petitioner's rule 80c appellate brief

MICHELE LUMBERT, CLERK AUGUSTA SUPERIOR COURT 95 STATE STREET AUGUSTA, MAINE 04330

GINA LYNN TURCOTTE 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1, Augusta, Maine

July 15, 2013

Re: GINA LYNN TURCOTTE v. SECRETARY OF STATE Docket No. AP-13-17

Dear Michele:

Enclosed you will find Petitioner's brief under Rule 80C as required to be ftled July 15, 2013

pursuant to Petitioner's motion for enlargement of time which was granted. A copy of the brief has

been mailed or hand delivered to Respondent on this day.

J;:;t~~ GINA LYNN TURCOTTE

Cc: Assistant Attomey General Donald W. Macomber

KENNEBEC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Docket No. AP-13-17

GINA TURCOTTE

Petitioner/APPELLANT

v.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Respondent/APPELLEE

RULE 80C PETITION

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

DUE AND SUBMITTED ON JULY 15, 2013

Gina Turcotte Petitioner/APPELLANT

3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1 Augusta, Maine

TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 2 of 57

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. TABLE OF CONTENTS

II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

IV. PLAIN MEANING RULE

V. DEFINITIONS

VI. DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER VII. IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE

VIII. INTRODUCTION

IX. STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED

X. FACTUAL BACKGROUND XI. ARGUMENT XII. RELIEF REQUESTED

XIII. CONCLUSION


II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER

Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of Authority,

Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed; Certificate of Live Birth;

Writ of Mandamus and Replevin

BLACK’S LAW, 4th and 9TH

Bouvier’s Law, 6th

MERRIAM WEBSTER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by

Automobile, 1890-1950, Dr. Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., Ph.D., Oklahoma City

University Law Review, Summer, 2005, 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 245

Maine Constitution, Article 1:

Section 1. Natural rights.

Section 2. Power inherent in people.

Section 3. Religious freedom; sects equal.

Section 4. Freedom of speech.

Section 5. Unreasonable searches prohibited.

Section 6. Rights of persons accused.

Section 6-A. Discrimination against persons prohibited.

Section 8. No double jeopardy.

Section 9. Excessive bail, cruel or unusual punishments prohibited.

Section 19. Right of redress for injuries.

Plain Meaning Rule

State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999

Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme Judicial

Court 2000

In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007


Motor Vehicles Rules

29-250 SECRETARY OF STATE BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Chapter 1: Rules For Administrative Suspension Relating To Demerit Point

Accumulation, Convictions And Adjudications

Chapter 2: Rules For Administrative Hearings

Chapter 3: Physical, Emotional And Mental Competence To Operate A Motor

Vehicle

Chapter 13: Rules Governing Driver License Restriction

Maine Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 80C

Maine Statutes

5 MRSA §9052. Notice

5 MRSA §9056. Opportunity To Be Heard

5 MRSA §9059. Record

5 MRSA §10001. Adjudicatory Proceedings

5 MRSA §10003. Right To Hearing

5 MRSA §10004. Action Without Hearing

5 MRSA §11001. Right To Review

5 MRSA §11005. Responsive Pleading; Filing Of The Record

5 MRSA §11006. Power Of Court To Correct Or Modify Record

5 MRSA §11007. Manner And Scope Of Review

29-A MRSA §112. Notice Of Hearing

29-A MRSA §1258. Medical Advisory Board

29-A MRSA §1251. License Required

29-A MRSA §1309. Reexamination Of Incompetent Or Unqualified Operators

29-A MRSA §1407. Change Of Location Or Status

29-A MRSA §2458. Suspension or revocation of license

29-A MRSA §2482. Notice of suspension or revocation of license


29-A MRSA §2485. Decision; Appeal

Maine Cases

Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969).

State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975)

Fickett v. Maine KEN-AP-02-57

Melanson v Secretary of State 2004 ME 127

DiPietro v. Secretary of State, 802 A. 2d 399 - Me: Supreme Judicial

State v. Savard, 659 A. 2d 1265 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1995

Centamore v. Dep't of Human Services, 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995)

CWCO, Inc. v. Sup't of Insurance, 1997 NrE 226, ¶6, 703 A.2d 125S, 1261

Imagineering v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991)

Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969)

State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975)

Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012

McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 896 A.2d 933

Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 55 A.3d 411

Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 896 A.2d 271

Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 838 A.2d 1157

Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149 957 A.2d 94

Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7

http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm

United States Code

Title 18, 31(6)

Title 18, 31(10)

http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm%2011/15/2010


United States Cases

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886

Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886 Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895

Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944 Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946)

City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 – 1948 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889

City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 – 1898 Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 – 1908

Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926

Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943

Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953

Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956 Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958

Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959

United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966


STANDARD OF REVIEW

At this stage of appeal, the standard of review is de novo, “Because the

Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the

Secretary of State's decision.” McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 5, 896

A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation

de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting

its language "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results," Estate of

Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411 (quotation

marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning, Cobb v. Bd.

of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 271. When a

statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without

applying the rule of statutory construction that "prefers

interpretations… that do not raise constitutional problems," McGee, 2006

ME 50, ¶ 18, 896 A.2d 933, and without examining legislative history, Ashe

v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, ¶ 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's

interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271. "We look to

legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute

only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous." Liberty Ins.

Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94. "A

statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations."

Estate of Joyce, 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411. [emphasis added]

PLAIN MEANING RULE

PETITIONER incorporates the plain meaning rule and consistently

applies it throughout this entire action, as clearly and expressly standardized

by Maine Supreme Judicial Court in:

State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999,

“The sole issue before us is one of statutory construction. "Statutory

interpretation is a matter of law, and we review the trial court's decision de

novo." Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524 (italics

added). "If the meaning of the language is plain, we must interpret the statute to

mean exactly what it says." [5] Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d


802, 803 (Me.1991) (quotations omitted). "Where the statutory language is

plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resort to rules of statutory

interpretation to seek or impose another meaning." Marsella, 585 A.2d at 803

(quotations omitted). "[N]othing in a statute may be treated as surplusage if a

reasonable construction applying meaning and force is otherwise possible."

Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.1995) (quotations omitted)."

Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme

Judicial Court (2000), “The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is

the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous,

there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction. See State

v. Harris, 1999 ME 80, ¶ 13, 730 A.2d 1249, 1251”

In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court

2007, “Because the word "knowingly" is defined in the Code and because its

definition is plain and unambiguous, we are not free retroactively to give the

word a different meaning. "Knowingly" is defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct

as "denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question." M. Code of Jud. Conduct

II(3)(J). ... See generally, Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16,

¶ 11, 745 A.2d 378, 384 ("The most fundamental rule of statutory construction

is the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous,

there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction.").”

DEFINITIONS

PETITIONER gives judicial notice that the following definitions are

incorporated as defined herein:

1. administration. The management or performance of the executive

duties of a government, institution, or business.

2. apparatus. See MACHINE. A device or apparatus consisting of fixed

and moving parts that work together to perform some function.

3. CHRISTIANITY. The religion established by Jesus Christ.

Christianity has been judicially declared to be a part of the common

law of Pennsylvania.


4. church. In a moral or spiritual sense this word signifies a society of

persons who profess the Christian religion; and in a physical or

material sense, the place where such persons assemble. The term

church is nomen collectivum; it comprehends the chancel, aisles,

and body of the church.

5. conscience. The moral sense of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense

applied to one's own judgment and actions. In law, the moral rule

that requires justice and honest dealings between people.

6. constitution. The fundamental and organic law of a nation or state

that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government,

defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees

individual civil rights and civil liberties. The written instrument

embodying this fundamental law, together with any formal

amendments. In British constitutional law, the constitution is a

collection of historical documents, statutes, decrees, conventions,

traditions, and royal prerogatives. Documents and statutes include

Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights (1689), and the European

Communities Act (1972). The implied parts of a written constitution,

encompassing the rights, freedoms, and processes considered to be

essential, but not explicitly defined in the written document.

7. corpus. [Latin "body"] The property for which a trustee is

responsible; the trust principal. Also termed res; trust estate; trust

fund; trust property; trust res; trust.

8. deed poll. A deed made by and binding on only one party, or on two

or more parties having similar interests.

9. doctrine. A principle, esp. a legal principle, that is widely adhered to.

10. DRIVER. (Bouvier’s 6th) One employed in conducting a coach,

carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other

animals.

11. driver. A person who steers and propels a vehicle.


12. driver's license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to

operate a motor vehicle.

13. driving. The act of directing the course of something.

14. ecclesiastical. Of or relating to the church.

15. fee simple. An interest in land that, being the broadest property

interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies

without heirs; esp., a fee simple absolute.

