political tv-watching and its effect on political trust

Name: Felix de Jongh (10124470). 19-12-2015

Course: Citizens and Public Opinion

Supervisor: C.M. Brenes MSc

Assignment: Final Essay

Word count: 3618 words

4318 including tables and graphs

Political Television Shows and Political Trust;

The Effects of TV-Media in Democratic Corporatist Countries

Abstract

Watching politically-oriented television programs has been blamed for negative effects on

social capital since the 1970’s. The negative character of the news is often pointed to as the

reason people distrust politicians. Others theorized that the causal relationship runs much

deeper. With the decline of TV in favour of the internet as a primary source for political

information gathering, the older age groups lag behind in adapting to and using of the

internet. Based on data from the European Social Survey, this study investigates whether a

correlation between political TV-watching and political trust can be found in five democratic

corporatist countries. A mild positive correlation was found, meaning that (at least for these

countries) watching politically-oriented broadcast actually somewhat improves trust among

individuals born before 1961.

Political TV and Political Trust

Introduction

In 1970’s United States of America, people’s trust in political institutions was dwindling. On

the other hand, television started to become the center of the household with many families

clustered in front of the screen. A theory was coined, blaming particular features of political

television shows as the culprit of the political malaise, which was dubbed the ‘videomalaise’-

theory by Michael J. Robinson (Robinson, 1976: p.412; Holtz-Bacha, 1990: p.73). Robinson

discovered that, in a case study of political broadcasting regarding the 1968 presidential

election, television journalists themselves created political discontents and frustrations to

dramatize the elections (1976: p.421). He concluded that the public’s growing dependence on

video journalism resulted in “(a) social distrust, (b) political cynicism, (c) political inefficacy,

(d) partisan disloyalty and (e) third party viability” (ibid: p.425). Robinson admitted that he

could not prove a causal relationship, but stated that the evidence does point towards

television being the cause of declining political trust (ibid).

Since Robinson could not provide definitive proof of his theory, it remained relatively

unimportant. Some studies even proved the opposite, finding that exposure to political

information both in print and on television led to less alienation and more political

participation in Western-Germany (Holtz-Bacha, 1990: p.81). Interest in the theory

resurfaced however, when Robert Putnam published a series of articles on the decline of

social capital, parting blame on certain aspects of television programming (1995a: pp.678-

680; 1995b: p.75). His works even spawned a counter-theory, the ‘Virtuous Circle’-theory,

which blames long-term distrust in American society (Norris, 1996: p.479). Research has

been inconclusive as of yet, with some finding evidence for the videomalaise-theory (Mutz &

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Reeves, 2005: p.12), while others find limited support and still doubt the causal relationship

the theory asserts (Avery, 2009: p.426).

With the recent rise of the internet, a serious competitor for politically oriented news

has emerged. As a news platform, it offers previously unheard of characteristics such as

interactivity, discussion and sharing which are found to increase political efficacy (Moeller,

et al, 2013: p.8), and have shown the potential of growth for social capital (Bakker & de

Vreese, 2011: p.15). This is contrary to Putnam’s belief that the ‘technological transformation

of leisure’ will bring about a more individualized society, making our communities wider and

shallower (Putnam, 1995b: p.75). However, not everyone is as quick to adapt to using new

technologies. For instance, at the end of 2010, only 40% of Americans over the age of 65 was

online, while the age group 50 – 64 had 70% using the internet (Zickuhr & Madden, 2012:

p.4).

To this population, the internet might not be substituting TV-watching, with television

remaining as the most important source for political news. Hence, some important questions

still remain unanswered which, in context with the videomalaise-theory, merit answers. This

paper will aim to answer the following research question: does watching more politically

oriented TV-programming have an effect on political trust in countries with a democratic

corporatist media system among citizens over 50?

Further in this essay, the videomalaise-theory will be explicitly explained, followed

by the method this essay will use to answer the research question above. The results of the

research will be presented, concluded by a discussion of the results and some lessons which

might be learned from said results.

