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Beckett v. Judge SarmientoNature: The case was earlier filed by an Australian national in relation to a child custody case. “With these, we see no reason to sustain the charge against respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law. For clearly, absent any evidence to the contrary, Geoffrey Jr. chose to live with his mother for a reason, which respondent judge, consistent with the promotion of the best interest of the child, provisionally granted through the issuance of the disputed March 15, 2011 order,” the decision reads.Earlier, Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian national filed a complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against the respondent for gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty pertaining to the latter’s decision in relation to the special proceedings case entitled Geoffrey Beckett v. Eltesa Densing Beckett.In his complaint, Beckett said he was married to Eltesa, a Filipina, on June 29, 2001. However, their union from the start was “far from ideal” and eventually became worst after they sued each other.In 2006, he said Eltesa filed a case against him for violence against women and children act and a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Sarmiento handled the said cases.On September 25, 2006, Judge Sarmiento rendered a decision based on a compromise agreement of the parties where both agreed that the father be given full and permanent custody of their child, Geoffrey Jr., then five years old, and subject to the visitorial rights of Eltesa.In the Christmas of 2010, Geoffrey said he consented that their child will stay with Eltesa provided that the child be returned on January 9, 2011.However, their child remained with Eltesa despite the date they agreed upon prompting the father to file a case against Eltesa.During the pre-trial of the case on March 15, 2011, Geoffrey said he saw the close friend of Eltesa go inside the chamber of the respondent and in open court, the latter then issued an order giving Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr. and directed the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a social case study on the child.Because of the order of the respondent, Geoffrey filed a motion for reconsideration citing respondent could no longer grant provisional custody to Eltesa citing it was in contrast with its earlier ruling based on a compromise agreement.In its reply before the OCA, the respondent denied the complainant’s allegation. He said on June 21, 2011, he denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Geoffrey based on the report of the DSWD recommending the child “be in the care and custody of the mother” contrary to its statement.After respondent’s reply, the OCA then recommended that the respondent “be adjudged liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined with stern warning.”The ruling came after respondent issued an order granting the provisional custody of the child to its mother when Sarmineto already issued an earlier ruling that the child will be in the full and permanent custody of the father.“Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata (a matter already judged),” the OCA decision reads.However, in the ruling, Velasco found no mistake in the decision of the respondent citing it’s the choice of the child where to stay.“Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr. in favor of his mother, did not disregard the res judicata rule. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over seven years of age, the child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit,” the decision reads.

Velasco added when the child refused to be turned over to his father he was then over seven years old and has the capacity of deciding with whom he wanted to stay. DISMISSED

xxxxxx

Yasin v. ShariaFACTS:On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the petitioners it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname. ISSUE:whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to

use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

xxxxxBar Matter (Josephine Uy)Doctrine: Change of Surname back to the maiden name is possible. This case is similar with the Yasin Case where petitioner that the use of the word “may” in the above provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory.

Marriage does not change a woman's name, it merely changes her civil status.  Her true and real name is that given to her and entered in the Civil Registry which she may continue to use despite her marriage or cessation of marriage for whatever reason she may have.

Josephine P. Uy-Timosa praying that she be allowed to use her maiden name, Josephine P. Uy, in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations.

Petitioner alleged that, despite her marriage, she has continuously used her maiden name in all her transactions, except in her school records and those in the Commission on Higher Education and other offices.  However, all her records in the University of Santo Tomas reflect her maiden name.

Petitioner further alleged that she and her husband have been separated since May 2000 and that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Manila.  The case is set to be submitted for decision on August 1, 2006.

Thus, petitioner requests that she be allowed to use her maiden name considering the impossibility of facilitating on time the amendment of her surname appearing in all the records concerned.

We grant petitioner's request. GRANTED

Article 370 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:(1)     Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2)     Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3)     Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

This provision clearly indicates that the wife's use of her husband's surname is optional, not obligatory.  Following; is the explanation given by the prominent civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino:

Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory.  We have no law which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage.  This in is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.  It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only her maiden name and surname.  She has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article."The Court adopted this view in Yasin v. Judge, Shari'a District Court, thus:

"Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after the annulment of marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory x x x.

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name.  The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).  Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change

in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.  When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.  Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it."

Clearly, petitioner has the right to use her maiden name Jospehine P. Uy in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations.