16. freehold. An estate in land held in fee simple; any real-property

interest that is or may become possessory.

17. Indefeasible: (Of a claim or right) not vulnerable to being defeated,

revoked, or lost.

18. Independent. Not subject to the control or influence of another. 2.

Not associated with another (often larger) entity 3. Not dependent or

contingent on something else.

19. Institution. An elementary rule, principle, or practice.

20. justice. The fair and proper administration of laws.

21. liberty. Freedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint, esp. by

a government. A right, privilege, or immunity enjoyed by prescription

or by grant; the absence of a legal duty imposed on a person.

"[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also

the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the

common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,

establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to

the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those

privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly

pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,

399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626 (1923).

22. natural liberty. The power to act as one wishes, without any

restraint or control, unless by nature. 'This natural liberty ... being a

right inherent in us by birth .... But every man, when he enters into

society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so


valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the

advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those

laws, which the community has thought proper to establish." 1

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 121

(1765).

23. religious liberty. Freedom - as guaranteed by the First Amendment

to express, without external control other than one's own

conscience, any or no system of religious opinion and to engage in or

refrain from any form of religious observance or public or private

religious worship, as long as it is consistent with the peace and

order of society.

24. License. A permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that

would otherwise be unlawful; esp., an agreement that it is lawful for

the licensee to enter the licensor's land to do some act that would

otherwise be illegal.

25. private morality. A person's ideals, character, and private conduct,

which are not valid governmental concerns.

26. OPERATE. (Black’s Law, 4th) This word, when used with relation to

automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of

the automobile ; that is, the driver operates the automobile for the

owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he

drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023,

1025.

27. operate. to perform a function; exert power or influence.

28. privilege. A special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a

person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. _ A privilege

grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It

immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would

subject the actor to liability.

29. public. Open or available for all to use, share, or enjoy.


30. punishment. A sanction - such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or

loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who

has violated the law. "Punishment in all its forms is a loss of rights

or advantages consequent on a breach of law. When it loses this

quality it degenerates into an arbitrary act of Violence that can

produce nothing but bad social effects." Glanville Williams, Criminal

Law 575 (2d ed. 1961).

31. punitive. Involving or inflicting punishment.

32. religion. A system of faith and worship usu. involving belief in a

supreme being and usu. containing a moral or ethical code; esp.,

such a system recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect,

or denomination. In construing the protections under the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, courts have

interpreted the term religion quite broadly to include a wide variety

of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.

33. remedial. Affording or providing a remedy; providing the means of

obtaining redress <a remedial action>. 2. Intended to correct,

remove, or lessen a wrong, fault, or defect <a remedial statute>. 3.

Of or relating to a means of enforcing an existing substantive right

<a remedial right>.

34. absolute right. A right that belongs to every human being, such as

the right of personal liberty; a natural right. 2. An unqualified right;

speci£., a right that cannot be denied or curtailed except under

specific conditions

35. secta. Roman law. A group of followers, as of a particular religion or

school of philosophy, law, etc.; a religious sect; a group adhering to

a distinctive doctrine or to a leader.

36. secular. Worldly, as distinguished from spiritual.

37. sentiment. an attitude, thought, or judgment prompted by feeling; a

specific view or notion.

38. spiritual. Of or relating to ecclesiastical rather than secular matters.


IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE

Before PETITIONER’s mother conceived and gave life to PETITIONER’s

physical body, PETITIONER was I AM; the Divine Spirit, who consciously chose

to inhabit the physical vessel of flesh, blood and bones of the human body to

have an experience as a human being. Each atom and cell of this physical

vessel which PETITIONER inhabits to travel across this land is infused with the

spark of the Creator; I AM one with the light, one with Creator, the Alpha and

the Omega, without beginning nor end, without time.

Natural Order of Law and Authority irrefutably begins with and is

irrevocably governed by GOD and GOD’S LAW which includes, but are not

limited to, Laws of Common Sense, Truth & Justice, Laws of Grammar and

Proper Use of Words which can be considered by all men and women to be the

higher laws of the universe.

Higher Laws are natural common laws which govern the behavior of

every man, woman and child without exception beholding our allegiance to our

own private Sovereign Ruler of the Universe and only according to our own

private consciences and which our feelings, thoughts, words and beliefs are not

to be regulated or injured by any government, sect or private individual.

PETITIONER, in alliance with every other man, woman and child, are

collectively “The People”, and in whose authority our government was created

and instituted for our benefit and who have an unalienable and indefeasible

right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same,

when our safety and happiness requires it as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2

of the Constitution of the State of Maine.

As a cooperative and collaborative group with a specific mutual purpose

and goal, The People create the GRAND JURIES, the TRIAL JURIES and the

ELECTIONS which are some of the tools and machinery by which behaviors

that violate the CONSTITUTION are remedied and by which itself is protected,

enforced, and amended as needed.

The body of the CONSTITUTION articulates provisions which created the


EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE and JUDICIAL branches of government which were

also instituted for our protection and benefit and which each officer is Trustee

of the Public Trust with such power having been bequeathed to them by The

People upon swearing their public oath to uphold and protect the Constitution,

adhering to ethical and moral principles above any private gain.

Within each branch of government are public offices and officers who are

vested with specific legal duties, authorities and rights for the benefit of The

People: the Executive Branch includes PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR, MAYOR and

ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS; the Legislative Branch is divided into the HOUSE

which represents citizens based on district populations and the SENATE which

represents citizens on an equal state basis; and the Judicial Branch which is

divided into the SUPREME COURT, the APPEAL COURT, the TRIAL COURT,

and ALL LOWER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS.

Three branches of government were created with the intention to be a

system of checks and balances to ensure The People’s representatives act with

ethical, moral and lawful behavior in full adherence and loyalty to The People

in whose power and authority they institute all federal, state, and local laws,

statutes, codes, regulations, rules, orders and ordinances for the purpose of

establishing justice, insuring tranquility, providing for our mutual defense,

promoting our common welfare, and securing to ourselves and our posterity

the blessings of life, liberty and the pursuit of prosperity and happiness, and

with the irrevocable power to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when

our safety and happiness requires it, which is a modern-day human experience

in this third-dimensional world on planet Earth.

PETITIONER’s third-dimensional vessel of flesh, blood and bones was

born into the Turcotte family on December 17, 1968, now simply known as

Gina Lynn, who is a freeborn inhabitant, natural heir to the Divine Estate,

Beneficiary to the Divine Trust, freeholder in fee simple absolute, one of the

Posterity expressed in the Preamble of the United States Constitution and the

Constitution of the State of Maine, to wit, “We the people of Maine, in order to

establish justice, insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our


common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of

liberty, acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler

of the Universe in affording us an opportunity, so favorable to the design; and,

imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form

ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of

Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government

of the same.”

The Constitution for the State of Maine was structured after and in

acquiescence with the Constitution for the United States, each of which are

documents of a dual nature:

1. the Constitution is a trust document, and

2. it is the articles of incorporation which created a unique trust res

and estate of inheritance for each inhabitant.

It is a tenet of law that in order to determine the intent of a writing one

must look to the title, the Empowerment Clause in statute, which in the case of

the Constitution is the Preamble. In writing the Constitution the founders

followed the common law of England which stretches back some 1000 years.

The Preamble fulfills the requirements necessary to establish a trust. It

identifies the Grantor(s), Statement of Purpose, Grantee(s), Statement of Intent,

Written Indenture, and the name of the entity being created and is written and

constructed as a trust so that it would have the thrust of ageless law.

Let us take a look:

WE THE PEOPLE (Grantors) of the United States (from or out of) in order

to form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common

defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty

(statement of Purpose) to ourselves and our posterity (Grantees/heirs

unnamed), do ordain and establish (Statement of Intent) this constitution

(Written Indenture) for the United States of America (name of the entity being

created).

The trust res is in the Articles of the Confederation and the Declaration

of Independence. The intent of the constitution was to bequeath freedom, life,


liberty and the pursuit of happiness to themselves and their posterity. The

founders intended to secure and pass on the sovereignty of the people to the

people of future generations of Americans, in perpetuity.

PETITIONER’s rights are derived from the land upon which she stands

and her relation, or status, to that land. In America these rights originated with

the Articles of Confederation and the Declaration of Independence and are

attached to the land called America (The Laws of Real Property). PETITIONER’s

status, or relation to that land, is determined by the laws of Descent and

Distribution.

PETITIONER’s right to freedom, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness

is her inheritance as bequeathed to her via the Constitution of the United

States of America and upon which the Constitution of the State of Maine was

drafted and enacted.