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Theory

Late 1960’s, political trust was dwindling in the United States, exemplified by the 1968

elections between Wallace and Nixon (Robinson, 1976: p.409). Spurred by footage of the

Vietnam War, people became more skeptic of politicians (ibid: p.410). By 1972, 64% of

Americans reported they felt that television provided most of their knowledge of current

political affairs, both nationally and internationally (ibid: p.409). Combined with

hypothesized links between televised public affairs and a change in political climate (first

conceived by Kurt and Gladys Lang in 1955) (ibid: p.410), Robinson believed to have found

proof that television was detrimental to the level of trust in politicians by the public.

In his theory, which he dubbed the videomalaise-theory, he suggests six interrelated

characteristics which explain the growth of videomalaise. The first being the “abnormal size

and shape of the of the television news audience”. Other than newspapers, television is able

to reach people who are not willing to put in the effort of reading to stay in touch with current

affairs. This means, according to Robinson, that the less wealthy or less well educated are not

only more likely to watch TV-news, they more heavily rely on it. Because of this, TV

audiences are more susceptible to media effects (Robinson, 1976: p.426).

The second characteristic are the public perceptions of the credibility of networks.

Combined with the aforementioned audience characteristic, people are more eager to believe

whatever is broadcast (Robinson, 1976: p.427). This is also due to the content, which is

Robinson’s third characteristic of videomalaise: in order to catch audiences, networks use

more interpretive news reporting (ibid). Television journalism needs to be thematic, with a

continuous narrative – a beginning, a middle and an ending – to maintain the interest of the

audience (ibid: pp.427-428). Fourth, there is too much of a negativistic emphasis in television

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reporting, Robinson states. Bad news is pushed up front, emphasizing what is wrong with the

world instead of focusing on the good (ibid: p.428). The fifth characteristic is closely related

to the fourth. TV has a tendency to focus on conflict and violence. TV-news tends to favor

‘aggressive’ news items, to address the predilection for action of the audience (ibid: p.429).

The sixth and final characteristic is the anti-institutional theme in network news.

Robinson calls network news broadcasting anti-institutional and ‘disestablishmentarian’.

With democrats and republicans equally negatively treated by the news, Robinson

hypothesizes the message the audience will gain from this: “none of our policies work, none

of our institutions respond, none of our political organizations succeed” (Robinson, 1976:

p.429). On top of that, Robinson finds that most media look at the current state of affairs with

nostalgia to earlier times, where none of the current problems existed, implicitly blaming

these problems on current politicians (ibid).

In his closing statement, Robinson that perhaps the videomalaise theory was only

applicable in the period between 1963 and 1972 (Robinson, 1976: p.431), which

inadvertently resulted in no further development of the theory until the mid-90’s, when

Putnam ‘re-discovered’ it when trying to find an explanation for the decline of civil society

and social capital, a construct that consists of features of social organization (like networks,

norms and social trust) that cause the conditions for coordination and cooperation which

result in mutual benefit for the public, in the United States (Putnam, 1995b: p.66; Norris,

1996: p.474). He proposed three additional general effects television has had on the

population of the United States:

Time displacement: social and media participation are positively correlated, however,

the act of watching television is an exception to this. Watching TV as a leisure activity

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inhibits participation in society outside of the home since the television sits at the center of

the private domain; the home (Putnam, 1995a: p.678). It replaces social activities, such as

social gathering and informal conversations (ibid: p.679). Television, over the years, has

reduced participation in social, recreational, and community activities among people of all

ages (Putnam, 1995a: p.679).

Effects on the outlooks of viewers: also called the “mean world effect”, people who

watch more television are unusually skeptical about the benevolence of other people, for

instance overestimating crime rates in their neighborhood. Putnam acknowledges that this

causal pattern disputed, since misanthropy may encourage staying at home and watching

television (Putnam, 1995a: p.679). In other words, people who already have a negative

outlook on society, might already have the tendency to seclude themselves to the safety of

their house. Putnam refutes this by mentioning lots of studies finding that the act of watching

television increases pessimism about human nature (ibid). This may induce passivity among

the public, and Putnam warns this may also change our fundamental physical and social

perceptions permanently (ibid).

Effects on Children: watching television is especially prevalent with children, with the

amount of time spent watching TV taking up as much time as all other activities an average

child might do, such as sports, hobbies, or just generally ‘hanging out’, combined among the

9-14 age group (Putnam, 1995a: p.679). This results in a decrease in childhood socialization,

an essential part of the development of a child’s social skills, which results in an increased

level of aggressiveness towards others, reduces school achievements among children, and is

statistically associated with psychological malfunctioning later in life (Condry, 1993: pp.272-

273).

