountries are aggressively pursuing their owninterests.

In agriculture, intensive talks are underway toknock together a new agreement. Developingcountries are called to undertake yet anotherround of aggressive tariff reduction, yet theUS adopted their Farm Bill in May 2002,increasing subsidies by 63 per cent As a resultof enlargement, EU subsidies will increase upto 2006 and subsidy levels will be maintainedat the 2006 level until 2013. It is inevitablethat dumping in developing countries willescalate yet, in spite of this, the South is beingtold it must continue to liberalise .

Doha also fast-tracked the negotiations inservices. The request phase started in June2002 despite the fact that the mandatedassessment (Article XIX.3 of the GATS) ofthe Uruguay Round services liberalisation hasnot been carried out. The offer phase takesplace from March 2003. Many developingcountries are at a loss at dealing with thecurrent GATS negotiations. The liberalisationrequests they have received from thedeveloped countries have covered all sectorsimaginable, yet their small service suppliersare in no position to compete with theNorthern corporations. They are extremelynervous that they will be pressured intoopening up their domestic service markets inthe current GATS round.

On the question of the new issues - investment,competition, transparency in governmentprocurement and trade facilitation - the EUhas chosen to ignore the Chairman’s statementthat the launch of these issues depends upon

a decision based on explicit consensus at the5th Ministerial.3 In discussions in Geneva, theEU has called for a broad definition of foreigndirect investment, and the US is insisting onthe inclusion of portfolio investment. Thelaunch of the new issues will essentially beabout removing domestic regulations thatprotect domestic enterprises, hence eliminatingthe last bastion of policy space developingcountry governments have at their disposal tosupport their local industries and enterprises.

Cancun will be a critical decisive moment inhistory. If the round — with all the new issues- is launched, it will have devastating impacton ordinary people all over the world. Refusalby developing countries to launch the newissues, on the other hand, will bring the WTOto a standstill and hopefully the beginning ofa significant roll-back. The outcome rests onwhether developing countries will be able toresist the political and economic pressures ofthe rich countries. Developing countrygovernments so far have failed their peopleby agreeing to be swindled time and timeagain. It should be clear to all that attempts to‘developmentalise’ the WTO, as with attemptsto ‘democratise’ it, are nothing more than apublic relations exercise carried out by thepowerful to couch their corporate interests.

Even the more enlightened Southerngovernments in trade negotiations tend tosacrifice long-term interests in order to avoidshort-term pain (aid or market access beingput at risk). While the choices before them arenot always easy to navigate, they would dotheir people a major service by taking a longer-term view and finally taking a strong standagainst the bullying strategies of the richcountries . They have the lives of their peopleat stake.

• -----------------------------1 Japan tried to exclude vaccines from the coverage

of the Declaration. In future, vaccines will be willused to combat HIV.

2 K.M.Chandrasekhar, Statement in the GeneralCouncil meeting of 20 December 2002, cited inRaghavan, Chakravarthi, ‘Trade: Scrooge’s gift forthe Third World at WTO’, #SUNS 5260, 23December 2002.

3 This is elaborated in Chapter 3, footnote 5.

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