wto accession from the perspective of wto members

The WTO Accession Process from the Perspective of

Members

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Outline and Structure of this Presentation

Discussion of the different kinds of interests Members approach accession negotiations with– Market access interests– Systemic interests– Other geopolitical and strategic interests

Discussion of a few hand-picked sectors– Agriculture– Intellectual Property

Questions and (hopefully) Answers

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Which Members are we talking about?

Each Working Party is different and attracts the interest of different Members

Not every Member has resources in Geneva or the capital to dedicate to accessions and some wont have a trade interest which is significant enough for them to “weigh in”

However a core group of Members are represented on every accession working party: Australia, Canada, the European Communities and its Member States, India, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States

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The Different Issues Involved: an Overview

Market access interests – Real and present Market access interest– Potential or theoretical market access interest

Systemic interests– Compliance with current rules– Compliance with future rules

Other Geopolitical or strategic interests– Going after geopolitical objectives– Settling old scores


Market Access Interests

The importance of market access as a driving force for Members

It will, most probably, be a market access issue which underlies any decision for a non-core group Members to join a given accession working party


Real and Effective Market Access Interests

Definition: a good or service which a WTO Member currently exports into the market of the applicant

Members’ objectives here are clear: Improve current market access terms or lock in current market access conditions


Real Market Access Issues for Trade in Goods

Negotiate a tariff binding at or below the applied level which the product currently enjoys;

Commitment not to set up more restrictive trade barriers where none have existed before (TRQs, import licensing procedures);

Use of antidumping duties by the applicant (case of Belarus and Lithuania, or Ukraine and Kyrgyz Republic);

Opposite case of antidumping duties in place by a Members and negotiating a kind of “peace clause: for them (case of Mexico and China).


Potential or Theoretical Market Access Interests

Definition: market access requests of an applicant involving a product where there is little or even no trade currently taking place.

As a rule, involve products which are of general export interest to a given Member such as of cheese, or luxury watches (Swiss) Tequila (Mexicans)

Member in question will have this request as part of a standard formula or template

The importance of this concession to the Member in question can be seen more in terms of domestic politics


Systemic Issues

A number of broader and more far-reaching concerns also see Members take a tough and committed stance

Two Distinct Categories of Systemic Interests: – Applying Today’s Rules Now – Creating Conditions on the Ground for Tomorrow


Systemic Issues: Applying Today’s Rules Now

Example: Immediate and Full Implementation of the TBT and SPS Agreements– Issue important for Members who want to protect their

market access interests from nullification or impairment by WTO-illegal TBT or SPS measures

– The best strategy for applicants is to identify what are the most significant products for Members and bring standards into compliance for these products

– And then there is always the legislative action plan– Members generally hostile to any requests for

implementation period, given the lengthy period of time accessions usually take anyway


Systemic Issues: Creating Conditions on the Ground for Tomorrow

Members can see a given accession as a chance to ask the applicant to accede with rules in place which the multilateral system may be moving towards

Example The GPA– Essentially only 13 Signatories– Only limited success in broadening membership since the

UR– Accession seen as a good way to “up-the-numbers”– 13 acceded Members have become observers, of which 9

are currently negotiating accession– Also an underlying market access interest given the

importance of the public sector in many acceded Members


Other Geopolitical or Strategic Interests

A number of accessions have also seen a different set of issues leveraged within the unique dynamic represented by the WTO accession process

Essentially two types of non-trade related issues:– Pursuit of Geopolitical Objectives (example of Kyoto Protocol)– Settling old scores (settlement of old Comecon debts)


Section Two: A Sectoral Analysis

Agriculture– Easily the most problematic and wearisome from a negotiating

and political-economy perspective Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

– Also very difficult for accession countries, but more in terms of implementation and enforcement issues)


Agriculture: “The Big Headache”

A few Members doing the “heavy lifting” in these negotiations: US, and the Cairns Group

The key to understanding the approach of these Members can be found in para. 2 of the Preamble to the URAA: “to establish a fair and market-orientated agricultural trading system

Three issues focused on here– Market Access– Domestic Support– Export Subsidies


Agriculture: Specific Market Access Issues

Sugar: Thailand Brazil and Australia Beef: United States, Dairy: Canada and New Zealand, Cheese Switzerland. Tequila” Mexico Average bound tariff levels will generally result at

somewhere between 10% and 20% (generally hostile to tariff peaks)

Hostility to Special Safeguards (seen as the quid pro quo for tariffication and not available to accession countries


Agriculture: Domestic Support

Again it is generally the views of the Cairns Group and the US - all relatively committed to reducing overall levels of trade-distorting domestic support - which will generally be heard loudest;

Amber Box the exception in WTO accessions Green Box: careful scrutiny of whether the Annex 2 criteria has

been met Blue Box not an issue in accession given the special nature of

this tool Development Box: something countries have to fight hard for

if they want it


Agriculture: Export Subsidies

A lot of Members extremely hostile to export subsidies Applicants will need to remember that the multilateral

trading system is currently engaged in a bitter dispute on indefinitely phasing out these measures This is a goal that actually looks like it might now be achieved by 2013

Thus Members see little reason to allow new Members to buck the trend towards phasing out these highly trade distorting forms of support.


Intellectual Property Rights

Most of the “heavy lifting” in tends to get done by those Members with clear IP export interests;

Applicant usually required to agree to fully implement all provisions of the TRIPS agreement “without recourse to any transition period”;

No tariff schedules or schedules of specific commitments for Members and applicants to negotiate over when it comes to TRIPS;

Negotiations invariably center on the extent to which the laws, administrative institutions and judicial procedures in the applicant guarantee foreign investors sufficient legal protection for their intellectual property rights,

In addition to focusing on whether there is real and effective judicial redress in the event of any infringements thereof.


Some Typical IP Issues in Accession

Whether the trademark law allows three-dimensional symbols, combinations of colors, alphabets and figures to be registered as trademarks;

Copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting– Applicant will have to demonstrate that adequate laws are in place;– And that they are being vigorously enforced by the competent

authorities


Findings and Conclusions

The WTO accession process is first and foremost about market access. Applicants will need to “pay the price” of admission to the WTO by means of meaningful market access to their goods and services markets;

Members, whose primary concern is promoting the national economic interest which they represent, would be foolish not to avail themselves in full of the opportunity accession represents to them;

This is not likely to change anytime soon, since Members (the only one who can change the system) have a clear and vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

The reason for the tough and protracted nature of these negotiations can be found in the historical nature of the GATT as a contractual arrangement to which those who wished to join had to negotiate terms and conditions for doing so (the protocols of accession), This is essentially the system we are stuck with now.


Want to know More? Technical Note on the Accession Process by the WTO Secretariat

(WT/ACC/10/Rev.3 available at www.wto.org with further references

Technical Note on the Accession Process by the WTO Secretariat Information on Current Accessions (WT/ACC/11Rev.5 available at www.wto.org)

Lanoszka Anna, The World Trade Organization Accession Process: Negotiating Participation in a Globalizing Economy, in: Journal of World Trade 35(4) (2001) at pp. 575-602.

Grynberg Roman and Roy Mickey Joy, The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO Lessons for the Multilateral Trading System, in: Journal of World Trade 34(6) (2000) at pp. 159-173

UNCTAD, WTO Accessions and Development Policies, New York and Geneva, 2001.


http://www.wto.org/

http://www.wto.org/

www.wto.org www.unctad.org www.worldbank.org www.oecd.org


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The WTO Accession Process from the Perspective of

Members

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wto accession from the perspective of wto members

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