NIW Rf PUtUC

Peron! Peron! Peron!

After ten years, destiny has deserted the man

who controlled Argentina with the support of

the Army, Church and "the shirtless ones."

by Daniel Friedenberg

ON Saturday, June 11 of this year, 100,000 ferventCatholics staged a Corpus Christi demonstration inthe heart of Buenos Aires, directly defying a gov-

ernment ban of President Juan D. Peron. Injuries andarrests resulted. Directly following, on Wednesday, June15, two of the highest ranking members of the Argen-tine clergy were picked up by the police without noticeand put on a plane leaving for Italy. The next day PopePius XII excommunicated all those Argentines who"trampled on the rights of the Church," with Peronhimself heading the list, a measure which has only beenapplied to Communist heads of state in our century. Afew hours after the decree was announced by the Vatican,a bloody revolt broke out in Buenos Aires against theregime. First, a wave of fighter planes attacked theGovernment House. Troops debouching from the NavalMinistry verged on the President's office and were re-pulsed by the Army and volunteer civilians. Anotherwave of fighter planes reinforced by light bombers re-newed the attack. It was apparent that the Air Forceas well as the Navy was involved. Tanks and armoredtrucks brought up additional defending soldiers. Thesame night, in a voice deeply charged with emotion,Peron announced that the revolt had been put down bythe "marvelous action of the Army." In words that ringcuriously to the American mind, he devoted much of hisshort broadcast to the relation of people and Army atthis critical juncture of affairs:

The Army, during these events, has behaved as italways behaves. Not one man has deserted. . . . Withthis I achieve one more passionate aim of my life: thatour Army should be loved by the people, and ourpeople loved by the Army. Nobody will ever be ableto say that a soldier of the Army has shot against his

Daniel Friedenberg is a New York businessman whorecently completed a study of the career of Juan Peron.

brothers, as nobody will ever be able to say that achief or officer of the Army is so despicable as to shooteven once against his brothers.

That is why I Want, at this time, when we seal theindestructible union between people and Army, thateach one of you, brother Argentines, should erect inyour heart an altar to this Army, that not only has doneits duty but also done it with heroism. . . .

General Peron; in almost ten years of office, had with-stood several revolts, but none so serious as that of June16 and those which have shaken Argentina during thispast week. It has now become a common occurrencefor readers of the daily press to expect a new outbreak,a new repression, a worsening of the domestic situationin Argentina. And today it is assumed by students ofLatin American affairs, that Peron's days are numbered.

For those seriously concerned with what happens toour powerful neighbor in South America, the regime ofJuan D. Peron has always presented a puzzling problem.Undoubtedly sharing many of the characteristics of afull-fledged Fascist, the General nevertheless seems toarouse more enthusiasm among the working people thanany other segment of Argentine society. A strong mili-tary leader who rules by force in the name of nationalismand unity, two classical symbols of the extreme right,Peron is hated by the rich with a ferocity usually reservedfor left-wing dictators. And the two most obviousgroups backing his power, the Army and the laborunions^ have been by tradition violent enemies all throughArgentine history. It is no wonder that political com-mentators continually refer to the "Enigma of Peron."

In attempting to analyze what exactly has occurred inAt^ntina during the last dozen years, it is necessary toview the rise and success of Juan D. Peron against thewhole pattern of Argentine history. Almost any schoolboy following recent events can parrot the explanationthat the regime rested on the support of the Army, the

UPTIMMt 36, 19SS •

Church and what has been called the descamisados—the a myth of the Argentine sportsman^playboy which isshirtless workers—and that in attacking the Church the reflected in many fn de siecle European novels.dictator at last aroused the people to revolt. Although It was however the economic policies of this groupin certain respects, this judgment is basically true, like which led to most of the trouble in Argentina today.most truisms, it serves to conceal as much as it reveals. Strongly influenced by the laissez faire doctrine in itsWhen the General, in his first broadcast after the failure earliest and most predatory form, the oligarquia appliedof the June 16 revolt, spoke so passionately of the the theory indiscriminately to their own backward econ-" indestructible union" of the Army and people, it was omy. The prosperity of the larger estancias dependedquite obvious that a question existed as to the relation of on cheap labor for tiie export of beef and cereals, andthe two groups. When the revolt broke out mere hours British capital was lured on the most extravagant termsafter the Vatican announced the excommunication of to build railroads in order to ship the immigrant massPeron, it was equally obvious that such a deep-seated inland. The beef barons were anxious to earn Englishrebellion could not have been planned in a day or even pounds and spend them in Paris, not to create basica week. And a regime resting on such ill-assorted ele- industry and a home market: in fact, the developmentments as the Army, the Church and labor, must indeed of hard goods industries which might compete with thehave an interesting background. * foreign imports necessary to pay for their agricultural

goods was alien to their self-interest. The effect of thisThe Emergence oi Central Gooernment ^-centration on «port and Iadc ofinterest and contempt

