philosophy 102 (stolze) notes on dale jamieson, ethics and the environment, chapter 6

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PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment , chapter 6

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Page 1: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE)

Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Page 2: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

The Value of Nature

• Biocentrism

• Ecocentrism

• The Plurality of Values

• Conflicts and Trade-Offs

Page 3: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

A Biocentric Argument

1. All living things have experiences.

2. Anything that has experiences has interests.

3. Therefore, all living things have interests.

4. Anything that has interests is morally considerable.

5. Therefore, all living things are morally considerable.

Page 4: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Paul Taylor’s Biocentrism

In Respect for Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) Paul Taylor argues that there are four beliefs “that form the core of the biocentric outlook” (pp. 99-100):

(a) “Humans are members of the Earth’s Community of Life in the same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members of that community.”

(b) “The human species, along with all other species, are integral elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly, is determined not only by the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other living things.”

(c) “All organisms are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way.”

(d) “Humans are not inherently superior to other living things.”

Page 5: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

James Sterba’s “Alien Invasion” Thought

Experiment

“Suppose our planet were invaded by an intelligent and very powerful species of aliens that can easily impose their will upon us. Suppose these aliens have studied the life history of our planet and they have come to understand how we have wreaked havoc on our planet, driving many species into extinction, and how we still threaten many other species with extinction. In short, suppose these aliens discover that we are like a cancer on our biosphere. Suppose further that these aliens are fully aware of the differences between us and the other species on the planet. Suppose they clearly recognize that we more closely resemble them in power and intelligence than any other species on the planet does. Even so, suppose the aliens still choose to protect those very species we threaten. They begin by forcing us to use no more resources than we need for a decent life, and this significantly reduces the threat we pose to many endangered species. However, the aliens want to do more. In order to save more endangered species, they decide to exterminate a certain portion of our human population, reducing our numbers to those we had when we were more in balance with the rest of the biosphere. Now if this were to happen, would we have moral grounds to object to these actions taken by the aliens?” (From James Sterba, “Rethinking Global Justice from the Perspective of All Living Nature and What Difference it Makes,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, January 2007).

 

Page 6: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Sterba’s Set Up

In Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism (New York: Oxford, 2001, pp. 27-49), Sterba builds on the work of Paul Taylor and asks us to consider “the nature of “interspecies morality” by analogy with morality as a compromise between egoism and altruism

HUMAN INTERESTS <-------------------------------> INTERESTS OF OTHER SPECIES

INTERSPECIES MORALITY

Page 7: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

James Sterba’s Argument for “Biocentric Pluralism”

(1) We should not aggress against any living being unless there are either self-evident or non-question-begging reasons for doing so.

(2) To treat humans as superior overall to other living beings is to aggress against them by sacrificing their basic needs to meet the nonbasic needs of humans.

(3) Therefore, we should not treat humans as superior overall to other living beings unless we have either self-evident or non-question-begging reasons for doing so.

(4) We do not have either self-evident or non-question-begging reasons for treating humans as superior overall to other living beings.

(5) Therefore, we should not treat humans as superior overall to other living beings.

(6) Not to treat humans as superior overall to other living beings is to treat them as equal overall to other living beings

(7) Therefore, we should treat humans as equal overall to other living beings.

Page 8: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Sterba’s Four Priority Principles

• Human Defense

• Human Preservation

• Disproportionality

• Restitution

Page 9: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Human Defense

Human Defense = “Actions that defend oneself and other human beings against harmful aggression are permissible even when they necessitate killing or harming individual animals or plants or even destroying whole species or ecosystems” (p. 33).

Page 10: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Human Preservation

Human Preservation = “Actions that are necessary for meeting one’s basic needs or the basic needs of other human beings are permissible even when they require aggressing against the basic needs of individual animals and plants or even of whole species or ecosystems” (p. 34).

Page 11: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Disproportionality

Disproportionality = “Actions that meet nonbasic or luxury needs of humans are prohibited when they aggress against the basic needs of individual animals and plants, or of whole species or ecosystems” (p. 37).

Page 12: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Restitution

Restitution = “Appropriate reparation or compensation is required whenever the other principles have been violated” (p. 38).

Page 13: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Ecocentrism

• Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”

• Jameson’s objection to Leopold’s use of the term “biotic community” (p. 150).

• Edward Abbey, esp. Desert Solitaire

Page 14: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

The Plurality of Values

• Prudential Values

• Aesthetic Values

• Natural Values

Page 15: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Prudential Values

• Nature should be valued insofar as it serves the interests of human beings.

• Two problems with the prudential argument for environment preservation: (a) it is argument from ignorance and (b) it assigns no value to activities that drive species to extinction

Page 16: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Aesthetic Values

• Beauty

• Authenticity

• Rarity

• Sources of Aesthetic Value: Object or Subject (or Both?)

• The Experience of the Sublime

Page 17: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Natural Values

• Autonomy => Wildness

• Diversity

Page 18: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

Conflicts and Trade-Offs

• Sierra Nevada Bighorn Sheep vs. Mountain Lions

• Feral Goats vs. Endemic Plants

• Natives vs. Exotics

Page 19: PHILOSOPHY 102 (STOLZE) Notes on Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, chapter 6

A Thought Experiment

Should we interfere if we see a predatory animal about to attack its prey, in order to protect the prey? For example, should we try to stop a fox from killing a squirrel? What if the fox is about to attack a stray cat? Should we prevent a companion cat from hunting wild birds? (From Marc Bekoff, Animals Matter: A Biologist Explains Why We Should Treat Animals with Compassion and Respect [Boston: Shambhala, 2007].)