The constitution granted the government the power and authority to

administrate and to carry on corporate functions. Under the common law,

inherent rights cannot devolve to a 'body politic' through a corporation. Rights

only devolve to human beings as through and by way of a trust. Under the

constitutional law, in order to determine the meaning of a written instrument

the court must look to the title. In this case, once again, it is the Preamble.

Pursuant to the laws of real property that have been in existence from the

beginning, the Preamble clearly shows a freehold in fee simple absolute in it.

Freeholds in fee simple were instruments of trust, not corporate. "Our Posterity"

cannot be speaking of a corporate entity because posterity can only mean a

living man or woman, and only by birth and nativity.

The Articles of the Constitution are the Articles of Incorporation that

established Congress as Trustees of the Trust and defines their power and

authority as well as their limitations. Annexed to the Constitutional Trust is a

will-like structure, the Amendments. The Trust and the trust res were already

in existence when the will/codicil (Amendments) were added some four years

later. The Amendments do not constitute the Trust in fact, they are annexed to

the Trust as a codicil (a supplement or addition to the will, not necessarily


disposing of the entire estate, but modifying, explaining or otherwise qualifying

the will in some way.)

A Trust, once completed and in force, cannot be amended or altered

without the consent of the parties in interest, except under reserved power of

amendment and alteration. An amendment is ordinarily possible by parties in

interest and against parties without vested interest. Prior to enactment of the

14th Amendment, the freeborn inhabitants, citizens of the states, were the

parties in interest.

The 14th Amendment created the 14th Amendment legal fiction citizen

“GINA LYNN TURCOTTE” who does not have a vested interest in the trust or the

trust res. The 14th Amendment can be viewed as a codicil to the will that

republished the constitution with new meaning, changed the intent behind it and

turned it into a testamentary instrument with capabilities of being used against

the PETITIONER through a seemingly voluntary revocation.

When PETITIONER’s mother provided evidence of her birth and applied

for a social security number on PETITIONER’s behalf, and when PETITIONER

mistakenly claimed be a United States citizen, who is a party with no vested

interest in a freehold, the trust or the trust res, the PETITIONER was literally

declared to be deceased; therefore, the decedent (PETITIONER) retains no legal

interest in the property and PETITIONER, in her new capacity as a legal fiction

citizen, is then coerced to act as Executor of PETITIONER’s own estate.

PETITIONER, a freeholder and Beneficiary to the trust, has been tricked

and coerced by the Trustees into testifying against herself when applying for a

social security number, drivers license, or when signing an IRS 1040 form, and

which the Trustees have mislead PETITIONER into believing are all mandatory.

The Trustees have breached the trust having amended the will for their

own personal profit and gain at the expense of the true heirs. PETITIONER has

unwittingly, without full disclosure, become the Executor; the Trustees have

become the Beneficiaries to the trust through Laws of Donations, effectively

stealing PETITIONER’s Divine Inheritance.

A breach of trust of fiduciary duty by a Trustee is a violation of the


correlative right of the Cestui Que Trust and gives rise to any correlative cause

of action on the part of the Beneficiary for any loss to the estate Trust. This

rule is applicable in respect to both positive acts or negligence constituting a

breach of fiduciary duty by the Trustee. A Trustee's breach of fiduciary duty

falls within the maxim that 'equity will not aid one who comes into court with

unclean hands.'

When the Trustee's breach is by an act of omission the Beneficiary can

scrutinize the propriety of the Trustee. A Beneficiary must always have full

disclosure and full knowledge of the material facts and circumstances. A

Beneficiary must also have had knowledge of and understood their rights and

have no obligation to search the public records to obtain said knowledge.

The Trustees have committed acts of omission, misrepresentation, deceit

and deception in order to mislead and coerce PETITIONER into giving up her

beneficial interest in the trust and the trust res. The Trustees have compelled

PETITIONER, a freeholder in fee simple, to accept benefits 'under the will' as

perverted by the 14th Amendment, without freedom of choice for failure of full

disclosure thereby preventing enforcement of contractual rights to property

bequeathed to her by the will. The Trustees are trying to repudiate the Trust,

employing a lifetime of propaganda and programming enforced through threats,

violence and coercion, and failing to provide notice to the Beneficiary of the

repudiation which must now be brought home and lawfully remedied.

The Doctrine of Election dictates, “that a party shall not be permitted to

insist at different times upon the truth of two inconsistent and repugnant

positions, according to the promptings of his own interest, as to first affirm and

later disaffirm a contract, or the like” Myers v. Ross, D.C., 10 F.Supp. 409, 411,

in connection with testamentary instruments is the principle that one who is

given a benefit 'under the will' must choose between accepting the benefits and

asserting some other claim against the testator's estate or against the property

disposed of by the will. PETITIONER’s right as a Beneficiary to elect whether to

take 'under the will' or 'against the will' is a personal privilege to her which may

be controlled by the creditors of the Beneficiary. If PETITIONER elected to take


‘against the will’ then creditors can claim no right or interest in the estate

contrary to PETITIONER’S election.

Acceptance of benefits 'under the will' constitutes an election precluding

PETITIONER from enforcing contractual rights to property bequeathed by the

will. This rule is subject to the qualification that acceptance of a benefit 'under

the will', when made in ignorance of the Beneficiaries’ rights or under a

misapprehension or misrepresentation as to the condition of the Testator's

estate, does not constitute an election upon full knowledge and disclosure.

In the beginning God gave men and women dominion over all things, as

Beneficiaries of the Divine Trust. The founding fathers of the United States of

America created the constitution for the United States, an estate trust, to pass

sovereignty of the people onto the people of future generations, in perpetuity.

In America today, upon giving birth, a mother is compelled, under

deceptive coercion and without full factual disclosure, to apply for the creation

of a Cestui Que Vie trust, creating a 14th Amendment paper citizen of the United

States. Upon receipt of the mother's application the Trustees establish a trust

under the error of assumptions that the child has knowingly elected to accept

the benefits which are bequeathed by the will, 'under the will'. The Trustees

further assume that the child is incompetent, a bankrupt and lost at sea and is

presumed to be dead until the child reappears, knowingly reestablishes living

status, challenges assumptions of any acceptance of the benefits 'under the

will' as being one of free choice with full knowledge of the facts and thereby

redeems the estate.

Under the assumption that the child is a 14th Amendment citizen, the

child's footprint is placed by the hospital upon the birth certificate creating a

slave bond which is sold to the federal reserve, who then converts it into a

negotiable instrument and establishes a second Cestui Que Vie trust. The

child's parents are coercively deceived to apply for a social security number for

the child, unwittingly testifying that the child is a 14th Amendment paper

citizen of the United States, not a party in interest to the trust or the trust res,

and assumed to be dead after 7 years, and when the federal reserve cannot


seize the physical child, they file for the issue of the salvage bond and the child

is presumed to be legally dead.

When a child is Baptized by the church, the Baptismal certificate is

forwarded to the Vatican who converts the certificate into a negotiable

instrument and creates a third Cestui Que Vie trust. These three trusts

represent the enslavement of the property, body and soul of the child.

The civil administration, UNITED STATES, continues to operate today

under this triple crown of enslavement based on the error of assumptions that

we are 14th Amendment citizens of the United States based on the breach of

trust by the Trustees.

PETITIONER has been lost in the sea of illusion, her divine estate placed

in trust. PETITIONER has awakened to the truth, so long hidden from her, and

now redeems her estate. PETITIONER hereby acknowledges and accepts the

deed and her right as lawful and proper owner of the estate with exclusive right

of use of all land, tenements and heredimants thereof, to have and to hold in

fee simple forever.

This freehold in fee simple has been held under an assumed lease for

forty-four years. Said fee has been held in abeyance, in expectation,

remembrance, and contemplation in law there being no person in esse, in

whom it can vest and abide: though the law has considered it as always

potentially existing, and ready to vest whenever a proper owner appears.

It is hereby established, in fact, that PETITIONER, who was given the

name Gina Lynn when she was born on December 17, 1968 into the Turcotte

family, is the proper owner of the estate GINA LYNN TURCOTTE in whom vests

and abides to have and to hold in fee simple forever.

Freely born, sovereign people have a common law and constitutionally-

protected right to travel on the roads and highways of this land as maintained

by their government on their behalf and specifically for their use and benefit.

Licensing of private, not-for-hire travelers cannot be required of free sovereign

private people because taking on the restrictions of a driver’s license requires

the surrender of and creates encumbrances upon PETITIONER’s inalienable


right to travel in her private property.

In England in 1215, the Magna Carta enshrined the right to travel in

Article 42, to wit, “It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our

kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his

allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common

good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of

the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who

shall be treated as it is said above.”

Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the

State of Maine are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation that

would abrogate those rights. A claim or exercise of a constitutionally-protected

right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no remedial action, civil

sanction or criminal penalty imposed because PETITIONER lawfully exercised

her constitutionally-protected rights.

PETITIONER has the inalienable right to use public roads unrestricted in

any manner so long as she is not damaging property or violating rights of

others. The government is effectively restricting PETITIONER’s freedom of

locomotion by requiring PETITIONER to obtain a drivers license and thus

violating PETITIONER’s common law and constitutionally-guaranteed right to

travel upon the public highways and possess and enjoy private property during

her pursuit of safety, prosperity and happiness.

Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion in Shapiro v

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) that the right to travel “is a right broadly

assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the

right of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by

the Constitution to us all.” The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to

travel; but, holding that the right to travel is so fundamental the Framers

thought it was unnecessary to explicitly include it in the Constitution or the

Bill of Rights.

The PETITIONER’s right to travel upon public ways in her private

property is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will,


but a common right which every individual has under their right to life, liberty,

and pursuit of happiness. Under this guarantee, the PETITIONER may, under

normal conditions, travel at her inclination along the public highways or in

public places using her private property in any way she deems suitable while

conducting herself in an orderly and decent manner; thus, the Trustees do not

have the power to abrogate the PETITIONER’s right to travel upon the public

roads in her private property by passing legislation forcing her to waive that

right and allegedly converting it into an alleged privilege of a ‘drivers license’

which is in fact not a ‘privilege’ according to 29-A MRSA §1251 which in fact

mandates all Maine residents immediately apply to obtain a drivers license.

29-A MRSA §1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENT’s willful

violation of Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6-A, “No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the

equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil

rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof.”

When PETITIONER registered her automobiles with RESPONDENT or

obtained a drivers license, she did so only reluctantly and under duress,

blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated

fraud and governmental corruption in order to preserve whatever minimal

freedoms are remaining.

“American history can easily be written in two parts: America before the

arrival of automobiles and America after automobiles. Motorized vehicles altered

everything from the demographic distribution of American society to the ways

Americans live and work to the normative balance of home and family life…

Nineteenth century Americans would scarcely recognize the immense quilt of

laws which govern highway travel today. With the exception of the Civil War,

nothing before or since has so fundamentally altered America's scheme of rights

and freedoms as that of the laws now governing highway travel. Today, the vast

majority of Americans voluntarily submit to a variety of registration,

identification, and licensing schemes in order to travel by automobile. Today's

laws [were] once viewed as unconstitutional. The hand of the State now extends


over aspects of travel in ways which would have been impossible according to

common law precedents familiar to earlier Americans.

Prior to the nineteenth century, courts generally held the public roadways

were open to all users without regard to the travelers' methods or means of

transport. Licenses or other indicia of governmental permission were thought

unnecessary or even violative of [constitutionally-protected] rights. But

widespread disdain and fear of the automobile led twentieth century

policymakers to push aside these long-standing constitutional barriers in order to

regulate motorized driving. This new regulatory approach was justified on the

grounds that motor vehicles were too dangerous to operate unlicensed and that

traffic injuries were increasingly on the rise.” The Orphaned Right, Dr. Roots

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824, “The word "license,"

means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a

permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power

to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to

authorize.”

Title 29, Chapter 7: OPERATORS' LICENSES of the Maine Revised

Statutes can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning rules, and

in accordance with Black’s Law, Bouvier’s Law, and Merriam Webster, as, “A

revocable permission given to an individual to exert power or influence over

private property which actions would otherwise be unlawful”, later repealed.

The Maine Legislature then enacted Title 29-A, Chapter 11: DRIVER'S

LICENSE, which can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning

rules, and in accordance with Black’s Law, Bouvier’s Law, and Merriam

Webster, as, “A revocable permission given to an individual who is employed by

another in steering or directing the course of a coach, carriage, wagon, or other

vehicle, including horses, mules or other animals, for a fair wage paid to the

driver by its employer for the driver’s safe and proper conduct while in control of

the conveyance for which conduct and control would otherwise be unlawful.” to

wit: a “driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not

operate the automobile unless he drives it himself.” Beard v. Clark, Tex. Civ.


App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025.

The Trustees (legislators) who are empowered by, through and on behalf

of the inhabitants of this state, have publicly memorialized a notable difference

regarding the inherent meaning of the words “operator” and “driver” by which

they knowingly and intentionally substituted the word “driver” in place of the

word “operator” under 29-A MRSA when referring to any “driver’s license” to

control or operate a motorized vehicle on the public highways of this state.

The Maine legislature publicly acknowledged through their intentional

use of the word “driver” within 29-A MRSA that the action which they feel

requires a drivers license is not that of a private action of enjoying and using

one’s personal property on a public roadway, but instead a drivers license for

contractual for-hire employment for the purpose of controlling, steering and

directing the course of a motor vehicle or animal in the driver’s employment by

another with a fair wage paid for the driver’s time, energy and labor.

United States Criminal Code, Title 18, §31(6) defines “motor vehicle”

as “every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by

mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the

transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.”

United States Criminal Code, Title 18, §31(10) defines “used for

commercial purposes” as “the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee,

rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection

with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.”

29-A MRSA §1253(2) Compliance with federal law. dictates, “The

State must comply with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Public

Law 99-570, Title XII, the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999,

Public Law 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 and regulations adopted under those

Acts in issuing or suspending a commercial license. In the case of any

conflict between the federal statute or regulation and a statute or rule of

this State, the federal statute or regulation must apply and take

precedence.” [emphasis added]

29-A MRSA §101(42) defines "motor vehicle" as “a self-propelled vehicle


not operated exclusively on tracks but does not include:

A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001;

B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the

all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is

operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and

C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device”

29-A MRSA §101(42) directly conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §31(6).

29-A MRSA §101(91) defines “vehicle” as “a device for conveyance of

persons or property on a way. ‘Vehicle’ does not include conveyances propelled

or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles as

defined in Title 12, section 13001 or an electric personal assistive mobility device

as defined in this section.”

29-A MRSA §101(50) defines "owner" as “a person holding title to a

vehicle or having exclusive right to the use of the vehicle for a period of 30 days

or more.”

29-A MRSA §101(59) defines "public way" as “a way, owned and

maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general

public has a right to pass.”

29-A MRSA §101(75) defines “street or highway” as “a public way”.

29-A MRSA fails to establish any clear difference between a private

automobile and a commercial motor vehicle as required by 18 U.S.C. §31(6);

therefore, 29-A MRSA §1253(2) mandates that 18USC §31(6) take precedence.

It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 is “Class C” which is

not a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and which has never had commercial

endorsements.

It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 shows no offenses

involving intoxication or serious bodily injury.

PETITIONER has been defrauded and coerced ad infinitum since

February 3, 1989 through RESPONDENT’s willful nondisclosure effectively

coercing and intimidating PETITIONER to obtain a ‘drivers license’ whereby she

unknowingly waived her sovereign right to travel without earning a fair wage in


her private property without being restricted by unlawful and unconstitutional

governmental encumbrances.

PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENT has violated her freedom of

religion as protected by Maine Constitution Article 1, Section 3, by coercively

restraining PETITIONER in exercising her personal liberty to worship GOD in

the manner and season most agreeable to PETITIONER’s own conscience.

PETITIONER’s religious beliefs oblige PETITIONER to reject all external

authorities, both secular and spiritual, which are not aligned with the dictates

of PETITIONER’s own conscience and personal sense of morality, including

PETITIONER rejecting all organized, unorganized, incorporated and

unincorporated governmental, political and religious sects.

PETITIONER’s religious beliefs prohibit all seizures and conversions of

PETITIONER’s natural inherent rights through PETITIONER coercively obeying

RESPONDENT’s assumed authority to convert PETITIONER’s possession and

use of private property and her right of free locomotion into an alleged privilege,

and an actual statutory mandate to obtain a drivers license which is required

for PETITIONER to use, enjoy, defend and protect her private property.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886, “An

unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it

affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as

inoperative as though it had never been passed.”

Through RESPONDENT’s stealthy encroachment through the use of

ambiguous statutes and rigid administrative rules, the corporate state “body

politic” stole PETITIONER’s religious freedom and personal liberty and sold it

back to her as a driver’s license. This stealthy encroachment process of the

corporate state against PETITIONER depended on time and propaganda for its

success. Most humans live perhaps 85 years; the corporate state enjoys eternal

life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to

remember the lessons and history of the previous generation which the

corporate state depends upon in order to perpetuate.

Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886, “It is the


duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and

against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”

Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895, “We are

bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time

it was adopted”

Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944, “Constitutional

rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.”

Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946),“A

license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful.

The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without

it.”