• ' for mdustrial technology resulted in a neglect of capitalThe modern history of Argentina might be said to investment outside of the ranches proper,

begin with the election of Bartolome Mitre as president Foreign capital, eagerly encouraged, rushed to fill theof the republic in 1862, since it was during his electoral gap; and it was not long before the meat packing indus-period that immigration was first encouraged. Hitherto, try fell under foreign control, was financed by foreignthe country had been racked by civil wars and disorders banks, delivered to the coast on railroads owned andcaused by caudillos or local chieftans, each with his own operated by foreign investors and shipped in foreignarmy of adherents and mercenaries. With the advent of holds. As a consequence, not only did the entire eco-Mitre, an unusually intelligent and cultured man, a com- nomy oscillate to stock market movements in Europeanpromise was effected between the interests of the pampa capitals, and in particular England, but the most enor-or interior and the larger coastal cities which permitted mous pressure was exerted by foreign interests to "con-the setting up of a working federal government. tain" Argentine politics and keep them under the vassal-

For over 50 years the successors of Mitre, banded to- age of the estancia owners. The country began together in what became known as the Conservative Party, resemble a South American Ireland. Furthermore, asruled Argentine politics. This party was the political industry developed it too became dependent on the prod-face of the estancia or large ranch owners, a small and ucts of the pampa and thus indirectly on foreign capital:incredibly rich group who passed the election down from instead of exploiting the country's basic mineral re-one to another by means of fraud and coercion. It was sources, it limited itself to processing the foodstuffs forthe epoch of enormous expansion. Unrestricted immigra- export consumption. Even today, after recent attemptstion, which meant cheap labor, was the key to the devel- to reverse the process, more than 90 percent of Argentineopment of the rich pampa at a time when the industrial- total exports are still animal or agricultural products,ization of Western Europe required ever larger imports A reaction against the narrow policy of the Conserva-of food stuffs. The men who controlled the Conserva- tive Party was inevitable. At the time of the presidencytive Party, in some ways similar to the idealized picture of Mitre, Argentina had a population of less than 2of our Southern plantation owners prior to the Civil million, but due to the successive and constantly accelerat-War, were an aristocratic and cultured group. Now ing waves of immigration, the number steadily rose. Bycalled the oligarquia, they were the great landowning 1895 the population doubled, in 1914 it stood close todescendants of the original Creole settlers and repre- 8 million and the census of 1930 indicated nearly 11.5sented the colonial tradition and mentality of Spain tem- million citizens. The new immigrant mass, stemmingpered by nineteenth century French liberalism. Though almost exclusively from Italy and Spain, settled inCatholic and staunch supporters of the unity of Church Buenos Aires and the other large cities near the coast,and State, they initiated legislation granting civil marri- Radical and anarchist by tradition, it reacted violentlyage and control of education by the secular authorities, against the oligarchic hold on politics. The second gen-Politically they evinced a restrictive attitude toward eration soon became strongly nationalistic, more nationaldemocracy and free elections, based on fear of the in feeling than the old-rooted aristocracy whose idealgrowing immigrant wave. Their children were usually was France and cosmopolitan culture, A new middlesent to Paris for higher education, where their gracious class began to be formed from the immigrant groupmanners, good looks and prodigality combined to create which yearned to break the social monopoly of the aristo-

10 NIW MPUILIC

crats. And the spread of revolutionary economic doc- the Radicals alienated themselves from the growingtrines made the working-dass leaders realize that un- might of the syndicalist groups and the intelligentsia,limited immigration led to a cheapening of the cost of Already in the first term of Irigoyen, the shift towardlabor and their consequent impotence in the struggle for extremes was apparent. The more rightist elements ofpower against the oligarquia. the Conservative Party still held strength in several of

The result of all these pressures was the creation of the backward provinces, the left-wing Democratic Pro-the Radical Party, an amorphous mass of the urban gressive Party was making headway in Santa Fe, and themiddle-class, workers, professionals and a leaven of federal capital of Buenos Aires had begun to fall to theidealistic aristocrats. The cement that united ail the Socialists. For the incoherent masses who had formerlymembers of the Radical Party was hatred, hatred of the supported the Radicals were seeking an economic solu-oligarquia which through bribery and fraud controlled tion, not a mere new set of names on the ballot box.the political life of the country. Beyond this, its econo- And to make matters worse for the Radicals, corruptionmic policy was incoherent, extending from the extreme began to appear in the small ruling elite of the party,left to mild goody-goodyism and even including a wing Lost in the welter of violent dogma and slander, theof religious Catholics who objected to the worldly skep- Argentine people were being prepared for the arrival ofticism of the aristocrats and their tolerant approach to a Leader who would satisfy their aspirations outside ofreligious questions. the "betrayals" of constitutional structure.

The Radical Party, which resembled a national plebis- ^he re-election of Irigoyen as an old man only twelveate more than an opposition party, swept to power in y^^rs after the crushing first victory of the Radicals,1916 in the first election by secret ballot in the history instead of healing their desperate cause, proved to beof Argentina. The first Radical President, Hipolito the end of the party. Befuddled and senile, IrigoyenIrigoyen, a figure very similar to Teddy Roosevelt m ,elied on his ancient comrades, who milked the publicmany respects, retained an emotional hold on the im- treasury till scandals resounded from one end of themigrant masses by his fanatic hate of the oltgarquta. But country to the other. In 1930 the Army, the consciousthe inner conflicts of the Radical Party were too extreme tool of the estancia owners who had lost all hope of afor any individual to resolve. A catch-as-can basket for return to power through the ballot, revolted and sweptall the elements opposmg the Conservatives, the Radical ^way the Radical government.Party was incapable by its very diffuse nature of unitingunder the responsibility of power. Essentially a revolt on T I . /^ i x i /- jthe part of the new immigrant middle class against the ' " ^ GencrfllS lake ZommaMold aristocracy, the leadership considered its task well The Army in Argentina had always been an ally of thedone after victory at the polls. aristocracy. In the days preceding wholesale immigration,