Section 14, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men".  This is our nation's response to the increasing clamor of women worldwide for gender equality.  Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, in her Concurring Opinion in Yasin, expounded that if this constitutional provision means anything at all, "it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage."

ACCORDINGLY, we GRANT petitioner's request to use her maiden name Josephine P. Uy in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations.

xxxxx

Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs614 SCRA 281Procedural HistoryThe case is about a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the President dated May 27, 2005 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President and in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying the petitioner’s request to revert to the use of her maiden name in the issuance of a renewed passport. Statement of FactsThe petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipina whose passport was expiring on October 27, 2000. The following entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name and “Remo” as her middle name. Petitioner who at that time her marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs in Chicago, Illinois.On August 28, 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota denied the request to revert the use of her maiden name, thus stating; that the Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these conditions. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000. The Office of the President also dismissed the appeal on July 27, 2004. IssueWhether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport. Answer

Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she should not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.ReasoningIn Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court, petitioner therein filed with the Sharia District Court a “Petition to resume the use of maiden name” in view of the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. Petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, petitioner’s marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.

No conflict between Civil Code and RA 8239 Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Yasin case not in point Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.

Special law prevails over general law Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory

construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. Implied repeals are disfavored Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

HoldingThe court denied the petition due to unjustified changes in one’s name and identity in a passport.

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Heirs of Go vs. Servacio 

General Rule: Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated upon termination of marriage by the death of a spouse. If the surviving spouse sells a portion of the conjugal property without prior liquidation, the sale is void. Exception: This CaseDOCTRINE: The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights. FACTS:  On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio

B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,

whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).

In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.

On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).

On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand.

They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property. PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal

property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.

Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money.

RTC’s RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale. o However, declared the property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property

of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina).

o The participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta.

o Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

 ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? – NO RULING:  

Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. 

Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code: 

Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the   Civil Code   or other laws, as provided in Article 256 . (n)

 The CPG established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.

 However, the CPG must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.  So the proper action is not for the nullification of the sale and the recovery of the 5,560 square meters of land sold. The proper recourse of the heirs is an action for Partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the meanwhile supposed to be vendee would only be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her which can be determined only when the liquidation or partition is over. If it turns out upon liquidation that the 5,568 square meters sold to her is more that the portions allotted to the vendors, then vendee should return the excess. The heirs shall not be barred by prescription or laches. 

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court. xxxx

Ninal vs. Bayadog

Procedural History: This case is an original petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito Niñal to Norma Bayadog under the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59. Norma, the respondent, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father‘s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.

Statement of facts: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.  They had 3 children—Babyline Niñal, Ingrid Niñal, Archie Niñal and Pepito Niñal Jr.—the petitioners.  Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985.  1 year and 8 months later on December 11, 1986, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage licence.  They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.  Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1997.  After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

Issues:   1.  Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void.2.  Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of

Pepito’s marriage and even after his death.Answers:1. Yes, the second marriage of Pepito was void for absence of marriage licence.2. Yes, the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage.

The marriage will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts upon mere proof of facts even after the latter’s death.

Reasoning:Even though Pepito and Norma instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years, the marriage would not be valid because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito and his first wife may had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.  Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.  It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Holding:  The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

xxxx

De Mijares v. Villaluz

Facts; Respondent a Justice of the Court of Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant and is being recommended for suspension from practice of law.

Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married each other pending the court's decision on the former's marriage. However, their relationship was shortlived as right after the marriage, the complainant left their would-be-honeymoon place after some unbearable utterances made by the respondent. Several months after, the complainant learned that respondent a subsequently married a certain Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint.

Issue; WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law.

Ruling; Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court found the respondent engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and recommends SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.

The mere admission of the respondent of contracting the marriage with thecomplainant while knowingly his first marriage subsists and then married another woman after said marriage with

complainant is a gross misconduct. His claim that he married complainant to protect her from the administrative charge against her is unfounded since one cannot correct a wrong by doing another wrongful act. Finding the respondent morally unfit in the practice of the law profession, the court upheld the recommendation of Justice Purisima.

xxxx

Suntay vs. Suntay

Facts: Emilio I, who predeceased his parents, is a legitimate son of Federico and Cristina. Emilio III is the illegitimate son of Emilio I. However, Emilio III was adopted by Federico and Cristina.

