peron readings 1 - 9

8/9/2019 Peron Readings 1 - 9

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Benjamin Keen - A Short History of Latin America pp. 307-313 P-1

THE PERON ERA: 1943-1955

PernsRise to Power

The military coup that overthrew Castillo in 1943 had deep and tangled roots. The fraud and corruption that taintedboth Conservative and Radical politics in the Infamous Decade no doubt offended military sensibilities, andCastilloschoice of the Pro-Ally Patron Costas as his successor also angered some of the military, who weredivided in their attitude toward the belligerents in World War II. But the coup of 1943 had deeper causes. Duringthe 1930s, the officer corps of the Argentine armed forces, predominantly middle class in its social origins,developed an ardent nationalism that saw the solution forArgentinasproblems in industrialization and all-aroundtechnical modernization. The interest of the military in industrialization was closely linked to its desire to create apowerful war machine capable of creating a Greater Argentina that could exercise hegemony in a new SouthAmerican bloc. To industrialize it was necessary to endArgentinasneocolonial was necessary to endArgentinasneocolonial status, to free it from dependence on foreign markets. The pro-German attitude of many officersstemmed in part from the German military instruction that they had received and from their admiration for thesupposed successes of the Nazi New Order, but even more, perhaps, from the conviction that England and the

United States had conspired to keep Argentina a rural economic colony. Their pro-German attitude was nottranslated into a desire to enter the war on Germanysside but rather into the wish to keep Argentina neutral in thegreat conflict.

As concerned domestic policy, the military proposed a massive speedup of industrialization and technicalmodernization, even though it feared the social changes and forces that such transformations might unleash. Inparticular, it feared the revolutionary potential of the working class. In effect, the military proposed to buildArgentine industrial capitalism with a thoroughly cowed, docile working class. As a result, one of the first acts of themilitary regime was to launch an offensive against organized labor. The government took over the unions,suppressed newspapers, and jailed opposition leaders. This policy of direct confrontation and collision with laborhad disastrous results and threatened to wreck the industrialization program. The military was saved from itself byan astute young colonel, Juan Domingo Peron, who took over the Department of Labor in October, 1943 andpromptly raised it to the status of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare.

Born in 1895, the son of immigrant and Creole parents of somewhat marginal economic status (his fatherwas a farmer); Peron ended the military college at sixteen and very slowly rose in rank to captain in 1930. Heplayed a minor role in the coup of that year. During the next decade, he spent several years in Europe, where hewas much impressed by the German and Italian dictatorships. In 1941, Peron joined the Group of United Officers,although only a junior colonel, and quickly rose to its leadership ranks. He was prominent in the colonelscliquethat replaced the GOU in power in 1944. Beginning with a subcabinet post as secretary labor and welfare, Peronbecame the indispensable man in the Ramirez government. He subsequently became vice president and ministerof war, in addition to secretary of labor and welfare.

Pernsgenius lay in his recognition of the potential of the organized and unorganized working class andthe need to broaden the social base of the nationalist revolution. He became the patron of the urban proletariat.Workers were not only encouraged to organize but favored in bargaining negotiations, in which his departmentparticipated. As a result, workerswages not only rose in absolute terms but their share of the national income

grew. This, of course, increased mass purchasing power and hereby promoted the process of industrialization.Peron also created a state system of pensions and health benefits, with the result that employerscontributions forpensions, insurance, and other benefits raised steadily until the year of Pernsfall (1955). In return for these realgains, however, the unions lost their independence and became part of a state-controlled apparatus in Pernshands. Meanwhile, Peron was strengthening his position within the military. In February 1944, he led a group ofofficers in forcing the resignation of President Ramirez, who, as noted previously, was replaced by General Farrell.

Not all of the military was happy with Pernsprolabor policies or with his meteoric rise to power. The endof the war in 1945 also provoked civilian demands for an end to military rule and the restoration of the constitution.In October 1945, Pernsmilitary and civilian foes staged a coup that resulted in his ouster and imprisonment. But


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the organizers of the coup were divided and unclear about their objectives, and Pernsfollowers mobilized rapidly.Loyal labor leaders organized the Buenos Aires working class for massive street demonstrations to protest Perns

jailing. The workers virtually took over the city, without opposition from the armed forces. The bewilderedconspirators released Peron from prison. Thereupon, he resigned from his various government posts, retired fromthe army, and began his campaign for the presidency in the 1946 elections.

In preparation for the election of 1946, Peron taking due account of the defeat of fascism in Europe, cast

himself in the role of a democrat ready to abide by the result of a free election. He created a Labor party tomobilize the working class, the principal component in a class alliance whose other major elements were thenational industrial bourgeoisie and the army. Pernschief opponent was Jose Tamborini, candidate of the UnionDemocratica (Democratic Union), a heterogeneous coalition of conservative landed elite, the bureaucratic andprofessional middle class that traditionally supported the Radical party, and even the Socialist and Communistsparties. Peron defeated Tamborini, by 300,000 votes out of 2.7 million. He was helped in the election by theblundering foreign policy of the United States whose State Department issued a Blue Book blasting Peron for hisfascist ties. Peron countered by circulating a Blue and White Book (blue and white wereArgentinasnationalcolors) that stressed the theme of Yankee imperialism.

Postwar Economics

The postwar boom enabled Peron to keep his coalition together. The export sector produced large surpluses in thebalance of payments, making available funds for industrialization, mainly in labor-intensive manufactures. Between1945 and 1948, real wages for industrial workers rose 20 percent. Personal consumption also rose. Since therewas only a slight decline in the share of the national income that went to profits, the redistribution of income to theworking class did not come at the expense of any other segment of the alliance. Industrialists kept profits up andbenefited from increased domestic consumption, which provided a growing market for their products. The onlysector of the economy that was slighted was agriculture.

Peron managed to win over a considerable sector of the dependent middle class through his use ofgovernment patronage, just as Yrigoyen had done before. He kept the military happy by his commitment toindustrialization, an important aspect of his desire for national self-sufficiency and by providing it with generoussalaries and the latest equipment for modern warfare.

One of Pernsgreatest assets was his beautiful and stylish wife Eva Duarte de Peron, known

affectionately by Argentines as Evita, who acted as his liaison to the working class. Evita, a former dance hall girland radio and movie star, headed a huge charitable network that dispensed tremendous amounts of money andpatronage. So beloved was she that when she dies in 1952 at the age of thirty-two, Peron led a movement to getthe Catholic Church to canonize her. The presidentspopularity with the working class suffered after her death.Evita strongly advocated womenssuffrage, which was granted in 1947. Consequently, women supported Peron inlarge numbers.

After 1948, however, the economic picture changed drastically. With the exception of a short-livedrecovery during the Korean War (1950-1951), Argentina entered a period of severe recession, which includedseveral drought-induced bad harvests. The late 1940s brought the first signs that Argentina would face seriouslong-term economic difficulties. Its export commodities began to confront increased competition from the UnitedStates and from revitalized Western European agriculture. Later, the advent of the Common Market worsened

Argentinasposition. Balance of payments deficits replace the large surpluses that had financed the nations

import-substitution industrialization. Industrial production fell, as did per capita income. Real wages dropped 20percent from the 1949 level in 1952-1953. It was in this decline that Pernspolitical failure was rooted.There are two schools of opinion regarding Pernseconomic policy. The first, typified by the English

scholar H.S. Ferns, is highly critical. According to this analysis, Pernspolicies were disastrous in the long run. Inthe first place, he drained the export agricultural sector to the point where farmers had no incentive to expandacreage or modernize production. Farm production dropped precipitously (although this was in part due to badweather during the early 1950s). Furthermore, higher real wages increased internal consumption of Argentinefoodstuffs, thus lessening the amount of food commodities available for export.

In addition, the critics hold that the major portion of government expenditures was ill-advised. Perns


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economic policy revolved around two essential points: government intervention in the economy on a large scaleand reestablishment of Argentine control of its own economy. The president nationalized the Central Bank, therailroads, the gas industry, much of the electric power industry, the merchant marine, and the air transport,insurance, and communications industries. The government controlled prices on consumer goods and rents.Mismanagement and corruption permeated these state enterprises, and this siphoned much of the utility and profitsof these operations. The critics also claim that Peron paid inflated prices for these nationalized enterprises, leaving

no money for capital improvements. The problem was especially acute with the state railroads, which desperatelyneeded new equipment and repairs. But Peron had paid the British an enormous sum for the railroads and nothingleft for improvements. In some cases, the Argentine government paid off bonds at par years ahead of maturity,although the bonds were selling on the stock exchanges for 60 to 70 percent of par, and they paid low interest.Paying off such debts, it is claimed, was financial madness.