Closed off from the real movement in the country, the the landowning gentry had followed a wise policy ofRadical chiefs saw the Argentine as a reflection of them- granting tracts up to 50,000 acres of rich pampa soil toselves: the middle class supplanting the aristocracy. But retiring officers, thus assuring a community of class in-the facts were different. Though politically beaten, the "- terest. Although the officers of more recent years de-economic power of the oligarquia was untouched. The rived from the middle class rather than the oligarquia,large ranch owners still dominated the country and by they were of that more settled segment of old Argentinesprocess of marriage had assimilated the newly-rich city who felt an admiration rather than a hostility toward theindustrialists. More than 50 percent of the population ruling minority, a yearning which often translated itselfcould be classed as peons barely grubbing a subsistence as into an avid desire for social prestige and brilliant mar-sharecroppers on the feudal estates. The lot of the city riages. The rise of Mussolini and thence Hitler cast aworkers was unchanged and the bloodiest labor suppres- powerful attraction on this group, and the hiring of asion in the history of Argentina, when armed thugs hired German military mission, which trained the officer casteby employers co-operated with the Army to break a continually from 1912 to the outbreak of World War II,strike of the metal workers, actually occurred during the accentuated its natural authoritarian and Germanophileadministration of Irigoyen. The middle class was a inclination. The high state of tension between the oldsmall isolated fraction which had acquired neither a Creole aristocracy and the new immigrant mass was adommant economic role in the country nor a stable perfect seeding ground for Army intrigues. As long aspolitical hold on the electorate. Blindly adhering to President Irigoyen had been supported by a strong popu-their own delusion, the Radicals—unlike the Democratic lar swell, the Army hesitated to inject itself into politics.Party in the United States which absorbed the vitality of but the revelations of corruption and scandal in histhe Populists and organized labor—^refused to broaden second period of office had at last presented the goldentheir social program. While earning the undying hatred chance. With the revolt of the Army in 1930, theof the estancia owners who, influenced by the example of hollow edifice that had been called democracy collapsed.Mussolini, turneid to a nationalist and fascist program. The history of Argentina since 1930 might well be

SirriMtBt M, 1955 11

called the Age of Generals. The basic forces in society middle-dass origin whose ne'er-do-well father hadwere so splintered no element could forge a program floated all his life in petty jobs on the rich estancias, hadsufficiently appealing to rally the country. T'he old been put through military school by an uncle who earlyaristocracy, which had sold its liberal heritage before sensed the intelligence of the boy. Proud, charming,the turn of the century in fear of the new immigrants, ruthless and amoral, Peron rose rapidly in his Armywas a tiny minority living in terror of a truly popular career. But the way to the topmost summit was closedmovement. The middle class, lost in the collapse of the for the sons of poor men unconnected by marriage toRadical Party, sheltered in alternate apathy and disgust the ranch barons who dominated Argentine society,behind the mantle of the military. And the workers, In the normal scheme of things Peron would havewho had come to consider the Socialist Party a debating remained all his life a discontented Colonel. The widesociety for intellectuals and artists, gave up all hope of social unrest in Argentina during the late •30s, however,a constitutional group to right their precarious lot. It offered striking opportunities for upstarts of cunningwas only the Army, the one obvious force which could and rapacity. The mistake of the other ambitious Gen-maintain its will by naked power, that gave a political erals had been their limited insight into the politicalfacade to Argentine society. situation; blinded by the obvious, they thought the key to

The "cleanup" General, Jose Felix Uribum, who led power lay in currying favor with the old guard Conserva-the revolt of 1930, was so inept he was shortly replaced tives. But the very restless sense of discontent with hisby another General, Augustin P. Justo, who didn't take own lot gave Peron a shrewder understanding. For,long in showing that if popularly elected candidates synonymous with the fall of the Radical Party in 1930,have their weaknesses, there are things far worse. By a mighty phalanx called the General Confederation of1938 affairs of state had declined to such a point, the Labor had emerged from the welter of separate unions.Army and its oligarchic managers were fearful of a This labor giant had broadened and strengthened in thecounter revolution. subsequent years of political turmoil. Though attached

In an attempt to put down the unrest of the people, in theory to the socialist and anarchist opposition, thea decent candidate by the name of Roberto M. Ortiz was Confederation was in reality an unwieldly monster ofallowed to campaign as the Conservative emblem bearer, discontentecl men who would throw their support toBut Ortiz, though elected by obvious fraud, showed him- any who could bring about improved conditions ofself too responsive to the needs of the electorate and, living. And on the implications of this insight Peronunder the pretext of illness, was discarded in favor of staked his political career. Well known among histhe Vice-President, Ramon S. Castillo, an open pro- fellow officers, he felt certain of their attachment onceFascist. Events in Europe were beginning to throw long he approached the highest echelon. A self-confessedshadows on the Argentine shore. The handwriting on Fascist (sent to Italy to study II Duce's military strat-the wall showed only too dearly that the Nazi period was egy in the late '30s, he had formed a passionate idola-reaching its end. Castillo's graft-ridden and muddy try for the Italian dictator, even calling him "theregime was a handicap for the more intelligent Nation- greatest man who ever lived"), he was sure of the sym-aiists, who viewed with dismay the tumult of the pro- pathy of the most conservative elements. What he nowAlly masses and the large supplies of United States needed was a method to insinuate himself into the heartsLend-Lease arms which were building up the military of the working people.power of Brazil. Besides, 1943 was an election year and