Issue: Whether or not Emilio III is allowed to inherit despite the prohibition of an illegitimate grandson to inherit from the grandparents.

Ruling: Yes, Emilio III is allowed to inherit from Federico because Emilio was adopted by Federico making the former a legitimate heir of the later.

In her "Motion to Resolve Respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay's Motion For Reconsideration" (Motion To Resolve) dated 11 July 2011, respondent Isabel Cojuangco mentioned that petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III, at the time that he was administrator of the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, "did not file an inventory of the assets xxx until 14 November 2002" and "the inventory that was submitted, did not include several properties of the decedent" and that properties belonging to the decedent "have found their way to different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself," while "some properties have found their way to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, petitioner in this case; by reason of falsified documents '' as specified in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Motion To Resolve.

WHEREFORE, this Court RESOLVES  to REQUIRE petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III to submit within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution his COMMENT on the foregoing statements made by the respondent.

The Court further resolves to:

1. NOTE petitioner's comment dated 27 July 2011 on respondent’s motion to resolve dated 11 July 2011; and 

2. NOTE and DENY for lack of merit petitioner's respectful motion/request for the inhibition of Justice Roberto A. Abad dated 19 August 2011.

PAGE 21

Lack of Digest: 1. People v De Guzman (March 200) and 2. Espinosa v. Omana

Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (―respondent Tadeo‖) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (―petitioner Diana‖).

Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations:

During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister‘s house or would play tennis the whole day

When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband

On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling.

In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent‘s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling

The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent

- Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action .

ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana

HELD: YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission as seen in facts

FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS

Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage – petition does not need to show (NOT) root cause since only experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of physical incapacity RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

SIMPLIFICATION

DIANA contends that the 2nd petition of his husband is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there

is no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. (only experts can determine the root cause and at times they couldn’t determine it). What the new Rules require the petition to allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Second petition of Tadeo complies with this requirement. (he has stated in his petition facts to support his claim – stated in the FACTS)

xxxx

Buenaventura vs. CA

Facts:

Sps Leonardo Joaquin & Feliciano Landrito are the parents of petitioners. Petitioners assail the sale of several lands by their parents to their other siblings (see p. 265 for complete list of sales made) for being void ab initio based on the ff grounds:1. no actual valid consideration2. properties are more than 3x more valuable than the measly purchase price (purchase

price was grossly inadequate)3. deeds of sale do not reflect & express the true intent of the parties4. deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs of

their legitime. Defense of the respondents:

1. no cause of action, requisite standing & interest2. sales were w/sufficient considerations & made by their parents voluntarily in good faith &

w/full knowledge of the consequences3. certificates of title were issued w/factual & legal basis.

Trial court dismissed the case WRT Gavino Joaquin & Lea Asis. Ruled in favor of the respondents & dismissed the complaint. 1. The rt of the compulsory heirs to a legitime is contingent & it only commences from the

moment of the death of the decedent (CC Art. 777). The value of the property left at the death of the testator is the basis for determining the legitime (Art. 908). Plaintiffs cannot claim an impairment of their legitime since their parents are still alive.

2. Deeds of Sale were executed for valuable consideration. CA affirmed Trial Court decision. In addition to the grounds stated by the trial court, CA also

mentioned that:1. While still alive, parents are free to dispose of their properties provided such is not done

in fraud of creditors. 2. Petitioners are not parties in interest since they’re not parties to the deeds of sale nor

are they creditors of their parents.

Issues & Ratio:

1. WON petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. – NO.

The complaint betrays their motive for filing the case. They are interested in obtaining the properties by hereditary succession but they have failed to show any legal right to these properties.

Real party-in-interest is one who is either benefited or injured by the judgment of the party entitled to the avails of the suit. This includes parties to the agreement or are bound either principally/subsidiarily. Parties must have a present substantial interest & not merely expectancy/future contingent subordinate or consequential interest.

In this case, the petitioners only have an inchoate rt w/c vests only upon the death of their parents. Besides, sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate since the lots are replaced with cash of equivalent value.