A second school of opinion, led by Jorge Fodor, defends Peron. This analysis maintains that the dictatorsmaneuvering room was severely limited by world financial and market conditions, especially in Britain and theUnited States. Argentinasalternatives were governed by four crucial factors. First, much of the nations exportsurplus was tied up in Great Britain and virtually unavailable, because Britain was in the midst of an economiccrisis. Peron paid a high price for the railroads and perhaps some bonds because the British used the enormoussum of Argentine money locked in their country as a bargaining device.

Second, the amount ofArgentinasgains during the world was vastly exaggerated. It was true that

Argentina received high prices for its farm commodities during and after the war, but theses prices were deceiving,for Argentina, through its trading monopoly, the Argentine Institute for Trade Promotion (IAPI), had to extend creditto enable Europe to buy its products. This meant that Peron did not have as much capital to spend as his criticshave maintained. His money was tied up in England or on the Continent in credit.

Third, even if Peron had possessed these huge sums, he had no place to spend them. He has beenattacked for not sinking money into much needed public works, especially railroads and roads, and into heavyindustry. The fact is, however, that neither England nor the Continent could supply these products, and theUnited States were unable and unwilling to supply them. Argentine neutrality during the war meant that the UnitedStates would not export capital goods and other industrial commodities to Argentina.

Fourth, and finally,Argentinasown economic forecasts predicted that its future as an exporter offoodstuffs was bleak, given the economic condition of Europe and the specter of growing competition. Peron,therefore, acted rationally when he shortchanged agriculture in favor of industry. When the market conditions for

agricultural exports improved, Peron put money into this sector.The critics appear to be on solid ground when they point to the enormous sums spent on the military andon impractical military schemes for industrial self-sufficiency, such as nuclear energy projects. Pernsdefenderswould underline that he had a very limited area for maneuver and did the best he could.

Furthermore, many of Pernsmoves were made to counteract or eliminate undue foreign influence inArgentinaseconomy. He nationalized the Central Bank, not only because he wanted to extend government controlover fiscal policy, but because the Central Bank was controlled by foreign banks. The establishment of the IAPIwas also designed to counteract foreign influence. During the war, the Allies established a joint purchasing agency;this meant that Argentina, in effect, had only one market for its products. The IAPI, the sole seller of the nationscommodities, had more bargaining power than individual producers could have had. It played an important role inthe rise of Argentine industry through its monopoly on export cereals. Buying the cereals at low prices and sellingthem on the world market at high prices it channeled the surplus into industrial development. But in the early

1950s, with world prices, the IAPI gradually lost its capacity for financing industry.Whatever one may think of Pernseconomics, the fact remains that he solved none of the countrysmajoreconomic problems. The main roadblocks remained. Transportation continued to be inadequate and obsolete, anda scarcity of electric power stood in the way of industrial modernization. Argentina did not produce enough fuel tomeet domestic needs, and this created an enormous drain on the balance of payments. The nations industryremained limited for the most part to import-substitution light industry. Despite his anti-imperialist rhetoric, Perondid not nationalize such key foreign-owned industries as meat packing and sugar refining. Most serious of all,Peron did nothing to break the hold of the latifundio on the land. As a result, agriculture was marked by inefficientland use, which impeded long range development.


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PernsDownfall

After his reelection in 1952 and in response to the economic crisis of the early 1950s, Peron formulated a new plan(the Second Five-Year Plan, 1953-1957) that, to a great extent, reversed his previous strategy. He tried to expandagricultural production by paying higher prices to farmers for their produce and by buying capital equipment for this

sector (tractors and reapers). He sought to increase the agricultural production available for export by means of awage freeze, which he hoped would restrict domestic consumption. Although real wages declined, workers did notsuffer proportionately more than other groups. But the industrial bourgeoisie was unhappy, for labor productivitydeclined while the regimes pro labor policies propped up wages. The industrialists, supported by a considerableportion of the army, wanted deregulation of the economy so they could push down wages. But the major problemof the industrial sector was lack of capital, since the agricultural sector no longer generated a large surplus.

In order to solve the capital shortage, Peron abandoned his previously ultra nationalistic stand and activelysolicited foreign investment. In 1953 the government reached an agreement with a North American company, theStandard Oil Company of California, for exploration, drilling, refining, and distribution rights in Argentina. Peronhoped thereby to reduce the adverse effect oil purchases abroad had on the balance of payments. The followingyear, the government entered into a partnership with H.J. Kaiser, an American businessman, to produceautomobiles. Argentinasaviation industry, a pet project of the military, was converted to auto production. Foreign

capital used the most modern technology and machines, which required fewer workers and, therefore, tended tocreate unemployment in the affected industrial sectors.

In order to maintain government expenditures and a bloated bureaucracy in the face of declining revenues,Peron printed more money. The amount in circulation increased from 6 to 45 billion pesos during his two terms. By1954 he had had some success in stabilizing the economy; he achieved a balance of payments surplus, and capitalaccumulation showed an upward curve. But his new economic strategy had alienated key elements of his coalitionof workers, industrialists, and the armed forces. Peron then sought to divert attention from economic issues withdisastrous results.

Peron adopted two new strategies. First, he attempted to enhance his moral and ideological appeal.Second, he began to employ greater coercion to suppress a growing opposition. The vehicle for his ideological andmoral appeal was justcialismo, Peron ideal of justice for all--a third route to development that was neithercommunist nor capitalist.

Pernsstrategy included attacking the church. Starting in 1951, the new regime grew more repressive.The government suppressed and took overArgentinasmost famous newspaper, La Prensa (1951). Further, Peronused his National Liberating Alliance, a private army of thugs, and the thirty-five-thousand-man federal police forceto intimidate the political opposition. Torture, imprisonment, censorship, purges, and exile became the order of theday. After 1954, even the General Confederation of Labor became a coercive force, whose prime function seemedto be to suppress opposition within the labor movement.

Pernsreluctance to go along with the industrialists desire to push down wages and increase productivityalienated that group; the industrial bourgeoisie then joined forces with the agrarian interests, which had long andbitterly opposed Peron. This desertion ended Pernsonce highly successful coalition. Inevitably, Pernshold onthe working class loosened as the wage freeze and inflation reduced the value of their wages. The death of EvaPeron in 1952 contributed to the deterioration in the relations between Peron and the working class. She hadserved as her husbandsambassador to the workers. With Evita (little Eva) no longer at the head of the Social Aid

Foundation, a vast philanthropic organization that distributed food, clothing, and money to the needy, Pernsrelations with labor did not go so smoothly.Despite economic adversity, Peon could not have been overthrown had not the military abandoned him.

For the better part of a decade, he had masterfully balanced, divided, and bribed the military. Most of the seniorofficers owed his both their rank and their prosperity. The army was heavily involved in industrial production, andthis provided an excellent means to become rich. In addition, to win its allegiance, Peron had showered the militarywith expensive military hardware and excellent wages. However, his relations with the armed forces began todisintegrate when he altered his economic policy to lessen emphasis on industrialization and self-sufficiency. Onthis score, his concession to Standard Oil in 1953 was the last straw for the nationalist military. The military was


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also affronted by the dictatorspersonal behavior (he had an affair with a teenage girl), and it objected to his virulentattacks on the Catholic Church, a pillar of traditionalism, during 1954 and 1955. It also resented Pernsefforts toindoctrinate the military in the tenets of justicialismo.

Thus, in struggling to extricate the nation from an economic quagmire, Peron undermined the multi-classcoalition that had brought him to power and sustained him there. When the final successful revolt took place inSeptember 1955, after a failure in June, enough of the working class was alienated to assure the militaryssuccess.

Peron briefly threatened to arm his working class supporters, the descamisados (the shirtless ones), but insteadfled into exile.

James Cockcroft - Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America pp. 502-507 P-2

Peronist Revolution, 1943-1955: Populism and Corporativism

Rising labor unrest and political protests against the domination of the oligarchy set the stage for another militaryintervention to restore order and save the nation. On June 4, 1943, General Arturo Rawson and 13 colonels of theGOU (Group of United Officers, founded in 1941) threw out the Conservatives and set up a new Revolutionarymilitary government. Much of the leadership was Fascist. It proscribed political parties, jailed its opponents,

banned Jewish and leftist newspapers, outlawed organized laborsMarxist-dominated CGT, and packed laborleaders into concentration camps. It restricted strikes, cutting their number to a paltry 27 in all of 1944. In light ofthis, the powerful Union Industrial Argentina, a confederation of big industry, expressed its backing of the newregime.

But the militarysiron-handed rule could not conceal internal factionalism. After three days Rawson wasreplaced by General Pedro Ramirez, who vowed to keep Argentina neutral during World War II--thus bucking theLatin American trend of siding with the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. Washington responded byfreezing Argentine gold reserves in the United States, recalling the American ambassador, and restricting shippingto Argentine ports. By early 1944 the U.S. pressure worked. Argentina broke relations with the Axis powers(Germany, Italy, and Japan) and Ramirez resigned.