Colonels running the show fearful they might lose con- Taking Mussolini as his star, Peron seriously enteredtrol. June of 1943 ushered in a series of internal revolu- politics. His rise was meteoric. Breasting the intrigues oftions. Like Rome after the disappearance of the last the fateful year of 1943, he was appointed Chief ofblood-line Caesar, the Army, now conscious of its ability Staff of the Army to General Rawson, outwitted his lead-to make and unmake presidents, strove to create its own ing competitors under General Ramirez and soon be-basis for state authority. As the Roman Generals Galba, came the actual force behind (jeneral FairrelL It*was inOtho and Vitellius rose and fell in a very brief period, the latter days of General Ramirez when he achieved theso the Argentine Generals Rawson, Ramirez and Farrell faster stroke which led him to supreme power. For itwaxed and waned to the beat of subterranean conflicts, was at this time that, at last putting his insight on theAnd again, as the Roman Vespasian finally sensed the nature of the Argentine working class dissension into use,peculiar combination necessary to achieve lasting power, Peron brought Into being a new special Secretariat whichso a new and hitherto unknown Argentine grasped the was charged to administer all welfare and labor prob-essential currents .in society and put them to his megalo- lems.

maniac uses. The new Secretary of Labor and Welfare was aJuan Donimgo Perm, a person of rather obscure phenomenon the likes of which Argentina had never

NRW MPItBLiC

seen before. It seemed like the sluices of the twentiethcentury with one violent jolt opened wide, sweepingaway the conservative interests as though flotsam. Inthe name of nationalism, with the words "country,""sacrifice," "duty" and "glory," all the phrases the Con-servatives mouthed for their own purposes, Peron in-stituted social reforms in brief months that foreverchanged the political history of his land. AlthoughIrigoyen in his first term had passed some legislationameliorating the lot of the most needy—employers' lia-bility for injured workmen, restrictions of Sunday laborand some control over the sweat shops—the conditionof the average worker in Argentina was pitiful. Withone fell swoop this was changed. A mighty torrent ofdecrees poured out: salaries were automatically raised15 to 20 percent; minimum wage laws were passed forthe first time in the history of the country; paid vacationswere instituted and resort homes set up for working-class people; employees could not be fired without re-ceiving a dismissal pay amounting to several months in-

^come; and, most of all, the Peron Secretariat, in realitybiased against the employer, was charged to enforce therent and price controls formerly enacted but not opera-tive, as well as the new edicts.

An electric impulse swept the country. Almost as oneman, the entire working population hailed its savior.Forgotten were the Socialists, the Progressive Democrats,the Anarchists and the newly formed Communist groups;obliterated were the Radicals. ''Peron, Peron, Peron"was the chant on the streets as the workers left their jobs—receiving mandatory pay for political "strikes" in ac-cordance with one of the new decrees—to scream theirapproval. And a new sound entered. "Viva Evila":Eva Duarte, the colorful mistress of Peron and his futurewife, a woman who hated the ruling class with a furyso deadly that no measure was too rapid to ensure itsdemise.

Peron Bids for Supreme PowerThe regime of General Farrell was shaken to its roots.

Behind the scene pressures began to be exerted. TheNavy, whose leadership had largely' remained faithful tothe fallen Radicals, the aristocrats and the dissident poli-ticians demanded that the Army demagogue be removed.The pressure became increasingly heavy. And one earlymorning a police van pulled up. Colonel Peron wasremoved from Buenos Aires and taken in seclusion to aspecial island reserved for political prisoners.

But succeeding events showed that Argentina hadturned a decisive corner. Only eight days after his arrest,on October 17, 1945, Peron, even uncertain himselfwhat awaited, requested leave to go to Buenos Aires onthe pretense of sickness—and returned to a scene ofpandemonium that has made the date immortal in LatinAmerica. For Eva Duarte, in co-operation with Cipriano

Reyes, head of the Packing House union, a left-wingleader who had come to idolize Peron, organized ademonstration which in terms of genuine feelingdwarfed the so-called Mussolini march on Rome. Outfrom the slums, the suburbs, the back streets poured amass of humanity which had never before been seen onthe fashionable avenues of Buenos Aires; the people,the ugly and poor and common people who lived inobscurity, rose up and invaded the city cursing and defy-ing the powers that be to oppose them. For the firsttime in the history of Argentina the rule of State momen-tarily shifted into the hand of the descamisados, theshirtless workers. And the Army split in factions, theConservatives, paralyzed by fear, dared not make a move.Dictatorship came that day, though the legal fandangoof a concerted Radical, Socialist, Communist and Con-servative opposition tried to oppose Peron at the nextelection the following year.