2. WON the deeds of sale are void for lack of consideration. – NO. A contract of sale is not a real contract but a consensual contract. It’s binding & valid upon

the meeting of the minds as to the price regardless of the manner of payment or breach of such. It’s still valid even if the real price is not stated in the contract, making it subject to reformation. But if the price is simulated, there is no meeting of the minds, thus the contract is void (CC Art. 1471).

Act of payment of the price does not determine the validity of a contract of sale. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a rt to demand fulfillment or cancellation of the contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the deeds of sale were simulated. They don’t even know the financial capacity of their siblings to buy these lots. Respondents’ minds met as to the purchase price w/c was stated in the deeds of sale & the buyer siblings have paid the price to their parents.

3. WON the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of the price. – NO. CC Art. 1355: Except in cases specified by law, lesion/ INADEQUACY OF CAUSE shall not

invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. CC Art. 1470: Gross inadequacy of price doesn’t affect a contract of sale, except as may

indicate a defect in the consent or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.

Petitioners failed to prove any instance in the aforementioned provisions that would invalidate the deeds of sale. There is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the property on sale. It only matters that all respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave.

Vales vs. Villa: Courts cannot be guardians of people who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because a person has been defeated/overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome ILEGALLY. There should be a violation of the law, commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation & remedy it.

HOLDING: CA affirmed.

PAGE 22

*Beckett v. Judge Sarmiento, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013- Supra Case

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*SSS v. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the

same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved

had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,” as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

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*Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD: Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid. DENIED

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*Arca v. Javier, G.R. No. L-6768, July 31, 1954

On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on board a ship of the United States Navy, for it appears that he had joined the United States Navy since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca, defendant Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Because of defendant Alfredo

Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife, Salud R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and transfer her residence to (Maragondon), Cavite — her native place Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA. Having received a copy of the complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September 23, 1940 although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other things that defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the period of twelve months preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was a resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United States at that time and she was not with him then it was because he was in active duty as an enlisted man of the United States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the United States without her. She further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he had always supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied, furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite, and their separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about 10,000 miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her husband if the latter has gone to ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her answer, contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by defendant Alfredo Javier, nevertheless the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriage of Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce dated April 9, 1941. Thereupon, the evidence discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines but went back to the United States.

In July, 1941 after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941 — defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and bought a house and lot New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950.

At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310. However, defendant Alfredo Javier was

acquitted of the charge of Bigamy predicated on the proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA which had the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant Alfredo Javier and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal due to the fact that the accused had no criminal intent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first marriage was still subsisting.

ISSUE: Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction?

With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of majority, we do not need to consider it here.

It was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson, 67 Phil., 207, which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that case, John Canson claimed not only that he had legal residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was brought, but he was an American citizen, although it was proven that his wife never accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that "it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."

It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.

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*Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355

FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita

Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

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*Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

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*Somera v. Pilapil, 174 SCRA 663

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit

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*Quita v. CA, 300 SCRA 406

Fact of the Case: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van

Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.

Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their country’s national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo

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*Llorente v. CA, 345 SCRA 592

Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzo’s will would encroach her legitime.

Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition.

The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). “Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.

Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining. Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. “ Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”

But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzo’s Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no

such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state.

As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

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*Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437

FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD: The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy

The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

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*Diego v. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67

a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single;

b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a “Decree of Divorce” and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was “ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.”

c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.

Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law

Held: Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust.[9] This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law

WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

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*RP v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005

Article 26 of the Family Code – Divorce

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC.

HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.

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*San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007

Facts: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was previously the governor of the Province of Laguna. During the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who later obtained a decree granting absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up to the time of his death.

After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate. A petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City.

The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) venue was improperly laid since the petition should be filed in Laguna where Felicisimo was the elected governor; (2) Respondent does not have legal capacity to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the decree of absolute decree is not binding in the Philippines.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Issues:

1. Whether venue was properly laid.

2. Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

1. Venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate should be filed in the RTC of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death”. In the case of Garcia Fule v. CA, we laid down the rule that for determining venue, the residence of the decedent is determining. Residence for settlement of estate purposes means his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

2. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse. However, the respondent was not able to provide sufficient documentation to prove the decree of divorce obtained in Hawaii.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties acquired during their cohabitation. The case is therefore remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

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*Amor-Catalan v. CA, G.R. No. 167109, Feb. 6, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. RTC judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza.Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence petition for review.