On March 2, 1944, Vice-President General Edelmiro J. Farrell was sworn in as Acting President. By thenthe original 1943 coup leaders were in disarray and a shrewd 48-year-old 6-footer of the GOU, Colonel Juan

Domingo Peron, the Minister of Labor and Welfare and newly appointed Interim War Minister, was emerging as theregimes strong man.Like many other officers, Peron came from a humble middle class background. He was the farm-family

son of immigrant, Creole parents. He had entered military college at age 16 and had gradually risen through theranks. He had lived in Europe and admired the Orderly successes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Peron andother colonels in his clique aspired to free the nation from the control of British and U.S. economic interests. Theyhad little patience for either the old-guard oligarchy that had dominated the nation for most of the last 80 years orthe quarreling pro-middle-class politicians of the Radicals and other parties.

Major civilian groups were too weak to counter Peron. The oligarchs were more unpopular than ever; thenew industrialists and middle classes could not unite. Peron recognized what recent events had made obvious: anew social group, the working class, many of them recent arrivals to the factory and frigori fico zones of BuenosAires, was ready to enter the political arena. In September 1943 the Communist-dominated, outlawed meat

workers union led a general strike that was lifted in October only after Peron negotiated with its leaders.Argentinasunions sought government recognition, collective bargaining, higher wages, and a better deal for labor.Communist labor leaders agreed to lift the September strike in part because they welcomed the renewal of meatshipments to the Allies fighting fascism in Europe.

Peron was deeply anti-Marxist. In late November 1943 the government upgraded the labor department tocreate the Labor and Welfare Ministry under Pernsleadership. It renewed arrests of leftist labor leaders,including Communists. Peron began forming an alliance with strike militants and independent unionists who hadopposed the Communists agreement to lift the general strike. He drew his initial mass labor support from therailroad unions, headed up by his personal friend Colonel Domingo A. Mercante. The railroads were British-owned


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and unpopular, so granting their workers benefits did not particularly worry domestic industrialists.Anxious not to alienate big business, Peron was at first slow to grant many of laborseconomic demands.

By April of 1944, however, many unions, independents, and leftists were preparing for a huge antigovernment MayDay rally to protest its anti-labor policies. This forced Peron to step up his wooing of labor. By granting unions loyalto him official government recognition and delivering wage hikes and social welfare, Peron was able to forge amass bases amongArgentinasdescomisados or Shirtless ones as he and his companion Eva Duarte liked to call

them.The May Day rally was called off, and the government began enforcing labor laws and collective

bargaining, leading to a huge rise in the number of contracts signed. Real wages among unskilled workers jumpedby 17 percent between 1943 and 1945. Pernstilt to labor alienated big business Union Industrial Argentina,which by the end of 1944 joined sides with the landed elites Sociedad Rural.

Also in late 1944 Nelson Rockefeller became U.S. Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin Americanaffairs. He advocated a more conciliatory posture toward Argentina, since it had finally declared war against theAxis powers and the United States would need friends in Argentina to counter Pernsfurther radicalization.Rockefeller helped to bring aboutArgentinasinclusion in the United Nations at sessions held in San Francisco in1945.

By mid-1945 Argentine society was polarized on the issues of Perns concessionsto labor, his attemptsto change rural tenancy regulations and help the downtrodden, his nationalist and independent foreign policy, and

continued military rule. The United States shifted its policy once more--to a position of hostility toward Pernsgovernment symbolized by the appointment of Spruille Braden as ambassador. Son of copper magnate WilliamBraden (whose interests later became part of Kennecott Copper); Braden was a veteran troubleshooter for U.S.corporations in Latin America, including Rockefellers Standard Oil (see Chapters 15 and 16).

On October 9, 1945, Pernsrivals in the military and his civilian opponents, including Socialists, Radicals,and oligarchs, mounted a coup, arrested Peron, and jailed him in a military hospital. During the next week tens ofthousands of the descamisados took over Buenos Aires, facing down police and defying soldiers. Judging fromrecent scholarship, their spontaneous protest had little coordinated leadership from Peronist leaders.

By the end of October Pernsfollowers had organized the Labor party and Peron had made up his mindto run for the presidency in February 1946. Ambassador Braden was recalled to become Assistant Secretary ofState for Latin American Affairs and to direct the anti-Peron campaign from Washington. Bradensoutspokendenunciations of Peron contributed to a nationalist swell of support for Peron.

On the eve of 1946 elections the U.S. State Department published a Blue Book charging Peron with pro-Nazi activities. Peron countered with a Blue and White Book (Argentinasnational colors) critical of Yankeeimperialisms hiscampaign slogan was Braden or Peron? Argentines answered by electing Peron president by thecommanding margin of 300,000 votes. Braden went on to serve as United Fruits public relations director and pointman for attacking the democratically elected reformist government of Arbenz in Guatemala. He also became afounder of the ultra rightist John Birch Society in the United States.

As a popularly elected president, Peron was able to practice a broad-based corporativist populism,appealing to both big business and organized labor. He had a rare opportunity granted him byArgentinaslargeforeign currency and gold reserves accumulated during World War II. From 1945 to 1948 real wages rose another20 percent. Industrialists profits multiplied, as industrial production increased by one-third and domesticconsumption expanded because of the wage hikes. Despite subsequent signs of an economic decline, Peron waseasily reelected president in 1951.

Pernsoperative style was consistent with his corporativist and personist ideology of bringing conflictinggroups under the tutelage of a strong state and his ultimate individual leadership. His anticommunism pleased bigbusiness, even though it initially opposed him in 1945-1946. While controversy rages bout what Pernsideologyand intents were--he said many conflicting things in the course of his life (1895-1974)--his practices were clearlyanti-Communist, procapitalist, corporativist, populist, and often nationalist. He gained the backing of the CatholicChurch by promising to block legal divorce and to protect church schools and by marrying his companion EvaDuarte.

Peron nationalized many leading foreign firms, including the railroads, urban transport, ports, and utilitiescompanies. He established state enterprises in steel, shipping, insurance, and banking. He set up rent controls


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and worker pension funds. He brought nationalized German companies into a state manufacturing complex andalso expanded the military-industrial conglomerate Military Factories. He created a state trading board to controlforeign trade and an industrial credit bank to support the growing group of Argentine industrialists, large and small.

Foreign exchange from agricultural exports helped fund the importation of equipment needed forindustrialization. Throughout the 1940s the lot of many Argentine businesspeople and workers improved notably.But when the costs of capital goods imports rose and severs draughts and drops in world prices for wheat and other

grains occurred in 1950s, the initial successes of Peronist populism and nationalism were undermined by economichardship. Workers continued their militant demands for economic hardship, trusting that Peron would aid themagain.

Pernsimmense popularity with Argentine workers was based on his having brought them into thepolitical arena and advanced their living standards. Between 1943 and 1949 laborsshare of national income rosefrom 45 to 59 percent. The workers own mobilizations and militancy kept the heat of Peron in case he wavered.From 1946 to 1948 the meat-packing unions continued to disrupt production to demand compliance with earlieragreements and recognition of many leaders who were independent and not Peronists. Peron jailed his opponentsin labor and consolidated a bureaucratic ruling bloc inside the rapidly expanding unions, whose membershipquintupled to 2.5 million. Even after the bulk of workers gains had been made rank-and-file union militants had topressure the Peronist bureaucratic leadership to maintain their benefits.

Many workers looked to Pernsflamboyant actress-wife, Eva Duarte de Peron, for help. Evita as they

affectionately called her oversaw charity projects that provided benefits to the working poor. She herself had beenraised in poverty, an illegitimate child scorned by society. The ranks of the poor were expanded by a new influx ofimmigrants--160,000 a year from 1948 to 1950--needed to staffArgentinasexpanding industries and services.Evita gained a reputation in worker circles as an Untiring defender of our union interests. She advocated womenssuffrage, and in 1947 women got the vote. Together, Evita and Juan Peron could rally huge buoyant crowds.When Evita died of cancer in 1952 the nation mourned. She remained a symbol for the working poor.

In reality, President Pernsconcessions to labor could not be sustained in the face of obstacles presentedby declining export prices in the 1950s and a deepening recession combined with inflation (stagflation). To combatthe economic crisis, Peron encouraged foreign investment, took out a big U.S. loan, and struck a deal withStandard Oil of California. He offered price incentives for rural landowners and coddled big business. He had theCGT order workers to restrain their wage demands and to increase their productivity. An entrenched bureaucraticcaste in the trade unions increasingly cast its lot with big industrialists, domestic and foreign. As labor historian

Charles Bergquist later notes, Wages fell behind the rise in living costs for long periods of time and leaders of boththe independent and pro-Peronist unions tended to become Passive instruments obedient to the dictates of Peron.They substituted Mystical loyalty to Peron For the radical reformism of a class-conscious proletariat.