City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 – 1948, “Specifically or

technically speaking, [a] license means to confer on a person the right to do

something which otherwise he would not have the right to do-a special privilege

rather than a right common to all persons.”

By looking back at historical disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other

ways of passage, we clearly see that public property is nothing more than

property held in common tenancy for use by each and every individual.

Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889, “Personal liberty, which is

guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right

of locomotion,-to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may

lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others

may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.”

Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889,"The right to travel is a part

of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of

law...."

City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 – 1898, “A license being

regarded as a privilege can not possibly exist with reference to something which

is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride over the

highways by motor vehicle, or horse vehicle in a reasonable manner.”

Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 – 1908, “This Court has said with


respect to an unconstitutional law that the matter stands as if the law had not

been passed.”

Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926), “it

would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which,

by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by

the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is

accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable

privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to

challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny

a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose.

But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the

limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment

of Constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one

constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a

surrender of all.

It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of

the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.” [emphasis

added]

Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930, “The

right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property

thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he

has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and

to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the

ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing

modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon

thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary

purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of

moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or

transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which a city may

permit or prohibit at will.


The exercise of such a common right the [RESPONDENT] may, under its police

power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not

arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise

it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and

circumstances, to exercise it. Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259; Ex parte

Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915-F, 840; Hadfield Lundin, 98

Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L.R.A. 1918-B, 909, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 942.

The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the

streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing,

and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile

on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or

permitted to be held by some and refused to other of like qualifications, under

like circumstances and conditions.

It has been said that when the State or a city has the power to prohibit the doing

of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act upon any

condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary or capricious it may be;

and may lawfully delegate to executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled

and arbitrary discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do

such acts; Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259, 263; State ex rel. Crumpton

Montgomery, 177 Ala. 221, 59 So. 294; State Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 22 Atl. 675;

City of St. Joseph Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S.W. 101, 49 Am.St.Rep. 577; Brown

Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl. 227.

This doctrine has been pronounced most often in cases involving the granting,

refusing, and revoking of licenses or permits to sell intoxicating liquors, or to do

other things which because of their character are, or tend to be, injurious, as for

instance keeping a gambling house or a bawdy-house, or operating a junk or

pawn shop; and it has also been applied to cases involving permits or licenses to

transport persons or property for hire along the streets. See Taylor Smith, supra,

and cases there cited. But this doctrine has no application to permits issued for

the purpose of regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a private


automobile on the streets of a city, in the usual and ordinary way, to transport

the driver's person and property.”

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943, “It is

contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this

activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of

this tax. It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a

privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge

for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.”

Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit

1956, “The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted

into a crime.”

Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958, “The

use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in

modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use

an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within

the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen may not be

deprived without due process of law”

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958, “No state legislator

or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating

his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous

Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul

the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired

under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . .’

United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136.”

United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966, “The

constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the

highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so,

occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right

that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. In Crandall v.

Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving the State


by common carrier, the Court took as its guide the statement of Chief Justice

Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492:

"For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed,

we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United

States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass

and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own

States."

Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each

State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State," that right

finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested,

is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary

concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom

to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right

under the Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Twining v.

New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177

(concurring opinion), 181 (concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U. S. 1, 6-

8; 12-16 (dissenting opinion)...

… Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the

Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no

need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right

exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is

now 18 U. S. C. § 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore,

129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now.”

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court

1966 “The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways

is not a mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected

by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Arrow Transportation

Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); State v.

Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262

P. 881, 56 A.L. R. 317 (1927); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922);

Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); People v. Nothaus,


147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1960); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles,

35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d

620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52

(1951); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.1951); Berberian v. Lussier, 87

R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953).”

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966,“Where rights

secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or

legislation which would abrogate them.”

Under obligation to RESPONDENT’s unconstitutional licensing rules

which violate PETITIONER’s freedom of religion, free speech, rights against self-

incrimination and illegal search and seizure, PETITIONER unwillingly reported

the existence of a prior medical condition which she mistakenly thought may

impair her safe operation of her private property in order to prevent being

harassed by RESPONDENT’s law enforcement, court and licensing agents.

PETITIONER innocently failed to comply with RESPONDENT’s rules by

not promptly and perpetually changing her physical and mailing address each

and every time she changed domiciles, which recently has been every week or

every few months, then when PETITIONER exercised her right of locomotion by

automobile without knowing that the ‘driver’s license’ had been suspended, she

was immediately profiled as an ‘incompetent driver’ and a ‘criminal’ and

subjected to excessive police power, coercion, intimidation, prejudice,

harassment, arrest, assault, battery, kidnapping and false imprisonment by

law enforcement, executive and judicial agencies in clear violation of federal

and state constitutions.

PETITIONER has never been accused of operating under the influence of

any intoxicating chemicals nor of refusing to submit to a chemical test nor of

needing to submit to any chemical test nor of any type of negligent, unsafe or

reckless operation since the license was first issued in 1989.

RESPONDENT cannot lawfully require PETITIONER to obtain a license to

exercise a fundamental private liberty to travel in PETITIONER’s select method

of transportation on a free, open public roadway because those roadways are


reserved for public use and maintained by sovereign people as tenants in

common. The body politic STATE OF MAINE would not exist without the free

acknowledgement, support and participation by the free sovereign inhabitants.

INTRODUCTION

This action is being brought to challenge the authority of and decision by

STATE OF MAINE, SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE to

mandate, issue and then arbitrarily suspend license #1491178 on January 5,

2010 pursuant to Medical Rules 29-250, Ch. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) and 29-A

MRSA §2458(2)(D) despite RESPONDENT’s issuance of three (3) consecutive

years violation free credits for 2008, 2009 and 2010 and without having any

evidence that PETITIONER was incompetent to safely control an automobile or

that she posed any risk whatsoever to the public at large as clearly evidenced

by the administrative record filed by RESPONDENT on May 29, 2013.

PETITIONER does not object to RESPONDENT’s filing the administrative

record untimely because RESPONDENT’s tardy behavior proves beyond a

shadow of a doubt that RESPONDENT presumes they will receive bias and

favoritism, despite having thirty (30) years practice with Maine Rules of Civil

Procedure, which is prima facie evidence of the basic principle at the crux of

this petition – RESPONDENT and their agents routinely and habitually violate

the Maine Constitution and act outside the boundaries of law and fair play

presuming their behavior will be condoned, supported and justified by the

courts.

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A MRSA 1251(1)

states, “Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person commits an

offense of operating a motor vehicle without a license if that person operates a

motor vehicle on a public way or parking area:

A. Without being licensed. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E

crime, which is a strict liability crime

C. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for

more than 30 days but fewer than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is

a traffic infraction;


D. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State

for more than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime,

which is a strict liability crime

E. With a license issued by this State that expired within the

previous 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction.

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A MRSA §1251

(1-A) mandates every living man, woman and child over the age of sixteen (16)

who “[w]ithin 30 days of becoming a resident of this State…shall apply to obtain

a license in accordance with section 1301. Except as provided in section 510,

subsection 1, a person who fails to comply with the requirement of this

subsection and operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area

commits:

A. A traffic infraction if the person has been a resident for less than 90

days; or

B. A Class E crime if the person has been a resident for at least 90 days.

Evidently as shown by 29-A MRSA §1251, when the word “shall” is

used without any qualifiers or exceptions, the definition must be taken literally

and within the boundaries of the plain meaning rule which does declares the

possessing and enjoying the use of a ‘drivers license’ is not at all a privilege as

this court and other courts in this state have alleged and adjudicated.

“There exists no absolute right to obtain and hold a driver's license.

Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969). The driver's license is a

privilege to which certain rights and responsibilities attach and for valid reasons

involving public safety may be granted or withheld.” State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861,

863 (Me.1975); Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649.

Petitioner claims 29-A MRSA §1251 violates the Maine Constitution,

Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 24 in that mandatory licensing

under 29-A MRSA §1251 prohibits private, unregulated and unalienable use

of private property on all “public ways or parking areas” without having

physical possession of a proper “drivers license”, and which applies to all

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13952855048314725206&q=administrative&hl=en&as_sdt=2%2C10

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13952855048314725206&q=administrative&hl=en&as_sdt=2%2C10


private property defined as a “self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on

tracks but does not include:

A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001;

B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the

all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is

operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and

C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device.

Evidently, according to certain sections of Title 29-A of the Maine Revised

Statutes Annotated, it is a “traffic infraction” or a “strict liability crime” to obtain

private property as defined to be a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively

on tracks and to use it for its intended purpose outside the physical limits of

the owner’s private land without a proper “drivers license” even when that

property is not used for commercial purposes in compliance with 18 USC

§31(6).