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Putnam’s conclusions of the negative effects of television on social capital were met

with widespread critical acclaim among political scientists. Some, most notoriously Pippa

Norris, disagreed with his message. Her conclusion was that the causal relationship Putnam

put forth between civic engagement and television viewership was too complex to simply

conclude that the one causes the other (Norris, 1996: p.479). Certain programs don’t

necessarily cause a decline in the democratic health of society, and might even have

beneficial effects not yet explored. On that basis, Norris concludes that the lack of trust in the

American democratic institutions is unproven, and deeply implausible (ibid), hinting at

similar studies which have instead found positive links between regularly watching television

news and characteristics associated with social capital, such as political knowledge,

participation, and efficacy (Norris, 1996: p.475). Norris later expanded upon her theory,

which was dubbed the ‘virtuous circle’-theory, concluding that the videomalaise theory was

just “blaming the messenger”, whereas her theory urges the understanding of deep-rooted

flaws in the institutional democratic systems (Norris, 2000: p.3-4).

The debate between these two theories has been inconclusive, with more recent

studies finding both statistical proof for the videomalaise theory on the one hand, but on the

other also for the virtuous circle theory (Avery, 2009: pp.425-426): those who are already

mistrusting of government, will not be influenced by news media of which they are also

distrusting; whereas people who do trust the government develop greater trust by political

news exposure (ibid: p.426). What most research has in common though, is that they all find

definitive proof of a correlation existing between exposure to watching political

programming on television, This paper will not aim to answer which direction this correlation

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takes – either negative or positive – but whether there is still significant statistical proof to be

found of its existence in a vastly changing society subject to technological developments.

Method & Analysis

In order to investigate the research question, data from the European Social Survey was used.

This dataset consists of numerous variables relating to watching television and political trust,

as well as many other variables unrelated to this study. It results from a survey held by

European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC, from now on referred

to as ESS) in about 27 countries, sometimes more, sometimes less. Every two years, the ESS

publishes a new dataset. Respondents are selected by strict random probability methods,

aiming to get at least 800 respondents from every country, with a maximum of 1500

respondents based on population (“Sampling European Social Survey”, 2012: p.2-5). For the

first part of this study, rounds 5 (2010), 6 (2012) and 7 (2014) were used, to investigate

whether a change in political TV-news watching patterns was discernible, to see if there was

a significant change of people switching off their TV’s in favor of other forms of media, or

watching less political broadcasts.

Of these ~27 countries, a selection was made which will be used to investigate

whether there is still a correlation. This selection was made on the basis of Hallin &

Mancini’s typography of media systems, using one of their proposed models, the democratic

corporatist model. This model consists of the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria

and Switzerland), the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark), Belgium

and the Netherlands (Brüggeman et. al, 2014: pp.1042 - 1043). The model, and the countries

within, are characterized by a “high reach of the press market, relatively high degrees of

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political parallelism, strong professionalization, and strong state intervention, in the form of

strong public service broadcasters and subsidies for the press” (ibid: p.1043) causing them to

be the least vulnerable to media effects among the three proposed models, the others being

the Liberal model and the Polarized Pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: p.299).

Based on this premise, five countries were selected: Belgium, Germany, Denmark,

The Netherlands and Sweden. Austria was disregarded, since it was not included in the 2010

ESS dataset. Switzerland was not included as well, since its political institutions and

demographic make-up are bordering on the Polarized Pluralist model. Finally, Norway and

Finland were not included as to not make Scandinavia overrepresented in the resulting

dataset, instead focusing on the geographical center of this media system model.

Taking into account Zickuhr and Madden’s results, a further distinction was made.

They found that in October of 2010, 70% of people aged 50-64 used the internet at least once.