By 1955 most Argentine industrialists had turned against Peron. Like Peron, they looked to foreign capitalfor help, even if it meant making them junior partners of better-off U.S. and European investors. Other former alliesalso turned against Peron, including the Church and many people from the middle classes. Students were fed upwith Peronist Goons sent their campuses to control their political life. The moment was opportune for the mostreactionary forces of the landed oligarchy to ally themselves with other dissidents and turn the clock back.

George Pendle - A History of Latin America pp. 206-209 P-3

One officer, Colonel Juan D. Peron-who had experience of MussolinisItaly, where he served as a militaryattach- realized more clearly than anyone else that a new type of caudillo was now required. He must be acaudillo of the trade unions, of industrialization, nationalization, and Five-Year economic plans. To obtain the votesof the neglected masses, the new caudillo would really have to improve their living conditions. (In the militaryregime of 1943 Peron chose himself for the post of head of the then unimportant Secretariat of Labor, a job whichno one else wanted). Also, of course, even the newest caudillo still need to be a man endowed with the traditionalcaudillo qualities, masculine charm, dash, and eloquence (all of which Peron abundantly possessed). Peron wasup to date even in his public relations technique. Friendly with a glamorous radio actress, Eva Duarte, heappreciated the enormous prestige enjoyed by entertainment stars and sporting aces. He bestowed his patronage


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on Argentine boxers, racing motorists, swimmers, and footballers, thereby sharing, in some measure, the acclaimthat they received.

Under Perns direction at the Secretariat of Labor, many long-overdue reforms were affected. Peronencouraged the development of trade unions in the meat-packing plants and other industries where the employershad not allowed them. He contrived that his Secretariat should supervise collective bargaining between workersand employers; that the bargaining should usually result in substantial concessions to the workers; and that the new

wage agreements should be given the widest possible publicity, as evidence of his success in defending working-class interests. He also kept a close hold on the trade union movement by ruling that collective contracts wouldonly be recognized as valid if the unions signing them had been officially approved by the Secretariat. During thispreparatory period in his rise to power, Peron secured the appropriation of a large sum for the construction ofworking-class flats. Compulsory holidays with pay were decreed for all wage-earners. it was not surprising,therefore, that when in 1945, jealous of Pernsgrowing political influence, a military clique arrested him, the tradeunion leaders-feverishly assisted by Eva Duarte- organized mass demonstrations to demand that he be set free.Men in shirt-sleeved- henceforth to be known as descomisados- poured into Buenos Aries from the working-classsuburbs. On the famous day of 17 October these descomisados were virtually in control of the capital. To appeasethem, Peron was released. A few days later he and Eva Duarte were married.

After the triumph of the 17 October, Peron placed his friends on key positions in the government but didnot himself take off: instead, he devoted his energies to preparing for the elections which were to be held in

February 1946. His supporters formed a new party, the Partido Laborista, which nominated him as its candidate forthe presidency. The party pledged itself to work for the nationalization of the public services (notably the railways);the building of hospitals and homes for the workers, the aged, and the infirm, and the defense of the social gainsmade while Peron was Secretary of Labor The hierarchy of the Catholic Church supported Peron. Because he hadsympathized with the Germans and the Italians during the Second World War, the United States government didtheir utmost to discredit him. The elections took place under the supervision of the army, and were, by commonconsent, the cleanest that had ever been held in Argentina. Peron won the presidency for himself, almost twothirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and all but two of the seats in the Senate. With the rank ofbrigadier-general, he was inaugurated president of the republic.

The rule of Peron and Evita in the space of a few years brought Argentina right out of the era of theestanciero and of the upper-class charity for the poor, into an era of urban industry and social security. But whilethey badgered the landowning oligarchy politically and financially, the Pernsnever attempted to nationalize the

great estates: they knew that the disruption of the social pattern in the rural areas would have disastrous effects onproduction.When Evita died in 1952, still a young woman, the Peron regime had already served its purpose. The

Perns had broken the landownersmonopoly on power, without ruining that class (indeed, the value of land wasalways rising). For the mass of the population, Pernism had lifted the horizon of expectation.

After Evitasdeath the regime disintegrated, and its excesses multiplied. The rising cost of living causedwidespread discontent. Pernshigh-handed methods had always infuriated the upper classes, and theyincreasingly gave offence to the Church. Corruption in government circles and in the state-owned industries andagencies now exceeded anything that Argentina had endured even under Rosas or Irigoyen. Nationalist-mindedmilitary officers were indignant when Peron, with the purpose of reducing the huge cost of importing petroleum,decided to grant concessions in the Patagonian oilfields to a United States company. The situation became moreand more troubled, until in September 1955 it was rumored that Peron intended to distribute arms to the trade

unions, with instructions to suppress his enemies. Thereupon the officers commanding the chief provincialgarrisons led their troops against Buenos Aires, while the navy, joining the rebellion, blockaded the Plata estuary.Peron sought refuge on a Paraguayan gunboat which was in Buenos Aires harbor. In accordance with LatinAmerican practice, he was granted political asylum, and a fortnight later he was allowed to travel into exile.

So the military right wing were again in charge of the country, and as usual they were confident that theyalone what was good for the people. They dismissed all Peronistas from the senior ranks of the armed forces, fromthe federal and provincial administrations, and from the judiciary and the universities; military interventores wereplaced in charge of the trade unions; and when presidential and congressional elections were at last held in 1958,


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the Peronistas (who comprised at least one third of the electorate) were not allowed to nominate their owncandidates.

John Fagg - Latin America-A General History pp. 704-720 P-4

The Rise of Juan Domingo Peron

Pernsconspicuous activities from the first days of the Farrell administration caused him to be regarded,correctly from the most part, as the real power of that regime. Born in 1895 in the southern part of Buenos Airesprovinces, he was of mixed Spanish and Italian ancestry and of the middle class. After spending his childhood inranch country, he moved to Buenos Aires with his parents. His academic and athletic abilities won him entranceinto the national military college, where he prepared for a career in the army. An intelligent and industrious officer,respected as a fencing champion, a mansman, and something of a scholar, he nonetheless crept up slowly in aservice where considerations of pedigree favored the landed aristocracy. In 1930, when he participated in Uriburu'srebellion against President Yrigoyen, Peron was a captain. During the following six years he moved up two grades.He taught at the war college for some time, becoming a respectable historian and author. Then he served twoyears in Chile as a military attach, his tour of duty being cut short, or so it has been said, by accusations on the

part of his hosts that he was engaging in espionage. In 1939 he went on a mission to Italy to train with themagnificent army that Mussolini claimed would soon astonish the world. During the next two years Peron traveledover several countries in Europe, read, observed, and pondered. He became conscious of a historic destinyreserved for him, a Napoleonic star. He was vain enough to believe that he could copy the successful methods ofthe great dictators--Mussolinisperfidy, Hitlerstechnique with threats, and Francosfeline relentlessness--withoutmaking their mistakes. A tour of Spain soon after the end of the civil war filled him with a determination that such astruggle must be avoided at all cost in his own country.

In only three years he rose to the top. His personality had much to do with his success. Peron was anextrovert with extraordinary magnetism; he was very persuasive--or frightening. Athletic, masculine, andhandsome, he conformed to the Argentine ideal of a hero. A hypnotic speaker like Hitler, he could inspire, console,and enrage vast crowds as he pleased. In one speech he could personify tenderness and seem a sincerehumanitarian; in another a few minutes after, he would be a bloodthirsty terror. In short, he was a marvelous actor,

as so many successful politicians have to be. Peron was no ignoramus. He was thoughtful and very well-read;when he cared to, he could impress a discriminating audience. Yet he fraternized casually with enlisted men,rustics, and unlettered workers as a good fellow who shared their attitudes and understood their problems.Apparently he had no moral sense whatever.

This close student of Mussolini had understood far better than his associated how important it was tocomplement naked military power with popular support. This meant, in fact, organizing the poor and ignorantthrough blatant appeals to envy and class hatred, through demagoguery and vulgarity. Peron had no hesitancywhatever in exploiting these means, and while he was certainly not the first demagogue to appear in Argentina, hegauged the aspirations of the masses better than any other. His real opportunity came during the eight-monthadministration of President Ramirez. Peron won two positions, neither of first importance; he was undersecretary ofwar and head of the department of labor. The former enabled him to learn what he needed to know about theofficer hood and to manipulate appointments and promotions so as to strengthen his position as the nerve center of

the GOU. The second post, which might have been an honorific affair, a mere sinecure, he elevated to cabinetrank within a few months. Despite his scanty experience with labor unions or industrial affairs, Peron learnedquickly. Labor unions, which had been intimidated so long by the government and were still belittled by Ramirez,learned that the new minister was likely to obtain excellent terms in disputes with employers. A rash ofunionization, long overdue in Argentina, garnered hundreds of thousands of workingmen into organizationscontrolled by Pernscreatures. The minister himself seldom failed to exploit an opportunity to associate his namewith a settlement favorable to labor or with new benefits.