It would be a mistake to assume that the support onthe part of the working class had brought into existencea left-wing dictatorship. Peron was not left-wing; hewas not center; he was not even right-wing but purelyand simply Peronista. Any means to seize power wasgood and Peron had merely used the violent social dis-content as a tool to attain his objectives. The sincereleft-wingers who had contributed to his rise in power,like Cipriano Reyes, soon learned the bitter truth inprison cells. But it was the relation of Peron to theCatholic Church which most clearly revealed this fact.

The Church has a less important place in the structureof Argentine society than most Americans realize. Thegreat landowning Creoles who controlled the countryduring the 1800's, in their reaction against Spanish auto-cracy, had become strongly influenced by French liberal-ism. The Church was on the defense for most of thenineteenth century, a tendency which reached its climaxin 1884, when secular education was established by lawand the Apostolic Delegate, who violently dissented, hadbeen handed his passport and given 24 hours to leave thecountry. In fact, the religious liberalism of the oldaristocratic group had been one of the factors that con-tributed to the rise of the Radical Party. Although Ar-gentina is considered a Catholic country and both thePresident and Vice-President must by law be communi-cants of that religion, lay education, civil marriage andpurely municipal cemeteries have long been established.The masses are notoriously indifferent in religious mat-ters and Buenos Aires, with a population of 3.5 millionpeople, has no more Catholic churches than Philadel-phia, a predominantly Protestant city of smaller size. Itis even claimed by authorities versed in the subject thatthe influence of the Catholic Church over the lives ofthe people is less persuasive in Argentina than theUnite:d States.

But the Church had never reconciled itself to such apassive role in the Argentine state. Per se neither JFascist

SEPTEMM» 26, 1955

nor feudal, it was concerned with regaining its position aseducator of the young. Disappointed by the Radical Partyas it had been before by the Conservatives, the Churchfelt equally shorn of its historic function under the ruleof the middle class and the aristocracy. State subsidies ofthe ecclesiasta, control of education, official and exclusiverecognition of the State religion: these were its avowedobjectives and, in search of these, it would support anyindividual or party regardless of other programmaticcontent.

Juan D. Peron, though personally indifferent and evenhostile to the Church before his rise to power, clearly sawthe possibilities in such a situation. He had a directmodel in the conduct of his idol, Benito Mussolini. TheItalian dictator in his early Fascist days was not only vio-lently anti-Christian but an acknowledged Nietzscheanand writer of anti-clerical novels. Yet, most revealingly,when the Fascists clashed with the first Christian Demo-cratic movement, which had been organized in 1919 byDon Sturzo, a Catholic priest, the Vatican withdrew itssupport of the Catholic party. After the Fascists at-tained power, years of secret conferences between Mus-solini and the Vatican resulted in the Lateran Accord of1929. By the terms of this agreement, the Church re-tained its right to exercise "moral and spiritual power"over the people and the Roman Catholic religion be-came "the sole religion of the state." Religious instructionwas handed over to the Catholic clergy in the publicschools and the Church in return gave full recognition tothe temporal power of the Italian Fascist government.The Italian Catholic Action Society further agreed, inexchange for its control over public morality and thefamily, to refrain from politics and not conflict with theFascist youth organizations. As long as II Duce lived, theterms of this Accord were never breached.

An "Argentine Lateran Accord" was what Peronsought. He desperately needed the strength of theChurch. The Conservatives, large segments of the middleclass and the intelligent left-wing leaders bitterly op-posed him. Almost the entire leadership of the Navy andcertain cadres of the Army were uneasy under his rule.The oniy group of which he could be certain, outside hispersonal following in the Army, was the fickle mob, thedescamtsados who might be swayed by a turn to theworse in social conditions. If he could add the powerof the Church to his cause, he would be able to split theopposition of the wealthier people.

Thus the strange spectacle arose that a man whoduring most of his mature life had evinced contempt forpriests, now became their strongest ally. The first stepswere taken while Ramirez was still President and Peronhead of the Junta actually running the government. Byquick steps the clock was turned back to the days pre-ceding 1884. Catholic instruction was reintroduced in allstate schools and church subsidies greatly increased.Prominent Catholic leaders were given posts of im-

13

portance. And the final payoff was made in 1949 whenthe Peron-tailored new Constitution reaffirmed govern-ment adherence to the Catholic faith.

Varicftson pn a Classical PatternThe triumvirate underpinning the power of Peron

was complete—with an odd variant. Right-wing dicta-torship traditionally rests on a coalition of Army, Churchand the moneyed interests, either bankers and industrial-ists in the more advanced countries or the landed aristo-cracy in agricultural lands. The technique of gainingpower is to whip up support among a section of theworkers by attacking "plutocracy" while, at the sametime, being in secret agreement with key elements ofvested interest. Then, when power is attained, theliberal, Socialist and Communist leaders are broken,puppet labor leaders installed and the mass is left supineor held in grip by demagogic formulas.

In the case of Peron, the pattern started in classicorder, but certain differences soon became apparent. For,though indeed the genuine labor leaders were discardedin favor of hack Peronistas, the social advances of theearly years were sustained. Even though the General Con-federation of Labor was converted into the most serviletool of political tyranny, security of employment, lump-sum indemnity on discharge, higher wages and paidvacations became permanent facets of the Argentineeconomy. A moral dignity was given to the voice of theworkers by Peron's constant appeal to their support. Andif inflation did soon eat into the real gains, inflation in-curred in the surrounding Latin American countries wasfar more brutal. The continued support of the workingclass and the continued opposition of the oligarquiamight be considered the final criterion.