A “public way” are roads which are financed by, created by, maintained

for and used by sovereign people of this state by paying certain administrative

fees, taxes, surcharges, and “remedial penalties” for “traffic infractions” and

“strict liability crimes”.

RESPONDENT suspending PETITIONER’s “drivers license” violates her

inherent unalienable right of possessing and enjoying private property in the

pursuit of and attempt to obtain basic safety and happiness into a “traffic

infraction” or “strict liability crime” depending solely on the length of time

residence is claimed to be within the boundaries of this state.

The alleged ‘administrative record’ submitted by RESPONDENT on May

29, 2013 is inconsistent, contradictory and does not justify RESPONDENT’s

successive repeated refusals to grant mandatory administrative hearings after

being notified by PETITIONER on March 18, 2013 that required notices and her

actual knowledge of authority and subject matter of the suspension, or her

right to an administrative hearing, did not occur until early March 2013.

RESPONDENT’s repeated refusal to grant compulsory pre-suspension

and post-restoration administrative hearings despite the uncontested facts of


the administrative record was contrary to law in that it was based on an

interpretation inconsistent with statutory and constitutional duties, was made

upon unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was

unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was arbitrary

and capricious.

RESPONDENT cannot suspend or revoke any license with arbitrary and

capricious motives without a shred of evidence to support the suspension and

without first following strict procedural due process as strictly required by the

Constitution.

RESPONDENT issuing PETITIONER violation free credits for years 2008,

2009 and 2010 does not justify any type of license suspension because clearly

no evidence exists of unsafe operation, obvious incompetence or of being any

type of danger to the public immediately prior to the administrative suspension

on January 5, 2010.

RESPONDENT’s sole purpose for communicating with PETITIONER in

November and December 2009 was to induce PETITIONER to comply with an

obligatory medical evaluation which was not provoked by any adverse reports

of unsafe operation or incompetency and which was a blatant violation of

PETITIONER’s freedom of religion, freedom of speech, rights against self

incrimination, illegal search and seizure, due process and equal protection.

The administrative record shows that PETITIONER did not receive two (2)

notices sent by RESPONDENT in November and December 2009 requiring her

submission to the unconstitutional medical evaluation and then initiating an

indefinite suspension for failure to comply with the medical evaluation request.

The administrative record does not indicate RESPONDENT complied with

5 MRSA §9052, 5 MRSA §10003(1), 5 MRSA §10004(3), or 29-A MRSA

§2482(1).

RESPONDENT coercively used 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D) to compel

PETITIONER to fulfill a compulsory and unconstitutional medical evaluation

and coercively forced her to revise her mailing address which was clearly

contrary to law in that it was a blatant violation of PETITIONER’s freedom of


speech, right against self incrimination, illegal search and seizure and equal

protection.

RESPONDENT’s actions were based on an interpretation inconsistent

with clearly expressed statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon

clearly unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was not

supported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was clearly

arbitrary and capricious.

PETITIONER affirms that, during a thorough and detailed review of the

record which was filed on May 29, 2013, PETITIONER noticed RESPONDENT

has submitted absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support or defend

their arbitrary and capricious actions suspending License #1491178 on

January 5, 2010 under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), stating PETITIONER “Is

incompetent to drive a motor vehicle”.

PETITIONER states that, as a matter of fact and which is abundantly

evidenced within the record as submitted by RESPONDENT, there IS evidence

of one or more of the following:

1. Governmental fraud.

2. Governmental complicity.

3. Governmental conspiracy to deprive PETITIONER of constitutionally

secured rights.

4. Intentionally or negligently falsifying or altering official public records.

5. Blatant incompetence or willful disregard for written laws, rules and

procedures.

PETITIONER outlines the following facts as filed with this court on May

29, 2013 by RESPONDENT,

Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, page 1 of STATE OF MAINE’s certification

“that the paper to which they attached is a true copy of the records of their office”

at the DEPARTMENT OF STATE as sworn to by SECRETARY OF STATE Matthew

Dunlap on May 22, 2013 under the GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE.


DRIVER RECORD REPORT-2 PRINTED 05/22/13 09:18:31

ENTRY

DATE

ACTION

DATE DESCRIPTION

05/29/07 05/25/07

CONVICTION – SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH

ZONE

VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB)

05/29/07 05/25/07 CONVICTION – VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW


01/01/10 12/31/09 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

03/08/11 12/31/10 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notification that the line item for

05/22/13 excerpt shows

CONVICTION – SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE

does in fact PRECEDE

CONVICTION – VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW

and

123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact MISSING.


Tab 3, BMV files, page 3, illustrated BELOW which was excerpted from

the record submitted by the RESPONDENT ,

DRIVER RECORD - REVIEW REQUESTED PRINTED 04/02/13 09:03:10

DELETE

DATE

ACTION

DATE DESCRIPTION

05/25/07 CONVICTION – VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW


05/25/07

CONVICTION – SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH

ZONE


123108 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009

122909 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809


030811 010510 DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL REQ

FL FILE MED EVAL

RESTORED: 03/08/11







and

123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact PROPERLY INCLUDED.


Tab 3, BMV files, page 3, illustrated BELOW which was excerpted from

the record submitted by the RESPONDENT,

DRIVER RECORD - REVIEW REQUESTED PRINTED 03/20/13 09:43:58

DELETE

DATE

ENTRY

DATE

ACTION

DATE DESCRIPTION

05/29/07 05/25/07

CONVICTION – VIOLATION SEAT BELT

LAW

VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07

(002153985/D-VB)

05/29/07 05/25/07

CONVICTION – SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A

65 MPH ZONE

VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07

(002153985/D-VB)

010109 123108 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

111009 111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009

122909 122909 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809


030811 110109 010510 DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL

REQ

FL FILE MED EVAL

RESTORED: 03/08/11


[diagonal line part of official record]






and

123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact PROPERLY INCLUDED.


It should be obvious to the reader that a serious discrepancy and error

has occurred in the maintenance of official motor vehicle records and which

does in fact significantly compromise the integrity of RESPONDENT’s evidence

and motivation to prosecute PETITIONER.

It is evidenced within this record under Tab 2, Certified Driving Record,

that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was issued ONLY 2 YEARS

VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2009 and 2010.

It is also evidenced within this record, in two distinct locations under

Tab 3, BMV files, that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was in fact

properly issued 3 YEARS VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2008, 2009

and 2010.

PETITIONER states that she was previously employed full time, in good

standing, by STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE from January

2007 through April 2008 in the OUI/Habitual Offender Unit which did in fact

afford PETITIONER with expertise, a thorough education, comprehensive

knowledge and special skills to expertly and correctly assess a driver record

and its individual line items.

PETITIONER affirms that the information under Tab 3, BMV files, is

perfectly accurate.

PETITIONER alleges that the information under Tab 2, Certified Driving

Record, was intentionally falsified or negligently erroneous in order to weaken

PETITIONER’s affirmative defenses and her likelihood of prevailing in this case

and its criminal companion case.

PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENT’s efforts to cloud the court’s

judgment through filing deceptive and fraudulent records of evidence has been

unsuccessful in spite of their exacerbated efforts to prevent PETITIONER from

exercising her lawful, constitutionally-guaranteed rights.

The alleged administrative record shows that the violation free credit

issued for year 2010 was in fact issued on March 8, 2011 which is the same

day RESPONDENT restored the license without requiring reinstatement fees,

civil sanctions or administrative charges after PETITIONER filed a completed


medical evaluation from PETITIONER’s doctor affirming “minimal/no risk” of

unsafe operation for any medical issues.

RESPONDENT restoring the license without reinstatement fees, civil

sanctions or any administrative charges and immediately issuing violation free

credits on March 8, 2011 for 2010 are two pieces of prima facie evidence that

the “medical suspension” is not now, and never has been, a “traffic violation” or

“strict liability crime” and which has no assigned civil or criminal penalty of

any kind and cannot be used as a prior offense under 29-A MRSA §2412-A.

Upon RESPONDENT restoring the license on March 8, 2011 with medical

affirmation of competency, PETITIONER demanded removal of all “medical

restrictions” from the license which were revealed to still be active many

months later violating the equal protection clause and requiring a second

demand for removal retroactive to March 8, 2011.

Upon further review, PETITIONER observed that RESPONDENT still has

not removed the medical restriction from license 1491178 and which now

shows a mandatory evaluation date of 2014 in clear violation of PETITIONER’s

right to equal protection under the constitution and laws of this state.

An incorrect mailing address is not by itself, and cannot be used as any

evidence of incompetency rising to the level of being a threat to public safety, or

being any type of justification for suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch.

3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) and 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D), without being combined

with adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation.