The installation of General Farrell as president early in 1944 placed Peron near the front of thegovernment. As vice-president, minister of war, and minister of labor and social security, he enjoyed even more


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advantages than before. Although his power over the top army commanders was by no means total--in fact, thiswas never to be, even at his height--it was sufficient to assure him immense importance. A story much incirculation that might have been true, and was certainly in character, was there Peron would not assign or promotean officer until he wrote out in his own hand a letter of resignation--which Peron could date and publish at hispleasure. Another technique, which he may have copied from Cardenas of Mexico, was to stimulate the loyalty of

junior officers and enlisted men to himself by paying them personal attention and providing them with better pay

and conditions. In a showdown between the war minister and their immediate commanders they might well sidewith Peron or at least inhibit ambitious generals.

Even more revolutionary than Pernsattachment of the army were his efforts to win working classsupport. Within a few years he raised the proportion of unionized labor from one-tenth to two-thirds of the workingforce. The leaders of these unions were seldom the original organizers of years past, for Peron made a cleansweep of the old hierarchy. Usually they were men he chose and felt he could manage through office and bribery,even blackmail. They professed fervent loyalty to him if they wished to remain in their posts, which tended to bevery lucrative. Social security benefits were extended to almost every type of workingman, white-collared oroveralled. Even the forgotten rural proletariat fell into Pernspower by means of agricultural unions which hesponsored. It was both a slow and a difficult process to unionize certain regions, where the company store andprivate police discouraged organizers, but it made considerable headway. Copying the Brown Shirts of Hitler andthe Black Shirts of Mussolini, those extralegal policemen and militiamen who served the official parties, Peron

developed an organization of the descamisados (shirtless), who really had upper garments but not the white shirtsworn by men of affairs. Thousands of young men, many of them rowdies from the poorer districts, notably La Bocain Buenos Aires, were trained into experts at beating up opponents, looting shops or factories, and otherwiseterrifying gentlefolk. Reminiscent of Rosas mazorca gangs of a century before, the descamisados well knew thesignals by which Peron could fill the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Casa Rosada within a few minutes with shoutingenthusiasts or set armed mobs surging through the fashionable sections of Buenos Aires. Even regular armytroops feared them. Finally, Peron used his position to grant holidays, wage increases, and bonuses to laborsimply by announcing these benefits whenever he thought he needed the publicity. Employers had to pay or seetheir businesses smashed, in many cases literally. The Argentine workingman was no longer an orphan. He had afriend and leader who had delivered material benefits and endowed him with status and power. Who cared if hismethods were arbitrary?

While Peron scoffed at the idea of running for president, saying it was Impossible that he would ever seek

the office, every indication pointed to this ambition. Conditions seemed ripe, though the army gave him somecause for uneasiness at this time. Labor fairly idolized him and apparently had forgotten the older politicians. Therural masses seemed to be deserting the Radical and Democratic Progressive parties which had held theirallegiance so long. And as a defiant champion of Argentine nationalism, Peron appealed to miscellaneous groupseverywhere who yearned for new values. Still, the outcome of World War II suggested thatArgentinasforeignpolicy for the past five years had been madness. Ambassador Bradensencouragement to the opposition had donesomething to revive the old parties. In most of the world the mood of 1945 was restlessly democratic, as wasnatural at the close a long war, and Argentina shared some of this attitude. During September and early October anumber of demonstrations in Buenos Aires showed the popular temper to be nervous and critical. Misled intobelieving that Peron was going out of fashion like the other fascists, a group of army and navy officers concocted aplot to remove him. On October 9 a garrison near the capital pronounced and compelled him to resign. Then hewas taken to penitentiary on Martin Garcia Island. It seemed a ridiculous end for so promising a career.

The conspirators allowed General Eldemiro Farrell to remain as president, for he was a pliable nonentity.A false spring of revival swept through the country, heartening to liberals and democrats who rejoiced overArgentinasnarrow escape from totalitarianism. As in previous coups of this type in 1930 and 1943, the new rulingclique was not exactly sure what was to be done next. None of its members was an outstanding figure. While theyhesitate, others acted. Pernsmost loyal lieutenants accurately assessed the situation as not lost beyondrecovery. Summoning the descamisados, they found these street fighters still obedient and capable of arousing therest of the working class. For several days huge mobs stalked through the splendid avenues of Buenos Aires, allthe more ominous because they were subdued in manner. Gradually they began to assert themselves moreforcefully, chanting slogans and roughing up opulent or intellectual persons. An important contribution to their


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morale came for Peron's mistress, a minor actress and radio singer named Eva Duarte. This strident beautyproved herself as effective a demagogue as her lover. As isolated acts of violence took on a pattern suggestingproletarian revolution, the generals nervously calculated the chances of pitting the troops against the grim popularmass. Soon they decided it was too risky. On October 17 the movement reached a crescendo of wrath whenuntold thousands gathered in the Plaza de Mayo shouting give us our leader back. A reign of terror seemedimminent. For once, the only time, President Farrell asserted himself and dismissed the new government. Peron

returned to the balcony of the Casa Rosada to thank his followers, a hero restored to his people by populardemand. From that fateful evening on October 17, 1945 to the summer of 1955 no one could doubt that JuanPeron was the ruler of Argentina.

It was now in order for him to become president of the republic. Elections were called for February 1946with the army, which was still independent of Peron, pledging its honor to see that they would be conductedproperly. Peron collected his various blocs of supporters in an organization he named the Labor Party. TheRadicals attempted to rally their scattered members and to put together a massive coalition including theProgressive Democrats, Socialists, and Communists. They named as their candidate Jose Tamborini, as estimableman who was greatly handicapped by the unfamiliarity of his name and a colorless personality, from neither ofwhich Peron suffered. Peron enjoyed every advantage in fame, political appeal, and dynamism. He particularlyexploited the fervent patriotism which second-generation Argentines were now displaying. Britain, the historicembodiment of imperialism, he defied with a passion that appealed to many Argentines. The United States, which

had so long been an object of envy and dislike, was an even more convenient bugbear. Although Braden had gonehome some months before, Peron shouted up and down the country that the voters choose between Braden oPeron, a slogan chalked on many walls. Hoping to discredit Peron, the United States issued a Blue Book whichwas designed to prove beyond doubt that recent Argentine governments had shamelessly cooperated with the Axis.Instead, it offended more Argentines than it converted, turning more voters to Peron as a patriot. The mostinfluential clergymen favored Peron; a pastoral letter read in every church instructed the faithful to vote against hisopponent. The campaign was open and the election was free, as every qualified observer, foreign and domestic,agreed. Peron won a huge electoral majority and it carried his followers into control of both houses of congress andinto most of the provincial posts. His popular plurality was less impressive, 1,500,000 to 1,200,000, but quitesubstantial.

Juan Domingo Peron as President-Dictator

Nothing in Pernsprevious career suggested that his electoral victory might induce him to governconstitutionality, as well he might have. His regime, officially inaugurated on June 4, 1946, therefore contained fewsurprises. From the outset it was clear that the president was everything, the other branches of the nationalgovernment and the local organisms having no independent power whatsoever. Congress remained obedientbecause most of its members were Peronists and could be disciplined through his political machine. Thisorganization, after considering several jaw-breaking names, sensibly decided to call itself the Peronista Party.Congressmen who were not Peronistas were intimidated, expelled, and frequently imprisoned under a lawpunishing desacato (disrespect), which could be interpreted to include sharp questioning or any type of criticismeven on the floor of the legislative body. Peron also crushed the judiciary, which had enjoyed considerable prestigefor its probity and independence unique in Latin America he had four of the five Supreme Court justices impeachedand ousted on spurious grounds. Other federal judges were simply turned out wholesale by the device of having

congress refuse to confirm their positions. Finally, all officialdom was purified; state or local rulers were dislodgedby means of the familiar right of intervention unless they were ardent Peronistas.Re-staffing the administration from top to bottom was a conventional practice, even in democratic

countries. To control the officers of government through a party dictatorship was less customary, though Yrigoyenand the Radicals had gone almost as far as Peron in earlier days. However, Peron utilized many refinements whichalmost extinguished the republican spirit and the democratic tradition. His informal militia, the descamisados, weremost useful in breaking the heads and shattering the offices and ships of men suspected of being opponents. Acritic of Peron might at any time lose his health, dignity, livelihood, or freedom at the hands of these hoodlums,whom the police never chastised. The secret police conducted searches, pilfered the mails, and made arrests


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without regard for the niceties of civil liberties. Torture was a common practice in police stations. Argentineslearned to look over their shoulders before they spoke, to expect invasions of their homes and offices, and to informforeign visitors in a special language of the doings of some character known as John Sunday (Juan Domingo-Peron). Argentinasexcellent press and her great publishing establishment, in both cases the finest in LatinAmerica, had learned something of censorship since 1930. Now they acquired much more familiarity with thispractice. An impertinent editorial or an inconvenient news story might be followed by a strike, a sharp rise in the tax

rate, the arrest or beating of the offending writer, a curious unobtainability of paper or ink, or one of the dreadedSpontaneous incursions of descamisado gangs who would wreck the premises. Managers of publishing houseslearned what not to print, and book dealers what not to display, if they wished to remain in business.