It is for this reason that certain sincere liberals have adivided opinion as to the long-term significance of theregime. Whether the estancia owners refused to acceptPeron or the influence of Eva Duarte prevented him fromembracing what should have been his natural allies, itwas soon apparent that the third element of the triumvir-ate supporting the dictator was not the moneyed interestsbut rather the mob violence of the urban workers.

For years it seemed that Peron had touched the magiclodestar of success. Discontented officers of the Armyand Navy were purged and personal cronies advancedto positions of command. A praetorian guard devoted tothe dictator was maintained in Buenos Aires. Thefederal police force went through a period of great en-largement. The judiciary system was made subordinateto executive fiat. The Socialist and Communist Partieswere carefully circumscribed and the Radicals forbiddenall outlet to propagandize. The reorganization of all laborunions was completed, the free press broken. And theallegiance of the Church weakened the natural opposition

14 RIPIWUC

High school students march for Peron

of the upper and middle classes, particularly among thewomen.

Growing Economic DiscontentThe real enemy of Peron, however, was one that no

tricky reorganization of political forces could exercise.It was basic economics. This fact was masked by theextraordinary value of Argentine food stuffs in the worldmarket from 1943 to 1949 when, due to war and post-war needs, the country was so rich it could afford anconsiderable number of social experiments withoutdamage. But the key dilemma facing the incredibly fer-tile agricrultural land of Argentina all through its historyhas been the unresolved conflict between city and country.The hinterland is dominated by a landowning aristo-cracy concerned with upholding an agrarian system basedon the export of beef and cereals. This "two cropeconomy," similar to the cotton economy of our South acentury ago, depends on cheap labor to undersell themore mechanized acreage of Canada, Australia and theUnited States in the world market. The whole structureof life on the pampa rests on peonage and the migratoryworker. But the progressive immigrant mass of BuenosAires and the other littoral cities can only evolve throughan expanding industrial economy of high wages andmass production. The root of the equation is power,electric power which would hasten mechanization ofindustry and raise the low productivity of labor. This,however, the estancia owners resist because high wageswould siphon labor from the large estates and highindustrial productivity would threaten the import marketby which the foreign nations make up the balance ofexchange. In an ideal world, given the natural resourcesof Argentina, the tension could have been transcendedby creating a "super Denmark," a state devoted to thefullest mechanization of its agrarian economy for theexport trade. The only practical way for Argentina toresolve forever the paralyzing antagonism would be tosmash the estate system by forcibly dividing the land.

This Peron could not do without offefnding a largesection of the officer class in the Army. He could force

the estancia owners to provide breakfasts to migrant laborof mate or coffee with cheese, he could hand out to theurban workers a mess of social security porridge, but allthis in actuality was security at fixed wages in an infla-tionary economy. For, dominated by lust of power andnot sound economic theory, demagoguery and not ideas,the dictator was moved on a flood of events rather thandominating them. By temperament and training, hewas incapable of transforming the revolt he initiatedinto a true social revolution. AJl available statistics indi-cate that there has been no redistribution of wealth inArgentina and that the relative position of the upper 10percent is unchanged. Peron could not touch the statusquo and though the aristocratic lords of the land mightwrithe with hate at the mention of his name, the real rootof their basic wealth was untouched.

Juan D. Peron's troubles can thus be historically datedfrom the end of the reconstruction period after WorldWar II, when world food prices began to fall. As thedevastated areas came back into production, the desperateneed for Argentine beef and cereals declined. And thenthe cost of the General's experiment became evident.

When Peron came to power, there was a large surplusin the national treasury. This he proceeded to use up. Atotalitarian regime must maintain many essentially non-productive cost items. The Army was greatly enlargedand the state bureaucracy swollen beyond measure. Thepuppet syndicates controlling labor, an enhanced policeforce and internal security machine all added to the load.Peronist front organs for youth and workers were sup-ported by the state. An additional flock of oflice em-ployees, petty white collar jobs given to friends offriends and party hacks, were a derivative expense whichcould not be eliminated because of their institutional in-terest in the perpetuation of the regime. Graft and em-bezzlement of public funds were natural concomitantsof a system where mediocrity was deliberately courted inorder to avoid the rise of powerful contenders. Publicfiestas, grandiose parades, church subsidies, uneconomicattempts to exploit marginal mineral resources, drainedmore and more of state income. The railroads, gas, elec-tricity and the telephone system were nationalized attremendous cost and run in slipshod manner. And busi-ness, which only under the extreme penalty of confisca-tion assented to the added cost of social services—oftendirectly subsidized by the government—showed signs offaltering. In a short time Argentina became a nationwith one of the highest tax rates in the world.