RESPONDENT erred when they knowingly and willfully failed to provide

ample public notice of an alleged threat to public safety, knowingly failing to

consult the medical advisory board prior to suspending the license, nor does

the RESPONDENT’s administrative record have any clear convincing evidence

to justify a suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3)

and 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D) all of which violated many constitutional

protections.

RESPONDENT violated the Maine Constitution, as well as 5 MRSA

§10004(3), by extending the administrative suspension beyond 30 days totaling


427 days and then again violating those same constitutional protections when

it failed to notify PETITIONER on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand

administrative hearings when PETITIONER completed and submitted the

required medical evaluation.

RESPONDENT’s decision to illegally extend the January 5, 2010 medical

suspension beyond the clear statutory limitation of 30 days was the direct and

proximate cause for PETITIONER being prosecuted on July 5, 2011 for a ‘strict

liability crime’ under 29-A MRSA §2412-A with violation dates of February 10,

2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-512 dismissed) and March 7, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-

513 guilty via coerced illegal plea agreement).

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice of the fact that if the

RESPONDENT had adhered to the strict guidelines of MRSA, and particularly

to 5 MRSA §10004(3) and had released the medical suspension on the 31st day,

then PETITIONER would not have been charged and convicted of operating

after suspension in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 nor would the pending companion

case AUGSC-CR-2012-286 be whatsoever pending or in existence.

PETITIONER filed a timely request for post-conviction review of the

coerced plea agreement for AUGDC-CR-2011-513 on July 6, 2012 which was

denied in September 2012; PETITIONER filed an immediate request for

reconsideration which was denied in November 2012.

PETITIONER was not informed by RESPONDENT and was unaware of the

statutory authority for the medical suspension on January 5, 2010, or her

rights attached thereto, because she never received or saw any written notice

from RESPONDENT until March 2013 while reviewing evidence for pending

action AUGSC-CR-2012-286.

PETITIONER instantly demanded proper administrative hearings to

challenge RESPONDENT’s statutory authority to suspend the license in

January 2010 under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) and 29-A

MRSA §2458(2)(D) without any clear convincing evidence on the record, nor

receiving adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation.

RESPONDENT knowingly and willfully violated protections of the Maine


Constitution when refusing, three times, to grant administrative hearings upon

PETITIONER’s proper written requests in March and April 2013 at all times

indicating PETITIONER’s demands were made untimely but without providing

clear and convincing evidence that PETITIONER had received actual notice or

knowledge on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand administrative hearings.

RESPONDENT knowingly violated protections of the Maine Constitution

when suspending license 1491178 for incompetency without clear evidence of

adverse operation, failing to provide notice or preliminary hearing, retaining

suspension beyond clearly stated statutory limitations, and refusing to provide

administrative hearings thrice demanded in March and April 2013.

Double jeopardy was effectively invoked when criminal charges were

illegally filed and successfully prosecuted on July 5, 2011 under 29-A §MRSA

2412-A(1)(A) via a coerced plea agreement resulting directly from the medical

suspension of January 5, 2010 and being the direct proximate cause for the

pending action under AUGSC-CR-12-286 and which prompted this 80C action.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED

1. WHETHER 29-A MRSA §1251, 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA

§2412(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION.

2. WHETHER THREE YEARS CONSECUTIVE VIOLATION FREE CREDITS EARNED DIRECTLY PRIOR TO SUSPENSION IS EVIDENCE OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D).

3. WHETHER INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS CLEAR CONVINCING

EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D).

4. WHETHER RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO

PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

5. WHETHER RESPONDENT CONSULTED MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRIOR TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D).


6. WHETHER RESPONDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD HAD CLEAR

CONVINCING EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING LICENSE SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D).

7. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN

SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D)WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.

8. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 MRSA §10004(3) BY

EXTENDING ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION ON JANUARY 5, 2010 BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427 DAYS ENDING ON MARCH 8, 2011.

9. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS ON MARCH 8,

2011 BY FAILING TO NOTIFY PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.

10. WHETHER RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS

WHEN REPEATEDLY REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.

11. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN

SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.

12. WHETHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL

CHARGES WERE FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND PETITIONER is one of the freeborn, living, breathing, sovereign

inhabitants of the republic of Maine.

PETITIONER has given lawful and properly certified notice reclaiming

and redeeming her sovereign status effectively nullifying all unlawful contracts

in May 2012, hereby attached to this Motion as exhibits, those notifications

consisting of Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of


Authority, Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed and a certified

copy of the Certificate of Live Birth, to the following governmental and court

authorities:

a. STATE OF MAINE, DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF

VITAL RECORDS, 244 Water Street, STATE HOUSE STATION #11,

AUGUSTA, MAINE

b. Magistrate, Kennebec County Probate Court, 95 State Street, Augusta,

Maine

c. Charles E. Summers, Jr., 148 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333

d. William J. Schneider, 6 State House Station, Augusta, ME 04333-0006

e. Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, 400 Michigan

Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D.C. 20017

f. U.S. Attorney General, Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, U.S.

Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

20530-0001

g. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C

Street NW, Washington, DC 20520

On August 23, 2012, PETITIONER certified mailed Writ of Mandamus

and Replevin, hereby attached to this brief as exhibits, to the following

governmental authorities:

Mike Pool, Director, Bureau of Land Management Washington Office,

1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5665, Washington DC 20240

Carole Carter-Pfisterer, Assistant Director, Bureau of Land Management,

Human Capital Management , 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5611,

Washington, DC 20240

Department of Health and Human Services, Vital Records, SHS #11,

Augusta Maine

PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since

February 3,1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to


request a ‘drivers license’ whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to

travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes without

being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.

PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since

February 3, 1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to

request ‘vehicle registration plates’ whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign

right to travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes

without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.

Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 repeals ‘drivers license’

requirements for common law reasons which can be found here:

http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm

11/15/10: House Prefiled; 01/12/2011: House First Readers; 01/24/2011:

House Second Readers; to wit:

Free people have a common law and constitutional right to travel on the

roads and highways that are provided by their government for that

purpose. Licensing of drivers cannot be required of free people because

taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of an

inalienable right;

In England in 1215, the right to travel was enshrined in Article 42 of

Magna Carta: It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of

our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water,

saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short

space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and

outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation

at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above.

Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the

State of Georgia are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation

that would abrogate these rights. The claim and exercise of a constitutional

right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no sanction or penalty

imposed upon an individual because of this exercise of constitutional

rights;

http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm%2011/15/2010


American citizens have the inalienable right to use the roads and

highways unrestricted in any manner so long as they are not damaging or

violating property or rights of others. The government, by requiring the

people to obtain drivers' licenses, is restricting, and therefore violating, the

people's common law and constitutional right to travel;

In Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Potter Stewart noted

in a concurring opinion that the right to travel "is a right broadly assertable

against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right

of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by

the Constitution to us all." The Articles of Confederation had an explicit

right to travel; and we hold that the right to travel is so fundamental that

the Framers thought it was unnecessary to include it in the Constitution or

the Bill of Rights;

The right to travel upon the public highways is not a mere privilege which

may be permitted or prohibited at will but the common right which every

citizen has under his or her right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under

normal conditions, travel at his or her inclination along the public

highways or in public places while conducting himself or herself in an

orderly and decent manner; and

Thus, the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the citizens' right

to travel upon the public roads by passing legislation forcing the citizen to

waive the right and convert that right into a privilege.

PETITIONER peacefully asserts her sovereignty and personal liberty to

freely possess private property liberated from all governmental interferences

and encumbrances which is a guaranteed right to every citizen under our

Constitution and common equity laws.

RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a

fundamental liberty of not-for-hire traveling.


fundamental liberty of possessing private property.



fundamental liberty of using one’s own personal property as one deems

suitable.

RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise one’s right to

use public highways for private non-commercial traveling in one’s conveyance

of free choice.

RESPONDENT cannot require “enrollment” of private data into

RESPONDENT’s “registration records”.

Any person who travels in an automobile which is not registered, without

‘proper vehicle registration plates’, and who uses that private unregistered

conveyance for private travel purposes does in fact put herself at very high risk

for being arrested and imprisoned for failure to do a thing which patently

violates Bill of Rights, 4th Amendment and Maine Constitution, Article 1,

Section 5 protections against unlawful search and seizure of persons, papers

and things, “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and

possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures”.

29-A MRSA §1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENT’s willful

infringement of protections under the Maine Constitution.

Any person who registers an automobile or obtains a license with the

RESPONDENT complies reluctantly only under duress, blatant intimidation,

willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental

corruption.