Among the most stubborn of Pernscritics were university faculty members and students. Already theyhad suffered considerably under President Castillo and he colonels prior to 1946. Now they were thoroughlybeaten down. Nine-tenths of the faculty in the six universities lost their positions. Students were expelled by thehundreds, their limited rights to self-government under the reform of 1918 being flouted with contempt. Peronshowed no mercy in denying outspoken students their degrees, which often meant they could never enter theprofessions for which they had trained. Students also learned that hoodlum mobs were available to break theirbodies and time a public meeting or demonstration took on an anti-Peron character. Meanwhile, Peron spokeglowingly about destroying the aristocratic university system and replacing it with one - more democratic, wherevocational training would supplant the historic disciplines and there would be no fees. Fortunately, he never gave

matter persistent attention. It was easier to revamp the public school system so that textbooks and courses wouldglorify the regime. Although Peron cripples and debauchedArgentinasfine educational establishment, it wassturdy enough to survive him.

Peron was probably sincere in maintaining that his system was original, eclectic, and truly adapted to LatinAmerican conditions in a way no other had ever been. The name he attempted to affix to this system wasJusticialism, which perhaps mercifully, was never made very specific or even coherent as a doctrine. After muchfanfare he assembled a constituent congress in 1948. Its product, the constitution of 1949, outwardly had much incommon with the instrument of 1853, though Argentina was now a very different country from the truncatedConfederation of the days of Urquiza and Alberdi. Nominally, it maintained the federal system, along with theseparation of powers and civil liberties. Women were allowed to vote for the first time inArgentinashistory.Presidents were to be chosen by direct election and could succeed themselves (Peron laughingly let this provisionslip through; he affected o have no interest in the matter). A list of Rights for the aged indicated the warm

humanitarianism that supposedly suffused the working classes could think of except the right to strike. There werekind words for children. Also, wide and vaguely defined powers were entrusted to the national government inmatters of economic affairs, foreign trade, and ownership of minerals and public services. As a document theconstitution of 1949 did not depart radically from the windy and misleading charters of other Latin Americancountries.

Pernseconomic program deserves a variety of contradictory judgments: insane, patriotic, unrealistic,pragmatic, magnificently conceived, sinister, disastrous, amazingly successful, and so on. No epigrammaticassessment really fits, for Justicialism was all of those things in the economic area, and more. Experts abroadbecame convinced that Peron was bent on destroying his countrysprosperity as though he were a captive of asuicidal mania. Yet he repeatedly surmounted crises and confounded his critics. His policies were so daring s tobe irresponsible, and they were carried out amid extreme corruption and degrading misrepresentation. They cameclose to running agriculture and the stock-raising industry. Yet when Pernism was a thing of the past, it could be

fairly said that Argentina had strengthened and diversified much of economy, that standards of living had improved,ad that her people were devoted might have progressed much faster under a less erratic government.Some glimmer of consistency emerges from Pernism when Argentina is seen as undergoing a rampage

of nationalism like that of Mexico during the 1930s, or belatedly participating in a world-wide revulsion againstimperialism. Basically, the Argentines wanted to terminate their material dependence on Britain without substitutingfor it new semi colonialism under the United States, West Germany, or the Soviet Union. Peron understood thislonging and turned it to his own advantage. British markets and good will had cast away with a frivolity that appalledsober students but delighted the masses. Americans were defied and insulted, always a popular activity for anArgentine public figure, but Britain was the initial enemy. Just before World War II it was known that alien investors


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held more than two billion dollars worth of Argentine property, in railroads, public utilities, street railways, packingplants, and land. British owners accounted for about three-fourths of this total. For the time being, during the yearsof austerity following the war, the British still urgently needed Argentine meat, wheat, and wool. Therefore, Peronseemed it safe to strike at this long-time partner who now seemed an exploiter. In doing so he was also hurting thelanded aristocracy, the Hierarchy he abused with such vulgarity in his speeches, the fashionable and culturedclasses who despised him as an upstart or madman.

On July 9, 1947, the anniversary ofArgentinasdeclaration of independence from Spain in 1816, JuanPeron stood in the very room in the city of Tucuman where this announcement had been made and proclaimed theeconomic independence of the republic. An agreement with Britain in 1948 resulted in the exchange of most of

Argentinasrailways for about $600 million in credits and food products. It was a proud moment for the Argentineswhen their government took possession of the transportation system, and they looked forward to enjoying betterservice and equipment. As for the British, they had not survived and prospered over the centuries for nothing.They were really pleased to be rid of this huge investment. It later developed that they had obtained a much moreequitable bargain than contemporaries thought, perhaps had even gotten the better of Pernsnegotiators! By1948 the national government owned practically all the banks, insurance companies, means of communication andtransportation, ports and elevators, and public service installations. Whether it operated them well or ill, mostArgentines felt a gratification difficult for foreigners to appreciate. Their country was no longer in any sense acolony.

Peron exhibited a certain degree of statesmanship in making a mammoth effort to industrialize Argentina,something that had been going on for some years without much official encouragement or even understanding. Hisunderlying design was for the republic to convert her economy so as to favor capitalists and labor and to strengthenthe middle classes by building up the domestic market. If his program succeeded, Argentina would have a muchhigher standard of living and would be dependent on no outsider. The decline of the cattle barons and wheat lordshe accept with satisfaction. The creation of a large industrial establishment necessarily involved importing capitalgoods abroad, mainly heavy equipment from the United States. For several years an enormous volume of thesesimports could be financed with the credit and gold reserves accumulated during the war and just after. Thereserves were huge, for Argentina had charged unmercifully for her products during the war and the period ofhardship following. It is Pernscredit that he expended these funds wisely.

It was also important to acquire means of fueling the industrial plant he was constructing. Coal fromWales, Chile and the Ruhr, and petroleum from Venezuela or the Middle East cost heavily in foreign exchange and

would become more expensive asArgentinasrequirements grew. For the first time scientific surveys were made ofthe Andes, whose resources had long been neglected, and enough coal and minerals were found to reduceArgentine dependence on outsiders. Oil had long refused to appear in the republic, but the national monopoly,YPF, increased its efforts and discovered substantial pools in Chubut, the wind-swept southern province, Salta inthe extreme northwest, and the tropical Argentine Chico (renamed President Peron). With reference to electricpower, all that was needed was to supply the nation was effort, and this was forthcoming on a heroic scale. A veryexpensive but well-planned program accomplished wonders in harnessing power from the streams that sprang outof the Andes. The mighty Iguazu Falls in the northeast awaited utilization, which the government began to project.To be sure, Buenos Aires grew so fast she periodically outran her electrical power resources. Streets were oftendark, factories were hampered, and apartment dwellers had to walk up the stairs when elevators balked for lack ofcurrent.

Since all of these projects were expensive, the administration developed an agency to handle the export of

raw materials and the importation of capital goods and other finished products. A mammoth monopoly known asIAPI, Instituto Argentino para la promocion del intercambio (Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Exchange)bought up beef, wheat, and other raw materials, stored them, and exchanged them for such foreign goods orcredits as the authorities could arrange. This nationalization of exports failed to function as efficiently as Peronpromised. IAPI often paid lower prices to ranchers and farmers, who were orphans under the regime in any event,than foreign concerns once had; yet sold their products abroad at exceedingly high rates. The explanation of thediscrepancy was the venality of the officials who managed IAPI. In the long run IAPI defeated the purpose forwhich it was supposedly created. Argentine agriculture and stock raising suffered and declined, while foreigncustomers stopped buying from IAPI as soon as other suppliers made themselves available.