This is distinctly less than the 80% of people in the age group 30-49 they found (Zickuhr &

Madden, 2012: p.4). The rise they found in internet usage (in 2012, 77% age 50-64)

points towards increased adaption of the internet, but these results might be slightly skewed

since individuals aged 48 in 2010 suddenly found themselves in a different age group in

2012. And, as they conclude, “once online, internet use becomes a regular part of seniors’

lives” (ibid: p.5), a deep line was drawn. People born in the year 1960 (being 50 in 2010) and

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Year

2010 2012 2014

Total respondents - Belgian(& nationality) - German - Danish - Dutch - Swedish

4518 - 743 - 1390 - 751 - 909 - 725

4569 - 768 - 1342 - 740 - 907 - 812

4295 - 679 - 1327 - 607 - 890 - 792

Gender (%m:%f) 50.1:49.9 49.2:50.8 49.8:50.2

Average age 64.74 y/o 66.06 y/o 67.31 y/o

Table 1: basic sample characteristics (data from: ESS5, ESS6 and ESS7)


earlier were included, while people born after 1960 were excluded from the dataset. This

ensures that the random probability sample ESS takes is the same for rounds five through

seven.

This resulted in three datasets, each with well over 4000 respondents. Unsurprisingly,

the average age grows with ~1.3 years for each subsequent dataset, as can be seen in Table 1.

This can easily be explained due to the fact that a respondent eligible for the dataset would be

50 in 2010, and 54 in 2014. Furthermore, older respondents are more likely to have died of

old age or age-related diseases, meaning that the average age doesn’t change equivalently to

the year the survey was held. This does make the total number of respondents in 2012

remarkable, with the dataset being larger by 51 respondents in 2012 than in 2010. This can be

explained by the Swedish sample, which was taken from a total population of 1497

respondents in 2010, and 1847 in 2012. Likewise, the Danish population in 2014 consisted of

1502 respondents, whereas it previously was 1650. Other, more minor inconsistencies in the

sample, can therefore be explained by inconsistencies in the population.

To see if there was a transitional effect away from watching television among people

over 50 in 2010, the samples for each country and each dataset were grouped by the amount

of hours they themselves reported watching political news on television. The results of this

can be seen in table 2. The Danish watch the most political broadcasting, followed by the

Netherlands, while Germans reported the lowest hours. As can be seen in the table, there is

no significant decline in watching political programming with the exception of Denmark.

Looking at the mean hours, most stayed roughly the same or even increased when comparing

2014 results to 2010. Combining all countries together shows a net increase in reported hours

of watching political broadcasting, which leads to the assumption that people over 50 in 2010

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Amount of hours watching political TV-programming (in %)

Country Year 0 0-0.5 0.5 – 1 1 – 1.5 1.5 – 2 2 – 2.5 2.5 – 3 >3 Mean*

Belgium 2010 3.55 21.17 46.45 18.03 5.60 2.05 1.23 1.91 1.117

2012 4.14 16.31 50.53 18.32 5.75 3.07 1.20 1.20 1.137

2014 4.33 19.13 46.34 18.83 6.58 2.99 0.89 0.89 1.110

Germany 2010 2.41 30.48 40.72 14.84 7.09 2.34 1.10 1.02 1.056

2012 1.76 25.00 44.11 18.35 6.42 2.29 1.45 0.61 1.095

2014 1.93 20.99 45.76 18.06 7.72 3.47 1.31 0.77 1.145

Denmark 2010 1.21 9.50 38.04 25.54 14.11 6.45 2.15 2.96 1.437

2012 0.82 10.44 37.50 25.55 14.84 6.04 2.20 2.61 1.429

2014 1.67 12.52 34.39 27.55 13.69 5.01 2.00 3.17 1.406

Netherlands 2010 2.27 16.53 37.83 21.40 9.97 5.78 2.49 3.74 1.346

2012 3.15 19.78 34.27 22.92 10.90 3.93 2.81 2.25 1.276

2014 2.39 14.48 35.01 24.40 13.34 5.59 2.39 2.39 1.362

Sweden 2010 2.53 16.85 46.21 19.38 9.97 2.81 1.40 .84 1.182

2012 1.25 20.97 44.82 19.10 9.24 1.75 1.75 1.12 1.165

2014 2.20 16.34 45.01 19.71 9.99 3.76 1.43 1.56 1.227

Mean 2010 2.39 20.48 41.52 19.19 9.06 3.74 1.62 2.00 1.209

2012 2.19 19.42 42.28 20.56 9.07 3.26 1.81 1.41 1.202

2014 2.42 17.28 41.86 21.15 9.97 4.11 1.59 1.61 1.237

Table 2: Percentage of people reporting amount of hours watching political TV-programming

*= mean is calculated by multiplying the percentage with amount of hours, taking the larger number as factor; i.e. 0-0.5=*.5, 0.5-1=*1, etc, and >3=*4. The resulting mean is therefore an approximation, not a definitive nr.

have not stopped watching political broadcasts on television in favor of the internet. This

means that, to answer the research question, there will not have to be accounted for a

longitudinal effect resulting in further analysis only being based off data from ESS7.

