philosophy 107 (stolze)

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PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE) Notes on Geoffrey Gorham, Philosophy of Science , Chapter 4

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PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE). Notes on Geoffrey Gorham, Philosophy of Science , Chapter 4. Scientific Realism vs. Anti-Realism. Scientific Realism = “modern scientific theories provide a true (or approximately true) account of the world” (p. 90). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE)

PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE)

Notes on Geoffrey Gorham, Philosophy of Science, Chapter 4

Page 2: PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE)

Scientific Realism vs. Anti-Realism

• Scientific Realism = “modern scientific theories provide a true (or approximately true) account of the world” (p. 90).

• Anti-Realism = “the aim of scientific theories is not to provide a true account of the world” (p. 90).

Page 3: PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE)

The “No Miracles” Argument for Scientific Realism

“Realism is the best (or only) explanation for the empirical and technological success of modern science” (p. 90).

Page 4: PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE)

Ant-Realist Objections to Realism

• Realism “begs the question”

• “Pessimistic induction”

• Theoretical “underdetermination”

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Anti-Realism and Skepticism

• “Skepticism is the ancient philosophical doctrine that we know very little. Scientific anti-realism can be understood as a moderate form of skepticism since it claims that science doesn’t provide us with knowledge beyond the observable” (p. 96).

• Skepticism and Descartes

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Revising Realism in response to Anti-Realist Objections

Two variations on Truth-Realism:

• Progress-Realism = “modern science hasn’t actually reached the truth but only makes progress towards the truth”

• Structural-Realism = “modern science achieves a true or ‘truer’ account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature” (p. 101)

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Varieties of Anti-Realism

• Instrumentalism = “theories are best understood as tools or instruments for organizing experience rather than straightforward claims about the world” (p. 103).

• Semantic Reductionalism = “theories are indeed claims, but disguised claims about experience rather than about unobservable entities” (p. 104), e.g., behaviorism

• Constructive Empiricism = “the aim of science is ‘empirical adequacy,’ i.e. truth about the observable rather than truth about the unobservable” (p. 106).

• Conceptual Relativism = “jettisons altogether the notion that science describes a world independent of our theories” (p. 107).

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Scientific Unification and Reduction

• Unification = “occurs within a given science when two or more kinds of phenomena that had previously been covered by distinct concepts or laws are brought under a single analysis” (p. 110), e.g., the neo-Darwinian synthesis.

• Reduction = “the attempt to show that the concepts and laws of a given science follow directly from the concepts and laws of another, more fundamental science” (p. 111), e.g., sociobiology and genetic determinism.

• Objections: emergence and pluralism

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