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By 1949 Pernsprogram was in deep trouble. Europe was no longer compelled to butArgentinasproducts at blackmail prices. And nature frowned on the southern republic at this time by inflicting a terrible droughton the pampas, causing the failure of crops and diminution of herds. With her exports falling off disastrously andher wartime credits almost exhausted, Argentina was hard-pressed to finance her industrialization program. Peronprofessed to be unworried. Credit, he said, was only a state of mind. He boasted that Argentina would never againaccept a loan from abroad. In 1950, however, he was greatly relieved when the United States saw to it that the

Export-Import bank granted a loan (though it was not called this, in view of Pernssensitivities) of $125 million.This advance and the sharp rise in prices occasioned by the Korean War staved off a financial collapse, andArgentina creaked along miraculously for several more years. Bankruptcy was ever close, however, and inflation,which plagued almost the entire globe, refused to obey the presidentsorders to cease and desist. The cost ofliving overtook the enormous wage increases Peron had decreed, leaving the working classes little better off. Hemade desperate efforts to halt the rise in prices and to enlist the publicscooperation in several imaginativecampaigns for this end. It was doubtful whether the factors being constructed everywhere, the dams, power plants,and public works would be finished before the nationseconomy went to pieces.

Nothing whatever had been done about dividing the great ranches and farmlands except in a few caseswhen Peron nationalized the estates of his personal enemies. This was not because he wished to favor thehierarchy, but because he experience of Mexico and other countries had indicated a certain economic unwisdomin breaking up large rural units. Peron could point to many achievements in other directions. Nearly every section

of the republic had taken life. Everywhere buildings were going up, testimony not only of urban industrialization butalso of a provincial revival. Forestry and mining in the Andean areas had become important industries with promiseof much future growth. Ocean fishing was no longer neglected, little as Argentines were inclined to substitute fishfor beef. The republic was now the possessor of a large merchant marine, purchased abroad, which Peron saidwould make her forever independent of foreign shippers. However shaky the economy appeared to bankers andcreditors, electrification, new sources of fuel, and the largest industrial establishment in South America wererealities. Argentinashuman resources had also grown faster than most demographers imagined and had done sorecently without much immigration. Her population stood at 18,000,000 by the end of Pernsrule, twelve times itssize a century before. No one could doubt that the nation was tapping its riches with some effectiveness. Men hadlong admired Argentina as an economic wonder. After a decade of Peron they regarded her as a miracle, for shedeveloped so rapidly under such an erratic government.

Freedom Peron degraded in nearly every way, but egalitarianism flourished until the masses idolized him

as El Lider (the leader), their unique benefactor. He brought them unionization, higher wages, paid vacations,shorter working hours, dignity, status, free medical care, improved housing, and safeguards against accident,illness, and old age. Even the rural workers shared these benefits, to which they responded in the usual twentieth-century way by departing from the countryside and moving in droves to the cities. Of course, many criticisms ofPernsachievements were valid: that he had done little but insult and threaten the oligarchy, who were still rich;that his agglomeration of labor unions, the Confederacion general de trabajo, was honeycombed with tyrannicaland grafting officials; that inflation consumed most of the wage increases, that the descamisado gangs gave thewhole lower class a totalitarian tradition that would long linger. These disagreeable points, however, could not anddid not obscure the enormous gains Peron had delivered to the workingmen of Argentina.

Eva Duarte Peron

Pernssocial policies cannot be separated from the astounding, career of Eva Duarte Peron. Ofillegitimate birth in a provincial town in 1919, she had gone to Buenos Aires as a young woman to become anactress. She had a few minor parts on the stage but found a better livelihood by singing in cabarets and on theradio. Soon she was circulating in the fast society of high-ranking army officers, who seldom troubled to presenther to their wives. Thus she acquired fine clothes, jewels, and a bad reputation. Eva was an extraordinarilybeautiful woman, blonde and brown-eyed. Although her education was very limited, she was intelligent and, in asentimental way, idealistic. Peron met her during the summer of 1943-1944. He was a widower just then rising topower. Eva became his mistress, but more; she was a truly fanatical Peronista and an assistant with muchacumen. Peron recognized her important role in liberating him on October 17, 1945. A few weeks later they were


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married.For six years Eva Peron was the most famous woman in the world. She was the real secretary of labor

and welfare in her husbandsgovernment. She wrote a newspaper column and acquired a controlling interest inseveral journals. After agitating successfully for the right of women to vote, she organized and headed thewomansbranch of the Peronista Party. Her voice, which lost much of its musical quality in countless publicharangues, was heard all over the country, on the radio, the balcony of the Casa Rosada, in street meetings, before

labor unions, children, and, in fact, nearly every imaginable group. Her message was not consoling orcompassionate but full of hatred. She inveighed against Pernsenemies and scolded those who failed tocontribute their best to his crusade. Her special foes were upper-class womenfolk, the society ladies who sneeredat the titular first lady of the republic. Since Rivadavia's time, in the 1820s, the aristocratic women of Buenos Aireshad supervised a host of charities in their Sociedad de Beneficencia. Eva Peron set out to ruin it, first b acts ofspite, such as having garbage dumped in inconvenient places or by causing servant troubles. Then she outdid it,creating an Eva Peron Foundation to which workingmen Voluntarily contributed a dayspay now and then andwhich businessmen who wished to avoid a visit by the descamisados liberally endowed. There was no accountingof the fantastic sums involved since, as Senora Peron disarmingly stated, Everyone knows I am honest Misdirectedthough much of its money was, the foundation did a great deal of good. Charity was now possible on a tremendousscale, available to anyone who dropped by the Casa Rosada and had a few words with the presidentslovely wife.Many Argentines received clothing, medicine, and grants to help them through difficult days. Eva Peron had a

wicked sense of humor, which on one occasion she combined with national vanity to delight her countrymen. Whenthe Argentine embassy in Washington received a routine appeal for contributions to local charities, the great-hearted lady in Buenos Aires shipped a large quantity of food and clothing. Argentina, she explained, wasgenerous enough to share her riches with Yankee beggars.

Valued partner of her crusading husband, scourge of the Best people angel of mercy, Lady Bountiful--these were the roles the onetime frustrated actress played with immense success. Another and more subtlecharacterization was filling the position dominated by film stars in some countries and by royalty in others. EvaPeron had the most expensive clothes and the most spectacular jewels of any Argentine. By flaunting them as shedid, she gave vicarious satisfaction to countless women of the lower classes who relished seeing one of their ownso lavishly bedecked. instead of resenting her extravagance they admired her brazenness. And they enjoyedbeing told that such clothing might come within their reach in the better Argentina Peron was building.

No delicacy or modesty inhibited Eva Peron as she forced the Argentines to become familiar with her.

Descamisados were encouraged to chant Evita as though invoking a holy spirit. Her portrait appeared on postersall over the nation and in the display windows of merchants who valued their safety. Syrupy tributes came forth inspeeches of almost any type, in newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and newsreels. Of course, surreptitiousmeans were found to circulate jokes and rumors about her morals of the indecent enrichment of her family. In 1951a campaign was initiated to have her nominated for vice president when Peron ran for reelection in the followingyear. However, the army hierarchy was socially conservative and could scarcely contemplate such an affront toArgentine manhood. In one rare occasion when they crossed Peron, the generals made their feelings clear, andthe campaign suddenly ceased.

Soon afterward it became known that the first lady was sick. An operation for cancer of the throat failed todeliver her from this ailment. As long as her failing strength permitted, she appeared before her beloveddescamisados, pale and wrinkled, croaking horrendous threats to her husbandsenemies. When she dies on July26, 1952 at the age of thirty-three, thousands of mourners in front of the Casa Rosada wept. All over the country

clocks were stopped at the hour of her passing, many to remain so for two or three years. Black banners weredraped about the innumerable portraits in public places. The painted word Evita still appeared wherever a wall offacing was blank, and anyone who scoffed risked violence or worse. The province of La Pampa took her name, asdid the city of La Plata, and every province received an order from the national congress to rename a town afterher. The absurd and rather pathetic autobiography, which had been ghost-written, La razon de mi vida (Thereason for my life), became a required textbook in every Argentine school. There was undoubtedly much truefeeling in the blasphemous orgy of national grief that followed the death of Eva Peron, which included demands thatshe be declared a saint by the Catholic Church. But much of it was also artificially stimulated by President Peron,who wished to exploit her popularity and use it to strengthen his own.


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Pernism and the World

Under the Peron dictatorship Argentina gave the fullest play to the spirit of belligerent nationalism. Thecountry was full of aggressions, which had long been turned within itself, since it had not been involved in a foreignwar since 1870. Chronologically, Great Britain was the first enemy. it was not enough for Argentina to overcharge

this good customer for meat and flour during the war and the period of austerity afterward, when these commoditieswere in pitifully short supply. Peron also ranted at supposed British perfidies in the past and present, and theinspired press poured out vile abuse. For a time Peron seemed determined to seize the Falkland Islands, whichArgentines call the Malvinas, but ultimately he shrank from challenging the Royal Navy, demobilized as it was. Noparticular purpose can be found in this official bluster unless it was to humiliate the Anglophile oligarchy withinArgentina. After the sale of the foreign-owned railways in 1948, some of the venom went out of the anti-Britishcampaign. Perhaps Peron was also chastened a little when the British reduced their purchases in Argentina asworld conditions improved. Yet he had needlessly repudiated a century of good will and a most fruitful period ofcollaboration that had benefited both countries.

