Download - Politik Uang dalam Pemilu Pasca-Orde Baru
KUASA UANGPolitik Uang dalam Pemilu Pasca-Orde Baru
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Vote Buying and Democratic Elections
How many voters do actually sell
their votes in Indonesia?
The average of responses to various
measures of vote buying is 28.6
percent, ranging from 25.1 percent
to 33 percent of respondents.
There were around 187 million
registered voters. The range
between 25 percent and 33 percent
would mean an estimated 47 million
to 62 million voters nationwide.
These figures define a range, rather
than a precise point-estimate, of
vote buying incidents.
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Direct vote buying by country
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How Much Money to Give?
Urban-rural variations
Inter-regional variations
Inter-candidate variations
Harga pasaran (market price)
In 2014, at least 7 billion rupiah for vote buying only.
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Agency loss
In my interviews and FGDs with
candidates, they raised deep
concerns about the unreliability of
brokers and voters.
Evidence from brokers’ survey:
(1) Potential defection: some
brokers support multiple candidates.
(2) Some of the money they were
distributing would go missing.
(3) Brokers exaggerate the number
of supposedly base voters and even
in deceiving their candidates.
(4) “Margin error”
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How effective is vote buying?
If vote buying is so misdirected
and susceptible to broker
predation, why do candidates
invest so heavily in it?
If such exchange is truly
inefficient, how can this have an
impact on electoral outcomes?
The effect of vote buying on
voting behaviour is two-fold:
(1) whether cash handouts are
effective at producing higher
turnout
(2) whether they are effective at
influencing vote choice.
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Did you vote during
the 2014 election? Total
No Yes
Receiving offers of vote buying
in the 2014 legislative elections
No 26.0 74.0 100
Yes 19.0 81.0 100
Total 24.3 75.7 100
Pearson Chi-Square
(Value/df/significance)5.675/1/0.017
Cross-tabulation of a respondent’s reported turnout and
their likelihood of being offered vote buying
Vote buying results in greater turnout
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Vote buying effect on vote choice
My obtrusive measure: offers of
vote buying influenced the vote
choice of an estimated 10.2
percent of total respondents.
Likewise, receiving money
during subnational executive
elections only had an electoral
effect on 11.1 percent of the
voters.
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What purpose does vote buying serve?
At first glance, all estimates
regarding the effect of vote
buying may appear small.
Despite the effect of vote
buying looking insignificant,
a minor shift in vote shares
can make a difference
between winning and losing
in competitive elections.
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The average margin of victory by
political party (%)
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Correlations between competitiveness &
vote buying within electoral districts (%)Vote Buying
N Correlation Sign.
Vote
Margin92 -.218* 0.036
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Prisoner’s Dilemma
Policy Implications
First, the open-list system obviously makes elections more candidate-centric
because they create incentives for the cultivation of a personal vote.
Official statistics of parliamentary elections over the period of 2004–2014
exhibit a clear linear trend towards an increase in the share of personal votes
cast and a decline of party votes.
Second, money has become the most important foundation of political
success. Indeed, more money doesn’t guarantee victory, but it does increase
the chance of it (Aspinall et al., 2015).
The popular view is that given such massive costs, only better-resourced
candidates can do well in elections. FORMAPPI revealed that only 33% of
the candidates could be classified as party cadres. Almost half of the total
candidates (3241 out of 6607) had business backgrounds.
Third, by contributing to more candidate-centred elections, the open-list
system has also jeopardised the relationship between voters and parties,
directing voters towards the short-term appeal of candidates.
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Rekomendasi: Pendekatan Institusi
Sistem pemilu berkaitan dengan maraknya politik uang. Tidak hanya itu,
pelembagaan partai juga melemah. Party ID turun tajam. Selain itu, kualitas
anggota DPR juga menurun sejak proporsional terbuka diperkenalkan.
Ada beberapa usulan yang patut dipertimbangkan:
(1) Perubahan proporsional terbuka ke proporsional tertutup. Kasus Timor
Leste. Namun proporsional tertutup juga tak ideal. Politik uang ditingkat elit
dan oligarkhi partai. Guna mereduksi oligarkhi, bisa diintrodusir primary
election bagi penetapan calon.
(2) Secara komparatif, sistem distrik terbukti mengurangi politik uang. Tapi
resistensi kuat dari partai-partai menengah karena akan mengurangi
pluralisme politik.
(3) Jika sistem proporsional terbuka tetap dipertahankan, pengurangan
district magnitude bisa menjadi solusi mengurangi politik uang.
(4) Sistem pemilu campuran seperti di Jerman bisa menjadi jalan tengah
kebuntuan.
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Link Gratis: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-981-13-6779-3