ISSUE:W/N defendants Orlando Catalan and Merope Braganza contracted a bigamous marriage

The records show that there was no competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are:(1) Absolute divorce or avinculo matrimonii -terminates the marriage(2) Limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines:

[1] In Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope

[2] In Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents. However, if there was indeeda divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus: Freed from their existing

marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of:[1] Divorce decree[2] Foreign law…allowing it Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for receptionof additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage

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*Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.

Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Ruling: No.

Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.

However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign

divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.

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*Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

The Supreme Court applied Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas in reinstating petitioner Fujiki’s (a Japanese national) petition for judicial recognition before the RTC of Quezon City of a foreign judgment obtained in Japan by Fujiki’s wife Marinay (Fujiki & Marinay married in 2004) declaring Marinay’s subsequent marriage to Maekara (Maekara & Marinay married in 2008 in Quezon City) void due to its bigamous nature.

The Fujiki vs Marinay case has repercussions on various principles under Philippine Family law.

We have traditionally understood Article 26 of the Family Code (in allowing a judicial recognition by the Filipino spouse of a foreign divorce decree obtained abroad) as the only express statement in Philippine law allowing the judicial recognition of a foreign judgment affecting the marital status of a Filipino citizen. Fujiki has made us understand that Article 26 of the Family Code is merely an expression of a greater general rule that foreign judgments relating to marital status may be recognized in the Philippines if the foreign judgment is consistent with Philippine public policy and the State has a sufficient interest in the recognition of the foreign judgment. The Supreme Court said:

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[CIVIL CODE , Art. 17.] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even

though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

In other words, although Article 26 of the Family Code is an express legislative statement that a divorce decree is consistent with Philippine public policy so long as the requisites laid down by jurisprudence (see eg, Republic v. Orbecido (GR 154380, October 5, 2005) where a spouse must be an alien at the time the divorce is procured, irregardless of the original citizenship of that spouse at the time of marriage) are complied with, Article 26 of the Family Code does not preclude the recognition in the Philippines of a judgment affecting the status of Filipino citizen, so long as that judgment is ‘consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws’ (quote from Fujiki). From the reinstatement in Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013) of the petition, it may be inferred that, at the very least under Fujiki’s facts, a petition for judicial recognition filed by a foreigner spouse of a foreign judgment declaring the Filipino spouse’s subsequent marriage as void, due to its bigamous nature, is consistent with Philippine public policy, even if that foreign judgment was obtained by the Filipino spouse (in Fujiki, the foreign judgment was obtained by the Filipino spouse). It, however, remains to be seen whether or not such a petition filed in Fujiki would succeed had it been the Filipino spouse who filed the petition for recognition of the foreign judgment. This is because while the Supreme Court in Fujiki explained the public policy repercussions of maintaining a direct action under Philippine law to declare as null and void a marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages), It did not go further in explaining the standards by which foreign judgments should be deemed sufficiently or substantially in accordance with the public policy sought to be protected by a direct action. The Supreme Court in Fujiki explained the public policy underlying a direct action as follows:

A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,[FAMILY CODE , Art. 35-67.]83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,[quoting ARTICLE 84 FAMILY CODE; Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61] the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,[quoting ARTICLE 50 FAMILY CODE] and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is located.”[quoting ARTICLE 48 FAMILY CODE; quoting s 9 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]

Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013) also affirmed the earlier pronouncement in Juliano-Llave vs Republic (G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011), which gave a spouse of the first marriage, an interest as an ‘aggrieved spouse’ under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC to file a direct action to have his/her other spouse’s subsequent bigamous declared null and void.

In Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), the Supreme Court citing Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas (GR 186571, 11 Aug 2010) stated what the petitioner seeking recognition of the foreign judgment must prove:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

xxx

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”

xxx

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is either inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.

Notwithstanding the lack of an express statement in Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), it is submitted that foreign law must also be proven in the petition for judicial recognition of the foreign judgment, for how else can one determine whether or not the foreign court had

jurisdiction, or that the foreign procedure is consistent with our public policy, or that the effects of the foreign decision is to capacitate the parties to remarry (see where Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas (GR 186571, 11 Aug 2010) citing Garcia vs Recio (G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001) where ‘conformity to the foreign law allowing it’ must be demonstrated)? In Fujiki, the Supreme Court alluded to the need to prove foreign law, when it said that ‘Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.