To understand the effects of political TV-news watching on political trust, political

news watching was used as an independent variable. It was measured against three different

dependent variables based on democratic actors, namely ‘trust in parliament’, ‘trust in

politicians’ and ‘trust in political parties’. These dependent variables were conceived by

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asking respondents how much they trusted these actors with options ranging from 0 (no trust

at all) to 10 (complete trust).

Table 3 shows the results of this analysis for trust in parliament. Swedes are most

trusting of their parliament, followed by Denmark. Their levels of trust are significantly

different from the other three countries. Trust in politicians is highest in Denmark, with both

Germany and Belgium reporting very low levels of trust in their politicians as can be seen in

table 4. Trust in political parties is once again highest in Denmark, with both Belgium and

Germany reporting distinctly lower levels of trust (table 5).

Looking at the amount of hours reported affecting trust, it is remarkable that all

dependent variables report a peak in trust at the 1.5 – 2 hours of watching political TV. Only

the 2.5 – 3 hours group reported higher a higher average trust in their parliament. Also

notable is that the >3 group reported higher levels of trust than the 0 hours group in all three

variants of political trust. This seems to discredit the videomalaise theory; watching less

political television does not increase levels of political trust. The results of this analysis are

better visualized looking at graph 1, which shows a steady increase up until the 2-2.5 hour

Country

Hours Belgium Germany Denmark The Nthrlnds Sweden Mean*

0 3.45 4.33 4.50 4.42 4.87 4.31

0–0.5 4.30 4.38 5.91 4.67 5.75 5.00

0.5–1 4.66 4.92 5.86 4.99 6.28 5.34

1–1.5 4.76 5.06 5.77 5.13 5.99 5.34

1.5–2 5.11 5.39 5.22 5.20 6.16 5.42

2–2.5 5.00 5.27 5.90 5.18 5.93 5.26

2.5–3 4.50 5.82 6.67 4.71 6.45 5.63

>3 5.50 4.5 5.89 4.29 4.83 5.00

mean 4.60 4.88 5.75 4.98 6.03Table 3: average trust in parliament and amount of hours watching political TV-programming

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Country

Hours Belgium Germany Denmark The Nthrlnds Sweden Mean*

0 2.62 2.96 3.11 3.28 3.56 3.11

0–0.5 3.45 3.51 4.69 4.43 4.24 4.06

0.5–1 4.05 3.83 4.91 4.68 4.89 4.47

1–1.5 4.26 3.89 4.90 4.78 4.96 4.56

1.5–2 4.67 4.25 4.82 4.99 5.14 4.77

2–2.5 4.40 3.91 5.17 4.92 3.97 4.47

2.5–3 4.00 4.71 4.08 3.67 4.09 4.11

>3 3.83 3.40 5.39 4.00 4.33 4.19

mean 3.96 3.80 4.85 4.65 4.74

Table 4: average trust in politicians and amount of hours watching political TV-programming

Country

Hours Belgium Germany Denmark The Nthrlnds Sweden Mean

0 2.64 3.80 3.33 3.68 4.00 3.49

0–0.5 3.46 3.52 5.03 4.53 4.43 4.19

0.5–1 4.00 3.72 4.99 4.70 5.02 4.49

1–1.5 4.16 3.88 5.12 4.71 4.88 4.55

1.5–2 4.23 4.00 5.05 4.94 5.42 4.73

2–2.5 4.25 3.91 5.57 4.82 4.07 4.52

2.5–3 5.00 4.65 4.33 4.00 4.70 4.54

>3 2.50 3.50 4.61 4.57 4.00 3.84

mean 3.89 3.75 5.01 4.67 4.86

Table 5: average trust in political parties and amount of hours watching political TV-programming

category, and an overall net-decline afterwards – except for the 2.5-3h peak for trust in

parliament.