Any person who innocently fails or knowingly refuses to comply with

registration and licensing rules and who exercises the right of locomotion by

automobile is immediately categorized as a ‘criminal’ and subjected to

intimidation, harassment, arrest, assault and kidnapping by law enforcement

and judicial agencies in violation of federal and state constitutional protections.

A person’s right to locomotion is a sacred right beholden to everyone.

A license is a grant or permission that is often assigned and documented

by way of a piece of paper which affords the licensee to do an act that would

otherwise be unlawful.


Exercising one’s right to travel and right to locomotion has never been

‘unlawful’.

Being sovereign has never been ‘unlawful’.


fundamental liberty to travel in one’s chosen conveyance on a free, open public

way which is reserved for use by the sovereign people as tenants in common.

17-A MRSA §2(19). Definitions state an "organization" means “a

corporation, partnership or unincorporated association”.

17-A MRSA §2(20). Definitions state a "person" means “a human being

or an organization”.

RESPONDENT, State of Maine, Secretary of State is a legal corporation

and a registered corporate person.

17 MRSA §2931. Prohibition. “A person may not, by force or threat of

force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally attempt to

injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other

person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that

person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States

Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Section 2 of the Bill of Rights clarifies “that all power is vested in, and

consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and

servants, and at all times amenable to them”.

Article 1, Section 2 of the Maine Constitution, states, “All power is

inherent in the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and

instituted for their benefit; they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible

right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same,

when their safety and happiness require it.”

Article 4 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article

1, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution, declares, “The people shall be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable

searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person

or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be searched,


and the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause -- supported by

oath or affirmation.”

RESPONDENT has violated and prevented due process of law.

RESPONDENT has violated PETITIONER’s constitutionally protected

rights.

RESPONDENT has unclean hands and cannot prevail pursuant to

maxims of law.

Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals

1959, “This Court has held that there is no such license known to Texas law as

a "driver's license". See Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400;

Brooks v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 546, 258 S.W.2d 317.”

Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals

1953, “The information upon which this conviction was predicated alleged that

appellant ‘did then and there unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon

a public highway … while his … drivers license was suspended.’

In Hassell v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400, 401, we said:

"There being no such license as a `driver's' license known to the

law, it follows that the information, in charging the driving of a

motor vehicle upon a public highway without such a license,

charges no offense." See also Holloway v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

237 S.W.2d 303.

Because the information fails to charge an offense, the judgment is

reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.”

ARGUMENT

A. 29-A MRSA §1251, 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA §2412(1-A)(A)

AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION.

29-A MRSA §1251, 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA §2412(1-A)(A)

AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 violate PETITIONER’s rights to possess,

enjoy and protect private property under Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 9, and

24 of the Maine Constitution as well as PETITIONER being required to report

PETITIONER’s medical conditions being a violation of PETITIONER’s natural


rights as protected by Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-A, 9, 19 and 24 in that

RESPONDENT forces PETITIONER to ‘speak’ PETITIONER’s medical condition

and then RESPONDENT ‘seizes’ PETITIONER’s medical records for

RESPONDENT’s review so RESPONDENT can seize PETITIONER’s alleged

‘privilege to drive’ which is masked as a statutory mandate at RESPONDENT’s

command after being required to get a ‘drivers license’ to use PETITIONER’s

private property on public roads which are paid for, maintained and used by

the public (PETITIONER), and when RESPONDENT requires PETITIONER’s

medical conditions to be disclosed pursuant to Motor Vehicle Rules as

PETITIONER legally complied with, RESPONDENT then imposes excessive

penalties and punishments outside of the realm of reasonable proportions and

turns the innocent mistake, which does not rise to the offense of a civil action,

into a criminal offense and then denies PETITIONER’s right to redress

PETITIONER’s injuries with RESPONDENT about the original medical reporting

requirement and basis for their alleged authority for their subsequent

suspension for innocently forgetting to disclose PETITIONER’s physical

whereabouts every thirty days while PETITIONER was unwillingly transient.

B. RECEIPT OF VIOLATION FREE CREDITS DOES NOT JUSTIFY ANY TYPE

OF SUSPENSION.

This argument wins on its own.

C. AN INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS NOT CLEAR EVIDENCE OF

INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO

PUBLIC SAFETY OR JUSTIFICATION FOR SUSPENSION UNDER

MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA

§2458(2)(D) .

There is no legal precedent supporting a suspension imposed under 29-A

MRSA §2458(2)(D) for innocently forgetting to change an address when


not coupled with other dangerous or negligent actions.

D. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC

NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

If RESPONDENT had posted mandatory public notice in November and

December 2009 of the impending suspension of license 1491178 on

January 5, 2010, PETITIONER’s family and friends who read the local

news religiously would have promptly notified PETITIONER of the public

notice and PETITIONER would have promptly changed her address and

complied with the medical evaluation request under duress and

RESPONDENT’s fraudulent coercive tactics.

E. RESPONDENT DID NOT CONSULT MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRIOR

TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5

MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D) VIOLATING THE DUE

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

There is no evidence that RESPONDENT consulted with the Medical

Advisory Board or any other medical professional in consultation about

PETITIONER’s incompetency prior to suspending the license.

F. RESPONDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD DOES NOT HAVE ANY

CLEAR EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES

29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D)

VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONER’s claims

of constitutional violations.


G. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL

RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA §10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA §2458(2)(D)

WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR EVIDENCE OF

DANGEROUS VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL

ADVISORY BOARD.

The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONER’s claims

of constitutional violations.

H. RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 MRSA §10004(3) BY EXTENDING

ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427

DAYS.

The evidence speaks for itself in that the RESPONDENT had no basis to

preserve this suspension for 427 days despite its alleged authority.

I. RESPONDENT ERRED ON MARCH 8, 2011 WHEN FAILING TO NOTIFY

PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.

RESPONDENT had an obligation on March 8, 2011 to verbally notify

PETITIONER of her rights to an administrative hearing and the authority

of the suspension upon their recorded knowledge that postal mail had

twice been returned to them and that PETITIONER had no actual

knowledge of said notices or the contents therein.

J. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN

REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.

This argument needs no explanation.


K. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN

SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO

PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING

SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO

PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE

DEMANDED IN 2013.

RESPONDENT has no evidence to justify any type of suspension and

then failing to properly notify PETITIONER of her rights and then denying

PETITIONER’s rights to be heard after discovering two years later that

RESPONDENT had deemed PETITIONER incompetent without just or

good cause, evidence, facts or opinions to support any such sentiment or

judgment.

L. DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE

FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 UNDER

29-A §MRSA 2412-A(1)(A) RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL

SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE

CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.

PETITIONER was prosecuted in separate criminal proceedings on July 5,

2011 under coercive tactics by former A.D.A Steven Parker with full

knowledge that the medical suspension had been DELETED FROM THE

RECORD and continued to intimidate PETITIONER with excessive fines,

an expressed and clear intention to seek imprisonment and punitive

damages if PETITIONER did not agree to a plea agreement, which

PETITIONER unwillingly agreed to and expressly reserved her

unalienable rights on and for the record on July 5, 2011 in open court.

RELIEF REQUESTED

1. Declaratory judgment that RESPONDENT violated PETITIONER's rights

and protections of the Maine Constitution Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4,

5, 6, 6-A, 8, 9, 19 and 24.

2. Void AUGDC-CR-2011-512/513 and directly refund all related monies.

3. Void all open and closed related companion cases in superior, district

and violation bureau courts.

4. Release bail bond ($300) and bail conditions for AUGSC-CR-20 12-286.

5. Order RESPONDENT to remove and delete the medical restriction on

license # 1491178 which is scheduled for review in 2014.

6. Order RESPONDENT to flag license #1491178ME as "DO NOT STOP"

on the national driver registry on grounds of religious freedom.

7. Give PETITIONER leave to file civil rights suit against RESPONDENT.

8. All other legal, punitive, and compensatory remedies as deemed just.

9. All other equitable remedies as deemed just and appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Common law has returned. Maritime law has gone back out to sea.

PETITIONER stands on solid ground with absolute clean hands, no evidence

of malevolent motives or behaviors, with full transparency and truth, under

GOD's LAW ONLY and rejecting all man-made statutory laws which violate

her natural rights and explicit protections of those rights expressed in the

Maine Constitution.

The time has come for all men and women to speak the truth, honor

the truth, speak only facts with full transparency and complete accountability

when errors and mistakes are committed. When injuries occur, the injured

has full rights to require redress and remedy of those injuries despite the

alleged immunity against prosecution for negligent, capricious, arbitrary and

blatantly illegal use of words under GOD:t':d cd~~aw d:s:~~ed herein.

DATED: July 15, 2013 ~ ~ Gina Lynn Turcotte