The General was in a quandary. His much-touted in-dustrialization had only been turned to the productionof items as airplanes and refrigerators, luxury or mili-tary goods which might excite the public mind but hadno effect on the basic problem. The increasingly largershare of private income turned to government use wasforcing hrim to take steps which, no matter what direc-tion, would be unpopular. He could not materially undo

26, 1955 IS

the social benefits else he lose support among the work- declared that he would cut off his arm before permittinging masses. But neither could he attack the basic wealth American capital to enter his country, soon was labeled,of the oligarquia, the whipping horse he used to excite in the sly expression of the opposition, a Venus de Milo:the poor but which he didn't dare to destroy. Slogans one arm went to Henry J. Kaiser and the other to thesuch as "Sacrifice For the Fatherland" were useless on Standard Oil Company of California. Not a single actthe skeptic and highly civilized middle dass. And the in his entire career had been more unpopular and evenArgentine people were of such mixed origin, they could today the Standard Oil deal is still languishing beforenot be aroused by Franco-like Hispanidad appeals or the legislature because the Peronist Congress dare notTeutonic trumpetings of Blood and Destiny. hold a quorum sufficient to pass the law for fear of the

It was at this period that Peron seriously considered wrath of the people.foreign aggrandizement as a method to divert the Ar- The rising economic discontent with the regime htckegentines from the coming crisis. Chile and Bolivia were o^t into the open, however, on a completely differentparticularly fascinated by Justicialismo or what Father level. Of the three legs of the political tripod supportingCoughlin called Sodal Justice, the nearest Peron came P^ron, that of the Church was the most uncertain. Theto inventing a successful Fasdst myth. The peculiar Army and the labor unions had been so pulverized, itcombination of military and labor force behind his ad- was impossible for malcontents to do much damage. Butministration seemed a wholesome solution to many the Church, with an independent organization of its own,Latin Americans. A Pan-American bloc, in the name of had entered the coalition as a co-operative partner rathera "Third Position" to counter the weight of the United than a subordinate. The Churdi was as chary of beingStates, controlled and dominated by Argentina, would absorbed as Peron was anxious to break its independence.excite all the anti-yanqui sentiments in the Latin Ameri- The very existence of a separate body in the Argentinecan heart. Peru was going through her own home-brew state was a threat to the dictator. He knew that a focalPeronism and would probably co-operate; Colombia, fur- poi^t of possible opposition, like the proverbial snowther north, was a sympathetic ally. ball, would gather weight in free movement. And his

Ti -^ r , . r r T> ..L i. T l r • political instinct told him that stormy days threatened.But unfortunately for Peron, the centrifugal forces in ^ , , . . , , ,. , r r

,, , , , . c ^L A • i. • u J As to who precipitated the split between Juan D.the squabbling South American countries had more „ i , 5- , ,. x-, i* i , • -i, • i, r, ,, fu 1 • , r i.- V 1 Peron and the Catholic Church, only history will judee.

strength than the desire to form a common anti-Yankee ^ . , . . ' , • ' , ..^ \ ,,r f^ n I. H i . . J ,Li u- Certainly, provocation existed on both sides. A smallfront. Each small tyrant was more concerned with his ,., , •''. ^ . r ^ i ,• , • i i i i

,- ,, ,, i- r A - liberal minority ot Catholic clerics had always opposedown prerogatives than the augmenting of Argentine , ,. ^ , , , , ^, , ^Y .

-r^ 1- A • n • S 1- • f- J the dictator on the grounds that the Church was bemgpower. Then, the American fingers in Bolivian tin and • , , • , •, • • , r • <• ri-,., , , j r . j j i . compromised by its dose identity with a fascist form ofChilean copper drew a long way . . . and Peron did not ^ ' , . ^ ,, ^ j u r 1 - i . L u J -i-i-L government. This group came more and more to the

dare to do by force what he hoped might be accom- * , • .-^ , • r ,, . , , , , 1 -I fore as the economic difficulties of the regime created

plished through wile. , ,. ,. ^, . . , , ^, ,public discontent. There were hints that the Church

The last bitter hope that remained was the encourage- ^^^ interested in forming a Christian syndical movementment of foreign investment. And here the wheel made ^ ^^^ ^^^^^^y Confederation of Labor. Thefull swing. Peron had always been an enemy of foreign ^^^^^^.^ y^^^^ Workers started to proselytize in the fac-capital and with good reason, for the Argentine people ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ j - ^ j ^ ^ - ^ ^ indicated sympathy for the nu-dreaded before all else what they considered American ^^^ Christian Democratic group which was trying toimperialism. It was the encouragement of English in- ^^^^ ^ religious-political movement modeled on the stylevestment that, more than any other popular factor, led ^^ ^^^^^ -^ Western Europe,to the fall of the Conservative Party at the beginning ofthe century. The Argentine masses were well aware /%. i J: AI i IJ. ^

that the inTent of the sldical Party to nationalise foreignoil interests had swelled the coffers of the revolutionary But it was in the field of youth where the outburstgroup that overthrew Irigoyen in 1930. But Peron had first became virulent. Both Peron and the Church knewno choice left. In retaliation against the blocking of that control of the country's youth was the key to theAmerican dollars, the Export-Import Bank refused to future. The University students were openly anti-Perongrant credits. And the dictator, who had strangled his and only passively Catiiolic. An attempt was made byown economy by excessive taxation and non-productive both sides to influence the lower or secondary level. Theexpenditures, needed foreign currency or he would dictator organized the Union de Estudiantes Secundariosstarve. The consequence was a secret accord by which (Union of Secondary Students). The Church counteredPeron agreed to release blocked currency and permit by forming a Union of Catholic Students, but the specialrisk capital to enter Argentina, in return for advance- inducements at the command of the government madement of fore^n credit. its own organ more attractive.

No such agreement, however, can be kept secret for What may have been the decisive point that changedlong and the General, who at the outset of his regime this underground skirm'ishing to open warfare was when

NIW IWPUBUC

the General turned over the Presidential summer home hope for a better future. Each Army leader who entersat Olivos, in the suburbs of Buenos Aires, to the high his office, trembles for his skin; each worker who shoutsschool girls of the Union of Secondary Students, and at the interminable rallies, does so only because he dreadsstarted spending much time in their company. A riot that bad may be replaced by worse. And the dictatorof salacious stories soon rocked Argentina. The Church stays by playing on the mutual terror that is implied inwas profoundly alarmed. From their point of view, this the possibility of a Civil War, threatening the armed.was breaking the Gentleman's Agreement. Peron was forces with a domestic rebellion and cajoling the workerseven going beyond the terms of the Italian Lateran Ac- with the thought of what might happen if an unbridledcord, on which their mutual interest was founded. For, oligarquia again returns to reign. ;although Mussolini's Fascist youth organizations had And so the Mortality Tale unfolds to its end. Thebeen given a green light to organize politically, it was Leader who rode to power on his promises to the poor,specifically understood that the Church reserved moral dreads their sullen apathy at the time of crisis. Theand spiritual power over the people. The whole sacred Leader who reinforced his power by a deal with theinstitution of public morality and the family seemed at Church, quakes at the thought of the double-edgedstake. The Church did not hesitate' to state its open swords he drew forth. The Leader who stayed in powerdisapproval. by aid of the Army, sees the martial cloak slipping from

Once Peron was aroused he determined to strike back his grasp. Peron, the man who studied Mussolini andhard and sure. All his old hatred of priests rushed to claimed he knew and would avoid all his mistakes, didthe fore. He knew that the benefits conferred upon the not live up to the lesson of the master. For he fell intoChurch had aroused anti-clerical feelings dormant for the two traps of sentiment and arrogance,almost three-quarters of a century. He was aware that The enormous advantage of the dictator over his con-the neighboring states had long gone beyond Argentina stitutional rivals lies in his flexibility. Anything thatm their secular evolution: in Brazil, the church and state impedes his love for power, such as integrity or consist-had been,separated and secular education established as ency, is mere baggage to be dropped. As Napoleonlong ago as 1891; in Chile, the same events occurred in ^^id: "It was by becoming a Catholic that I ended the1925; and Uruguay was not only a secular state but had Vendee War. It was by becoming a Moslem that Isevered diplomatic relations with the Vatican over 30 established myself in Egypt, by becoming an ultramon-years ago. He could appeal to the right of free thought tane that I gained the priests of Italy. If I governed aand traditional liberalism. And if things were brought nation of Jews, I should re-establish the Temple ofto an impasse, he could always release the irreligious Solomon." The mind of the dictator must be divided indescamtsados to tear and ravage. . i . , . u ^ i . . i . i - i < - i

T , . , . ° „ - , watertight compartments; he must discard friends, reviseIn his megalomaniac surety, Peron foreot, however, •, , , f r , • • . ^ ,

that the support of the Church was the one element f . ' f^^ ""^ about-face as the situation requires. Thedividing his upper- and middle-class opposition. The '^'^^^^'^ sentimental attachment to ideas will bringvengeful aristocracy and the urban businessmen com- ^ ^ - ^ * ' intoxicated by success and the sycophany ofprising the Radical leadership were devoid of an issue ^ ^ followers, Peron confused the shadow of power withsince the social advances promulgated by the dictator. * ^ substance of those behind it. The historical functionThe oligarquia had lost control of the Army. But in of the right-wing dictator is to act as a lackey for theattacking the Church, Peron at last gave the opposition propertied and ecclesiastical elements of society; if, outa rallying cry stripped of sordid motive in the public eye; of sentimental hatred for priests or moral fervor to raisehe at last created an issue around which his opponents the plight of the masses, he turns against his masters, thecould coalesce. The faltering economic conditions and dictator has no one else to blame when they conspire topu bhc shock over concessions to foreign capital did the destroy their creation. The Army has guns and the

_. street mob only words; that is the ultimate difference theThe revolution of June 16 was a direct consequence, dictator must respond to. And if, as crisis approaches

It tailed, at least in its direct immediate purpose, because A *.u u \ i J i.u i. ^ ^L., A 1 J , • • r. A- . 1 r •,/• , ^^^ ^^ shaken leader threatens to arm the masses, itthe Army leadership in Buenos Aires stayed faithful to , , , • . - . . i i . . , • ,rits master would be a strange Army indeed which did not, in self

preservation, strike before its monopoly of strength wereendangered. As the incipient dictator must guard

The Begmnmg of the End against public compromises with the ruling class beforeBut the position of Juan Domingo Peron today is far attaining power, so must he as strongly guard against a

different than it was on that fateful moment of October sentimental refusal to make the necessary private com-17, 1945. For, whether he falls now or delays his promises later. If he mistakes demagogic rhetoric fordecline by tactical maneuvers, Peron is only sustained by acts and becomes hypnoti2ed by his own words, it willnegation, by fear of what might follow rather than be for him to accept the consequences. •