Is there any merit then, to the claims that watching political broadcasting has an effect

on levels of trust in political institutions? To discover that, the correlation coefficient has to

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be calculated. The results of said calculation can be found in table 6. A weak positive

correlation was found, with the lone exception of the effects on Swedish trust in their parlia-

Graph 1: average trust in political instutions

ment, where a very weak negative correlation was found to exist. Overall, with all countries

combined, a weak positive correlation remained. Results for this calculation, however, also

indicated that the correlation was not significant for Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden,

but when combined the results were still significant. The strongest correlation between

watching political TV-news and political trust was found in Belgium.

Country

Variable Test Belgium Germany Denmark Netherlands Sweden Combined

Parliament P .116 .105 .000 .029 -.028 .064

Sig. .003** .000** .991 .401 .436 .000**

Politicians P .146 .084 .048 .028 .035 .093

Sig. .000** .003** .247 .412 .333 .000**

Pol. Parties P .107 .063 .016 .031 .020 .079

Sig. .006** .024* .695 .356 .594 .000**

Table 6: measurement of correlation and significant for all three dependent variables per country

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0h 0 - 0.5h 0.5 - 1h 1 - 1.5h 1.5 - 2h 2 - 2.5h 2.5 - 3h >3h0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Parliament

Politicians

Pol.parties

Ave

rage

trus

t (0-

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*= a significant correlation tested at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)**= a significant correlation tested at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Discussion

The positive correlation found in the analysis means that proof is found in the data against the

videomalaise theory. However, because the sample was decided upon based on the

videomalaise theory being the least likely theory to be proven, this does not mean the

videomalaise theory does not exist elsewhere in the world, namely the United States, where

the theory originated. Robinson himself stated that the European TV-media were much less

focussed on exposing what is wrong, and are more satisfied with the status quo (Robinson,

1976: p.428). The selection of the five countries based on the democratic corporatist model

by Hallin & Mancini, in which media is subjected to government over watch to provide

certain standards in reporting (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: p.299), further enhanced the

unlikeliness proof for the videomalaise theory could be found. It would have been interesting

to include the United States in the results to compare differences, but since the data used was

from the European Social Survey, this was impossible.

On the other hand, some evidence for elements of Norris’ virtuous circle theory could

be found. While watching no political broadcasts at all gave low results for trust, it steadily

increased up until the 1.5 – 2 hour category. This amount of daily political news-watching

seems to give the best results for political trust. Watching for longer periods tended to give

increasingly lower results for trust, providing evidence for her statement that misanthropists

were much more likely to stay at home and watch (political) broadcast for extensive periods

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(Norris, 1996: p.479). Further study is needed to analyze whether there is a causal

relationship between a more negative outlook on life and time spent behind a television.

To definitively answer the research question “does watching more politically oriented

TV-programming have an effect on political trust in countries with a democratic corporatist

media system among citizens over 50”, this study has gone a long way. There is a slightly

positive correlation, meaning that watching more politically oriented TV-programming

increases trust in political actors and institutions. A caveat has to be placed though, since

watching more than two hours seems to have a negative effect.

While the dataset(s) used were sufficient to answer the research question, an

important variable was missing. Even though there was a variable pertaining to usage of the

internet for personal means, there was no variable measuring internet-use for political

information gathering. It could be hypothesized that the sample used did not substitute TV in

favor of the internet, but rather uses the internet to supplement their intake of political news.

If such a variable were available in the dataset, this study could have taken a more

meaningful and interesting direction. Since people born in or before 1960 are slowly adapting

to using the internet (Zickuhr & Madden, 2012: p.4), it would be interesting for future

research to investigate whether this is the case.

Even though people born in or before 1960 are diminishing in number as time goes

on, older people still make up a large part of the electorate and are often found to be more

likely to vote than the average citizen (“Stemgedrag stemgerechtigden Tweede

Kamerverkiezingen”, 2011). They might be less impressionable and thus less subject to

sweeping changes in behavior and beliefs, but keeping tabs on gradual changes in their views

remains important for at least another twenty years. The impact of generation Baby-boom on

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election results is still there, and to keep them most trusting of political actors and institutions

they should watch 1.5 to 2 hours of political programming on their television daily.

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