With the defeated Axis nations Peron cultivated close ties, perversely defying world opinion but, perhaps,displaying a considerable vision. Refugees and war criminals from Hitlersfallen empire found a welcome inBuenos Aires, with great numbers living in peace despite the clamors of their victims. While Franco Spain was

being ostracized by the United Nations for several years after the war, Peron ostentatiously offered that country hisfriendship, keeping his ambassador in Madrid though few other countries did. Eva Peron made a much-publicizedvisit to Spain in 1947, where she was greeted like a beloved royal tourist. Peron also irritated Britain, the UnitedStates, and other democracies--whom he seemed to equate with the Once people he derided at home--bydeliberately playing up to Communist Russia. He recognized the Soviet Union, something previous Argentinegovernments had never done, and permitted the Communist Party to function openly in Argentina. Several barterarrangements between Argentina and the Iron Curtain countries were mutually profitable, though not to the degreePeron had prophesied. As for the domestic Communists. they got along comfortably in PernsArgentina.Peronistas and Communists were convinced they were taking advantage of one another, and perhaps both werecorrect.

Pernsfriendliness with the Communist world was a useful lever to win favors from the United States, adevice other national leaders was not above using. After the few months experience with Ambassador Spruille

Braden in 1945, the Americans reverted to the role of a long-suffering Good Neighbor who refused to be provoked.As the Cold War intensified, Peron exploited Washingtonsdilemma by insulting and threatening the yanqui, to thedelight of many Argentines and other Latin Americans. This abuse did not arouse a hostile reaction from the UnitedStates, at least officially. On the contrary, it made the government all the more eager to please Peron, aswitnessed by the loan in 1950 that probably saved his regime from a financial debacle. The forbearance of TioSam was based on the fundamental realities that lay beneath the shower of vocal offences from Buenos Aires.Argentina had no military might whatever in the stark new world of power politics after 1945. Her large and showyarmy and her minute air force and navy were insignificant factors in an age of intercontinental bombers and nuclearweapons. The only way Peron could harm the United States was by granting bases to the Russians. This he wasunlikely to do for many reasons, chief among which wasArgentinasurgent need for American machinery and othercapital goods. This need was not reciprocal; Argentina produced nothing the United States could not obtainelsewhere. Although the Americans were in some yearsArgentinasprime customers, they could easily turn to

other suppliers. In ignoring or placating the strident dictator the State Department was not being pusillanimous.Rather, the American policy grew out of the conviction that an inter-American solidarity and long-range relationswith the people of Argentina were worth the price of enduring the provocations of a tyrant.

Toward other Latin American nations Peron exhibited signs of aggressiveness. he had many admirers inthe Hispanic world, and he cultivated the militaristic dictators who aped him and attempted to influence labororganizations through his own CGT. Paraguay, which was economically at the mercy of Argentina, was ruled by anarmy group inclined to be sycophantic before Peron. Bolivia fell into the power of a party inspired by Argentina andhostile to American Exploitation. The army junta which ruled Peru was generally friendly to Peron, if nervous abouthis ambitions. The same was true of Colombia and Venezuela and sometimes of the small republics of the


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Caribbean. However, Peron overplayed his hand by assuming too confidently that Chile planned to remake itselfon the Justicialist pattern and become a satellite of Argentina. Brazil had reason to be nervous about Peron. Muchreckless talk in the Argentine army about the supposedly imminent disintegration of the mammoth, spongy republicallegedly weakened by its Negroid character both offended and frightened the Brazilians. Peron harassed theliberal regime of President Dutra in minor ways between 1946 and 1951. Uruguay was Pernsworst annoyance.This small democracy was by its very existence a rebuke to the Argentine dictatorship, and its prosperity made a

mockery of some of Pernspolicies. It was also a nest of Argentine refugees, as it had been in the days of Rosasa century before. Peron retaliated as much as he dared by forbidding Argentines to travel to the little republic, thusdepriving it of a large source of income from portenos who had long made a habit of visiting its casinos andbeaches. The Mexican Revolutionists, who competed with Peron for Latin American leadership, were perhapsaware that the Argentine dictator had copied many of their measures, but they consistently made known theirdisapproval of his regime.

Peron pretended to profound aspirations. On several occasions he said that World War III had alreadybegun and that it would lead to the destruction of both the United States and Russia. Therefore, Argentina shouldgroom itself as a third force--a popular ambition among many nations--to inherit the world. This she should do byfollowing a course midway between capitalism and Communism, which Peron claimed Justicialism signified, and bybeing militarily strong and socially united. Although his metaphysics were rarely taken seriously, perhaps not evenby himself, it was possible to make a persuasive case for the success of his diplomatic policies. A pariah among

the United Nations in 1945, Argentina had come to enjoy some influence in the world organization and to becourted by all of Hitlerserstwhile enemies while enjoying the friendship of the former Axis partners themselves.Her Latin American neighbors either feared or imitated Argentina; in any case they respected her. And yet Pernsregime had little but nuisance value in international affairs. When his achievements were weighted against whatArgentina might have accomplished between 1945 and 1955 under a democratic system with a sound economicpolicy, there was little to admire, much to inspire pity and disgust.

Decline and Fall

Evil days for liberty or democracy might be tolerated by most Argentines with comparative equanimity aslong as there was reason to believe they were being led into a paradise of material well-being. By 1951 or 1952,however, it became increasingly apparent that El Lider was faltering rather badly on this path. Meat exports were

only a third as great as they had been fifteen years before. Peron thought it necessary to exhort his people toconsume less beef, by far their favorite dish, and to command them to observe one meatless day a week. Moreand more there appeared to be a sound basis for the rumors concerning the fantastic profits the potentates of IAPIwere making at the expense of farmer and rancher, and also the consuming public. And for all the public boasts ofiron and oil discoveries, Argentina was still expending the major share of her diminished credits on imports of theseproducts. Heavy machinery could no longer be bought in sufficient quantities to keep pace with the scale ofindustrialization. There never seemed to be enough electrical power, despite Peronista claims and genuineaccomplishments. Luxuries from abroad were almost unprocurable. Dislocations and inconveniences plaguedalmost every aspect of the nationseconomy, though the rest of the world was booming as never before in allhistory. Buenos Aires, for so long the pride of the Hispanic world, became a conspicuously shabby city, unrepaired,unpainted, dirty, with antiquated services and very old and not many automobiles--all this at a time when other LatinAmerican cities were experiencing a frenzy of construction and chaotic traffic problems because of so many shiny

new cars. Inflation broke loose in Argentina worse than ever, impoverishing a population which had long been toldthat Peron knew the secrets of economics. All over the country people would see the sign, Peron crumpled (Peronfulfills). It seemed more and more a mockery as business worsened and promises remained unmet.

While economic conditions were becoming more precarious, several events shook the faith of thepopulation in the regime. One was the revelation, clandestine but rightly believed, and that Eva Peron had lootedher celebrated charity foundation. Another incident was the strangulation of La Prensa, the very symbol of the olddays of Argentine liberty and enlightenment. Having already subdued La Nacion after a long campaign ofharassment, Peron closed in on this final bastion of a free press. In 1951 the noble journal was stilled, its publisher,Dr. Alberto Gianza Paz, fleeing abroad to receive honor and sympathy wherever there was freedom of the press.


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The CGT took over the plant and name of La Prensa. An impudent banner, Ya es Argentina (Now it is Argentina),was wrapped all the way around its building facing the Casa Rosada. With control of the nations press at lastabsolute, the government next barred all foreign journals which had been, or might be, critical of Peron. To aliterate people such as the Argentine these matters were acutely oppressive and humiliating. Finally, thepresidential election of November 1952 revealed the helplessness of the voters to change the system. The firstArgentine president to run for immediate reelection, Peron was unwilling to allow an open campaign and honest

tabulation of the votes, in contrast to 1946. He had an opponent in Ricardo Balbin, the candidate of the RadicalParty and its allies, but this challenger rarely received permission to speak on the radio, and the controlled press allbut ignored him. His public speeches were usually disorderly affairs. According to the announced results, Peronobtained 65 percent of all votes cast. Possibly this percentage represented the loyalties of the general electorate,for no one could seriously doubt that Peron still held the support of the masses.

Since his secret police was exceedingly effective in reporting on the state of opinion, the president couldnot have failed to know that his popularity was slipping. Like Franco of Spain, he had known many close calls andalways seemed to emerge the stronger after a period of

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