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FAST DATA FOR FAST DEMOGRAPHY Demography is destiny” is a well-known expression. It suggests change is inex- orable, somehow unchangeable, subject only to inertia. But demography can be fast. It is said that demographers have an “easy” job forecasting, especially com- pared to, say, economists. This is not true, however, especially at the national and sub-national level. Changes in world pop- ulations depend only on future births and deaths. At the national level, migration fig- ures in, and crucially so. Take Europe in particular, where fertility and mortality are both low and stable, yet migration – as we have seen – is very hard to predict. The idea of “inertia” does not help us at all. Not only migrations can change fast. Baby booms (and busts) and sudden policy changes have changed the number of births in the past. Even mortality can change quickly, and not only for the worse like we see in wars. Yet censuses continue to be spaced ten years apart, meaning they miss many of these fast changes. Monitoring population change requires continuous attention and flows of data. In other words, if we are to capture fast demography, we need data just as fast as the economists. Francesco C. Billari, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Contact: [email protected] Population Insights No. 01 October 2015 www.population-europe.eu Figures in Focus STEADILY UPWARD: LIFE EXPECTANCY IN GREECE DEFIES CRISIS This issue is in collaboration with University of Oxford, University of Rostock, and the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU). www.population-europe.eu No. 01 | October 2015 1 Fast Demography | Life Expectancy in Greece | Parental Leave 01 Greek life expectancy is on the rise. Between 2004 and 2013, life expectancy at birth rose more than two full years from 79.3 to 81.4, keeping Greece above the EU average (up 2.2 years to 80.6) and on par with some richer countries like Germany (up 1.6 years to 80.9). Within the country, the change has not been driven by rich regions only: Epirus (Ipeiros), the country’s poorest by GDP per capita (2011), saw a rise in life expectancy similar to that of Athens (Attiki). This data is useful because life expectancy, an important barometer of a popu- lation’s overall health, can be quite sensitive to shocks. A classic example is the rapid increase in life expectancy in East Germany after unification to West Ger- man levels. Of course, it is not a perfect measure. Drug shortages, for instance, will leave patients with specific conditions more vulnerable, but this vulnerability may not necessarily be reflected in the larger numbers. Imperfections notwithstanding, however, one could be forgiven for expecting the worst for Greece. Over the summer there was no shortage of media cover- age of the challenges facing the country’s healthcare system after several years of macroeconomic contraction and cuts in public spending. Yet these numbers indicate a certain resilience in Greece not hitherto reported. We show in a forthcoming article [1] that such a non-response is not necessarily an exception – economic crises appear to have only minor effects on lifespan in rich countries. Combined with other major social and political changes, however, the effects become stronger. In other words, it is uncertain whether Greek life expectancy will remain unaffected in coming years. Roland Rau and Christina Bohk-Ewald, University of Rostock, Germany Contact: [email protected] [1] Christina Bohk, Roland Rau (2015): Impact of Economic Conditions and Crises on Mortality and its Predictability. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (in press). Source: Own illustrations on the basis of Eurostat data Food for Thought

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Page 1: Population Insights Parental Leave - forscenter.chforscenter.ch/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Population-Insights-01_15.pdf · FAST DATA FOR FAST DEMOGRAPHY “Demography is destiny”

FAST DATA FOR FAST DEMOGRAPHY

“Demography is destiny” is a well-known

expression. It suggests change is inex-

orable, somehow unchangeable, subject

only to inertia. But demography can be

fast.

It is said that demographers have an

“easy” job forecasting, especially com-

pared to, say, economists. This is not true,

however, especially at the national and

sub-national level. Changes in world pop-

ulations depend only on future births and

deaths. At the national level, migration fig-

ures in, and crucially so. Take Europe in

particular, where fertility and mortality are

both low and stable, yet migration – as we

have seen – is very hard to predict. The

idea of “inertia” does not help us at all.

Not only migrations can change fast.

Baby booms (and busts) and sudden

policy changes have changed the number

of births in the past. Even mortality can

change quickly, and not only for the worse

like we see in wars.

Yet censuses continue to be spaced ten

years apart, meaning they miss many of

these fast changes. Monitoring population

change requires continuous attention and

flows of data. In other words, if we are to

capture fast demography, we need data

just as fast as the economists.

Francesco C. Billari, University of

Oxford, United Kingdom

Contact: [email protected]

PopulationInsights

No. 01October 2015

www.population-europe.eu

Figures in Focus

STEADILY UPWARD: LIFE EXPECTANCY IN GREECE DEFIES CRISIS

This issue is in collaboration with University of Oxford, University of Rostock, and the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU).www.population-europe.eu

No. 01 | October 2015 1

Fast

D

emog

raph

y

|

Life

Ex

pect

ancy

in

G

reec

e

|

Pare

ntal

Le

ave

01

Greek life expectancy is on the rise. Between 2004 and 2013, life expectancy

at birth rose more than two full years from 79.3 to 81.4, keeping Greece above

the EU average (up 2.2 years to 80.6) and on par with some richer countries

like Germany (up 1.6 years to 80.9). Within the country, the change has not

been driven by rich regions only: Epirus (Ipeiros), the country’s poorest by GDP

per capita (2011), saw a rise in life expectancy similar to that of Athens (Attiki).

This data is useful because life expectancy, an important barometer of a popu-

lation’s overall health, can be quite sensitive to shocks. A classic example is the

rapid increase in life expectancy in East Germany after unification to West Ger-

man levels. Of course, it is not a perfect measure. Drug shortages, for instance,

will leave patients with specific conditions more vulnerable, but this vulnerability

may not necessarily be reflected in the larger numbers.

Imperfections notwithstanding, however, one could be forgiven for expecting

the worst for Greece. Over the summer there was no shortage of media cover-

age of the challenges facing the country’s healthcare system after several years

of macroeconomic contraction and cuts in public spending. Yet these numbers

indicate a certain resilience in Greece not hitherto reported.

We show in a forthcoming article [1] that such a non-response is not necessarily

an exception – economic crises appear to have only minor effects on lifespan in

rich countries. Combined with other major social and political changes, however,

the effects become stronger. In other words, it is uncertain whether Greek life

expectancy will remain unaffected in coming years.

Roland Rau and Christina Bohk-Ewald, University of Rostock, Germany

Contact: [email protected]

[1] Christina Bohk, Roland Rau (2015): Impact of Economic Conditions and Crises on Mortality and its Predictability. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (in press).

Source: Own illustrations on the basis of Eurostat data

Food for Thought

Page 2: Population Insights Parental Leave - forscenter.chforscenter.ch/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Population-Insights-01_15.pdf · FAST DATA FOR FAST DEMOGRAPHY “Demography is destiny”

The European Commission’s new roadmap

on work-life balance for families seeks to im-

prove labour market participation of women.

Women’s employment, asserts the Commis-

sion, is “tightly linked to the distribution of

work and family responsibilities between

men and women” and, consequently, gender

gaps in pay and pensions [1].

The roadmap itself was presented in re-

sponse to political circumstances—namely,

the failure of the 2008 proposal for a new dir-

ective on maternity leave, which languished

in negotiations until it was withdrawn this

year. But the Commission’s broader concern

is that varying national policies lead to social

and economic inequalities between mem-

ber states. In fact, parental leave schemes

have a wide range of policy-relevant con-

sequences. For families it is a matter of fam-

ily and career planning, for firms a matter

of talent and costs, and for governments of

fertility, equality, competitiveness and solid-

ifying popular family structures.

The experience of Hungary and Poland indic-

ates that parental leave policies do indeed

affect the calculus of families and firms and

therefore deserve a place in the debate.

WORK IN POLAND, CHILDREN IN

HUNGARY

In our recent study [2], we selected these

two countries because they offer different

models of leave but share enough political,

economic and historical commonalities to

control for confounding factors. Our findings

show different schemes affect the likelihood

of having a second child and (re)entering

employment for women already on parental

leave.

We found that Hungary’s fairly generous,

universal (albeit tiered) leave system—

which grants employed mothers 70% of

their pre-maternity salary for 2 years and a

gradual reduction of payments thereafter—

increased the likelihood of second births

while on leave. It slowed mothers (re)entry

into work, however, potentially resulting in a

loss of human capital among Hungarian wo-

men compared to their Polish counterparts,

who returned to work much more quickly. In

Poland, employed (“insured”) mothers were

granted 100% of their salary but for only 4

to 5 months, after which payments dropped

off sharply to a means-tested minimum.

Figure 1 shows the intensity of mothers’

return to work over time in both systems,

responding to the payment “cliffs” described

above: at 2 years in Hungary and

6 months in Poland. The reactions

are almost opposite: The gradual

reduction of payments until the

child’s third birthday motivated

Hungarian women to intensify

their return after the cliff. In Po-

land, the precipitous drop in pay-

ments led the rate of re-entry to

spike before, then bottom out by

the end of Year One. Together, the

results indicate families are gen-

erally willing (and able) to forego

some of their income, perhaps,

but not all of it.

Ultimately, we can conclude that

better paid parental leave in-

volved certain advantages and

disadvantages. A good parental

leave policy should take into ac-

count the effects of leave on both

couples’ childbearing and women’s employ-

ment. Extended periods of leave clearly

help women to conceive their second child

quickly after the first but they also delay wo-

men’s return to paid work. The delay can

affect their future performance in the labour

market, resulting in the adoption of tradi-

tional divisions of labour within families—the

same arrangements that contribute to pay

gaps in the first place.

Anna Matysiak, Wittgenstein Centre,

Austria, and Ivett Szalma, Swiss Centre

of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS),

Switzerland

Contact: [email protected]

[1] ] European Commission Roadmap: “New start to ad-dress the challenges of work-life balance faced by working families”, August 2015, p. 1.[2] Anna Matysiak and Ivett Szalma: Effects of Parental Leave Policies on Second Birth Risks and Women’s Employ-ment Entry, Population-E, 69 (4), 2014, 599-636.

ImprintPublisher: Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science on behalf of the collaborative network “Population Europe“Editors: Andreas Edel (V.i.S.d.P.), Harald Wilkoszewski, Isabel Robles SalgadoContact: Population Europe Secretariat, Markgrafenstraße 37, 10117 Berlin, GermanyDistributed by: Population Europe Brussels Office, c/o Max Planck Society, Rue Royale 225-227, 1210 Brussels, BelgiumPhone: +32 (0)2 250 1419 | Fax: + 32 2 250 1420Email: [email protected] | Web: www.population-europe.eu

Twitter: @PopulationEU | Facebook: /PopulationEuropeIn cooperation with: Patrick I. Dick, Brussels, BelgiumLayout: The Brettinghams GmbH, Berlin, Germany; Emily LinesPrint: www.flyerpunk.de, Marienburger Straße 16, 10405 Berlin, Germany

This issue of Population Insights has been published with financial support from the Progress programme of the European Union in the framework of the project ”Supporting a Partnership for Enhancing Europe‘s Capacity to Tackle Demographic and Societal Change”.

No. 01 | October 2015www.population-europe.eu

Between work and (more) childrenParental leave in Central and Eastern Europe

DEMOGRAPHY & POLICY

2

No. 01 | October 2015Population Insights