KUASA UANGPolitik Uang dalam Pemilu Pasca-Orde Baru

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Vote Buying and Democratic Elections

How many voters do actually sell

their votes in Indonesia?

The average of responses to various

measures of vote buying is 28.6

percent, ranging from 25.1 percent

to 33 percent of respondents.

There were around 187 million

registered voters. The range

between 25 percent and 33 percent

would mean an estimated 47 million

to 62 million voters nationwide.

These figures define a range, rather

than a precise point-estimate, of

vote buying incidents.

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Direct vote buying by country

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How Much Money to Give?

Urban-rural variations

Inter-regional variations

Inter-candidate variations

Harga pasaran (market price)

In 2014, at least 7 billion rupiah for vote buying only.

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Agency loss

In my interviews and FGDs with

candidates, they raised deep

concerns about the unreliability of

brokers and voters.

Evidence from brokers’ survey:

(1) Potential defection: some

brokers support multiple candidates.

(2) Some of the money they were

distributing would go missing.

(3) Brokers exaggerate the number

of supposedly base voters and even

in deceiving their candidates.

(4) “Margin error”

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How effective is vote buying?

If vote buying is so misdirected

and susceptible to broker

predation, why do candidates

invest so heavily in it?

If such exchange is truly

inefficient, how can this have an

impact on electoral outcomes?

The effect of vote buying on

voting behaviour is two-fold:

(1) whether cash handouts are

effective at producing higher

turnout

(2) whether they are effective at

influencing vote choice.

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Did you vote during

the 2014 election? Total

No Yes

Receiving offers of vote buying

in the 2014 legislative elections

No 26.0 74.0 100

Yes 19.0 81.0 100

Total 24.3 75.7 100

Pearson Chi-Square

(Value/df/significance)5.675/1/0.017

Cross-tabulation of a respondent’s reported turnout and

their likelihood of being offered vote buying

Vote buying results in greater turnout

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Vote buying effect on vote choice

My obtrusive measure: offers of

vote buying influenced the vote

choice of an estimated 10.2

percent of total respondents.

Likewise, receiving money

during subnational executive

elections only had an electoral

effect on 11.1 percent of the

voters.

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What purpose does vote buying serve?

At first glance, all estimates

regarding the effect of vote

buying may appear small.

Despite the effect of vote

buying looking insignificant,

a minor shift in vote shares

can make a difference

between winning and losing

in competitive elections.

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The average margin of victory by

political party (%)

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Correlations between competitiveness &

vote buying within electoral districts (%)Vote Buying

N Correlation Sign.

Vote

Margin92 -.218* 0.036

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Prisoner’s Dilemma

Policy Implications

First, the open-list system obviously makes elections more candidate-centric

because they create incentives for the cultivation of a personal vote.

Official statistics of parliamentary elections over the period of 2004–2014

exhibit a clear linear trend towards an increase in the share of personal votes

cast and a decline of party votes.

Second, money has become the most important foundation of political

success. Indeed, more money doesn’t guarantee victory, but it does increase

the chance of it (Aspinall et al., 2015).

The popular view is that given such massive costs, only better-resourced

candidates can do well in elections. FORMAPPI revealed that only 33% of

the candidates could be classified as party cadres. Almost half of the total

candidates (3241 out of 6607) had business backgrounds.

Third, by contributing to more candidate-centred elections, the open-list

system has also jeopardised the relationship between voters and parties,

directing voters towards the short-term appeal of candidates.

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Rekomendasi: Pendekatan Institusi

Sistem pemilu berkaitan dengan maraknya politik uang. Tidak hanya itu,

pelembagaan partai juga melemah. Party ID turun tajam. Selain itu, kualitas

anggota DPR juga menurun sejak proporsional terbuka diperkenalkan.

Ada beberapa usulan yang patut dipertimbangkan:

(1) Perubahan proporsional terbuka ke proporsional tertutup. Kasus Timor

Leste. Namun proporsional tertutup juga tak ideal. Politik uang ditingkat elit

dan oligarkhi partai. Guna mereduksi oligarkhi, bisa diintrodusir primary

election bagi penetapan calon.

(2) Secara komparatif, sistem distrik terbukti mengurangi politik uang. Tapi

resistensi kuat dari partai-partai menengah karena akan mengurangi

pluralisme politik.

(3) Jika sistem proporsional terbuka tetap dipertahankan, pengurangan

district magnitude bisa menjadi solusi mengurangi politik uang.

(4) Sistem pemilu campuran seperti di Jerman bisa menjadi jalan tengah

kebuntuan.

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Link Gratis: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-981-13-6779-3