PAGE 23

*People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010NATURE: motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and reconsideration

Appellant was indicted for two counts of rape. He pled “not guilty” when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

On appeal, CA affirmed appellant’s conviction, but modified it with an additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages.

We dismissed the appeal for failure of appellant to sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged decision as would warrant the exercise of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private complainant contracted marriage on August 19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. Attached to the motion is the pertinent Certificate of Marriage and a joint sworn statement (“Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay”) executed by appellant and private complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage between them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity,to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony. Parenthetically, we would like to mention here that prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar circumstances was decided by this Court in 1974, or around 36 years ago.Based on the documents, including copies of pictures taken after the ceremony and attached to the motion, we find the marriage between appellant and private complainant to have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman is ABSOLVED of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their subsequent marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.

*Espinosa v Omana

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997,

Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaña presented Marantal's "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaña's knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was notarized.

ISSUE: whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa's "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

HELD: This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.[2] The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,[3] which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

We cannot accept Omaña's allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña's negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries[9] or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[10]

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña's notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

Gorayeb vs. Hashim (1927)Nature: Appeal by way of certiorari to the decision of Court of Appeals.Facts: Plaintiff Gorayeb and defendant Hashim were married in Syria. They were separated in fact for more than twelve years. The Plaintiff instituted civil case No. 19115 in the CFI to compel the defendant to pay her alimony.The Court of First Instance on December 24, 1923 decided in favour of the Plaintiff awarding her alimony of P500.00 per monthWhile the decision of the plaintiff’s claim of support was still undetermined, the defendant went to the United States where he was able to procure a divorce decree from the State of Nevada. He went back to the Philippines and the plaintiff filed a motion in civil case No. 19115, alleging that the defendant had failed to pay the pension of P500 per month, which had been awarded to her in the decision of December 24, 1923, and praying that he be adjudged to be in contempt of court and that he be fined and sentenced to imprisonment for six months and until he should comply with the order. As defense , the defendant pleaded the divorce decree from Nevada, asserting that because of the such decree his marriage to the plaintiff was already dissolved therefore releasing him from the judgment of the lower court . The Court of appeals decided that despite the divorce decree the defendant should continue paying the plaintiff P100 per month.Issue:

1. Whether or not the foreign decree of divorce should be recognized by Philippine court.2. Whether or not there is still a need of an affirmative action or a special proceeding in

order for our courts to recognize a foreign decree of divorce.Ruling: Issue #1. No.In Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855) xxx…. the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. In the same case this court went on to say: "It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile.Issue # 2. NoSection 309 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, declaring that a judgment obtained in an American court shall have the same effect in the Philippine Islands as in the place where such judgment was obtained, contains a qualification expressed in the following words: "except that it can only be enforce here by an action or special proceeding." In the case at bar,xxx.. it will be remembered that the defendant pleaded the decree of divorce by way of defense in his answer; and if the decree of divorce had been such as to have entitled it to recognition here, the defendant could in our opinion have obtained the benefit of it in this action. The provision in question no doubt contemplates primarily the situation where affirmative action has to be taken in the Philippine Islands to give effect to the foreign judgment as where

the plaintiff desires to obtain execution upon property in these Islands to satisty a judgment obtained abroad. But a decree of divorce operates on the marriage status; and if effective at all, it dissolves the marriage tie, without the necessity of any affirmative proceeding in any other court. At any rate, all that was intended to be secured by the provision requiring an action or proceeding here was that the courts of this country should have an opportunity to pass judicially upon the efficacy of the judgment. This purpose is accomplished as well where the foreign judgment is relied upon in an answer and duly proved, as where the original action is actually brought by the holder of the judgment. It could not have been intended by the authors of section 309 that the holder of the foreign judgment must be deprived of the benefit of it merely because he happens to be defendant rather than plaintiff in an action brought in our courts.

*Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355

FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.  The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry.   A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.  Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.  However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.  Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.  She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.  Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children.  She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.  Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.  Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.  The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.  In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.  A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.  Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. 

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

**** THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves: With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicenta’s refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.

*Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982.The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint…

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxxYou are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

*Somera v. Pilapil, 174 SCRA 663

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding

investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent. NOUnder Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.  Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.  Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit